Notes

File Explanation
This file contains an affirmative case about the Saudi Coalition and its war in Yemen. It includes a 1AC, case backlines, and responses
to the off-case arguments in the negative file.

The 1AC includes three contentions:

1. Yemen Advantage
2. Iran Advantage
3. Disinformation Warning

Its length is appropriate for students on the faster end of the typical high school words per minute range, but it can be narrowed to
accommodate students of all speaking abilities.

The 2AC materials include case backlines and responses to the following off-case negative positions:

1. Houthi Victory DA
2. Supplier Shift DA
3. Hodeidah Surge CP
4. Leverage (Threaten) CP

There are enough materials on all of these issues to facilitate in-depth debates.
 Suggestion (Narrower Versions)
There are also smaller/narrower versions of the Saudi Coalition files on the SDI Dropbox. I suggest that students begin with the
smaller files before moving to the more expansive ones. The narrow versions of the files are designed to utilize the SCALEDSMART
Instant Re-Debates method for learning and practicing new content.
 User’s Guide
While this file is broader than the narrow version, it remains intentionally focused and balanced enough to facilitate in-depth debates
about many complicated subjects related to the Saudi Coalition’s war in Yemen. There are more cards on most issues than students
could realistically read in a round, and many cards are highlighted much more completely than they should be in a different
competitive context. Choosing which card(s) to read on a particular issue is part of the challenge, but the file is organized so that
students can “plug and play” when necessary.

When training with this file, students should focus on getting as deep as possible on the limited number of central issues that are
presented. To encourage students to explore Saudi Coalition-specific arguments that they are unlikely to know well (yet), this file does
not include any copied-and-pasted backfile cards.

To encourage deeper dives, students (and their instructors) are also encouraged to construct targeted mini-debates about the issues in
this file. There are enough cards on most issues to facilitate these activities.
 YouTube Playlist
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLpBMs3UxrdcvZVbMokiVChQezsY7idwlB

This is a complicated subject. In lieu of lengthy written notes, this playlist includes thirteen videos that will help students begin to
better understand the issues involved. There are many; see below.
 Things You’ll Need To Know
In order to effectively debate this case (on the affirmative and negative), students will need to learn a lot of content. The following is a
suggested list of topics to begin studying.

The relevant Wikipedia pages are quite helpful, but I also suggest starting with the following publications:

“Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention”

Congressional Research Service
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf

“Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019”

Congressional Research Service
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R45046.pdf

You can also search for additional CRS reports relating to these topics.

Saudi Arabia
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Wahhabism
King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS)
MBS Rise To Power
Jamal Khashoggi

UAE and Coalition Partners

Saudi Coalition Members
United Arab Emirates
Khalifa bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ)
Gulf Cooperation Council
Operation Decisive Storm
Qatar diplomatic crisis

The U.S. Role

History of U.S. Arms Sales to KSA/UAE
Civilian Casualties
In-air refueling
Precision guided munitions
Yemen War Powers Resolution
2019 Emergency Arms Sales

Iran
Iran
Hezbollah
Ali Khamenei
Hassan Rouhani
Saudi Arabia-Iran Relations
Iranian Revolution
Iran-Iraq War
2011 alleged Iran assassination plot

Yemen’s Political History

Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen)
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)
1990 Unification
Ali Abdullah Saleh
Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi
Popular Resistance Committees
Southern Transitional Council
Aidarus al-Zoubaidi

The Houthis
Ansar Allah / The Houthi movement
Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi
Abdul-Malik Badreddin al-Houthi
Zaidiyyah/Zaidism
Twelver/Imamiyyah
Supreme Political Council

Terrorism in Yemen
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen
Nasir al-Wuhayshi
Qasim al-Raymi
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

The Coalition’s War

2015-present Yemen Civil War
Major events
Significance of Sana'a, Taiz, Aden, Hodeidah
Significance of Bab-el-Mandeb strait, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf
1AC
 1AC — Yemen Advantage
Contention One is Yemen

The Saudi coalition uses U.S. weapons to commit war crimes in Yemen. New
arms sales will be used to directly kill thousands of civilians.
Larison 19 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2019 (“Trump’s Bogus ‘Emergency’ to Arm the Saudis and Emiratis,” The American Conservative, May 23rd, Available
Online at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/trumps-bogus-emergency-to-arm-the-saudis-and-emiratis/, Accessed 06-
11-2019)
Trump is preparing to make a bogus “emergency” declaration to get around
Congressional opposition to further arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE:
Meanwhile, the Trump administration is expected to declare an emergency under U.S. arms control laws amid the
increased tensions with Iran, a step that would allow it to sidestep normal congressional review and rush billions of dollars
in weapons to key Middle East allies, said current officials and people familiar with the matter.
The declaration is expected to come by week’s end, the officials said, allowing the U.S. to move ahead on sales to Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The looming action is drawing opposition from U.S. lawmakers who previously have opposed weapons sales to Saudi
Arabia and the U.A.E. because of how Washington’s Gulf allies are using the arms in Yemen, where the United Nations
says thousands of civilians have been killed by airstrikes carried out by the Saudi-led military coalition.
“President Trump is only using this loophole because he knows Congress
would disapprove of this sale,” said Sen. Chris Murphy (D., Conn.). “It sets an
incredibly dangerous precedent that future presidents can use to sell
weapons without a check from Congress.”
It goes without saying that there is no genuine emergency that requires the U.S. to
rush more weapons to the two governments that are bombing and starving Yemen.
Like the president’s other abuses of exceptions written into the laws, he is taking advantage of a provision that was supposed to be
Because
used only in extraordinary situations in order to circumvent Congressional opposition to his bankrupt policies.
Congressional opposition to arming these regimes is stronger than ever, the Trump
administration hopes to exploit any loophole it can find to keep funneling weapons
to despotic clients as they continue to rain death and destruction on Yemeni
civilians. Trump has been doing everything he can to ensure that nothing
interrupts the flow of U.S.-made weapons to the war criminals in Riyadh and Abu
Dhabi, and the upcoming “emergency” declaration is just the latest example of
how far he will go to cater to these governments.
The rush to deliver more weapons to the Saudis and Emiratis comes on the heels
of another blatant attack on civilians in Sanaa last week. The Saudi coalition bombed a
residential area in one of the most densely packed parts of the capital. Dozens
were injured, and at least six were killed. The New York Times reports on the continued Saudi coalition
attacks on civilians and the U.S. role in supporting them, and it describes the casualties from the recent airstrike in Sanaa:
After five days of treatment in a shabby Yemeni hospital, Luai Sabri died on Tuesday. The 20-year-old had a cracked skull,
a ruptured spleen and a damaged liver, according to a relative, injuries caused by a bomb that dropped from a warplane
flown by the Saudi-led coalition.
The airstrike was part of a wave of bombings over the Yemeni capital, Sana, last Thursday that coincided with a spike in
tensions between the United States — which supports the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen — and Iran — which backs the
coalition’s enemies, the Houthi rebels.
It is practically guaranteed that the Saudis and Emiratis will use additional
weapons sent to them by the U.S. to carry out attacks like this one. The coalition has
frequently struck civilian targets not because of a lack of training or lack of
precision weapons, but rather because their governments aren’t concerned about
the civilian lives they take and they deliberately target non-military sites with
regularity. Mohamad Bazzi explains:
Radhya al-Mutawakel, co-founder and leader of Mwatana for Human Rights, a Yemen-based organization, told the House
the Saudis and their allies simply don’t care about protecting
subcommittee that
Yemeni civilians. “It’s not a matter of training. It’s a matter of
accountability. They don’t care,” she said. “If they cared, they can make it much better, at least not to
embarrass their allies.”
According to the Yemen Data Project, Saudi and UAE warplanes have
conducted more than 19,500 air strikes on Yemen since the war began, an
average of nearly 13 attacks per day. (About a third of these attacks are on military targets, while
the rest are classified as nonmilitary targets or “unknown.”) The coalition has bombed schools,
hospitals, markets, mosques, farms, factories, roads, bridges, power
plants, water-treatment facilities, even a potato-chip factory.
To continue arming the Saudis and Emiratis at this point is to knowingly provide
war criminals with the means to commit more war crimes against innocent
civilians. The coalition’s appalling record of attacks on civilians is reason enough
to halt all military assistance and support for the war on Yemen. The U.S. should
have nothing to do with their campaign:
“Stronger levers to hold the coalition accountable are a fantastic idea ,” said
Kristine Beckerle of Mwatana, which has called on the U nited States to cut its
support to the Saudi-led coalition. “But if your partner appears consistently
unwilling to comply with international law, or to minimize harm to civilian
life, then at some point you should not be partnering with them at all, as
is clearly the case for Yemen.”
Members of Congress should fight Trump’s bogus “emergency” declaration, and there
are already signs that Senate Democrats are getting ready to do just that. In addition to Chris Murphy, the ranking Democratic member
of the Foreign Relations Committee, the generally hawkish Bob Menendez, has come out very strongly in opposition to Trump’s
attempted end-run around Congress:
“The possible consequences of this will ultimately jeopardize the ability of the U.S. defense industry to export arms in a
manner both expeditious and responsible,” he said. “I will pursue all appropriate legislative and other means to nullify
these and any planned ongoing sales should the administration move forward in this manner.”
Trump already showed with his veto of S.J.Res. 7 that he has nothing but contempt for the
Constitution and the Congress, and this bogus “emergency” confirms it. Congress
needs to find a means to block Trump on this to keep a lawless executive in check
and for the sake of the Yemeni civilians that the Saudi coalition will otherwise
kill with these weapons.

Two-hundred thirty-three thousand Yemenis (including one-hundred forty

thousand children) will die in 2019 unless the U.S. blocks arms sales to the
coalition.
Bazzi 19 — Mohamad Bazzi, Associate Professor of Journalism at New York University, former Adjunct Senior Fellow for
Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, former Middle East Bureau Chief at Newsday, 2019 (“Trump wants to sell
more weapons to Saudi Arabia. Congress must stop him,” The Guardian, June 8th, Available Online at
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jun/08/saudi-arabia-trump-weapon-arms-sales-must-be-stopped, Accessed 06-09-
2019)
 the Trump administration
On the Friday before Memorial Day, when few Americans were paying attention,
announced that it would circumvent Congress and sell $8bn in new weapons to
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It was Donald Trump’s latest attempt to give a
blank check to two US allies leading a disastrous war in Yemen.
If Trump succeeds in getting around Congress, these weapons sales will prolong
suffering in Yemen and eliminate one of the last levers that allowed the US to
exert influence over Saudi and Emirati actions: the threat of Congress blocking
arms deals.
On 5 June, a bipartisan group of senators said they would try to block the administration from going ahead with the sales by
introducing 22 “resolutions of disapproval” – one for each of the deals cleared by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. The effort is led by
two unlikely allies: Bob Menendez, a Democrat from New Jersey and frequent Trump critic, and Lindsey Graham, a Republican from
South Carolina who is one of Trump’s biggest supporters.
The two senators agree on one thing: that Saudi Arabia should face more scrutiny of its actions in Yemen after Saudi agents murdered
the journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October. Since then, members of Congress have tried to force the
Trump administration to reexamine its alliance with the kingdom – especially its relationship with Mohammed bin Salman, the brash
and ruthless crown prince often considered an architect of the Yemen war. But Trump and his senior aides have made clear that they
still support the prince and won’t try to isolate him, despite a CIA assessment that concluded, with “high confidence”, that Prince
Mohammed ordered the killing of Khashoggi.
The senators’ effort, which includes seven co-sponsors, is yet another example of Congress
trying to claw back its constitutional responsibilities. On 24 May, when Pompeo notified Congress
that the administration would move ahead with the $8bn deals without congressional approval, he cited a rarely used provision of the
Arms Export Control Act which allows the president to bypass Congress if he determines there is an emergency that impacts national
security. Pompeo invoked the Trump administration’s favored bogeyman: an increased threat of “Iranian aggression”.
But over the past month the administration has inflated the threat posed by Iran to US troops and allies in the Middle East and several
hawkish Trump aides, especially national security adviser John Bolton, have pushed for a new confrontation with Tehran. At Bolton’s
request, the Pentagon updated plans to send as many as 120,000 troops to the Middle East. The administration is using similar scare
tactics to justify its end-run around Congress to sell more weapons to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
As Senator Chris Murphy, a Democrat from Connecticut and one of the earliest critics of US support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen,
wrote on Twitter: “To state the obvious, there is no new emergency reason to sell bombs to Saudi Arabia to drop in Yemen. The
Saudis [have] been dropping the bombs on civilians, so if there is an emergency, it’s a humanitarian emergency caused by the bombs
we sell the Saudis.”
Trump’s supposed desire to end US involvement in foreign wars – in Syria and Afghanistan – clearly hasn’t superseded his wish to
keep Saudi Arabia and the UAE happy and continuing to purchase American weapons. This willingness to prolong the suffering of
millions of Yemenis also underlines the administration’s single-minded obsession with countering Iran. Trump and his advisers
repeatedly try to justify a prolonged war in Yemen by blaming Iran and its support for the rebel Houthi militia. This narrative ignores
the fact that the Houthis did not receive significant help from Iran before Saudi Arabia intervened in March 2015.
With the administration firmly behind its Saudi and Emirati allies, Congress offers
the best hope to end the American role in a war that has triggered one of the
world’s worst humanitarian crises. In early April, the House voted to cease military support for the Saudi-led
coalition in Yemen, finally approving a bill to restrain presidential war powers that has taken years to pass both chambers of Congress.
On 16 April, Trump vetoed the bill. Two weeks later, the bill’s supporters in the Senate tried to
override the veto but fell short, 53-45. (It takes two-thirds of the Senate, or 67 votes, to override a presidential
veto.) But the measure was still a turning point because it focused attention on the
extent and unpopularity of military support for Saudi Arabia and its allies.
As the political jockeying unfolded in Washington, the United Nations Development Programme issued a report
underscoring the extent of the humanitarian disaster being fueled by US weapons
and logistical support. The report warned that the death toll in Yemen could rise to
233,000 [two hundred thirty-three thousand] by the end of 2019 – far higher than
previous estimates. (The projection includes an estimate of 102,000 deaths from
combat and 131,000 indirect deaths due to the lack of food, health crises like a
cholera epidemic and damage to Yemen’s infrastructure.)
“The current conflict in Yemen is one of the greatest preventable disasters facing
humanity,” the report said, adding that the conflict has turned into a “war on
children”, with a Yemeni child dying every 12 minutes. The report estimated that
140,000 [one hundred forty thousand] of those killed by the end of 2019 would be
children under the age of five.
Despite a majority of Congress voting to end support, American assistance to the
Saudi-led war persists, thanks to Trump’s veto. In their latest effort to stop the
weapons sales, congressional critics of the war will likely need to secure a veto-
proof majority. It is a matter of moral and political urgency.

Reject geopolitical and economic justifications for U.S. arms sales that
downplay the massive ongoing violence against millions of Yemenis.
Almutawakel and Alfaqih 18 — Radhya Almutawakel, Co-Founder and Leader of the Mwatana Organization for
Human Rights—an independent Yemeni organization aiming to defend and protect human rights in Yemen, was has the first person to
brief the UN Security Council on the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and Abdulrasheed Alfaqih, Co-Founder and Leader of the
Mwatana Organization for Human Rights—an independent Yemeni organization aiming to defend and protect human rights in
Yemen, 2018 (“Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates Are Starving Yemenis to Death,” Foreign Policy, November 8th, Available
Online at https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/08/saudi-arabia-and-the-united-arab-emirates-are-starving-yemenis-to-death-mbs-
khashoggi-famine-yemen-blockade-houthis/, Accessed 06-20-2019)
Jamal Khashoggi was but the latest victim of a reckless arrogance that has become the hallmark of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy.
Yemenis were saddened, but not surprised, at the extent of the brutality exhibited in Khashoggi’s killing, because our country has been
living through this same Saudi brutality for almost four years.
As human rights advocates working in Yemen, we are intimately familiar with the
violence, the killing of innocents, and the shredding of international norms that
have been the hallmarks of Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in our country. For nearly four
years, Saudi Arabia has led a coalition, along with the United Arab Emirates, that has cynically
and viciously bombarded Yemen’s cities, blockaded Yemen’s ports, and prevented
humanitarian aid from reaching millions in need.
According to the Yemen Data Project, Saudi and Emirati aircraft have conducted
over 18,500 air raids on Yemen since the war began—an average of over 14 attacks
every day for over 1,300 days. They have bombed schools, hospitals, homes,
markets, factories, roads, farms, and even historical sites. Tens of thousands of
civilians, including thousands of children, have been killed or maimed by Saudi
airstrikes.
But the Saudis and Emiratis couldn’t continue their bombing campaign in Yemen
without U.S. military support. American planes refuel Saudi aircraft en route to their targets, and Saudi and
Emirati pilots drop bombs made in the United States and the United Kingdom onto Yemeni
homes and schools. Nevertheless, U.S. attention to the war in Yemen has been largely
confined to brief spats of outrage over particularly dramatic attacks, like the August school
bus bombing that killed dozens of children.
Saudi crimes in Yemen are not limited to regular and intentional bombing of civilians in violation of international humanitarian law.
By escalating the war and destroying essential civilian infrastructure, Saudi Arabia
is also responsible for the tens of thousands of Yemeni civilians who have died
from preventable disease and starvation brought on by the war. The United Nations concluded that
blockades have had “devastating effects on the civilian population” in Yemen, as Saudi
and Emirati airstrikes have targeted Yemen’s food production and distribution,
including the agricultural sector and the fishing industry.
Meanwhile, the collapse of Yemen’s currency due to the war has prevented millions of
civilians from purchasing the food that exists in markets. Food prices have
skyrocketed, but civil servants haven’t received regular salaries in two years. Yemenis are being starved to
death on purpose, with starvation of civilians used by Saudi Arabia as a weapon
of war.
Three-quarters of Yemen’s population—over 22 million men, women, and children—are currently
dependent on international aid and protection. The U.N. warned in September that Yemen soon
will reach a “tipping point,” beyond which it will be impossible to avoid
massive civilian deaths. Over 8 million people are currently on the verge of
starvation, a figure likely to rise to 14 million—half of the country—by the end of 2018 if the
fighting does not subside, import obstructions are not removed, and the currency is
not stabilized.
To be clear, there is no party in this war is without blood on its hands; our organization, Mwatana, has
documented violations against civilians by all parties to the conflict in Yemen, not only Saudi Arabia. The Houthis have killed and
injured hundreds of civilians through their use of landmines and indiscriminate shelling, while militias backed by the United Arab
Emirates, Yemeni government-backed militias, and Houthi militias have arbitrarily detained, forcibly disappeared, and tortured
But the de facto immunity that the international community has given Saudi
civilians.
Arabia through its silence prevents real justice for violations by all sides .
The people of the Middle East have long and bitter experience with international
double standards when it comes to human rights, as purported champions of
universal rights in the West regularly ignore grave violations by their allies in the
region, from the former shah of Iran to Saddam Hussein to Saudi Arabia’s current crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman.
This double standard was on display during the crown prince’s recent tour of world capitals and Silicon Valley, where he was
generally praised as a “reformer,” and media figures recited his vision for Saudi Arabia in the year 2030 without asking what will be
left of Yemen by the year 2020 if the war continues.
Similarly,this double standard is on display when Western policymakers downplay
Saudi and Emirati violations of Yemenis’ human rights by claiming that a close
partnership with Riyadh is needed to prevent perceived Iranian threats to the international
community, without asking whether that same community is also endangered by Saudi
Arabia’s daily violations of basic international norms. And yes, there is a double
standard in the wall-to-wall coverage of Khashoggi’s horrific murder, when the
daily murder of Yemenis by Saudi Arabia and other parties to the conflict in
Yemen hardly merits mention.
Those in the United States and elsewhere who are incensed by Khashoggi’s murder must summon
similar moral clarity and condemn Saudi Arabia’s daily killing of innocents in
Yemen. If Saudi violations are to be genuinely curtailed, Khashoggi’s killing must
mark the beginning, not the end, of accountability for Saudi crimes. Khashoggi’s
death has been reduced to a single data point, rather than being seen as the result
of subverting universal values in favor of geopolitics or business interests.
Reversing course—ending U.S. military support for the Saudi-Emirati intervention in
Yemen and supporting U.N.-led peace efforts and the reopening of Yemen’s air and sea ports—can still save
millions of lives.
If U.S. lawmakers had spoken up and taken action on Yemen years ago, when Saudi
Arabia’s rampant violations were already well known, thousands of Yemeni
civilians who since then have been killed by airstrikes or starvation would still be
alive today—and perhaps Jamal Khashoggi would be, too.
Blaming “both sides” for the violence absolves the coalition and its primary
arms supplier of responsibility for ongoing war crimes — they’ve killed two-
thirds of civilians.
Larison 19 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2019 (“Saudi Coalition Bombing Causes 2/3 of Yemeni Civilian Casualties,” The American Conservative, June 18th,
Available Online at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/saudi-coalition-bombing-causes-2-3-of-yemeni-civilian-
casualties/, Accessed 06-11-2019)
The Armed Conflict Location Eventa & Data (ACLED) Project released its latest findings on
fatalities caused by the war on Yemen, and now that they have completed their assessment of all data from
the first year of the war they conclude that more than 90,000 have been killed over the
course of the last four years:
BREAKING: #YemenWar Death Toll Exceeds 90,000 According to New @ACLEDINFO Data for 2015
ACLED has now extended #Yemen coverage from the present back through 2015, capturing the full int'l intervention into
the country's civil war. Press release here: https://t.co/GluwkQWLSZ pic.twitter.com/A0uPsp9Rh5
— Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (@ACLEDINFO) June 18, 2019
The death toll reported here does not account for preventable deaths caused by
starvation and disease. As we know from other studies, even more Yemenis have
died from these causes than have been killed by bombs and shells. The overall cost
of the war is much higher than the 90,000+ figure reported by ACLED, and this
new figure is significantly higher than previous casualty estimates. News stories
frequently cited outdated numbers that dramatically understated how many had
lost their lives because of the war. For years, the “official” death toll remained
frozen at 10,000 years after it six or seven times as many people had been killed. Fortunately, that erroneous
information has started to be replaced with more accurate assessments of the
losses inflicted by the war.
Two-thirds of the civilian casualties included in this count were killed by Saudi
coalition airstrikes:
New data from @ACLEDINFO shows at least 91,600 ppl have been killed in Yemen’s war since 2015. Airstrikes by the
Saudi-led coalition account for 67% of civilians killed.
— Sune Engel Rasmussen (@SuneEngel) June 18, 2019
the Saudi coalition is “the actor most responsible for civilian
As ACLED’s summary states,
deaths.” In some parts of Yemen, Saudi coalition responsibility for civilian deaths is even higher than 67%. In those
areas that have come under the heaviest and most indiscriminate bombing, the
percentage of civilian casualties caused by Saudi coalition airstrikes rises to 75%,
and these are the areas that account for most of the total number of civilian
casualties for the entire country:
Living in Hodeidah, Taiz, and Sadah governorates has been extremely lethal for civilians. In each governorate more than
2,000 civilians have been killed since 2015 — combined making up more than half of all civilian fatalities reported in
Yemen since 2015. More than 75% of the direct civilian fatalities in these governorates are caused by airstrikes from the
Saudi-led coalition.
The U.S. shares in the responsibility for causing those thousands of civilian deaths
through our government’s ongoing support for the war and the continued selling of
U.S.-made weapons to Saudi coalition governments. The Trump administration is
determined to continue making the U.S. an accomplice to future Saudi coalition
war crimes with the decision to expedite arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE .
Arms sales constitute ongoing participation in an active genocide — U.S.
complicity is enabling the slaughter.
Bachman 19 — Jeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights and Director of the Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights
MA Program at the School of International Service at American University, holds a Ph.D. in Law and Public Policy from Northeastern
University, 2019 (“A ‘synchronised attack’ on life: the Saudi-led coalition’s ‘hidden and holistic’ genocide in Yemen and the shared
responsibility of the US and UK,” Third World Quarterly, Volume 20, Issue 2, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor
& Francis Online)
Complicity in genocide
It is clear the US and UK have provided the Coalition with aid and assistance that is
essential to its ability to commit its attacks and maintain the blockade, the results
of which, together, constitute genocide. As Hokayem and Roberts state, US (and UK) material and
logistical support are ‘key to the coalition’s operations’.92 Even if the US and UK do
not intend for their support to be used in the commission of genocide, it is irrelevant
to the question of whether they are complicit in the genocide. It is enough that the
US and UK have provided their respective support to the Coalition ‘with a view to facilitating
the coalition’s military campaign’.93
The above is substantiated by the two-part test for state responsibility. The second part, that the act would be wrongful if committed
The same acts being perpetrated by the Coalition would
by the supporting state, is clearly satisfied.
still be genocide if carried out directly by the US and UK. The first part is one of knowledge. Though
more difficult to substantiate, the duration of the Coalition’s genocide in Yemen and the continual
material and logistical support provided by the US and UK amount to implicit
knowledge of the circumstances of the Coalition’s crimes, which would be
significantly more difficult to commit without their support. In other words, the Coalition has
been engaged in its attacks for more than three years now. The US and UK simply cannot plausibly deny
knowledge of the Coalition’s crimes, even if they would resist invoking the ‘g-
word’ to describe them.
The US and UK also cannot deny having knowledge that their material and logistical
support facilitates the Coalition’s crimes. The weapons they have sold to Coalition members have been used
in Yemen and the refueling has allowed the Coalition to carry out its attacks. The US and the UK have also provided additional
US and UK support cannot be
support for the maintenance of the air and naval blockade of Yemen’s ports. Thus,
separated from the crimes it enables. Their aid has been provided in support of
the Coalition’s military campaign and the military campaign constitutes a
genocidal attack on all aspects of life in Yemen. The US and UK have continued to
provide the Coalition with material and logistical support for years with full
knowledge of the crimes being committed and that their support facilitates the
crimes. Some might point to the increased involvement of the US in Coalition
targeting as evidence of an intent to limit Coalition harm to civilians. However, even if
this were the case, the Coalition’s deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on
civilians is neither the only crime nor the only concern. It is also not the only act
that connects Coalition policies to genocide. As argued earlier, the tragic loss of life is one element of a
holistic concept of genocide. Therefore, it must be concluded that the US and UK share responsibility for the
genocide in Yemen.
Conclusion
Like so many cases of genocide committed by powerful state actors or their
benefactors, the Coalition’s genocide in Yemen is hidden in plain sight. This is
possible for two principal and interconnecting reasons. First, there is an unsupported belief that the US
neither commits genocide nor associates with those who do. This is not to say that the US has
escaped criticism for its relations with human rights violators, but rather that when it comes to genocide the more common
critique in political and scholarly discourses is that the US has too often been a bystander. Despite
troves of evidence that refute this belief, it is one that nonetheless is perpetuated.94 It is within this
context that the student protestors at Johns Hopkins University held signs that read ‘It’s Still Genocide When US Allies Do It’ and
‘Samantha Empowers Genocide in Yemen’.
genocide studies is still largely dominated by a limited conception of
Second,
genocide that equates it to mass killing of members of a group with the sole intent
being the destruction of the group. Hence, even though the Genocide Convention
explicitly states that genocide is a crime whether committed in times of peace or
war, there will undoubtedly be some who dismiss the allegations of genocide in Yemen
by asserting that the Coalition is engaged in an armed conflict with Houthi rebels .
Therefore, based on limited conceptions of genocide, the coalition cannot be committing genocide, because its purposes in Yemen are
not to destroy the Yemeni people, but rather to defeat the Houthis. Opponents might also point to the ‘small’ death toll from direct
physical violence, while rejecting the idea that genocide can be committed ‘indirectly’ or by cultural destruction.
Cases of genocide, like that in Yemen, then, are hidden behind a conceptual veil. They
do not conform to the limited conception of genocide that continues to dominate
genocide studies; therefore, they remain at the periphery of the field, if not invisible
altogether. However, a holistic conception of genocide that incorporates Lemkin’s three methods of
genocide, and the eight techniques from which they were derived, reveals the processes by which the very
foundations of group life, both material and non-material, can be destroyed.
When applied to the Coalition, a holistic concept also reveals the ongoing genocide
in Yemen. The Coalition has deliberately attacked civilians in their homes,
markets and mosques, and while attending weddings and funerals. The Coalition
has intentionally destroyed Yemen’s vital civilian infrastructure and cultural
heritage, attacked its hospitals, and imposed an air and naval blockade of Yemeni
ports. It has undermined public health in Yemen, causing tens of thousands of
preventable deaths. Even as this was being written, the Coalition was engaged in assaults on Hudeida and Saada. In
Hudeida, at least 55 people were killed and 170 injured when densely populated districts of the port city were attacked on 2 August
2018, including the areas around Al-Thawra Hospital.95 One week later, on 9 August, a school bus transporting children home to
Saada from a field trip was bombed (using a US-manufactured and -sold MK-82 bomb),96 killing at least 54 people, including 44
children.97 There are also warnings of a second impending cholera epidemic, along with ‘8.4 million Yemenis who are a step away
from famine’.98
The Coalition’s actions in Yemen amount to nothing less than a synchronised
attack on all aspects of life in Yemen, the very foundation of Lemkin’s concept of
genocide. Without the uninterrupted flow of aid and support from the US and UK, the
Coalition would not be capable of committing genocide on the scale that it has
achieved. The provision of military equipment and weapons, along with the mid-air refueling,
targeting advice and support, sharing of intelligence, and expedited munitions resupply and maintenance have made it
possible. The US and UK have provided this aid and support with full knowledge of its consequences. The very fact that
the US has increased its targeting assistance in response to criticism of the
Coalition’s attacks on civilians is evidence of knowledge of the harm being
perpetrated. Therefore, it is incontrovertible that the US and UK share responsibility
with the Coalition for genocide in Yemen.
—— Footnotes ——
92. Hokayem and Roberts, “War in Yemen,” 179.
93. Hathaway et al., “State Responsibility for US Support.”
94. See Bachman, The United States and Genocide.
95. “Yemen: ICRC Deplores Civilian Cost.”
96. See Elbagir et al., “Bomb that Killed 40 Children.”
97. Almosawa, Hubbard and Schmitt, “44 Small Graves”; Abdulkareem, “Mourning and Anger at Funeral.”
98. Adow, “Yemen War.”

The plan quickly shuts down the Saudi coalition’s air-to-ground strike
capabilities for operations in Yemen. This ends the war and jumpstarts peace
negotiations.
Goodman 18 — Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law at New York University School of Law,
Professor of Politics and Professor of Sociology at New York University, Founding Co-Editor-in-Chief of Just Security, Member of
the Council on Foreign Relations, Member of the Advisory Committee on International Law at the U.S. Department of State, former
Special Counsel to the General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense, former Rita E. Hauser Professor of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law at Harvard Law School, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Yale University and a J.D. from Yale Law School, 2018
(“Options for Congress to Respond to Saudi Transgressions: Here’s What Works according to Former Senior U.S. Officials,” Just
Security, October 22nd, Available Online at https://www.justsecurity.org/61172/effective-ineffective-congressional-responses-saudi-
arabia-arm-sales-sanctions-khashoggi/, Accessed 06-08-2019)
What are the more effective and less effective measures that the United States
could pursue in response to recent actions by Saudi Arabia? I asked several
experts, including former senior officials. Their views provide valuable
perspectives on how to think about some of the challenges and tradeoffs with
different approaches.
Among the important insights were statements that reveal potential weaknesses in
current and proposed legislation, including: legislation that relies on executive branch certification
as a condition for further congressional action, legislation that excessively relies
on executive branch discretion in the implementation of sanctions, and legislation
that focus on more symbolic than material forms of U.S. support for the Saudi war
in Yemen. Another theme that several experts raised is to think not only about sanctions to penalize Saudi Arabia for
wrongdoing or sanctions to encourage responsible behavior by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the future, but to think more
broadly about how to orient the U.S. relationship to Riyadh.
Purposes of new congressional action on Saudi Arabia
Despite lack of strong support from the White House, a bipartisan group in Congress seems poised to take action. Last year, an arms
package to Saudi Arabia was almost blocked, missing by just 4 votes. In recent days, at least three Republican Senators who voted in
favor of that arms sale—Senators Bob Corker (R-TN), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and Marco Rubio (R-FL)—have come out strongly
against Riyadh and in favor of substantive repercussions the Kingdom will likely face in light of Jamal Khashoggi’s death. Ten
Republican Senators who voted for the 2017 arms sale including Corker, Graham, and Rubio, signed a letter to President Trump
triggering the sanctions process against Saudi officials under the Global Magnitsy Act [John Barrasso (R-Wyo.), Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.),
Cory Gardner (R-Colo.), Johnny Isakson (R-Ga.), Rob Portman (R-Ohio), Ron Johnson (R-Wis.), Jim Risch (R-Idaho)]. Also earlier
this month, and over one week into the Khashoggi crisis, two other Republican Senators who had voted in favor of the 2017 arms sale
—Senators Susan Collins (R-ME) and Jerry Moran (R-KS)—signed a bipartisan letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo challenging
his recent certification that Saudi Arabia had taken sufficient steps to reduce civilian casualties to warrant the same continued U.S.
support for the Saudi-coalition in Yemen.
The question now turns to what precise measures Congress should adopt in
response to Saudi Arabia. The answer to that turns on the particular purposes in mind. Brian McKeon, former Under
Secretary for Policy at the Department of Defense and now senior director at the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global
Engagement, told me, “I think the question really is what is the goal. Is it to untie ourselves from the stain of the war in Yemen? Or to
send a broader signal to the Kingdom that there’s a price to pay for their behavior in murdering Khashoggi and then lying to everyone
about it? If the former, a statute, whether in an appropriations bill or otherwise, could readily bar some or all support for the conflict.
And if the policy choice is that continuation of the war is a mistake, or at least US direct involvement, then I should think members
would want to ban any continued support. It would need to be combined with more pressure on KSA and the UAE to get serious about
a resolution of the conflict.”
All of these purposes may now be on the table. As the latest in a series of extremely wanton acts by the Saudi leadership, the killing of
Khashoggi has triggered a significant reevaluation of the U.S. relationship with Riyadh. Depending on which set of purposes Congress
an issue is what legislative measures would be more or less likely to
has in mind,
pressure Sadia Arabia to effectuate U.S. policy goals.
Menu of options
I focused my conversations with former U.S. officials and other experts on the following set of options:
1. Bar future foreign military sales (FMS) relating to air-to-ground strike capabilities for
operations in Yemen (e.g., precision-guided munitions)
2. Suspend existing Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) licenses relating to air-to-ground strike
capabilities for operations in Yemen (e.g., for maintenance and sustainment of
fighter aircraft)
3. Bar appropriations for in-flight refueling of Saudi aircraft conducting missions
in Yemen
4. Adopt targeted and mandatory financial sanctions of the senior-most Saudi officials.
5. Push for Global Magnitsky Act sanctions
6. Other options
This list does not include suspending U.S. support for defensive weapons systems,
and none of the experts suggested placing such support on the list. One former official who
supported measures to suspend arms sales specially highlighted the importance of maintaining U.S. support for defensive systems to
protect Saudi Arabia from threats coming over its border from Houthi militants. “We should not suspend THAAD or sale of other
weapons necessary to defend the KSA from missile/rocket attacks. And we should send a strong signal to Iran that any effort to
exploit this moment will be met with a harsh response,” the former official said.
One recurring theme involved concerns about predicating any approach on
executive branch certification, such as the State Department’s determination that
Saudi Arabia met specified conditions. A former senior official told me, “I don’t like any approach that
involves certification requirements, because this administration has shown it’s prepared to certify
just about anything (other than the manifest Iranian compliance with the JCPOA).”
[Editor’s note: on the Secretary of Defense’s recent certification of Saudi Arabia and the UAE actions in the Yemen war, see Larry
Lewis, “Grading the Pompeo Certification on Yemen War and Civilian Protection: Time for Serious Reconsideration,” and Ryan
Goodman, “Annotation of Sec. Pompeo’s Certification of Yemen War: Civilian Casualties and the Saudi-Led Coalition.”]
Options 1-3
It is important to separate option 1 (includes blocking future arm sales) and option
2 (includes suspending maintenance and logistics for existing weapons systems),
because the latter may have more immediate effects on Saudi offensive military
operations in Yemen. In short, Riyadh would have no readily available substitute for
maintaining and servicing existing American weapons systems. On Fox News Sunday, Senator
Rand Paul said, “We have incredible leverage. … They can’t last a couple of months
without parts and mechanics to help them run their air force.” National Review’s David French
wrote:
“American F-15s comprise close to half the Saudi fighter force, and the Saudi variant of the F-15E Strike Eagle represents
They can’t just waltz over to a different
a substantial portion of the air force’s striking power….
country and transform their armed forces — not without suffering
enormous setbacks in readiness and effectiveness during a years-long
transition. A fundamental reality of arms deals is that a major arms
purchase essentially locks the purchasing nation in a dependent posture
for training, spare parts, and technical upgrades.”
Threatening support for Saudi Arabia’s war machine can serve a variety of
purposes.
First, such levers present a potentially significant stick and carrot for achieving
policy goals that are broader than the Yemen war. As Senator Macro Rubio stated earlier this month on
CNN’s State of the Union, “Arm sales are important, not because of the money, but because it also provides
leverage over their future behavior….They will need our spare parts. They will
need our training. And those are things we can use to influence their behavior.”
Options 1-3 can also help curtail Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s misadventures, if not
his leadership of the Saudi government itself. Bruce Riedel, who served as senior adviser on South Asia
and the Middle East to the last four presidents, explained in a recent essay, “Responsibility for the war is on Mohammed bin Salman,
Shaking the arms relationship is by far the
who as defense minister has driven Riyadh into this quagmire.
most important way to clip his wings.” A former Obama official said as well, “The message
needs to be that the relationship is being frozen unless MBS moves aside. What
Yemen and the Gulf crisis and Khashoggi affair have clarified is that MBS has
allows personal pique and vendettas to override any impulse to reform. He has
made the region an even more dangerous place, and, left to his own devices, is
very likely to drag us into regional conflict. So I would pursue 4 and 2, with the former underscoring our
message that MBS needs to step aside, and the latter grounding their Air Force, to both add internal pressure on MBS and to pressure
the Saudis to negotiate a resolution to Yemen.”
Options 1-3 can, indeed, serve purposes specific to the Yemen War, including
distancing the United States from support for Saudi crimes and encouraging the Saudis
and United Arab Emirates to finally bring the war to a close through political
negotiations.
In a New Yorker Radio Hour interview with David Remnick back in March, Riedel explained, “ The United States is not a
direct party to the war, but we are an enabler of the war. If the United States decided
today that it was going to cut off supplies, spare parts, munitions, intelligence, and
everything else to the Royal Saudi Airforce, it would be grounded tomorrow.”
One former senior official suggested tying arm sales to different sets of purposes, “I think Congress should pause all FMS and end
other support to the Saudi campaign in Yemen. Resumption of arms sales should be conditioned on Riyadh agreeing to a fully
transparent international investigation into the Khashoggi incident, regular intelligence community assessments of Saudi efforts to
reduce civilian casualties in Yemen, and a report from the administration outlining their strategy for addressing the humanitarian crisis
in Yemen and producing a peaceful settlement.”
Another former senior official supported a clean break from U.S. support for the Yemen war rather than a piecemeal approach. “On
A clean end to US military
Yemen, the best move would be to support the Khanna-Murphy War Powers resolution.
support for the Saudi-UAE war in Yemen is better than more targeted efforts to
police that support (like the bar on in-flight refueling). Suspending existing DCS
licenses and placing limits on future foreign military sales for things like air-to-
ground strike capabilities would be a natural supplement to this approach,” the former
official said.
Jeffrey Prescott, who served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf States on the
National Security Council and now a strategic consultant to the Penn Biden Center expressed a similar perspective, “My view is that
the callous murder of Mr. Khashoggi — and the Trump administration’s clear impulse to sweep it under the rug — demonstrates how
far the relationship with Saudi Arabia has gotten off track, and the need for serious consequences. As a start, we could use this
moment to extricate ourselves from military involvement in the disastrous war in Yemen, a step that is long overdue. Ideally we would
simultaneously help push for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict – necessary, not easy, and very unlikely given how little effort the
washing our hands of involvement in the war,
Trump administration has put into serious diplomacy. But
even in the absence of a US diplomatic push, will still put pressure on UAE and
Saudi to end the conflict.”
Professor Mohamad Bazzi, who is writing a book on proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran, had a similar assessment of the
Together,
effectiveness of suspending US military support as a means to effectuate a resolution to the conflict. Bazzi told me, “
actions 1, 2, and 3 (likely in that order of effectiveness) would go significantly
beyond the Obama administration’s freeze on the sale of precision-guided
munitions to Riyadh in late 2016. They would signal to the Saudis and Emiratis
that US military assistance will now truly become contingent on progress in
political negotiations. I suspect that’s the only way Saudi and UAE leaders can be
convinced to pursue a political settlement, which the Trump administration agrees
(at least rhetorically) is the path to ending this war.”
Notably, in my interviews with former U.S. officials, suspension of in-flight refueling
(option 3) was generally considered a weak measure on its own, treated as a
supplement or afterthought to other measures. That may be due to the percentage
of Saudi aircraft that actually depend on such refueling and the Saudis’ ability to
replace U.S. in-air refueling with other substitutes. Concerns about the utility of option 3 as a pressure
point is especially important because it is the only measure that’s triggered by section 1290 of the McCain National Defense
Authorization Act if the Secretary of State fails to certify that the Saudis are taking appropriate steps to reduce civilian casualties in
Yemen.

The plan would force the coalition to change its strategy and cease its combat
operations.
Riedel 18 — Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow and Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project and Senior Fellow in the Center
for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, former Senior Advisor on South Asia and the Middle East on the National
Security Council at the White House during the H.W. Bush, Clinton, W. Bush, and Obama Administrations, former Professor at the
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, holds an M.A. in Medieval Islamic History from Harvard University, 2018
(“After Khashoggi, US arms sales to the Saudis are essential leverage,” The Brookings Institution, October 10 th, Available Online at
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/10/after-khashoggi-us-arms-sales-to-the-saudis-are-essential-leverage/,
Accessed 06-11-2019)
Trump visited Saudi Arabia and said he had concluded $110
Eighteen months ago, Donald
billion dollars in arms sales with the kingdom. It was fake news then and it’s still fake
news today. The Saudis have not concluded a single major arms deal with
Washington on Trump’s watch. Nonetheless, the U.S. arms relationship with the
kingdom is the most important leverage Washington has as it contemplates
reacting to the alleged murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
Follow the money
In June 2017, after the president’s visit to Riyadh—his first official foreign travel—we published a Brookings blog post detailing that
his claims to have sold $110 billion in weapons were spurious. Other media outlets subsequently came to the same conclusion. When
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman visited the White House this year, the president indirectly confirmed that non-deal by
chiding the prince for spending only “peanuts” on arms from America.
The Saudis have continued to buy spare parts, munitions, and technical support for
the enormous amount of American equipment they have bought from previous
administrations. The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) is entirely dependent on American and
British support for its air fleet of F15 fighter jets, Apache helicopters, and Tornado
aircraft. If either Washington or London halts the flow of logistics, the RSAF will
be grounded. The Saudi army and the Saudi Arabian National Guard are
similarly dependent on foreigners (the Saudi Arabian National Guard is heavily dependent on Canada). The
same is also true for the Saudis allies like Bahrain.
Under President Obama, Saudi Arabia spent well over $110 billion in U.S. weapons, including for aircraft, helicopters, and air defense
missiles. These deals were the largest in American history. Saudi commentators routinely decried Obama for failing to protect Saudi
interests, but the kingdom loved his arms deals.
But the kingdom has not bought any new arms platform during the Trump administration. Only one has even been seriously discussed:
A $15 billion deal for THAAD, terminal high altitude area defense missiles, has gotten the most attention and preliminary approval
from Congress, but the Saudis let pass a September deadline for the deal with Lockheed Martin. The Saudis certainly need more air
defenses with the pro-Iran Zaydi Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen firing ballistic missiles at Saudi cities.
The three and a half year-old Saudi war in Yemen is hugely expensive. There are no public figures from
the Saudi government about the war’s costs, but a conservative estimate would be at least $50 billion per year. Maintenance
costs for aircraft and warships go up dramatically when they are constantly in
combat operations. The Royal Saudi Navy has been blockading Yemen for over
40 months. The RSAF has conducted thousands of air strikes. The war is draining
the kingdom’s coffers. And responsibility for the war is on Mohammed bin Salman, who
as defense minister has driven Riyadh into this quagmire. Shaking the arms
relationship is by far the most important way to clip his wings.
Avenging Khashoggi
Congress now has the power to make a serious decision, halting arms sales and
the logistics train for the kingdom in the wake of the reported murder of Saudi critic Jamal Khashoggi in the
Saudi Consulate in Istanbul Turkey last week. The outrageous attack on Jamal deserves serious reaction, and given Trump’s
dereliction of duty on the matter, it is up to Congress to act. The president may try to
override a Senate arms stand-down but it would be a painful setback for the
prince.

