CRITIQUE OF SUÁREZ ON BEING (ENS)

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2018.

In the second disputation of his 1597 Disputationes metaphysicae,1 Francisco Suárez

(1548-1617) distinguishes between two meanings of the term ‘being.’ “In the first sense it is used
as a present participle to signify something actually existing or possessing a real act of existing.
In its second sense it is used as a noun to mean something with a real essence. By a real essence
Suarez means an object of thought that is not a pure construction of the mind (a fictional or
chimerical being), but one that is true because it can exist in the real world.

“‘Being’ taken as a participle and as a noun is equivalent to actual and possible being.
The only difference between the two uses of the term is that ‘being’ as a noun prescinds from
actual existence; that is to say, it neither excludes actual existence nor denies it, but merely
leaves it out of account. On the other hand, ‘being’ as a participle signifies being with both a real
essence and actual existence. There is only one concept of being common to both actual and
possible being. Actual being is but a limited case of possible being (it is actualized possible
being), as man is but a limited case of animal (he is a rational animal).”2

For the essentialist Suárez, the objective concept of being as a noun (ens ut nomen) is the
object of metaphysics3 (which is a striking departure from the realist actus essendi metaphysics
of St. Thomas Aquinas). He writes: “Being taken as a noun signifies that which has real essence,
prescinding from actual existence, not indeed excluding it or denying it but merely abstracting
from it.”4 For Suárez, “nella seconda ‘disputa’ l’oggetto della metafisica può venire dunque
definito come il ‘concetto obiettivo comune dell’ente in quanto nome.’”5 “…avanzata da
Suárez...il ‘concetto formale’ in quanto atto della mente e il ‘concetto obiettivo’ in quanto
oggetto immediatamente inteso con un tale atto, ovvero rappresentato mediante il primo. Dei
due, il concetto appropriato all’oggetto della metafisica sarà il secondo.”6 “Per concetto formale
Suarez intende l’atto mediante il quale l’intelletto coglie l’essere, mentre per concetto oggettivo
designa l’essere in quanto colto dall’intelletto. Orbene, a giudizio del filosofo, come unico è
l’atto che coglie l’essere, così pure unico ed univoco è il concetto oggettivo che ne consegue.
Questi, infatti, non è altro se non il risultato dell’opera di spogliamento, o di astrazione, che
l’intelletto opera nei confronti di tutti gli attributi specifici della realtà. È costituito, cioè, da quel
residuo che permane una volta che il reale è stato intellettualmente astratto da tutte le sue
specificazioni quidditative.”7 “In the philosophy of Suárez the new elements of the theory of
knowledge take on systematic consistency, while at the same time they reflect the issues of
Scholastics of modern times. Metaphysics, according to Suárez, is the study of being in general,
whose concept is formed through abstraction of all the matter and also abstracting from all
differences that distinguish concrete beings. Being is the essence that does not imply
1
F. SUÁREZ, Disputationes metaphysicae, 2, 4, 9, p. 90.
2
A. MAURER, Medieval Philosophy, Random House, New York, 1962, p. 358.
3
F. SUÁREZ, op. cit., 2, 4, 3.
4
F. SUÁREZ, op. cit., 2, 4, 9.
5
J. VILLAGRASA, Metafisica II, APRA, Rome, 2009, p. 87.
6
J. VILLAGRASA, op. cit., p. 85.
7
A. ALESSI, Sui sentieri dell’essere, LAS, Rome, 2004, p. 114.

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contradiction, while still not being pure fiction (quod in se nullam involvit repugnantiam, neque
est mere conficta per intellectum) – that is, the essence that can exist (quod produci potest, et
constitui in esse entis actualis, quae ex se apta ad esse, seu realiter existere).8 In other words, the
concept of being abstracts from the actual existence of objects (it is the possible being), even if at
the same time it is conceived of in function of the existence, since it is that which can exist or
exists in reality. Metaphysics, like every other science that proceeds necessarily from abstraction,
finds refuge in possibility, while concrete reality is seen as a modality or realization of the
possibility. The intelligible world of Platonism is now translated into the possible world
conceived in abstraction, and understood as the separation between essence and existence. To
think is the capacity to conceive of the essence of a thing, abstracting from its actual concrete
existence.

“For this reason it is also important to remember the distinction of Suárez between the
formal and objective concepts.9 The formal or subjective concept is the mental act of conceiving
a nature, while the objective concept is that which through that act is known (every individual
possesses his own formal concept, but the objective concept of many coincide, for example, if
everyone thinks of ‘2 plus 2’). The subjective concept is thinking, the objective concept is the
thought, that which presents itself to the subject: the object (a notion that will become
fundamental in modern philosophy). There immediately emerges the problem of the distinction
between the real thing and the objective concept: this latter, for some, is the reality itself of a
thing (it is seems strange to say that the thing is an objective concept); instead, if one says that
the objective concept is not the thing, but rather that which is thought of the thing, one could
perhaps conclude that the mind does not arrive at reality, but only at its mental representation.”10

Thus, the Suárezian essentialist metaphysics of the objective concept of being would not
anymore be the science of real being (ens reale in the Thomistic sense, dealing with extra-mental
beings or things having their respective acts of being [esse as actus essendi, the actuality of all
acts and the perfection of all perfections, De Potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9]) but rather a science of the
concept of being, a thought-of being, and metaphysics consequently would be about abstract
concepts, and this abstract essentialist metaphysics would then pave the way for the immanentist
essentialism of modern rationalism (e.g., Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff). “In realtà, la profonda
reinterpretazione dell’ente operata da Suárez ha la sua chiave di volta nella riduzione dell’ente
all’essenza e di questa al concetto. L’iter logico dell’interpretazione razionalista dell’ente
percorso da Suárez è più o meno il seguente:

“1. La ‘cosa reale’ è la realizzazione di una essenza-concetto, che deve precedere la cosa
reale. La precedenza del concetto sulla cosa è intesa al modo della possibilità logica, cioè al
modo dell’attitudine per l’esistenza. La possibilità, quindi, precede alla realtà; o in un altro
modo, il possibile è atto per essere realizzato, cioè per essere posto nell’esistenza.

“2. Se il rapporto di precedenza che intercorre fra il concetto e la cosa è lo stesso rapporto
che c’è tra il possibile e il reale attuale – perché il possibile è l’essenza e l’attuale è l’esistenza –
allora questa precedenza fra entrambi i principi esclude una simultanea compresenza nella

8
F. SUÁREZ, op. cit., 2, 4, 7.
9
Cf. F. SUÁREZ, op. cit., 2, 1, 1,
10
J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic and Gnoseology, Urbaniana University Press, Rome, 1987, pp. 148-149.

