Experience Hendrix V Hendrix Licensing No. 99 (Plaint. Resp. On Constitutionality)

Case 2:09-cv-00285-TSZ Document 99 Filed 10/15/10 Page 1 of 12
1 THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. ZILLY
6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE
8
EXPERIENCE HENDRIX, LLC, a
9 Washington Limited Liability Company, and No. C09-0285 TSZ
AUTHENTIC HENDRIX, LLC, a Washington
10 Limited Liability Company, PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
11 Plaintiffs, RE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
WASHINGTON PERSONALITY RIGHTS
12
vs. ACT
13
HENDRIXLICENSING.COM, LTD, d/b/a
HENDRIX ARTWORK and
14
HENDRIXARTWORK.COM, a Nevada
15
Corporation, and ANDREW PITSICALIS and
CHRISTINE RUTH FLAHERTY, husband and
16
wife,
17 Defendants.
18
19
20
21
22
23
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ W ILSON SMITH C OCHRAN DICKERSON

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON THE A PRO FESSIO NAL SERVI CE CO RPO RATIO N
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WPRA (Cause 1700 FINANCIAL CENTER, 1215 4TH AVENUE
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98161-1007
No. C09-0285 TSZ) TELEPHONE: (206) 623-4100 FAX: (206) 623-9273
1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 Each of Defendants’ constitutional challenges to the WPRA is framed in terms of
abstract, hypothetical scenarios. The Court cannot adjudicate Defendants’ counterclaim

3
concerning the application and constitutionality of the WPRA because they have not
4
demonstrated that they have been injured or are in imminent danger of suffering an injury that
5
could be redressed by a decision declaring the WPRA unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court
6
lacks jurisdiction to issue the requested declaratory ruling.
7 On the merits, Defendants’ arguments ignore the literal terms of the Act, which limit its
8 application to infringements occurring in Washington. As discussed in our earlier briefing,
9 limiting the Act to infringements in Washington eviscerates Defendants’ principal arguments.
Further, while complaining that the WPRA purports to create a national law of personality
10
rights, their own constitutional arguments rest on the proposition that every state, including
11
Washington, must apply New York law to Jimi Hendrix’s personality rights. As shown below,
12
there is no constitutional requirement that Washington must apply New York law, or the law of
13
any other state, to infringements of personality rights occurring within Washington. So long as
14 Washington has sufficient minimum contacts with the subject matter and parties involved, it is
15 free to apply its own law.
16 II. DEFENDANTS’ ERRONEOUS ASSERTIONS
Before addressing Defendants’ specific constitutional arguments, Plaintiffs wish to

17
address several erroneous assertions that pervade Defendants’ brief and upon which all of their
18
constitutional claims turn. When these erroneous assertions are stripped away, any remaining
19
merit in Defendants’ arguments vanishes.
20
1. Defendants assert that Allstate and Shutts require application of New York law
21 to all cases involving Jimi Hendrix’s publicity rights because “[h]is death is the occurrence or
22 transaction upon which both existence of any right of publicity and the devising thereof
23
PLAINTIFFS SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON W ILSON SMITH C OCHRAN DICKERSON

