GELMART INDUSTRIES PHILS., INC.

, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND FELIX
FRANCIS, respondents.

Facts:

Private respondent Felix Francis started working as an auto-mechanic for petitioner Gelmart
Industries Phils., Inc.

On April 11, 1987, private respondent was caught by the security guards taking out of
GELMART's premises one (1) plastic container filled with about 16 ounces of "used' motor oil,
without the necessary gate pass to cover the same as required under GELMART's rules and
regulations and was placed under preventive suspension pending investigation for violation
of company rules and regulations specifically, rules on theft and/or pilferage of company
property. Consequently, Felix Francis was found guilty in violating such rules and was
terminated.

Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. In a decision dated
February 26, 1988, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana ruled that private respondent was
illegally dismissed and, accordinglyrespondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before
the NLRC and ordered the latter's reinstatement with full backwages from April 13, 1987 up
to the time of actual reinstatement. NLRC ruled on the ground that the used oil, being of no
use for the company, is not considered as a company property thus, the company was not
deprived of anything. The company Gelmart Industries Phils. filed an appeal before the NLRC
and the decision was modified. Respondent-appellant was hereby directed to reinstate
complainant-appellee to his former position without loss of seniority rights and to pay him
backwages equivalent to six (6) months. Gelmart Industries filed before the Supreme Court a
special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order on the ground that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the reinstatement of private respondent to his former
position with payment of backwages equivalent to six (6) months.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC commited grave abuse of discretion in its decision.

Held:

The NLRC rightfully tilted the balance in favor of the workingmen — and this was done
without being blind to the concomitant right of the employer to the protection of his
property. To reiterate, be it of big or small commercial value, intended to be re-used or
altogether disposed of or wasted, the "used" motor oil still remains, in legal contemplation,
the property of GELMART. As such, to take the same out of GELMART's premises without the
corresponding gate pass is a violation of the company rule on theft and/or pilferage of
company property. The suspension imposed upon private respondent is a sufficient penalty
for the misdemeanor committed.

Considering that private respondent herein has no previous derogatory record in his fifteen
(15) years of service with petitioner GELMART the value of the property pilfered (16 ounces
of used motor oil) is very minimal, plus the fact that petitioner failed to reasonably establish
that non-dismissal of private respondent would work undue prejudice to the viability of their
operation or is patently inimical to the company's interest, it is more in consonance with the
policy of the State, as embodied in the Constitution, to resolve all doubts in favor of labor.

ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER AND EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM AND SERVICES, INC.
(ACCESS), Petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IBNO
MEDIALES, Respondents.

Facts:

On May 26, 1996, respondent applied with petitioner for vacation leave with pay which he
earned after working for more then a year. His application for leave was granted. While en
route to the Philippines, his co-workers informed him that he has been dismissed from
service.

Petitioner ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER & EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM & SERVICES, INC.(ACCESS)
seeks to modify the monetary awards against it in the Decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), dated October 14, 1997, a case for illegal dismissal.

Petitioner impugns the monetary awards granted by the NLRC to private respondent. It
submits that although the unexpired portion of private respondents employment contract is
eight (8) months, it is liable to pay respondent only three (3) months of his basic salary,
pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. 8042, or SR1,200 (monthly salary) multiplied by 3 months, for
a total of SR3,600. Petitioner claims that the NLRC erred in ruling that as private
respondent’s employment started only on February 28, 1995, R.A. 8042, which took effect
on July 15, 1995, would not apply to his case. Petitioner argues that it is not the date of
employment but the date of dismissal which should be considered in determining the
applicability of R.A. 8042.

Petitioner prays that the award in the NLRC Decision dated October 14, 1997, be changed to
SR3,600 instead of 13,200

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. 8042 does not apply as respondent’s employment which started in
February 1995 occurred prior to its effectivity on July 15, 1995.

Held:

Private respondent’s cause of action did not accrue on the date of his date of his
employment or on February 28, 1995. His cause of action arose only from the time he was
illegally dismissed by petitioner from service in June 1996, after his vacation leave expired.
R.A. 8042 which took effect a year earlier in July 1995 applies to the case at bar.

Under Section 10 of R.A. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.

Private respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3)
months or a total of SR3,600.
ATHENNA INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, vs. NONITO
VILLANOS, respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner Athenna International Manpower Services, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged

in recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment. Respondent Nonito
Villanos is a contract worker recruited by petitioner to work as a caretaker in Taiwan.