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composizione dell’ente finito. In questo modo, essenza (possibilità) ed esistenza (attualità) si
trasformano da principi in stati o modi di essere di una stessa cosa. Inoltre, nell’opinione di
Suárez, ambedue i principi si distinguono soltanto ad opera dell’intelletto, giacché l’unico
estremo reale in natura è l’esistenza, mentre l’essenza procede dalla considerazione del principio
fondante dell’ente facendo astrazione della sua attuale esistenza.

“3. Il razionalismo nasce, in ultima istanza, da un approccio formalista verso l’ente, nel
quale l’ente stesso viene a risolversi nel concetto, ormai vero centro metafisico dell’ente, in torno
al quale viene ad aggiungersi, al modo quasi di un’aggiunta accidentale, l’esistenza. Questa, a
sua volta, non sarebbe altro che la realizzazione fattuale del concetto, la sua posizione esteriore e
al di fuori del pensiero. Conseguentemente, l’essere fondamentale sarebbe l’essenza, poiché su di
essa dovrebbe poggiare necessariamente l’esistenza. E se l’essenza è un concetto oggettivo della
ragione, da ciò risulta che l’essere fondamentale ed assoluto è oggettività razionale.11 Ora questo
non è altro che il razionalismo, verso il quale Suárez ha indirizzato il timone nella sua
navigazione filosofica.”12

Giving a critique of Suárez’ essentialism as regards being (ens), Mariano Fazio and
Daniel Gamarra write: “Suárez definisce il concetto di essenza come ciò che di più radicale e
intimo c’è nella realtà. Allo stesso tempo, l’essenza è ciò che viene espresso nella definizione e
cioè l’insieme delle note costitutive della cosa. Secondo Suárez, l’essenza costituisce il nucleo
della realtà in quanto si tratta di un principio primo, ontologicamente anteriore all’essere stesso.
La risposta che darà alla questione della distinzione fra essenza ed essere dipende completamente
dalle caratteristiche ontologiche dell’essenza; infatti il problema di quella distinzione è una
conseguenza della riflessione sull’essenza.

“L’esistenza, come di solito si esprime Suárez per parlare dell’essere, è un qualcosa di

aggiunto all’essenza: una volta che questa è definita può esistere, in modo tale che l’esistenza è
esteriore all’essenza in se considerata. Così l’esistenza non influisce nella conoscenza
dell’essenza: cioè non aggiunge più realtà, più specificità alla cosa dal punto di vista essenziale;
se la realtà è ciò che viene espresso dalla definizione, ciò che veramente conta ordine alla sua
conoscenza è l’essenza, non l’esistere che non specifica assolutamente niente riguardo a ciò che
la cosa è. Poi c’è il fatto, secondo Suárez, che l’essenza è invariabile sia che essa di trovi nello
stato di esistenza sia che si trovi nello stato di possibilità. Infatti, fra l’essenza che realmente
esiste e quella solamente possibile non c’è differenza in quanto alla definizione: l’uomo possibile
e l’uomo reale hanno lo stesso concetto, la differenza è esistenziale ma non essenziale.

“Quindi, se l’essenza costituisce il nucleo della realtà, come deve essere questa essenza
affinché possa esistere? Anzi, perché può un’essenza esistere? La risposta riguarda il grado di
completezza dell’essenza. Questa diventa una condizione dell’esistenza in quanto l’essenza deve
essere in sé non contraddittoria, cioè deve esserci al suo interno una piena compatibilità fra le
note che la compongono. Se l’essenza è così strutturata, può esistere. Perciò la possibilità
intrinseca dell’essenza costituisce non soltanto la definizione della cosa, ma anche la condizione
dell’esistere della cosa. In questo modo Suárez include nel concetto di realtà anche la possibilità:
è reale ciò che è non-contraddittorio, cioè l’essenza possibile che rimane identica a se stessa

11
Cfr. X. ZUBIRI, Sobre la esencia, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1985, p. 62.
12
J. VILLAGRASA, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

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anche nel caso dell’esistente concreto giacché tutto ciò che viene ad essa aggiunto nell’esistenza
concreta, ha un carattere prettamente accidentale riguardo a ciò che l’essenza in se stessa è. Da
qui la distinzione fra realtà attuale e realtà possibile, che differiscono non per il contenuto
essenziale ma per il fatto di esistere, avendo presente che questo dipende dalla possibilità della
essenza.

“Il concetto di essere come concetto metafisico primo, e cioè quello attraverso cui la
realtà viene di solito definita e che costituisce a sua volta l’oggetto della metafisica, sarebbe
l’essenza dell’essere: cioè quella essenza prima e fondamentale, più generale e indeterminata,
che è anche la possibilità più ampia e generica. In questo senso Suárez interpreta l’oggetto della
metafisica in un modo diverso da quello della tradizione che gli serve di ispirazione. La
metafisica, secondo gli autori classici, ha come oggetto l’ens in quantum ens, l’ente in quanto
ente; ma se questo ente primo è l’essenza più generale non è certamente un ente esistente, ma
l’essenza più generale; perciò è anche il concetto più generale. Questo concetto generalissimo
che appare come l’oggetto proprio della metafisica è il concetto oggettivo di essere,
contraddistinto dal concetto formale che descrive piuttosto l’atto psicologico stesso di concepire
una cosa. Concetto oggettivo è invece ciò che viene conosciuto, cioè l’oggetto in quanto tale.

“La questione che a questo punto diventa molto problematica è che la metafisica non
avrebbe come oggetto l’essere reale ma un concetto di essere; è vero che il concetto oggettivo
non è l’atto psicologico di pensare, ma ciò che viene pensato; ma allo stesso tempo, ciò che viene
pensato non è indipendente dal pensare, e così l’essere non sarebbe l’essere reale ma l’essere
pensato e quindi la metafisica sarebbe scienza di un concetto, sapere di un concetto. La centralità
e la modalità con cui Suárez pone il tema dell’essenza con indipendenza dall’essere crea alla fine
una situazione in cui l’essenza viene definita come ciò che c’è di più reale, e questa realtà è a sua
volta una realtà costituita dalla non-contraddizione interna dell’essenza; cioè non interessa se
l’essenza è attuale (esistente) o possibile, ma soltanto che sia identica, che non include
contraddizione in sé. Ma questo è appunto identificare l’essenza con il suo concetto. Quindi se
l’essere è anche una essenza, anche se viene definito come l’essenza più generale, verrà anche
considerato prima come concetto non-contraddittorio, ma non come realtà in sé.