The plan’s clear signal of U.S. disapproval would override other supportive
Trump administration policies — it’s the only signal they’ll take seriously.
Spindel 19 — Jennifer Spindel, Assistant Professor in the Department of International and Area Studies and Associate Director
of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center at the University of Oklahoma, former Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Institute for Security
and Conflict Studies at George Washington University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota, 2019
(“The Case For Suspending American Arms Sales To Saudi Arabia,” War on the Rocks, May 14th, Available Online at
https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/, Accessed 06-07-2019)
Arms Embargos Are Signals and Can Build Coalitions
Policymakers and scholars agree that arms embargoes are not effective “sticks” in international politics. Rarely do states cave when
even if an arms embargo isn’t a direct tool of
faced with punishment in the form of an embargo. But
coercion, an embargo would be an important political signal. There are at least two reasons
for the United States to seriously consider an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia.
arms sales are signals that cut through the noise of the international system.
First,
Cutting off arms transfers is a common way that states express their dissatisfaction
with others and try to influence behavior. As Lawrence Freedman observed in 1978, “refusing to
sell arms is a major political act. It appears as a calculated insult, reflecting on
the stability, trust, and credit-worthiness, or technical competence of the would-be
recipient.” Yet this crucial point seems to have been lost in the current policy debate about whether or not the United States
should continue selling arms to Saudi Arabia. My research shows that stopping arms transfers or
denying requests is an effective way to signal dissatisfaction and causes the
would-be recipient to re-think their behavior.
Take, for example, the U.S. relationship with Israel in the 1960s. The United States sold
Israel Hawk surface-to-surface missiles in 1962, M-48 Patton tanks in 1964 and 1965, and A-
4E Skyhawk bombers in 1966. Israeli leaders understood that these transfers signaled
a close U.S.-Israeli relationship. As diplomat Abba Eban wrote, the arms transfers were “a
development of tremendous political value.” Even against this backdrop of close
ties and significant arms sales, Israeli leaders were extremely sensitive to arms
transfer denials. In April and May 1967, the United States denied Israeli requests for armored
personnel carriers and fighter jets. Approving the transfers would have signaled
support, and likely emboldened Israel, as tensions were growing in the region.
Israeli leaders believed these transfer denials overruled prior signals and
demonstrated that the United States was not willing to be a close political ally for
Israel. Eban described Israel as “isolated,” and the head of Israel’s intelligence service said that the
arms transfer denials made it clear that “in Israel, there existed certain
misperceptions [about the United States].” If arms transfer denials could have such a
significant effect on Israeli thinking — keeping in mind that there was a close and
significant political relationship between the US and Israel — imagine what a
transfer denial would mean for U.S.-Saudi relations. Like Israel, Saudi Arabia
would have to re-think its impression that it has political support and approval
from the United States. We can, and should, ask whether or not withdrawal of U.S. support would affect Saudi behavior, but
it’s important that this question not get overlooked in the current debate.
Because arms transfers (and denials) are powerful signals, they can have an effect
even before a transfer is actually completed. This suggests that even the
announcement of an embargo against Saudi Arabia could have an effect. Take, for
example, Taiwan’s recent request for a fleet of new fighter jets . As reports mounted that Trump had
given “tacit approval” to a deal for F-16 jets, China’s protests increased. The United States has not sold advanced fighter jets to
Taiwan since 1992, partially out of fear of angering China, which views Taiwan as a renegade province. Even if the deal for F-16s is
formally approved, Taiwan is unlikely to see the jets until at least 2021, and the balance of power between China and Taiwan would
not change. As one researcher observed, the sale would be a “huge shock” for Beijing, “But it would be more of a political shock than
a military shock. It would be, ‘Oh, the U.S. doesn’t care how we feel.’ It would be more of a symbolic or emotional issue.” Yet
China’s immediate, negative reaction to even the announcement of a potential deal
shows how powerful arms transfer signals can be.
If this same logic is applied to an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia, an arms
embargo would signal that Saudi Arabia does not have the support of the United
States. This signal would be an important first step in changing Saudi behavior
because it would override other statements and actions the United States has sent
that indicate support. And Trump has given Saudi Arabia a number of positive
signals: He called Saudi Arabia a “great ally” and dismissed reports that that the
Saudi government was involved in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He has
expressed interested in selling nuclear power plants and technology to Saudi Arabia.
And he has repeatedly claimed that he has made a $110 billion arms deal with
Saudi Arabia (he hasn’t). With these clear signals of support, why should Saudi
Arabia alter its behavior based on resolutions that come out of the House or
Senate, which are likely to be vetoed by Trump, anyway? An arms embargo would
be a clear and unambiguous signal that the United States disproves of Saudi actions
in Yemen.

The plan provides political cover for allies like France and the UK to join the
embargo. This increases pressure on the coalition.
Spindel 19 — Jennifer Spindel, Assistant Professor in the Department of International and Area Studies and Associate Director
of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center at the University of Oklahoma, former Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Institute for Security
and Conflict Studies at George Washington University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota, 2019
(“The Case For Suspending American Arms Sales To Saudi Arabia,” War on the Rocks, May 14th, Available Online at
https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/, Accessed 06-07-2019)
The second reason for supporting an embargo concerns U.S. allies and the logistical difficulties of making an embargo have an effect.
One of the reasons embargoes have little material impact is because they require
cooperation among weapons exporting states. A ban on sales from one country
will have little effect if the target of the embargo can seek arms elsewhere.
Germany, instituted an arms ban against Riyadh in November 2018, and German leaders
have pressured other European states to stop selling arms to the Saudis. Germany
understands the importance of the embargo as a political signal: as a representative of the
German Green Party explained, “ The re-start of arms exports to Saudi Arabia would be a fatal
foreign policy signal and would contribute to the continued destabilization of the
Middle East.” But the German embargo has had minimal effect because Saudi
Arabia can get arms elsewhere.
According to the 2019 Military Balance, most of Saudi Arabia’s equipment is American or
French in origin, such as the M1A2 Abrams and AMX-30 tanks, Apache and Dauphin helicopters, and F-15C/D fighter jets.
Saudi Arabia has some equipment manufactured wholly or in part in Germany, such
as the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Tornado ground attack craft, but these weapons are a small portion of
its complete arsenal. A U.S. embargo would send an important signal to the
allies who also supply Saudi Arabia, allowing them to explain participation in
the embargo to their own domestic constituencies. This is especially important
for countries like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, that need to export arms
to keep their own production lines running. While the research shows that
sustaining an arms embargo is often the most difficult step, embargoes can restrain
sending states’ arms exports. Even if a U.S. embargo won’t have a direct effect on
Saudi Arabia on its own, an embargo is important for building coalitions for a
more expansive embargo that could affect Saudi behavior.

Immediate action is vital to prevent Trump’s emergency sales.

Abramson 19 — Jeff Abramson, Non-Resident Senior Fellow for Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers at the
Arms Control Association, Manager of the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor—the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine
Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions, Organizer of the Forum on the Arms Trade—a network of civil society experts,
former Policy Advisor and Director to the Secretariat of Control Arms—the global civil society alliance that championed the adoption
of the Arms Trade Treaty, holds an M.P.P. from the University of California-Berkeley, 2019 (“U.S. "Emergency" Arms Sales to Saudi
Arabia and United Arab Emirates,” Forum on the Arms Trade, May 23rd, Available Online at
https://www.forumarmstrade.org/ussaudimay2019.html, Accessed 06-11-2019)
In his dealings with Riyadh, and more broadly in his revised conventional arms
transfer policy, President Trump has made clear his desire to sell more weapons, more
quickly, often without proper concern for human rights or wise restraint. His
expected use of emergency powers to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia without
Congressional approval is dangerous, but not surprising. All parties to the conflict
in Yemen have abused weapons to the detriment of civilians there. Adding more
U.S. weapons into the mix promises to further the humanitarian crisis in Yemen
and undermines U.S. leverage to promote peace. Trump should not take this
step.
Congress can and should act on U.S. involvement in the war in Yemen, as it is
increasingly doing by passing War Powers resolutions and taking other steps. In this
case, the chair and ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or House Foreign Affairs Committee can invoke their
Congress
seldom used authority to demand a pre-delivery notification before any weapons are transferred to Saudi Arabia.
should also immediately consider measures to halt arms deliveries to Saudi
Arabia and other countries that have already demonstrated a record of misusing
them in Yemen.
The plan blocks sales already in the pipeline.
Hartung 19 — William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, former
Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, former Director of the Arms Trade
Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, 2019 (“Trump’s ‘Emergency’ Sale To Saudi Arabia Must Not Stand,” LobeLog—the
Inter Press Service’s blog, May 24th, Available Online at https://lobelog.com/trumps-emergency-sale-to-saudi-arabia-must-not-stand/,
Accessed 06-07-2019)
The problem with Trump’s arms sales policy towards Saudi Arabia isn’t how
much he’s been selling, but the nature of the deals. Early in his term he reversed an
Obama administration suspension of a deal for precision-guided bombs to Saudi Arabia, and
now he is trying to push through another sale by undermining the right of Congress
to scrutinize such sales.
Sen. Menendez has pledged to use “legislative and other means to nullify these and
any planned ongoing sales.” Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) has called the emergency maneuver
“a big mistake,” and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has said he would “not do business with
Saudi Arabia until we have a better reckoning” of the role of Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Congressional opponents
are mulling the best way to block the deal, and time is of the essence.
One option would be to push legislation to block the transfer, sale, or authorization
for license of bombs and other offensive weapons to the Saudi regime. Crucially, such
a measure would stop bomb sales already in the pipeline. The time to act is now.
 1AC — Plan
The United States federal government should bar foreign military sales and
suspend direct commercial sales licenses to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates relating to air-to-ground strike capabilities for
operations in Yemen.
 1AC — Iran Advantage
Contention Two is Iran

U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia increase the risk of U.S.-Iran war.
DePetris 19 — Daniel R. DePetris, Fellow at Defense Priorities, Middle East and Foreign Policy Analyst at Wikistrat, Inc.,
Researcher at the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts, Columnist at the National Interest, The American
Conservative, The Huffington Post, and The Washington Examiner, holds an M.A. in Political Science from the Maxwell School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, 2019 (“Trump’s Decision to Arm the Saudis Against Iran Will End in
Disaster,” The American Conservative, May 28th, Available Online at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/trumps-
decision-to-arm-the-saudis-against-iran-will-end-in-disaster/, Accessed 06-11-2019)
Developments in the Persian Gulf are heating up, and they are heating up fast.
An additional 1,500 U.S. troops are packing their bags for the region—this on top of
an accelerated deployment of an American aircraft carrier battle group and B-52
bombers. Add to that pledges of steadfast resistance from Iranian President Hassan
Rouhani and personal animus between American and Iranian officials, and you’ve
got a very real possibility that an abrupt miscalculation could become a war that
almost no one wants.
It’s obvious what this situation calls for: a direct line of communication between
Washington and Tehran with the express purpose of calming the waters and
preventing a conflagration. And yet the Trump administration seems to be gunning
for the opposite—more bellicose threats, more military assets, and more sanctions .
More weapons sales are also evidently part of the picture. Last Friday, the administration
officially informed Senator Robert Menendez, the top Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, that it
would leverage a little-used loophole in the Arms Export Control Act to expedite the sale of
arms to Saudi Arabia, Iran’s chief regional adversary. President Trump has declared
that “an emergency exists which requires the proposed sale in the national security interest of the United States.”
That allows him to completely bypass Congress and finalize the sale on his own .
The provision, meant to be used in only the most dire emergencies, essentially eviscerates the congressional
review process and steals power away from lawmakers who would ordinarily need
to sign off on such a move.
One envisions National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo whispering
in Trump’s ear as he sits behind the big desk in the Oval that sending more
weapons to Riyadh will deliver a message of resolve (a favorite Beltway buzzword) to the
Iranians.
But there aren’t enough adjectives in Webster’s dictionary to describe just how
counterproductive, and, well, plain dumb this would be.
First, such a decision would demonstrate total and complete contempt for a
bipartisan majority in both houses of Congress that just two months ago voted to pull U.S.
military support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. President Trump went on to veto the resolution
shortly thereafter, rendering the effort moot. Yet the fact that the measure passed was a clear-cut
expression of congressional intent—the first time in history that the 1973 War Powers Act was used successfully
in an attempt to withdraw the United States from an overseas conflict that wasn’t authorized by Congress. Trump would be
spitting in the face of the legislative branch were he to continue this aggressive
stance towards Iran.
Trump, of course, has shown that he doesn’t particularly care much about Congress’s concerns. But presumably, he does care about
getting the United States out of the Middle East’s proxy conflicts and sectarianism-infected rivalries. This is one of the main reasons
more weapons to the Saudis is such a colossal mistake. By tying Washington to the Kingdom so
closely, it reinforces a narrative already prevalent among the Gulf monarchies that
Trump is a man who can not only be bought but used.
The fact that Washington is selling these weapons to Riyadh rather than giving
them away doesn’t make this ordeal any less pathetic. The president may not grasp the connection,
but by opening up America’s arsenal to the Saudis, he is indirectly deepening
America’s role as a combatant in a Saudi-Iranian rivalry that has torn the
Middle East apart and done next to nothing to make the American people safer. At a time when the United States should
be rebalancing its force posture and taking a hard look at where and how it allocates its limited military resources, Trump is
bringing us deeper into a region of diminishing geopolitical importance.
Finally, we need to evaluate this latest arms sale through the prism of today’s events. American-Iranian relations
are in the pits. Direct communication between the two nations is likely
nonexistent. Washington is passing messages and warnings to Tehran through
intermediaries like the Iraqis, Omanis, and Swiss. And the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
remains on high alert status, monitoring moves by U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf
that could be construed as aggressive or preparations for an attack.
Trump has talked rightly about war being the last thing he wants and has broached
the idea of a bilateral negotiation with Tehran on issues of concern. Establishing
more communication nodes with the Iranians is the correct approach.
More weapons in the hands of the Saudis, however, sends Iran the opposite message
—that the United States is only interested in talking if the topic is full surrender. And
if Iran remains resistant to the idea, Washington will sell munitions to its
adversaries until it’s ready to sign off like the Japanese in 1945.
It should go without saying that this is not something the Iranians will respond kindly to.
The administration is confident that maximum pressure will eventually frighten
Iran to the table where it will give up everything. More likely is the opposite—the
Iranians will stiffen their spines.
It’s not too late for President Trump to reverse a potentially calamitous decision. For
the good of America’s security, one hopes he has second thoughts and recognizes
that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia don’t always align.

The Saudis are intentionally pushing the U.S. into a war with Iran to distract
from their quagmire in Yemen.
Riedel 19 — Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow and Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project and Senior Fellow in the Center
for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, former Senior Advisor on South Asia and the Middle East on the National
Security Council at the White House during the H.W. Bush, Clinton, W. Bush, and Obama Administrations, former Professor at the
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, holds an M.A. in Medieval Islamic History from Harvard University, 2019
(“Why Saudi Arabia is focused on tensions with Iran,” Al-Monitor, May 20th, Available Online at https://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/05/saudi-arabia-mohammed-bin-salman-military-action-iran.html, Accessed 07-02-2019)
Saudi Arabia is eager for the United States to take military action against Iran in the
expectation that it will lead to regime change in Tehran. Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman, who is the leading hawk, has a disastrous track record in military affairs. The
Saudis have called for an Arab summit in Mecca on May 30 to rally support against Iran.
The Saudi government-controlled and -directed press is openly pushing for
“surgical strikes” by the United States against targets in Iran. One editorial said that such
strikes are necessary because of the sabotage of Saudi oil tankers off Fujairah in the
United Arab Emirates and the Houthis' drone attacks on the east-west oil pipeline in
Saudi Arabia. Both attacks are blamed on Iran; the Saudi leadership has publicly
blamed Iran for the drones' attack, saying the Houthis are Tehran's puppets.
Other opinion pieces argue that the Iranians have a weak military that would be easily defeated by America’s forces, and that a
military humiliation would lead to popular demonstrations and the end of the clerical regime. Under this theory, the Iranians' allies,
including Hezbollah, would also be destroyed in a war, although they would impose unprecedented damage on Israel in the process.
The damage Iran and its allies would do to the Saudis and other gulf states is left unstated.
The crown prince was the driver behind the kingdom’s disastrous decision to go
to war in Yemen over four years ago as defense minister. Then Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-
Faisal was skeptical about the decision but he was in poor health and was ignored
by the king, who backed his son. The head of the Saudi National Guard was not consulted.
The result is an expensive quagmire for the kingdom and a humanitarian
catastrophe for Yemen. A recent study commissioned by the United Nations estimates a quarter million Yemenis have
died due to the war. The Houthis have brought Saudi cities and oil installations under fire. The drones used last week demonstrated a
significant improvement in Houthi capabilities. The Iranians and Hezbollah have provided expertise and equipment to help the Zaydi
Shiite rebels. But the Houthis are not Iranian pawns and make their own strategic decisions. Support for the Houthis is cheap for Iran.
The crown prince is eager to draw attention away from the Yemen imbroglio
and his reckless decisions there. The war has become a public relations disaster
for the Saudi prince in Europe and the United States. The Democrats are using it as a campaign issue in the
2020 elections.
Mohammed also wants to distract attention away from the premeditated murder of
Jamal Khashoggi. The prince's lame cover-up of his role in allegedly ordering the execution of the Washington
Post columnist has collapsed. The US Congress is considering a bill to prevent those involved in the murder to be prohibited
from getting a visa to come to the United States, an effective way to punish the mastermind.
The prince wants public and congressional attention to focus on Iran instead. But
that seems unlikely. The press and the Hill are deeply skeptical about another war
in the Middle East with a foe four times bigger than Iraq.
Traditionally Saudi Arabia has been risk averse and sought conflict avoidance . King
Abdullah was very critical of Iran but was not supportive of military action. He
deliberately obscured the Iranians' role in the Khobar Towers terrorist attack to
avoid war. He was against the Bush administration war with Iraq.
The Saudis are making pro forma statements against a regional war but it appears
the palace wants a limited US military operation. The Mecca summit is likely
to brand Iran as a terrorist state. Washington should be cooling tensions and
talking sense to Riyadh. Instead, the president is threatening Iran with tweets
which only encourage the Saudis' reckless behavior.

They’re also pushing U.S.-Iran war to compensate for their weakening

coalition.
Ayoob 17 — Mohammed Ayoob, University Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Relations and Coordinator of
the Muslim Studies Program at Michigan State University, Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Policy, 2017 (“Saudi Arabia's Great
Gamble,” The National Interest, November 25th, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/saudi-arabias-great-
gamble-23348, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Given this constellation of forces,it is extremely unrealistic for MbS and his courtiers to expect Iran to
give in to Saudi ambitions in relation to the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle
East. The attempt by the Saudi regime to portray its rivalry with Iran in Sunni-Shia
terms can also be expected to backfire. The most important non-Arab Sunni country, Turkey, has
already moved considerably closer to Iran than it was before the Qatar crisis erupted. Sunni Qatar’s
recent defection from the Saudi camp and into Iran’s arms can be read as a sign of
things to come in the Gulf region. It is worth noting in this context that Qatar is the only Wahhabi state other than Saudi
Arabia and thus would have been expected to demonstrate greater ideological affinity with its larger neighbor. Oman, which
already has good relations with Tehran, looks like the next potential defector from
the Saudi orbit with Kuwait, which has a 30–40 percent Shia population.
MbS’s aggressiveness toward Iran and his deliberately provocative religio-
political rhetoric vis-à-vis Tehran are only likely to hasten this process. And, if it comes to a
military showdown, the Saudi forces, despite the top-of-the-line military
equipment Riyadh has acquired from the United States and its allies, will likely be unable to
match the battle-hardened Iranian military and the IRGC, which are well-known for their capacity
to improvise in times of conflict. This is why Riyadh is itching to sell its conflict with
Hezbollah and with Iran to the United States as a part of the continuing confrontation
between the Trump administration and Tehran, thus enticing Washington into a
shooting war with Tehran. In other words, as one analyst suggests, Riyadh wants to fight Tehran
to the last American.

Even in the best case, a U.S. war with Iran would escalate into a massive
Middle East war.
Goldenberg 19 — Ilan Goldenberg, Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a
New American Security, Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, former Chief of Staff to the
Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations at the U.S. Department of State, former Senior Professional Staff Member covering
Middle East issues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former Special Advisor on the Middle East and Iran Team Chief in the
Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense, holds an M.A. in International Affairs from
Columbia University, 2019 (“What a War With Iran Would Look Like,” Foreign Affairs, June 4th, Available Online at
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2019-06-04/what-war-iran-would-look, Accessed 06-13-2019)
Tensions between Iran and the United States are at their highest point in years. The 2015
Iran nuclear agreement is teetering. The Trump administration is using sanctions to strangle the Iranian economy and in May deployed
an aircraft carrier, a missile defense battery, and four bombers to the Middle East. Washington has evacuated nonessential personnel
from its embassy in Baghdad, citing intelligence suggesting that Iran is increasingly willing to hit U.S. targets through its military
proxies abroad.
The United States also stated that Iran almost certainly perpetrated the recent damage to oil tankers flagged by Saudi Arabia, Norway,
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and claimed that Iran had temporarily loaded missiles onto small boats in the Persian Gulf. In
early May, U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton publicly threatened a response to any Iranian attacks, “whether by proxy, the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards [sic] Corps or regular Iranian forces.”
The good news is that the situation is not as bad as it appears. None of the players
—with the possible exception of Bolton—seem to really want a war. Iran’s military strategy is to keep tensions at a
low boil and avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. Washington struck a tough public posture with its recent troop
deployment, but the move was neither consequential nor terribly unusual. If the United States were truly preparing for a war, the flow
of military assets into the region would be much more dramatic.
The bad news is that a war could still happen. Even if neither side wants to fight,
miscalculation, missed signals, and the logic of escalation could conspire to turn
even a minor clash into a regional conflagration—with devastating effects for
Iran, the United States, and the Middle East.
A conflict would most likely start with a small, deniable attack by Iran on a U.S.-
related target. Iran’s leaders, in this scenario, decide that it is time to stand up to U.S. President Donald Trump. Shiite militias
in Iraq with ties to Iran hit a U.S. military convoy in Iraq, killing a number of soldiers, or Iranian operatives attack another oil tanker
in the Persian Gulf, this time causing an oil spill. Tehran knows from past experience that such attacks do not result in direct
retaliation from Washington, provided they are somewhat deniable. Iranian proxies in Iraq, for example, killed roughly 600 American
soldiers from 2003 to 2011, with few consequences for Iran.
But this time is different. Following the Iranian attack, the Trump administration decides to strike at several military sites in Iran, just
as it hit Syrian targets in 2017 and 2018 after the regime of President Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons. Using air and naval
assets already stationed in the Middle East, the United States strikes an Iranian port or hits a training camp for Iraqi Shiite fighters in
Iran. Through public and private channels, the U.S. government communicates that it conducted a one-time strike to “reestablish
deterrence” and that if Iran backs off, it will face no further consequences. Ideally, the Iranian leadership pulls back, and things end
there.
But what if Iran does not respond the way Assad did? After all, Assad was fighting for his very survival in a years-long civil war and
knew better than to pull the United States any further into that fight. Iran’s leader has many more options than the beleaguered Syrian
president did. The Islamic Republic can use proxy forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen to attack the United States
and its partners. It has an arsenal of ballistic missiles that can target U.S. bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
Its mines and land-based antiship missiles can wreak havoc in the Strait of Hormuz and drive up global oil prices. Iran has the capacity
to shut down a significant portion of Saudi oil production with aggressive sabotage or cyberattacks, and with its paramilitary unit
known as the Quds Force, Iran can attack U.S. targets around the globe.
Between the United States and Iran there is a distinct potential for misunderstanding,
not least when both actors are making decisions under time pressure, on the basis
of uncertain information, and in a climate of deep mutual distrust. Iran may
mistake a one-off strike by the United States as the beginning of a significant military
campaign that requires an immediate and harsh response. The danger that the United
States will send confusing signals to the Iranians is especially high given Trump’s
tendency to go off on Twitter and the fact that his national security adviser has
articulated a more hawkish agenda than his own.
The two sides will also face an intense security dilemma, with each side’s
defensive measures appearing aggressive to the other side. Suppose that during the crisis the
United States decides to send aircraft carriers, battleships, bombers, and fighters to the region to defend itself and its allies. Iran’s
military leaders might infer that Washington is gearing up for a bigger attack. Similarly, imagine that Iran decides to protect its
missiles and mines from a preemptive U.S. strike by moving them out of storage and dispersing them. The United States might
interpret such defensive measures as preparation for a dramatic escalation—and respond by carrying out the very preemptive strike
that Iran sought to avoid.
In one scenario, all these escalatory pressures set off a larger conflict. The United States
sinks several Iranian ships and attacks a port and military training facilities. Iran drops mines and attacks U.S. ships in the Persian
Gulf. Iranian proxies kill dozens of U.S. troops, aid workers, and diplomats in the region, and Iranian missiles strike U.S. bases in
At every turn, Iran tries to save face by
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, causing limited damage.
showing resolve but stopping short of all-out war; Washington, intent on
“reestablishing deterrence,” retaliates a little more aggressively each time. Before
long, the two have tumbled into full-scale hostilities.
At this point, the United States faces a choice: continue the tit-for-tat escalation or overwhelm the enemy and destroy as much of its
military capabilities as possible, as the United States did during Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991. The Pentagon
recommends “going big” so as not to leave U.S. forces vulnerable to further Iranian attacks. Bolton and U.S. Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo support the plan. Trump agrees, seeing a large-scale assault as the only way to prevent humiliation.
The United States sends some 120,000 troops to its bases in the Middle East, a figure approaching the 150,000 to 180,000 troops
deployed to Iraq at any given point from 2003 to 2008. American aircraft attack conventional Iranian targets and much of Iran’s
nuclear infrastructure in Natanz, Fordow, Arak, and Esfahan. For now, the military does not start a ground invasion or seek to topple
the regime in Tehran, but ground forces are sent to the region, ready to invade if necessary.
Iran’s military is soon overwhelmed, but not before mounting a powerful, all-out
counterattack. It steps up mining and swarming small-boat attacks on U.S. forces
in the Persian Gulf. Missile attacks, cyberattacks, and other acts of sabotage
against Gulf oil facilities send global oil prices skyrocketing for weeks or months, perhaps to
$150 or more per barrel. Iran launches as many missiles as it can at U.S. military bases.
Many of the missiles miss, but some do not. Iran’s proxies target U.S. troops in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, and Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen increase
their rocket attacks against Saudi Arabia. Iran may even attempt terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies or
military facilities around the globe—but will likely fail, as such attacks are difficult to execute successfully.
Israel might get drawn into the conflict through clashes with Hezbollah, the Shiite militant
group and political party in Lebanon. Iran has tremendous influence over Hezbollah and could potentially push the group to attack
Israel using its arsenal of 130,000 rockets in an attempt to raise the costs of the conflict for the United States and one of its closest
Such an attack will likely overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense
allies.
system, leaving the Israelis with no choice but to invade Hezbollah’s strongholds
in southern Lebanon and possibly southern Syria. What began as a U.S.-Iranian
skirmish now engulfs the entire region, imposing not only devastating losses on
Iran’s leadership and people but serious costs in blood and treasure for the United
States, Israel, Lebanon, the Gulf states, and other regional players.
Even once major military operations cease, the conflict will not be over. Iranian
proxies are hard to eradicate through conventional battlefield tactics and will target
U.S. forces and partners in the Middle East for years to come. U.S. air strikes would
set back the Iranian nuclear program anywhere from 18 months to three years. But air strikes
cannot destroy scientific know-how, and the conflict may push Iran to take the
program further underground and build an actual nuclear weapon—a goal it has refrained
from achieving thus far.
Moreover, even if the United States goes into the conflict hoping only to weaken Iran militarily, it will soon face calls at home and
from Jerusalem, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi to overthrow the Islamic Republic. As a result, the United States may stumble
into the kind of regime change operation it carried out in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011
—but this time on a much larger scale. Iran today has a population of 80 million, more than three times that of Iraq
at the beginning of the Iraq war. The country’s topography is much more challenging than Iraq’s. The cost of an invasion
would over time reach into the trillions of dollars. And consider for a moment the destabilizing
effects of a refugee crisis stemming from a country with a population the size of
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria combined.
The United States might instead try to engineer the collapse of the Islamic Republic without invading, as it tried in Iraq in the 1990s.
But unlike many Middle Eastern countries that have grown unstable in recent years, Iran is not an artificial creation of European
colonialism but a millennia-old civilization whose nationalism runs deep. Iranians are not likely to respond to a major war with the
United States by blaming their own leadership and trying to overthrow it. Even if they did, the most likely result would be a transition
In the worst case,
from clerical rule to a military dictatorship headed by the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
internal collapse would lead to civil war, just as it has with several of Iran’s neighbors, potentially
creating terrorist safe havens and enormous refugee flows.
Even short of such worst-case scenarios, any war with Iran would tie down the
United States in yet another Middle Eastern conflict for years to come. The war and its
aftermath would likely cost hundreds of billions of dollars and hobble not just
Trump but future U.S. presidents. Such a commitment would mean the end of the United States’ purported shift
to great-power competition with Russia and China.
Most likely,all parties understand these dangers—not least the Iranian government, for which a war with the
United States would be particularly catastrophic. And for this reason, both sides will continue to try to
avoid an all-out war. But sometimes even wars that nobody wants still happen.
The Trump administration and the Islamic Republic should tread much more
carefully, lest they send their countries down a dangerous and costly spiral that
will quickly spin out of control.
Nuclear escalation is likely — especially under Trump.
Afrasiabi and Entessar 19 — Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, former Professor of Political Science at Tehran University,
former Advisor to Iran's Nuclear Negotiating Team, former Visiting Scholar at Harvard University, the University of California-
Berkeley, Binghamton University, and the Center for Strategic Research (Iran), holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Boston
University, and Nader Entessar, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice at the University of
South Alabama, former Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for International Political and Economic Studies (Iran), holds a Ph.D.
in Political Science from Saint Louis University, 2019 (“A nuclear war in the Persian Gulf?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July
2nd, Available Online at https://thebulletin.org/2019/07/a-nuclear-war-in-the-persian-gulf/, Accessed 07-02-2019)
Tensions between the United States and Iran are spiraling toward a military
confrontation that carries a real possibility that the United States will use nuclear
weapons. Iran’s assortment of asymmetrical capabilities—all constructed to be
effective against the United States—nearly assures such a confrontation. The current
US nuclear posture leaves the Trump administration at least open to the use of
tactical nuclear weapons in conventional theaters. Some in the current administration
may well think it to be in the best interest of the United States to seek a quick and decisive victory in the
oil hub of the Persian Gulf—and to do so by using its nuclear arsenal.
We believe there is a heightened possibility of a US-Iran war triggering a US nuclear
strike for the following reasons:
The sanction regime set against the Iranian economy is so brutal that it is likely to force Iran to
take an action that will require a US military response. Unless the United States backs
down from its present self-declared “economic warfare” against Iran, this will likely escalate to an open
warfare between the two countries.
In response to a White House request to draw up an Iran war plan, the Pentagon proposed sending 120,000 soldiers to the Persian
Gulf. This force would augment the several thousands of troops already stationed in Iran’s vicinity. President Trump has also hinted
Defeating Iran through conventional military
that if need be, he will be sending “a lot more” troops.
means would likely require a half million US forces and US preparedness for
many casualties. The US nuclear posture review is worded in such a way that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in
conventional theaters is envisaged, foreshadowing the concern that in a showdown with a menacing foe like Iran, the nuclear option is
The United States could once again justify using nuclear force for the sake of a
on the table.
decisive victory and casualty-prevention, the logic used in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.
Trump’s cavalier attitude toward nuclear weapons, trigger-happy penchant, and
utter disdain for Iran, show that he would likely have no moral qualm about
issuing an order to launch a limited nuclear strike, especially in a US-Iran
showdown, one in which the oil transit from the Gulf would be imperiled, impacting the global economy and necessitating a
speedy end to such a war.
If the United States were to commit a limited nuclear strike against Iran, it would minimize
risks to its forces in the region, defang the Iranian military, divest the latter of
preeminence in the Strait of Hormuz, and thus reassert US power in the oil hub of the Persian Gulf. Oil
flowing through the Strait of Hormuz is critical to a rising China. US control over this merchant waterway would grant the United
States significant leverage in negotiations. A limited US nuclear strike could cause a ‘regime
change’ among Iranian leadership, representing a strategic setback for Russia, in light of their recent foray in the Middle East
with Iranian backing.
there are several significant negative consequences to a US use of nuclear
Undoubtedly,
weapons, opening the way for other nuclear-armed states to emulate US behavior,
and for many other non-nuclear weapons states to seek their own nuclear deterrent
shields. There would also be a huge outcry in the international community causing the US global image to suffer.
 With President
Will such anticipated consequences represent sufficient obstacles to prevent a limited U.S. nuclear strike on Iran?
Trump, who counts on “bomb Iran” billionaire Sheldon Adelson as one of his main campaign contributors, the threshold
for using nukes certainly seems to have been lowered.

The plan allows the U.S. to extricate itself from the Saudi-Iran rivalry.
Ending arms sales to the coalition is vital.
Ayoob 18 — Mohammed Ayoob, University Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Relations and Coordinator of
the Muslim Studies Program at Michigan State University, Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Policy, 2018 (“How America Could
get Pulled into a War In Yemen,” The National Interest, September 9th, Available Online at
https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/how-america-could-get-pulled-war-yemen-30852, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Yemen has become the focal point for the tussle for
Now that the struggle for Syria is all but over,
power and influence between Saudi Arabia and Iran—the two major powers competing for primacy in
the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East. The Saudis, having lost in Syria, are doubling their
effort to deny what they perceive could be another victory for Iran in Yemen next
door. The war launched by the Saudi and Emirati forces and their Yemeni allies against the Houthis, Zaidi Shias now in
control of the capital Sanaa and broad swathes of northern Yemen, can, therefore, be expected to escalate and
may even lead to direct confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This
sounds plausible given threats by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS) to take the war to
Iran.
The conflict in Yemen is portrayed in the Western press and in statements by American leaders as a sectarian battle between Sunnis
and Shias. For example, President Obama, talking about conflicts in the Middle East in general, stated that they are “rooted in
conflicts that date back millennia.” Leading New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman declared that in Yemen “the main issue is
the 7th century struggle over who is the rightful heir to the Prophet Muhammad—Shiites or Sunnis.”
Such statements demonstrate an appalling lack of knowledge about conflicts in the Middle East in general and in Yemen in particular.
The civil war in Syria became intertwined with regional and international rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran on the one hand and
Russia and the United States on the other. But it did not begin as a conflict between Shias and Sunnis. Instead, it started as a multi-
sectarian struggle for democracy and removal of the Assad dictatorship. Neither were the Saudi and Iranian interventions in Syria
dictated primarily by sectarian animosities.
President Assad and his co-religionists, the Alawites, are not Shia by any definition although the Alawite religion, which is very
secretive about its dogmas, is often portrayed as an offshoot of Shia Islam. In fact, the Alawitess are so heterodox that most Muslims,
including most Shias, would consider them, as they would consider the Druze, as being beyond the pale of Islam. Bashar al-Assad,
like his father Hafez al-Assad, has tried to pass himself off as a Muslim because it gives him greater political legitimacy as the ruler of
a predominantly Muslim country.
Just as in Syria, where the Saudi-Iranian geopolitical rivalry based on realpolitik motives, was played out at the expense of the Syrian
the Saudi-Iranian struggle for preeminence is a major factor in the Yemeni
people,
civil war. While the details of the two cases are not the same, Yemen, like Syria, demonstrates that it is not a sectarian fight with
the Saudis supporting the Sunnis and the Iranians supporting the Shias.
The Houthis from the north are indeed Shia, but they are Zaidi Shias, which is a genuine offshoot of Shiism but very different from
Iran’s Twelver Shiism and much closer to Sunni Islam. The Zaidi Imamate of Yemen was established in the ninth century and Zaidi
Imams off and on ruled large tracts of North Yemen. From 1918 two powerful Imams, father and son, established their rule in almost
all of North Yemen until it was overthrown in 1962 by a group of Arab nationalist officers, supported by President Gamal Abdel
Nasser of Egypt, who proclaimed the Yemen Arab Republic.
A civil war ensued between the Republic and the Imam of Yemen. It is instructive to note that during this civil war that lasted five
years the Sunni Wahhabi monarchy of Saudi Arabia was the principal supporter and arms supplier of the Zaidi Shia Imam of Yemen.
The Saudi support for the Imamate and antipathy toward the Republic was the consequence of the rivalry between monarchical Saudi
Arabia and Republican Egypt, which supported the Yemen Arab Republic. The Imamate collapsed in 1967 when Saudi Arabia
withdrew its support. This episode demonstrates clearly that the Saudi role in Yemen in the earlier civil war was determined by
strategic considerations, primarily the House of Saud’s fear that Nasser’s Egypt was spreading a pan-Arab and republican ideology
that threatened its rule. It had nothing to do with sectarian considerations since most of the Republican side, like the Saudis, were
Sunnis while the Imam of Yemen was a Zaidi Shia.
The same applies to Saudi Arabia’s policy today when it opposes the Houthis, the modern political incarnation of the Zaidi imamate
that it supported not so long ago, because of their supposed association with the Saudis’ latest nemesis Iran. The difference in the two
Its current intervention in the
episodes is that in the 1960s Saudi involvement in the Yemeni civil war was discreet.
war, the brainchild of Crown Prince MBS, is very brazen. Fighter jets belonging to
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have strafed and inflicted heavy casualties on the
common Yemenis killing hundreds and injuring thousands. They have also caused
great damage to the already meagre infrastructure in Yemen, literally bombing it
back to the Stone Age.
However, Saudi and allied attacks have made very little dent in the Houthi control
of northern Yemen, including its capital. What the Saudi strategy has succeeded in
doing is to drive the Houthis into Iranian arms thus making Tehran’s support for
them a self-fulfilling prophecy. Saudi policy has provided Iran a God-sent
opportunity to benefit from Riyadh’s callous military attacks and find a strategic
foothold in Yemen. In response to Saudi attacks on the Houthis the Iranians have supplied arms, including short and
medium range missiles, to the latter quite often through their proxy Hizbullah. This has provided the Houthis the capability to
periodically fire missiles at strategic targets within the Saudi homeland.
The United States has become embroiled in the conflict for two major reasons. First, Yemen has become
the last refuge of the AQAP, the most active arm of Al Qaeda, which the United States has been targeting for years. Second,
American support for its ally Saudi Arabia is fueled by Washington’s antagonism
toward Iran. Its alliance with Saudi Arabia is now based primarily on their
common perception that Iranian influence in the region will increase if left
unchecked. It is also driven by large Saudi purchases of sophisticated American
weapons that help keep the American arms industry afloat. U.S. support for Saudi adventurism in
Yemen has added to the humanitarian crisis in the country as the United States and its
Western allies have turned a blind eye toward Saudi excesses thus providing
Riyadh with the incentive to continue its harsh bombing campaign.
American policy has not achieved its objective of ejecting AQAP from Yemen. In fact, by supporting Saudi Arabia’s campaign to
destroy the rudimentary infrastructure of the Yemeni state and thus degrade the residual capacity of the state to control territory it has
provided AQAP the opportunity to expand its presence in Yemen just as American policy of decimating Iraqi state structures helped
first al-Qaeda and then ISIS expand their tentacles in that country. Failed states provide the best breeding ground for terrorists.
Washington’s support for MBS’s aggressive policy toward Yemen will be
counterproductive in terms of achieving American objectives in Yemen and in
the region. It is likely to provide AQAP and possibly other jihadist organizations with the territorial space to build and expand
their bases. Furthermore, in the long run it will redound to the benefit of Iran and its allies
once Saudi Arabia is forced to end its intervention in Yemen as a result of sheer
exhaustion if nothing else. Yemen’s topography, especially in the north which is the stronghold of the Houthis, is very
much like that of Afghanistan making it extremely difficult for foreign interventions to end successfully. It is time
Washington reassessed its strategy toward Yemen and disengaged from the Saudi-
Iranian conflict that could drag it into another quagmire.
 1AC — Disinformation Warning Contention
Contention Three is a Disinformation Warning

Most neg evidence is directly underwritten by the Saudi coalition. It should

be the neg’s burden to prove that the “experts” they cite are not bought and
paid for.
Stimpson and Harris 19 — Cassandra Stimpson, Research Associate at the Arms and Security Project and the
Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative at the Center for International Policy, former Development Officer and Senior Programme
Officer for Uganda at GOAL Global—an international aid charity, holds an M.A. in Intelligence, Security, and Strategic Studies from
the University of Glasgow (Scotland), and Nia Harris, Research Associate with the Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative at the
Center for International Policy, Undergraduate Student in International Affairs and French at the University of Georgia, 2019 (“The
Lobby for War With Iran,” Ink Stick, June 26th, Available Online at https://inkstickmedia.com/the-lobby-for-war-with-iran/, Accessed
06-27-2019)
If you’re brave enough to tune into the news these days, it won’t take long until you’re forced
to watch a tough-talking, cherry-faced expert or politician lamenting that however
much we desire peace, the United States is left with little choice but to demonstrate the
strength of the US military to the Iranian regime. The calls for the US to start
another Middle East war are echoing across the halls of Congress and in think
tanks all over Washington.
“Iran is a cancer… We have Iran down, and now we need to choke ‘em,” according1 to Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.).
“Unprovoked attacks on commercial shipping warrant a retaliatory military strike against the Islamic Republic of Iran,” declared 2 Sen.
Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) on Face the Nation regarding recent tanker attacks in the Gulf of Oman.
After the disastrous results in Iraq and Afghanistan the obvious question is, who would pursue another Middle East entanglement? As
is often the case in DC, if seeking answers, just follow the money.
What you haven’t heard from these, and many other Iran-hawks is how the governments of Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are underwriting much of this bellicose rhetoric,
with a clear intent in mind: to embed the United States into another endless war in the
Middle East. The Saudis and Emiratis spent more than $30 million in 2018 on
lobbying and public relations firms registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).
These foreign agents reported making over $3 million in campaign contributions
in 2018 and had literally thousands of meetings with politicians, think tank
experts, and media outlets to influence the narrative in Washington. And, they
have been doing this for years.
For many Iran hawks, there’s a very clear money trail directly from Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Center for International Policy’s (CIP) Foreign Influence
Transparency Initiative (FITI), where we both work, has repeatedly documented Saudi and 3

Emirati foreign agents giving millions to Members of Congress, many of which have
been the most outspoken supporters of conflict with Iran. Former House Majority leader and
current Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) was the top4 recipient of firms representing Saudi Arabia in 2018 at $50,000, also
receiving smaller donations from the UAE. Rep. McCarthy absurdly claimed5 in response to recent tanker attacks in the Gulf of Oman
that “Iran is the individuals [sic] that fund the terrorism around the world, the attacks going into Israel, the attacks going into Saudi
Arabia, the problems anywhere else around the world, nine times out of ten it’s Iran that’s using it and a part of it” and that Iranians
“only understand strength.” Nevermind that 15 of the 19 hijackers in the horrific 9/11 attacks were from Saudi Arabia.
Sen. Cotton, demonstrated calling for war above, received $7,250 from lobbying firms representing the United Arab Emirates, and
was contacted three separate times on regional developments, specifically regarding Iran and “potential ballistic missile sanctions
against” Tehran. In 2018, Sen. Kennedy, whose advice for Iran is to “choke ‘em,” received at least $5,000 from Akin Gump, a firm
representing the UAE, and his office was contacted multiple times by lobbyists representing Saudi Arabia.
Another particularly egregious example of Saudi influence comes from Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.). Specifically, the McKeon Group
contacted Inhofe’s staff the same day they reported6 making a $1,000 contribution to Inhofe’s campaign. Within two weeks, Inhofe
voted against a resolution to end US involvement with the Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen. More recently, in June 2019, Sen.
Inhofe blocked7 a proposed provision in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that would disallow funding offensive
military operations in Iran. Sen. Inhofe received over $7,550 from Saudi registered firms in 2018.
In addition to Members of Congress, the Saudis and Emiratis have given lavishly to many of the
think tanks whose experts are clamoring for war with Iran. For instance, the Middle
East Institute, who houses a dedicated “IranObserved” program, received $20 million dollars from
8

the UAE from 2016-2017 and has also received millions from Saudi Arabia. The 9

Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) was the most contacted think
tank by the UAE last year, and the most contacted individual by UAE foreign
agents, Michael Knights, produces articles like this , that may as well be titled “The
10

Key to Peace in Yemen: More War,” calling for further arms to the Saudis and
Emiratis.
“Iran is susceptible to a strategy of coerced democratization because it lacks
popular support and relies on fear to sustain its power…The very structure of the
regime invites instability, crisis and possibly collapse,” said Mark Dubowitz, CEO of 11

the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) in a memo to President Trump’s National
Security Council advocating regime change. What Dubowitz didn’t say is that FDD has received
millions from the UAE.
Though WINEP and FDD claim to not take foreign funding, think tanks are under
no legal obligation to release funding details, and thus many accept money from
Gulf actors, or their US proxies, without disclosing it and revealing the
potential conflicts of interest they might have when discussing US policy in the
Middle East.
Also, there’s growing evidence that foreign influence at think tanks may be having a
direct effect on the State Department. For example, recent reporting suggests that the State 12