A PRO FESSIO NAL SERVI CE CO RPO RATIO N
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WPRA 1700 FINANCIAL CENTER, 1215 4TH AVENUE
(Cause No. C09-0285 TSZ) 1 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98161-1007
TELEPHONE: (206) 623-4100 FAX: (206) 623-9273
1 depends.”1 Those cases do not establish any such constitutional requirement. Rather, the cases
2 stand for the proposition that courts must examine the entire bundle of circumstances and
interests presented in a particular case in order to determine whether the law of the forum state
3
can be applied.2
4
2. Defendants further assert that, “Other than an heir residing in Washington (Al
5
Hendrix), Washington had no contacts [with Jimi Hendrix].”3 Factual inaccuracies aside,4 this
6
assertion ignores the legal standard established in Allstate and Shutts, which is whether there
7 are sufficient contacts between the transaction in question (in this case, a hypothetical
8 infringement within Washington, not Jimi’s death) and the forum state, so as to create a
9 legitimate state interest in applying the forum state’s law.5 Because the Act can be applied only
to infringements of rights occurring within Washington, and because the Plaintiffs are
10
domiciled and conduct business in Washington, any hypothetical case involving Defendants
11
would meet this constitutional standard on its face.
12
3. Again ignoring the geographic scope of the Act, Defendants claim that, “The
13
WPRA’s application . . . allows Washington state to confer and regulate a publicity right for
14 anyone anywhere in the United States or World, and in many cases retroactively,” and that,
15 “The WPRA . . . creates a national Washington State-centered system of Publicity Rights,
16 supplanting Congress’ authority over such matters . . . .”6 These assertions fail to account for
Washington’s legitimate interest in regulating personality rights and the fact that the Act does
17
not direct courts in other states to apply Washington law without regard to their own choice of
18
law rules or constitutional requirements.
19
20
21
1
Ptlfs’ Supp. Brf. at 4:3-5.
2
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981); Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985).
22 3
Id. at 4:17-18.
4
Jimi Hendrix was born, raised and educated in Seattle. His sole heir resided here until his death and the
23 enterprises that own and license the rights associated with him are headquartered here.
5
Allstate at 312-313.
6
Pltfs’ Supp. Brf. at 6:1-2 and 7:7-9.
TELEPHONE: (206) 623-4100 FAX: (206) 623-9273
1 III. ARGUMENT
2 A. Defendants Lack Standing to Challenge the WPRA
Defendants’ Supplemental Brief makes it apparent that they lack standing to maintain
3
their counterclaims for a declaratory judgment and, specifically, to obtain a declaration of
4
unconstitutionality. All of their arguments on the merits are framed in terms of hypothetical
5
facts or speculation about possible future activities. For example, for purposes of their
6
Commerce Clause claim, Defendants argue, “If a manufacturer or licensor of goods containing
7 publicity rights fully legal in any other state or territory were to allow them, intentionally or not,
8 into Washington for sale, they would be subject to statutory damages and disgorgement of
9 profits.”7 In order to evaluate this claim, there would have to be evidence to show that: (1)
Defendants were a manufacturer or licensor of goods that infringed upon rights created by the
10
WPRA; (2) the goods were being marketed in Washington; and (3) an action to enforce rights
11
under the WPRA had been or was likely to be brought. There is, however, no evidence before
12
the Court that would establish any of these facts.
13
Defendants’ Takings Clause argument is similarly conjectural. While asserting that
14 Defendant Pitsicalis has “several images and likenesses of Jimi Hendrix under his exclusive
15 control,” Defendants never explain how a hypothetical action under the WPRA, compelling
16 Defendants not to offer those items for sale in Washington, would implicate the constitutional
standard that they says is applicable; i.e., a deprivation of all economically beneficial use of the
17
property.8 If Defendants’ assessment of the applicable law is correct, Defendants could clearly
18
market those goods elsewhere and thereby retain nearly all of their economic value.
19
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that would allow the Court to determine
20
whether: (a) Mr. Pitsicalis actually owns or controls images and likenesses of Jimi Hendrix; (b)
21 those images are subject to or exempted from the WPRA; or (c) those images are covered by
22
23
7
Defendants’ Supp. Brief at 7:10-13.
8
Defendants. Supp. Brief at 10-11.
TELEPHONE: (206) 623-4100 FAX: (206) 623-9273
1 this Court’s previous injunction. Without this evidence, Defendants cannot discharge their
2 burden to establish standing.
Similarly, Defendants’ Privileges and Immunities Clause argument rests upon two far-
3
fetched hypothetical situations: (1) that even absent an infringement occurring within
4
Washington, Defendants could be sued in this state for infringing activities occurring in another
5
state, because Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts to be subjected to the personal
6
jurisdiction of Washington courts; or (2) that if Defendants are sued in Nevada because their
7 activities “wandered” into Washington, Nevada courts would apply Washington law.9 Neither
8 of these hypothetical scenarios is based on any facts in the record.
9 An infringement not occurring in Washington does not necessarily meet the minimum
contacts necessary for a court to exercise jurisdiction over the infringer. In the context of
10
internet activities, merely placing an advertisement on the internet does not confer jurisdiction
11
over a nonresident. In Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,10 the plaintiff brought a lawsuit for
12
trademark infringement. The plaintiff in Cybersell relied on the fact that the defendant operated
13
a website, accessible in the forum state, as the basis for jurisdiction over the defendant.11 The
14 defendant’s website advertised its services but did not allow parties to transact business via the
15 site.12 Noting the lack of interactivity on the defendant's website, the court concluded that the
16 defendant had “done no act and [ ] consummated no transaction, nor has it performed any act by
which it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities, in Arizona, thereby
17
invoking the benefits and protections of Arizona law.”13 Merely “wandering into Washington”
18
would be insufficient to invoke jurisdiction over a seller.14 Jurisdiction requires that the seller
19
20
9
Defendants’ Supp. Brief at 12.
10