“Per questo cammino la metafisica di Suárez fa un passo decisivo verso il razionalismo

moderno, in cui le essenze avranno un posto ancor più radicale dal punto di vista sistematico,
mentre verrà sempre meno la considerazione metafisica dell’essere e dell’esistenza. Non è infatti
un caso che Leibniz abbia letto le Disputationes metaphysicae e si sia ispirato alla metafisica di
Suárez, o che la definizione di esistenza di Wolff abbia bisogno ancora del concetto di
possibilità.”13

Contrary to the metaphysics of essentialism, metaphysics is about the science of real

beings with their respective acts of being (esse as actus essendi), the act of being (esse) being the
actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections14; it is not about an analysis of the most
general notion of being (ens generalissimum), as many of the rationalist and essentialist-inspired
manuals of ‘ontology’ published over the course of hundreds of years would have us believe. “A

13
M. FAZIO and D. GAMARRA, Introduzione alla storia della filosofia moderna, Apollinare Studi, Rome, 1994,
pp. 33-36.
14
Cf. De Potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.

4
merely abstract and generic notion of being (ens) would exist in the minds of philosophers who
would deal with metaphysical realities as though they were logical concepts. Thus, according to
Scotus and Suárez, we first know individual existent beings through our intelligence, and then
we abstract their ‘common nature,’ thereby obtaining their essence. Finally, we arrive at a
supreme genus, which is most abstract and separate from experience, and this is supposed to be
being (ens). This was the notion of being (ens), whose content was no longer real being, but the
most general idea of being, inherited by rationalism. This explains why metaphysics, as
rationalism understood it, was prejudicially tagged as a science that has nothing to do with
experience and the real world.”15

Concerning Suárez’s essentialism, the Thomist Joseph M. De Torre writes: “According to

Suárez, the concept of being is the product of an abstraction, whereby the mind separates the
essence from the existence: this is the meaning of ens as a noun, whereas ens as a participle
corresponds to the act of existing. In the latter case, the concept of being is analogical, and here
Suárez agrees with St. Thomas; but in the former case it is univocal, and here Suárez joins Duns
Scotus. However, ens as a noun corresponds to the real essence, i.e., essence as non-
contradictory, or capable of existing in act, and that is the object of metaphysics, which Suárez
defines as ‘the science which looks at being as being, or in so far as it abstracts from matter as to
its being.’

“Consequently, it seems that, for Suárez, metaphysics is to reality what the abstract is to
the concrete. Being is conceived as essence. His conclusions could not be more opposed to those
of St. Thomas himself, although they could well be endorsed by most of the Thomists mentioned
earlier. His formalism or essentialism is much more thoroughgoing and consistent than even that
of Duns Scotus, and he definitely shifts the emphasis from God to man by focusing on the
concept of being (an idea in the human mind) rather than on reality as such outside man and
transcending him.

“Transition to Rationalism. ‘Essence’, for Suárez, is whatever can be conceived by the

human mind as an objective or logical (non-contradictory) possibility (as distinct from St.
Thomas’ real potentiality for being), and ‘subsistence’ is the ultimate determination of the
essence, which makes it capable of receiving existence.16

“Existence is thus one of the modes or states of the essence: possible (of reason) or actual
(existent). And so, in the actual existent there is no real distinction of essence and existence. This
makes the distinction between God and creatures appear more problematic. For Suarez, this
distinction consists in that in order that the created essence may pass from possible to actual it
needs the intervention of divine causality. This makes the creature’s dependence on God rather
extrinsic.

“…Due to the abstractive or essentialist approach of his metaphysics Suárez had a

profound impact on the Cartesian rationalists.17 One can appreciate Pope Leo XIII’s

15
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 30.
16
Cf. C. FABRO, Introducción al tomismo, Rialp, Madrid, 1967, pp. 95-97.
17
Cf. E. GILSON, Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1952, pp. 96-
120.

5
recommendation in his historic Encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879) on the restoration of Thomism
(reiterated by all popes ever since), to go to the primary sources, namely to the works of St.
Thomas himself, rather than to his commentators.”18

Concerning the anti-realist, essentialist conception of being by the rationalist Wolff, De

Torre observes the following: “Just as Spinoza had done, Wolff criticized Descartes for not
having defined the basic notions with enough precision, and turned to Suárez, whom he held in
unqualified esteem.19 Thus he amalgamated the essentialistic metaphysics of both Suárez and
Leibniz, following the Cartesian method of clear and distinct ideas with Spinozian rigor.

“For Wolff, the possible is identical with the thinkable (in Greek: noumenon), i.e., with
whatever human reason can think of as non-contradictory. The principle of contradiction is thus
conceived as a principle of thinking, and only by derivation a principle of being.20 Moreover, the
possible is identical with being (ens), which is simply ‘whatever can exist, and therefore that to
which existence is not repugnant,’21 which is the same as the essence pure and simple: ‘Essence
is the first thing we conceive about being…Without it, being cannot be.’22 ‘Activity follows the
essence.’23

“Thus the following equation is established: being = essence = possibility = the thinkable.
This is a far cry from the metaphysics of the act of being (esse). But it is the only metaphysics
known by subsequent philosophers, beginning with the empiricists and Kant,24 and somehow
adopted by not a few Scholastics ever since.25”26

Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write in their Metaphysics: “It would be incorrect to
consider being as a vague and indeterminate attribute which would belong to all things as their
least perfection. Some philosophers understood being as the poorest concept, as that which is left
after having set aside all the characteristics which differentiate things from one another. For
them, it would be the most abstract and empty notion, one which can be applied to everything
(maximum extension), because it has practically no content (minimum comprehension), and
indicates no more than the bare minimum that all things have in order to be real.

“This manner of looking at being is a logical approach rather than a metaphysical one,
and it impedes any understanding of esse as the act of things, possessed in a different way in
each one of them, and in the most perfect manner in God.

18
J. M. DE TORRE, The Humanism of Modern Philosophy, Southeast Asian Science Foundation, Manila, 1989, pp.
41-42.
19
C. FABRO, op. cit., p. 157; E. GILSON and T. LANGAN, Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant, Random
House, New York, 1964, p. 173.
20
For realistic metaphysics it is the other way round.
21
C. WOLFF, Ontologia, n. 134.
22
C. WOLFF, op. cit., n. 144.
23
C. WOLFF, op. cit., n. 169.
24
Cf. E. GILSON, Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1952, pp. 112-
121.
25
Cf. J. E. GURR, S.J., The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems, 1750-1900, Marquette
University Press, Milwaukee, 1959.
26
J. M. DE TORRE, op. cit., p. 74.