He alleged that he was assessed P100,000 placement fee by petitioner. As he had

only P30,000 to pay petitioner, respondent begged for a reduced fee. Petitioner agreed and
the placement fee was reduced toP94,000 only, on the condition that the remaining balance
of P64,000 shall be paid through salary deductions upon his deployment. Respondent's
Contract of Employment with Wei Yu Hsien arrived. Under this contract, he was to work as
caretaker for one year, ten months and twenty-eight days with a monthly pay of New Taiwan
Dollars (NT$) 15,840.

Upon his arrival in Taiwan, he was assigned to a mechanical shop, owned by Hsien, as a
hydraulic installer/repairer for car lifters, instead of the job for which he was hired.

On November 14, 1998, respondent was made to sign a document stating that he was not
qualified for the position. On February 17, 1999, he filed a complaint against petitioner for
illegal dismissal, violation of contract, and recovery of unpaid salaries and other benefits
before the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. 9, Dipolog City. The Labor Arbiter
rendered its decision holding petitioner and Wei Yu Hsien solidarily liable for the wages
representing the unserved portion of the employment contract, the amount unlawfully
deducted from respondent's monthly wage, moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. For the remittance of illegal placement fee in the amount ofP99,110,
petitioner was held solely liable. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It found that respondent was not at all dismissed,
much less illegally. Petitioner submits that, in this case, respondent bore the burden of
proving that his resignation was involuntary.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the NLRC denied in its second
resolution. On appeal to the CA, the same rendered its decision stating the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Hence, an appeal to the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not Nonito Villanos was illegally dismissed.

Whether or not Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, entitles respondent only to six months
worth of the unserved portion of his employment contract; and that the order to refund the
amount of P99,110 as placement fee has no factual basis because respondent himself
admitted he only paid P30,000 as placement fee, albeit, he was assessed the amount
of P94,000.

Held:
1st issue: Records show that upon his repatriation from Taiwan, respondent immediately
went to petitioner's office and confronted its representative, Lorenza Ching, about the
assignment given to him which was contrary to the agreed position of caretaker, for which
he specifically applied. He demanded that he be reimbursed the P30,000 he paid as
downpayment. Upon his arrival in his hometown, indicating that respondent did not
voluntarily resign, but was forced to resign, which was tantamount to a dismissal. Petitioner
failed to prove the legality of the dismissal, despite the fact that the burden of proof lies on
the employment and recruitment agency. Thus, the presumption stands to the effect that
respondent was illegally dismissed by his employer. Respondent could only be terminated
for a pertinent and just cause, such as when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards of employment made known to him by his employer
at the time of his engagement.

2nd issue:

Since respondent was dismissed after only one month of service, the unexpired portion of
his contract is one year, nine months and twenty-eight days. Hence, three months salary for
every year of the unexpired term, as the lesser amount is due to the respondent pursuant to
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 8042.

SEC. 10. Money Claims. - . . .In case of termination of overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Furthermore, he is only entitled to the reimbursement of the amount of placement fee he

actually paid, which is the P30,000 he gave as downpayment plus interest at twelve percent
(12%) per annum.
NITTO ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
-versus-
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products,
hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core
maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement 2for a period of six (6) months from
May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the
applicable minimum wage.

On August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was working
on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby
hospital. Further, Capili entered a workshop within the office premises which was not his
work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in
the process injured his left thumb. The following day he was asked to resign. Three days
after, , private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch, National Capital
Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits. The Labor
Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid and
dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. On appeal, NLRC issued an order reversing the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC declared that Capili was a regular employee of Nitto
Enterprises and not an apprentice. Consequently, Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution
ordering for the reinstatement of Capili and to collect his back wages. Petitioner, Nitto
Enterprises filed a case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not NLRC correctly ruled that Capili is a regular employee and not an apprentice
of Nitto Enterprises.

Whether or not Capili was illegally dismissed.

Held:

1st issue: The apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was
executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of
"care maker/molder. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990.
Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the
apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.

The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously
give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Nitto Enterprises did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that
apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered
only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor
and Employment. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement has no force and effect; and Capili is
considered to be a regular employee of the company.

2nd issue: Before a valid dismissal exist the twin requirements of due process- substantive
and procedural must be complied with. The employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he
so desires. In the case at bar, the petitioner "strong-armed" the respondent into signing the
resignation letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof
notwithstanding the absence of notices for the respondent regarding the reasons of his
dismissal.
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,
-versus-
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his
capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and
POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR., respondents.

Facts:

Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner
Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the
school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.

Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while
the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. According to Allan's testimony, a fast
moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to
avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if something had bumped against
the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the
pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against
vehicular traffic, and hit him and died.

