Bangot, Christopher John

BP Amoco Polymer Plant Incident (2001)

I. Incident Background
a. Company Profile
BP Amoco Polymers, Inc.
BP Amoco Polymers Inc. is a subsidiary of BP PLC, a British corporation, where its main
line of business is in petrochemicals. With its merger with Amoco Corporation of the United
Stated in 1998, BP and Amoco became the largest oil company. With the company’s
integrated oil and gas services it expanded its business area. This includes development and
production of essential sources of energy, production of useful and diverse products such as
paints, packaging, chemicals etc. This led to various subsidiaries to the corporation, including
BP Amoco Polymers Inc. which was focused on the manufacture of plastics and synthetic
fibers. Other associated companies continued in fields which were related to petroleum and
petrochemicals such as in exploration, production, refining, transportation of oil and natural
gas whilst other manufacture its chemical derivatives [1] [2].
b. Incident Description
Three people were killed on March 12, 2001 in the facility of BP Amoco Polymers in
Augusta, Georgia. This occurred as the personnel tried to clean a vessel which contained hot
polymer mass inside. They were also unaware that the vessel was pressurized as they had
done the task. After partially unbolting the side cover of the vessel, it blew off and had impact
to the workers, killing them. As the cover blew out, hot prepolymer mass also spewed out the
vessel. There was also damage to pipes as the vessel was moved backward because of the
pressure release. The tubing was for hot fluids used in the plant and when came contact with
the hot prepolymer mass, ignited and causing a fire [3].
II. Analysis
a. Detailed Incident Report
BP Amoco’s main product, Amodel polymer, was the one involved in the incident
during its processing. Polymers are chainlike molecules that are synthesized from existing
identical molecules called monomers. At least five or more of these monomers are linked
together to form a polymer molecule, some of which may reach even hundreds or thousands.
In the process of polymerization, water is formed as a by-product [4].
NORMAL PROCESS
The Amodel polymer is synthesized by the equilibrium reaction shown below. An
aliphatic di-amine is reacted with aromatic and aliphatic di-carboxylic acid. Amodel is also
known as a polythalamide nylon. After the two components are dissolved and heated, with the use
of a catalyst, the raw materials form a long molecular chain and water.