21 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997).
11
Id. at 130 F.3d at 416.
12
Id. at 419.
22 13
Id.
14
Defendants do not elaborate how they might “wander” into Washington. Presumably this would be through the
23 internet. But such “wandering” does not in itself necessarily confer jurisdiction. Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila
N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 460 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We consistently have held that a mere web presence is
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.”).
TELEPHONE: (206) 623-4100 FAX: (206) 623-9273
1 “purposefully directed his activities” with Washington or its residents, that the violation arises
2 out of the seller’s “forum-related activities,” and that the exercise of jurisdiction “comport with
fair play and substantial justice.”15 Defendants’ “wandering” hypothetical does meet this test.
3
Furthermore, the first scenario is legally impossible since the Act only applies to
4
infringements occurring within Washington, and his second depends upon the application of
5
Nevada’s choice of law rules to an unknown set of facts. Defendants’ First Amendment and
6
Copy Right Clause arguments present the same set of problems. While complaining that the
7 Act’s exemptions are unduly narrow and therefore infringe on protected expression or
8 copyrighted works,16 Defendants have not submitted evidence concerning any works that they
9 have created or own that would be protected under the First Amendment or copyright laws.
Without this evidence, it is impossible for the Court to determine the interplay between the
10
WPRA and the First Amendment or the Copyright Act, as applied to Defendants’ situation.
11
B. The WPRA validly protects Jimi Hendrix’s Posthumous Personality Rights
12 against Infringements Occurring in Washington
13
Defendants concede that “on its face” the Act applies to Jimi Hendrix,17 but suggest that
the Court should ignore the Act’s plain language because to apply the Act would render the Act
14
unconstitutional. Plaintiffs do not know whether Defendants have suggested this path in order
15
to avoid their standing problems—which exist regardless of whether the Court reaches the
16
constitutional claims—or in hopes of avoiding the heavy burden of showing unconstitutionality.
17
Regardless, while courts should construe statutes so as to avoid constitutional infirmity, this
18 rule of construction does not permit courts to re-write statutes to avoid constitutional issues.18
19
20 15
Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We apply a three-part test to determine whether the
exercise of specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is appropriate: (1) The non-resident defendant must
21 purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform
some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the
22
defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial
justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.”).
23 16
Defendants’ Supp. Brief at 15, 16.
17
Defendants’ Supp. Brief at 2:19.
18
Tucker v. State of Calif., Dept. of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996).
TELEPHONE: (206) 623-4100 FAX: (206) 623-9273
1 With respect to the express terms of the Act, it is important to note that, after the
2 Foundation case and decisions involving the estate of Marilyn Monroe, there was “widespread
confusion and concern, not just among the executors of celebrity estates, but among
3
merchandise manufacturers, film studios and advertisers.”19 The 2008 amendments to WPRA
4
addressed these concerns20 by adding a specific directive to recognize posthumous rights
5
regardless of domicile at death, but that directive is only applicable to infringements occurring
6
in Washington.
7 Washington has done no more than establish a set of rules to be applied to infringements
8 within its own borders. The 2008 amendments do not change or override New York law.
9 Rather, the amendments filled a gap in Washington law, by making it clear that Washington
will protect posthumous rights against infringements within the state regardless of domicile. In
10
this regard, the 2008 Amendments do not discriminate based on state citizenship. Indeed, they
11
make no distinctions in that regard.21
12
Finally, it is important to note that Defendants can claim no vested right in the
13
continuation of prior law22 and that the hypothetical activities that Defendants posit as
14 triggering the Act would necessarily occur after the effective date of the Act. Accordingly, there
15 is no basis to say that the Foundation case controls here. To the contrary, Foundation fully
16 indicates that the Court would have applied the current specific directive, if it had been in place
at the time.23
17
18
19
19 Green & Branch, “No Respect for the Dead”, ENTERTAINMENT LAW DIGEST, pg 9-10 (2008).
20
Interests other than those of Plaintiffs were supportive of the amendments, including Corbis Corporation, one of
the largest digital rights management companies in the world (located in Seattle). See generally Ex. D to Donohue
20 Decl., submitted with Opening Supplemental brief.
21
RCW 63.60.010; 63.60.050 (WPRA protects personality rights of deceased person against infringements
21 occurring within State of Washington, regardless of deceased person’s domicile).
22
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 484 (1911).
23
In the Foundation case, this court concluded that the WPRA did not apply and instead applied New York law
22
because the WPRA did not contain an express choice of law provision:
The Court concludes that the Act [WPRA] is not applicable in this case. Because the Act does not contain
23 on its face an express choice of law provision, the Act is not a statutory directive as to the choice of law to
be applied in a right of publicity case.
Foundation Order at 8.
TELEPHONE: (206) 623-4100 FAX: (206) 623-9273
1 C. Personality Rights are State-Based and are Recognized in the Majority of States
2 Defendants mistakenly claim that Washington has enacted a nationwide system of
personality rights that overrides every other state’s law. In reality, there is no uniform national
3
system of personality rights.24 Subject to specific and narrow constitutional limitations, a state
4
may define and protect personality rights within its jurisdiction.25 In addition to those states that
5
recognize personality or publicity rights through statute, numerous additional states have
6
established common law rights through case law. However, the scope of each law varies from
7 state to state, depending on the state’s statutory or common law schemes.26
8 Defendants make a sweeping statement that only Washington State would recognize an