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 “This logical way of considering being was explicitly devised by rationalist philosophers,
particularly, Wolff and Leibniz. But even Scotus and Suárez had earlier regarded being (ens) as
the most indeterminate concept whose content is identified with the ‘possible essence.’ Thus,
they made being (ens) and essence identical, and regarded the essence as a neutral element with
respect to the act of being (esse), thus reducing essence to a simple ‘possibility of being.’
Pursuing this line of thought, Wolff defined being as ‘that which can exist, that is, that whose
existence is not contradictory (Wolff, Ontologia, 1736 ed., n. 134). He therefore divided being
(ens) into possible and actual; the primacy of being belongs to possible being, for actual being is
no more than the former’s ‘being put into act.’27

“One of the main deficiencies inherent in this position is the following: thought absorbs
or assimilates being (ens), since this extremely indeterminate notion of being exists only in the
human mind, as a result of logical abstraction. Therefore, it would not be a real being but a
conceptual being. In rationalism, ‘possibility’ is understood as the ‘non-contradictory’ character
of a notion, that is, ‘the possibility of being thought of or intellectually conceived.’”28

“To consider esse as existence is a logical consequence of identifying being (ens) with
possible essence, separated from the act of being. There arise two worlds, so to speak: the ideal
world made up of abstract essences or pure thought, and the world of realities enjoying factual
existence. The latter is no more than a copy of the former, since it does not add anything to the
ontological make-up of things. As Kant said, the notion of 100 real guilders does not in any way
differ from the notion of 100 merely possible guilders.29

“The distinction between ideal and abstract essence on one hand, and the real existence
on the other, has given rise to serious repercussions in many important philosophical questions.
In the domain of knowledge especially, this has led to the radical separation of human
intelligence from the senses: essence would be the object of pure thought, whereas factual
existence would constitute the object grasped by the senses (this gave rise to the equally wrong
extreme positions of rationalism and empiricism or positivism; in the case of Leibniz, it gave rise
to the opposition between ‘logical truths’ and ‘factual truths’).

“Another consequence of this view is the attempt to prove the existence of the First
Cause starting from the idea of God (ontologism): God would be the only essence which
includes existence among its attributes, and therefore, God should exist. This ‘proof’ ends up
with a God which exists only in the mind.”30

Gilson’s Critique of Suárez on Being (Ens)

Étienne Gilson critiques the essentialism of Suárez concerning being (ens) in his Being
and Some Philosophers (1952 second edition), writing: “Suárez had been teaching theology for
years, when, while he was engaged in writing out the substance of his lectures, it occurred to him

27
This division of being (ens) into ‘possible’ and ‘actual’ became widespread. It is still accepted by some
contemporary Thomist philosophers of ‘essentialist’ tendencies.
28
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 24.
29
Cf. I. KANT, ‘Critique of Pure Reason,’ B 628/A 600.
30
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

7
that, as a theologian, he had been constantly using philosophical principles without going to the
trouble of explaining them, at least to his own satisfaction. He then interrupted his theological
work for some time and wrote down the bulky philosophical interlude which bears the title
Metaphysical Debates (Metaphysicae Disputationes).

“These Metaphysicae Disputationes occupy a very peculiar place in the history of

philosophy. As disputationes, they still belong to the Middle Ages. Suárez has kept the
mediaeval habit of never settling a philosophical dispute without first relating, comparing and
criticizing the most famous opinions expressed by his predecessors on the difficulty at hand. On
the other hand, the Disputationes of Suárez already resemble a modern philosophical work, not
only in that they are purely philosophical in their content, but also because they break away from
the order, or disorder, of the Aristotelian Metaphysics. As Suárez himself says, not far from the
beginning of his book, the subject matter of the Disputationes is not the text of Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, but the very things (res ipsas) with which metaphysical knowledge is concerned.31

“Among those things the very first one is, of course, being. What is the meaning of that
word? We should first distinguish between being (ens) as a present participle and being as a
noun. Ens (being) is derived from sum (I am). Sum, as existing, is derived from I exist. As to sum
itself, it is a verb which always signifies actual existence and of which it can be said that it
always includes its own present participle. Sum (I am) always means sum ens (I am being), just
as quidam est (someone is) actually means quidam est ens (someone is being). This is why, in its
primary acceptation, the word ens (being) seems to have signified any thing that was endowed
with actual existence, that is, with that very existence which the verb sum (I am) signifies. Only,
owing to a spontaneous extension of this primary meaning, ens has later come to point out,
besides such subjects as actually possess existence, those that are merely capable of it.32 When
understood in this second sense, being (ens) becomes a noun which signifies what Suárez
himself calls a ‘real essence’ (essentia realis). By this formula, which still plays a very important
part in large sections of modern Scholasticism, Suárez means to designate such essences as are
not arbitrary products of thought, that is, such essences as are neither self-contradictory nor
chimerical nor fancied by some play of our imagination, but are true in themselves and thereby
susceptible of actual realization.33 In a doctrine in which the realness of essences is defined by
their fitness for existence, the Avicennian divorce between essence and existence needs no
longer to be feared. If essences are ‘real’ as aptae ad realiter existendum, the very nature of
possibility is the possibility to exist. Essentia therefore regains with Suárez its intrinsic relation
to esse. At least, it looks so; but we still have to ascertain up to what point it is really so.

“There is no reason to worry about this twofold meaning of the word ‘being.’ The fact
that it signifies at one and the same time both actual being and possible being does not make it an
equivocal term. For, indeed, the word ‘being’ does not signify two distinct concepts, that of
existent being and that of possible being. It does not even signify a common concept of being
wherein those two other ones would be included and, as it were, blended together. What we are

31
F. SUAREZ, Metaphysicae disputationes, disp. II, Prooemium, Coloniae, 1614, vol. 1, p. 31.
32
Ibid., II, 4, 3, p. 42A.
33
Ibid., II, 4, 4, p. 42F: “Si ens sumatur, prout est significatum hujus vocis in vi nominis sumplae, ejus ratio consistit
in hoc, quod sit habens essentiam realem, id est non fictam nec chymericam, sed veram et aptam ad realiter
existendum.” Cf. II, 4, 8, p. 43B.

8
now dealing with is a single concept, but taken in two different degrees of precision. And,
indeed, ‘used as noun, ens signifies what has a real essence (essentia realis), prescinding from
actual existence, that is to say, neither exclusing it nor denying it, but merely leaving it out of
account by mode of abstraction (praecisive tantum abstrahendo); on the contrary, taken as a
participle (namely, as a verb) ens signifies real being itself, that is, such a being as has both real
essence and actual existence, and, in this sense, it signifies being as more contracted.’34

“What Suárez means by this last expression is that actually existing being represents a
restricted area of being in general which, as has just been said, includes both possible and actual
being. This is a statement which necessarily implies that both possible and actual being are the
same being and, furthermore, that actual being is a particular case of being at large. Exactly:
actual being is being in general, taken in one of the cases when it actually exists.