Di-amine + Di-carboxylic acid + Catalyst ⇔ Polymer chain + Water

As the process is occurring, the reaction is slightly releasing heat but is offset by the by-
product water since the process is done in high temperatures and it absorbs some the heat
released, thus converting it to steam. Over-all with the consideration of vaporizing the water
during the process, the reaction is slightly endothermic or absorbs some amounts of energy
[3].
Initially, the raw material that are used in the production of polymers are solid in
ambient temperatures thus the first step is to dissolve them, producing a mixture of a salt
solution with the raw materials. Then it is fed to a pressurized pre-reaction chamber wherein
temperature is increased to ranges of 190 to 230C. At this stage, the reaction partially
proceeds forming a prepolymers, an unfinished form of polymers. A high-pressure pump
sends the prepolymer to a preheater where temperatures are again increased to ranges of
290 to 340C. At lower reaction temperatures, the number of branches for crosslinking to
create polymers from monomers is lower thus, a need for it to be reacted at higher
temperatures [5]. The increased temperature causes the reaction to proceed further, creating
more linkages and forming polymer products of specific molecular weights. The product is
then passed through an orifice where this causes a decrease in pressure from the preheater,
making water to vaporize directly into steam, separating it from the processed prepolymer
solution. The dispersed prepolymer and steam stream is fed into a tubular reactor, where
again the temperature is increased further.
The prepolymer fluid’s residence time in the reactor less than a minute and is 80%
complete as it exits it. To finish the process, an extruder is used to finish the reaction by
simultaneously heating, kneading and pumping the polymer to form the final product with
the desired molecular weight. The produced polymers are then pelletized, cooled, stored
afterwards.
During startup and shutdown of the process, a mechanical difficulty with the extruder
is encountered by operators. To address this, the effluent prepolymer stream from the
reactor is stored in a large 750-gallon polymer “catch” tank. The tank is a horizontal cylindrical
steel vessel with covers bolted on its side. The polymer catch tank is represented below where
it also has an inlet and outlet stream controlled by valves, two drainpipes with valves, a relief
valve and inlet for water and nitrogen gas.
The entering stream to the polymer catches tank is a mass of hot prepolymer material
which was heated prior from the reactor. The vessel has no means of controlling the heat
within it since there is no connected cooling jacket. The rate of how long the fed material will
cool depends on how much hot prepolymer mass is present and ambient conditions.
Again, the polymer catch tank is only used during the start-up and shutdown phases
in the process. During start-up, typically the effluent from the reactor is initially fed to the
polymer catch tank for about 50 minutes then the stream is diverted from the reactor to the
extruder. As the prepolymer mass is inside the tank, it often cools and solidifies. On the other
hand, during shutdown as the inflow of raw material is cut, a solvent is used to dissolve the
prepolymer that may be remaining up to the reactor and in the piping. As the solvent is fed
and until it is detected from the extruder, the flow of prepolymer material is then diverted to
the polymer catch tank. The solvent will not mix with the prepolymer mass entering the vessel
because of reduced pressure, it would easily vaporize thus a separation and leaves the tank
by a vent line. To complete the shutdown, the set-up is then flushed with water and steam,
removing any prepolymer and heat that might still be present in the tank. The accumulated
mass in the polymer catch tank is then pulled out then disposed. Comparing the amount of
entering material to the polymer catch tank, the one during start-up contributes to a much
larger mass to enter the tank than the shutdown.
INCIDENT
A week prior to the incident on, March 10, 2001, Saturday, the unit where Amodel is
processed was used and was still operating normally except during its shutdown. An
equipment failure for the extruder was identified by maintenance and a restart was scheduled
the following week, March 12. As with the normal procedures for start-up and shutdown, the
polymer catch tank was used to contain any remaining prepolymer material after shutdown
and was cleaned afterwards. The vessel was reported to be in good condition, then closed
and rebolted.
On the day of March 12, operators attempted start-up procedures for the Amodel
unit, and the polymer catch tank was also recently cleaned. Prior to this, the problem with
regards to the extruder was addressed by running the solvent used to clean the equipment
to help clean it in the inside for any remaining polymer material residues. The lead operator
and his respective supervisor both agreed to this during the attempted start-up. However,
the personnel present did not do the standard pre-run step on the extruder as part of the
normal start-up procedures. To pre-run an equipment prior to operation is the responsibility
of an operator to check as it is to ensure that no problem is with the equipment, completing
the task at hand safely and without delay [6].
It was supposed to be pre-run for one to two minutes to verify if it was working just
fine but instead skipped this part. Raw material was then fed to the reaction unit, and as with
normal start-up procedures, the exiting stream of prepolymer material from the reaction unit
was to be diverted to the prepolymer catch tank for about 50 minutes.
It was approximately 45 minutes after the prepolymer material was diverted to the
catch vessel that the operator attempted to start the extruder. Unfortunately, the extruder
did not function as it was expected since its screws would not turn. Supervisors were notified
of the issues of the extruder and maintenance was also called to assist. Personnel tried to
troubleshoot the problem with the extruder and had several attempts in resolving it but was
unsuccessful. This spanned for about 25 minutes and an abort start-up was advised by the
supervisors. In the span of time during the workers tried to fix the extruder, the polymer catch
tank continued to receive prepolymer material from the reaction unit.
Since start-up was aborted and the extruder did not function, basically all the raw
material that was fed in the reaction unit flowed to towards the polymer catch tank and was
continually receiving prepolymer mass as shutdown procedures were done. As with
shutdown procedures, the solvent, the purging agent of the process, was fed to clean out
remaining polymer residues in the reaction tank. Operators noticed after some time during
the period of shutdown that the fed vapor was already leaking at the bolted cover side of the
polymer catch tank. Supervisors present were notified of the leaking vapor and decided to
divert the remaining flow from the reaction unit to a nearby reactor knockout pot for the
purpose of storage of the remaining prepolymer mass. Before the flow was transferred to the