Department and FDD collaborated on a Twitter-led smear campaign against anti-

sanction and anti-war Iranian-American groups, journalists, and human rights
activists. FDD advisor Saeed Ghassemenijad heavily promoted the spam account, IranDisinfo, which has ceased activity since
the State Department suspended funding to their Global Engagement Center, who ran the account. The Global Engagement Center
was meant to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation but was instead used to intimidate Americans who did not take a hardline
approach to Tehran. The account repeatedly highlighted
also Dubowitz’s work for FDD
Mark .
Similarly, Brian Hook, US Special Representative for Iran, parroted many Emirati and Saudi talking points on June 19, during
testimony13 before the House on the Administration’s current Iran policy. When questioned about Iranian support for the Houthis,
Hook said “Iran is playing a very long game in Yemen” and would like to “use the Houthis in the same model that they used
Hezbollah in Lebanon” A fact sheet14 on Iran, produced by the Saudi government and distributed by Hogan Lovells US LLP, reads
“Iran wants to turn the Houthis into a Yemeni version of Hezbollah, thereby turning Yemen into a second Lebanon, where a militia is
constantly holding the government hostage.” These parallels continued throughout Hook’s testimony. Hook stated that “Iran also
deepened its engagement in regional conflicts intensifying, prolonging and deepening the conflict in Yemen,” a point also made on the
same Saudi fact sheet. Hook also pointed out that Iran “has spent hundreds of millions of dollars organizing, training, and equipping
the Houthis to fight,” which again closely mirrors a talking point in the Saudi fact sheet.
It isn’t the first time this has happened, as demonstrated by Rep. Ed Royce’s (R-Calif.) impassioned speech on keeping the US in the
Yemen war that, as the Intercept reported15, had been written by Saudi lobbyists The Administration and Saudi Arabia may naturally
share the same sentiments toward Iran, but do we really want Saudi foreign agents writing US
talking points on Iran?
All sides in the standoff with Iran promise that they do not intend to spark a war. Yet, threatening rhetoric combined with the close
relationship the administration has with the Saudis, Emiratis, and their Washington confidants may lead to an ‘unintended’ conflict.
Due to the slow cycle of FARA reporting, no one knows exactly what the Saudis
and Emiratis are currently advocating in closed-door meetings with th[i]ank
tanks, Members of Congress, and other policy influencers — or how much money
they’re giving to them. Perhaps, current talking points mirror a recent Saudi editorial that promoted surgical strikes
16
 We can only wonder if a few thousand dollars and a foot in
as the “next logical step” in Iran.
the door provides the fuel for the conflict spiral on behalf of foreign powers, and
another US military entanglement in the Middle East.
The bottom line is that from Congress to think tanks, academia and more, we can no
longer be certain whose voice is being represented by the vanguard of US
policy. All of the Saudi and Emirati fueled rhetoric is leading the US down an
incredibly dangerous path, as demonstrated on Thursday night when Trump nearly launched a retaliatory attack which
could have easily escalated to a war with Iran. So, the next time you hear a Middle East “expert” rattle
on about how we have no choice but to go to war with Iran, it is worth questioning
which foreign country is pulling the strings.
—— Footnotes ——
Note: These were created from the hyperlinks in the text.
1. https://www.newsweek.com/iran-john-kennedy-cancer-war-intelligence-choke-sanctions-ayatollah-1432327
2. https://twitter.com/FaceTheNation/status/1140269492259446784
3. https://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/3ba8a1_dbf2bbd2e0d442e1a9d4848bc7c7fb71.pdf
4. https://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/3ba8a1_dbf2bbd2e0d442e1a9d4848bc7c7fb71.pdf
5. https://www.mediamatters.org/embed/clips/2019/06/17/66646/fnc-justice-20190615-mccarthy
6. https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6391-Supplemental-Statement-20181230-4.pdf
7. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/06/congress-administration-iran-options.html
8. https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emilytamkin/washington-think-tanks-still-divided-on-whether-to-return
9. https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2018-11/2016%20Contributions.pdf
10. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2019-05-02/real-plan-end-war-yemen
11. https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/25/trump-iran-foreign-policy-regime-change-239930
12. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/05/politics/us-suspends-funding-anti-iran-group/index.html
13. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKK_fABJjl4
14. https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2244-Informational-Materials-20180313-7.pdf
15. https://theintercept.com/2019/05/02/yemen-war-powers-resolution-saudi-lobbyists/
16. https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Saudi-paper-urges-military-strikes-against-Iran-589909

Neg think tank evidence is irredeemably compromised — Saudi and UAE

funding comes with strings attached so they can shape the narrative.
Freeman 19 — Ben Freeman, Director of the Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative at the Center for International Policy,
Core Faculty Member at the Institute for Defense and Business—a nonprofit education and research institute that delivers professional
education programs to government agencies, military, non-governmental organizations, and private industries, former Deputy Director
of the National Security Program at Third Way, former National Security Fellow at the Project on Government Oversight, former
Instructor at the American Military University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Texas A&M University, 2019 (“Following the
Foreign-Policy Money Trail in Washington: How Middle Eastern Powers Fund Think Tanks,” TomDispatch, February 21st, Available
Online at http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176530/, Accessed 06-27-2019)
The 2016 elections awakened Americans to a startling reality: the country’s
political system is ripe for foreign interference. The Russians took full advantage of social media with bot
armies and through unregistered foreign agents. While their influence garnered considerable attention and has led to increased
one area has remained largely off the
enforcement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA),
congressional and media radar screens. Yet it remains a vital part of the way other
governments try to influence policy in this country: the foreign funding of think
tanks.
Most Americans undoubtedly have little idea what a think tank actually does. Having worked
at two of them myself, it’s fair to say that even those of us who have labored inside these basic building
blocks for policymaking in Washington are often still trying to figure out just what many of them do.
Still, whether you know it or not, you’ve certainly seen think-tank employees on
cable news, heard them on the radio, or read their op-ed pieces.
After all, think tanks are homes for so many of the “experts” who are the go-to sources for
media coverage of foreign and domestic policy topics on just about any day -- and are often key
go-to sources for those making policy in Washington, too). You know, the former Department of Defense
official you caught on NBC News discussing Iran or the Middle Eastern expert you saw quoted in Newsweek critiquing the Trump
members of Congress and executive branch
administration’s policies there. Outside the public eye,
officials rely heavily on think tanks for expertise on a wide range of issues, for key
congressional testimony, and even for quite literally helping craft public policy.
Those who run Washington generally trust the inhabitants of think tanks of their political
bent to provide the intellectual foundations upon which much of public policy is built.
At least in some cases, however, that trust couldn’t be more deeply misplaced, since
cornerstones of the ever-expanding think-tank universe turn out to be for sale.
Every year foreign governments pour tens of millions of dollars into those very
institutions and, though many think tanks are tax-exempt non-profits, such donations often turn out to be
anything but charitable gifts. Foreign contributions generally come with critically
important strings attached – usually a favorable stance toward that country in
whatever influential work the think tanks are doing. In other words, those experts you
regularly read or see on screen, whose scholarship and advice Washington’s politicians
and other officials often use, are in some cases being paid, directly or indirectly, by
the very countries on which they are offering advice and analysis. And here’s the catch:
they can do so without ever having to tell you about it.
The Money Trail From Foreign Governments to Think Tanks
“I’ve never had to worry in my years at CAP about an analyst or me saying X, Y, and Z and
worry about a funding source. Never thought about it. Never,” explained Brian Katulis of the Center for
American Progress (CAP). He was speaking at a Middle East Institute (MEI) event in January entitled “The Role of Think Tanks
in Shaping Middle East Policy.” MEI President Paul Salem echoed this sentiment, noting that funding,
particularly foreign government funding, shouldn’t ever shape a think tank’s work.
“Independence,” he proclaimed, “is sacred.”
Such comments, like the events themselves, are just the norm in Washington think-tank life – unless, that is, you follow the
money, in which case they seem both striking and supremely ironic. On any given day,
Washington is, in fact, awash in foreign-policy events at think tanks. There, experts
convene to publicly discuss just about every topic you’d want to hear about – except
one, of course: their funding. And that is what made the Katulis-Salem exchange particularly interesting. What they
and their follow panelists never mentioned at an event extolling the importance of
think tanks in helping craft political Washington’s Middle East policies was this: both
CAP and MEI have received millions of dollars from authoritarian governments
in the Middle East.
MEI has publicly reported receiving millions from Saudi Arabia and lesser
amounts from the Persian Gulf states of Oman and Qatar. By far its largest donor, however,
seems to have been the United Arab Emirates (UAE), reportedly making a “secret” $20
million contribution to that think tank, earmarked to “hire experts in order to
counter the more egregious misperceptions about the region” and “to inform U.S.
government policymakers.” In other words, in the spirit of that MEI panel title, the UAE’s funding
was explicitly designed to shape that think tank’s – and so U.S. – policy
considerations.
While hardly in that $20 million range, CAP has also publicly reported receiving at least $1.5
million from the UAE.
 those two think tanks are hardly the only ones receiving donations
And keep in mind that
from countries in the Middle East. The Center for a New American Security , for
instance, received $250,000 from the United Arab Emirates to produce a study on the need
for the U.S. to export military-grade drones to countries like... the UAE. That
think tank’s subsequent report on the topic notes that the U.S. doesn’t export
drones to the UAE and other countries, but should because “this reluctance to
transfer U.S. drones harms U.S. interests in tangible ways.” Never mind that a
third of those killed in drone strikes in the devastating war in Yemen are civilians .
The Brookings Institution received a $14.8 million donation from Qatar. In fact,
according to a New York Times analysis, nearly all of the most prominent foreign-
policy think tanks in Washington have accepted money from authoritarian regimes
in the Middle East or elsewhere. And that, in turn, is just the tip of the iceberg, since
think tanks are not legally required to publicly disclose their funding.
Charity or Influence Buying?
If think tanks are to be believed, the money they receive from such funders
changes little. Recent events at a number of think tanks, including the Center for American Progress
and the Middle East Institute, should, however, give pause to anyone who assumes that such
institutions are by their nature insulated from the influence of foreign funders.
Recently, serious questions have been raised about whether CAP’s ties to the UAE , itself
a close ally of the Saudi royals, contributed to its awkward response to the brutal murder of
Washington Post journalist and Saudi citizen Jamal Khashoggi in that Kingdom's consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. Following that
killing, CAP released a response condemning the Saudis for their involvement in Khashoggi’s murder,
but not calling for specific consequences to punish the Kingdom.
According to reporting by the Intercept’s Ryan Grim, such consequences were stripped
from the statement by a CAP staffer who just happened to be Brian Katulis. Then, in December, CAP
largely sat on the sidelines as the Senate passed a historic resolution to end U.S.
involvement in the devastating Saudi-UAE war in Yemen. At the MEI event in January, Katulis dismissed
those giving “energy and dynamism” to “the Yemen debate” for ignoring “the full
complexity of the challenges.” Jamal Khashoggi’s name wasn’t even mentioned.
Despite MEI head Salem’s claim that “independence is sacred,” there’s reason to question how
independent scholars can be when their work is, at least in part, dependent on
foreign funding. In at least one case, for instance, Salem’s institute published the work
of Fahad Nazer, who was directly on the Saudi payroll. While earning $7,000 a
month as a foreign agent for Saudi Arabia, Nazer wrote several pro-Saudi articles
for both think tanks and mainstream media outlets, including one for MEI that
made no mention of his financial ties to the Saudis. That March 2018 article did, however,
encourage yet more U.S. support for the country’s ruling crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, who,
Nazer wrote, would “be good for Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the world.”
Just seven months later, bin Salman would reportedly authorize the brutal murder of Jamal
Khashoggi and, in January 2019, Nazer himself would become the official
spokesperson for the Saudi Embassy in Washington.
Blurred Lines and Lack of Transparency
Nazer’s case also illustrates a growing pattern of interactions between think tanks
that receive foreign funding and the registered foreign agents of those countries. In
 Emirati foreign agents last year reported contacting think tanks at least 85
fact,
times, according to an analysis of Foreign Agents Registration Act filings for a forthcoming report on the Emirati lobby in the U.S.
by the Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative at the Center for International Policy, which I direct.
CAP’s Katulis and MEI were among the top think-tank contacts
Perhaps not surprisingly,
for UAE’s foreign agents. According to 2018 filings, Katulis was contacted at least 12 times
by the Harbour Group, which the UAE paid more than $5 million in 2018 to
“influence U.S. policy,” according to the firm’s FARA filings. Katulis was a particular focus for
them because he was helping to organize a “study tour” in which think-tank
experts would take a luxurious trip to both the UAE and Saudi Arabia. That group
also contacted MEI at least 14 times on behalf of the UAE, directing most of its
efforts towards a “speaking engagement at MEI” for the Emirati ambassador to the
U.S., the same man who had directed that “secret” $20 million contribution to the
institute.
it is perfectly legal for think tanks that receive funding from foreign
Under current law,
governments to also work with foreign agents registered to represent those very
governments. FARA includes an exemption for those engaged in “bona fide... scholastic, academic, or scientific pursuits.”
Like many parts of the FARA statute, it’s not at all clear what “bona fide” means, but think tanks are presumably exempt from
registration if they meet this threshold.
While the work done by both think tanks and registered foreign agents can sometimes overlap, the two are worlds apart on one critical
Under FARA, registered foreign agents are required to disclose a
score: transparency.
considerable amount of what they do, including whom they’re working for, how
much they’re being paid, and whom they’re contacting, as well as when and where
they do it, on behalf of foreign principals like the United Arab Emirates. And most of that
information is available online. Anything they distribute on behalf of a foreign
backer must also include a “conspicuous statement” to let anyone know that what
they’re reading is being distributed on behalf of a foreign principal.
Think tanks receiving funding from foreign sources are, however, not required to do
any of the above.
As is appropriate during tax season, most of this should, in the end, be blamed on the Internal Revenue Service. Think tanks usually
operate as tax-exempt organizations and, according to the IRS, “a tax-exempt organization is generally not required to disclose
publicly the names or addresses of its contributors set forth on its annual return.”
While MEI and CAP do both disclose their funding sources on their websites – for
which they should be commended – many think tanks do not. And few, even among those that do, mention
any potential conflicts of interest that might be reflected in their published reports
or the speeches and media appearances of their members. Even more worrisome, a Project
On Government Oversight investigation by Lydia Dennett found numerous examples of
think-tank experts not reporting or mentioning financial ties to foreign
governments when testifying before Congress. Hiding such potential conflicts of
interest is likely to leave the public and policymakers with the impression that
they’re hearing truly objective experts, when they may, in fact, be taking testimony
from someone who is functionally or literally on the payroll of a country with
a deep stake in what they’re telling Congress.
If think tanks are to remain credible sources of foreign-policy expertise, such ties must, at the very least, be laid bare.
A first step would simply be to require think tanks to publicly disclose any foreign funding they receive, something easily done by
amending the IRS code. In addition, just as registered foreign agents are required to include a “conspicuous statement” letting readers
know they’re working on behalf of a foreign power, think tanks should have to fully disclose their funding sources and any potential
conflicts of interest in all their written products, as well as at speaking engagements, especially testimony before Congress. It
should also be incumbent upon the media to do a better job of vetting sources. Sure, journalists are
extraordinarily busy, but if a simple Google search can reveal that the Middle East “expert”
you’re quoting is being paid by a country in the Middle East, it behooves you to
tell your readers that.
Finally, transparency is essential, but it’s well past time for think tanks themselves to focus on the track records of the countries
they’re getting money from. The Brookings Institution did just that by cutting ties with the Saudis shortly after the murder of
Khashoggi and, soon after, MEI, too, announced that it would decline any further funding from the Saudi government. More recently,
and following the questions raised about CAP’s involvement with the United Arab Emirates, that think tank announced that it would
no longer accept UAE money. As a CAP spokesperson said, “It’s just the right thing to do.”
Most think tanks haven’t done “the right thing”
CAP, MEI, and Brookings are, however, the exceptions.
and dropped funding from autocratic regimes. Nor are they likely to voluntarily
increase transparency about that funding. The burden then falls on Congress to enact reforms ensuring that
senators and representatives will know when the expert they’re hearing discuss a specific country or the region it’s in is being paid by
Failure to act could leave Americans asking a simple and
that very same country.
uncomfortable question: Which country is buying U.S. foreign policy today?

Taking coalition-funded evidence seriously actively participates in a

disinformation campaign to exonerate them from their war crimes.
Carapico 18 — Sheila Carapico, Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Richmond, holds
a Ph.D. in Political Science from the State University of New York at Binghamton, 2018 (“War of Aggression: The Saudi & UAE
Slaughter in Yemen isn’t a Proxy Conflict with Iran,” Informed Comment, June 6th, Available Online at
https://www.juancole.com/2018/06/aggression-slaughter-conflict.html, Accessed 06-28-2019)
Alongside their throttlehold over which reporters can visit what parts of Yemen, and
thus what story they can tell, Saudi and Emirati investments in public relations,
lobbying, think-tanks, and political consultants are shaping the narrative about
their war there. Headline writers, pundits, Wikipedia, news correspondents, and
even some so-called experts frame the asymmetric conflict as a “proxy war.”
Sunnis nations led by Saudi Arabia are battling Shi`a Iran and its regional proxies,
the story goes; the world’s worst man-made humanitarian disaster thus appears as
un-named collateral damage.
The word “proxy,” incongruously accompanied by the label of a “civil war”
between an “internationally recognized government” and “Iranian-backed militia,”
rationalizes the unwarranted, unprovoked Saudi-UAE intervention in Yemen. Some
headlines and stories reflect sloppy journalism and the tendency to mindlessly
reiterate hackneyed tag-lines. However, make no mistake: big petrodollar spending
around DuPont Circle systematically produces a story-line that exonerates
the murder and starvation of Yemenis who are not even “Shi`a” in the name of
countering overblown Iranian influence.
A proxy war is a clash between contending powers that do not engage directly in
combat. Rather, rivals arm, train, and goad third parties in smaller countries to fight
one another. The classic Cold War cases were civil or cross-border wars in Central
America and southern Africa where communist or socialist forces battled US clients. In the big antagonism between
patrons – the Soviet Union and the United States – the battlefield was in the so-called Third World. Some sources (like Wikipedia)
characterize the Korean and Vietnam wars as “proxy” conflicts, because the American objective was to defeat communist “proxies;”
but these conflicts, named for the places US forces engaged, are more commonly, and accurately, recalled as direct American
interventions, or instances of American imperialism. Like scores of US interventions during the era of bipolar competition, they
reflected a hegemonic urge to insulate friendly allies from popular revolutions, and to perpetuate dependent regimes.
The US- and UK- supported Saudi and UAE dynasties and their hired analysts insist
that their Yemeni adversary is a proxy of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The
inference is that Arab Gulf monarchies righteously resist Iranian – or Shi`a — influence
in the Peninsula. Therefore, forty months of relentless bombing and blockade are
justified as self-defense.
Poppycock. Sure, the Houthi militia have ex post facto Iranian support – not in their
several pre-2011 rebellions against the Salih government, but more recently. When they swept
into Sana`a in 2014, with the turncoat support of Salih and his regiments, they
instigated regular flights to and from Tehran. This infuriated the Saudi and Emirati
governments, who ordered the bombing of Sana`a’s runways and the indefinite
shutdown of the airport. Improbably and irrationally, given the domestic roots of
their grievances, the Houthis adopted Iranian slogans “death to America, death to Israel.”
PressTV and other Iranian propaganda outlets champion the Houthi cause .
Civilian transport and propaganda do not, however, proxies make. The evidence
of Houthis receiving Iranian arms despite the strangling Saudi-led, US-backed air
and naval blockade is thin; the missiles they fire are low-tech and antiquated,
mostly leftovers from the Soviet era. Iranians have not been filmed inside of
Yemen. If anything, cries of “Iranian-backed” grossly inflate Tehran’s influence, and
even that is more self-fulfilling after-the-fact prophesy than casus belli. No
reasonable claim can be advanced that the Houthis take their marching orders or
even their inspiration from the Islamic Republic. Two rather aside points in this regard: first, until
recently the Persian Twelvers did not even consider the Zaydi Fivers as Shi`a ; and
secondly, the ‘cold war’ between Tehran and Riyadh is as much about republican vs.
royal visions of an Islamic state as it is a denominational confrontation between
the two great branches of Islam.
Moreover, the “internationally recognized government” has been in comfortable exile
in Riyadh since March or April of 2015. “Internationally recognized” is another way of
saying that the so-called government of Abdarrubuh Mansur Hadi – often portrayed as a
puppet — has no domestic mandate or following, only Gulf sponsors. These
patrons, particularly Saudi Arabia, have a history of meddling in Yemen against popular
movements and democratic impulses. Among other instances, the House of Saud
backed the Zaydi Imamate against republican officers in North Yemen during the
1962-1970 civil war: then, and perhaps now, the fear of republicanism over-rode any
antipathy towards Zaydi Shi`ism. The Gulf patriarchies worried about uprisings in
North Africa; the mass protests in Yemen in 2011 – led, incidentally, by women – caused
genuine panic in the palaces.
The most dangerous aspect of the “proxy war against Iranian-backed militia”
narrative is that it deflects attention away from indisputable war crimes. The
Saudi-led coalition is now making a push on the strategic Red Sea port of al-Hudaydah, which has
already been out of commission for three years and remains “occupied” by Houthi rebels. Al- Hudaydah port and the
governorate of al-Hudaydah lie along the Red Sea coastal plain known as the Tihama. The people
of the Tihama, residents of fishing, herding, pottery-and-basket-making, and sharecropping communities who have
already suffered disproportionately from Saudi-led bombing and the naval
blockade, are dark-skinned Yemenis of mixed Arab and African ancestry.
Spiritually, they identify with the Shafi`i denomination of Sunni Islam. Socially,
they are the poorest of the poor. Politically, they have no sympathy for the
Houthis, much less Iran.
The victims of the coming – or current — onslaught are not “proxies of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard.” They are starving children under attack by filthy-rich
monarchies wielding the most advanced weapons Britain and the United States have to
sell.
Yemen Advantage Backlines
 They Say: “Plan Doesn’t End War”
The coalition can’t continue their air campaign without U.S. support —
maintenance, spare parts, and technical assistance.
Iddon 18 — Paul Iddon, Freelance Middle East Affairs Journalist, Contributor to The New Arab, Rudaw English, and Ahval
(Turkey), 2018 (“Have Western arms sales to Saudi Arabia peaked?,” The New Arab, December 21st, Available Online at
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2018/12/21/have-western-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-peaked, Accessed 07-02-2019)
One argument against hastily placing an arms embargo on Riyadh over such actions is that it will
simply buy weapons systems from countries that will scrutinise it less. If they do
so, the argument goes, then Western powers will have even less influence to exert over
the kingdom's actions.
The Saudis have indeed sought a small number of their arms elsewhere. When the Americans
didn't sell them drones, Riyadh bought Chinese-made ones, which were clear replicas of the kind of drones Washington had refused to
sell them.
It's probably true that in the long-term a Western arms embargo on Riyadh will likely
result in it seeking arms elsewhere. But in the short-term, the Saudi military is
heavily dependent on American and British support to operate the majority of
weapons currently in its arsenal.
Without this support, they would doubtlessly find it far more difficult to wage war in
Yemen, or maintain a fleet of sophisticated American jet fighters, bombers and
tanks, all of which require significant maintenance and supply of spare parts to
operate, especially during military action.
Consequently, if a serious arms embargo were imposed on Saudi Arabia, it would likely take
years, and billions of additional dollars, for Riyadh to supplement its military
equipment through other sources.
To wage its air campaign on Yemen the Saudis rely overwhelmingly on American-
and British-made weapon systems and munitions. Since the 1980s Riyadh has not
only relied on Western-made weapon systems but also heavily on technical help
and know-how. The Saudi air campaign is largely made possible by American mid-air refuelling, something Riyadh cannot
adequately do itself.

The plan would immediately ground the coalition’s fighter aircraft.

Bridgeman 19 — Tess Bridgeman, Senior Editor at Just Security, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the Reiss Center on
Law and Security at New York University School of Law, former Special Assistant to the President, Associate Counsel to the
President, and Deputy Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, holds a D.Phil. in International Relations from Oxford
University and a J.D. from New York University School of Law, 2019 (“Congress, Saudi Arabia, and the Conflict in Yemen: Where
do We Go from Here?,” Just Security, February 12th, Available Online at https://www.justsecurity.org/62560/congress-saudi-arabia-
conflict-yemen-here/, Accessed 06-11-2019)
If the new Congress is also serious about curbing U.S. participation in Yemen’s
devastating civil war, it should include a provision explicitly cutting off specific
forms of U.S. support — not just directing withdrawal from “hostilities” — in a must-pass vehicle. Congress has a
number of very good options for doing so at its disposal. For example, two options, which could be combined for maximum
impact, are (1) expressly prohibiting any further U.S. assistance or support, including
intelligence sharing and logistics support activities, to any members of the Saudi-led coalition for the
civil war in Yemen, and (2) as Ryan Goodman has explained, suspending Direct Commercial Sales
licenses for maintenance and sustainment of fighter aircraft used in the Saudi
coalition’s offensive operations in Yemen.
The first option would have the impact of ending the activities the U.S. is
actually undertaking in support of the Saudi-led coalition. The second would
create a strong incentive for the coalition to get serious about negotiations to end
the conflict: it would have the impact of grounding the coalition’s fighter
aircraft in short order, as they rely on maintenance and spare parts provided
under U.S. licenses.
Members on both sides of the aisle have expressed outrage at Saudi Arabia’s leadership for the devastating impact of its air campaign
If Congress wants to ensure in
in Yemen’s civil war and its silencing of critics through murder and disappearance.
practice that the United States cannot continue to support the Saudi-led coalition in
Yemen and that the Trump administration holds Saudi leaders accountable, it has
strong options available to do so.

The plan would force the coalition to withdraw from Yemen.

Hartung 19 — William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, former
Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, former Director of the Arms Trade
Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, 2019 (“It’s Time To Stop Arms Sales To Saudi Arabia,” LobeLog—the Inter Press
Service’s blog, May 15th, Available Online at https://lobelog.com/its-time-to-stop-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/, Accessed 06-07-2019)
For starters,Congress should work to close off the other main avenue of U.S. support
for the Saudi-led coalition—the sale of bombs, combat aircraft, armored vehicles,
attack helicopters, and other equipment to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two
primary perpetrators of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. According to statistics from the Security
Assistance Monitor, the United States has offered over $68 billion in weaponry to those two
nations since the start of the current Yemen conflict in March 2015. As Bruce Riedel of the Brookings
Institution has noted, these U.S.-supplied systems are the backbone of the Saudi military,
and without those weapons and related maintenance and support they could
not sustain their intervention in Yemen.

The plan would make it impossible for the coalition to continue the war.
Larison 18 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2018 (“Congress Should Cut Off All Support to Saudi Arabia,” The American Conservative, October 11th, Available Online
at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/congress-should-cut-off-all-support-to-saudi-arabia/, Accessed 06-07-2019)
Riedel makes the case for blocking arms sales and cutting off military
Bruce
assistance to Saudi Arabia:
The war is draining the kingdom’s coffers. And responsibility for the war is on Mohammed bin Salman, who as defense
minister has driven Riyadh into this quagmire. Shaking the arms relationship is by far the most important way to clip his
wings.
Congress now has the power to make a serious decision, halting arms sales and the logistics train for the kingdom in the
wake of the reported murder of Saudi critic Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey last week. The
outrageous attack on Jamal deserves serious reaction, and given Trump’s dereliction of duty on the matter, it is up to
Congress to act. The president may try to override a Senate arms stand-down but it would be a painful setback for the
prince.
Congress ought to have cut off military support and arms sales to the Saudis long
ago, and they should certainly do so now. This would not only send a clear
message to Riyadh that the blank check this administration has given them is no
more, but it would also make it practically impossible for the Saudis to continue
bombing Yemeni civilians. As Riedel says, “The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) is entirely
dependent on American and British support for its air fleet of F-15 fighter jets,
Apache helicopters, and Tornado aircraft. If either Washington or London halts
the flow of logistics, the RSAF will be grounded.” Supporters of the war on Yemen often say
that U.S. military assistance is “modest” or “limited” as a way of minimizing our government’s role,
but they usually neglect to mention how critical it is to the coalition’s
operations. If the U.S. withdrew support from the Saudi coalition, they would not
be able to continue their war and would have to come to terms with the
reality of failure. The longer that the U.S. keeps propping up their war effort, the
longer the war drags on needlessly and the more Yemeni civilians suffer and die
for no good reason.
Halting arms sales and ending support for the war are the right things to do for the
U.S. and for Yemen, and they will show the crown prince that there are some
significant consequences to his reckless and destructive behavior.

Ending arms sales prevents the coalition from continuing the war in the
short- and long-terms.
Reisener 19 — Matthew Reisener, Program Associate at the Center for the National Interest, 2019 (“America Must Question
Ally Actions in Yemen,” The National Interest, February 23rd, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/middle-east-
watch/america-must-question-ally-actions-yemen-45112, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Ending American support for the coalition and threatening to suspend arms sales
to its leading members would force Saudi Arabia and the UAE to end or
dramatically reduce their military operations in Yemen. “The Saudi military is heavily
dependent on U.S. weapons and support, and could not operate effectively without
them,” according to a report from the Center for International Policy. Additionally, while the UAE’s offensive is
largely ground-based and relies more on the daily cooperation of mercenaries than
it does the United States, America can still influence Emirati policy due to the UAE’s
strong reliance on American arms sales.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE depend broadly on American military support to guarantee their regional security and
would be far more likely to begrudgingly comply with American demands than
risk alienating their most important ally. If nothing else, ending weapon sales would
drastically disrupt their ability to conduct military operations in the short-term
while putting at risk the supply of weapons they need on to continue the war in the
long-term.

The symbolic impact of the plan causes the coalition to change its strategy.
Spindel 19 — Jennifer Spindel, Assistant Professor in the Department of International and Area Studies and Associate Director
of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center at the University of Oklahoma, former Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Institute for Security
and Conflict Studies at George Washington University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota, 2019
(“The Case For Suspending American Arms Sales To Saudi Arabia,” War on the Rocks, May 14th, Available Online at
https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/, Accessed 06-07-2019)
Arms embargos are often dismissed as symbolic, and therefore ineffective. But
just because something is symbolic, doesn’t mean that it won’t have an effect.
A U.S. arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a clear signal of American
disproval of Saudi actions in Yemen, and would be an equally important signal
to Washington’s allies, who are left wondering if the United States is ambivalent or
uninterested in the growing Yemeni humanitarian catastrophe.
By continuing to provide weapons, President Donald Trump tacitly endorses Saudi
policies. This signal is strengthened by Trump’s recent veto of the resolution that
called for an end to U.S. support for the war in Yemen. While Trump justified the veto by saying that the
resolution was a “dangerous attempt to weaken my constitutional authorities,” statements from Congressional representatives show
they are aware of the powerful signals sent by arms sales. Sen. Tim Kaine said that the veto “shows the world
[Trump] is determined to keep aiding a Saudi-backed war that has killed thousands
of civilians and pushed millions more to the brink of starvation.” An arms
embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a signal both to leaders of that country,
and other states, that the United States does not endorse Saudi actions. Those arguing against a
ban are correct on one point: Embargos as blunt force instruments of coercion are rarely effective. But arms embargos are
effective as signals of political dissatisfaction, and serve an important
communication role in international politics.

The coalition won’t change their strategy unless the U.S. stops arms sales.
Spindel 19 — Jennifer Spindel, Assistant Professor in the Department of International and Area Studies and Associate Director
of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center at the University of Oklahoma, former Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Institute for Security
and Conflict Studies at George Washington University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota, 2019
(“With Arms Sales, ‘It’s Not Just the Economy, Stupid’,” Duck of Minerva, October 12th, Available Online at
https://duckofminerva.com/2018/10/with-arms-sales-its-not-just-the-economy-stupid.html, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Even if Saudi Arabia proved the crucial market to keeping US production lines
open, Trump is overlooking the foreign policy signal that the arms sales send. By
continuing to supply Saudi Arabia with arms, the US is tacitly endorsing Saudi
actions. Congress should, at the very least, suspend arms sales to Saudi Arabia. The State
Department approved $1 billion worth of sales to the kingdom in March – delaying the transfer of TOW anti-tank missiles would be
one clear way to signal US displeasure with Saudi Arabia. Otherwise, why should Saudi Arabia cooperate
with investigations into the disappearance of Khashoggi, or modify its policy in Yemen? In the realm of
international politics, talk is cheap; actions matter. Cutting off arms sales or
switching suppliers is one way states can signal their dissatisfaction with partners,
as Turkey so clearly did by purchasing the S-400. The political stakes of arms sales are high – and it
is crucial that policymakers consider that political significance in their arms sales
decision calculus along with economic and military considerations.

Empirically, arms embargoes are effective.

Miller and Binder 19 — Andrew Miller, Deputy Director for Policy at the Project on Middle East Democracy, former
Director for Egypt and Israel Military Issues on the U.S. National Security Council, former U.S. State Department Official in the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, on the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff, and at the U.S. Embassies in Doha and Cairo,
holds an M.A. in International Relations and Affairs from the University of Virginia, and Seth Binder, Advocacy Officer at the Project
on Middle East Democracy, former Program Manager of the Security Assistance Monitor Program at the Center for International
Policy, holds an M.A. in International Relations from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University,
2019 (“The Case for Arms Embargoes Against Uncooperative Partners,” War on the Rocks, May 10th, Available Online at
https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-arms-embargoes-against-uncooperative-partners/, Accessed 06-12-2019)
The efficacy of withholding military assistance, including grant aid and arms sales, to modify the behavior of recipient countries is a
hotly debated topic in the U.S. foreign policy community. Last month, War on the Rocks published another contribution to this
In “The Case Against Arms Embargos, Even for Saudi Arabia,” Raymond
discussion.
Rounds opposes what he calls an “arms embargo” on Saudi Arabia, arguing that
suspending U.S. arms sales as leverage over policy disagreements will only
backfire by driving the kingdom to purchase arms from other countries. He contends that
suspending sales to Saudi Arabia will fail to alter objectionable Saudi conduct, whether in Yemen or domestically, while “[damaging]
ties with Saudi Arabia.” According to Rounds, this dynamic is not unique to Saudi Arabia, but a general proposition that applies to all
U.S. arms recipients.
If he is correct, arms embargoes — a regular tool of U.S. foreign policy — are quixotic attempts to shape the behavior of foreign
governments and put the United States at a strategic disadvantage to global competitors. While this argument seems reasonable, if
depressing, it suffers from two principal and serious flaws.
First,the empirical record does not support Rounds’ contention that arms embargoes
do not deliver. While these suspensions are not a silver bullet, there is ample
evidence to demonstrate that they can be effective in changing the policy of a
target country. For example, in 2005, the United States successfully used the
suspension of a joint weapons project to persuade Israel to cancel a proposed sale
of drone equipment to China. In another example, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
secured commitments from Egypt to resolve a longstanding criminal case against
41 foreign NGO workers, including Americans and Europeans, and to suspend military
cooperation with North Korea in exchange for releasing $195 million in suspended
military aid. More recently, the legislative hold Sen. Robert Menendez placed on an
arms sale to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, when combined with threatened
legislation to impose further restrictions on transfers to Saudi Arabia, helped
pressure the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen to re-engage in negotiations with the
Houthis, resulting in an imperfect but still important deal on the port of Hodeidah.
The author’s argument that arms embargoes do not work cites the 2013 suspension of U.S. military
aid to Egypt following that country’s military coup. This policy clearly failed to reverse the military coup led by current
President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, but there are good reasons to question the validity of the
example. Proponents of the suspension argue with good reason that it was not
given a fair chance to work. Shortly after the decision was announced, senior U.S.
officials told the Egyptians the aid would soon be restored, undercutting the
coercive value of the suspension. From the perspective of the Egyptian
government, it would have been irrational to make serious concessions in response
to what they believed was an idle threat. Just as important, due to a plethora of exceptions
and carve-outs, some U.S. military assistance to Egypt continued throughout the
suspension period, including maintenance and sustainment, sparing the Egyptian
military from the full force of the hold.
Despite undercutting its own suspension, the hold still produced some good. U.S.
diplomats were able to leverage the policy to deter the Egyptian government from
enforcing an arbitrary September 2014 deadline for NGOs to register under Egypt’s
draconian 2002 NGO law. And, although Egypt released U.S. citizen Mohamed Soltan from prison two months after aid
was resumed, Cairo was partly motivated by the concern that the Obama administration
could reverse its decision to resume arms shipments. To be sure, these accomplishments were
relatively limited, and we should be careful not to overestimate the efficacy of arms holds. A foreign government is unlikely to
prior suspensions have yielded
fundamentally change its position on what it views as an existential issue. But
tangible gains, and they should remain part of the U.S. foreign policy toolkit.
This is the only way to force the coalition to take seriously the U.S.’s demands
for a ceasefire.
Larison 18 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2018 (“End U.S. Support for the War on Yemen Before It’s Too Late,” The American Conservative, November 5th,
Available Online at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/end-u-s-support-for-the-war-on-yemen-before-its-too-late/,
Accessed 06-07-2019)
Bruce Riedel comments on the Saudi coalition’s escalation in the days following Mattis and Pompeo’s call for a ceasefire in 30 days:
Congress is ready to take action to curtail America’s involvement in the war after the midterms. A Democratic majority in
the House would likely hold hearings on alleged Saudi war crimes and the murder of Khashoggi. The crown prince’s
tarnished reputation will be in the docket.
But the Saudis have escalated their airstrikes on Sanaa and Hodeidah instead. The capital and the main port have been
heavily pounded by the Saudi coalition since Pompeo and Mattis spoke.
It is likely that the Saudis and Emiratis don’t take the administration’s ceasefire
demand seriously, and so far they have no reason to do so. There is no hint that
Trump will withdraw support from the coalition if they refuse to comply with the
demand, and administration officials have made such a habit of covering for
coalition wrongdoing that the Saudis and Emiratis have to assume that they are not
in any danger of losing the administration’s backing. The Soufan Center notes in its analysis of
Pompeo and Mattis’ statements that both of the statements are toothless:
However, in both statements, there were no details as to how to bring the warring sides to the table, or how to restrain the
Saudi bombing campaign. In fact, just after the U.S. tentatively called for a cease fire, Saudi jets pounded Sanaa with a
series of air strikes, perhaps sending a message to Washington that Riyadh has its own timetable. The coalition also has
moved thousands of troops into position for an expected push into the port city of Hodeida. It remains unclear whether the
U.S. will actually pressure Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. with any meaningful leverage beyond the statements supporting a
cease fire.
Regardless, another month of intensified fighting in and around Hodeidah threatens the lives of
millions of Yemenis who depend on the port for their food supply. Even if the ceasefire demand is
genuine and the coalition eventually takes it seriously, there could be irreparable
harm done to the civilian population before a ceasefire takes effect. If the
administration is trying to buy time for the coalition, it is time that millions and
millions of starving Yemenis can’t afford to waste.
If the Saudis and Emiratis take for granted that they still have the administration’s
full support, nothing less than cutting off all U.S. military assistance and
halting all arms sales will get the message through to them that they no longer
have a blank check from Washington. Since the administration is still unwilling to
do that, Congress has to do it for them. The House should pass H.Con.Res. 138 and the Senate should pass
S.J.Res. 54 to put an end to U.S. involvement. Congress has to act to end our involvement and
pressure the Saudi coalition to stop the war, because we know the administration
will almost certainly do nothing.
 They Say: “Stopping Coalition Won’t End War”
U.S. arms sales are the crucial enabler of the Saudi coalition’s continued
operations — they guarantee that the quagmire deepens.
Riedel 19 — Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow and Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project and Senior Fellow in the Center
for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, former Senior Advisor on South Asia and the Middle East on the National
Security Council at the White House during the H.W. Bush, Clinton, W. Bush, and Obama Administrations, former Professor at the
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, holds an M.A. in Medieval Islamic History from Harvard University, 2019 (“As
the Saudis host international summitry, their Yemen problem isn’t going away,” The Brookings Institution, May 28th, Available
Online at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/05/28/as-the-saudis-host-international-summitry-their-yemen-
problem-isnt-going-away/, Accessed 06-11-2019)
Saudi Arabia is preparing for three summits this week to rally Arab and Muslim
opposition to Iran as tensions mount in the region. The summits won’t help the
Saudis biggest problem: the quagmire in Yemen.
King Salman will chair summits of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League on May 30 in Mecca and of the Organization
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on May 31, also in Mecca. The choice of Mecca as the venue is designed to enhance the king’s claim to
leadership by underscoring his role as the custodian of the two holy mosques of Mecca and Medina. The Saudis are investing
considerable prestige in the summits.
The summits come after repeated assaults on the kingdom by the Zaydi Shia
Houthi rebels in Yemen. The rebels used drones to attack the east-west pipeline that pumps oil from the Eastern
Province to the Red Sea, and missiles to strike Saudi cities close to the Yemeni border. These attacks followed the sabotage of four
ships in the Emirati port of Fujairah.
The Houthis say the stepped-up attacks are a response to the Saudis’ refusal to
cease air strikes in Yemen after the Houthis withdrew from three ports on the Red
Sea to allow more humanitarian aid in to the country. The Saudi backed President Mansour Abdu
Rabbu Hadi has publicly accused the United Nations mediator of being pro-Houthi and biased toward the rebels. The Saudis
blame Iran for the breakdown in peace talks and the escalating violence. The
rebels insist, correctly, that they are independent of Tehran, but they are clearly
coordinating closely with their Iranian ally.
The Saudi media is urging a tough line on Iran, hoping it will produce regime
change in Tehran. Young Iranians are said to be ready to overthrow the
government if sanctions continue to tighten, and military action ups the ante; but
those claims aren’t credible. The Saudis are trumpeting Trump’s tweet that
military action will lead to the official end of Iran.
If Iran wants to fight, that will be the official end of Iran. Never threaten the United States again!
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump)
May 19, 2019
The Saudis have even invited their bete noire, Qatar, to the summits. It’s unlikely that
they intend to reconcile with Doha, but they are eager for the imagery of unity
against Tehran. The king and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman are reluctant to admit
that their quarantine of Qatar has badly splintered the Gulf Cooperation Council. Pakistani Prime
Minister Imran Khan is coming to the OIC summit, primarily to advocate the Palestinians’ opposition to the Trump administration’s
so-called deal of the century, he says.
Behind the summitry is a disastrous failure of decisionmaking that led to the
intervention in Yemen in 2015; the signature initiative of the crown prince.
Thanks to his leadership, Saudi cities and infrastructure are now targets for a
once-ragged militia that has developed increasingly sophisticated drones and
missiles with the help of Iran and Hezbollah. The war is the worst humanitarian
catastrophe in the world.
The Trump administration’s decision to sell billions in arms to Riyadh without
congressional approval will only encourage the crown prince to continue the
quagmire. The Saudis are not more capable of winning the war with more
munitions. The American support has singularly failed in four years to prevent
the Saudis from bombing civilian targets or reducing the carnage of the war.
Children are the most at risk and are paying a horrible cost.

Failure to cut off the coalition endorses their campaign and undermines
political negotiations.
Snyder citing Abramson 19 — Stephen Snyder, Senior Radio Producer at Public Radio International, citing Jeff
Abramson, Non-Resident Senior Fellow for Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers at the Arms Control Association,
Manager of the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor—the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on
Cluster Munitions, Organizer of the Forum on the Arms Trade—a network of civil society experts, former Policy Advisor and
Director to the Secretariat of Control Arms—the global civil society alliance that championed the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty,
holds an M.P.P. from the University of California-Berkeley, 2019 (“Trump's override of Congress on weapons deals 'is exactly what
Iran would want',” Public Radio International, May 29th, Available Online at https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-05-29/trumps-override-
congress-weapons-deals-exactly-what-iran-would-want, Accessed 07-02-2019)
The air campaign to defeat Yemen’s rebels, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, is responsible for most of
the documented civilian casualties in the Yemen war, according to the United Nations. Despite
efforts by the US to improve their aim, Saudi and Emirati pilots — flying US-
made planes and dropping US-made munitions — have killed thousands of
Yemeni civilians at hospitals, schools, weddings and funerals. Last year, an airstrike hit school
bus full of students.
the Saudis have
“Those are the weapons that have been at the heart of the most significant congressional opposition because
proven that they use so-called 'offensive' weapons in ways counter to US-stated
guidance and rules, and for apparent intentional harm of civilians,” says Jeff
Abramson, senior fellow at the Arms Control Association, also based in Washington, DC. “Any
weapons transfers at this point continue to show that the United States supports the
military approach taken by the Saudis and Emiratis, rather than a political
solution, even though the US claims that only a political solution is possible.”
 They Say: “Civilian Casualties Minimal”
U.S. weapons will continue to be used to commit war crimes — they’re not
minimizing civilian casualties.
Larison 18 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2018 (“U.S. Arms Sales and the War on Yemen,” The American Conservative, December 26th, Available Online at
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/u-s-arms-sales-and-the-war-on-yemen/, Accessed 06-11-2019)
The New York Times has published a very good report on the role of U.S.-made arms and U.S.-provided assistance in the war on
Yemen. This section merits a few comments:
For decades, the United States sold tens of billions of dollars in arms to Saudi
Arabia on an unspoken premise: that they would rarely be used.
The Saudis amassed the world’s third-largest fleet of F-15 jets, after the United States and Israel, but their pilots almost
never saw action. They shot down two Iranian jets over the Persian Gulf in 1984, two Iraqi warplanes during the 1991 gulf
war and they conducted a handful of bombing raids along the border with Yemen in 2009.
The United States had similar expectations for its arms sales to other Persian
Gulf countries.
“There was a belief that these countries wouldn’t end up using this
equipment, and we were just selling them expensive paperweights,” said
Andrew Miller, a former State Department official now with the Project on Middle East
Democracy.
If policymakers used to assume that U.S.-made weapons would not be used by the
clients that bought them, they no longer have the luxury of hiding behind that
excuse. The Saudis and Emiratis have been using the planes, weapons, and ships
they have acquired from U.S. manufacturers to massacre and starve civilians for
more than three and a half years. Given their conduct in the war on Yemen, there should be an
indefinite moratorium on selling weapons to the Saudis and Emiratis or any
other member of the Saudi coalition. We know very well how these governments
have used U.S.-made weapons, and we have to assume that they will continue to
use them in the commission of war crimes now and in the future. Any future
proposed arms sale to any of these governments has to be considered with the war
on Yemen in mind.
 They Say: “Plan Worsens Civilian Casualties”
The coalition uses precision-guided weapons to intentionally target civilians.
Larison 19 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2019 (“The Bogus ‘Emergency’ and the War on Yemen,” The American Conservative, June 12th, Available Online at
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-bogus-emergency-and-the-war-on-yemen/, Accessed 06-13-2019)
The “emergency” lie is tied up with the larger lie that is administration Yemen
policy. They claim that providing the Saudis and the UAE with precision-guided
weapons reduces the risk to civilians, but that ignores the fact that the Saudi
coalition routinely launches attacks on civilian targets on purpose. Sending more
weapons to governments that massacre civilians obviously cannot reduce the risk
to civilians. It guarantees more civilian deaths. We know in advance that these
weapons will be used to commit war crimes, and by trying to rush these weapons
to the war criminals the Trump administration is giving a green light to more
massacres, deepening U.S. complicity in these crimes, and announcing to the
entire world that the administration’s support for the Saudi coalition is
unconditional. The “emergency” is a lie in service to an evil cause, and all
members of Congress should reject it.

The coalition is intentionally targeting civilians.

Hartung 19 — William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, former
Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, former Director of the Arms Trade
Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, 2019 (“It’s Time To Stop Arms Sales To Saudi Arabia,” LobeLog—the Inter Press
Service’s blog, May 15th, Available Online at https://lobelog.com/its-time-to-stop-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/, Accessed 06-07-2019)
the
With respect to the sales of precision-guided bombs—whose use has been documented in the widespread killings of civilians—
argument of choice has been that even more civilians would die in Saudi/UAE air strikes if the
coalition were limited to “dumb” bombs that could not be targeted as accurately. This assertion is
premised on the idea that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are making good faith efforts
to avoid hitting civilians. The sheer volume of strikes on targets like hospitals, a
school bus, funerals, factories, water treatment plants, and other civilian
infrastructure puts the lie to this argument. Air strikes on civilians are not
“mistakes.” They are part and parcel of the Saudi/UAE strategy to bomb Yemenis
into submission and end the war on terms favorable to their coalition.