“Such are the Suárezian data of the problem, and, since actuality is there posited as a
particular case of possibility, the Suárezian solution can easily be foreseen. We can at least
forsee that the nature of the ‘real essence’ is called upon to play a decisive part in determining
that solution. What is essence? It certainly does not come first in the order of origin. God alone
excepted, it is not in the essence of things that we can hope to discover the origin of their being.
On the other hand, in the order of dignity and of primacy, essence is certainly first among the
objects of the mind. For, indeed, the essence of a thing is what which belongs to that thing in the
very first place, and, consequently, it is what makes it to be, not only a being, but that very being
which it is.35 Inasmuch as it provides an answer to the question, ‘quid sit res? (What is the
thing?),’ essence assumes the name of ‘quiddity,’ that is, of ‘whatness’ (quid, meaning ‘what’).
Inasmuch as it is what actual existence confers upon actual being, it assumes the name of
‘essence’ (from esse: to be). Thus, real being is an essence actualized by its cause and drawn
from possibility to actuality. Lastly, inasmuch as essence is envisaged from the point of view of
its effects, it remains what it already was to Aristotle, namely, a ‘nature,’ that is, the innermost
principle of all its operations.36 Our own problem then becomes one of defining the relation of
such an essence to its existence, especially in the case of actually existing finite beings.

“…In so far as our own problem is concerned, Suárez observes that it has received three
different solutions. Either there is a real distinction between essence and existence, or there is a
modal distinction, or there is a mere distinction of reason. Some of his modern disciples do not
hesitate to maintain that Thomas Aquinas himself has never taught the real distinction of essence
and existence, but, in this at least, they are not good Suárezians, for Suárez himself asserts that
the real distinction ‘is commonly assumed to have been the opinion of St. Thomas, and almost all
the ancient Thomists have subscribed to it.’37 This last part of his statement is almost
tautological, since one can scarcely reject the actual distinction of essence and existence and yet
be a Thomist. I say ‘actual’ distinction, but Suárez himself says ‘real,’ and he means it. When
defining the Thomistic distinction of essence and existence, he does not use the words of Thomas
Aquinas, but those of Giles of Rome whose personal terminology had done much to obscure the

34
Ibid., II, 4, 8, p. 43B.
35
Ibid., II, 4, 14, p. 44EG.
36
Ibid., II, 4, 5, p. 42H.
37
Ibid., XXXI, 1, 3, p. 115G. Suárez here mentions Avicenna, Giles of Rome (latissime de ente et essentia),
Cajetan, etc.

9
genuine meaning of the doctrine. According to its supporters, Suárez says, the real distinction of
essence and existence means that ‘existence is a certain thing wholly and really distinct from the
entity of created essence.’38 Without unduly pressing the fact, one may well wonder if this detail
has not had something to do with Suárez’ own ultimate decision.

“In point of fact, his whole discussion of the Thomistic distinction of essence and
existence revolves around this difficulty: it cannot be said of the created essence, once it is
posited in act out of its causes, that it still is distinct from its existence, ‘as if essence and
existence were two distinct entities, two distinct things: ita ut sint duae res seu duae entitates
distinctae.’39 And, indeed, if this is the correct formula of the problem, all that Suárez can do is
to answer no, because, as both Aristotle and Averroes agree in saying, there is no difference
whatsoever between ‘being man’ and ‘man.’ Of course, in a purely philosophical question such
as this, Aristotle and Averroes were bound to weigh more in the mind of Suárez than Avicenna
and Thomas Aquinas, but he had his own personal reason for making such a choice. And that
reason was such that it requires careful consideration for the light it sheds on the true nature of
our problem.

“At first sight the endless controversies between supporters and opponents of the
distinction between essence and existence have the appearance of a purely dialectical game, with
each party trying to prove to the other that he is making some logical mistake and to show him
where he is doing it. Even today, adversaries who come to grips on this problem are still trying to
catch each other in the very act of committing some logical blunder. This is to forget that, in so
far as logic is concerned, one may be faultlessly wrong as well as faultlessly right. No
philosopher can expect a fellow philosopher to draw from being, through logic alone, more than
his philosophy puts into it.

“Now, I have often thought that the endless debate between Thomists and Suárezians,
when it is more than a mere juggling of texts, is partly obscured by that illusion. Much more than
dialectical arguments, what matters here is the notion of being. What does Suárez call being? If it
is really actual being, then it is that being which belongs to an essence when, once a mere
possible, it has become actual owing to the efficacy of its causes. It then enjoys the being of
actual essence (esse actualis essentiae). Having said this, Suárez asks himself whether, in order
to be actually, such a being as that of actual essence still requires the supplement which Thomists
call existence. And, of course, his answer is, no. Let us posit any essence whatever, for instance,
‘man.’ Since it is not contradictory nor fancied by imagination, it is a ‘real essence.’ Again, it is a
real essence because it is, if not actual, at least possible. If it is only possible, it still lacks
actuality, and consequently it does not exist; but, if it is an actual possible, that is, if that essence
has the being of an ‘actual essence,’ what could it still lack in order to exist? Nothing. Essence
can be but actual or possible, and the only difference between these two conditions is that what is
actual is, whereas what is only possible is not. To say that an essence is a true actual being
(verum actuale ens) is therefore to say that such an essence actually is, or exists.

“What is going on in the mind of Suárez seems pretty clear. He begins by identifying
being with essence. Accordingly, he conceives all actual beings as simply many fully actualized

38
Ibid., XXXI, 1, 3, p. 115G. Cf. “nam si essentia et existentia sunt res diversae…” XXXI, 3, 7, p. 120C.
39
Ibid., XXXI, 6, 1, p. 124B.

10
essences. He then wonders what actual existence could well add to an already existing being.
The question is the more absurd as, from the very definition of its terms, existence itself is here
conceived as a thing, as that, in order to exist, an already existing thing should include, over and
above what it is, another thing. All this does not make sense, it is no wonder that Suárez parted
company with Thomas Aquinas on this most fundamental of all philosophical problems.

“But let us look more closely at his own position. Like all philosophers, and, I suppose,
like practically all men who understand the meaning of those terms, Suárez realizes that what
makes an actual essence to be different from a merely possible one is existence. Like all
Christian philosophers, Suárez moreover admits, and indeed expressly teaches, that no finite
essence exists out of itself but owes its existence to the divine act of creation. Existence then is to
him, as he readily acknowledges that it is to all men, the supreme mark of reality. He accordingly
declares that existence is a formal and intrinsic constituent of reality properly so called.
‘Existence,’ Suárez says, ‘is that whereby, formally and intrinsically, a thing is actually existing’;
whereupon he adds that ‘although existence be not a formal cause strictly and properly said, it
nevertheless is an intrinsic and formal constituent of what it constitutes.’40 Obviously, Suárez is
not existence-blind. He knows that real things do exist; what he does not know is where
existence can fit in such a philosophical interpretation of reality as his own is.