reactor knockout pot, that was the last point wherein materials were fed into the polymer
catch tank and no additional input was done to the tank. To complete the shutdown, a water
flush was done after the solvent to aid in heat removal in the set-up converting water to
steam. But, since the flow was diverted to the knockout pot, the polymer catch tank was not
included in the water flush and the hot prepolymer was within it did not receive any cooling
at all.
After the failed start-up and its following shutdown, maintenance crew was called to
clean the polymer catch tank and the knockout pot where prepolymer material is present.
Maintenance personnel arrives approximately three hours after the shutdown process and
proceeded to the normal cleaning procedures, unaware that there was an increased amount
of prepolymer mass in the catch vessel. Operators noticed that the nitrogen line valve for
both vessels were open and closed it. Only the nitrogen line had a lock-out tag-out
implementation, the other lines have none. The lack of locking and tagging mechanism made
the maintenance unable to determine if the vessel was pressurized or if any attempt was
made to use the drain valves prior to cleaning.
After an equipment isolation list was filled out and signed by an operator present,
along with two others from maintenance, they proceeded to emptying and cleaning the
polymer catch tank. 44 bolts were secured around the circumference of the sides of the
polymer catch tank and the three personnel assigned were removing the bolts with a
pneumatic wrench. As each of the bolts were removed, it reduces the restraining strength of
the cover from blowing out completely.
After 22 bolts were removed, the unfortunate incident happened where the cover
blew off, weighing 1,750 pounds, and hit a girder nearby. As the cover flew off the catch tank,
hot polymer mass spewed out the opening and struck the three personnel working to clean
it. Two of the working personnel died instantly because of the impact of the blown-out cover
and the other one was pronounced dead on arrival to the nearest hospital. Along with the hot
mass coming out from the vessel, white smoke or steam was also noticed to be coming out
according to witnesses. The force of the expulsion of the cover caused the whole polymer
tank to propel backward, it subsequently damaging the attached piping connected to the
vessel. A section of hot oil supply tubing connected to the inlet line for the vessel broke,
amounts of hot oil escaped, formed a vapor cloud and ignited. The large explosion alerted the
personnel in the tank to respond. It ultimately caused a fire which burned for several hours
since there was a continuous release of hot oil.
The plant emergency response team and nearby fire department responded to the
explosion. The area water deluge system and manual hose streams were used to control the
area of the fire. After approximately six hours after the incident started, the fire was
extinguished after the hot oil system was isolated.
 b. Proposed Engineering Solution/s
The first encountered problem or issue that contributed for the incident to happen
was the malfunction of the extruder. The last normal operation for processing Amodel already
encountered problems with the extruder but personnel and management did not really look
into the matter. Simple checking and maintenance for the equipment after the first problem
was reported could have averted the incident. This is to make sure that the equipment was
working properly and in good condition for use in following operations.
The next issue is with regards to the operators present during the incident. They did
not follow the standard procedure for start-up process. They should have ensured that as
they would start a batch operation of Amodel, all the equipment involved should be working
normally. Instead, the pre-run for the extruder was skipped. This was critical since it is to
verify if the extruder was already working normally after its reported malfunction. Also, they
tried running the extruder around 45 minutes after the first flow from the reactor is diverted
to the polymer catch tank. It was to flow for 50 minutes and this would only give around 5
minutes to have the extruder running but failed to do so. This significantly contributed to the
likelihood of the incident due to an increased amount of mass entering in the catch vessel
more than what was normal. Since it was in the company’s standard operation, it should have
been followed by the operator. It indicates how exactly things are to be done with regards to
operations, and should be kept current in review and approval of any revision on a
predetermined schedule, which is usually done annually [7].
A review of design of the process is also needed for the full-scale production of
Amodel. BP Amoco had no experience in the full-scale production of nylon plastics. Their
operation was based on a pilot plant with several years of experience. It is when BP Amoco
upscaled their operation that problems in the process were evident, like in the prepolymer
catch tank and the extruder. Unlike in a smaller pilot plant set-up, a full-scale production of
Amodel had difficulties in identifying the polymer catch tank level. This would mean that
personnel were not able to tell of how much prepolymer material has already accumulated
in the vessel. It also lacked a proper cooling system which would have helped in the heat
transfer since the prepolymer material fed is at high temperatures. A means for better
management of the material within the vessel would have reduced the chances of the
incident. BP Amoco should have had measures to compensate for design deficiencies.
The workers who were in-charge of cleaning the polymer catch vessel tank were the
ones greatly affected by the incident. This caused them their lives, but it could have been
prevented if a simple engineering control were applied in the company, the Lockout/Tagout
system. Only the nitrogen valve was tagged and the other connected to the catch tank has no
tag of any sort. This made the workers unable to be certain if the tank was pressurized or not.
An indicator if the tank were pressurized or not could have helped them come up with
measures on how to handle the vessel. They did not even have any standard procedures on
how to open the tank with safety precautions, a lapse of the company for failing to identify
potential hazards. The company needs to implement and review hazard analysis, a means to
have a systematic approach to analyze and address what could go wrong in the facility and
identify potential safeguards to prevent that problem from occurring [8].
 The last would be a better management review for changes done in the process.
Supposedly, the flow to the polymer catch tank was be only 30 minutes during start-up as
what it was written in the standard process steps. However, in actual practice in the facility,
the polymer catch tank received prepolymer mass from the reactor for 50 minutes. Any
changes from what was advised in the set guidelines by the company should be followed and
that changing or not following these set rules can have possible consequences.
References

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