Kenji Hayakawa

PHIL362A-001
Professor Schabas
December 2, 2010

On How to Study the Just Price Justly: A Discourse on the Method

In “Economic Freedom in Scholastic Thought” Odd Langholm conducts a historical

analysis of the medieval just price doctrine. Langholm’s study marks a substantial

improvement and a clear steering away from many of the pervasive methodological flaws

in previous studies of the just price. However, despite Langholm’s contribution, many

subsequent analyses of the just price continue to fall back into the previous, flawed habits

of investigation. This essay will outline the above trend, and conclude by arguing that

scholars must endorse Langholm’s method as a model for breaking free from previous

flawed methodologies.

Prior to Langholm, studies of the just price tend to use a method that has at least one of

the following three methodological flaws. First, scholars prior to 1975 tend to downplay

or ignore the significance of philosophical, literary, and social factors exterior to the just

price doctrine. In “Justum Pretium: One More Round in an “Endless Series”” Stephen

Worland argues that George Wilson’s “The Economics of the Just Price” —— a study of

the just price published in 1975 —— marks a methodological turn in the study of the just

price. According to Worland, it is Wilson’s “sociological method” that distinguishes this

study from previous scholarship. This implies that studies prior to Wilson tend to ignore

the social factors that have influenced the development of the just price doctrine.

Secondly, scholars tend to “translate” medieval texts into the language of modern

economics. For example, as an interpretation of the just price doctrine, Worland quotes
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Jevon: “Cost of production determines supply. Supply determines final degree of utility.

Final degree of utility determines value” (505). Supposedly, this quotation is a candidate

for the correct interpretation of the just price doctrine. However, Jevon’s statement is

loaded with modern economic jargon —— “cost of production” “supply” “utility”

“value” —— that distort the original text.

Thirdly, scholars tend to analyze the texts of a selective few thinkers —— Aristotle,

Aquinas, Duns Scotus, etc. —— as if they speak for the whole of the Middle Ages. For

example, in “In Defense of Thomas Aquinas and the Just Price” David Friedman asks the

question: “what determined the just price?” (234). In response to his own question,

Friedman quotes a passage from Aquinas1 that illustrates the factors that determine the

just price. After this quotation, Friedman proceeds by remarking that Aquinas’ text leads

to the question of “what the Scholastic writers meant by the intrinsic value of the

commodity” (235). This move implies two problems. First, Friedman stipulates the

existence of a single, authoritative notion of “the just price” in his question, and thereby

represents Aquinas’ text as the definition of just price. Second, by naming the entirety of

medieval thought under the rubric “Scholastic writers,” Friedman suggests that the

“intrinsic value of the commodity” was a theme relevant to all medieval Scholastic

writers. In both of the above implications, Friedman fails to be sensitive to the local

variations of the just price that existed across different places and periods.

1
‘The other way in which we can look at a contract of sale is in so far as it happens to bring benefit to one
party at the expense of the other, as in the case where one badly needs to get hold of something and the
other is put out by not having it. In such case the estimation of the just price will have to take into account
not merely the commodity to be sold but also the loss which the seller incurs in selling it. The commodity
can here be sold for more than it is worth in itself though not for more than it is worth to the possessor.
If, on the other hand, a buyer derives great benefit from a transaction without the seller suffering any loss
as a result of relinquishing his property, then the latter is not entitled to charge more. This is because the
surplus value that accrues to the other is due not to the seller but to the buyer’s situation: nobody is entitled
to sell another what is not his own though he is justified in charging for any loss he may suffer” (234-235).
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In order to remedy the methodological flaws outlined above, any research and analysis

concerning the just price must meet the following conditions. First, scholars must take

into account the philosophical, literary, and social factors that constitute the background

context which makes this or that version of the just price intelligible. Second, scholars

must discard the modern frame of mind in order to interpret the primary texts in their own

terms. Finally, scholars must analyze this or that text on the just price with reference to

the proper historical context of place and period.

Odd Langholm provides a model for a study of the just price that takes into account the

above three conditions. Sections I and II of Langholm’s essay consist in spelling out the

medieval thinkers who shaped the Code and Digest of Justinian. Based on textual

evidence, Langholm here argues that the issues in medieval economic thought centered

on the interpretation of the word “can” in the value maxim: “a thing is worth as much as

it can be sold for” (262). Here, Langholm draws attention to over sixty medieval thinkers2

who contributed to the development of multiple interpretations of the “can” (262-265).