9 enforceable right of publicity for Jimi Hendrix. They are wrong. A number of states would
recognize such a right.27 In fact, the Washington personality rights statute is comparable to
10
personality rights legislation adopted by other states and does not intrude upon the right of other
11
states to adopt their own approaches to personality rights. Washington’s law—providing a 75
12
year term—is not at the extreme of the state laws in the term or scope of rights. For example,
13
the duration of the statutory post mortem terms vary from 10 years28 to 100 years29 after the
14 death of the personality. Nor was Washington the first state to explicitly provide for choice of
15 law regardless of domicile.30
16
17 24
Nineteen states recognize the Right of Publicity via statute (California, Florida, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, New York, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas,
18 Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin). The American Law Institute’s Third Restatement of Unfair
Competition (1995) §46 also recognizes the Right of Publicity as a distinct and viable legal theory. The parameters
19 of the right vary from state to state, depending on the provisions of any given stature.
25
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
26
According to one publicity rights scholar, “The majority view is that the right exists by common law in every
20 state that has not defined its position through legislation.” http://rightofpublicity.com/brief-history-of-rop (by Prof.
Jonathan Faber http://rightofpublicity.com/about-the-author).
27
21 See, e.g., Ind. Code § 32-36-1-8(a) (2010) (Indiana statutory law); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp.
1339 (D. N.J. 1983) (New Jersey common law). Note that overseas, other countries may enforce post mortem
rights of publicity as well, regardless of Washington or New York law.
22 28
Although post-mortem right of personality is limited to 10 years in Tennessee, the right can continue in
perpetuity contingent on use. Tenn. Code §47-25-1104 (2010).
23 29
Ind. Code § 32-36-1-8(a) (2010) (Indiana); Okla. Stat. T. 12 § 1448(G) (Oklahoma 2010).
30
See, e.g., IND. CODE §32-36-1-1; see also http://www.markroesler.com/legal/battles.html (“Passed in 1994, this
noteworthy Statute has received much attention, especially because it protects a celebrity's image and likeness for
TELEPHONE: (206) 623-4100 FAX: (206) 623-9273
1 D. A State May Validly Choose Between its own Law and the Law of the Decedent’s
Domicile when Deciding the Application of Post Mortem Personality Rights
2
Defendants imply that some constitutional principle dictates that, when deciding
3 whether to enforce a post mortem right of publicity, a court must apply the personality rights
4 law of the state where the personality was domiciled at death. No authority supports this
5 proposition. Whether Washington (or any other state) applies its own personality rights law or
another state’s law is determined by the forum state's choice of law mandates and applicable
6
substantive law.
7
Further, there is no uniform practice among states in terms of deferring to the law of a
8
person’s domicile when choosing which state’s law to apply in personality rights cases.
9
Washington follows the Second Restatement on Conflicts of Law. In the Foundation case, this
10 Court applied the rules of the Second Restatement in deciding that New York law would apply
11 to whether a post mortem right for Jimi Hendrix’s name and likeness existed that could be
12 enforced in Washington. In doing so, it held that because the WPRA did not include a statutory
directive on choice of law, New York law applied. The Washington legislature has since
13
amended the WPRA to include a statutory directive on choice of law with respect to
14
infringements occurring within Washington.31 States that do not follow the Second Restatement
15
apply other tests in determining which law shall apply to a particular issue. For example, New
16
Jersey applied the “governmental interest” test to determine that New Jersey law applies to
17
18
19
100 years. It has become the model for many states looking to enact or amend Right of Publicity legislation,
including recent activity in California, Illinois, Washington and Ohio.”).
20 31
Defendants point out that the WPRA looks to the law of domicile in RCW 63.60.030(1)(a). This provision has
no bearing on whether the statute passes constitutional muster. It does not use the foreign state’s law to define the
21 nature or enforceability of the right. Rather, it simply establishes the class of persons entitled to enforce the right in
Washington if the deceased personality or individual dies intestate, giving deference to the laws of intestate
succession of the state of domicile for consistency reasons. This mirrors the U.S. Copyright Act’s approach (17
22
U.S.C. sec. 101 et seq.), in which “next of kin” (determined by law of domicile) are entitled to renew a copyright
(under the previous renewal scheme of the 1909 Act) if there are no living spouse or children, and there was no
23 will. 17 U.S.C. §304(a); P. Goldstein, “Goldstein on Copyrights”, 3rd Ed. 2010, section 6.3.2(d) (“Because section
304(a) generally relies on state law to fill the statute’s definitional interstices, the law of the author’s domicile at
the time of death should govern the order and identity of persons entitled to take from an intestate author.”).
TELEPHONE: (206) 623-4100 FAX: (206) 623-9273
1 Elvis Presley’s and Spanky MacFarland’s post mortem publicity rights.32 Those courts did not
2 look to the state of domicile in any respect.
Defendants also seem to argue that the WPRA and any other state personality right act
3
would be unconstitutional because it would be inconvenient and burdensome for a national
4
business to comply with a diverse set of local laws. Varying state personality rights laws may
5
create some hurdles for those who wish to use personality rights without authorization of the
6
rights’ owners or heirs (presumably because they must analyze the legal landscape in several
7 states before engaging in commercial activities). However, these hurdles do not make the state
8 laws unconstitutional and are not distinguishable from other types of laws that vary from state
9 to state (such as liquor control laws).
IV. CONCLUSION
10
The Court should dismiss Defendants counterclaim for a declaratory ruling concerning
11
the WPRA for lack of standing. If the Court is inclined to address the statute’s constitutionality,
12
it should rule that it does not violate due process, equal protection, or any of the other five
13
constitutional provisions that Defendants have thrown up in seeking to invalidate the Act.
14 Dated this 15th day of October, 2010.
15 s/ John D. Wilson, Jr._____________