Empirically, sales of precision guided munitions increase civilian casualties.

Benowitz 19 — Brittany Benowitz, Chief Counsel at the Center for Human Rights at the American Bar Association, former
Defense Advisor to a Senior Member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, holds a J.D. from the Washington College of
Law at American University, 2019 (“U.S. ‘Emergency’ Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates,” Forum on the Arms
Trade, May 23rd, Available Online at https://www.forumarmstrade.org/ussaudimay2019.html, Accessed 06-11-2019)
Further sales of weapons previously used in unlawful strikes, including in particular
precision guided munitions, would violate the United States obligations under the Geneva
Conventions and likely federal law. Eight of the ten strikes identified by UN experts
as unlawful in 2017 involved precision guided munitions. Contrary to the
misconception that these weapons reduce civilian casualties, the record shows that
it was only after the Obama administration suspended their sale that the unlawful
strikes on civilian casualties went down.
 They Say: “Plan Causes Southern War”
The UAE is withdrawing.
Nissenbaum 19 — Dion Nissenbaum, National Security Reporter at The Wall Street Journal, 2019 (“U.A.E. Moves to
Extricate Itself From Saudi-Led War in Yemen,” The Wall Street Journal, July 2nd, Available Online at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-a-e-moves-to-extricate-itself-from-saudi-led-war-in-yemen-11562094272?mod=rsswn, Accessed 07-
02-2019)
The United Arab Emirates is aiming to pull most of its forces out of the Saudi-led
campaign against Houthi rebels in Yemen, extricating itself from a four-year war that
has provoked Congressional opposition and become a flashpoint with Iran in the region.
Abu Dhabi has begun pulling tanks and attack helicopters out of the country,
In recent weeks,
according to Western officials. It also has withdrawn hundreds of soldiers from the Red Sea
coast, including those close to the port city of Hodeidah that serves as the country’s main gateway for
humanitarian aid, the officials added.
The U.A.E. has been the most important partner in the Saudi Arabia-led military alliance
fighting against the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels since March 2015. But the war has left thousands dead and fueled what the United
Nations calls the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, evoking widespread international criticism.
Tensions in the Middle East have soared since the U.S. warned of threats from Iran and its allies and sent more forces to the region
last month. While both Washington and Tehran have said they don’t want a war, a spate of recent attacks—including on commercial
ships off the Emirati coast—has kept the region on edge. U.S. officials have blamed Iran for the tanker attacks, which Tehran has
denied.
The U.A.E. has been stung by the expanding opposition in Washington to the military
campaign and fears their country will be one of Tehran’s first retaliatory targets if
President Trump orders military strikes on Iran, the officials and others briefed on the U.A.E.’s plans said.
The country is instead aiming to focus its efforts in Yemen on battling al Qaeda, Islamic
State and other extremist groups, these officials said.
U.A.E. officials said they couldn’t comment on the military drawdown described by Western officials. U.A.E. officials have briefed
Western and Gulf allies, according to these officials, but they have yet to publicly discuss the drawdown, first reported by Reuters.
Saudi officials said they couldn’t comment.
The move has prompted some concerns from its U.S. and Saudi partners that the drawdown could be framed as a victory by the
Houthi insurgents and their Iranian supporters, the officials said.
It isn’t clear how Saudi Arabia or the military coalition it leads will respond to the Emirati moves.
The U.A.E has been Riyadh’s most important ally in the coalition, joining in the air
campaign in Yemen, gathering intelligence, carrying out some military operations, and
providing vital support for Yemeni forces battling the Houthis.
But strains between the two Gulf nations over strategy in Yemen have created fissures. Peter
Salisbury, a Yemen specialist with the International Crisis Group, said the military
moves are a clear signal from the Emiratis that they want to focus on diplomacy
and extract themselves from an unpopular war.
“It definitely adds a new layer of complexity,” he said. “This lays bare some of the
divisions between some of the anti-Houthi groups.”

Their support was key to the STC.

Cafiero 19 — Giorgio Cafiero, CEO and Founder of Gulf State Analytics, holds an M.A. in International Relations from the
University of San Diego, 2019 (“Yemen: Regional dynamics surrounding the Southern Transition Council’s agenda,” Gulf State
Analytics, March 25th, Available Online at https://gulfstateanalytics.com/yemen-regional-dynamics-surrounding-the-southern-
transition-councils-agenda/, Accessed 07-02-2019)
In Southern Yemen, decades-old grievances remain unaddressed. Many Southern Yemenis see themselves as the victims of
exploitation at the hands of the leadership in the North. Such resentment increased following the Houthi takeover of Sana‘a in
September 2014 and Ansurallah’s military incursions into the South. Failure of Yemen’s internationally-recognized government to
provide peace, any semblance of law and order, or basic government services in the country’s southern governorates have contributed
to growing demands for a restoration of South Yemen as an independent state, which existed from 1967 to 1990.
Consequently, since its establishment in April 2017 (25 months after the Saudi-led coalition entered Yemen), the Southern
Transition Council (STC has gained greater influence
) , both in terms of hard- and soft-power. It appears that the
STC has enough power to significantly influence the outcome of Yemen’s Civil War to the degree whereby ignoring the group’s
demands would make peace in the war-torn country even more elusive.
the
Having impressively fought both the Houthis and Salafist-jihadist forces—al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Islamic State,
STC has gained stronger support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), whose officials see
the idea of a de facto independent state in southern Yemen after the dust settles in the war-torn country
as serving Abu Dhabi’s geopolitical, economic, and security interests. Within the
framework of combating groups that both the UAE and the US governments recognize as terrorist organizations, Washington has
backed the UAE’s counter-terrorism agenda in southern Yemen, including Abu Dhabi’s support for groups operating with the STC
umbrella.
Ultimately, establishing a pro-Emirati political landscape in southern Yemen is about Abu Dhabi’s strategic interests vis-à-vis
Shabwa’s oil fields, the oil terminal in al-Shihr, Yemen’s sole gas liquification plant which is located in Balfaf, in addition to southern
By establishing southern Yemen as a de facto client state run by Abu
Yemen’s seaports.
Dhabi and Dubai, the Emirati leadership sees the land as serving as a strategically-
prized area from where the UAE can further extend its geo-economic clout into
Africa.
The STC has received substantial criticism from voices who question Abu Dhabi’s motives, arguing that the UAE operates in southern
Yemen exclusively to benefit Abu Dhabi’s unique interests, not those of local Yemenis in their country’s southern governorates.
The challenge for Southern Yemenis will be to capitalize on the benefits of
partnering with the Emirates without allowing the UAE to establish a potentially
independent South Yemen as its client state.
 They Say: “No Moral Obligation”
Failure to end arms sales makes the U.S. complicit in the coalition’s ongoing
war crimes — this is morally unacceptable.
Larison 18 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2018 (“The U.S. Is Deeply Complicit in Saudi Coalition Crimes in Yemen,” The American Conservative, August 13th,
Available Online at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-u-s-is-deeply-complicit-in-saudi-coalition-crimes-in-
yemen/, Accessed 06-11-2019)
When we remember that the U.S. has provided the Saudi coalition with arms, refueling, intelligence, and diplomatic cover so that they
can wage their war on Yemen for more than three years, it is remarkable that U.S. officials try to keep up the pretense that our
government is not involved in the conflict. The Pentagon is quick to remind us that their support is “limited” and “non-combat” in
nature whenever the Saudi coalition kills civilians with U.S.-supplied weapons, but at the same time they are adamant that their
“limited” support must never be cut off. When they assert that U.S. assistance helps limit civilian casualties (for which they provide no
evidence), U.S. officials stress how vitally important that assistance is. When it comes to answering for coalition atrocities, they
pretend that they have nothing to do with the fighting. If that excuse doesn’t work, they will shrug and claim not to know the extent of
U.S. responsibility:
“We may never know if the munition [used] was one that the US sold to them,” Army Maj. Josh Jacques, a spokesperson
for US Central Command, told me.
In fact, there is evidence that the bomb that destroyed the school bus in Thursday’s massacre was one that the U.S. sold to them:
This tweet, from respected Yemeni journalist Nasser Arrabyee, shows part of a 500-pound MK-82 bomb. It is
manufactured in the United States and sold in large numbers to both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The remnants of the US bombs that killed Yemen children in the latest US-Saudi massare and war crime of August 9th,
2018
In Saada north Yemen. pic.twitter.com/z8bvadwncG
— Nasser Arrabyee (@narrabyee) August 11, 2018
Continued military assistance to governments that have routinely struck civilian
targets and killed thousands of people is abhorrent. When our government has
reason to believe that the assistance it provides will be used to commit human
rights abuses and war crimes, it is obligated to withhold that assistance.
Pretending not to know how the coalition is using the weapons and fuel the U.S.
provides them is not credible after more than three years of coalition atrocities against
Yemeni civilians.
The reality is that the coalition relies on U.S. and British military assistance to
wage their war and would not be able to continue it without that support. Bruce
Riedel says as much here:
Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institute: “if the United States of America and the United Kingdom tonight
told King Salman that this war [on Yemen] has to end, it would end tomorrow
because the Royal Saudi Air force cannot operate without American &
British Support”. pic.twitter.com/XQTcLlNKJn
— Louis Allday (@Louis_Allday) August 12, 2018
Cutting
Mattis must know this, and this is why he has strenuously opposed any effort to curtail or end U.S. support for the war.
off U.S. military assistance to the coalition would force those governments to halt
their campaign, and the Trump administration has no desire to stop them. On the
contrary, the administration has backed them to the hilt and refuses to hold them
accountable even when they commit the most egregious war crimes, including
the slaughter of dozens of children.
U.S. support for the Saudi coalition is essential to their war effort, and that makes
our government deeply complicit in what the coalition does in Yemen.
It’s a genocide, and the U.S. is complicit.
Bachman 18 — Jeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights and Director of the Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights
MA Program at the School of International Service at American University, holds a Ph.D. in Law and Public Policy from Northeastern
University, 2018 (“US complicity in the Saudi-led genocide in Yemen spans Obama, Trump administrations,” The Conversation,
November 26th, Available Online at https://theconversation.com/us-complicity-in-the-saudi-led-genocide-in-yemen-spans-obama-
trump-administrations-106896, Accessed 06-28-2019)
A Saudi-led coalition of states has been aggressively bombing Yemen and
imposing an air and naval blockade of its ports for more than three years, leading
UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres to describe Yemen as “the world’s worst
humanitarian crisis.”
Guterres put the crisis in stark perspective, emphasizing the near complete lack of security for the Yemeni people. More than
22 million people out of a total population of 28 million are in need of
humanitarian aid and protection. Eighteen million people lack reliable access to
food; 8.4 million people “do not know how they will obtain their next meal.”
As a scholar of genocide and human rights, I believe the destruction brought about by these attacks
combined with the blockade amounts to genocide.
Based on my research, to be published in an upcoming issue of Third World Quarterly, I believe the coalition would not
be capable of committing this crime without the material and logistical support
of both the Obama and Trump administrations.
A ‘storm’ recast as ‘hope’
Yemen has been gripped by a civil war since 2015, pitting the Shia Houthi movement – which has fought for centuries for control of
parts of Yemen – against a government backed by Sunni Saudi Arabia. Because of these religious differences, it would be easy to
recast what is largely a political conflict in Yemen as a sectarian one.
That characterization fits Saudi and U.S. assertions that the Houthis are controlled by Shiite Iran, a claim that has not gone
uncontested. Both the Saudis and the U.S. are hostile to Iran, so U.S. support of Saudia Arabia in Yemen represents what U.S.
administrations have said are strategic interests in the region.
Besides Saudi Arabia, the coalition attacking Yemen includes the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait and
Bahrain. Qatar was part of the coalition but is no longer.
During the first three years of “Operation Decisive Storm,” later renamed “Operation Renewal of Hope,” 16,749 coalition air attacks
in Yemen were documented by the Yemen Data Project (YDP), which describes itself as an “independent data collection project
aimed at collecting and disseminating data on the conduct of the war in Yemen.”
Based on the information available to it using open sources, YDP reports that two-thirds of the coalition’s bombing attacks have been
against non-military and unknown targets. The coalition isn’t accidentally attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure – it’s doing it
deliberately.
That’s evident from the kind – and volume – of civilian targets documented. They include places that are generally protected against
attack even under the lax rules of international humanitarian law: Residential areas, vehicles, marketplaces and mosques as well as
boats, social gatherings and camps for internally displaced persons.
Because of the role it plays in movement of people, food and medicine, Yemen’s transportation infrastructure is especially important.
Airports, ports, bridges and roads have all been repeatedly attacked.
Yemen’s economic infrastructure – farms, private businesses and factories, oil and gas facilities, water and electricity lines and food
storage – have also been hit. And the coalition has targeted and destroyed schools and medical facilities, too.
Finally, Yemen’s cultural heritage has been attacked. In all, at least 78 cultural sites have been damaged or destroyed, including
archaeological sites, museums, mosques, churches and tombs, as well as numerous other monuments and residences that have great
historical and cultural significance.
How to make a crisis
The attacks aren’t the only way the coalition is creating a massive humanitarian crisis.
The air and naval blockade, in effect since March 2015, “is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool and an
instrument of war,” according to the UN panel of experts on Yemen.
The blockade stops and inspects vessels seeking entry to Yemen’s ports. That allows the coalition to regulate and restrict Yemenis’
access to food, fuel, medical supplies and humanitarian aid.
In his analysis of the blockade’s legality, Dutch military scholar Martin Fink writes that the blockade means “massive time delays and
uncertainty on what products would be allowed to enter.”
Despite UN efforts to alleviate some of the worst delays, imports are often held up for a long time. In some cases, food that makes it
through the blockade has already spoiled, if entry is not denied altogether.
In some ways, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is unprecedented and can be tied directly to the conflict. As the World Bank notes,
“Yemen’s very difficult economic challenges before the current conflict cannot be compared to the intensely critical situation the
country is facing today.”
 de Waal describes Yemen as “the greatest famine atrocity
Similarly, Tufts University scholar Alex
of our lifetimes.” It was caused, writes de Waal, by the coalition “deliberately
destroying the country’s food-producing infrastructure.”
The failing security for the people of Yemen has been compounded by a failing
health system. The World Health Organization reported in September 2017 that only 45 percent of health facilities in Yemen
were functional.
As Secretary-General Guterres put it, “Treatable illnesses become a death sentence when local health services are suspended and it is
impossible to travel outside the country.”
As of February 2018, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the coalition had killed 6,000 people in
airstrikes and wounded nearly 10,000 more.
Yet, according to the OHCHR report, these counts are conservative. Tens of thousands of Yemenis have also died from causes related
to the war. According to Save the Children, an estimated 85,000 children under five may have died since 2015, with more than 50,000
child deaths in 2017 alone from hunger and related causes.
Coalition actions in Yemen amount to nothing short of what Raphael Lemkin, the individual who
coined the term “genocide,” referred to as a “synchronized attack on different aspects of life.”
The US contribution
The coalition’s genocide in Yemen would not be possible without the complicity
of the U.S. This has been a bipartisan presidential effort, covering both the Obama and Trump administrations.
U.S. arms are being used to kill Yemenis and destroy their country. In 2016, well after the
coalition began its genocidal assault on Yemen, four of the top five recipients of U.S. arms sales were members of the coalition.
The U.S. has also provided the coalition with logistical support, including mid-air refueling, targeting advice and support, intelligence,
expedited munitions resupply and maintenance.
Other than the sale of arms, perhaps the most significant contribution to the coalition’s ability to commit genocide in Yemen has been
the provision of fuel and mid-air refueling of Coalition warplanes, which was halted in early November, 2018. By the middle of 2017,
the U.S. had delivered over 67 million pounds of fuel to the coalition and refueled coalition aircraft more than 9,000 times.
Shared responsibility for genocide
As a genocide scholar, I believe that under international law, the U.S. shares responsibility
with the Coalition for genocide in Yemen.
What does this mean? It means that the U.S. must cease and desist all activities that facilitate
genocide in Yemen. This would include stopping all sales of weapons and ending
logistical support for Coalition action.
In an ideal world, one in which all states are equally subjects before international law, the U.S. would also seek an advisory opinion
from the International Court of Justice regarding what restitution it owes the people of Yemen for its role in the coalition’s genocide.
Similarly, the U.S. would request an International Criminal Court investigation into individual culpability of U.S. officials in both the
Obama and Trump administrations for their role in facilitating the crimes committed in Yemen.
Of course, this is not an ideal world.
The U.S. recognizes neither the International Court of Justice’s authority to judge the legality of its actions, nor the International
Criminal Court’s authority to investigate the suspected criminal acts of individual U.S. officials. Such an investigation could be
triggered by a UN Security Council referral, but the U.S. would simply veto any such effort.
All that is left, then, is for the people of the U.S. to hold their own to account for
the crimes committed in their names.
Iran Advantage Backlines
 They Say: “Saudi Provocations Fail”
The Saudis are pushing a U.S. war with Iran.
Kelanic 18 — Rosemary A. Kelanic, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, former
Associate Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at The George Washington University, holds a Ph.D. in Political
Science from the University of Chicago, 2018 (“The Saudi Alliance Must Go,” The National Interest, November 29th, Available
Online at https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/skeptics/saudi-alliance-must-go-37537, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Moreover, close ties to the House of Saud carry strategic costs in addition to the moral costs of
whitewashing the misdeeds of a murderous regime. Let’s not forget that U.S. support for Saudi regime was one of the main grievances
The Saudis also seem hell-bent on
Osama bin Laden cited for launching terrorism against the American homeland.
baiting the United States into a foolish and unnecessary military clash with Iran—to
have America settle their local feud for them. And the aforementioned war in Yemen, where Saudi forces
have used American-made weapons to commit barbarous acts against civilians, only undermines U.S. security by stoking the sort of
anti-American sentiment that motivated nineteen hijackers—fifteen of them Saudis—to carry out the heinous 9/11 attacks.

The risk is extremely high because Saudi Arabia’s strategy is to keep the U.S.
in a state of permanent conflict with Iran.
Parsi 17 — Trita Parsi, Founder and President of the National Iranian American Council—the largest organization representing
people of Iranian Heritage in the United States, former Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the School for Advanced
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, former Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute, former Policy Fellow at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University, 2017
(“Saudi Arabia Wants to Fight Iran to the Last American,” The National Interest, November 15th, Available Online at
https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/saudi-arabia-wants-fight-iran-the-last-american-23212, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Many observers have connected the dots and concluded that Saudi Arabia’s crown
prince is seeking to drag the United States into a war with Iran and Hezbollah. But
that’s only half the story. Looking at the recent events through a broader
geopolitical lens, a much more sinister plan emerges: a Saudi plan to trap the
United States in a permanent standoff with Tehran.
While most of the world has been aghast by Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s radical actions of this past week, his conduct is
only inexplicable when viewed from the wrong lens, such as the Sunni-Shia sectarian frame or the even more absurd attempt to cast
this conflict as part of a greater fight against terrorism. After all, Saudi Arabia provided the seed money for Al Qaeda and openly
funded and armed Al Qaeda in Syria (Jabhat al-Nusra), according to the U.S. government.
When seen from a geopolitical lens, however, the unlikely alliance between Zionist Israel and the Wahhabi House of Saud, their
opposition to the Iran nuclear deal and their coordinated effort to ratchet up tensions in the region suddenly acquire a degree of logic.
Rather than ethnic or sectarian motivations, Saudi Arabia’s ultimate aim is to drag
the United States back into the Middle East in order for Washington to reestablish its
military dominance and reimpose on the region an equilibrium that favors Tel Aviv and
Riyadh. This, however, does not require just a war in Lebanon, but a permanent state
of conflict between the United States and Iran.
Israel and Saudi Arabia see this as justified return to the order that existed prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The “dual containment”
policy of the Clinton administration established a balance in the region centered on Israel, Saudi and Egypt, with the explicit goal of
isolating and containing both Iran and Iraq. Tehran vehemently opposed the order and sought to undermine it by all means, including
by targeting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
But despite Tehran’s extensive efforts, Iran failed to bring about the collapse of the U.S.-led order. Instead, it was the United States
itself under George W. Bush that—inadvertently—brought about the end of the U.S.-backed balance by committing the disastrous
mistake of invading Iraq. The spectacular failure of this endeavor destabilized the region and weakened the United States, to a point
where it no longer could restore the old order or foist a new balance upon the region.
The Middle East has ever since essentially been orderless—there is no single dominant power or combination of states that can
establish and sustain a new balance. This is precisely why it is experiencing so much instability and violence: the absence of a clear
Israel and Saudi
order draws all major powers into a fierce competition to define the new equilibrium. This is also why
Arabia have found common cause against Iran and why they have been pushing the
United States to take military action against Iran.
Israel and Saudi Arabia were the biggest losers of the Iraq war and the collapse of Pax Americana. They enjoyed maximum security
and maneuverability under the previous order, and their regional rivals were checked and contained, courtesy of American treasure
and blood. Their priority for the last decade has been to compel the United States to recommit itself to the region and restore the pre-
2003 balance, or at a minimum re-embrace the role as hegemon over the Middle East.
But while the United States saw benefit in Middle Eastern hegemony twenty years ago, American, Israeli and Saudi interests have
sharply diverged over the past two decades. Not only does the United States lack the resources to resurrect the previous balance, the
benefits to U.S. national security are increasingly in question. President Barack Obama had ordered a global audit of America’s
resources, commitments, challenges and opportunities early on in his presidency. The conclusion was unmistakable: the most
strategically vital area for the United States in this century is East Asia. Yet, most of America’s resources were committed to the
Middle East in unending wars of increasingly marginal strategic significance. America needed a course correction that reversed its
overcommitment in the Middle East and undercommitment in East Asia: a pivot to Asia.
Both Tel Aviv and Riyadh viewed Washington’s reorientation towards Asia with concern. They feared it would weaken Washington’s
commitment to their security while also potentially making the United States more inclined to reach an accommodation with Iran.
Those fears rose dramatically as Obama resisted the Saudi and Israeli push to bomb Iran, and instead opted for diplomacy. To the
Saudis, Obama had sided with Iran. The details of the nuclear deal were irrelevant to Riyadh: the problem was the very idea of the
United States striking a deal with Iran, which by definition would signal the end of Washington’s policy of fully balancing Iran and
leave Saudi facing its Persian rival without unreserved American backing.
Saudi Arabia’s only prospect of balancing Iran today remains the same as it was ten years ago:
by dragging the United States back into the region militarily. If Iran’s nuclear program
or its role in Iraq won’t compel Washington to bomb Iran, the Saudis must
instigate a crisis that will force America back into the squabbles of the Middle
East. Lebanon can serve this purpose precisely because it brings in a critical factor absent in both Iraq and Yemen—the Israeli
angle and its American political potency. What the American public needs to fully understand, though, is that Riyadh is not
seeking a one-off in Lebanon but rather a perpetual U.S. confrontation with Iran, a never
ending war on behalf of Saudi Arabia.
As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in 2010, the Saudis “want to fight the Iranians to the last
American.” Why the Saudis would see this as attractive is clear. Why Netanyahu would like
to go along with this also follows a certain logic. That is not the mystery in this drama. The mystery is why the
president of the United States would go along with something that so clearly
contradicts U.S. national interest.
It is not the Saudi crown prince that is acting irrationally. It’s the president of the
United States.
Disinformation Warning Backlines
 2AC — General Indict of Neg Ev
You should presumptively dismiss evidence about Yemen from so-called
“think tank experts.”
Cobban 19 — Helena Cobban, President of Just World Educational—a non-profit organization, Chief Executive Officer of
Just World Books—a publisher of titles on Middle Eastern and other international issues, former Member of the International Institute
for Strategic Studies, former Member of the Middle East Advisory Committee at Human Rights Watch, former Columnist on Global
Issues for The Christian Science Monitor, former Research Fellow at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University,
former Co-Director of the Middle East Project at Search for Common Ground, holds an M.A. from Oxford University, 2019 (“The
UAE’s seedy influence operations are a footnote in the Mueller Report,” Mondoweiss—a Center for Economic Research and Social
Change publication, April 25th, Available Online at https://mondoweiss.net/2019/04/influence-operations-footnote/, Accessed 06-27-
2019)
Controlling the narrative on Yemen
the
All these shenanigans on the behalf of the Gulf-Arab super-rich are important—for a number of compelling reasons. First,
investments that all of them have made, over the past several years, have had a strong effect on public
understanding of key issues in the Middle East, and on policy. As noted earlier, these
issues include Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Iran.
Of these issues, Yemen is the one regarding which these Gulf Arabs have—
recently—been least successful in controlling the narrative. Their argument that
the Houthi alliance that has controlled the capital, Sanaa, and considerable surrounding
areas for many years[,] is illegitimate, is totally controlled by Iran, and is solely
responsible for the country’s suffering—and that therefore Americans and everyone else
should support the Saudi/UAE alliance that has been battling the Houthis, has finally
been exposed on every count. Just last week, finally, the US Senate supported a resolution to end the support the US
military has been giving to the Saudi war effort in Yemen. That was a real victory for the antiwar forces. Trump vetoed the resolution,
but Sen. Sanders is hoping to win enough support to over-ride the veto. Stay tuned…
But MBS (help from MBZ and the Pentagon, under Obama) launched Saudi Arabia’s large-scale military push into Yemen back in
March 2015. It has taken four years for the US Senate to get to where it is on the Yemen issue, which is a shockingly long time. In the
meantime, more than 70,000 Yemeni civilians have been killed, and millions more face imminent threats of cholera and starvation.
the capture by these ruthlessly ideological forces of so many of the
Secondly,
Washington think-tanks that previously had long reputations for fair-minded,
objective research means it is almost impossible these days for anyone reading
their output—whether directly, or indirectly, through the way they get quoted in
the media—to get anything like an accurate picture of the situation in the countries
being described.
This applies particularly to Syria, where since 2011 the bought-and-paid-for think-tanks have rigidly suppressed any viewpoints that
challenge the view that Pres. Bashar al-Asad is uniquely evil and has to be overthrown. As someone who has worked on Syria-related
issues since the 1970s, I have seen this happen at first hand. In my last appearance at an MEI event on Syria, in summer 2011, I
pointed out that Pres. Asad still retained considerably more support from Syria’s citizens than the “regime change” crowd claimed,
and that the “opposition” was splintered and in disarray. I was right. But MEI notably never invited me back and even refused to host
other experts on Syria whom I had suggested for their programing.
If you read something from someone billed as a “think-tank expert” look
Bottom line:
carefully at their institution’s funding before you judge the value of their
work.

The coalition funds think tanks in order to hide their lobbying — Nazer
proves.
Economist 18 — The Economist, an English-language weekly magazine-format newspaper edited in London, 2018 (“The
swampy business of lobbying for foreign governments,” September 22nd, Available Onlien at https://www.economist.com/united-
states/2018/09/22/the-swampy-business-of-lobbying-for-foreign-governments, Accessed 06-27-2019)
Think-tanks can also serve as vehicles for influence-peddling. Prominent think-
tanks, like Brookings and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, have been embarrassed
after revelations that they accepted millions of dollars from foreign governments while
also producing seemingly objective research on subjects dear to them. Lesser-
known outfits can project more seriousness than an out-and-out lobbyist. The
Arabia Foundation, a recently founded think-tank often quoted in American media, is thought to be close to
the Saudi government. Ali Shihabi, the founder, says the think-tank is funded by private
Saudi citizens and that “we are not involved in any manner of lobbying”.
Another think-tank, the National Council on US-Arab Relations, retains an international
fellow named Fahad Nazer who has written for prominent think-tanks and
newspapers. A filing to the DoJ made by Mr Nazeer shows that he became a paid
consultant to the Saudi Arabian embassy in November 2016, receiving a salary of $7,000 a
month. The think-tank at which Mr Nazer is a fellow declined to comment on the
arrangement; Mr Nazer says he complies with all the laws and regulations, and is
careful to mention his deal with the Saudi embassy in media appearances .
 2AC — Hudson/FDD
Reject evidence from the Hudson Institute and the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies — they’re discredited mouthpieces for the coalition.
Heer 18 — Jeet Heer, Staff Writer at The New Republic, 2018 (“The New York Times publishes pro-Saudi writers from think
tanks that have deep autocratic ties,” The New Republic, November 22nd, Avialable Online at
https://newrepublic.com/minutes/152387/new-york-times-publishes-pro-saudi-writers-think-tanks-deep-autocratic-ties, Accessed 06-
27-2019)
The New York Times publishes pro-Saudi writers from think tanks that have deep
autocratic ties.
On Thursday, The New York Times published an op-ed headlined, “Trump is crude. But he’s right about Saudi Arabia.” Written
by Michael Doran, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and Tony Badran, a research
fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the op-ed offered a full
throttle defense not just of Saudi Arabia but also, specifically, of Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman, whom the CIA believes ordered the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
In a crucial paragraph, Doran and Badran argue that bin Salman is the legitimate ruler of Saudi Arabia:
Let’s imagine Mr. Trump’s critics get their wish. A replacement crown prince who rose to power under pressure of
sanctions would be severely weakened, if not entirely illegitimate.
It might seem curious that someone from “the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies” would support a hereditary monarch ruling over one of the most
authoritarian regimes on earth. But this paradox is perhaps explained by the fact
that both Doran and Bardran work for think tanks that have deep ties to Arab
autocracies.
As The New York Times reported in May, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been
using American think tanks as part of an extensive lobbying effort to shore up
their support in America. Two key figures in this effort are George Nader, an advisor to the
ruler of the UAE and Elliott Broidy, a major Republican donor and former deputy chairman of the Republican National
Committee.
Both the Hudson Institute and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies claim
they reject any foreign funding. But as the Times reporting makes clear, Nader was able to use
Broidy as a front-man for helping to fund the two think tanks in projects
supporting Saudi and UAE policies:
Mr. Nader did, however, provide a $2.7 million payment to Mr. Broidy for “consulting, marketing and other advisory
services rendered,” apparently to help pay for the cost of conferences at two Washington think tanks, the Hudson Institute
and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, that featured heavy criticism of Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Hudson Institute policies prohibit donations from foreign governments that are not democracies, and the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies bars donations from all foreign governments, so Mr. Nader’s role as an adviser to the U.A.E. may
have raised concerns had he donated directly.
Nader has served time in prison for
Nader and Broidy are dubious characters on other grounds as well.
sexually abusing children and has also been convicted of possessing child
pornography. Nader is currently a co-operating witness in special counsel Robert
Mueller’s investigation. In 2017, Broidy agreed to pay $1.6 million in hush money to a
woman he had an affair with in a deal arranged by President Donald Trump’s former lawyer Michael
Cohen.*
This publication of this op-ed mars the reputation of everyone involved. The
Hudson Institute and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies seem more than
ever to be mouthpieces for Arab autocrats. But The New York Times itself is also
tainted by publishing this op-ed. After all, their own reporting provides ample
evidence for why these two think tanks should not be taken seriously. Yet the
newspaper did nothing to inform readers of the op-ed about the very salient
connections between these think tanks and the Arab monarchies.
 2AC — Arabia Foundation
The Arabia Foundation is a Saudi front group.
Johnson 18 — Adam Johnson, Contributing Analyst at Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting—a media watchdog organization,
Co-Host of Citations Needed—a weekly podcast about the intersection of media, PR, and power, 2018 (“Media Boosts Obvious Saudi
Front Group as Neutral ‘Think Tank’,” Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, March 28th, Available Online at
https://fair.org/home/media-boosts-obvious-saudi-front-group-as-neutral-think-tank/, Accessed 06-27-2019)
The Arabia Foundation appeared in spring 2016, seemingly out of nowhere, as a Saudi-
focused think tank with “ties to Riyadh,” but vaguely independent of the regime.
Or at least independent enough so that media wouldn’t represent it as an extension
of the kingdom. But the past few weeks have clearly shown it to be little more than a
PR outlet for de facto Saudi ruler Mohammed bin Salman and his sprawling, opaque
business interests.
After multiple requests by FAIR for its donors, the Arabia Foundation refused to
give any, other than its founder, Saudi investment banker Ali Shihabi. It insists it
doesn’t take money from “the Saudi government,” but instead is backed by
unnamed private Saudi citizens.
The distinction between private citizens and the “government” in the hereditary
monarchy of Saudi Arabia is notoriously blurry, but one connection is worth noting: The
registered agent and legal counsel of the Arabia Foundation, Eric L. Lewis, represented
the Saudi government and related “charities” in the lawsuit brought by families of
9/11 victims over the Saudi royal family’s role in the September 11 attacks. The website of Lewis’ law firm, Lewis, Baach,
Kaufmann and Middlemiss, boasts it has “extensive experience representing and advising foreign sovereigns, including the
governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt.”
The New York Times (11/30/18) has described the group as “close to the Saudi
government,” while the Washington Post’s Ishaan Tharoor (11/6/17) noted it had “close ties
to the kingdom.” That doesn’t stop the Post opinion section from running multiple
op-eds from Arabia Foundation figures (5/31/17, 12/20/17, 1/4/18, 1/22/18). In most press
appearances, the group is simply identified as “a Washington-based think tank.”
Absent documented evidence of who exactly funds the group, why should media
not assume—based on its connections to the government and cartoonishly pro–bin
Salman line—that the Arabia Foundation is a front group for the government?
In repeated interviews (BBC World News, 3/20/18; Morning Joe, 3/20/18; CNN, 3/19/18) last week, Shihabi, the head of the
nominally independent group, spun for war crimes, human rights abuses and a whole host of morally dubious activities carried out by
the increasingly despotic Saudi ruler. The Arabia Foundation’s ties to the Saudi government are never noted or even vaguely
referenced in these interviews.
On MSNBC’s Morning Joe, after saying the “crown prince” has engaged in a “massive corruption crackdown” (a wholly PR frame
discredited earlier this month by the New York Times, 3/11/18), host Mika Brzezinksi teed up Shihabi to comment on Saudi Arabia.
The softball interview that followed hit all of the regime’s central premises without question: as well as “cracking down on
corruption,” bin Salman is “modernizing Saudi Arabia” and “taking on the religious establishment.”
No one on the panel brought up Saudi Arabia’s ongoing war crimes in Yemen—consistent with MSNBC’s network-wide virtual
blackout on one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises (FAIR.org, 3/20/18). The Council on Foreign Relations’ Richard Haas made
one opaque reference to Saudi “war with Yemen,” but didn’t note the thousands killed or up to one million infected with cholera; the
US-backed war was was simply dismissed as a “strategic overreach.” The New York Times’ Elisabeth Bumiller, another panelist, did
get in a question about torture, which Ali Shihabi dismissed as having “no evidence” despite Bumiller speaking with several doctors
who witnessed it.
Reliable Saudi stenographer David Ignatius who, as FAIR (4/28/17) noted last year, has been running the same reformist press release
for the royal family for 15 years, continued his unique brand of faux criticism, insisting that the Saudi prince was too “bold”—the
political commentary equivalent of answering “I work too hard” when asked on a job interview what your biggest flaw is.
Shihabi claimed without irony that what Saudi Arabia needed was “autocracy to affect change,” and a “benevolent autocrat.” His
evidence that the masses approved of bin Salman’s “bold, needed” leadership was approved of by the masses? That there has been “no
bloodshed, there’s been no demonstration, no domestic strife.” Of course, the last time there were anti-government demonstrations, in
2011, the Saudi military opened fire on protesters, and snuffed out resistance with torture and extrajudicial killings. In 2017, when one
Shia town resisted the regime, Riyadh flattened an entire neighborhood. This could perhaps be why the general population isn’t quick
to take to the streets, but the Arabia Foundation insist it’s an implicit admission the crown prince is loved and popular.
The CNN and BBC interviews, likewise, didn’t note the Arabia Foundation’s obvious ties to the Saudi regime.
Forbes keeps running “op-eds” by Arabia Foundation fellow Ellen Wald that amount
to little more than press releases for Saudi investment opportunities (e.g., 12/11/17, 2/1/18,
3/13/18). Another pundit on the Arabia Foundation’s payroll, Bernard Haykel, writes
fawning profiles of bin Salman in the Washington Post (1/22/18) without disclosing he’s a
founding director of the organization—instead listing his more benign academic
credentials.
The Arabia Foundation is so satisfied with the media’s presentation of its
messaging that it routinely tweets out articles it’s featured in and TV appearances
it’s had, knowing its messaging is syncing up nicely with bin Salman’s PR tour to
the United States. “Yemen is a tragedy. Wars are a tragedy. Saudi is aware of that and is going out of its way to try to address
humanitarian issues there,” boasted one tweet, quoting Shihabi’s interview with the BBC.
By contrast, this obtuse inability to connect dots is absent when discussing think tanks “close to” the Syrian government. Never is the
Assad-connected British Syrian Society set up as a neutral arbiter of affairs of the Syrian conflict. It is met with disdain, painted as
“little more than a Syrian regime propaganda exercise” (Guardian, 10/26/17), the “mouthpiece in the West” (Middle East Eye,
10/19/17) for a war crime–committing tyrant. Those who associate with it, including academics, journalists and British members of
parliament, are publicly shamed for participating in a “regime PR exercise” (Independent, 10/29/16). Yet somehow the “Saudi-
connected” Arabia Foundation, which cheers on a “benevolent autocrat” as he rains bombs on Yemen and uses hunger as a weapon of
war, receives no such moral banishment. Instead, it is dressed up as just another respectable think tank.
The fact that the Arabia Foundation is a thinly veiled PR firm for the Saudi
government matters. The average reader or viewer would take Shihabi and his
network of mercenary “fellows” less seriously if they were presented as
spokespeople for a repressive government rather than quasi-academics from a
impressive-sounding “foundation.”
With all the hysteria surrounding RT and foreign influence on the American public, one might think such an
obvious racket would give editors and TV producers pause. But the same rules don’t apply to
American allies. Their propaganda is treated not like a sinister “influence operation,” but
like a respectable group of academics calling balls and strikes on
international affairs.
AT: Houthi Victory DA
 2AC — Houthi Victory DA
1. Plan Decreases Iranian Influence — the Houthis aren’t a proxy for Iran,
but the plan weakens Tehran’s influence.
Hartung 19 — William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, former
Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, former Director of the Arms Trade
Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, 2019 (“It’s Time To Stop Arms Sales To Saudi Arabia,” LobeLog—the Inter Press
Service’s blog, May 15th, Available Online at https://lobelog.com/its-time-to-stop-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/, Accessed 06-07-2019)
the Houthi-led
Last but not least is the claim that stopping arms sales to the Saudi/UAE coalition will aid Iran. But
opposition is by no means a proxy for Tehran. They have longstanding
grievances that have nothing to do with Iran’s limited military support and would
be fighting no matter what posture Iran takes towards the conflict. If anything,
the brutal Saudi/UAE intervention is driving the Houthi coalition closer to Tehran.
The best way to undercut Iranian influence in Yemen is to support UN efforts to
end the war.

2. Plan Key To Peace — it’s impossible for the coalition to win, but the plan
builds momentum for a negotiated settlement.
Larison 18 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2018 (“The Ridiculous Hawkish Arguments for Supporting the War on Yemen,” The American Conservative, March 6th,
Available Online at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-ridiculous-hawkish-arguments-for-supporting-the-war-on-
yemen/, Accessed 06-24-2019)
James Jay Carafano must assume that his audience doesn’t know anything about the
war on Yemen:
Instead of turning our back on Yemen, the U.S. should focus on ending the war.
If U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition were withdrawn, that would go a long way
towards ending the war by making it much more difficult for the coalition to
continue waging it. Carafano frames stopping U.S. support for wrecking Yemen as “turning
our back on Yemen,” which is about as misleading as can be. The U.S. has been
turning its back on the civilian population of Yemen for the last three years by aiding and
abetting the governments that have been bombing and starving them. He notably
omits any mention of the coalition’s commission of numerous war crimes against the
civilian population. The plight of the civilian population created by the coalition blockade
is likewise nowhere to be found. If the U.S. were no longer enabling coalition war
crimes and collective punishment, that would be the first time in years that our
government would be seriously paying attention to the plight of the people of Yemen.
Carafano writes:
America is there for a reason: to keep the region from falling apart. The collapse of any friendly regime there is bad for us.
U.S. involvement in the Saudi-led war
The first part of this is debatable, but when applied to Yemen it is clearly not true.
has been contributing to the country’s fragmentation. The war is causing the
country’s devastation and division, and by supporting it the U.S. is encouraging
those outcomes. There is no “friendly regime” in Yemen to be defended. The Hadi
government has no legitimacy in the eyes of most Yemenis and has virtually no
support anywhere in the country, and the coalition’s goal of reimposing him on
Yemen will never be reached.
Helping the Saudis and their allies to pummel and starve a country that has done nothing to us
is what is bad for the U.S. In addition to making ourselves complicit in terrible
crimes and famine, U.S. support for this war has created conditions in which Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the local ISIS affiliate have been flourishing. Backing the
Saudi-led war on Yemen is harmful to U.S. interests and a shameful blot on our national
reputation.
Carafano gets something else profoundly wrong:
The greatest threats to Middle East stability and security are Iran and transnational Islamist terrorists groups, principally
the Islamic State group and al-Qaida. And it is precisely these forces that are fueling the Yemen war.
That is undoubtedly what the Saudis and Emiratis would have us believe, but it is simply not true. In Yemen, these are not the greatest
Iran’s involvement has been and remains limited, and it is a
threats to security and stability.
gross exaggeration to say that their involvement is what is “fueling the Yemen
war” when the coalition’s role in keeping the war going is a hundred times greater.
Jihadist groups are benefiting from the instability and upheaval created by the war,
but they are not the driving forces behind it. AQAP and ISIS are exploiting the
situation for their own ends, but the war continues because the coalition insists
on continuing it. The longer that the U.S. provides them with military assistance,
the longer it will be before they acknowledge that their intervention has failed .
Carafano makes another misleading statement:
If Congress forces the administration to abandon our allies, Tehran, Islamic State group and al-Qaida would feel
emboldened and likely double-down on expanding the war.
these governments aren’t really our allies, and
There is no reason to think any of this is true. First,
calling them that creates the impression that we owe them something when we do
not. AQAP and ISIS have gained strength since the coalition intervened because
the Saudi-led war has diverted attention and resources away from combating them.
When the Saudi-led war ends, those groups should have a harder time operating.
Cutting off U.S. support does not risk “expanding the war” at all. On the contrary, it will
pressure the coalition governments to curtail their interference in Yemen and create
an opening for a diplomatic solution. It is telling that hawkish defenses of U.S.
involvement in this war rely on thoroughly misrepresenting the nature of the conflict.
The U.S. absolutely should “drive the other players toward a peaceful political
settlement.” The first step in doing that is to stop being a party to the war and to
end our military backing for the governments that have done so much damage to
the country.

3. Coalition Withdrawal Solves — Houthi attacks are reactionary.

Bandow 18 — Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative
Defense Alliance, former Special Assistant to President Reagan, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, 2018 (“It's Time to End U.S.
Support for the Saudi War on Yemen,” The National Interest, May 15th, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/the-
skeptics/america-should-see-saudi-arabias-war-yemen-the-horror-it-25838, Accessed 06-13-2019)
Mattis claimed that ending U.S. combat support would allow the Houthis to
Secretary
use ballistic missiles to threaten “vital shipping lanes in the Red Sea.” Alleged
proof of this was an earlier Houthi missile attack on an American warship. That
attack led other administration officials to express concern about navigational
freedom, especially in the Bab-el-Mandeb waterway.
But Yemenis attacked the U.S. vessel because Washington is helping their
killers, Saudi Arabia. Before this war, Houthis did not target Americans and they
had no reason to. In peace the Yemenis rely on Gulf trade and they would never
want to impede it. Yet now the Saudi-led coalition has blockaded Yemen and its
access to the Gulf. By internationalizing the war Riyadh has also internationalized
the weapons. As U.S. Vice Admiral Kevin Donegan complained and noted, previously “there was no
explosive boat that existed in the Yemeni inventory.”

4. No Iran Influence Impact — the Houthis aren’t Iranian proxies.

Pillar 18 — Paul R. Pillar, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies and former Visiting Professor in the
Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Nonresident Senior Fellow in
Foreign Policy at the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution, served for 28 years in the U.S.
intelligence community including as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia and as a Member of the
Analytic Group at the National Intelligence Council, holds a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University, 2018 (“Why Does the U.S.
Support War Crimes in Yemen?,” The National Interest, September 5th, Available Online at
https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/paul-pillar/why-does-us-support-war-crimes-yemen-30572, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Fixation on Iran
Obsessions are never a sound basis for policy. The U.S. obsession with Iran drives the current U.S. policy on
Yemen. Iran has given aid to the Houthis, and the U.S. urge—which the Trump administration exhibits to an extreme—is to oppose
anyone and anything with a connection to Iran, and to support anyone opposing Iran.
This obsession, like others, muddies perceptions and thinking about where threats really lie.
Although the Houthis commonly are described as Iranian proxies, they aren’t,
notwithstanding how glad they may be to accept Iranian aid. The most significant
thing the Houthis have done during this war—their capture of the capital city of
Sana—they did against Iran’s advice.
Therefore, American policy with such unfortunate roots also may be counterproductive. Yemen is not a critical
theater for the Iranians, but their modest aid to the Houthi movement has been a
low-cost way of making their Saudi rivals bleed. The more that the regime of Saudi Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman seems distracted and flummoxed by its misadventure in Yemen, the
more incentive Iran has to keep encouraging the bleeding. This U.S. administration is a part of this
mess because it is waging economic warfare against Iran and aiming to destabilize its regime. America also shares in the Saudis'
international infamy that is documented in the U.N. report—and gives Iran even more incentive to
encourage the conflict.