“The very example offered by Suárez in support of his statement is enough to arouse
suspicion. Existence, he says, is a formal constituent of actual essence, as personality is a formal
and intrinsic constituent of the person. If this is really what he means, it is no wonder that he
refuses to consider existence as a truly formal cause; for, indeed, personality is not a cause of the
person in any sense of the word. There is not a person where there is personality; there is
personality where there is a person. So, too, existence is not the formal cause whereby an
existent actually exists, rather, existence is the property of actually given existents. What puzzles
Suárez at this juncture is, that existence seems to add so much to essence, and yet is itself
nothing. Here is a possible essence, then God creates it; what has God created? Obviously, God
has created that essence. And, as we already know, for that essence to be actualized by God and
to exist are one and the same thing. What Suárez fails to see, unless, perhaps, his adversary is
himself suffering from double vision, is that, when God creates an essence, He does not give it
its actuality of essence, which any possible essence enjoys in its own right; what God gives it is
another actuality, which is that of existence. Taken in itself, the essence of man is fully actual
qua essence. For a theologian like Suárez, the ‘real essence’ of the humblest possible being must
needs be eternally and eternally completely determined in the mind of God, so that it can lack no
actuality qua essence. What it is still lacking is existence. Creation thus does not actualize the
essentiality of the essence, but it actualizes that essence in another order than that of essence, by
granting it existence. Now, this is precisely what the philosophical essentialism of Suárez forbids
him to see. ‘Ens actu,’ Suarez says, ‘idem est quod existens: A being in act is an existing
being.’41 True, but the whole question is to know if a being in act is but its own essence, which is
an entirely different proposition. In a mind, an essence is in act through the existence of that
mind; in a thing, an essence is in act through the existence of that thing. In no case is it true to
say that an essence is in act through its actualization qua essence. Yet, this is what Suárez

40
Ibid., XXXI, 5, 1, p. 122.
41
Ibid., XXXI, 1, 13, p. 117.

11
forcefully asserts, and this is why he finally decides that between an actualized essence and its
existence there is no real distinction, but a mere distinction of reason (Ibid.).

“It is noteworthy that Suárez is here going even beyond Duns Scotus in his reduction of
being to essentiality. We have seen how thin the distinction between essence and its existential
modality was in the doctrine of Duns Scotus. Yet, Suárez considers the Scotists to be so many
supporters of some sort of real distinction, because, like Avicenna, they make existence an
appendix of the essence. To him, this is still too much. According to Suárez, it is the same for an
essence to be in actu exercito, that is, actually to exercise its act of essence, and to exist. Of
course, we can think of the essence as not yet exercising its act; then it is a pure abstraction of the
mind; and it is true that we can thus abstractly distinguish an existing essence from its existence,
but this mental distinction does not affect the thing itself. Between actual existence and an actual,
existing essence, there really is no distinction.

“I wish I knew of a way to make clear what Suárez says, without myself saying what I
think he does not see, but we are now reaching absolutely primitive positions and, so to speak,
primitive philosophical options. To contrast them is the best way to realize their true import.
Besides, this is what Suárez himself does when he dares the supporters of the distinction of
essence and existence to define its meaning.

“First, Suárez says, what can the proposition, ‘an essence is,’ mean, unless it means that
that essence exists? If a man says that a thing is, he thereby thinks that that thing exists. Now, to
what can the word ‘exists’ apply in such a case, if not to the thing itself? It does not apply to
existence, for, when I say: this rose exists, I am not saying that its existence itself exists. Then it
must needs apply to the essence; now, if it does, it necessarily means that the essence of the rose
no longer is a mere possible, but has become an actual being. In short, there now ‘is a rose,’ and,
if its essence now is, what can it still lack in order to exist? Such is the first argument of Suárez,
and it is, as he himself says, an a priori argument. What it proves for us is at least this, that in his
own notion of being Suárez has no room for existence as such. The whole question is to know if
the actuality of the ‘real essence’ does not require an existential act in order to become an
existential actuality; but this is a point which Suárez cannot see, because essence is for him
identical with being.

“His second argument, which he introduces tam simpliciter quam ad hominem, aims to
prove that the reasons why his adversaries posit the distinction of essence and existence are
futile, since the being of the real essence, such as he himself understands it, already exhibits all
the properties which they ascribe to existence. Now, the reasons which he refutes are actually
foreign to the problem at hand. For instance, Suárez shows that the distinction of essence and
existence is not necessarily required to save the distinction between the Creator and His
creatures, which is true. If created beings were nothing but essences actualized qua essences,
they still would be creatures. But this is irrelevant to the question. The real question is to know
what the metaphysical structure of concrete being is; when we know what it is, whatever it may
be, then we will know what sort of a being God has actually created. What is noteworthy,
however, in this objection of Suárez is his remark that he himself does not ascribe an eternal
being to possible essences, since, as mere possibles, they are nothing real. I cannot help
wondering how he himself has not seen what followed from this obvious truth for his own

12
doctrine. If, out of itself, an essence is a mere possible, and if a mere possible is nothing, what
will be the result of its actualization? Nothing. This existential nothingness of the possible
essence is precisely what compels us to look outside the order of essence for an intrinsic cause of
its actual reality.

“My opponents, Suárez goes on to say, assert that existence belongs to finite essences in
a contingent way only, and that, consequently, essence is really distinct from existence. Now, the
actualized essence would be just as contingent, since the cause of its actualization would still be
God. Hence the contingency of created beings can be saved without resorting to the distinction of
essence and existence. And there again Suárez is right. No one pretends that, if being is what he
says, the contingency of finite being would not be safe. But, once more, that is not at all the
question. The point which Suárez is trying to make is this. If you reject my doctrine of being
because it cannot answer these two last difficulties, you are wrong, because my actualized
essence answers them as well as your being of existence.42 And Suárez is still right: his possible
essences are not eternal beings, and his actualized essences are truly created beings. But the
question at stake is to know, of these two possible notions of created being, which is true and
which is not. Equally acceptable to Christian theologians, they can nevertheless both be
philosophically wrong, but they cannot both be philosophically true.

“There would be no point in protracting a discussion which is obviously marking time. It

now resembles one of those conversations in which one man says to another: ‘Don’t you see it?’
‘No.’ ‘Well, have a better look. Do you see it now?’ ‘No.’ Then what? All that is left to do is for
the man who thinks he sees to account for the fact that the other does not. And this is just what
we are now trying to do. We are not refuting Suárez, but giving an intelligible account of his own
position of the question. His complete intellectual honesty is beyond even the shadow of a
suspicion; he is absolutely sure he is right, and he clearly sees why his adversaries are wrong,
which makes him doubly sure he is right. Their fundamental mistake, Suárez says, is that they
are begging the question.43 When he asks them: ‘How can you know what existence is?’ they
answer by positing the distinction of essence and existence as a condition for such knowledge.
But how can we distinguish essence from existence, unless we already know what existence is?