John D. Wilson, Jr., WSBA No. 4828
16 Alfred E. Donohue, WSBA No. 32774
WILSON SMITH COCHRAN DICKERSON
17 1215 4th Ave., Suite 1700
Seattle, WA 98161
(206) 623-4100 phone
18 (206) 623-9273 fax
wilson@wscd.com
19
-and-
20
Karen Wetherell Davis, WSBA No. 21195
William A. Drew, WSBA No. 38697
21
ELLIOT, OSTRANDER, & PRESTON, PC
707 SW Washington St., Suite 1500
22 Portland, OR 97205
23
32
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D. N.J. 1983); McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994).
TELEPHONE: (206) 623-4100 FAX: (206) 623-9273
1 (206) 325-1244 / (503) 224-7112

(503) 224-7819 facsimile
2 karen@eoplaw.com
-and-
3
Michael Madden, WSBA #8747
4 BENNETT BIGELOW & LEEDOM, P.S.
1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1900
5 Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 622-5511
6
mmadden@bbllaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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TELEPHONE: (206) 623-4100 FAX: (206) 623-9273
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 15, 2010, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
2
Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to
3 the parties below.
4
Thomas T. Osinski
5 OSINSKI LAW
535 Dock St., Suite 108
6 Tacoma, WA 98402
tto@osinskilaw.com
7
David Martin
8 Timothy Shea
LEE SMART, COOK, MARTIN & PATTERSON P.S.
9 701 Pike Street, Suite 1800
Seattle, WA 98101-3927
10 dlm@leesmart.com
tds@leesmart.com
11
12
13 s/ John D. Wilson, Jr.