5. No Strait Closure Impact — disruptions and price spikes would be

minimal.
Cornell 19 — Phillip Cornell, Non-Resident Scholar in Energy and Foreign Policy at the Arabia Foundation, Non-Resident
Senior Fellow in the Global Energy Center at the Atlantic Council, former Senior Corporate Planning Advisor to the Chairman and
CEO of Saudi Aramco, former Special Advisor to the Executive Director of the International Energy Agency, holds an M.A. in
International Economics and European Studies from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 2019
(“Gulf Military Tensions and Oil Supply Security,” Arabia Foundation, May 14th, Available Online at
https://www.arabiafoundation.org/saudi-arabia-the-gulf-states/gulf-military-tensions-and-oil-supply-security/, Accessed 06-25-2019)
Oil prices are already up after Washington’s decision last month not to renew Iran
sanction waivers and amid signs that few if any shipments are leaving Iranian ports. In an already tightening
market, current military tensions are likely to push these prices higher. It is still unclear
whether the purported tanker attacks near Fujairah on May 12 are linked to Iran, but the subsequent media battle, the misreporting, and
the 2 percent increase in oil price all demonstrate how sensitive the political situation and oil prices are to regional posturing. The
price response is a function of the risk of conflict, its potential impact on oil exports, and the military and oil policy scenarios that may
develop as a result around one of the most critical choke points in the global oil supply chain.
Around 18 percent of global oil demand (or 18 million barrels per day [mb/d]) flows through the
Strait of Hormuz at the twenty-one-mile-wide entrance to the Persian Gulf. When formulating energy security strategy at
NATO in the late 2000s, we focused on international shipping lanes around choke points like Hormuz because of their vulnerability to
piracy, accidents, and strategic conflict.
But the risk is not really that Iran will block the strait; the US Fifth Fleet in
Bahrain should quickly neutralize any attempt to do that. Increased maritime
hazard would more likely occur as a result of mines, rocket fire, or even sabotage
affecting insurance rates and shipping schedules. The Fujairah attacks could be a sign of things to come.
Yet under conditions of such sporadic threat, transit volumes would probably
not decline significantly, even if tankers were eventually subject to naval escort
timetables. During the height of the “tanker war” in the mid-1980s when Iran
targeted oil exports to cripple Iraq, only 2 percent of shipments were disrupted.
Experience shows that despite higher-risk premiums, insurers will continue to
cover ships and cargos, and sailors will continue to sail.
Recent tanker attacks and diversions on the other end of Arabia near the Bab al-Mandeb
strait show that Iran’s regional proxies and allies can also affect shipments . Some ships
veered farther from the Yemeni shore after a Saudi tanker was hit in 2018, but only Saudi Aramco stopped transiting the area. If
these kinds of proxy attacks on vessels are stepped up, for example in the Persian Gulf, then in the
absence of direct conflict the United States and its allies could find themselves in the awkward position of facing shadow saboteurs
supplies will continue to flow.
without a fixed target to retaliate against. But
The more serious risk of oil supply disruption probably comes from attacks on export
infrastructure, perhaps by Iranian proxies in Iraq, and particularly if Iran targets Saudi installations on the opposite shore. A
May 13 Houthi drone attack on an East-West pipeline pumping station shows how cheap UAVs can now reach far into the country,
even if their impact is limited. Saudi Arabia exports about 7 mb/d, most of this via its main Persian Gulf ports of Ras Tanura (3.4
mb/d capacity) and Ras al-Ju’aymah (3 mb/d capacity). Both ports, as well as oil stabilization towers at Abqaiq, are well within range
of Iranian missiles.
A direct attack would represent a major escalation, but the impact could be significant. A 2011 Belfer Center study calculated that it
would require thirteen hundred Shahab-type missiles to achieve a 75 percent probability (with Patriot missile defense attrition) of
knocking out Abqaiq and thousands to knock out an entire port. At the time of the study, Iran only had about four hundred of these
missiles. But the Iranian missile program continued, unrestrained even by the JCPOA, and antiradar homing technology on the
modern Fateh-110’s has increased their lethality. Whether or not installations are seriously damaged, the presence of falling missiles
would cause the evacuation of personnel and at least partial shut-in of the facility for the duration of the attack itself (which may be
spread over days or weeks).
If all of Abqaiq’s 7 mb/d capacity were taken offline, either by damage or shut-in, Saudi Arabian exports could fall by more than 3.5
mb/d. Without a functioning wharf at Ras Tanura, other ports and the East-West pipeline to the Red Sea could still export upwards of
9 mb/d, so exports might fall by about 1 mb/d.
Such a supply disruption would likely prompt a strategic oil stock release
coordinated by the International Energy Agency (IEA). At the IEA in 2010, we developed stock release simulations
around possible instability in the region. Supplies would comfortably be covered by existing
strategic oil stocks, particularly over a thirty- to ninety-day release period when facilities might be shut in because of an
ongoing safety threat.
In the lower-probability case of significant infrastructure damage, longer-term outages can result when specialized repair parts are not
readily available. Saudi Aramco has worked to develop redundancy and flexibility in the repair supply chain to improve resiliency, in
part by fostering technologies like on-site 3-D printing, but some of these technologies are still in development. A six- to fifteen-
month repair time is “in the midrange” of past repair experiences. Even in a relatively extreme case, a 1 mb/d to 4 mb/d disruption
would not come close to depleting IEA strategic stocks—the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) alone holds 650 million barrels.
Oil prices will certainly spike if the threatened attack on oil exports from the Persian Gulf
materializes. But in terms of volume, those exports are resilient because for the
right price ships will continue to sail; spare capacity and redundancies exist for
most oil facilities; repair times are improving; and international strategic oil stocks
provide insurance against the most extreme scenarios.
6. No Oil Shock Impact — increased U.S. production and decreased global
demand cushion the blow.
Reed 19 — Stanley Reed, Energy, Environment, and Middle East Reporter at The New York Times, former London Bureau Chief
at BusinessWeek magazine, 2019 (“The Oil Market Shows It Can Take a Punch,” New York Times, June 21st, Available Online at
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/business/oil-prices-us-iran.html, Accessed 06-25-2019)
So far, this isn’t your typical oil crisis.
Previous moments of tension in the Persian Gulf region, like Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
once caused a major kink in oil supplies, igniting spikes in prices. After all, the Gulf provides
around a third of the world’s oil, and much of that crude passes through the narrow Strait of Hormuz, which has recently been a target
of attacks on tankers.
But this week the response in the oil markets to the tensions following Iran’s shooting
down of an American drone has seemed muted — even to the surprise of some participants. Analysts say
this could stem from profound changes that have occurred in oil markets in recent
years.
Production in the United States has risen significantly. America has become an oil
exporter, sharply reducing its purchases of oil from the Middle East, although that region
remains the world’s largest source of oil overall.
Another change this time around: The world’s demand for oil is growing at a slower pace. One
cause for this drop-off is that world economic growth is slowing, partly over concerns
about the trade war between the two largest economies — the United States and China. But another,
more permanent reason is the slow pivot away from fossil fuels as a source of
energy.
Certainly, the tensions in the Gulf could escalate quickly. But oil markets have evolved, changing the
calculus for risk in the region.
Persian Gulf tension is having an impact
Oil prices have moved higher, although modestly, the last few days. The price for brent crude, the international standard, has risen
about 5.8 percent since the drone was shot down, trading at about $65 a barrel Friday morning. But the recent high was about $72 a
barrel in mid-May.
Oil tanker companies, worried about the safety of their crews, say they are concerned about operating in the area. With so much
business coming from shipping oil out of the Persian Gulf, the companies would be very reluctant to pull out of the region entirely.
“The general area of the Strait of Hormuz represents a real and very serious risk to shipping,” Robert Macleod, chief executive of
Frontline, an Oslo-based tanker company, wrote in an email. “Ships must continue to passage the area but all precautions must be put
in place.”
A Frontline tankers, the Front Altair, was one of two tankers in the Gulf of Oman attacked on June 13.
Tanker charter rates have ticked up substantially over the last week, hitting about $28,000 a day for chartering the largest class of
tankers. Insurance premiums for shipping in the area have also risen. If anything, though, tanker operators have been disappointed that
prices have not risen even higher; in late 2018, the operators were able to charge about $50,000 a day.
“Rates have increased some, though not as much as many had thought or even hoped for,” wrote Fearnleys, an Oslo-based ship
broker, in a report published on Wednesday.
Traders may be shrugging off the threat of disruptions in the Gulf knowing that a
shortage could be made up by surging supplies from the United States.
A boom in oil and natural gas production in the United States in recent years, driven mainly
by shale drilling, has shaken up world oil markets and revived the United States as a
petroleum power. That trend is expected to continue.
Oil production in the United States grew by an extraordinary 17 percent last year, and
natural gas output was up by 12 percent. In the last decade, the United States has
added roughly six million barrels of oil a day, the equivalent of the combined
production of the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, two stalwarts of the Organization for the Petroleum
Exporting Countries.
Canada, too, has seen its oil output surge, up 8.5 percent last year.
The explosive growth has weakened OPEC’s hold on the oil markets and cut
gasoline prices sharply around the world, as supplies from the United States make their way
into circulation. Under pressure, OPEC and Russia have joined forces in coordinating production cuts, but they have not
been able to restore prices to the $100-a-barrel levels of 2014.
Traders know that because OPEC and Russia are keeping oil in the ground, there are large volumes of additional oil that could be
unleashed on the market.
The pace of world oil demand is slowing
The oil market’s tame response so far to the threats of disruption has surprised some analysts. Others, though, point to fears about the
world economy, and say that signs are emerging that growth in demand for oil, which had been strong in recent years,
is sharply easing.
The research firm IHS Markit concluded recently that some major markets were experiencing an actual contraction in demand for oil,
“the largest such decline since the worst of the financial crisis” of 2008.
Analysts say that if a weaker global economy continues to soften demand for oil, then relentlessly increasing supplies from the United
States and elsewhere may swamp the markets.
“As long as growth held up, you could absorb all the growth of U.S. supply,” said Roger Diwan, vice president for energy at IHS
with weaker demand, the global supply growth is going to overwhelm
Markit. “Now
global demand growth,” he added.
What if oil shipments were cut off?
It is important to keep in mind that there has been no actual disruption of oil flows from the
Gulf region.
But a major episode might well roil the markets. Analysts say that it would be very difficult to replace a
large portion of the 21 million barrels or so of oil that flows through the Strait of Hormuz on an average day.
A major disruption would likely do the most damage to Asian economies. According to the United States Energy Information
Administration, a government agency, 76 percent of the crude oil that flowed out of the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz
went to Asian markets like China, India and Japan.
But a cutoff of supplies would not be in the interest of any of the countries in the
region, including Iran, which still exports what oil it can through the Gulf. Oil
provides a vital source of revenue for many governments in the region.
The United States has shown in the past that it is willing to go to great lengths to keep the
sea lanes open. In the 1980s, for instance, after dozens of ships were damaged during the conflict between Iraq and Iran, navy
vessels from the United States and other countries escorted tankers through the area. This time around, the United States might seek
help from other oil importing countries like China and Japan.

7. Case Outweighs — a shipping lane doesn’t justify the ongoing slaughter of

civilians.
Hunt 18 — Edward Hunt, Freelance Writer covering war and empire, holds a Ph.D. in American Studies from the College of
William and Mary, 2018 (“As More Yemenis Die, U.S. Support Keeps a Major Oil Trade Route ‘Open for Business’,” The
Progressive, September 19th, Available Online at https://progressive.org/dispatches/yemenis-die-major-oil-trade-route-remains-open-
180919/, Accessed 06-25-2019)
As the Trump Administration continues to support the vicious Saudi-led military
intervention in Yemen, growing evidence indicates that its support is largely
motivated by concerns about the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a narrow sea passage off Yemen’s western
coast.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is one of the three most important oil trade
chokepoints—narrow channels along widely used global sea routes—around the Arabian Peninsula. Although its place in the war has
been largely ignored by the U.S. media, the strait has been a central factor in U.S. planning. Roughly five million barrels of oil and oil-
based products pass through the strait on a daily basis, eventually making their way to Asia, Europe, and the United States.
Publicly, Trump Administration officials say very little about the strait, insisting they are simply looking for a way to end the war.
They claim to be focused on helping the Saudi-led military coalition pressure Iranian-backed Houthi rebels into accepting a political
deal that will return to power the government of exiled Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi.
Trump officials and analysts have repeatedly prioritized the strait in
Yet over the past year,
both strategic and military planning.
A recent report by the Congressional Research Service, for example, includes a section titled “Houthi threaten Commercial Shipping
in the Red Sea.” The report, which maps the world’s major oil chokepoints, highlights the 4.8 million barrels of crude oil and
petroleum liquids that passed through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on a daily basis in 2016.
The war in Yemen began in March 2015, when a Saudi-led military coalition attacked the Houthi rebels, who had taken over the
western part of the country.Since the beginning of the intervention, the U.S. government
supported the Saudi-led coalition with military advice, intelligence support, precision-
guided munitions, and air-to-air refueling.
This has been devastating for the people of Yemen. The U.S.-backed Saudi-led
coalition has killed thousands of civilians and caused a humanitarian crisis. More
than 8 million people are facing starvation, more than 1 million people have
contracted cholera, and more than 2,000 people have died of cholera.
“I’ve argued from the beginning that there is a U.S. imprint on every single civilian death inside
Yemen,” Senator Chris Murphy, Democrat of Connecticut, has said. “I don’t think the Saudis
would be conducting this level of atrocity if not for the support from the United
States.” Additional U.S. officials have accused the U.S. government of complicity in both the killings of civilians and the
humanitarian crisis.
While the Trump Administration claims it is trying to end the conflict, its officials
are clearly worried that a Houthi-led government will make it more difficult for oil
tankers and other ships to pass through the area.
U.S. General Joseph Votel, the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) warned Congress in February that sixty to
seventy ships pass through the strait every day, making any disruption “a very real threat that we have to pay attention to.” A month
later, he told Congress that it was a priority for CENTCOM to keep the shipping lanes open. “We are principally focused on the
ballistic missile threat and the maritime threat that plays out in the Bab el-Mandeb and in the Red Sea to the west of Yemen,” he said.
Secretary of Defense James Mattis has raised similar concerns, warning that shipping would be imperiled if “we don’t get this under
control.”
The Trump Administration’s concerns are consistent with broader U.S. strategic priorities for the Middle East. President Trump has
repeatedly mused about the possibility of taking the region’s oil, and establishment officials have voiced their commitments to
keeping the region’s oil available to global oil markets.
About a year ago, former U.S. diplomat Eric Edelman told Congress that any disruptions in the global oil supply could be problematic
for the U.S. economy. “This is especially true of the Middle East, which contains half of global proven oil reserves, accounts for one-
third of oil production and exports, and is home to three of the world’s four biggest oil transit chokepoints,” he explained.
In July, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the Trump Administration would prevent disruptions. “The world should
know that America is committed to keeping sea lanes open, to keep transit of oil available for the entire world,” he said.
These intentions clarify the reasons behind the Trump Administration’s military
support for the Saudi-led coalition. The administration appears to prioritize the sliver
of sea off the western coast of Yemen, where much of the region’s oil remains in transit.
Its support continues despite a recent spate of horrors, including deadly attacks
on a fish market, a school bus, and fleeing civilians.
“The Bab el-Mandeb is open for business, as far as we're concerned,” General Votel recently remarked. “One of our key missions here
is to ensure freedom of navigation, freedom of commerce, and we will continue to exercise that through the region.”
By prioritizing the security of the Bab el-Mandeb strait for oil transit, the Trump
Administration ensures that the war will continue and that the Yemeni people
will continue to die.

8. No Economic Decline Impact — strong disincentives still prevent war.

Jervis 11 — Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science and
School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, former President of the American Political Science Association, holds a
Ph.D. from the University of California-Berkeley, 2011 (“Force in Our Times,” International Relations, Volume 25, Number 4,
December, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Sage Journals, p. 414)
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more
peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes?45 A zero-sum sense of
status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the
current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine
democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies.
While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great
enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each
other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were
more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the
more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited,
it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political
conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could
prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only
become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this
argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the
very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone
suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring
about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.
 Extend: “Plan Decreases Iranian Influence”
Ending the war is the best way to contain Iranian influence — their impact is
not unique.
Reisener 19 — Matthew Reisener, Program Associate at the Center for the National Interest, 2019 (“America Must Question
Ally Actions in Yemen,” The National Interest, February 23rd, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/middle-east-
watch/america-must-question-ally-actions-yemen-45112, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the conflict seems to be have strengthened the
Ironically,
positions of the forces it sought to oppose. At an event hosted by the Center for the National Interest last
December, Daniel Byman of the Brookings Institute argued that while Iran offered limited
support to the Houthis during the early stages of the conflict, the ties between the
two Shia forces have deepened as a result of Saudi intervention, strengthening
Iran’s position on the Arabian Peninsula. Furthermore, in addition to benefiting from increased access to American-made
weaponry, terror groups like Al Qaeda have capitalized on the chaos brought about by the near-collapse of the Yemeni state and
The longer the conflict rages and the more
solidified their foothold in the war-torn country.
American-made bombs are dropped on civilians, the easier it becomes for groups
like the Houthis and Al Qaeda to recruit new generations of militants into their
ranks. The Saudi campaign has become self-defeating.

Iranian influence is strong now despite U.S. support for the coalition.
Reisener 19 — Matthew Reisener, Program Associate at the Center for the National Interest, 2019 (“America Must Question
Ally Actions in Yemen,” The National Interest, February 23rd, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/middle-east-
watch/america-must-question-ally-actions-yemen-45112, Accessed 06-24-2019)
ending American participation and undercutting Saudi
This strategy is certainly not without risk;
and Emirati efforts in Yemen’s civil war could result in greater Iranian empowerment
through the success of the Houthis or could, as former Defense Secretary James Mattis warned, result
in the loss of civilian life if Saudi Arabia continues its bombing campaigns absent
the support of American intelligence or targeting assistance. However, both of these scenarios are
happening now even with America’s involvement, and Saudi-led efforts to
broker a political settlement could only stand to improve the deteriorating
conditions on the ground. American military support has proven insufficient to
prevent Iranian influence from spreading into Yemen or spare civilians from the
horrors of the conflict, and there is no reason to suspect that continuing these
failing policies will eventually bring about a different end.

By extending the war, U.S. arms sales increase Iranian influence.

Larison 19 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2019 (“Trump’s Bogus ‘Emergency’ and the War on Yemen,” The American Conservative, May 28th, Available Online at
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/trumps-bogus-emergency-and-the-war-on-yemen/, Accessed 06-07-2019)
Like clockwork, The Wall Street Journal editors rush to defend Trump’s outrageous abuse of power to send weapons to the Saudis and
Emiratis in defiance of Congressional opposition:
Every decision Mr. Trump makes these days is supposedly a constitutional crisis, but in this case the President is relying on
a provision in the Arms Export Control Act that allows for sales in the event of an emergency.
By abusing his power with this decision, Trump is making a mockery of the emergency
provision contained in the law. He is doing what he wants when there is no emergency that
could possibly justify it. Whenever there is an emergency or national security loophole contained in the law, Trump
 It is obviously a cynical abuse of an
exploits it to take actions that Congress would otherwise block.
exception that was intended to be used only in extraordinary situations. Nothing
has happened that supports Trump’s action on these arms sales, and by pressing
ahead with these sales the president is making every effort to ensure that the U.S.
continues to be an accomplice in the slaughter of innocent people.
The weapons that the U.S. sells to the Saudis and the UAE won’t be used to
defend against a supposed Iranian threat, and they won’t be used for deterrence.
We know very well that the Saudi and Emirati governments will use the weapons they
obtain from the U.S. to continue waging an atrocious war against Yemen, and
those weapons will very likely end up being used to kill civilians as so many other
U.S.-made weapons have been. Trump is helping to fuel Saudi coalition
aggression against a poor country that they have been wrecking and starving for
more than four years. This will not avert a war with Iran, but it will help to keep
the war on Yemen going. That means that the Saudis and Emiratis will continue to
be bogged down in a war they can’t win, and Iran’s limited influence in Yemen
will continue to grow. As usual, Iran hawks’ preferred policies do nothing to
reduce Iranian influence, and instead they help to increase it by fighting reckless,
unwinnable wars that Iran can exploit to its own advantage.

Every day the coalition’s war continues increases Iranian influence.

Esfandiary 19 — Dina Esfandiary, Fellow in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and
Security Studies at Harvard University, Fellow at the Century Foundation, Ph.D. Candidate in War Studies at King’s College London
(UK), former Adjunct Fellow in the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019 (“Is the Arab
Coalition Really Containing Iranian Influence in Yemen?,” Diwan—the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East
Insights publication, March 28th, Available Online at https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/78683, Accessed 06-28-2019)
Question: Is the Arab Coalition Really Containing Iranian Influence in Yemen?
Answer:
In short, no. Iran’s involvement in the conflict in Yemen is a low-cost, high-benefit
endeavor. It is an easy way to be a nuisance to Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia. At the
start of the conflict, Tehran had a relatively limited relationship with the Houthis,
whose grievances are real, legitimate, and very much local. As the conflict
progressed, Tehran’s support for the Houthis increased, but it still would not deploy its
elite forces as it did in both Iraq and Syria. That is because Yemen is not a strategic
priority for Iran. Economic, political, and religious interests, and the long border
between the two countries, has made Iraq a first order priority for Iran. Syria and
Lebanon allow Iran to extend its influence all the way to the Mediterranean and
give it access to its regional proxies. What’s more, Iran invested significantly in the war
in Syria and cannot simply walk away without reaping some of the postwar
reconstruction benefits.
In short, Yemen is a peripheral issue for Iran. It is useful for Tehran to be involved in
Yemen simply because the country is a high priority issue for Iran’s Gulf Arab
neighbors, and an easy lever for Tehran to play with to weaken its regional rivals.
The more the Saudi-led coalition doubles down in Yemen, the more Iran
increases its influence and feels victorious.
 Extend: “Plan Key To Peace”
Coalition withdrawal won’t lead to Houthi victory, but it will cause a political
settlement.
Larison 19 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2019 (“The Disgraceful Case for Increasing U.S. Support for the War on Yemen,” The American Conservative, May 2nd,
Available Online at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-disgraceful-case-for-increasing-u-s-support-for-the-war-on-
yemen/, Accessed 06-14-2019)
The authors suggest that cutting off the Saudi coalition would lead to a total
Houthi victory. That is doubtful, and they are relying on this scenario to try to
scare their audience into going along with their awful recommendation. None of
the warring parties has been able to win outright, and a withdrawal of the Saudi
coalition from the war would allow for a political settlement among Yemenis that
isn’t possible as long as the Saudis and Emiratis keep trying to impose their
proxies on the country. The authors tendentiously claim that Congressional pressure on the Saudi coalition has
encouraged the Houthis, but the reality is that U.N.-led peace negotiations have made more progress in the last six months since the
Senate first voted to end U.S. involvement than they made in the previous three and a half years. It is regrettable that it took Congress
so long to do the right thing, because we have already seen the positive effect that sustained criticism of the coalition can have.

The turn is unique — the Houthis are dug in now.

Horton 19 — Michael Horton, Fellow for Arabian Affairs at the Jamestown Foundation, Contributor to Jane's Intelligence
Review, The National Interest, and The Economist, 2019 (“Saudi Arabia is Losing the War in Yemen,” The American Conservative,
March 28th, Available Online at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/saudi-arabia-is-losing-the-war-in-yemen/,
Accessed 06-25-2019)
As the war in Yemen marks the end of its fourth year this week, it is clear that, with the aid and complicity of the United States and
United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have savaged an impoverished country. Yemen’s infrastructure
has been laid waste to, as has some of its most productive farmland. The result has been the worst humanitarian crisis on the planet.
Yemen has turned into Saudi Arabia’s Vietnam. Ditto for the
Yet despite this destruction,
UAE. The two countries have sunk billions of dollars and countless troops and
mercenaries into what has become a quagmire of catastrophic proportions. What they had
hoped would be a decisively quick war has turned into an albatross, with the rest of the
world now questioning their motivations and urging their Western helpmates to withdraw support immediately.
The overt reason for Saudi and Emirati involvement is to defeat the Houthi rebels, a
Zaidi Shia group with deep roots in Yemen. Yet this hasn’t been achieved. The two Gulf States claim that the
Houthis are proxies for Iran, but it has become increasingly clear that they are fiercely independent, and while they receive limited aid
from Tehran, they do not take orders.
Saudi and Emirati leaders would do well to learn from Yemen’s 2,000-year history of draining the blood and coffers of imperial and
lesser powers. The Yemenis defeated the Romans, the Ottoman Turks twice, and evicted the British in 1967. They also defeated the
Much like the U.S. in Vietnam more than 40 years ago and more recently in
Egyptians who invaded in 1962.
Afghanistan, the goliath invaders are fighting a war of attrition, bleeding their
resources, and losing whatever moral and political authority they might have had
in the process.
But were they ever being honest about their real intentions in Yemen? Saudi Arabia and the UAE have armed and supported a
mushrooming number of Yemeni militias and factions, some of which have ties to al-Qaeda. These policies have purposefully turned
Yemen into a patchwork of warring fiefdoms. This is because the covert purpose of the “intervention” has less to do with perceived
Iranian influence than it does with securing access to Yemen’s strategic real estate and its natural resources. Saudi Arabia and the
UAE are engaged in a neo-colonial war for power, resources, and territory. The two countries, which are increasingly in competition
with one another, are trying to carve Yemen up into spheres of influence.
Because it has a slightly more competent mercenary army, the UAE has the lead over Saudi Arabia in this regard. It’s set up military
bases throughout southern Yemen where it supports separatists of various stripes who want everything from an independent south
Yemen to an Islamic emirate. Not content with just occupying the mainland, the UAE has also established bases on the once pristine
Yemeni island of Socotra—a UNESCO world heritage site—and the island of Perim.
Saudi Arabia is playing catch-up with its ally and is laying claim to the governorate of al-Mahra in eastern Yemen. There, Riyadh
hopes to build a pipeline that will allow it to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. However, as in other parts of Yemen, the people are fighting
to stop what many view as a land grab by a foreign power. Residents of al-Mahra protested the construction of a Saudi-funded
madrassa that would have undoubtedly used Saudi schoolbooks, the same schoolbooks that were used by the Islamic State. Residents
are also blocking the construction of a Saudi military base.
Both countries have much to learn from America’s costly misadventures after 9/11. Despite fielding the world’s most capable armed
forces and spending several trillion dollars, the U.S. failed to achieve its aims in Iraq or Afghanistan, a country that is in many respects
similar to Yemen. In Iraq, the invasion destroyed much of that country and paved the way for the rise of the Islamic State, as well as
driving Baghdad into Iran’s open arms. In both nations, new and deadlier strains of extremism grew out of the power vacuums that
were created.
By continuing to fight the Houthis, Saudi Arabia and
The war in Yemen will have similar results.
the UAE are paradoxically strengthening their enemies and providing Iran with
more fertile ground for its influence operations. The Houthis are superb fighters,
but have shown less competence with regard to governance. The war and Saudi
and Emirati airstrikes have enhanced the Houthis’ legitimacy by allowing them to
do what they do best: fight.
It may be years before Yemen is a unified country with a functioning government again. In fact, Yemen may never again be unified.
the UAE and Saudi Arabia are unlikely to ever see a return on their
However,
investment. Even a cursory reading of Yemen’s history would have told them this. And failing that, an examination of
America’s failed wars should have dissuaded them from becoming involved in the first place.
 Extend: “Coalition Withdrawal Solves”
The plan sparks negotiations and ends Houthi attacks.
DeLozier 19 — Elana DeLozier, Research Fellow in the Bernstein Program on Gulf and Energy Policy at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Chief Executive Officer and Founder of The Sage Institute for Foreign Affairs, former Adjunct
Graduate Instructor at Khalifa University (UAE), former Adjunct Professor of Politics at New York University, holds an M.A. in
Political Science from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 2019 (“UAE Drawdown May Isolate Saudi Arabia in Yemen,” Policywatch
—a Washington Institute policy report, Number 3148, July 2nd, Available Online at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/uae-drawdown-in-yemen-may-isolate-saudi-arabia, Accessed 07-07-2019)
What Next For Yemen?
a solution in Yemen is more likely to be attained through a political
It has long been apparent that
process than a military one, especially with the U.S. Congress intensifying pressure in
that direction and the UAE drawing down. Riyadh’s military limitations mean that a
political solution may now be the only option. The Saudis cannot claim significant
success in their military objectives. Their border remains compromised by the
Houthis, while their forces have failed to retake the capital on behalf of President Abdu
Rabu Mansour Hadi and the internationally recognized Yemeni government. Going forward, the UAE’s
willingness to continue supporting Saudi-led airstrikes and other northern military
activity is unclear.
If the Saudis do not pursue a political solution more proactively, they risk being
left on their own to fight a war they cannot win. A UAE drawdown amid
continued Saudi airstrikes may be the worst option, as the Houthis may see it as
an opportunity to test the readiness of Yemeni forces in the south. In contrast, a joint
Saudi-UAE drawdown could create space for bilateral Saudi-Houthi de-
escalation talks, perhaps removing the rebels’ underlying reason for attacking
the Saudi homeland in the longer term regardless of whether Iran keeps urging
them to do so.

Houthi attacks would end if a peace agreement was reached.

Pillar 18 — Paul R. Pillar, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies and former Visiting Professor in the
Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Nonresident Senior Fellow in
Foreign Policy at the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution, served for 28 years in the U.S.
intelligence community including as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia and as a Member of the
Analytic Group at the National Intelligence Council, holds a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University, 2018 (“Why Does the U.S.
Support War Crimes in Yemen?,” The National Interest, September 5th, Available Online at
https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/paul-pillar/why-does-us-support-war-crimes-yemen-30572, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Neither does the administration's policy toward the Yemeni war accord with a realist perspective of where U.S. interests in the area do
The United States does not have a stake in the outcome of civil warfare in
and do not lie.
Yemen. The Houthi rebellion is rooted in very local issues involving what the
Houthis contend has been insufficient central government attention to the interests
of tribal elements in the north of the country. Nor do the Houthis pose more than a trivial
threat to anyone else in the region. Although the Trump administration and
Saudi Arabia have made a big deal about missiles that the Houthis have fired at
Saudi Arabia, those firings are pinpricks compared to the aerial assault in the
other direction for which the rockets have been an attempt at retaliation. Missiles
would not be launched if the Saudis and Emiratis had never launched their
destructive expedition.
An end to U.S. military aid to the Saudi-Emirati war effort would encourage the
Saudis and Emiratis to find ways to extricate themselves from their quagmire
and to attempt to sponsor a Yemeni peace settlement rather than an indefinite
war.

Recent Houthi attacks weren’t directed by Iran.

Parker citing Ramani 19 — Claire Parker, Foreign Affairs Writer at The Washington Post, former Research
Assistant on the Middle East/North Africa Historical Data Archive Project at Harvard University, holds a B.A. in Social Studies from
Harvard University, citing Samuel Ramani, D.Phil. Candidate in International Relations at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford
(UK), 2019 (“Iran has invested in allies and proxies across the Middle East. Here’s why they matter now.,” The Washington Post, June
18th, Available Online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-has-invested-in-allies-and-proxies-across-the-
middle-east-heres-why-they-matter-now/2019/06/18/0549200e-9152-11e9-b72d-d56510fa753e_story.html, Accessed 07-02-2019)
Houthi rebels see these strikes as self-defense against Saudi Arabia, which has been accused of
indiscriminately bombing civilians in Yemen and has fueled a massive humanitarian crisis. Researcher Samuel Ramani
argued that Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabian oil facilities last month were motivated
primarily by the Houthis’ desire to demonstrate internal cohesion and to gain
popular support — rather than to serve Tehran’s interests.

Ending the war would end Houthi attacks — they’re responses to the
coalition’s invasion.
Bandow 19 — Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative
Defense Alliance, former Special Assistant to President Reagan, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, 2019 (“U.S. Support Has
Fueled, Not Moderated, the Yemen War,” The National Interest, May 19th, Available Online at
https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/skeptics/us-support-has-fueled-not-moderated-yemen-war-58097, Accessed 06-13-2019)
The
Fourth, the Kingdom’s claim of self-defense is a contemptible attempt to turn its initial aggression into a bootstrap argument.
Houthis only recently began launching missiles against Saudi Arabia, after years
of coalition bombing. Bizarrely, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insisted that America was aiding the Saudis because
Houthi missiles aimed at the airport in Riyadh might hurt an American: “the United States has an obligation to protect our citizens.”
Butthere were no missiles flying when the KSA launched its attack and America
intervened on the royals’ behalf. Moreover, ending the war would ground the missiles.

The Houthis aren’t a threat — attacks are only retaliation.

Bandow 19 — Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative
Defense Alliance, former Special Assistant to President Reagan, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, 2019 (“U.S. Support Has
Fueled, Not Moderated, the Yemen War,” The National Interest, May 19th, Available Online at
https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/skeptics/us-support-has-fueled-not-moderated-yemen-war-58097, Accessed 06-13-2019)
Even the Republican-controlled Senate turned against the war, joining the House in voting to end U.S. involvement. However, enough
Administration arguments for
Republicans stood with the administration to sustain the president’s veto.
continuing participation in the conflict ranged among unbelievable, contemptible,
and risible. For instance, that Washington is not involved militarily: tell that to Yemenis who have died from U.S.-
made bombs delivered by U.S.-built planes refueled and guided by U.S. military personnel.
Houthi control would threaten the Kingdom, the Persian Gulf, and
Another was that
America. This indigenous religious/political movement is far less radical than
Wahhabism, the variant of Islamic fundamentalism lavishly promoted by Riyadh
across the globe, including in Yemen. The Houthis spent years battling Saleh before
joining with him against a common enemy, Hadi (and then the coalition). They
never waged war on the United States, KSA, or anyone else. Missile attacks were
retaliation for military aggression by the Kingdom, following years of ravaging
air attacks on Yemen.
 Extend: “No Iran Influence Impact”
The Houthis aren’t closes allies with Iran.
Zigismund 18 — Michael Zigismund, Associate Attorney at the Law Offices of Robert Tsigler—a New York City
immigration law firm, holds a J.D. from the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University, 2018 (“The United States
Should Leave Yemen, Not Broker Peace,” The National Interest, November 18th, Available Online at
https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/middle-east-watch/united-states-should-leave-yemen-not-broker-peace-36252, Accessed 06-24-
2019)
The Houthi rebels are considered, at least by the Saudis, to be an Iranian client, like
Hezbollah in Lebanon. Since 1979, U.S. analysts have considered Iran to be uniquely destabilizing, anti-Western, and a sponsor
of terrorism. American strategists have grown increasingly wary of Iranian influence in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria over the past two
decades. Because it’s located at the significant meeting point of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the idea of losing Yemen to Iran is
bound to worry any American defense official.
America’s anti-Iranian tradition has been amplified under the Trump administration. After all, Donald Trump rose to power arguing
that the prior administration’s nuclear deal with Iran was the “worst deal ever.” Add to this the fact that U.S. allies Saudi Arabia and
Israel are regional rivals against Iran, and the idea of countering Iranian influence among Houthis in Yemen becomes a no-brainer.
The administration is now even contemplating designating the Houthis as terrorists.
But this logic assumes a robust Iranian-Houthi alliance. At best, however, they’re allies
of convenience against their common Saudi enemy. After all, Iranian support for the
Houthis was limited until after Saudi Arabia’s offensive. Further, the group’s religious
connection is only skin-deep: Zaydi Shiism, which Houthis practice, diverges
significantly from the Twelver Shiism that most Iranians practice.

Before the coalition’s invasion, there was no relationship.

Carapico 19 — Sheila Carapico, Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Richmond, holds
a Ph.D. in Political Science from the State University of New York at Binghamton, 2019 (“Is the Arab Coalition Really Containing
Iranian Influence in Yemen?,” Diwan—the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Insights publication, March
28th, Available Online at https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/78683, Accessed 06-28-2019)
Question: Is the Arab Coalition Really Containing Iranian Influence in Yemen?
Answer: After the Houthi rebels—then in partnership with their old foe, the deposed Yemeni
president Ali Abdullah Saleh—stormed San‘a in 2014, flights bearing what Tehran called
humanitarian relief increased. Incensed that Tehran might gain influence in the
Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia bombed the runways of San‘a airport, limiting
Iranian and indeed all foreign access to most of Yemen.
Otherwise, the Saudi obsession with Iranian interference, coupled with the
coalition’s indiscriminate bombing and the cruel embargo on Red Sea ports, has
had the opposite effect. Previously, Yemeni Zaydis did not identify as Shi‘a,
Iranians did not visit Yemen, and many Yemenis did not visit Iran. Even
communications via telephone, the internet, or broadcasting were, and remain,
minimal. Four years of Saudi-led bombardment in the name of combatting Iran,
however, has led many Yemenis to regard Iran as an ally.

There’s no threat of an Iranian “empire.”

Bandow 18 — Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative
Defense Alliance, former Special Assistant to President Reagan, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, 2018 (“Why America Should
Say No to an Arab NATO,” The National Interest, November 26th, Available Online at
https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/skeptics/why-america-should-say-no-arab-nato-37162, Accessed 06-24-2019)
 Tehran doesn’t even seriously threaten its
Moreover, against the U.S. administration’s claims,
neighbors. Only in the nightmares of administration hawks and their friends in
Riyadh is Iran on the march. The latter’s economy is a wreck, ruling regime is
unstable, its military is weak, its allies are pitiful, and international friends are
sparse. Talk of some sort of empire including unstable Iraq, divided Lebanon,
ravaged Syria, and the nightmare of Yemen is a parody of serious analysis.
Forgetting his talking points during an interview, even MbS dismissed Tehran’s potential: “Iran is not a rival to Saudi Arabia. Its army
is not among the top five armies in the Muslim world. The Saudi economy is larger than the Iranian economy. Iran is far from being
equal to Saudi Arabia.”

Yemen is not a litmus test for Iranian hegemony.

Hashim 19 — Ahmed Salah Hashim, Associate Professor in the Military Studies Program at the Institute of Defense and
Strategic Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Singapore), holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and Defense
Studies from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2019 (“Is the Arab Coalition Really Containing Iranian Influence in
Yemen?,” Diwan—the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Insights publication, March 28th, Available Online
at https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/78683, Accessed 06-28-2019)
Question:Is the Arab Coalition Really Containing Iranian Influence in Yemen?
Answer: No, and that is not simply because there was and continues to be little Iranian
influence in Yemen. It has become de rigueur for the United States and its allies in the
Middle East to blame Iran for everything untoward that happens in the region. If anything, the Arab
coalition’s invasion of Yemen in 2015, an action undertaken with considerable confidence by Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), has actually heightened Iranian influence with, and presence in, that hapless
country. Many myths and half-truths have been converted into accepted fact. Iran has
traditionally had little influence or traction in Yemen. For Iran, Yemen is not on a par with
Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Tehran’s relationship with the Houthis is not deep, as it
is not ideological or theological. It is a myth that the Zaydi Houthis are Shi‘a.
Moreover, Iran does not merely support Shi‘a groups in the formulation and execution
of its foreign and national security policies. It has lent support to Sunni militant
groups such as Hamas and the Taliban.
The war in Yemen, which the coalition undertook for a wide variety of reasons, not least of which was the obvious fact of
runaway Houthi victories, has actually provided Iran with the ability to support a low-cost war
against two of its bitterest foes, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthis are formidable
fighters and in the north they have run circles around the Saudis. The Iranians,
though, are not going to make Yemen a litmus test of their national security in the
region, although they have not ignored Yemen’s strategic location. They do not see Saudi Arabia or the
UAE as benefiting from their adventures, since Yemen will remain a failed state
with a multiplicity of competing militias, extremist groups, proxies, and regional
factions.
 Extend: “No Strait Closure Impact”
The Tanker Wars disprove their thesis — prices actually fell.
Kelanic 19 — Rosemary A. Kelanic, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, holds a Ph.D. in
Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2019 (“Why Iran’s ‘oil weapon’ isn’t that scary,” The Washington Post, June 18th,
Available Online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/18/why-irans-oil-weapon-isnt-that-scary/, Accessed 07-01-
2019)
Last Thursday, the United States accused Iran of attacking two petroleum product tankers in the Gulf of Oman. Although the vessels
suffered minimal damage and both crews evacuated safely, some observers worry that Tehran may be gearing
up to unleash the “oil weapon” — a coercive strategy to change an opponent’s behavior by denying it access to oil
— against the United States and its allies.
Iran sits astride the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway through which some 20 percent of global oil passes each day. In recent years,
that, in theory,
the regime has repeatedly attempted to manipulate U.S. policy with threats to close the strait — an action
could send oil prices skyrocketing and wreak havoc on the world economy. In
practice, however, history suggests that Iran’s gambit — if indeed Iran is behind the attacks — would
almost certainly fail.
Blocking oil access rarely works as a strategy
Historically speaking, the oil weapon rarely achieves its desired political objectives , especially
against very powerful countries like the United States. My research has found that countries tried to disrupt oil access to great powers
only seven times in the past century. Five of those seven attempts failed outright to achieve their political goals.
The two cases of success occurred under exceptional circumstances that Iran could not hope to replicate today. But those cases do
have a common denominator: The United States was the coercer, not the target.
Arguably the clearest case of success — Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II, without an Allied invasion of the home islands
— resulted from an overwhelming combination of pressures, including cutting off access to oil. By March 1945, the Allied blockade
had completely severed Japanese oil imports, immobilizing Japan’s military and crippling its defenses against a U.S. invasion.
Tokyo’s last chance was that the Soviets would accept an oil-for-territory deal that had languished on the negotiating table over the
summer of 1945. Japan offered to withdraw from Manchuria in exchange for continued Soviet neutrality and Soviet oil. When Stalin
instead invaded Manchuria on Aug. 9, all hope of fueling the home islands’ defense collapsed. That same day, the United States
dropped its second atomic bomb on Japan. Oil denial influenced Japan’s choice to surrender, but the Soviet declaration of war, as well
as the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, likely mattered as much or more.
The other oil coercion example occurred in 1956, when Egypt, Syria and the United States persuaded Britain and France to withdraw
from the Suez Canal Zone. The two countries had foolishly invaded Egypt to annex the Suez Canal, through which two-thirds of
British oil imports traveled, for fear that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser might decide to close it.
The invasion not only failed to capture the canal — it also provoked Nasser to block the waterway and Syria to cut off the main oil
pipeline to Europe. Furious, President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused British and French emergency requests for U.S. petroleum — to
let them “boil in their own oil,” he remarked. At the same time, the crisis precipitated a run on the British pound. Oil denial likely
contributed to the Anglo-French decision to stand down, but compared with financial pressures, it was probably less important.
The oil weapon is hard to execute successfully
As these cases suggest, only under truly exceptional circumstances can coercers succeed in changing a great power’s policies through
oil denial.
One reason is that depriving great powers of oil is very difficult, militarily . It took a full-scale
conventional war for the United States to cut off oil to Japan. Iran, of course, cannot hope to do the same. Scholars have found that
Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities pose little threat to neighboring countries’ oil industries, for example.
Likewise, Caitlin Talmadge has shown that Iran’s military is too weak to fully block oil commerce through the Strait of Hormuz. At
best, Iran might depress tanker transit by harassing oil vessels enough to scare
some shippers away, though scholars disagree over how much oil commerce an Iranian harassment campaign could
suppress.
History suggests that such a campaign would have limited effects on shipping and
would not cause prolonged increases in oil prices. Tankers are remarkably
difficult to sink. Even during the worst days of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, attacks by
both sides on enemy tankers disrupted less than 2 percent of total oil traffic in the
Persian Gulf. The result? Despite the attacks, oil prices actually fell dramatically
across the span of the conflict.
Strategic oil reserves completely offset any BAM disruption.
Kelanic 19 — Rosemary A. Kelanic, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, holds a Ph.D. in
Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2019 (“Why Iran’s ‘oil weapon’ isn’t that scary,” The Washington Post, June 18th,
Available Online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/18/why-irans-oil-weapon-isnt-that-scary/, Accessed 07-01-
2019)
The U.S. and its allies can avoid or mitigate the damage
Powerful nations take countermeasures to
And there’s another reason the oil weapon seldom works.
avoid being targeted in the first place, or to mitigate the effects of an attack.
The United States already maintains a significant military presence in the Persian Gulf to deter threats and to respond quickly, if
necessary, to clear the Strait of Hormuz.
the United States and its allies maintain a network of strategic petroleum
Moreover,
reserves to cushion any disruption of supply. Globally, these reserves top 4 billion
barrels — enough oil to compensate for a complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz
for up to eight months. That’s a more than adequate cushion: Iran cannot
completely close the strait, and even pessimistic analyses conclude that the U.S.
Navy could reopen the strait in about a month.
More details may yet emerge about last week’s tanker story. But if Iran was involved, several motives could be at work, such as
warning the United States to “back off” any threats of military intervention or persuading the United States to drop the sanctions the
Whatever Tehran might hope to
Trump administration recently reimposed over Iran’s nuclear program.
accomplish, history suggests it probably won’t succeed.

There’s plenty of spare capacity — IEA.