The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, then seek reconsideration of
the decision of the Court on October 16, 1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of
Appeals, 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the appellate court's conclusion that there exists an
employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha. The
Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on
the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall
be directly and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who,
under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code
is not considered an employee of the petitioner.

The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in the case call for the
application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of the
petitioner. The private respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured party shall
have recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of the
incident, the servant was performing an act in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit
of the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not Funtecha can be considered an employee and acting in interest of his
employer during the accident

Held: Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch
students in the morning of the next school day.

In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house,
Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of
his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep
was intended by the petitioner school. Funtecha need not have an official appointment for a
driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent
act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of
the petitioner.

Furthermore, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as
would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the
official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing
another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove
that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by
persons other than the driver.

In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for
acts or omissions of its employees.
MANUEL LARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
-versus-
PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, JR., defendant-appellee

Facts: Petronilo del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs or cars, operated a taxi
business under the name of "Waval Taxi." The plaintiffs as chauffeurs received no fixed
compensation based on the hours or the period of time that they worked. Rather, they were
paid on the commission basis wherein each driver received 20 per cent of the gross returns
or earnings from the operation of his taxi cab.

On September 4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days advance
notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation company, as a
result of which, according to the mechanics and chauffeurs above-mentioned they lost their
jobs because the La Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment. They brought this
action against Del Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond
eight hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and one month salary (mesada) provided for
in article 302 of the Code of Commerce because the failure of their former employer to give
them one month notice. The trial court dismissed the complaint and then assumed by the
court of appeals on appeal. The CA then certified the case to the Supreme Court since it
involves a question of law.

Issue: Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation for work performed in
excess of 8 hours a day, Sundays and holidays included.

Held:

Section 2 of the Eight-hour Labor law excludes laborers who are being paid on piece work
basis and thus, not entitled for overtime work or other remuneration for work done in excess
of 8 hours.

In the case at bar, plaintiffs are receiving on commission basis 20% of the gross returns or
earnings from the operation of their taxi cab. Thus, it connotes that they can work in excess
or less than eight hours regardless of Sunday or holidays. In other words, his compensation
for the day depends upon the result of his work, which in turn depends on the amount of
industry, intelligence and experience applied to it, rather than the period of time employed.
It is the result of their labor, not the labor itself, which determines their commissions. They
worked under no compulsion of turning a fixed income for each given day. Hence, they are
considered to be within the meaning of workers paid on piece work basis and excludes them
from the application of the 8 hour labor law.
MANILA TERMINAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
-versus-
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and MANILA TERMINAL RELIEF AND
MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION, respondents.

Facts:

Manila Terminal Company, Inc. undertook the arrastre service in some of the piers in
Manila's Port Area at the request and under the control of the United States Army. The
petitioner hired some thirty men as watchmen on twelve-hour shifts at a compensation of P3
per day for the day shift and P6 per day for the night shift.

The watchmen of the petitioner continued in the service with a number of substitutions and
additions, their salaries having been raised during the month of February to P4 per day for
the day shift and P6.25 per day for the nightshift. The private respondent sent a letter to
Department of Labor requesting that the matter of overtime pay be investigated. But
nothing was done by the Dept of Labor.

The private respondent filed an amended petition with the Court of Industrial Relations
praying, among others, that the petitioner be ordered to pay its watchmen or police force
overtime pay from the commencement of their employment. Judge V. Jimenez Yanson of the
Court of Industrial Relations in his decision ordered the petitioner to pay its police force but
with regards to overtime service after the watchmen had been integrated into the Manila
Harbor Police, Judge Yanson ruled that the Court has no jurisdiction over it. The petitioner
has filed a present petition for certiorari

Issues:

Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction to render a money
judgment involving obligation in arrears.

Whether or not the agreement under which its police force were paid certain specific wages
for twelve-hour shifts, included overtime compensation.

Whether or not the Association is barred from recovery by estoppel and laches.

Whether or not the nullity or invalidity of the employment contract precludes any recovery
by the Association.
Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 4444 does not authorize recovery of back overtime
pay.

Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision that the petitioner's watchmen will
be entitled to extra compensation only from the dates they respectively entered the service
of the petitioner, hereafter to be duly determined by the Court of Industrial Relations.

On the first issue, the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction to award a money
judgment was already overruled by this Court on the case of Detective & protective Bureau,
Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations and United Employees Welfare Association that under
Commonwealth Act No. 103 the Court is empowered to make the order for the purpose of
settling disputes between the employer and employee.