“This last argument probably is the most enlightening of all, in so far as the personal
position of Suárez is concerned. What he would like to know is quid existentia sit: what is
existence, as if existence could be a what. Having himself identified being with its essence, he
could not possibly find in it an is which, if it is, is neither an essence nor a thing. This is why
Suárez does not know existence when he sees it. Hence his strange metaphysical notion of being.
If we take an essence, Suárez says, ‘abstractly conceived and precisely in itself, that is, as being
in potency, it is distinguished from actual existence as non-being is distinguished from being.’44
In his doctrine, the actualization of non-being as such is the very origin and philosophical
explanation of being.

“The influence of Suárez on the development of modern metaphysics has been much
deeper and wider than is commonly known. It has naturally reached in the first place those

42
Ibid., XXXI, 4, 4, p. 121CF.
43
Ibid., XXXI, 4, 5, p. 121A.
44
Ibid., XXXI, 1, 13, p. 117.

13
seventeenth-century scholastic philosophers who find very few readers today, yet have
themselves exerted a perceptible influence on the development of metaphysical thought. Through
them, Suárez has become responsible for the spreading of a metaphysics of essences which
makes profession of disregarding existences as irrelevant to its own object. This is the more
remarkable as, after all, Suárez himself had never discarded existences as irrelevant to
metaphysical speculation; but he had identified existences with actual essences, so that his
disciples were quite excusable in ruling existence out of metaphysics.

“This is what they were still doing yesterday and what they are still doing today. ‘Real
being’ is to them the proper object of metaphysics, but, if you ask one of them, Kleutgen, for
instance, what ens reale means for him, he will tell you, with explicit reference to the authority
of Suárez, that it means exactly the same thing as ens, not, however, ens as a present participle of
the verb esse, but as the noun which derives from it. Ens, then signifies something that has an
essence and is therefore a being. As to the essence itself, it is a ‘real essence,’ that is to say, ‘the
root, or the innermost bottom and the first principle of all the activity as well as of all the
properties of the things;’ in short, it is what ‘is most excellent in things and what grants to our
whole knowledge of things both its basis and its perfection.’ And, as if afraid of not being
understood, Kleutgen goes on to say: ‘It follows from the preceding considerations that, among
the Scholastics, the real is not confused with what is actual or existing, nor is it opposed to the
possible. The real may be possible as well as existing;’ and this, Kleutgen adds, ‘is what Suárez
had expressly stated.’ God save us from our disciples, for, even though this be more or less what
Suárez had said, he had at least common sense enough not to say it in that way. But nothing
could stop Kleutgen; he not only says it, he emphasizes it: ‘When we conceive a being as real,
we do not think of it as merely possible, by excluding existence, nor yet do we think of it as
existing, but we leave existence out of consideration.’ Whereupon he triumphantly concludes:
‘Thus, and only thus, can those finite and created things, to which existence is not essential,
become objects of science.’45

“There is a weird beauty in the perfect self-consistency of philosophical principles.

Unless he live under some sort of metaphysical spell, how could a man write such things? The
possible is here just as real as the actual, which means that possible reality is just as actual as
actual reality. When we think of a being as real, we do not think of it as existing, and we do not
even think of it as merely possible, because, in order to think of it as possible, we should have to
exclude existence, a thing not to be mentioned in metaphysics. A metaphysician should never
pollute his mind with the impure thought of existence, not even to exclude it! Last, but not least,
the first and most necessary condition for things to become objects of scientific knowledge is to
be purified of the slightest trace of existence. A perfect case of conceptual imperialism, if there
ever was one! And all this owing to Avicenna, who begot Scotus, who begot Suárez, who begot
Kleutgen; and the list still remains open.

“But the main responsibility for this strange metaphysical adventure might well not be
Avicenna. The rebellion of human reason against what of reality remains impervious to its
abstract concepts has probably more to do with it than any single philosopher we might quote.

45
J. KLEUTGEN, La Philosophie scholastique, vol. II, pp. 89-92, as quoted in P. DESCOQS, Institutiones
metaphysicae generalis, Eléments d’ontologie, G. Beauchesne, Paris, 1925, vol. 1, pp. 100-101. P. Descoqs himself
fully agrees with both Kleutgen and Suarez.

14
For reason has only one means to account for what does not come from itself, E. Meyerson says,
and it is to reduce it to nothingness.46 This is what essentialism, at least, has done on an
exceptionally large scale, by reducing to nothingness the very act in virtue of which being
actually is.”47

Jolivet’s Critique of Suárez (and Scotus) on Being (Ens)

“L’essere secondo Scoto e Suarez

“1. Teoria di Duns Scoto - Scoto ritiene che l’oggetto proprio dell’intelligenza umana sia,
non la quiddità delle cose sensibili, ma l’essere (ens), altrimenti, egli dice, la nostra conoscenza
sarebbe limitata alla fisica; la metafisica, che è scienza, non del sensibile, ma dell’essere come
tale, sarebbe impossibile. Il ragionamento di Scoto sarebbe invincibile se di fatto non avessimo,
come vedremo più avanti, la via dell’analogia, che ci permette di passare dall’essere sensibile
alle nozioni metafisiche e alla nozione proporzionalmente una (e universale) dell’essere.
Sennonché Scoto appunto crede che la metafisica non possa contentarsi di un oggetto
proporzionalmente uno; cioè analogo, esigendo, per costituirsi validamente, un oggetto univoco:
se l’essere, egli osserva, non è strettamente uno, non v’è più unità nella mia conoscenza, né
certezza nel mio sapere. (Cfr. Op. oxoniense, I, dist. 3, q. 3, n. 3, in ed. Vivès, 23 voll., Parigi,
1891-1895, vol. VIII), In quanto univoca, la nozione di essere può designare soltanto un concetto
indeterminato, poiché significa qualcosa di determinabile, cioè il puro soggetto stesso
dell’esistenza, considerato astrattamente, senza alcuna determinazione oggettiva.

“Questo concetto è assolutamente semplice, in quanto non è scomponibile; esso è il solo

che possa essere concepito senza ricorrere ad alcun altro, mentre tutti gli altri concetti non sono
intelligibili che per scomposizione nei loro elementi (uomo = animale ragionevole; animale =
vivente sensibile, ecc.). Da ciò consegue, aggiunge Scoto, che l’idea di essere è assolutamente
prima e ch’essa servirà dunque a spiegar tutto, senza poter essere essa stessa spiegata da
alcunché di anteriore ad essa.48

“2. Teoria di Suarez - Per Suarez, come per Scoto e san Tommaso, l’essere come tale è
l’oggetto proprio della metafisica. Per sapere ciò che è l’essere come tale, conviene, egli dice,
distinguere il concetto formale (atto mediante il quale io concepisco una cosa) e il concetto
oggettivo (la cosa stessa in quanto concepita e rappresentata). Proprio il concetto oggettivo di
essere è l’oggetto della metafisica. Ma per coglierne la natura, si può partire dal concetto formale
e domandarsi se il concetto formale di essere è realmente uno, comune a tutto ciò che è, e
distinto, per conseguenza da tutti gli altri concetti. A questa questione, Suarez risponde
affermativamente49: questo concetto non comporta infatti in se stesso alcuna composizione né
determinazione: esso è uno perché è assolutamente semplice.