Perkins 19 — Robert Perkins, Senior Writer and Editor of EMEA Oil News, 2019 (“Global spare oil production capacity at
'comfortable levels': IEA,” S&P Global, April 23rd, Available Online at https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-
news/oil/042319-global-spare-oil-production-capacity-at-comfortable-levels-iea, Accessed 07-01-2019)
Global oil markets are adequately supplied with "comfortable" levels of spare
production capacity, according to the International Energy Agency, ahead of US moves to tighten its oil
sanctions on Iran in May.
The Paris-based energy market watchdog estimated global spare production capacity
has recently risen to 3.3 million b/d, with 2.2 million b/d held by Saudi Arabia and around 1 million b/d by the
United Arab Emirates, Iraq and Kuwait.
The US on Monday said sanctions waivers granted to eight major buyers of Iranian oil would expire on May 2. The US, which has
accused Iran of destabilizing activities in the Middle East, said it intends to impose "maximum economic pressure" on Tehran through
its sanctions, which are aimed at blocking all of the country's oil exports.
Front-month Brent crude prices hit their highest level since late October, topping $74.70/b in London trading Tuesday, on the back of
US President Donald Trump's decision not to renew sanction waivers for importers of Iranian oil.
"The IEA will continue to monitor the oil market closely ... As ever, the IEA stands
ready to act if necessary to ensure markets remain well supplied," it said in a statement.
 Extend: “No Economic Decline Impact”
Data about the Great Recession disproves their thesis.
Drezner 12 — Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University, former International Economist in the Office of International Banking and Securities at the United States Department of
the Treasury, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University, 2012 (“The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The
System Worked,” Working Paper Published by the International Institutions and Global Governance Program of the Council on
Foreign Relations, October, Available Online at http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/IIGG_WorkingPaper9_Drezner.pdf,
Accessed 09-17-2013, p. 5)
Another salient outcome is mass public attitudes about the global economy. A general assumption in public opinion
research is that during a downturn, demand for greater economic closure should spike,
as individuals scapegoat foreigners for domestic woes. The global nature of the
2008 crisis, combined with anxiety about the shifting distribution of power, should have triggered a fall in
support for an open global economy. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the reverse is true.
Pew’s Global Attitudes Project has surveyed a wide spectrum of countries since 2002,
asking people about their opinions on both international trade and the free market more generally.17 The results show
resilient support for expanding trade and business ties with other countries. Twenty-
four countries were surveyed both in 2007 and at least one year after 2008, including a majority of the G20 economies. Overall,
eighteen of those twenty-four countries showed equal or greater support for trade in 2009 than two years earlier. By 2011, twenty of
between 2007 and 2012,
twenty-four countries showed greater or equal support for trade compared to 2007. Indeed,
the unweighted average support for more trade in these countries increased from 78.5 percent to
83.6 percent. Contrary to expectation, there has been no mass public rejection of the
open global economy. Indeed, public support for the open trading system has
strengthened, despite softening public support for free-market economics more generally.18
The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great
Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the
crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to
increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.19 Whether through greater
internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great
power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn
would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and
even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder.
The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. A fundamental conclusion from a
recent report by the Institute for Economics and Peace is that “the average level of
peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”20 Interstate
violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis—as have
military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the
Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular
decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been
reversed.21
 They Say: “Houthis Worsen Humanitarian Crisis”
The coalition is responsible for the most of the violence.
Bandow 19 — Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative
Defense Alliance, former Special Assistant to President Reagan, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, 2019 (“U.S. Support Has
Fueled, Not Moderated, the Yemen War,” The National Interest, May 19th, Available Online at
https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/skeptics/us-support-has-fueled-not-moderated-yemen-war-58097, Accessed 06-13-2019)
coalition forces have committed the vast majority of atrocities. Humanitarian
Third,
groups figure that the Saudis and Emiratis are responsible for two-thirds to three-
quarters of the casualties and destruction. Yemen has been ravaged, its civilian
population reduced to misery, so wealthy monarchies can gain geopolitical and
commercial advantage.

Hadi and the coalition are worse.

Bandow 19 — Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative
Defense Alliance, former Special Assistant to President Reagan, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, 2019 (“U.S. Support Has
Fueled, Not Moderated, the Yemen War,” The National Interest, May 19th, Available Online at
https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/skeptics/us-support-has-fueled-not-moderated-yemen-war-58097, Accessed 06-13-2019)
Washington has intervened on the wrong side. The Houthis never were
Second,
friends of America or liberty and have grown only more hostile under attack. But
the Saudis and Emiratis are far worse, unabashed aggressors for essentially
imperial ends. The Houthis oppose AQAP and support a united Yemen. Hadi and
the coalition have aided AQAP and other radical forces, while the UAE is
promoting Yemen’s break-up in search of economic advantage.
 They Say: “Saudi Oil Weapon Impact”
No Saudi Oil Weapon — they lack leverage.
Pillar 18 — Paul R. Pillar, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies and former Visiting Professor in the
Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Nonresident Senior Fellow in
Foreign Policy at the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution, served for 28 years in the U.S.
intelligence community including as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia and as a Member of the
Analytic Group at the National Intelligence Council, holds a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University, 2018 (“Saudi Arabia: The
Choice the United States Has to Make,” The National Interest, December 16th, Available Online at
https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/saudi-arabia-choice-united-states-has-make-38822, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Too often overlooked is what the Saudis would be doing anyway for their own interests without any special deference from the United
Regarding oil, the adage that suppliers cannot drink their own stuff is more
States.
applicable than ever, with prior Saudi leverage having been reduced by the
fracking revolution, the decrease in U.S. oil imports and overall diversification
of the oil market. Regarding terrorism, it wasn’t until after an Islamist attack in Riyadh in 2003 (in which the specific
targets were Western military contractors) that the Saudi regime started to become part of the solution and not just a big part of the
problem. But even today, any terrorists the United States might want Saudi Arabia to act against would be ones the Saudis would have
their own reasons to quash.

It’s an empty threat — high prices would be self-defeating.

DePetris 18 — Daniel R. DePetris, Fellow at Defense Priorities, Middle East and Foreign Policy Analyst at Wikistrat, Inc.,
Researcher at the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts, Columnist at the National Interest, The American
Conservative, The Huffington Post, and The Washington Examiner, holds an M.A. in Political Science from the Maxwell School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, 2018 (“Three Ways to Rethink the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Alliance,” The National
Interest, December 6th, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/three-ways-rethink-us-saudi-arabian-alliance-
38052, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Riyadh’s motivation in maintaining
Concerning stabilizing the oil market, the Saudis have a mixed record.
stability in the market has nothing to do with being a good friend to America and
everything to do with Riyadh’s economic interest. A country that depends on oil
returns to pad its budget, build up its foreign exchange reserves, and finance its
national subsidies on everything from gasoline and food to housing can’t afford a
long period of low profits. If prices rise too high over an extended period, the
Kingdom will increase crude exports to preserve market share and assure that
overseas buyers don’t switch suppliers. The Saudis do so not as a favor to the
American consumer but rather as a necessity their bottom-line.

Saudi Arabia won’t follow through on an oil threat.

Bandow 18 — Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative
Defense Alliance, former Special Assistant to President Reagan, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, 2018 (“The Saudi Shakedown:
Why Washington Can't Escape the Damage Done by Riyadh's Crown Prince,” The National Interest, November 1st, Available Online
at https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/saudi-shakedown-why-washington-cant-escape-damage-done-riyadhs-crown-prince-34862,
Accessed 06-24-2019)
Despite whispered threats of an oil boycott, which would have little impact in an
international market, the royals will continue selling black gold: how would the
crown prince afford his next yacht without the cash? Indeed, the royal family could
not survive without the revenue. Moreover, the market is far more diverse today,
including the United States as an increasing supplier. Other dangers have dissipated: The Soviet Union no
longer exists, let alone threatens to invade the Mideast and cut off the West’s energy supplies.
AT: Supplier Shift DA
 2AC — Supplier Shift DA
No Supplier Shift — it would take a decade even if Russia or China agreed.
Hartung 19 — William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, former
Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, former Director of the Arms Trade
Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, 2019 (“It’s Time To Stop Arms Sales To Saudi Arabia,” LobeLog—the Inter Press
Service’s blog, May 15th, Available Online at https://lobelog.com/its-time-to-stop-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/, Accessed 06-07-2019)
Another popular argument for continuing arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE is “if we don’t do it,
somebody else will.” But the United States and its European allies supply the Saudi air
force and the majority of the arsenals of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The
Saudi and UAE militaries could not turn on a dime and seek Russian or Chinese
systems to substitute for any cutoff of U.S. weaponry and support. It would take a
decade or more for these nations to end their dependence on U.S. arms. A few
deals with Moscow or Beijing would have limited impact on Saudi and UAE
military capabilities, if Russia and China were even willing to supply arms to two
nations that are responsible for the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe, with
the international opprobrium that would accompany any decision to do so.

No Defense Industrial Base Link — Pentagon funding and other exports

overwhelm.
Hartung 19 — William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, former
Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, former Director of the Arms Trade
Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, 2019 (“Do U.S. Defense Firms Really Need To Export Arms To Saudi Arabia?,”
Forbes, June 24th, Available Online at https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2019/06/24/do-u-s-defense-firms-really-need-
arms-exports/#2eeb1e7c63eb, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Is this just another case of Trumpian exaggeration, aimed at portraying him as a master deal maker who can bring good jobs to
There’s no question that particular
America in general and the heartland in particular, or is there more to it?
companies benefit from Saudi sales. The bulk of the more than $150 billion in U.S. arms
offers to Riyadh since 2009 have involved four of America’s top five defense contractors – Lockheed Martin,
Boeing, Raytheon, and General Dynamics – in deals that have involved everything from combat aircraft to
tanks to missile defense systems to armored vehicles to combat ships. The most controversial deals have involved precision-guided
munitions that have been used by Saudi Arabia in its brutal war in Yemen, which has sparked one of the world’s worst humanitarian
catastrophes. And all of these firms are seeking to grow their export markets, both to
increase profits and to provide insurance against the ups and downs of the Pentagon
procurement budget.
But the truth of the matter is that U.S. firms could do without sales to Saudi Arabia and other
repressive regimes, and they’d still be doing just fine financially. The current
Pentagon budget is at one of the highest levels since World War II, and it provides
ample funding for procurement and R&D, much of which lands in the coffers of
major defense firms that are the leading weapons exporters. This is particularly
true when one considers that the most likely outcome would not be a total ban on sales to Saudi Arabia,
but a prohibition on weapons most relevant to the Yemen war – precision-guided
munitions in particular. Other deals, like a lucrative $15 billion sale of the Lockheed
Martin THAAD missile defense system to Riyadh, would likely remain untouched.
Arms sales in general are important to key firms like Lockheed Martin and
Raytheon, which got roughly one-quarter to one-third of their revenues, respectively, from foreign sales in 2018. But the
biggest export earners were missile defense systems and combat aircraft
exported to allies in Europe and Asia, not bombs being used in war zones.

Case Outweighs — even if Saudi Arabia can eventually transition to other

suppliers, the plan ensures a valuable break in hostilities.
Spindel 19 — Jennifer Spindel, Assistant Professor in the Department of International and Area Studies and Associate Director
of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center at the University of Oklahoma, former Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Institute for Security
and Conflict Studies at George Washington University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota, 2019
(“The Case For Suspending American Arms Sales To Saudi Arabia,” War on the Rocks, May 14th, Available Online at
https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/, Accessed 06-07-2019)
The Difficulty of Stopping Atrocities
Beyond signaling, we know U.S. arms sales often end up in the wrong hands, and have been
used in Yemen. The Saudi-led war in Yemen has led to starvation conditions,
caused thousands of civilian casualties, and has led to the displacement of millions
of people. The United Nations estimates that 80 percent of Yemen’s population – 24 million people – require
some form of humanitarian or protection assistance, and that the severity of the
situation is increasing. Would an arms embargo create meaningful change in Yemen?
An initial effect of an embargo is that Saudi Arabia would have to work harder to
access war materiel. As Jonathan Caverley noted, more than 60 percent of Saudi Arabia’s
arms delivered in the past five years came from the United States. Even if this
percentage decreases over time, it will be costly for Saudi Arabia to transition to a
primarily Russian- or Chinese-supplied military. Though Saudi Arabia might be
willing to pay this cost, it would still have to pay, and take the time to transition
to its new weapons systems. This would represent a brief break in hostilities that
could facilitate the delivery of aid and assistance in Yemen.

Not Unique and No Impact — diversification now, but it doesn’t threaten the
defense industrial base.
Miller and Binder 19 — Andrew Miller, Deputy Director for Policy at the Project on Middle East Democracy, former
Director for Egypt and Israel Military Issues on the U.S. National Security Council, former U.S. State Department Official in the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, on the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff, and at the U.S. Embassies in Doha and Cairo,
holds an M.A. in International Relations and Affairs from the University of Virginia, and Seth Binder, Advocacy Officer at the Project
on Middle East Democracy, former Program Manager of the Security Assistance Monitor Program at the Center for International
Policy, holds an M.A. in International Relations from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University,
2019 (“The Case for Arms Embargoes Against Uncooperative Partners,” War on the Rocks, May 10th, Available Online at
https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-arms-embargoes-against-uncooperative-partners/, Accessed 06-12-2019)
The author’s other major concern is that arms suspensions could result in the loss of
arms sales to strategic competitors like Russia or China. The jobs created by such
sales are not trivial matters, but studies have found that they do not provide the
economic benefits or jobs that are often touted. Nor are these sales necessary to
maintain the military industrial base, which is powered by billions of dollars each
year from domestic purchases, except in rare cases. Fundamentally, the author’s implicit
argument — that if the United States reliably supplies weapons to strategically
important countries, they won’t seek them elsewhere — is suspect. Countries,
including close partners like Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, have long sought to
diversify their weapons stockpiles, and in an increasingly multipolar world,
more countries are seeking to diversify their arms suppliers to maintain their own
independence. While U.S. arms will continue to compete with Russian or Chinese
counterparts on a sale-by-sale basis, it will become increasingly unrealistic to be
the exclusive supplier of any partner country, irrespective of how reliable the United
States is.
 Extend: “No Supplier Shift”
The coalition can’t switch suppliers — Russian and Chinese weapons aren’t
interoperable with their arsenals.
Emmons 19 — Alex Emmons, Reporter covering national security, foreign affairs, human rights, and politics at The Intercept,
2019 (“Secret Report Reveals Saudi Incompetence and Widespread Use of U.S. Weapons in Yemen,” The Intercept, April 15th,
Available Online at https://theintercept.com/2019/04/15/saudi-weapons-yemen-us-france/, Accessed 06-30-2019)
Since the brutal murder of Saudi dissident and Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi last October, Congress has
increasingly pressured the Trump administration to stop backing the Saudi Arabia-led coalition fighting in Yemen
and halt U.S. arms sales to Riyadh. In response, President Donald Trump has repeatedly said that if the
U.S. does not sell weapons to the Saudis, they will turn to U.S. adversaries to supply
their arsenals.
“I don’t like the concept of stopping an investment of $110 billion into the United States,” Trump told reporters in October, referring
to a collection of intent letters signed with the Saudis in the early months of his presidency. “You know what they are going to do?
They’re going to take that money and spend it in Russia or China or someplace else.”
But a highly classified document produced by the French Directorate of Military
Intelligence shows that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are overwhelmingly
dependent on Western-produced weapon systems to wage their devastating war in
Yemen. Many of the systems listed are only compatible with munitions, spare
parts, and communications systems produced in NATO countries, meaning
that the Saudis and UAE would have to replace large portions of their arsenals
to continue with Russian or Chinese weapons.
“You can’t just swap out the missiles that are used in U.S. planes for suddenly using
Chinese and Russian missiles,” said Rachel Stohl, managing director of the
Conventional Defense Program at the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. “It takes
decades to build your air force. It’s not something you do in one fell swoop.”
The Saudi-led bombing campaign in North Yemen primarily relies on three types of aircraft:
American F-15s, British EF-2000 Typhoons, and European Tornado fighters. The
Saudis fly American Apache and Black Hawk helicopters into Yemen from military bases in
Saudi Arabia, as well as the French AS-532 Cougar. They have lined the Saudi-Yemen border
with American Abrams and French AMX 30 tanks, reinforced by at least five
types of Western-made artillery guns. And the coalition blockade, which is aimed at cutting
off aid to the Houthi rebels but has also interfered with humanitarian aid shipments, relies on U.S., French, and
German models of attack ships with, as well as two types of French naval
helicopters.
The catalogue of weapon systems is just one revelation in the classified report,
which was obtained by the French investigative news organization Disclose and is
being published in full by The Intercept, Disclose, and four other French media organizations. The report also harshly
criticizes Saudi military capabilities in Yemen, describing the Saudis as operating
“ineffectively” and characterizing their efforts to secure their border with Yemen as “a
failure.” And it suggests that U.S. assistance with Saudi targeting in Yemen may go beyond what has previously been
acknowledged.
No short- or long-term link — it’s an impossible transformation.
Caverley 18 — Jonathan D. Caverley, Associate Professor of Strategy in the Strategic and Operational Research Department
of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, Research Scientist in Political Science at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, former Assistant Professor of Political Science and Co-Founder of the Working Group on Security Studies at
the Roberta Buffett Center at Northwestern University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2018
(“Want to Punish Saudi Arabia? Cut Off Its Weapons Supply,” The New York Times, October 12th, Available Online at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html, Accessed 06-14-2019)
Perhaps selling weapons “strengthens international partnerships,” as Mr. Navarro put it, or at least discourages
Saudi Arabia from finding different ones. Mr. Trump on Thursday cited “four or five
alternatives” to American weapons, and the need to avoid “letting Russia have that
money and letting China have that money.” This, however, is unlikely even in the
long term.
Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a major war, and more than 60 percent of its arms
deliveries over the past five years came from the United States. The Saudi military
relies not just on American tanks, planes and missiles but for a daily supply of
maintenance, training and support, such as intelligence and refueling. In the
longer term, almost all of Saudi Arabia’s remaining exports come from Europe. To
truly squeeze Saudi Arabia, a coordinated embargo — much like the one now in place against Russia
— would be necessary but relatively easy. European governments already feel
strong domestic political pressure not to export to regimes like Saudi Arabia.
Transforming the Saudi military to employ Russian, much less Chinese, weapons
would cost a fortune even by Gulf standards, would require years of retraining
and would greatly reduce its military power for a generation. Russia cannot
produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its
own armed forces, much less for the export market. China has not produced, never
mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia
wants.
Last month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified that Saudi Arabia was minimizing civilian casualties in the Yemen air campaign
apparently to avoid jeopardizing $2 billion in weapons sales. That small number does not show how powerful the Saudis are so much
Given these sales’ low domestic economic impact and the enormous
as how cheaply the United States can be bought.
costs of going elsewhere for Saudi Arabia, the United States has the preponderance of
influence in this arms trade relationship. It should act accordingly.

Transition costs are prohibitive even for Saudi Arabia.

Guay 18 — Terrence Guay, Clinical Professor of International Business at Pennsylvania State University, holds a Ph.D. in
Political Science from Syracuse University, 2018 (“Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi
affair,” The Conversation, October 19th, Available Online at https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-
the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998, Accessed 06-14-2019)
US leverage
While it’s true that Russia and China are indeed major exporters of armaments, the
claim that U.S. weapons can easily be replaced by other suppliers is not – at least
not in the short term.
First, once a country is “locked in” to a specific kind of weapons system, such as
planes, tanks or naval vessels, the cost to switch to a different supplier can be
huge. Military personnel must be retrained on new equipment, spare parts need
to be replaced, and operational changes may be necessary.
After being so reliant on U.S. weapons systems for decades, the transition costs
to buy from another country could be prohibitive even for oil-rich Saudi Arabia.
The second problem with Trump’s argument is that armaments from Russia, China or elsewhere are
simply not as sophisticated as U.S. weapons, which is why they are usually
cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military superiority in the
Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its weapons from
American and European companies.
That is why the U.S. has significant leverage in this aspect of the relationship. Any
Saudi threat to retaliate against a ban on U.S. arms sales by buying weapons from
countries that have not raised concerns about the Khashoggi disappearance would not be credible. And is
probably why, despite worries in the White House, such a threat has not yet been made.

Even if they could shift, it would take years.

Larison 19 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2019 (“The Real Emergency Is in Yemen,” The American Conservative, June 13th, Available Online at
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-real-emergency-is-in-yemen/, Accessed 06-13-2019)
The New York Times reports on the Trump administration’s ridiculous excuses for the bogus arms sale “emergency”:
A senior State Department official on Wednesday defended the Trump
administration’s use of an emergency declaration to push through arms
sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, telling a hostile House
committee that holding back the weapons would have offered an opening to
commercial rivals in China and Russia.
The Trump administration has trotted out this lame excuse for continuing to arm
Saudi Arabia and the UAE as they wreck and starve Yemen, but it is not credible.
Supposing that Saudi Arabia and the UAE wanted to start buying more of their
weapons and weapons systems from Russia and China, it would take many years
to switch from the U.S.-made hardware that they have been buying for decades.
There is no danger that an interruption in the supply of U.S. arms to the Saudis
and Emiratis would lead them to radically overhaul their militaries in the
foreseeable future. There is absolutely no reason why these arms sales need to be
rushed through without Congressional review, and the administration officials sent to Congress to repeat
this nonsense have to know that.
 Extend: “No Defense Industrial Base Link”
At most, the link is less than two percent.
O’Connor 18 — Tom O’Connor, Staff Writer at Newsweek, 2018 (“U.S. Does Not Need Saudi Arabia Military Sales As
Much As Donald Trump Says, Reports Show,” Newsweek, November 26th, Available Online at https://www.newsweek.com/us-not-
need-saudi-military-sales-trump-says-1232147, Accessed 07-06-2019)
Reducing U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia would have a relatively minor effect on
the defense industry, whose gains from such transactions have been exaggerated by
President Donald Trump, according to recent reports.
Analysts at Cowen Research, a division of the U.K.-based Cowen, Inc. financial services firm, have found
that the impact in the U.S. of cutting military assistance to Saudi Arabia "would be
limited in duration and scope, and big-ticket buys of missile defense systems
would not be impacted," as CNBC reported Monday.
The report came as Trump faced pressure to penalize the kingdom due to its involvement in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, a local
journalist who fled his country only to be killed in Riyadh's consulate in Istanbul, and the controversial war it has led against a Zaidi
Shiite Muslim rebel group, known as Ansar Allah or the Houthis, in Yemen. As the backlash against Saudi Arabia grows, a number of
European countries have already begun to scale back their relations with the kingdom and its de facto leader Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman.
Trump has defended his close relationship with Saudi Arabia due to its position as the top U.S. weapons exports partner, but
Cowen Research found that even the defense firms most heavily invested in Saudi
Arabia would likely stand to lose little should Washington take action.
The president responded Tuesday to criticism of ongoing U.S. support for Riyadh by issuing a statement in which he proclaimed he
was "standing with Saudi Arabia," despite the fact that "it could very well be that the Crown Prince had knowledge of this tragic
event" of Khashoggi's killing. Even if this were the case, he argued that "our relationship is with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," an
ally in their shared fight against Iran, which he devoted much of the statement to condemning.
Trump also repeated his claim that "the Kingdom agreed to spend and invest $450 billion in the United States" during his trip there
last year, calling this "a record amount of money" that "will create hundreds of thousands of jobs, tremendous economic development,
and much additional wealth for the United States." He also claimed that $110 billion of this "will be spent on the purchase of military
equipment from Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and many other great U.S. defense contractors," arguing that canceling such a
deal would benefit Russia and China.
Cowen Research's findings detailed how canceling certain deals with Saudi Arabia
would actually affect some of the biggest U.S. defense firms. Lockheed Martin—
which has the biggest exposure to the kingdom with potential sales of the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system as well as Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles,
Black Hawk helicopters, munitions, C-130 aircraft and littoral combat ships on the
line—would only see a loss of about 1.5 percent in its projected revenue in 2019.
Raytheon, which primarily sells defensive equipment that was said to be unlikely
opposed by potential congressional restrictions, faced about $500 million, or less
than 2 percent, of its revenue in at-risk items, which were mostly munitions and missiles. Boeing,
which was set to sell some $1.7 billion worth in equipment—including F-15 jets,
Chinook and Apache helicopters—would only see a loss of about 1.5 percent of
its total sales.

The link is extremely small.

Caverley 18 — Jonathan D. Caverley, Associate Professor of Strategy in the Strategic and Operational Research Department
of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, Research Scientist in Political Science at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, former Assistant Professor of Political Science and Co-Founder of the Working Group on Security Studies at
the Roberta Buffett Center at Northwestern University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2018
(“Want to Punish Saudi Arabia? Cut Off Its Weapons Supply,” The New York Times, October 12th, Available Online at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html, Accessed 06-14-2019)
 Navarro, the White House’s director of trade and industrial policy, has argued that increased arms
Peter
sales “will be an important catalyst for strengthening American industry; the
stewardship of our national security; and the strengthening of our international
partnerships.” But the truth is that in the case of Saudi Arabia, the benefits on all three
fronts are slight.
Despite recent increases, Saudi arms orders remain a manageably small part of the
United States’ exports. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in 2017, a near-record year
for annual purchases, the United States delivered $5.5 billion worth of arms, 20
percent of all foreign military sales. That may sound like a lot, but the United States exports
only 25 to 30 percent of its defense industry production, so exports to Saudi
Arabia clearly remain a relatively small slice of the enormous defense
industrial pie.
 Extend: “Not Unique and No Impact”
GCC Link Not Unique — they already fear U.S. unreliability for other
reasons.
Gaub and Stanley-Lockman 17 — Florence Gaub, Senior Analyst for the Middle East and North Africa at the
European Union Institute of Security Studies (EUISS), former Senior Analyst at the NATO Defense College (Italy), holds a Ph.D.
from Humboldt University (Germany), and Zoe Stanley-Lockman, Defence Data Research Assistant at the European Union Institute
for Security Studies (EUISS), former Visiting Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang
Technological University (Singapore), holds an M.A. in International Security from the Institut d'Etudes politiques de Paris (France),
2017 (“Defence industries in Arab states: players and strategies,” Chaillot Paper, March, Available Online at
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_141_Arab_Defence.pdf, Accessed 07-02-2019, p. 69)
In the Gulf, several developments have led to the insight that greater independence
from outside security providers is paramount for national security: the American
withdrawal from Iraq in 2010, its announcement of a ‘pivot to Asia’ the following year,
defence spending cuts, Washington’s reluctance to engage militarily against the
Syrian regime in 2013 following the use of chemical weapons, are all signs
interpreted by Gulf leaders that the US will in the future not be as present in the
region as it used to be. American decision-makers themselves reinforced this
perception, refusing to extend a NATO Article 5-type collective security guarantee to its Gulf
partners, instead calling on them to do more in defence terms. The nuclear deal with Iran, signed in 2015 and
viewed with disquiet by certain Gulf States, only increased the perception that not only could the US
no longer be relied upon as a security guarantor, but that security would grow more
fragile – not so much because they distrust the deal, but because they conclude that as a result, Iran will become engaged in an
even bolder manner in the Arab region, whether in providing material support to Hezbollah in Lebanon or in reinforcing its ties with
Shia communities across the peninsula.

They’re already diversifying.

Gaub and Stanley-Lockman 17 — Florence Gaub, Senior Analyst for the Middle East and North Africa at the
European Union Institute of Security Studies (EUISS), former Senior Analyst at the NATO Defense College (Italy), holds a Ph.D.
from Humboldt University (Germany), and Zoe Stanley-Lockman, Defence Data Research Assistant at the European Union Institute
for Security Studies (EUISS), former Visiting Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang
Technological University (Singapore), holds an M.A. in International Security from the Institut d'Etudes politiques de Paris (France),
2017 (“Defence industries in Arab states: players and strategies,” Chaillot Paper, March, Available Online at
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_141_Arab_Defence.pdf, Accessed 07-02-2019, p. 71)
The blind leading the blind
One of the more curious developments has been the rise of eastern European countries
and other unexpected partners entering into cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia
and the UAE. This, however, demonstrates recognition that dependence on the West is
no longer guaranteed. Whereas arms imports trends show a tendency on the part of Gulf
countries to go after the most sophisticated ‘glamour weapons’, the arms industry
trends point more towards mastering the basics. With the exception of certain
Saudi programmes, such as the recent foray into full aircraft production, emphasis on COTS
solutions and partnerships with non-traditional partners with more middle-ground
capabilities is perceived as a necessary interim step towards operability and,
eventually, autarky.
Tracking new defence industrial partnerships in Gulf countries also indicates who
future suppliers will be. As can already be seen with regard to arms imports in the Middle
East, partnerships with second-tier, non-Western producers , namely South Africa, also
demonstrate how the emergence of nascent defence industries may weaken
Western dominance. If Arab DTIBs become more capable, this could have a ripple effect on
other markets that may favour GCC cooperation and regionally sourced
solutions. The implication for traditional suppliers from the US and Europe is a
new trade-off of less foreign policy leverage relative to increasingly capable allies
in the region.
[***Note: Autarky means “economic independence or self-sufficiency” (Google Dictionary).***]
 They Say: “Plan Costs Jobs”
No U.S. Jobs Link — they’re a rounding error for the overall labor market.
Thrall and Cohen 19 — A. Trevor Thrall, Associate Professor of International Security in the Schar School of Policy
and Government at George Mason University, Senior Fellow in Defense and Foreign Policy at the Cato Institute, former Assistant
Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan-Dearborn, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, and Jordan Cohen, Ph.D. Student in Political Science at the Schar School of Policy and Government at
George Mason University, 2019 (“The False Promises of Trump’s Arms Sales,” Defense One, April 5th, Available Online at
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/04/false-promises-trumps-arms-sales/156071/, Accessed 06-12-2019)
Finally, Trump’s claims about the economic benefits of arms sales ring the hollowest
of all. For starters, not only won’t arms sales create a million new American jobs, but a
great number of the jobs created by arms sales will go to citizens of the purchasing
nations. As the Security Assistance Monitor report notes, the number of licenses granted to weapons
manufacturers outside the United States doubled from 2017 to 2018. As a result, more
than one-quarter of all U.S. arms “sales” last year were deals to permit the
manufacturing of U.S.-designed weapons under license — that is, they created jobs in
other nations instead of the United States. The report also finds that the Trump administration
has sharply increased the number of deals in which foreign countries produce
U.S.-developed weaponry under coproduction agreements, further reducing the
number of U.S. jobs tied to arms sales.
Weakening the economic rationale even further is the fact that in order to seal major
deals, American defense contractors have to offer massive discounts, or offsets, to
the purchasing nations in the form of coproduction arrangements or technology
transfer. In 2014, for example, these offsets equaled roughly one-third of the value of
total U.S. arms sales. These offsets mean not only that American arms sales are
less profitable than they appear on paper, but also that they lead to fewer jobs
created in the United States than many, including the president, would like to think. Trump’s big
Saudi arms deal, for example, would likely lead to somewhere between 20,000 and
40,000 jobs, or less than two-tenths of one percent of the American labor
market.
The unpleasant truth is that the underwhelming economic benefits cannot justify Washington’s love of arms sales. Arms sales
simply do not benefit the U.S. economy nearly as much as Trump likes to claim.
Meanwhile, a large percentage of American arms sales goes to countries with horrible human rights records, to nations where arms are
at risk of finding their way into the wrong hands, and to nations embroiled in dangerous and destabilizing conflicts. Given this, it is
long past time to rethink American arms sales policy.

Jobs numbers are wildly exaggerated, and many will be in Saudi Arabia.
Hartung 19 — William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, former
Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, former Director of the Arms Trade
Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, 2019 (“It’s Time To Stop Arms Sales To Saudi Arabia,” LobeLog—the Inter Press
Service’s blog, May 15th, Available Online at https://lobelog.com/its-time-to-stop-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/, Accessed 06-07-2019)
Trump’s favorite argument for keeping the weapons trade going is jobs, jobs, jobs. His claims
President
of U.S. jobs tied to Saudi arms sales and related deals have fluctuated widely, from 40,000 to as
many as one million. But an analysis of actual deals concluded over the past two
years suggests a figure that is a fraction of the president’s claims. And many of
these jobs will be created in Saudi Arabia as part of that nation’s goal of having 50
percent of the value of its arms purchases produced in the kingdom by 2030.

Job creation will continue to plummet because of licensed production.

Dorminey 18 — Caroline Dorminey, Policy Analyst for Defense and Foreign Policy at the Cato Institute, former Graduate
Research Assistant at the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, holds an M.A. in International Relations and National Security
Studies from the University of Chicago, 2018 (“Your Taxes at Work: Some Foreign Arsenal Assembly Required,” Ink Stick, May 2nd,
Available Online at https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/taxes-work-some-foreign-arsenal-assembly-required, Accessed
06-21-2019)
the majority of incentives to foreign buyers of American weapons come in
Currently,
the form of offsets. These agreements are made once the US government has
cleared a sale and the company can liaise with whichever foreign government is
purchasing the product. Offsets are meant to make the deals more attractive, and
can include anything from co-production to technology transfer to Foreign Direct Investments.
This takes a major cut out of any profit for the defense contractors, who shoulder most of the
cost. In 2014 alone, contractors reported $20.5 billion in defense-related merchandise exports, with $13 billion worth of those sales
including some kind of offset. The total value of reported offset agreements for that year was $7.7 billion — over one-third the value
of total defense exports for that year.
Obviously, this makes offsets an unattractive option for increasing economic security. The defense industry would prefer not to bear
that burden — so then how will diplomats sweeten the deal for interested buyers while still protecting profit margins?
Foreign Military Financing to the rescue. The Arms Export Control Act authorizes the president to financially assist nations interested
in US defense products and services. While all that sounds technically sound, this financing comes in the form of either a grant (free
money to never be repaid) or as direct loans (which are then sometimes forgiven).
This type of financing comes directly out of the US federal budget — specifically out of the State Department’s portion. The final
budget omnibus that was signed into law in March settled on $6.1 billion to give freely to other countries to purchase American
weapons.
That’s right — $6 billion of American taxpayer dollars this year alone will go towards subsidizing the arsenals of other nations so that
they too can “Buy American.” Foreign Military Financing had, until now, been on the decline. From 1985 to 2015 the program
decreased 50 percent in real terms. With this new economic security component to stated guidance on arms sales, there is a very real
possibility that Foreign Military Financing could continue to rise.
Equally frustrating is Trump’s sound bite that arms sales will preserve and create more jobs back home — particularly in
manufacturing. Jonathan Caverley, a professor at the US Naval War College, recently pointed out that the “Commerce Department
estimates that a billion dollars of defense exports would ‘create or sustain’ 3,918 jobs.” That’s 1,782 fewer jobs than the 5,700 that
would be generated just by increasing US exports more broadly, according to the Commerce Department’s numbers. In fact, research
shows that virtually any other sector — health care, education, infrastructure — would be a better place to seek job creation.
While the arms trade sustains some jobs in the United States, it also creates jobs
abroad. A frequently used offset is licensed production, which means that the
US sells the information and parts to a weapons system but then it’s assembled
partly or entirely in the recipient nation. The F-35 deal Trump touted back in November of 2017 as creating
jobs will in fact do so — but in a Japanese production facility, not an American one. Other deals following this model
include a recent sale of Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky helicopters that will be
assembled in Saudi Arabia.
The defense industry takes these trends to heart — Raytheon has already
announced the creation of Raytheon Arabia, a “Saudi entity owned by the
Massachusetts-based firm.” Lockheed Martin and Boeing have also already
pitched joint-venture projects with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia — America’s number
one client. With more and more companies creating defense jobs overseas, it’s
clear that arms sales will have an even more diminished impact on the creation
of jobs stateside.
They’re a tiny fraction of the overall labor market.
Hartung 19 — William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, former
Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, former Director of the Arms Trade
Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, 2019 (“Do U.S. Defense Firms Really Need To Export Arms To Saudi Arabia?,”
Forbes, June 24th, Available Online at https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2019/06/24/do-u-s-defense-firms-really-need-
arms-exports/#2eeb1e7c63eb, Accessed 06-24-2019)
President Trump is far from the most consistent commander-in-chief we’ve ever had, but he’s convinced
of at least one thing – arms exports are good for American jobs and American companies, and all
other considerations be damned.
The president was at it again this weekend when he told NBC’s Chuck Todd that initiating an FBI investigation of the role of Saudi
Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman over the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi might jeopardize lucrative
U.S. arms deals with the kingdom. This is just the latest example of his love affair with weapons exports, beginning with his much-
touted and greatly exaggerated $110 billion arms sales package to Saudi Arabia that he announced during his May 2017 visit to
Riyadh.
Building on the Saudi mega-deal – which independent analysts have determined may be as little as 10% as large as the $110 billion
figure the president claims –Trump has thrown out incredible estimates of the U.S jobs
generated by the Saudi sales, from 40,000 to 500,000 and up to one million if one counts related deals
outside the military sphere. An estimate I did for a report by the Center for International Policy indicates that the real
number of jobs generated by the roughly $2.5 billion a year in arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia over the past decade is
likely 20,000 to 40,000 jobs, a tiny fraction of the more than 150 million jobs in
the U.S. economy.

Empirically proven — past sales.

Caverley 18 — Jonathan D. Caverley, Associate Professor of Strategy in the Strategic and Operational Research Department
of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, Research Scientist in Political Science at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, former Assistant Professor of Political Science and Co-Founder of the Working Group on Security Studies at
the Roberta Buffett Center at Northwestern University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2018
(“Want to Punish Saudi Arabia? Cut Off Its Weapons Supply,” The New York Times, October 12th, Available Online at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html, Accessed 06-14-2019)
exports to Saudi Arabia create relatively few
And contrary to President Trump’s statement,
American jobs. Based on Commerce Department figures, releasing the billion dollars of munitions
currently on hold in the Senate would “create or sustain” fewer than 4,000 jobs.
Here’s a more specific example: Publicizing a recent $6 billion helicopter deal
with Saudi Arabia, Lockheed Martin predicted that it would “support” 450
American jobs.
 They Say: “Middle East Exports Key”
Middle East not key — exports are already declining.
Weisgerber 19 — Marcus Weisgerber, Global Business Editor for Defense One, 2019 (“Pentagon’s Focus On China and
Russia Expected to Alter US Arms Sales,” Defense One, April 4th, Available Online at
https://www.defenseone.com/business/2019/04/pentagons-focus-china-and-russia-expected-alter-us-arms-sales/156079/, Accessed 07-
02-2019)
A new report shows a decline in Middle Eastern nations’ share of overall exports.
As the U.S. military shifts its focus to Russia and China, American arms exports
are expected to make a similar shift to allies in Europe and Asia, experts say.
Arms export data already shows a shift away from the Middle East, where
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE have been scooping up American
weapons.
“I would imagine that this year and next we would see an uptick in sales to Asia, but it hasn’t shown up yet,” William Hartung,
director of the Arms Security Project at the Center for International Policy, said Thursday.
The total value of arms-export deals approved by the Trump administration declined from $82.2 billion in 2017 to $78.8 billion last
year, according to a new report by Hartung and Christina Arabia, director of the Security Assistance Monitor.
Also declining from 2017 to 2018: the share of deals with countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa, two regions of intense
focus in the past two decades of counterinsurgency- dominated wars.
“Deals with countries in the Middle East and North Africa dropped from 36.6% to
21.9%,” the report states. “And offers to East Asia and the Pacific dropped from 23.6% to 14.3%.”
Meanwhile, the share of deals approved for countries in Europe and Eurasia nearly doubled from 29.5 percent in 2017 to 55 percent
last year.
“Europe was actually the biggest recipient of new offers in 2018, outpacing the Middle East,” Hartung said. “Some of that may be
related to concerns about Russia, although the biggest deal was the $10 billion for Italy to produce F-35s, which is a program that’s
been going on for many years.”
He pointed to Slovakia’s purchase of American F-16 fighter jets; Arabia noted the Polish and Romanian orders of U.S.-made missile
defense systems.
A number of European nations are currently considering buying Lockheed Martin F-16 or Boeing F/A-18 warplanes.
Sowhy are arms sales down in the Middle East?
“Part of it is just saturation of the market,” Hartung said.
Another key may be the Pentagon’s year-old National Defense Strategy, which
prioritizes preparation for great power competition with Russia and China.
Just months after arriving in the White House, Trump announced a $110 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia that includes warships,
helicopters, tanks, bombs and missiles.
“These things take a long time to work through the system and a country is not
going to buy fighter planes every year, they’re going to do it periodically,” Hartung said.
Lawmakers have also voiced opposition to selling bombs and missiles to Saudi Arabia and UAE because of civilian deaths in Yemen.
The murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi has also prompted an outcry against Saudi Arabia.
“So much has been sold year after year, after year, it strikes me as perhaps a bit of a pause and not necessarily an indicator of things to
come,” Hartung said.
Halfway through fiscal year 2019, the $23 billion arms sales approved by the State Department are lagging behind the pace of the past
three years, Roman Schweizer, an analyst with Cowen and Company, wrote in an April 3 note to investors.
“While the Trump administration has made foreign military sales a priority, there
could be other Trump foreign and economic policies working against U.S. sales,”
Schweizer said. “We have previously expressed concern that President Trump’s comments about NATO,
France and Germany could encourage those countries to spend more but within
their own domestic defense economies rather than on U.S. hardware.”
The government shutdown in December and January may also have partially caused the
slowdown.
AT: Hodeidah Surge CP
 2AC — Hodeidah Surge CP
1. Escalates Conflict — intensifying mass starvation and pandemics.
Larison 19 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2019 (“The Disgraceful Case for Increasing U.S. Support for the War on Yemen,” The American Conservative, May 2nd,
Available Online at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-disgraceful-case-for-increasing-u-s-support-for-the-war-on-
yemen/, Accessed 06-14-2019)
Knights, Ken Pollack, and Barbara Walter make an unpersuasive case that the U.S.
Michael
should increase its support for the Saudi coalition war on Yemen:
True peace in Yemen will remain elusive unless both sides accept that they have nothing to gain from more fighting. We
are not there yet. To get there will require not cutting off U.S. support for Saudi Arabia but threatening to doube down on it
unless the Houthis honor their commitments to the UN and are ready to disgorge most of their initial conquests. If
Washington is serious about ending the war, it must come to terms with this uncomfortable fact.
The “fact” mentioned here is not a fact at all. It is an unfounded opinion offered in support of a truly reprehensible policy idea.
Trying to get the Houthis to “disgorge most of their initial conquests” is what the
Saudi coalition has been trying and failing to do for more than four years.
Threatening to increase U.S. support to the coalition isn’t going to change this,
and actually increasing U.S. military assistance to an indefensible war is an
unacceptable option that would only serve to escalate and prolong the conflict.
It is absurd to think that adding fuel to the war on Yemen will bring the war to an
end more quickly. The Saudi coalition intervened in a conflict that already existed,
but in so doing they escalated and intensified it. Even if the war does not end
immediately, it would be a less destructive conflict and it would pose less of a
threat to the civilian population once the Saudis and Emiratis are no longer
involved. Encouraging these governments to persist in their failed war will
continue creating conditions for mass starvation and epidemics of preventable
diseases.

2. Millions Will Die — even a temporary aid interruption is a death sentence.

Larison 19 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2019 (“The Disgraceful Case for Increasing U.S. Support for the War on Yemen,” The American Conservative, May 2nd,
Available Online at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-disgraceful-case-for-increasing-u-s-support-for-the-war-on-
yemen/, Accessed 06-14-2019)
Indulging and encouraging the coalition’s worst behavior is what put Hodeidah in
jeopardy and threatened the people in its hinterland with starvation in the first
place. If the Saudi coalition were pressured to end their involvement in the war,
the threat to Hodeidah’s port and the danger to the civilian population would be
significantly reduced. The authors’ call to back the Saudi coalition in an attempt
to seize Hodeidah is disgraceful, since it was U.S. support for the previous
offensive that has significantly worsened conditions in the country. Attacking the
port would interrupt the delivery of commercial goods and aid. Depending on how much
damage was done to the port during the assault, it could render it inoperable for months. Even a
brief interruption would push the millions of people on the verge of starvation
over the edge into the worst famine in decades, and a damaged or closed port
would be a death sentence for even more Yemenis. To their discredit, the authors don’t
acknowledge any of this as the obvious consequence of the course of action they
propose. They are explicitly calling for an assault that aid agencies have repeatedly
said would drive Yemen’s civilian population into the abyss, and they have the
gall to claim that this will improve conditions.

3. Makes Negotiations Less Likely — the Houthis will negotiate now, but not
after another battle for Hodeidah.
ICG 18 — International Crisis Group, 2018 (“Yemen: Averting a Destructive Battle for Hodeida,” International Crisis Group
Briefing, June 11th, Available Online at https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/b59-
yemen-averting-destructive-battle-hodeida, Accessed 06-24-2019)
The coalition has also argued that the loss of Hodeida will force the Huthis to the
negotiating table. The Huthis have signalled repeatedly since mid-to-late 2017 to both Griffiths and
his predecessor Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed that they are willing to enter into a new round of talks.
What the coalition appears to imply is that the Huthis need to be made to feel more
pain in order to get them to adopt a more flexible posture at the negotiating table.
Coalition officials have also said that once the port is under their control they
would be more comfortable with cutting a deal with the rebels. But the Huthis’ top
leadership has now been fighting for fourteen years – the war that broke out in 2015 is just the latest
in a series that they have fought. It is not clear that they see their negotiating position as being
as weak as the coalition does, even if they are willing to consider a compromise
deal that effectively amounts to the handover of Hodeida – a move that would save
them considerable blood and treasure.
Nor is it common in any conflict for peace talks to commence swiftly after a
bloody battle for an important piece of territory. A new military imbalance could
instead dissuade the weaker party from coming to the table and embolden the
coalition and Hadi government to demand ever more ambitious – and
unrealistic – concessions from the Huthis.

4. Permute: Do Both — scale back arms sales and implement the Hodeidah
surge. Arms sales aren’t key to the surge’s effectiveness.
 Extend: “Escalates Conflict”
The plan doesn’t need to end all fighting to solve the advantage, and the
counterplan makes a political compromise less likely.
Larison 19 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2019 (“The Disgraceful Case for Increasing U.S. Support for the War on Yemen,” The American Conservative, May 2nd,
Available Online at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-disgraceful-case-for-increasing-u-s-support-for-the-war-on-
yemen/, Accessed 06-14-2019)
The Saudis and Emiratis depend on U.S. and U.K. military assistance and
technical support to keep their war going. Cutting that support would go a long
way to removing some of the worst belligerents from the conflict, and that would
clearly be an improvement over the status quo. That does not guarantee an end to
all fighting in Yemen, but it would create space for political compromise and it
would deprive the Houthis of one of their main justifications for continuing to
fight. Pulling the plug on the Saudi coalition’s war effort would deprive the
Houthis of the foreign threat that they have been able to exploit to distract from
their own abuses. The authors’ proposal would be a political gift to the Houthis,
since it would allow them to continue focusing popular discontent on the
coalition and the U.S.