On the second issue, based on the case of Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations and United Employees Welfare Association, the law gives them the right
to extra compensation. And they could not be held to have impliedly waived such extra
compensation, for the obvious reason that could not have expressly waived it.

On the third issue, the principle of estoppel and the laches cannot well be invoked against
the Association. it would be contrary to the spirit of the Eight Hour Labor Law, under which
as already seen, the laborers cannot waive their right to extra compensation. If the principle
of estoppel and laches is to be applied, the employee may be compelled to accomplish the
same thing by mere silence or lapse of time, thereby frustrating the purpose of law by
indirection.

On the fourth issue, the employee in rendering extra service at the request of his employer
has a right to assume that the latter has complied with the requirement of the law, and
therefore has obtained the required permission from the Department of Labor. This was
based on the case of Gotamo Lumber Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, wherein both
parties are in pari delicto. Moreover, the Eight-Hour Law, in providing that "any agreement
or contract between the employer and the laborer or employee contrary to the provisions of
this Act shall be null avoid ab initio.”

On the fifth issue, based on Fair Labor Standards Act of the United States which provides
that "any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 and section 207 of this title
shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid
minimum wages or their unpaid overtime compensation as the case may be," — a provision
not incorporated in Commonwealth Act No. 444, our Eight-Hour Labor Law.

We cannot agree to the proposition, because sections 3 and 5 of Commonwealth Act 444
expressly provides for the payment of extra compensation in cases where overtime services
are required, with the result that the employees or laborers are entitled to collect such extra
compensation for past overtime work. To hold otherwise would be to allow an employer to
violate the law by simply, as in this case, failing to provide for and pay overtime
compensation.
INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW, ENRICO GONZALES and MA.
THERESA MONTEJO,Petitioners, v. INTERPHIL LABORATORIES, INC., AND
HONORABLE LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, Respondents.

Facts:

Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the rank-and-file employees of Interphil Laboratories, Inc., a company engaged in the
business of manufacturing and packaging pharmaceutical products. They had a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from 01 August 1990 to 31 July 1993.

Prior to the expiration of the CBA the or sometime in February1993, the Vice president for
Human Resources of the respondent company was approached by the union president with
regards to the expiring CBA but the CP for human Resources told the union president that
they will discuss it in a formal meeting. On March 1993, the union again approached and
asked the company regarding the CBA through its officers but received the same reply. The
next day, all the rank and file employees started boycotting their regular work shift schedule
and left their workplaces and also commenced a work slowdown.

On 03 September 1993, respondent company filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a petition to declare illegal petitioner union's "overtime boycott" and
"work slowdown" which, according to respondent company, amounted to illegal strike.

On 05 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Caday submitted his recommendation to the then
Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing.8 Then Secretary Quisumbing approved and
adopted the report in his Order, dated 13 August 1997, hence: declaring the overtime
boycott and work slowdown as an illegal strike and finding the private respondents guilty of
unfair labor practice and violating the existing CBA. Respondents moved for reconsideration
but was denied.

Issues:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion on the following:

1. when it completely disregarded “parol evidence rule” in the evaluation and

appreciation of evidenceproferred by the parties;
 2. when it did not declare private respondent’s act of extending substantial
separation package to almost all involved officers of petitioners union, during the
pendency of the case, as tantamount to condonation;
3. when it held that the secretary of labor and employment has jurisdiction over a
case which long been filed and pending with the labor arbiter.

Held:

1st issue: The reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor cases pending before
the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or
equity are not controlling. Rules of procedure and evidence are not applied in a very rigid
and technical sense in labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not precluded from accepting
and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to, what is stated in the CBA

The employees are deemed to have waived the eight-hour schedule since they followed,
without any question or complaint, the two-shift schedule while their CBA was still in force
and even prior thereto. The two-shift schedule effectively changed the working hours
stipulated in the CBA. As the employees assented by practice to this arrangement, they
cannot now be heard to claim that the overtime boycott is justified because they were not
obliged to work beyond eight hours.

2nd issue: Respondent company correctly postured that at the time these union officers
obtained their separation benefits, they were still considered employees of the company.
Hence, the company was merely complying with its legal obligations.

3rd issue: It cannot be denied that the issues of "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown"
amounting to illegal strike before Labor Arbiter Caday are intertwined with the labor dispute
before the Labor Secretary. As the appellate court pointed out, the subsequent participation
of petitioner union in the continuation of the hearing was in effect an affirmation of the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor. Also, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article
263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and
decide the same accordingly.
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS SYSTEM (PHILIPPINES), petitioner,
-versus-
PAN AMERICAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, respondent

Facts: The