John D. Wilson, Jr. WSBA No. 32774
14 WILSON SMITH COCHRAN DICKERSON
1215 – 4th Ave., Suite 1700
15 Seattle, WA 98161
(206) 623-4100 telephone
16 (206) 623-9273 fax
donohue@wscd.com
17
Attorney for Plaintiffs
18
19
20
{2583.00001/M0230239.DOC; 1}
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TELEPHONE: (206) 623-4100 FAX: (206) 623-9273

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Case 2:09-cv-00285-TSZ Document 99 Filed 10/15/10 Page 1 of 12

1 THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. ZILLY

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ W ILSON SMITH C OCHRAN DICKERSON

2 Each of Defendants’ constitutional challenges to the WPRA is framed in terms of

abstract, hypothetical scenarios. The Court cannot adjudicate Defendants’ counterclaim

8 application to infringements occurring in Washington. As discussed in our earlier briefing,

9 limiting the Act to infringements in Washington eviscerates Defendants’ principal arguments.

15 free to apply its own law.

16 II. DEFENDANTS’ ERRONEOUS ASSERTIONS

Before addressing Defendants’ specific constitutional arguments, Plaintiffs wish to

PLAINTIFFS SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON W ILSON SMITH C OCHRAN DICKERSON

15 “The WPRA . . . creates a national Washington State-centered system of Publicity Rights,

2 A. Defendants Lack Standing to Challenge the WPRA

2 burden to establish standing.

8 of these hypothetical scenarios is based on any facts in the record.

2 Defendants mistakenly claim that Washington has enacted a nationwide system of

15 law regardless of domicile.30

2 look to the state of domicile in any respect.

9 to state (such as liquor control laws).

15 s/ John D. Wilson, Jr._____________

1 (206) 325-1244 / (503) 224-7112

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

PLAINTIFFS SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON W ILSON SMITH C OCHRAN DICKERSON

13 s/ John D. Wilson, Jr.

PLAINTIFFS SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON W ILSON SMITH C OCHRAN DICKERSON

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