Military pressure didn’t spur the Hodeidah ceasefire — neg authors are
wrong.
Larison 19 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2019 (“The Disgraceful Case for Increasing U.S. Support for the War on Yemen,” The American Conservative, May 2nd,
Available Online at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-disgraceful-case-for-increasing-u-s-support-for-the-war-on-
yemen/, Accessed 06-14-2019)
The authors’ assumption that cutting off the Saudi coalition won’t end the war is
contradicted by years of evidence that a diplomatic settlement has been impossible
so long as the U.S. has been giving them unconditional backing. Congressional
opposition to the war has demonstrably been a boon to the cause of peace in
Yemen, and Trump’s veto of the antiwar resolution has had the opposite effect. If
the U.S. did what the authors wanted, we should expect a surge in violence and a
faster deterioration in the humanitarian situation. The authors assert, “The hard
truth is that the cease-fire in Hodeidah came about only because of military
pressure from the Saudi-led coalition,” but this is absolutely false. The cease-fire
happened in spite of the Saudi coalition’s determination to seize the port by force.
The only reason that there needed to be a cease-fire in Hodeidah was that the UAE
and its proxies launched an offensive in the summer of 2018 with the approval and
encouragement of the Trump administration. Attacking Hodeidah used to be
something that the U.S. was supposed to be firmly against, but now it is the
centerpiece of the authors’ awful proposal.
If we win these arguments, disregard Knights et al. evidence.
Larison 19 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2019 (“The Disgraceful Case for Increasing U.S. Support for the War on Yemen,” The American Conservative, May 2nd,
Available Online at https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-disgraceful-case-for-increasing-u-s-support-for-the-war-on-
yemen/, Accessed 06-14-2019)
this proposal for increasing that support is
Like every other argument in favor of U.S. support for the war on Yemen,
based on shoddy assumptions, faulty reasoning, and a number of false claims.
It is a lousy argument in support of a despicable policy, and the authors should be
embarrassed to have written it. On no account should members of Congress take
their proposal seriously, but should instead intensify their efforts to rein in the
Saudi coalition and challenge the Trump administration’s ongoing support for an
indefensible war.
 Extend: “Millions Will Die”
UN estimates agree.
ICG 18 — International Crisis Group, 2018 (“Yemen: Averting a Destructive Battle for Hodeida,” International Crisis Group
Briefing, June 11th, Available Online at https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/b59-
yemen-averting-destructive-battle-hodeida, Accessed 06-24-2019)
V.The Risk of Even Greater Humanitarian Tragedy
A sustained battle for the port will likely shut off trade and humanitarian aid
access for a sustained period. If coalition forces seize control of even part of the
city, the Huthis likely will attack them from nearby towns and mountainous areas .
Meanwhile, the battle might not stop at the city. Fighting could continue along the main
Hodeida-Sanaa road, into the mountainous regions of Rayma and Haraz. This
would impede traffic from the port unless an agreement on access is brokered. UN
officials estimate that fighting for the city alone could displace hundreds of
thousands of people and warn of a “catastrophic humanitarian impact”.

The 2017 battle proves.

ICG 18 — International Crisis Group, 2018 (“Yemen: Averting a Destructive Battle for Hodeida,” International Crisis Group
Briefing, June 11th, Available Online at https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/b59-
yemen-averting-destructive-battle-hodeida, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Hodeida is the entry point for most basic goods into the north, accounting for
around 37 per cent of Yemen’s fuel and 69 per cent of its food imports via ship in 2018 to
date, serving the country’s main populated areas.
Along with Ibb and Taiz governorates – which the Huthis partially control – Yemen’s northern highlands are
home to around 60 per cent of an overall estimated population of 27.4 million. The
UN says Yemen’s humanitarian crisis is already the worst in the world; some 22.2
million people are in need of assistance. When the coalition prevented ships from
entering Hodeida port for sixteen days in November 2017 following a Huthi missile
attack on Riyadh, humanitarian organisations reported “skyrocketing” prices for
food and price increases of up to 100 per cent for fuel.
 Extend: “Makes Negotiations Less Likely”
Arming the coalition to force the Houthis to negotiate won’t work — Knights
et al. are wrong.
Bandow 19 — Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative
Defense Alliance, former Special Assistant to President Reagan, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, 2019 (“U.S. Support Has
Fueled, Not Moderated, the Yemen War,” The National Interest, May 19th, Available Online at
https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/skeptics/us-support-has-fueled-not-moderated-yemen-war-58097, Accessed 06-13-2019)
Finally, the administration claims it wants to stop the war. By continuing to subsidize
the Saudis and Emiratis. This bizarre rationale also was advanced by a recent article in Foreign
Affairs online by Michael Knights, Kenneth M. Pollack, and Barbara F. Walter, respectively of the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, American Enterprise Institute, and University of California (San Diego). Washington should continue to
enable the aggressors to commit war crimes since ending U.S. backing for “the Saudis will hinder the coalition’s war effort and
embolden the Houthis and their Iranian supporters, making them much less likely to accept a nationwide cease-fire and a power-
sharing agreement.” Indeed, the three analysts would increase American backing for the coalition, and “then use the resulting leverage
to force both sides to end the fighting and sign a power-sharing agreement.”
Yet the coalition has shown no inclination to moderate its approach despite four
years of U.S. support supposedly directed at moderating its approach. And the
administration’s close embrace has only emboldened Crown Prince bin Salman,
who has grown more repressive and reckless. Worse, this strategy requires
Washington to help kill even more Yemenis, who have done nothing against
America.
Imagine this argument applied to World War II. Our objective should be to halt the
fighting between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Thus, America should assist
Adolf Hitler’s forces to make Joseph Stalin more willing to negotiate a ceasefire and
peace agreement. Similarly, in East Asia America should back Japan against
China, since the latter was unwilling to accept accommodation with Tokyo.
Aiding imperial Japan would force the recalcitrant Chinese, nationalists and
communists alike, to come to terms.
 They Say: “Hodeidah Surge Will Be Quick/Clean”
Empirically denied — coalition estimates are naïvely optimistic.
ICG 18 — International Crisis Group, 2018 (“Yemen: Averting a Destructive Battle for Hodeida,” International Crisis Group
Briefing, June 11th, Available Online at https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/b59-
yemen-averting-destructive-battle-hodeida, Accessed 06-24-2019)
In the past, the coalition has regularly predicted that it would win its battles
quickly and cleanly – before adjusting its estimates when reality sank in. At the
start of the war in March 2015, for example, Saudi officials forecast that the war would
last only a few weeks. The Hadi government and the coalition struggle to provide
basic services and security in areas liberated from Huthi control such as Aden –
the site of battles between Yemeni forces – further undermining the argument that
they will be able to operate Hodeida more efficiently than at present.
 They Say: “Losing Hodeidah Will Decimate Houthis”
They’ll make up the revenue with customs checkpoints.
ICG 18 — International Crisis Group, 2018 (“Yemen: Averting a Destructive Battle for Hodeida,” International Crisis Group
Briefing, June 11th, Available Online at https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/b59-
yemen-averting-destructive-battle-hodeida, Accessed 06-24-2019)
The loss of the port would be a serious financial blow to the Huthis. But the rebels
are unlikely to collapse as a result. The Huthis have been stockpiling food and fuel
in preparation for the Hodeida offensive since late 2016. At present, improvised customs
checkpoints in Amran, Dhammar and al-Beida governorates, which they established at the start of the war, are
generating considerable revenues from overland trade – which, when combined, could
amount to as much as those furnished by Hodeida. The coalition is aware that if
the Huthis are pushed out of the city, they are likely to set up a similar operation to
tax “imports” entering territory they hold from Hodeida and further inflate the cost
of basic goods in order to make up for any revenue shortfall due to loss of the port.
As has been the case since the beginning of the war, the cost of the battle for Hodeida will largely
accrue to the already impoverished civilian population.
 They Say: “Bosnia Proves”
Holbrooke was a war criminal and directly responsible for the genocide in
Yugoslavia.
Grubacic 10 — Andrej Grubacic, Professor and Chair of the Department of Anthropology and Social Change in the School of
Consciousness and Transformation at the California Institute of Integral Studies, Member of the International Organization for a
Participatory Society, Co-Founder of the Global Balkans network and the Yugoslav Initiative for Economic Democracy, holds a Ph.D.
from the State University of New York at Binghamton, 2010 (“Richard Holbrooke, the Butcher of the Balkans,” Z Commentaries—a
Z Magazine publication, December 18th, Available Online at https://zcomm.org/zcommentary/richard-holbrooke-the-butcher-of-the-
balkans-by-andrej-grubacic/, Accessed 06-29-2019)
Judy Woodruff, in her recent obituary of Richard Holbrooke, asked herself why is that "members of the mainstream media are
"fawning" over Holbrooke, and whether he had received this sort of coverage while he was alive." This, the article continues, made
her "think about why we often wait until someone dies before we give them credit for their accomplishments. In a somewhat
metaphysical tone, she remarks that this is "universal phenomenon; few get their due before they disappear from the scene."
Wodruff admires Holbrooke's humanitarian impatience: "he loved public service so much that he was frequently trying to circumvent
the government bureaucracy that slowed things down." His public service was centered around "doing what he could to improve the
life of Afghanistan's people – their economy, farming, schools, opportunities for women – anything to give them a positive alternative
to the intolerant religious extremism that Taliban militants offer for their future." This is not unusual, because this "brilliant bundle of
energy" spent "an adult lifetime absorbed with what were arguably the hardest problems the world has known in that period – the war
in Vietnam, the conflict in the Balkans, the HIV-AIDS crisis in Africa, and most recently, Afghanistan."
Well, I would certainly like to recognize the importance of Richard Holbrooke, this "brilliant bundle of energy," humanitarian here
who always "believed that we have to get it right," for the history of my own region, the Balkans, and my country, ex-Yugoslavia.
Richard Holbrooke was a war criminal. He helped organize the military and
institutional framework for the mass slaughter of Yugoslav people. Since the
involvement of the United States in Yugoslav wars, Holbrooke helped block every
single peace initiative coming from the Yugoslav people. He is directly
responsible for the bombing of Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo in 1999; for the
occupation of Bosnia and Kosovo that followed; and for the mass exodus of
Romani and Serb civilians from post-war Kosovo.
In my book Don't Mourn, Balkanize! Essays After Yugoslavia, I describe the Yugoslav region after
Holbrooke:
"What do the Balkans look like today? They are a patchwork of nation-state remnants , such as
Slovenia; the vassals of the international community, like Croatia and Serbia & Montenegro;
and the three protectorates under military watch – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and
Macedonia (the latter facing the serious risk of a new civil war, potentially even more brutal than the one that ended in
2002). When it comes to the protectorates, the "international community" has, to date, had two paradoxical solutions: in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the imposition of a "multiethnic at any cost" approach, while in Kosovo, preparations are under
way for a "monoethnic independence", at least partially due to the fact that after the occupation of this Serbian province
ensued a year-long ethnic cleansing in the opposite direction – of which we hear almost nothing in the Western press – in
which nearly all the non-Albanian inhabitants were exiled and over 150 monasteries destroyed. But how do we explain the
newly photogenic Bosnia and Kosovo? Perhaps it's best to start with Bosnia which one Russian journalist, correctly it
would appear to me, calls the "model for Kosovo". In the Balkans, "success is a real rarity", writes Jonathan Steel,
apparently relieved of the burden of the concerned European. Especially in Bosnia, which is more a " patchwork than a real
state" (Politika Daily).
Two so-called entities – the muslim-Croatian federation and Republika Srpska – have remained practically "irreconcilable enemies".
This "Balkan colony of the international community" is made up of 10 cantons, 14 parliaments and 145 ministries. Sound
complicated? The peoples of Bosnia themselves remain perplexed more than 10 years after they were forced to accept this somewhat
bizarre arrangement. Government administration accounts for 70% of the national budget. Social services and pensions must be paid
out of the remaining funds even as the official unemployment rate in Bosnia hovers above 40%. What follows from this state of
affairs? Empty government coffers and corruption so widespread that it is not "part of the system but is the system".
An American diplomat with enviable cultural sensitivity, partial to invoking picturesque historical parallels, has said that, "Bosnia
looks like the Wild West of our movies". He's right. To date, more than two billion euros of international "donations" and
"development aid" have vanished in Bosnia. Bosnia is an epicenter for arms and drug smuggling and trafficking in women, where
local and especially international politicians collaborate with local criminals. Organized crime is the sole remaining domain of a
Bosnia has been transformed into a protectorate-laboratory in which
multiethnic Bosnia.
the "international community" observes how to transform "failed states"—from Kosovo
to Iraq-into stable and obedient ones . Paddy Ashdown, our postcolonial Harry Potter, remains at the head of
"Dayton's Bosnia".
In January, however, Ashdown will be replaced as colonial governor, or to put it more formally, as the High Representative for
Bosnia, by former German telecommunications minister Christian Schwarz-Schilling. Schwarz-Schilling already has nine years of
experience as a samurai-diplomat of the international community. He announced himself with racist, anti-Serb statements. According
to the Berlin Zeitung, Ashdown, "a former member of the British Royal Navy accustomed to battling in close quarters, is leaving
because he was unable to win substantial support during his mandate." He has been "criticized by Serbs, Croats and Muslims as an
arrogant colonial ruler."…. In other words, according to the diagnoses of Balkan experts, the people of Bosnia lack the requisite
political capacity necessary to be credible on the question of their own constitution. Moreover, the design of the new constitution
presupposes a situation in which, at a basic level, decisions are made in Washington and Brussels and carried out according to the
political will of Brussels and the "high representative of the international community" who has the responsibility to instruct the Balkan
tribes in the political culture.
The truth is that "it is time to rethink the way in which Bosnia is organized" but it is equally true that this project requires abolishing
the insulting colonial institution of the high representative and his dictatorial authority and giving decision-making power over the
constitution, number of entities and the cantons – the entire political process – and all else to those who actually live in Bosnia. ……
Kosovo, which is usually mentioned in the Western press only when some newsworthy violence erupts, is again a topic of diplomatic
concern. The so-called status talks begin this month with an announcement first made by Washington's undersecretary of state, a task
which fell to the US after a series of unusual coincidences. The UN has nominated a special negotiator, as has the EU. Does that mean
that one phase has already ended? As a reminder, the first phase of the "democratic project in Kosovo" encompassed no more and no
less than the "development of democracy", "economic prosperity" and "recognition of the rights of minorities".
Moreover, under the oversight of the NATO council and the UN, the current situation, already one of permanent post-conflict but
especially in the aftermath of the attacks on the non-Albanian residents last March, has become increasingly unlivable. The disputes
can be summarized formulaically: as long as what Belgrade offers to Kosovo Albanians is "some more than autonomy but less than
independence" while Kosovo politicians insist on "more than autonomy, not less than independence", the "international community's"
"compromise solution" for this "immature political ambience" is preparation for "independence without autonomy". Anan has
nominated the diplomat and former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari as special envoy during the Kosovo negotiations. This
nomination comes as no surprise. Few players on the international political scene have such a frighteningly efficient reputation as this
former diplomat. Namibia, Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, Eritrea, and finally Aceh: Ahtisaari has always stuck his fingers into
peaceful initiatives.
Now it's Kosovo's turn. By founding the Crisis Management Institute in Helsinki, Ahtisaari sought to create a monopoly on peaceful
conflict resolution: where the "international community" lights a fire, Ahtisaari arrives to extinguish it. All you need to do is call him.
This Finnish firemans' greatest success was the peaceful settlement in Aceh. If a "lasting compromise" in Kosovo is reached next year
the Nobel Peace Prize will certainly not evade his humanitarian grasp, especially as he was already a frontrunner candidate this year.
Undersecretary Burns is also visibly worried about stability. Speaking to the US Senate, he opined that NATO will use force if any of
the parties to the Kosovo status negotiations employ the threat of violence as a political tactic. In Burns's thinking, the talks may well
"bring about independence". The Kosovo Albanians shouldn't rush to begin independence day celebrations just yet though, explained
the undersecretary and Balkan expert with a schoolteacher's concern: "They need to prove that they are worthy".When we compare
Burns to his colleague however, former US special envoy for the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke, the cowboy-undersecretary begins to
look like a poster-boy for political correctness. Holbrooke, famous for his declaration that the "Serbs are shit people", on the occasion
of the same Senate outing, said, with now celebrated candor, that Belgrade will have to find a way to let go of Kosovo. To that he
added that the province's independence will inevitably lead to the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro's linkage. Among other
things, both Burns and Holbrooke have supported a referendum on independence for Montenegro."
All this was writen before the recent discovery of organ trade in Kosovo
(http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/14/world/main7149845.shtml). People involved in this affair, Hashim Thaci and other
leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army, were the same "freedom fighters" that Holbrooke, as the special envoy for the Balkans,
appointed as American partners in the Balkans, and, later, as rulers of the "New Kosovo." According the report by Council of Europe
investigator Dick Marty, Holbrooke's friends are accused of secretly taking captives across the border into Albania after the war,
where many Serbs and Romai citizens are said to have been murdered for their kidneys, which were sold on the black market.
Holbrooke was not the only one. Former Special Representative to the Secretary General of the UN in Kosovo, Sergio Vieira de Mell,
was often quoted to complain: "Madeleine Albright is in love with Thaci. Jamie Rubin is his best friend. It's not helpful.
Thaci arrived here with the impression that he has the full weight of the American government behind him. He believes he has earned
the right to rule." Albreight, Ruben, and Holbrooke were aware if the report, published in March 2000, by former UN Special
Investigator for the former Yugoslavia Jiri Dienstbier, who reported to the UN Commission on Human Rights that "330,000 Serbs,
Roma, Montenegrins, Slavic Muslims, pro-Serb Albanians and Turks had been displaced in Kosovo – double the earlier estimates.
What that means is most of Kosovo's minorities no longer are in their original homes."
The real legacy of Richard Hoolbroke in the Balkans are two occupied countries,
Kosovo and Bosnia, thoushands of dead and injured civilians in Serbia,
Montenegro and Kosovo, torture and human kidney trade, and more then million
uprooted people in the region. He was the real butcher of the Balkans.

The Bosnian campaign they’re citing caused a brutal war and delayed peace
negotiations by four years.
Johnstone 10 — Diana Johnstone, Contributor to Counterpunch, former Editor of Dialogue—a Paris quarterly publication
concerned with Balkan geopolitics, former Press Officer of the Green Group in the European Parliament, former Editor of In These
Times, Author of Fools’ Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO, and Western Delusions, holds a Ph.D. in French Literature from the University
of Minnesota, 2010 (“Holbrooke or Milosevic: Who is the Greater Murderer?,” Counterpunch, December 15th, Available Online at
https://www.counterpunch.org/2010/12/15/holbrooke-or-milosevic-who-is-the-greater-murderer/, Accessed 06-29-2019)
*** Note: Izetbegovic is pronounced ee-zab-EH-go-vich.
It is usually considered good form to avoid sharp criticism of someone who has just died.
But Richard Holbrooke himself set a striking example of the breach of such etiquette. On
learning of the death in prison of Slobodan Milosevic, Holbrooke did not hesitate to
describe him as a “monster” comparable to Hitler and Stalin.
This was rank ingratitude, considering that Holbrooke owed his greatest career
success — the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina — almost entirely to
Milosevic. This was made quite clear in his memoir To End a War (Random House, 1998).
But Holbrooke’s greatest skill, made possible by media complicity, was to dress up reality in a
costume favorable to himself.
The Dayton Peace Accords were presented as a heroic victory for peace extracted
by the brilliant Holbrooke from a reluctant Milosevic, who had to be “bombed to
the negotiating table” by the United States. In reality, the U.S. government was fully
aware that Milosevic was eager for peace in Bosnia to free Serbia from crippling
economic sanctions. It was the Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic who wanted
to keep the war going, with U.S. military help.
In reality, the U.S. bombed the Serbs in order to get Izetbegovic to the negotiating
table. And the agreement reached in the autumn of 1995 was not very different from the
agreement reached in March 1992 by the three ethnic groups under European Community auspices,
which could have prevented the entire civil war, if it had not been sabotaged by
Izetbegovic, who withdrew his agreement with the encouragement of the then U.S.
ambassador Warren Zimmermann. In short, far from being the great peacemaker in the
Balkans, the United States first encouraged the Muslim side to fight for its goal of a
centralized Bosnia, and then sponsored a weakened federated Bosnia — after
nearly four years of bloodshed which left the populations bereft and embittered.
The real purpose of all this, as Holbrooke made quite clear in To End a War, was to demonstrate that Europeans could not manage
their own vital affairs and that the United States remained the “indispensable nation”. His book also made it clear that the Muslim
leaders were irritatingly reluctant to end war short of total victory, and that only the readiness of Milosevic to make concessions saved
the Dayton talks from failure — allowing Holbrooke to be proclaimed a hero.
The functional role of the Holbrooke’s diplomacy was to prove that diplomacy, as carried out by Europeans, was bound to fail. His
victory was a defeat for diplomacy. The spectacle of bombing plus Dayton was designed to show that only the threat or application of
U.S. military might could end conflicts.
Milosevic had hoped that his concessions would lead to peace and reconciliation with
the United States. As it happened, his only reward for handing Holbrooke the victory of his
career was to have his country bombed by NATO in 1999 in order to wrest from Serbia the
province of Kosovo and prepare Milosevic’s own fall from office. Holbrooke played a prominent role in this
scenario, suddently posing shoeless in a tent in the summer of 1998 for a photo op seated among armed Albanian secessionists
which up to then had been characterized by the State Department as “terrorists”, and shortly thereafter announcing to Milosevic that
Serbia would be bombed unless he withdrew security forces from the province, in effect giving it to the ex-terrorists transformed by
the Holbrooke blessing into freedom fighters.
In his long career from Vietnam to Afghanistan, Holbrooke was active on many fronts. In 1977, after Indonesia invaded East Timor
and set about massacring the people of that former Portuguese colony, Holbrooke was dispatched by the United States supposedly to
promote “human rights” but in reality to help arm the Suharto dictatorship against the East Timorese. Sometimes the government is
armed against rebels, sometimes rebels are armed against the government, but despite appearances of contradiction, what is consistent
throughout is the cynical exploitation and exacerbation of tragic local conflicts to extend U.S. imperial power throughout the world.
Holbrooke and Milosevic were born in the same year, 1941. When Milosevic died in 2006, Holbrooke gave a long statement to the
BBC without a single syllable of human kindness. “This man wrecked the Balkans,” said Holbrooke.
“He was a war criminal who caused four wars, over 300,000 deaths, 2.5 million homeless. Sometimes monsters make the biggest
impacts on history – Hitler and Stalin – and such is the case with this gentleman.”
Holbrooke presented himself as goodness dealing with evil for a worthy cause . When
negotiating with Milosevic, “you’re conscious of the fact that you’re sitting across the table from a monster whose role in history will
be terrible and who has caused so many deaths.”
Who was the monster? Nobody, including at the Hague tribunal where he died for lack of medical treatment, has
ever actually proved that Milosevic was responsible for the tragic deaths in the
wars of Yugoslav disintegration. But Holbrooke was never put on trial for all the
deaths in Vietnam, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq and, yes, former Yugoslavia, which
resulted at least in part from the U.S. policies he carried out.
From his self-proclaimed moral heights, Holbrooke judged the Serbian leader as an opportunist without political convictions, neither
communist nor nationalist, but simply “an opportunist who sought power and wealth for himself.”
In reality,there has never been any proof that Milosevic sought or obtained wealth for
himself, whereas Holbrooke was, among many other things, a vice chairman of Credit Suisse
First Boston, managing director of Lehman Brothers, vice chairman of the private
equity firm Perseus LLC, and a member of the board of directors of AIG, the American
International Group, at a time when, according to Wikipedia, “the firm engaged in wildly speculative
credit default insurance schemes that may cost the taxpayer hundreds of billions to
prevent AIG from bringing down the entire financial system.”
Milosevic was on trial for years without ever being to present his defense before he died under troubling circumstances. Holbrooke
found that outcome perfectly satisfying: “I knew as soon as he reached The Hague that he’d never see daylight again and I think that
justice was served in a weird way because he died in his cell, and that was the right thing to do.”
There are many other instances of lies and deceptions in Holbrooke’s
manipulation of Balkan woes, as well as his totally cynical exploitation of the
tragedies of Vietnam, East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. But still, his importance should not be
overstated. Moral monsters do not always make a great impact on history, when they
are merely the vain instruments of a bureaucratic military machine running
amok.
AT: Leverage (Threaten) CP
 2AC — Leverage CP
1. Counterplan Gets Circumvented — plan doesn’t.
Allan and Anderson 19 — Elizabeth Allan, Student at Yale Law School, holds an M.Phil. in Modern Middle Eastern
Studies from the University of Oxford (UK) and an M.A. in International Policy from the University of Georgia, and Scott R.
Anderson, David M. Rubenstein Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, Senior Editor and Counsel at
Lawfare, Adjunct Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, Fellow with the Truman National Security Project,
Affiliate of the Program on International Law and Armed Conflict at Harvard Law School, former International Affairs Fellow with
the Council on Foreign Relations, former Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State, former
Legal Advisor for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad (Iraq), holds a J.D. from Yale Law School, 2019 (‘Where Congress Stands on
Yemen,” Lawfare, February 21st, Available Online at https://www.lawfareblog.com/where-congress-stands-yemen, Accessed 07-07-
2019)
What happened next, however, underscores both the limits and the potential of these
sorts of provisions. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo initially issued the required
certification in September 2018, despite bipartisan skepticism that Saudi Arabia
had actually satisfied the relevant requirements. The Wall Street Journal later reported that Pompeo
had acted against the almost unanimous recommendation of his State Department
staff, who had urged him to issue a waiver instead. This contributed to growing
congressional frustration with the Trump administration’s policy toward Saudi Arabia and the
Yemen conflict, ultimately leading the Trump administration to voluntarily cease
providing the Saudi-led coalition with in-air refueling. As a result, the Trump
administration has refused to issue another certification or waiver under Section
1290 despite bipartisan requests, on the apparent logic that Section 1290 no longer
imposes any meaningful penalties for doing so.
If Congress wishes to put concrete legal restrictions on the executive branch’s
actions in Yemen, the next NDAA—which will be drafted over the coming year and brought to a vote sometime in the fall
—is the most likely vehicle. Presidential allies in the House and the Senate may seek to limit or avoid these provisions, but
Democratic control of the House, combined with Republican reservations about Yemen policy in the Senate, make this a realistic
The restrictions proposed in S. 398 are a likely model for such restrictions, though other
possibility.
formulations are also possible. And while the experience with Section 1290 underscores just
how willing the Trump administration is to put its credibility on the line to
preserve its close relationship with Saudi Arabia, Congress can make the requisite
certifications and waivers narrower and more difficult to circumvent—or just
remove them altogether in favor of hard legal restrictions, such as prohibitions
on the types of support the United States is currently providing.

2. Genocide Complicity DA — if the counterplan maintains arms sales, it

maintains U.S. complicity in an ongoing genocide. Case outweighs the net-
benefit.

3. Conditions Won’t Be Met — Saudi Arabia doesn’t care enough about arms
sales to agree to the deal.
1NC Chollet and Goldenberg 18 — Derek Chollet, Executive Vice President and Senior Advisor for Security
and Defense Policy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Contributing Editor to Foreign Policy, Adjunct Senior
Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, Visiting Fellow at the Perry World
House at the University of Pennsylvania, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs at the U.S.
Department of Defense, former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security
Council, former Principal Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff for the U.S. Secretary of State, former Fellow at the Center for
a New American Security, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the American Academy in
Berlin, and Ilan Goldenberg, Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American
Security, Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, former Chief of Staff to the Special Envoy for
Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations at the U.S. Department of State, former Senior Professional Staff Member on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, former Special Advisor on the Middle East and Iran Team Chief in the Office of the Under-Secretary of
Defense for Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense, holds an M.A. in International Affairs from the School of International and
Public Affairs at Columbia University, 2018 (“The United States Should Give Saudi Arabia a Choice,” Foreign Policy, November
30th, Available Online at https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/30/saudi-arabia-should-be-given-a-choice-stop-the-surprises-or-suffer-the-
consequences-mbs-khashoggi/, Accessed 06-24-2019)
Here’s where leverage comes in. The United States must also make clear what happens
if Saudi Arabia does not accept this offer. This is not simply about arms sales,
which the Saudis care about but not enough to change their behavior, and the
U.S. defense industry can live without (although it would understandably prefer
not to make this choice). If Saudi Arabia is going to be an erratic, unpredictable
partner, the United States doesn’t want to be as closely tied to them.
This would mean scaling back goals regarding Saudi Arabia. It would mean less
military cooperation and more modest economic relations. It would mean fewer
higher-level visits to kowtow to them. It would also mean less strategic ambition .

4. No Net-Benefit — if the counterplan ends arms sales, it’s identical to the

plan. Presumption flips aff when the neg reads a counterplan.

5. No Civilian Casualties Net-Benefit — the coalition intentionally targets

civilians with U.S. support. It can’t get worse — that’s on the case.

6. Permute: Do Both. Simultaneous enactment would require Saudi Arabia to

meet the conditions in order for the arms embargo to be lifted. This doesn’t
sever because arms embargoes are inherently temporary and the counterplan
is identical to the plan if Saudi Arabia doesn’t take the deal.
UN 18 — United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2018 (“Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament,”
United Nations Report, Available Online at https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/sg-disarmament-
agenda-pubs-page.pdf#view=Fit, Accessed 07-07-2019, p. 7-9)
Preventing And Ending Armed Conflict And Violence
Measures for arms control and disarmament also play a critical role at the global and
regional levels for the prevention of armed conflict, ensuring stability and ending gender-based
violence. At the national and local levels, arms control contributes to preventing armed violence more broadly. [end page 7; page 8 is
entirely graphics and has been omitted]
The international community has developed a wide range of tools that connect
arms control with prevention. These range across the entire lifespan of conflict,
from preventive diplomacy and mediation, to temporary restrictive measures
like arms embargoes and cooperation in post-conflict settings. United Nations entities play a
leading role in many of these efforts. There is considerable scope for strengthening the linkages between the broader prevention
agenda and measures of arms control and disarmament. As the protracted nature of contemporary armed conflict increases the salience
of prevention, this linkage is of particular importance.

7. No Qatar Net-Benefit — U.S. leverage fails.

Dunne 18 — Charles W. Dunne, Non-Resident Fellow at Arab Center Washington DC, Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle
East Institute, Visiting Distinguished Research Fellow of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense
University, former Foreign Policy Adviser to the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy at the Joint Staff in the U.S. Department of
Defense, former Director of Middle East and North Africa Programs at Freedom House, former Director for Iraq at the U.S. National
Security Council, holds an M.A. in Arab Studies from the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, 2018
(“No American Traction on Resolving the GCC Crisis,” Arab Center Washington DC, December 27th, Available Online at
http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/no-american-traction-on-resolving-the-gcc-crisis/, Accessed 07-07-2019)
Ongoing Stalemate
Despite US efforts, as 2018 draws to a close the intra-GCC conflict remains stalemated with
little indication that an acceptable political solution is emerging, a war of words
continuing apace, and quietly ineffective American diplomacy failing to make
much of a headway. It appears that the United States may have overestimated its leverage
on MbS in the wake of the Khashoggi affair: in fact, it seems to actually have much less influence.
The crown prince is likely determined to avoid being seen as backing down in the
face of external pressure, lest he be viewed as weak and invite challenges to his
authority. Moreover, the Trump Administration’s efforts to shield MbS and the US-
Saudi relationship from any fallout due to the Khashoggi murder likely convinced the
kingdom there was little price to pay in its relationship with the administration for
pursuing its vendetta against Doha. Trump’s own mounting political and legal
challenges may also influence Riyadh’s calculation on the costs of crossing the
president.

8. Permute: Do The Counterplan. This doesn’t sever: the counterplan is not

textually competitive because the conditions it adds are plan-plus. The plan
should be done — it’s not an aff burden to defend immediacy or certainty.

9. Qatar Impact Not Unique — the damage has already been done.
Kinninmont 19 — Jane Kinninmont, Head of Programmes at The Elders—an independent group of global leaders founded
by Nelson Mandela to work for peace and human rights, former Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Head of the Middle East and
North Africa Programme at Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs (UK), holds an M.Sc. from the School of
Oriental and African Studies at the University of London (UK), 2019 (“The Gulf Divided: The Impact of the Qatar Crisis,” Chatham
House Research Paper, May, Available Online at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2019-05-30-
Gulf%20Crisis_0.pdf, Accessed 07-07-2019, p. 36)
Prospects for resolution
Several factors could drive the parties to begin unwinding the tensions:
A US-driven ‘cold peace’
the US could make a difference. US ambitions to
As the pre-eminent security ally for all the countries concerned,
at least bring Qatar and the
build a Middle East Strategic Alliance of Arab states – largely as a signal to Iran – could
countries of the Arab Quartet around the same table in pursuit of a larger cause – even if it is uncertain how active
or significant the alliance may be in reality. As part of this effort to convene an anti-Iranian bloc, the US may push for the embargo to
be wound down and for Qatar, in return, to curb its recently strengthened ties with Iran.
But even if the embargo does come to an end, the recent events will mean an
enduring legacy of mistrust among leaders in Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia
who may be in charge of their countries for decades to come. The longer the divisions
last, the greater the risk that they will also be entrenched within societies,
circumscribing leaders’ future options.
10. Reject Plan-Contingent Counterplans — process-focused counterplans
distort the topic, hurting depth and clash over core controversies.
Debatability trumps “literature” because there’s no enforceable standard for
solvency evidence. Disads are sufficient to “test” unconditional cutoffs.

11. No Supplier Shift Net-Benefit — if the plan links, so does the counterplan.
Spindel 19 — Jennifer Spindel, Assistant Professor in the Department of International and Area Studies and Associate Director
of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center at the University of Oklahoma, former Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Institute for Security
and Conflict Studies at George Washington University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota, 2019
(“The Case For Suspending American Arms Sales To Saudi Arabia,” War on the Rocks, May 14th, Available Online at
https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/, Accessed 06-07-2019)
The United States could, in theory, impose stricter end-user controls on Saudi Arabia.
This would have the advantage of keeping Saudi Arabia within the world of U.S. weapons systems, and might prevent it from
diversifying its suppliers, which would ultimately weaken any leverage the United States might have. Longer-term, it would not be to
It is
America’s advantage if Saudi Arabia takes a lesson from Turkey, and starts courting Russia as a new arms supplier.
difficult to enforce end-user controls, since, once a weapon is transferred, the
recipient can use it however it wishes. It might also be the case that Saudi Arabia
would object to stricter end-user controls, and would seek new suppliers as a
result.
 Extend: “CP Gets Circumvented”
The counterplan requires someone in the U.S. government to officially
determine whether Saudi Arabia has met the conditions of the deal. Normal
means is Secretary of State Pompeo. Empirically, he’ll certify blatant lies in
order to keep the weapons flowing to Saudi Arabia.
Larison 19 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
Chicago, 2019 (“Pompeo’s Pathetic Pro-Saudi Spin,” The American Conservative, March 27th, Available Online at
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/pompeos-pathetic-pro-saudi-spin/, Accessed 07-07-2019)
During his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mike Pompeo said
the following about Yemen and Saudi Arabia (around 4:10:15 here):
The challenges that you’ve cited, the death that you just cited in Yemen, is
not because of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. You have the wrong end of the stick
on that.
That answer caught the attention of several observers, some of whom referred to the coalition attack on the Save the Children hospital
in Saada that took place yesterday and killed eight people, including five children:
Pompeo absolves MBS from what's happening in Yemen. He says the "death in Yemen … is not because of the kingdom
of Saudi Arabia"
— John Hudson (@John_Hudson) March 27, 2019
Pompeo just told @RepDavidTrone that the deaths in #Yemen are not due to #SaudiArabia. Shame on you @SecPompeo.
Thank you Congressman for speaking truth to power.
— Kate Kizer (@KateKizer) March 27, 2019
But Pompeo until today absolves MBS from what's happening in Yemen. He says the "death in Yemen … is not because of
the kingdom of Saudi Arabia"
— Mohammed al-Kibsi (@MohammedalKibsi) March 27, 2019
Sec. Pompeo testifying today repeatedly absolves Saudi gov't & MBS from staggering civilian casualties in Yemen, says
the "death in Yemen…is not because of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia" https://t.co/1t7CueY30k
— Peter Billerbeck (@PeterJBX) March 27, 2019
This is not the first time that Pompeo has knowingly made false statements to
Congress. His outrageous certification last fall that the Saudi coalition was working to
reduce harm to civilians was the most obvious example, but he has followed it up
with numerous lies about Yemen and who is to blame for most of the loss of life
and the humanitarian crisis there. We saw that on display earlier this month. It is not surprising that
an enabler and accomplice to war criminals would cover for the criminals, but
Pompeo’s brazen denialism is nonetheless remarkable. Pompeo’s statement is
consistent with his usual shameless whitewashing of Saudi responsibility for war
crimes and especially the crime of mass starvation. The reality is that the Saudi
coalition’s airstrikes are responsible for most of the civilian deaths that have
occurred in Yemen, and they bear the largest share of responsibility for creating
the humanitarian crisis that threatens the lives of 15 million people. As the
principal supporter of the Saudi coalition’s war effort, the U.S. shares in this
responsibility, and that is probably why Pompeo is so determined to cover it up.
The crown prince is the architect of the war, and attacking Yemen is his signature
policy. No one can honestly deny Mohammed bin Salman’s responsibility and that of the
Saudi government for their crimes in Yemen, but Pompeo is making a career out
of doing just that.
Even the Obama administration certified sales despite clear evidence of war
crimes. Only the plan stops the conflict and U.S. complicity.
Whitson 18 — Sarah Leah Witson, Executive Director of the Middle East and North Africa Division of Human Rights Watch,
Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School, 2018 (“Obama Officials’ Incomplete Reckoning
with Failure on Yemen,” Just Security, November 19th, Available Online at https://www.justsecurity.org/61522/obama-officials-
incomplete-reckoning-failure-yemen/, Accessed 07-07-2019)
On November 11, 30 senior Obama administration officials issued a statement calling on
the Trump administration to end all support for Saudi Arabia in the war in Yemen.
This was a positive and thoughtful effort, given America’s participation in a war that has had catastrophic outcomes for the
people of Yemen. But it was, ultimately, a failed reckoning for the Obama administration’s role in
risking American complicity in Saudi-led coalition abuses in the first place.
The statement by the former senior officials attempts to acknowledge that America’s participation in the war — providing
intelligence, refueling, and logistical assistance to the Saudi-led coalition — was now clearly a mistake, given the coalition’s failure to
limit its myriad violations and end the war. But they justify the Obama administration’s initial decision to support the war as based on
“a legitimate threat posed by missiles on the Saudi border and the Houthi overthrow of the Yemeni government, with support from
Iran.”
A more honest reckoning for how the US got to where it is in this war in Yemen would start with a
greater admission of the truth of the Obama administration’s motivations and
mistakes in participating in this war. In their letter, the Obama officials try to distinguish their administration’s support for the
war as “conditional,” vs. Trump’s “unconditional” support. Of course, this matters little to the Yemeni people because the outcome
has been the same: death and destruction, very often by US bombs.
The Obama administration’s stated justifications for joining the war effort obscure the truth of what led them to the war. Other Obama
administration officials had already stated that their support for the war, coupled with a $1 billion arms deal, was first and foremost
payback for Saudi’s grudging tolerance of the Iran nuclear deal, and to reassure them that the US remained a reliable ally, despite the
deal. The amount of Iranian support to the Houthis has been debated, of course, but with little evidence, all pretty murky; better known
is the fact that the Houthis are a fiercely independent group with a long history of waging war in Yemen.
As the war has evolved, Iran’s involvement with the Houthis has certainly grown, filling in the vacuum for the Houthis’ desperate
search for allies, effectively creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. What is clear is that the former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh
– long supported by the US – and various Yemeni defense forces controlled by his son and nephew supported the Houthis to such a
degree that international observers formally dubbed them the “Houthi-Saleh forces.” The Houthis had been at war with Saleh’s
government for decades over long-simmering grievances as a minority group in the country. They had supported the uprising against
Saleh and were active participants in the country’s “National Dialogue” to reshape the country’s governance. When Houthi armed
groups marched on the capital, it was to rebel against the newly drafted constitution and a proposed federal structure they believed
would weaken them. They negotiated an agreement with President Hadi to resolve their differences, but soon found themselves in
control of the capital when Saleh-backed defense forces stepped down from defending key government buildings, including the
parliament and the presidential palace.
The Obama administration, not learning enough from past foreign military experiences in Yemen, accepted baseless assurances from
the Saudis — including the then-deputy Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman and the inexperienced Saudi military — that they would
overthrow the Houthis in months. The US decidedly looked the other way from Saleh’s strong support for the Houthis, including vast
stores of weaponry from the Defense Ministry, an institution that remained loyal to Saleh. The war dragged on, with limited military
gains by the Saudi-led coalition, but a rising toll of unnecessary and unlawful death and destruction.
Well before President Trump’s appearance, we at Human Rights Watch and others had
documented well over 100 apparently indiscriminate or disproportionate aerial
attacks by the Saudi-led coalition on civilians and civilian infrastructure in Yemen, causing
devastation to Yemenis in their homes, markets, schools, hospitals, and even during their
weddings and their funerals. In case after case, we showed that US weapons were
being used in many of these attacks, including widely banned cluster munitions in
populated areas. False denials and cover-ups by Saudi military authorities were
clear signs that they were not trustworthy partners. We repeatedly provided this
evidence to Obama administration officials, but they would insist, despite the
obvious evidence to the contrary, that the support they were providing was
reining in the Saudis and helping improve their ability to comply with the laws of
war. This is not a case of hindsight knows best. The Obama administration should
have known back then.
Also well before Trump adviser — and son-in-law — Jared Kushner’s conspicuous friendship with Muhammad bin Salman, the
Saudi-led coalition’s arbitrary and excessive delays on imports to Yemen were exacerbating health and nutrition crises, as diseases
like cholera spread like wildfire. The Saudi-led coalition’s closure of a critical airport meant that many Yemenis couldn’t travel to get
the healthcare they needed. UN humanitarian agencies and global relief organizations pleaded in vain about the harm caused by the
coalition restrictions, to little avail.
the Obama administration was providing Saudi Arabia not only with
Meanwhile,
ongoing military support (which the formal officials mention) but also diplomatic cover (which the
former officials omit), especially at the UN. When the UN finally named Saudi Arabia on its “Global List of Shame,” of the worst
offenders against children, for its attacks on children in Yemen, the US stood silent as Saudi Arabia strong-armed the UN. Then-
Secretary General Ban Ki Moon resisted for a while, but finally caved in and removed Saudi Arabian from the list, admitting that
Riyadh had threatened to cut its funding to various UN agencies. Twice during the Obama administration, the US had the opportunity
to push for a UN inquiry into abuses by all sides in the Yemen conflict, and twice it did not—the Saudi-led coalition didn’t want one.
Despite repeated queries about whether the US supported the first proposed UN inquiry, Obama officials responded with silence or
words of deflection, which spelled the political demise of such an initiative.
The cost of the Obama administration’s support for Saudi Arabia’s war went beyond Yemen. The juxtaposition of the Obama
administration decrying Syrian/Russian attacks on civilians and Assad’s ongoing blockade of humanitarian goods, while the United
States was defending Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians and the impact of the blockade in Yemen, undermined the credibility of
the Obama team’s efforts to restrain the Syrian government. The Russians openly mocked then-UN Ambassador Samantha Power for
this hypocrisy. The US should have condemned and acted to curb both coalitions, equally and fairly.
Whatever conditionality the Obama administration thought it had created — in
holding up the transfer of precision munitions near the tail end of Obama’s term
and suspending cluster munition transfers earlier — ultimately did not have
meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians.
Nor were the steps robust enough to protect the US and US officials from risking
complicity in war crimes.
Despite the claimed “unconditional” support from the Trump Administration, its
officials, too, have reacted strongly to some excesses: condemning the total blockade, pushing Saudi
Arabia to permit cranes to get into Yemen, ending refueling of coalition planes. But, like the steps of the previous administration, it
is not anywhere close to enough. As Yemenis remember the pain and suffering the US has helped inflict on
their country, as they surely must, they will not look more kindly on the Obama administration’s
merely “conditional” support. And that is not to mention several dozens of Yemeni civilians killed in drone
strikes in the pursuit of Al Qaeda fighters.
The responsibility for these failed policies does not fall equally on all senior Obama officials, and some individuals made every effort
to steer the ship in a far better direction. But that’s not the point here. The point is an honest, full appreciation of the reasons for these
policies and their consequences. The statement by former senior officials fails in that task.
The tragic fact is that the US can play a less destructive role in Yemen—building on what
we’ve seen these last few weeks. The US could end arms sales to Saudi Arabia, push for the UN to
call out Riyadh for its role in Yemen’s nightmare, and investigate the US role in war crime after war crime so that the US, too, can
ensure it does not keep making the same deadly mistakes.
The bipartisan Senate bill introduced on November 15 calling for sanctions and restrictions on Saudi Arabia for the harm it has caused
in this war is the strongest effort to date for taking serious action.
The question is: Will they? Will US officials be able to look back in a few years and write a letter saying they did all they could to
stop famine, to prevent more atrocities, to ensure countless Yemenis don’t go without justice or redress? Or will those officials, too,
only be able to see there was so much more that could have been done when it is far too late and many more have died?