46
E. MEYERSON, La Déduction relativiste, p. 258, art. 186.
47
É. GILSON, Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1952, pp. 96-107.
48
Cfr. D. SCOTO, Op. oxon., ed. Wadding, Lione, 1639; rist. in ed. Vivés, Parigi, 1891-95, I, Dist. 3, q. 3, n. 6.
49
F. SUAREZ, Disputationes Metaphysicae, in ed. Vivés, 28 voll., Parigi, 1856-61, Disp. I, Sect. I, n. 9: “Dicendum
est conceptum formalem proprium et adaequatum entis ut sic, esse unum, re et ratione praecisum ab aliis
conceptibus formalibus aliarum rerum et objectorum…Hinc etiam conceptus entis, non solum unus, sed etiam
simplicissimus dici solet, ita ut ad eum fiat ultima resolutio caeterorum, per alios enim conceptus concipimus tale
vel tale ens; per hunc autem praescindimus omnem compositionem et determinationem; unde hic conceptus dici

15
 “Ma, oggettivamente, come stanno le cose? Al concetto formale corrisponde un concetto
oggettivo egualmente uno? Bisogna ben ammetterlo, dice Suarez, poiché l’unità del concetto
formale risulta dall’unità dell’oggetto. Tuttavia, gli enti sono diversi: è dunque necessario
conciliare l’unità e la diversità. Per questo, Suarez esclude l’unità proporzionale tomistica e
ammette che l’unità è opera dello spirito, mentre la diversità è reale. In altri termini, l’essere,
oggetto della metafisica (concetto oggettivo), significa ciò che ha qualche realtà, ciò che è
qualche cosa e che fa astrazione da ogni esistenza, reale o possibile, senza affermarla né
negarla. L’essere così concepito è realmente universale e uno di una unità logica. Si tratta, per il
pensiero che vi si fonda, di farlo uscire dalla sua indeterminazione: il processo al quale esso
ricorre per ottenere ciò consiste nell’usare un procedimento inverso a quello che ha formato, per
astrazione, il concetto oggettivo dell’essere, cioè nel restituirgli il suo carattere concreto
mediante la considerazione degli inferiori o realtà diverse da cui è stato tratto.50

“3. Osservazioni.

“a) Punti comuni alle due teorie. Non possiamo entrare nella discussione
particolareggiata di queste teorie. Tuttavia bisogna mettere in rilievo alcuni punti essenziali.
Anzitutto si sarà potuta notare la rassomiglianza fondamentale delle teorie scotista e suareziana,
fondate l’una e l’altra, non soltanto sulla distinzione (che è evidente), ma sull’opposizione del
reale e dell’idea. D’altra parte, Suarez come Scoto, propongono di ridurre il concetto di essere al
senso negativo di «ciò che esclude il nulla» o di «ciò che non è nulla» e questa concezione di un
essere perfettamente indeterminato procede nei due casi dall’analisi formale dei concetti, che
non può infatti condurre a un’altra nozione. Così, nelle due dottrine, l’essere non può essere
affermato per cose diverse se non si astrae dalle loro diversità, poiché esso non include né
esclude queste diversità: in altri termini, la trascendenza dell’essere deriva dalla sua perfetta
indeterminazione. Infine, tanto per Suarez quanto per Scoto, quando bisognerà pervenire alle
determinazioni dell’essere come tale, nessuna analisi del concetto di essere sarà utilizzabile,
poiché il concetto di essere è uno solo negativamente: è impossibile scoprirvi, anche
potenzialmente, alcuna determinazione. Non v'è dunque altro ricorso possibile che l’appello
all’esperienza.51

“La radice comune di queste due teorie dell’essere risiede nel concettualismo (o
nominalismo moderato) di Scoto e di Suarez. L’uno e l’altro, infatti, sembrano ammettere che il
concetto oggettivo non si identifichi con la cosa extramentale, tesi che ci allontana
definitivamente dalla concezione tomistica (104). Questo concettualismo conduce Scoto,

etiam solet ex se esse primus qui ab homine formatur, quia, caeteris paribus, facilius de quacumque re concipi
potest, quae omnia tradit S. Thomas.”
50
F. SUAREZ, Disp. Met., ed cit., Disp. II, Sect. 6; n. 10: «Potest abstrahi conceptus entis per solam praecisionem
intellectus, quae non consistat quasi in separatione unius ab alio, scilicet formalis a materiali vel materialis a formali,
ut fit in abstractione generis a differentia; sed quae consistat in cognitione aliquo modo confusa, qua consideratur
objectum non distincte et determinate prout est in re secundum aliquam similitudinem vel convenientiam quam cum
aliis habet: quae convenientia in ordine ad conceptum entis est in rebus secundum totas entitates et modos reales
earum et ideo confusio seu praecisio talis conceptus non est per separationem praecisivam unius gradus ab alio, sed
solum per cognitionem praecisivam conceptus confusi a distincto et determinato... Determinatio ad inferiora genera
solum esse potest per simplicem conceptum magis expressum et determinatum, quia contractio debet proportionate
respondere abstractioni et expressio seu determinatio praecisioni».
51
Cfr. A. MARC, L'idée de l'être chez saint Thomas et dans la Scolastique postérieure («Archives de Philosophie»,
t. X, Parigi, 1933, pp. 47-49).

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seguendo una logica che noi abbiamo spesso sottolineata (e che si ritrova nella teoria delle
distinzioni cartesiane) a un realismo eccessivo. Suarez, il quale professa che l’universale
metafisico (o universale diretto) non è la natura reale stessa, ma la rappresentazione intenzionale
di quella natura, procede nel medesimo senso di Scoto.52 Il punto fondamentale qui sta dunque
nel fatto che gioca una teoria dell’astrazione del tutto differente da quella di san Tommaso.
Abbiamo visto che l’astrazione la quale specifica le diverse scienze è, per san Tommaso,
l’astrazione formale, cioè quella che astrae la forma dalla materia. Per Scoto e Suarez, al
contrario, l’astrazione è ciò che abbiamo chiamata l’astrazione estensiva (abstractio totalis), cioè
quella che astrae il tutto potenziale dai suoi inferiori (151). L’essere, da questo punto di vista,
non essendo più che una cornice vuota, non può essere oggetto di scienza, in ragione della sua
indeterminazione assoluta.”53

52
Cfr. la nostra Notion de Substance, Parigi, 1929, pp. 95-111.
53
R. JOLIVET, Trattato di filosofia, vol. 4 (Metafisica II), Morcelliana, Brescia, 1960, nos. 160-162.

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