These thinkers, spanning across almost four hundred years from the thirteenth to the

seventeenth century, come from a diverse range of different locations including Florence,

Bologna, and Salamanca (262-265).

After this preliminary survey, Langholm presents the following medieval development

of the value maxim. The value maxim, according to Langholm, was originally brought to

attention by Accursius during the early thirteenth century (266). This was a normative

2
Thinkers mentioned by Langholm are: Azo, Accursius, Bartolus, Cinus, Baldus, de Ubaldis, Fulgosius, de
Imola, Castrensis, Pontanus, Tartagnus, Maynus, Laurentius Hispanus, Tancredus, Pope Gregory IX,
Boniface VIII, Vincentius Hispanus, Botone, Hostiensis, Andreae, de Ancharamo, Zabarella, de Burito, de
Ania, Panormitanus, William of Auxerre, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent, Olivi, Odonis,
Buridanus, Bernardino of Siena, Antonio of Florence, Henry of Hassia, Henry of Oyta, Gerson, Caepolla,
Conrad of Summenhart, Martin Luther, Giles of Lessines, Pisanus, de Ausmo, Trovamala, Carletus,
Mazzolini, de Vitoria, de Medina, de Soto, de Azpilcueta, de Navarra, Lopez, Toletus, Salon, de Aragon.
This list is still, as Langholm cautions, a “preliminary survey” of “leading protagonists” (262).
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maxim that allowed for many subsequent qualifications. Henry of Ghent distinguishes the

factual and the juridical senses of the word “can,” and argues that the maxim implies the

“juridical” sense, which means that a thing is worth what it “ought to” be sold for (267).

Bartolus qualifies the value maxim by adding at its end: “… provided the buyer knows

what he is buying” (268). Tartagnus adds: “… provided the buyer knows and

understands what he is buying” (268). The question of the meaning of “knowing” and

“understanding” relates to the question of the definition of inscientia by Henry of Ghent

and levitas by Olivi (269). From these questions, Aristotle’s notion of “conditional

consent” is re-examined by Gerson (270-271). What counts as “conditional” was

determined through empirical research conducted by the Scholastics in various places and

periods (272). From this re-examination of “conditional consent,” Buridan states that “no

one exchanges except to get as much or more than he gives” (272). This statement is then

put under critical analysis under the distinction between consent due to a pressing

necessity and consent without compulsion (272-273). In this context, the distinction

between necessaries and luxuries is drawn and put under examination (273). Here,

economic compulsion is related to need, and need is related to “substantive necessity” by

Aquinas (273). In this context, Caepolla modifies the value maxim as: “a thing is worth

what it can be sold for to someone not in poverty or some other need” (274).

With the above historical trajectory at hand, Langholm examines the origin and

development of the just price. According to Roman law, each property owner must be a

just arbiter who prices his or her goods “moderately” (275). However, Olivi objects to

this by pointing out that once a good is in exchange, it is no longer owned by anyone, and

thus is not subject to anyone’s arbitration (275). Rather, Olivi suggests that a good in
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exchange is subject to “justice” (275). The price that justice has put on a good is the “just

price” (276). Originally, the just price applied only to necessaries, where the buyer was

able to compel the seller to sell “foodstuffs” at a price determined by law (276). The

notion of the just price is tied back to the value maxim by Panormitanus, who states: “a

thing is worth what it can commonly be sold for (276). To this, Hostiensis adds: “he who

offers foodstuffs for sale may be forced to sell at the just price” (276).

Here, Langholm notes that the Scholastic writers “all agreed that value should be

understood communiter” (279). In order to make this maxim applicable to the

marketplace, Bartolus modifies the value maxim as follows: “a thing is worth what it can

be sold for, that is, commonly and in a public place, to many people, over several days”

(279). The main goal of this practical maxim was to prevent local citizens from

overpricing necessaries against strangers (279). Bartolus’ maxim reflects the double-

meaning of the word “communiter,” which connotes both “joint” and “usual” (280).

Thus, the just price was a price at which necessaries were usually exchanged at the public

market (281). Here. Langholm notes that what varies among the Scholastic writers is not

the nature of the just price, but rather its justification (281). Thus, the key question is not

whether the just price is a market price, but rather what justifies the price communiter to

be considered as the just price (281).