Pompeo will lawyer the certification. We’ve highlighted a few representative

examples, but there are many more.
Goodman 18 — Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law at New York University School of Law,
Professor of Politics and Professor of Sociology at New York University, Founding Co-Editor-in-Chief of Just Security, Member of
the Council on Foreign Relations, Member of the Advisory Committee on International Law at the U.S. Department of State, former
Special Counsel to the General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense, former Rita E. Hauser Professor of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law at Harvard Law School, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Yale University and a J.D. from Yale Law School,
(“Annotation of Sec. Pompeo’s Certification of Yemen War: Civilian Casualties and Saudi-Led Coalition,” Just Security, October 15th,
Available Online at https://www.justsecurity.org/61053/annotation-sec-pompeos-certification-yemen-war-civilian-casualties-
resulting-saudi-led-coalitions-operations/, Accessed 07-07-2019)
[***Note: Goodman responds (below) to specific paragraphs of Pompeo’s certification letter. When he does, the excerpt from
the certification letter is indented and Goodman’s responses — prefaced by a [#] — are not. This is the opposite of how the
indentations were made in the article, but it is more readable as a debate card. “[Pompeo:]” has also been added to the
beginning of each excerpt in case this note is not clear or is removed downstream.]
Pompeo certified that the Saudi-led Coalition fighting a war in Yemen is
Last month, Secretary of State Mike
taking sufficient steps to reduce civilian casualties in its military operations. The Secretary’s
decision whether to issue a certification is required by a recent statute: section 1290 of
the McCain National Defense Authorization Act. Under that provision, a failure to
certify (or issue a waiver in its stead) would have automatically triggered suspension of
congressional appropriations for the refueling of Coalition aircraft conducting missions in Yemen.
On Wednesday, a bipartisan group of Senators sent a brief letter to Secretary Pompeo challenging
his certification and calling on him to return to Congress with more specific
information by the end of this month. “We find it difficult to reconcile known facts with at least two of your certifications,” the
Senators wrote, referring to the Secretary’s claim that the Coalition has taken demonstrable actions to reduce civilian casualties.
I provide my annotation of the Secretary
I share the general concerns raised in the Senators’ letter. Below
of State’s unclassified Memorandum of Justification. I assess the memorandum in detail and spell out
specific concerns as well as some areas of praise.
The relevant part of the congressional statute contains the following language:
the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a certification indicating whether the
Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United Arab Emirates are undertaking:
demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations of
the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen, including by—
(i) complying with applicable agreements and laws regulating defense articles purchased or transferred from the United
States [under the Arms Export Control Act]; and
(ii) taking appropriate steps to avoid disproportionate harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure
Let’s now turn to the section of the Secretary’s memorandum that addresses these issues of civilian casualties.
MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION REGARDING CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 1290 OF THE JOHN S.
MCCAIN NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 (P.L. 115-232)
…
Reducing the Risk of Harm to Civilians and Civilian Infrastructure
[Pompeo:] The Administration assess[sic] that the KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] and UAE [United Arab Emirates] are
undertaking[1] demonstrable actions to reduce[2] the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from
military operations of the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the UAE, including by complying with the
applicable agreements and laws regulating defense articles purchased or transferred from the United States, and that they
are taking appropriate steps[3] to avoid disproportionate harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure.
[1] “Are undertaking” might be positive in the sense that the KSA and UAE are still pursuing these efforts and have not abandoned
them. It might also be somewhat positive if this statement refers to actions of recent vintage that may yet yield a reduction in civilian
harm. On the other hand, “are undertaking” might also mean that some actions are still in the stages of being pursued and have not
been implemented despite three and a half years of war and U.S. and U.K. efforts to have the Coalition fully adopt particular reforms.
How the phrase “demonstrable actions to reduce” functions in the memorandum is key
[2]
to understanding the State Department’s posture and position. The memorandum
relies throughout on purported positive activity that relate almost entirely to
actions on paper or in process, but not the actual execution of military strikes. The
memorandum, in fact, admits that Coalition airstrikes continue to produce civilian casualties at far too high a rate. A fundamental
problem with this line of justification is that, if anything, it means that the “demonstrable actions” have actually proven ineffective to
date.This unusual product from the State Department may be due to Secretary Pompeo’s issuing
the certification over the objections of his legal advisers and most of the State
Department’s military and area specialists (see the Wall Street Journal reporting for that background).
At best, the Secretary of State is asking Congress to accept a certification that claims the
KSA and UAE have adopted process-inputs (formally accepting a no-strike list, changing rules of
engagement, and committing to training programs in humanitarian law) while the Coalition nevertheless
reportedly frequently kills civilians and targets civilian infrastructure such as a shrine, a
funeral home, a school bus, a wedding party, a bridge vital to humanitarian relief, a refugee boat, and medical clinics and hospitals.
As a matter of international law, targeting operations that either purposefully or
recklessly kill civilians can amount to war crimes. Recklessness includes situations in which a party to
a conflict employs a targeting system that is known over time cannot effectively distinguish between legitimate military objects from
civilians and civilian objects. Targeting operations that harm civilians and civilian infrastructure as a result of negligence also violate
the laws of war but do not incur criminal liability.
“Taking appropriate steps” and “demonstrable actions to reduce” civilian
[3]
casualties is an accurate description of the standard set by Congress, and the
Secretary of State is charged with making the certification according to that standard. It
is important, however, to contrast this with the extraordinary language that the Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and National Security
Adviser John Bolton each used in statements endorsing the certification: they both asserted an empirically unfounded claim that the
Saudis and UAE are “making every effort” to reduce civilian casualties. That claim is even contradicted by the Secretary of State’s
memorandum (see [7], [21] and [22]).
[Pompeo:] The Administration recognizes that civilian casualties have occurred at rates[4] that are far too high[5] in the
Saudi-led Coalition’s campaign in Yemen.
[4] It would be important to know what the Department means by “rates.” It could mean the administration has some data on the
number of civilian casualties per strike, or it could simply mean the number of civilian casualties per a given time period.
[5] In one sense, this reference to rates of civilian casualties being “far too high” is a significant and welcome development. We have
not seen such clear-eyed, U.S. government statements about the Coalition’s record recently. The critical nature of the statement is
similar to some of the strong statements made by the Obama administration prior to the suspension of arm sales to Saudi Arabia in
2016.
That said, “far too high” lacks precision, and more importantly it may obscure the well reported fact that the rate of civilian casualties
has increased over time. In March 2018, for example, the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights reported, “The number
of civilian casualties dramatically increased during the past six months.” To compound the problem, since March 2018, Coalition
strikes have resulted in some of the worst incidents involving the largest numbers of civilians, and “Coalition air strikes have caused
most of the documented civilian casualties” in the war, a U.N. report by the Group of Eminent Experts concluded in August 2018. The
rise in civilian casualties has occurred despite the purported efforts by the Coalition to avoid harm to civilians and civilian
infrastructure.
Finally, the memorandum should not simply address the number or rates of civilian casualties. It should also address whether there
was any justification for civilian casualties in many instances. In any war, strikes on legitimate military targets will often involve
civilian casualties. The Coalition, however, appears to have directly struck objects such as a shrine, a funeral home, and others on no-
strike lists. In 2015, the Coalition apparently declared entire cities military targets. The U.N. Panel of Experts studied ten strikes
between January and December 2017 and concluded that “independent investigations could not find any evidence of the presence of
high value targets that would justify the collateral damage at these target sites.” These findings are consistent with investigations by a
leading local human rights organization Mwatana Organization for Human Rights.
[Pompeo:] We believe civilian casualties must be mitigated and reduced as much as possible for both strategic and
moral[6] reasons. As a result, we are engaging the Saudi-led Coalition to urge them to strengthen measures that reduce the
risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure.
[6] This sentence does not include “legal” reasons. It is likely that including the term “legal” would be understood to mean (or an
admission) that the current level of civilian casualties is not lawfully permitted.
[Pompeo:] The Department of State and the Department of Defense (DoD) will continue to press Saudi Arabia and the
UAE on this issue at the highest levels. The Administration assesses that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are undertaking
some[7] actions to reduce[8] the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from Saudi-led Coalition
military operations.
[7] “Some” is a major qualification . It is also a measured assessment that is conspicuously different than Defense
Secretary Mattis’ and National Security Adviser Bolton’s hyperbolic claims. With respect to 2017, even this qualified assertion is
contradicted by the U.N. Panel of Experts, a body mandated by the Security Council, which reported, “The air strikes carried out by
the Saudi Arabia-led coalition and the indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance by Houthi-Saleh forces throughout much of 2017
continued to affect civilians and the civilian infrastructure disproportionally. The Panel has seen no evidence to suggest that
appropriate measures were taken by any side to mitigate the devastating impact of these attacks on the civilian population.”
“Actions to reduce” is where almost all the analytic work is being performed in
[8]
the memorandum. See earlier discussion of the memorandum’s phrase “are undertaking demonstrable actions to reduce” in note
[2].
[Pompeo:] The Saudi-led Coalition incorporated a no-strike list (NSL) into its target development procedures[9] and
changed its rules of engagement to incorporate some[10] U.S. recommendations.
[9] Take note that this very basic precaution (incorporating a no-strike list into targeting
procedures) is included as a remarkable accomplishment for the Coalition. Most
importantly here, the memorandum does not discuss whether the Coalition sufficiently
abides by the no-strike list when carrying out military strikes. It is misleading, at
best, to omit such information. “Two senior American officials said that in many Saudi strikes supporting troops under
fire and targeting so-called pop-up targets, or militants on the move, Saudi military planners were not regularly consulting the no-
strike list, which includes sites like mosques and marketplaces,” according to the New York Times. One case study is the Coalition’s
repeated bombing of the main bridge into Yemen’s capital–a civilian structure that the United States reportedly placed on the no-strike
list because it was a vital route for humanitarian supplies including “90% of World Food Program food coming from Hodeidah to the
capital,” according to Oxfam. “Of course we condemn the attack,” a spokeswoman for the State Department said at the time.
[10] “Some” is a significant qualification . The United States would not lightly suggest changes to target
procedures and rules of engagement. So a failure to incorporate U.S. recommendations raises a bright red flag.
[Pompeo:] The Saudi Ministry of Defense committed[11] to fund U.S.-provided training for the Royal Saudi Air Force
(RSAF) on minimizing civilian casualties as one component of a $750 million, multi-year[12] Foreign Military Sales
training case.
[11] Many (myself included) have wondered what happened with this “commitment,” which was made well over a year ago. It is
astonishing that the State Department does not (cannot?) provide information whether the program has undergone significant
implementation or yielded effects. What’s more, the $750 million was attached to the purported $110 billion arms sale in 2017.
Experts have written that the $110 billion deal is largely a chimera because it lacks actual contracts. The degree to which the $110
billion deal is unsubstantial and has not materialized raises additional questions about the materialization of the $750 million
“commitment” attached to that deal.
[12] The total of $750 million is sizeable. It would be important to know over how many years that total is meant to be spread.
[Pompeo:] This training seeks to improve[13] RSAF targeting capabilities and reduce the risk of civilian casualties. As
of[14] May 2017[15], the U.S. government delivered a course for the RSAF that included training on the law of armed
conflict (LOAC) and air-to-ground targeting processes.
[13] The memorandum’s claim is only that the training “seeks to improve.” Conspicuously absent is any claim that training has
resulted in meaningful improvements. Indeed, during the relevant time period, the harms to civilians and civilian infrastructure have
gotten worse.
[14] “As of” may mean long before.
[15] May 2017 precedes the date that KSA committed to a $750 million training program. So it is no evidence of that program’s
implementation, and it is conspicuous that the memorandum does not refer to training in more recent times.
[Pompeo:] In 2016, the Coalition established the Joint Incident Assessment Team (JIAT) to investigate strikes that result in
collateral damage.[16]
[16] The memorandum refers to the standing up of the JIAT as though it is an unvarnished accomplishment. Note, however, that the
memorandum does not explicitly assess the effectiveness of the JIAT even though this official body now has a long record to evaluate.
In truth, the JIAT is highly controversial and to many close observers it has been used more to cover up incidents of civilian casualties
rather than genuinely investigate and address them. (See note [23] for critical analyses of the JIAT.)
[Pompeo:] The United States has called on Saudi Arabia and the UAE to conduct thorough, transparent, and expedient
investigations in cases where airstrikes have caused harm to civilians and civilian objects, and to make the results of those
investigations public. These cases including coalition operations that reportedly resulted in civilian casualties on August 9,
2018, in Sa’ada, and on August 23, 2018, in al-Durayhimi, and the targeting[17] of civilian infrastructure such as water and
sanitation facilities which could exacerbate cholera outbreaks in Yemen.[18]
[17] The use of the term “targeting” is potentially enormously significant. It may mean that the U.S. government assesses that the
Coalition purposefully struck certain civilian infrastructure such as water and sanitation facilities, which could amount to war crimes
even under the most stringent standards for a criminal state of mind.
[18] This is an important statement because any aspect of Coalition operations that exacerbate health issues in the county, most
especially the spread of cholera, must be taken very seriously. The statement here should also be read in conjunction with another
concern raised in a separate section of the memorandum, namely, that the Coalition’s closure of commercial flights into and out of the
capital city’s airport has “cut off access for Yemeni civilians to outside medical treatment,” according to the State Department. (Other
authorities are even more critical of the Coalition’s cutoff of access to medical treatment.)
[Pompeo:] The Saudi-led Coalition announced on September 1, 2018, that it would undertake such an investigation and
hold those responsible to account. It is important to note that cholera is endemic in some parts of Yemen, even in the
absence of armed conflict, and that Houthi entrenchments in Hudaydah have damaged water lines there. That resultant
damage is a more direct cause of the spread of cholera in that area. As part of its engagement with UN leadership to refine
and implement its humanitarian plan for Hudaydah, the UAE has allowed the UN to embed a civil-military advisor in Abu
Dhabi and has been receiving the NSL from Evacuation and Humanitarian Operations Cell (EHOC) officials in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia. We continue to press the need for additional actions[19] to reduce civilian casualty incidents.
[19] Continuing to press the need for additional actions is another way of acknowledging that current Coalition actions to reduce
civilian casualties are inadequate. It also suggests that the KSA/UAE still do not understand the need for such actions.
[Pompeo:] Recent[20] civilian casualty incidents indicate insufficient[21] implementation of reforms and targeting
practices. Investigations have not yet yielded accountability measures.[22] Additional information can be found in the
classified annex.
[20] “Recent” does not exclude that prior incidents failed in this regard as well. And it would be better if the memorandum had also
explained the long pattern of such deficiencies. That said, the reference to recent incidents is quite damning. It means that the most up-
to-date evidence is that the Coalition has still not sufficiently observed implementation of reforms or effectiveness in changing
targeting practices or reducing civilian casualties. Yet the Secretary of State issued a certification nonetheless. This part of the
memorandum may be a result of a Secretary of State’s having to accept some of the findings of the branches of the State Department
and its experts who know these facts, yet still exercising the decision to certify over their objections.
[21] “Insufficient” is an ambiguous term. In this case, it hides the fact of how
grossly inadequate implementation has been. Larry Lewis, a former State Department
official–who stepped down in May 2017 and was the lead person in the department’s efforts to
try to get the Coalition to comply with civilian casualty reductions–wrote a critique
of the memorandum that is most relevant to this issue of reform implementation and expected results. Lewis writes,
for example, that “general training in [the law of armed conflict] and targeting is also
unlikely to have significant benefits to the Coalition’s ability to reduce civilian
harm. Such training has been provided since 2015, so this course is simply not new.” Also, a
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Andrew Exum revealed that Pentagon
officials had long told colleagues outside the Defense Department that it was essentially
hopeless to expect the KSA to substantially improve its targeting practices with
regard to civilian casualties amidst the ongoing war. In the eyes of the sponsors of this Congressional
legislation, such an assessment would likely provide an additional reason to back away from support for the Coalition knowing that
there are deep structural reasons that prevent the KSA from improving its egregious targeting practices on any reasonable timetable.
[22] This a stunning admission and statement by the State Department, and should be lauded for its candor and transparency. This
sharp criticism should be understood as a indictment of the Joint Incident Assessment Team (JIAT), mentioned earlier in the
memorandum. That official body, which was created upon advice from the State Department, is supposed to examine suspected
civilian casualty incidents and identify improvement for future operations. The JIAT has been roundly criticized by close observers
including most recently in a mission report by the UN special expert on Human Rights While Countering Terrorism (June 2018), a 90-
page report by Human Rights Watch (August 24, 2018), and a report by the U.N. Group of Eminent Experts (August 17, 2018).
What the memorandum does not do, however, is inform Congress of the times that the
Coalition has not simply failed to adopt accountability measures, but instead has
purposefully and repeatedly tried to cover up incidents of wrongdoing–including several
involving the JIAT itself in obfuscating responsibility for civilian casualty incidents. Consider three examples out of many from which
to choose:
1. In June 2018, the Coalition bombed a cholera treatment facility run by Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).
The Saudi embassy emailed members of the US Congress falsely claiming that the international medical group had failed to tell
Riyadh about their own facility’s location. (MSF had notified the Coalition 12 times of the cholera hospital’s location.)
2. The Coalition engaged in a several months-long, consistent pattern of denying ever using cluster bombs during the war (e.g., “We
do not use cluster bombs in Yemen, period.”). The Coalition later admitted it had used cluster bombs when finally confronted by the
British government relying on documentation by Amnesty International.
3. In October 2016, the Coalition deliberately targeted a funeral home, killing more than 140 and wounding at least 525 including the
mayor of the capital city and several other local leaders who, like him, had been playing a significant role in trying to bring the
conflict to a peaceful resolution. The Coalition spokesperson Brigadier General Ahmed al-Asiri told reporters that the Coalition had
not carried out any strikes near the funeral hall. The Coalition later admitted it had conducted the attack following undeniable public
reporting.
[Pompeo:] The Administration also assesses that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are complying with applicable U.S. laws
governing the sale and transfer of arms, including[23] the Arms Export Control Act, with rare exception[24]. Defense
article sales to both countries are subject to U.S. end-use monitoring requirements, allowing the Administration to verify
that items have not been modified, tampered with, or transferred to a third party without prior authorization. The
Department of State adjudicates all potential arms transfers through a review process on a case-by-case basis and through a
consultative process with Congress, as required by law. US. support to the Coalition allows it to pursue its mission of
assisting the legitimate government of Yemen.
[23] The word “including” is potentially significant for close observers of this area of law. (For experts: one question is whether it
should include Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act as applied to direct commercial sales under the Arms Export Control Act
(see note 63 of this expert opinion paper).)
Obvious questions include: what is meant by “rare”? Over what period of time?
[24]
How significant are each of these instances of noncompliance even if rare? Some of the
worst airstrikes are presumably conducted by Coalition aircraft that have been refueled by the U.S. military. The most relevant
question for the Arms Export Control Act, however, is whether U.S. munitions were used in such strikes. A Defense Department
manual explains that U.S. officials must be vigilant in monitoring and reporting “any indication that U.S.-origin defense articles are
being used against anything other than a legitimate military target.” An American Bar Association expert paper prepared for Congress
in 2017 by Lt. Colonel (ret.) Professor Michael Newton explains, “As indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians in
violation of international humanitarian law serve no lawful self-defense purpose, the use of U.S.-origin equipment in such attacks is a
violation of Saudi Arabia’s end-use agreements. Saudi Arabia is therefore ineligible for a resumption in sales until the violations
cease.”
In December 2016, Human Rights Watch reported that it “found remnants of US-supplied
weapons at the site of 23 apparently unlawful coalition airstrikes, including more than a dozen
attacks involving US-made cluster munitions.” That number is likely an underestimate. It includes only
incidents in which the organization itself investigated an attack, found a likely violation of the laws of war, and identified the available
remnants as U.S. origin. Since December 2016, several of the most egregious Coalition strikes have reportedly involved U.S.
munitions, including:
1. On September 2, 2017, a Coalition airstrike on a family residential compound in a remote location killed three and injured sixteen,
including fourteen women and children. The U.N. Panel of Experts “found no explanation in the public domain as to why this
residential area, which is prima facie a civilian object immune from direct attack, was considered by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition to
be a legitimate military objective.” The UN investigators found a tail fin from a U.S.-made Paveway guided bomb at the site.
2. On April 22, 2018, the Coalition reportedly struck a wedding party in an isolated village, killing at least 22 people, including 8
children, and injuring over 50 others, including as many as 30 children. Debris from the bomb used in that strike indicated that it was a
GBU-12 Paveway II precision-guided bomb manufactured by Raytheon.
3. On August 9, 2018, the Coalition reportedly struck a school bus, killing at least 40 children and wounding at least 56 children. The
munition used was reportedly a 500-pound laser-guided MK 82 bomb made by Lockheed Martin.
 Extend: “Genocide Complicity DA”
The counterplan replicates Obama’s failed yellow light policy that maintains
U.S. complicity without changing Saudi behavior.
Byman 18 — Daniel Byman, Professor and Senior Associate Dean at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,
Senior Fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, former Director of the Center for Security Studies and
Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, former Research Director of the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the
RAND Corporation, former Professional Staff Member on the 9/11 Commission and the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff of the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018 (“The U.S.
'Yellow Light' in Yemen,” Lawfare, August 3rd, Available Online at https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-yellow-light-yemen, Accessed
07-07-2019)
The United States continues to tacitly support Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates’s
military campaign in Yemen even as the country implodes, Iran’s influence grows and U.S. allies sink into the quagmire.
The U.S. government calculated that supporting its allies in favor of preventing Iranian encroachment offers more value than the
fallout from the humanitarian crisis. Yet the newest operation over the port of Hodeidah offers the United States an opportunity to
push for peace negotiations.
When the Saudi and Emirati intervention began in 2015, the Obama administration
neither wholeheartedly supported nor strongly opposed it, eventually settling into
a lukewarm embrace. The United States was engaged then in its own mini-war in Yemen, where it had been hunting
terrorists since 9/11. In 2002, the United States killed al-Qaeda terrorist Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a Yemeni national, in the first drone
strike outside a designated war zone. U.S. efforts continued fitfully in the years that followed. However, the Obama administration
stepped up operations when al-Qaeda’s branch in Yemen, known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, tried, and almost succeeded in,
bombing an airplane over Detroit in 2009. In 2011, the United States launched the first (and only) drone strike that deliberately
targeted a U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, who operated out of Yemen. Today, U.S. special operations forces work with the UAE to
target al-Qaeda and Islamic State fighters in Yemen. The U.S. also conducts drone attacks, and special operations forces are beginning
to help Saudi Arabia locate Houthi missile bases and stockpiles.
Under President Barack Obama, the United States followed an often-confusing policy in Yemen,
attempting to balance humanitarian concerns, a sense that the intervention would
fail, and a desire to please Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Those allies see Yemen as a key regional issue
and worry about Iranian influence; by tolerating their intervention, the United States does them a favor in a country with historically
low U.S. interests. Indeed, U.S. support proved vital for the military intervention to continue. Quietly, the United States—along with
The International Crisis Group
France and the United Kingdom—provides intelligence, air refueling and other logistical support.
describes U.S. policy in Yemen as a “yellow light,” an indication of U.S. ambivalence,
that allies blithely ignored, recognizing that U.S. backing would still be
forthcoming.
At the end of his administration, Obama gave the Saudis a symbolic wrist slap,
temporarily halting the sale of "smart" bombs to the kingdom because of the war and the
repeated Saudi military mistakes that led to the deaths of many Yemeni civilians. In
the end, supporting and simultaneously opposing the war proved the worst of
both worlds, frustrating allies yet doing nothing to stop the intervention or
improve the humanitarian situation in Yemen.
For the current administration, the Saudi relationship is particularly important, and President Trump quickly lifted the Obama ban on
sales of "smart" bombs. Although he cares little about Yemen, Trump responded positively to Saudi and UAE efforts to court him and
embraced their view of Yemen. He noted, correctly, that the Saudi-U.S. relationship was “very strained” under Obama, and Saudi
leaders seem to be among the few foreigners that Trump likes. However, the Trump administration’s first foray into Yemen was a
botched raid by special operations forces seeking terrorists in a Yemeni village that led to the death of a U.S. Navy SEAL and,
according to villagers, the deaths of about 25 civilians, including nine children—hardly an auspicious beginning. In the end, the
Trump administration has not veered too far from the Obama posture, most recently rebuffing a request to join the UAE-led offensive
on the strategic port of Hodeidah.
The Hodeidah operation is likely to push Yemen’s humanitarian situation from nightmarish to something worse, both because of the
fighting and the slow (or nonexistent) pace of post-conflict reconstruction. Millions of Yemenis teeter on the edge of survival, and
even temporary disruptions in food supplies would push them over. The Houthis, who are known for torturing political opponents and
are often indifferent to the widespread misery of ordinary citizens, have an incentive to play up the suffering to pressure their enemies.
The UAE promised to address the humanitarian crisis that its military operation exacerbates, and that would be progress. International
actors should press the UAE and Saudi Arabia to make good on that offer.
The United States should abandon the “yellow light” policy in Yemen in favor of a “red
light” policy. The tally between costs and benefits of supporting the Saudi and
Emirati intervention falls decidedly in the costs category. The allies’ approach is
self-defeating. Iran is stronger in Yemen than it was before the intervention began in 2015. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula has at times capitalized on the chaos to expand, and the group remains robust despite Emirati and U.S. efforts. The UAE and
Saudi Arabia have spent tens of billions of dollars on the war; yet now many Yemenis hate them for the war’s destruction. Even with a
victory in Hodeidah, the war will drag on.
The “yellow light” policy does not avoid U.S. complicity in the humanitarian disaster in Yemen.
Although the Trump administration does not care about humanitarian crises, especially those in the Middle East, U.S.
logistical and intelligence support for the Saudi and Emirati intervention ties the
U.S. reputation to their actions. Even though U.S. leaders claim that this country is
not at war in Yemen, and though few Americans know of the U.S. involvement, U.S. support enabled the
intervention. As Republican Sen. Mike Lee of Utah noted, “It stretches the imagination, and it stretches the English language
beyond its breaking point, to suggest the U.S. military is not engaged in hostility in Yemen.”
the “yellow light” policy—coupled with the Trump administration’s strong
Further,
embrace—empowers Saudi Arabia and the UAE to take self-defeating steps. This ranges
from Trump's strong rhetorical support in general, to extensive back channels with these leaders, to taking their side in their dispute
the Saudis and Emiratis
with Qatar, to Trump's withdrawal of the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal. Together,
perceive these gestures as indications that Trump does not care about Yemen
and will follow their lead in the region.
 Extend: “Conditions Won’t Be Met”
Saudi Arabia will refuse to accept external conditions on arms sales.
Singh 19 — Michael Singh, Lane-Swig Senior Fellow and Managing Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
former Senior Director for Middle East Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, former Special Assistant to U.S. Secretaries of
State Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell, holds an M.B.A. from Harvard University, 2019 (“U.S. Policy in the Arabian Peninsula: An
Evaluation,” Prepared Testimony Submitted to the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 6th, Available Online at
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20190206/108861/HHRG-116-FA00-Wstate-SinghM-20190206.pdf , Accessed 07-06-
2019, p. 6)
It is important, in my view, that the U.S. exercise care when imposing conditions on
military aid or military sales, such as are now being debated with respect to Saudi
Arabia. We should avoid, in my view, tying military assistance to unrelated issues,
however compelling. The track record of this sort of conditionality is poor, likely
because military assistance offers insufficient leverage to address deeper
political and social problems in a partner state, and because our partners bristle at
any perception that the U.S. is using assistance to impose our views on other
matters. Tying multiple issues together means that progress on all will move at
the pace of the most difficult among them; it is better to address our concerns
separately and accept that progress will be fast in some areas and slow in others .
It is entirely appropriate, however, to tie assistance and sales to the conduct of partner
militaries and the manner in which they wage war, as well as on stringent end-use
verification. In addition, both Congress and the administration should bear in mind the systemic risks of steadily increasing
arms sales to the region.15 Arms sales and other military assistance can fuel
interventionism, distort civil-military relations in recipient states, and result in
proliferation in cases of instability or poor custody. Policymakers also need to continue to bear in
mind the need to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge—despite warming relations between Israel and our Arab allies—as well as
the possibility of conflict between U.S. allies more generally.
—— Footnotes ——
15. See for example Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Cato
Institute Policy Analysis No. 836, https://www.cato.org/publications/pol-icy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy

Saudi Arabia won’t agree to the deal — empirically proven.

Rand 18 — Dafna H. Rand, Vice President for Policy and Research at Mercy Corps—a global humanitarian aid NGO, former
Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the U.S. State Department, former Member of
the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. State Department, former Member of the U.S. National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. in
Political Science from Columbia University, 2018 (“Extricating the United States from Yemen: Lessons on the Strategic Perils of
Partnered Operations,” Lawfare, November 25th, Available Online at https://www.lawfareblog.com/extricating-united-states-yemen-
lessons-strategic-perils-partnered-operations, Accessed 07-06-2019)
The longstanding U.S. security assistance partnership with the Gulf states rests on
the U.S. foreign military sales program (FMS). Over the past several decades, the State Department
has processed billions of dollars in FMS requests for the Saudi military and the
UAE and then sent them along for congressional approval. The sum total of these cumulative sales
represent the capabilities sustaining the coalition’s current war effort in Yemen.
Remarkably, the Menendez/Young bill recognizes this fact. In one of the first legislative acknowledgments of the lock-in effects of
previous security-sector assistance, this bill includes a provision that would suspend previously processed sales that are now enabling
Earlier support and training offered by
the Yemen campaign. These senators seem to realize the quandary:
the United States can now be deployed, without oversight, for any purpose,
including confronting a threat that does not align with U.S. strategic interests.
 Yemen experience exposes how offering security assistance in the name of
Finally, the
building partner capacity can, paradoxically, erode U.S. influence with partners
over time.
The arrangement of limited support for the coalition reached in 2015 was awkward
from the beginning. For the first time since the first Gulf War, the United States agreed
to support a coalition waging a war in the Middle East, rather than formally
joining or leading it. This arrangement meant a priori that the United States would not be
driving the big picture decisions. Moreover, U.S. support for the coalition did not earn
it enough leverage to sway the coalition’s choice of targets or other operational
decisions that would have protected the people of Yemen. Since 2016, the United
States has not been able to dissuade its Emirati partners from steadily advancing its
troops up the Red Sea coastal region, toward Hodeidah governorate, with significant
humanitarian consequences. This past summer and fall, the United Nations and international community warned the
UAE and others in the coalition against launching an offensive in Hodeidah in particular, given its population density and the presence
of a port through which 70 percent of all humanitarian aid transits into Yemen.
Even as the ethical and reputational costs of every errant coalition airstrike have
grown since 2015, the United States has failed to persuade the Saudis to improve their
abilities to hit dynamic targets—with high profile, deadly results for the people of Yemen,
including attacks on weddings, funerals, and school buses full of children. In 2017,
just as the Pentagon began formally investing in tactical training efforts to improve non-dynamic targeting, U.S. strategic
leverage seemed to decline, particularly when the Trump administration changed the
signaling coming from Washington. What had been the tentative yellow light offered by the Obama
administration turned into a green light to the coalition war efforts. By the end of 2017,
the United States and United Kingdom could not prevent the Saudis from blockading
Yemen’s Red Sea ports, choking off key humanitarian access points and
deepening the humanitarian crisis.
In sum, the limited approach chosen by the United States afforded almost no leverage to
shape its allies’ doctrine, strategy, or operations. Meanwhile, the Yemen war has exposed that decades of
military hardware sales and training clearly left out key principles on how to fight wars, including how to abide by international
humanitarian law. For instance, it is regrettable that despite the decades-long project to build the Gulf states’ capacity, the U.S.
military’s own hard-won counterinsurgency lessons, learned in Iraq and Afghanistan during this same time period, were never
transmitted to these close U.S. allies.
 Extend: “No Civilian Casualties Net-Benefit”
The plan is a better way to reduce civilian casualties — the net-benefit
doesn’t turn case.
1AC Goodman 18 — Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law at New York University School of
Law, Professor of Politics and Professor of Sociology at New York University, Founding Co-Editor-in-Chief of Just Security,
Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Member of the Advisory Committee on International Law at the U.S. Department of
State, former Special Counsel to the General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense, former Rita E. Hauser Professor of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law at Harvard Law School, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Yale University and a J.D. from Yale Law
School, 2018 (“Options for Congress to Respond to Saudi Transgressions: Here’s What Works according to Former Senior U.S.
Officials,” Just Security, October 22nd, Available Online at https://www.justsecurity.org/61172/effective-ineffective-congressional-
responses-saudi-arabia-arm-sales-sanctions-khashoggi/, Accessed 06-08-2019)
Another former senior official supported a clean break from U.S. support for the Yemen war rather than a piecemeal approach. “On
A clean end to US military
Yemen, the best move would be to support the Khanna-Murphy War Powers resolution.
support for the Saudi-UAE war in Yemen is better than more targeted efforts to
police that support (like the bar on in-flight refueling). Suspending existing DCS
licenses and placing limits on future foreign military sales for things like air-to-
ground strike capabilities would be a natural supplement to this approach,” the former
official said.
Jeffrey Prescott, who served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf States on the
National Security Council and now a strategic consultant to the Penn Biden Center expressed a similar perspective, “My view is that
the callous murder of Mr. Khashoggi — and the Trump administration’s clear impulse to sweep it under the rug — demonstrates how
far the relationship with Saudi Arabia has gotten off track, and the need for serious consequences. As a start, we could use this
moment to extricate ourselves from military involvement in the disastrous war in Yemen, a step that is long overdue. Ideally we would
simultaneously help push for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict – necessary, not easy, and very unlikely given how little effort the
washing our hands of involvement in the war,
Trump administration has put into serious diplomacy. But
even in the absence of a US diplomatic push, will still put pressure on UAE and
Saudi to end the conflict.”

The Saudis won’t take the counterplan seriously — they ignore U.S. pressure
to reduce civilian casualties.
Igoe 19 — Michael Igoe, Senior Reporter at Devex, 2019 (“USAID tried — and failed — to convince Saudi Arabia not to strike
civilian targets in Yemen,” Devex, March 7th, Available Online at https://www.devex.com/news/usaid-tried-and-failed-to-convince-
saudi-arabia-not-to-strike-civilian-targets-in-yemen-94430, Accessed 07-07-2019)
At the start of the conflict in Yemen, which has now devolved into the world’s worst humanitarian crisis,
U.S. officials worked behind closed doors to convince Saudi Arabia’s leaders not
to target humanitarian and civilian sites for airstrikes.
Those efforts largely failed due to a lack of high-level political will within the
Saudi government, according to two former U.S. officials who testified on Capitol Hill
Wednesday.
the State Department, thought that the best approach was to
“In the beginning of the war, we, at
work with our partners, work with our allies behind closed doors, to build on the strong partnership that the
U.S. had with Saudi Arabia,” said Dafna Rand, vice president for policy and research at Mercy Corps and a former
deputy secretary at the Department of State.
In 2015, after a number of mass casualties from Saudi airstrikes against civilian
targets, U.S. officials — who assumed these were the result of mistakes induced
by the “fog of war” — sent a trainer to Riyadh to advise the Saudi government on
how to limit civilian casualties, Rand said. This person had done the same kind of work
on behalf of U.S. Central Command in Afghanistan.
“We approached this very technically, behind closed doors, very quietly sent our
trainer in, and he was well-received by the Saudi ministry of defense, and we kept
on trying this, and we were hopeful in the beginning, and we kept on sending him,” Rand said.
A ceasefire between the Houthi rebels and the Saudi-led coalition in 2016 offered U.S. officials some
reason for optimism that their approach was working. Then, when the ceasefire broke down in August
and a series of mass casualty events produced a new level of civilian bloodshed, it
became clear that the message was not getting through .
The U.S. officials concluded that while many members of Saudi Arabia’s military
wanted to learn from America’s experience with limiting casualties, leaders at the
highest levels of government had much less political will to limit civilian targets
and prevent civilian deaths.
“It was very clear that precision was not the issue, and that guiding was not the issue. It was
the type of target selection that became the clear issue, and even when … the U.S.
government told them which targets not to hit, we saw instances where the
coalition was targeting the wrong thing,” Rand said.
The U.S. Agency for International Development was also involved in the process — particularly in terms of identifying areas and sites
that the Saudis should not target with their airstrikes.
USAID put together a list of humanitarian sites such as NGO offices and
warehouses — “things that, if you looked at them from the air, you might not be
aware it’s a humanitarian facility. Whereas we assume you would know what a school looks like, what a hospital
looks like, and so on, and not hit those things,” said Jeremy Konyndyk, a senior policy fellow at the Center for Global
Development who directed USAID’s office of foreign disaster assistance during the Obama
administration.
the Saudis tended to treat anything not on the no-strike list as fair
“What we found was that
game. So then we expanded the list, and we began naming specific categories of
sites, including specific road routes that were critical to the humanitarian effort ,”
Konyndyk said.
In 2016, Saudi airstrikes targeted and destroyed bridges along the main road from
the port of Hodeida to Yemen’s capital city, Sanaa. That road served as the principal transport route for humanitarian
and commercial food shipments into the country.
“They struck that despite us having specifically told them through that process not to ,”
Konyndyk said.
Radhya Al-Mutawakel, a Yemeni human rights activist who leads the organization Mwatana for Human Rights, pointed out that
when Saudi attacks produce mass civilian casualties, there is often not even a
military target nearby that might explain the collateral damage.
“People themselves were asking why we were targeted,” Al-Mutawakel said. “That’s why it’s not a matter of
training, it’s a matter of accountability. They don’t care. If they care, they can just make it much
better,” she said.
The United States, as a key ally of Saudi Arabia and major arms supplier to the country, has both culpability and leverage in a conflict
that has left 80 percent of Yemen’s population in need of humanitarian assistance, Konyndyk told lawmakers.
Applying that leverage will require more concerted effort at the highest levels of government.
“When the Saudis are doing something we don’t want them to do … asking them
nicely while continuing to sell them arms has not yielded much progress,” Konyndyk
said. “The only times we have seen progress has been when, at a very high level up
to and including, at times, the president himself, when they put that request forward
and make clear that it will have consequences for the U.S. bilateral relationship if
it is ignored, then we see movement.”
 Extend: “Permute – Do Both”
Arms embargoes like the plan are temporary, not permanent. If the recipient
country’s behavior changes, they become eligible for termination or
adjustment of the embargo.
UNSC 15 — United Nations Security Council Resolution 2220, 2015 (Full Text Reprinted in “Security Council Urges
Heightened Cooperation on Illicit Transfer of Small Arms, Light Weapons, Adopting Resolution 2220 (2015) with Abstentions,”
United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, May 22nd, Available Online at
https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11901.doc.htm, Accessed 07-07-2019)
“13. Reiterates that Council-mandated arms embargoes should have clearly
established objectives and provisions for regular review of the measures with a
view to lifting them when the objectives are met, in accordance with the terms of the applicable
Council resolutions, acknowledges that when considering a partial or complete
termination, suspension or adjustment of an arms embargo the Council should, where
applicable, take into account the capacities by the Member State subject to an arms
embargo to, inter alia, apply physical security and stockpile management practices,
implement marking, record keeping and tracing, develop national export and
import control systems, enhance border security, and strengthen judicial
institutions and law enforcement capacity and welcomes the conduct of
assessment missions to evaluate progress by Member States subject to a
Council-mandated arms embargoes towards meeting the conditions set by the
Council for their termination or adjustment and to provide options and recommendations regarding
United Nations and other technical assistance to these Member States or their regions;
[***Note: this card intentionally ends at a semicolon because this is the end of this part of the resolution; nothing was removed
from this paragraph. For the full resolution (including surrounding paragraphs), see the URL.]

“Reducing arms sales” doesn’t require a permanent moratorium — their

interpretation of fiat is anti-educational.
Carter 77 — Jimmy Carter, President of the United States, 1977 (“Excerpts From the White House Transcript of Carter's First
Interview as President.,” The New York Times, January 25th, Available Online at
https://www.nytimes.com/1977/01/25/archives/excerpts-from-the-white-house-transcript-of-carters-first-interview.html, Accessed 07-
07-2019)
Plans for Reduction of Arms Sales
Q.Do you plan to call a temporary or permanent moratorium on arms sales
abroad, and also, what are the chances of a SALT agreement this year? Will you be separating out the Backfire bomber and the
cruise missile?
A.I don't think a moratorium would be the right expression, because that is an
abrupt and total termination of all ownership. I don't contemplate that. But in
our first National Security Council meeting we discussed, in I think unanimity, the
necessity for reducing arms sales or having very tight restraints on future
commitments to minimize the efforts by arms manufacturers to initiate sales early
in the process.
The Secretary of State will be much more hesitant in the future to recommend to
the Defense Department the culmination of arms sales agreements. I have asked that all
approvals of arms sales, for a change, be submitted to me directly before the recommendations go to Congress. We also have asked
Vice President Mondale in his early trip among our own allies and friends, some of whom are heavy arms exporters, to join with us on
a multilateral basis.
We will also be talking to some of the primary arms purchasers, particularly the Middle East,
when Secretary Vance goes there very shortly, to hold down their own purchases of arms from us
and other countries. This will be a continuing effort on my part.

Conditionality is always implicit even when not explicitly stated.

Singh 19 — Michael Singh, Lane-Swig Senior Fellow and Managing Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
former Senior Director for Middle East Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, former Special Assistant to U.S. Secretaries of
State Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell, holds an M.B.A. from Harvard University, 2019 (“U.S. Policy in the Arabian Peninsula: An
Evaluation,” Prepared Testimony Submitted to the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 6th, Available Online at
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20190206/108861/HHRG-116-FA00-Wstate-SinghM-20190206.pdf , Accessed 07-06-
2019, p. 6)
Conditionality need not be explicit or Congressionally-mandated. It should instead
be implicit in our security coordination with partners; we should only support
military actions that serve our mutual interests, are conducted in accordance with
international norms, have clear and realistic objectives and timetables, and have a
viable political strategy alongside any military plan. This may produce difficult
conversations in which we inform partners that we cannot support a particular
operation, but this likely less damaging to our partner-ships than initially offering
support to a dubious action only to walk away when it begins to falter.

Contextual evidence about the plan proves.

Goodman 18 — Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law at New York University School of Law,
Professor of Politics and Professor of Sociology at New York University, Founding Co-Editor-in-Chief of Just Security, Member of
the Council on Foreign Relations, Member of the Advisory Committee on International Law at the U.S. Department of State, former
Special Counsel to the General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense, former Rita E. Hauser Professor of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law at Harvard Law School, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Yale University and a J.D. from Yale Law School, 2018
(“Options for Congress to Respond to Saudi Transgressions: Here’s What Works according to Former Senior U.S. Officials,” Just
Security, October 22nd, Available Online at https://www.justsecurity.org/61172/effective-ineffective-congressional-responses-saudi-
arabia-arm-sales-sanctions-khashoggi/, Accessed 06-08-2019)
One former senior official suggested tying arm sales to different sets of purposes , “I
think Congress should pause all FMS and end other support to the Saudi campaign in
Yemen. Resumption of arms sales should be conditioned on Riyadh agreeing to a
fully transparent international investigation into the Khashoggi incident, regular
intelligence community assessments of Saudi efforts to reduce civilian casualties in
Yemen, and a report from the administration outlining their strategy for addressing
the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and producing a peaceful settlement.”
 Extend: “Permute – Do The CP”
Permutations don’t have topicality burdens. They are “no link” arguments,
not plan amendments. “Severance” only makes sense when referring to the
plan, not the resolution.

Plan-focused debate is better than rez-focused debate because it facilitates in-

depth clash over a series of distinct policy proposals, fostering comparative
policy analysis and nuanced strategic thinking.
 They Say: “Resolved Is Immediate/Certain”
“Resolved” is not part of the resolution and is not in our plan.
Louisiana no date — Louisiana State Legislature, No Date Cited (“Glossary of Legislative Terms,” Available Online at
http://www.legis.state.la.us/glossary2.htm, Accessed 02-06-2006)
Resolution: A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations,
stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the
constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved".
Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. (Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11, 13.1, 6.8, and 7.4
and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)
 They Say: “Should Is Immediate/Certain”
“Should” is not “certain” nor “immediate.”
Kansas Court of Appeals 16 — Court of Appeals of the State of Kansas, 2016 (State of Kansas, Appellee, v.
Joseph Shane Allen, Appellant, Case Number 112,780, Available Online at http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-
Opinions/opinions/CtApp/2016/20160506/112780.pdf, Accessed 07-07-2019, p. 9-10)
Recently, this court has rejected the same argument that Allen makes here in several unpublished opinions. See State v. Cuellar, No.
112,535, 2016 WL 1614037, at *1-2(Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion);State v. Hastings, No.112,222, 2016 WL 852857, at *4-5
(Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion);State v. Singleton, No. 112,997, 2016 WL 368083, at *4-6 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished
opinion), petition for rev. filed February 26, 2016; State v. Jones, No. 111,386, 2015 WL 4716235, at *5-6 (Kan.App.2015)
(unpublished opinion), rev. denied 303 Kan. ___ (February18, 2016). There, as here, the district court instructed the jury using PIK
the
Crim.4th 51.010, which the defendants argued eliminated the possibility of jury nullification. And there, like in this case,
defendants insisted that the word should compelled the jury to convict,
contravening other cases that disapproved of imperatives like must or will. We
have consistently found that the instruction at issue here "does not upset the balance between encouraging jury
nullification and forbidding it... . [U]nlike the words must, shall, and will, the word should does
not express a mandatory, unyielding duty or obligation; instead, it merely denotes
the proper course of action and encourages following the advised path." Hastings,2016
WL 852857,at *4.
We believe our colleagues in Singleton said it best:
"Butas every teacher instructing a class knows, and as every parent
admonishing a child knows, should is less of an imperative than must or
will. . . . Should as used in this instruction is not the equivalent of 'must' or
'will' used in the instructions discussed in [other cases]. Should is advisory.
It is not an imperative. The district court did not err in giving this instruction." 2016 WL 368083, at *6.
Allen presents no compelling argument as to why a different result is warranted in this case. We find that the instruction used here,
PIK Crim.4th 51.010, does not direct a [end page 9] verdict for the State. Accordingly, it is legally sufficient, and it was not clearly
erroneous for the district court to use it here.

In policy contexts, “should” doesn’t require certainty or immediacy — it

allows exceptions.
RC 10 — Riverside County (California)’s General Plan, a document outlining the county’s overarching governance strategy,
2010 (“Chapter 1: Introduction,” County of Riverside General Plan — GPA 1096, December 1st, Available Online at
http://www.rivcoph.org/Portals/0/pdf/introduction.pdf, Accessed 11-16-2018, p. 12-13)
Policy Interpretation
not all policies are the same; they differ in terms
For a policy to be useful, it must be clear. However,
of expected results, commitment of resources, and indication of importance or urgency. Therefore, it is
important to simplify the language used in the General Plan and understand the distinctions
between the [end page I-12] different levels of policy. The following definitions of terms
provide guidance in interpreting the policy language of the General Plan:
• Shall: Policies containing the word "shall" indicate that an action must be taken
in all cases. This represents absolute commitment to the policy, and the
expectation is that the policy will always be carried out.
• Should: Policies containing the word "should" indicate that an action will be
taken in most cases, but exceptions are acceptable for good reason.
• Allow: Policies containing the word "allow" indicate that a proposed action will be supported within certain parameters and
following certain guidelines.
• Coordinate: Policies containing the word "coordinate" indicate that an action will occur along with some other entity, and the County
will carry its share of the burden or responsibility.
• Explore: Policies containing the word "explore" indicate that an action will be taken to investigate the subject at hand to discover
whether or not some further commitment is in order.
• Consider: Policies containing the word "consider" indicate that an action may or may not be taken, depending upon the results of
analysis that remain to be completed.
• Limit: Policies containing the word "limit" indicate that an action will be taken to keep the subject within certain limits, or at least
operate to make undesired change more difficult.
• Restrict: Policies containing the word "restrict" indicate that an action will be taken to actively keep the undesired action to a
minimum. Where other action terms are used that are not specified here, they are to be equated to the closest applicable term described
above.