G.R. No.
123546 July 2, 1998 Evelyn Obligar Garganera the sum of FIFTY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. JOERAL GALLENO, Accused-Appellant.
PER CURIAM:
What could be more compelling than deciding a case which
involves the sexual abuse of a five-year old child? Equally
important is the fact that the case before us involves the highest
penalty imposable by law. Being the guardian of the most
fundamental liberties of every citizen, the Court must pass upon
every intricate detail of the case at bar to determine whether or
not accused-appellant committed the gruesome act imputed
against him.
Accused-appellant Joeral Galleno seeks reversal of the judgment
of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial
Region stationed in Roxas City, relying on the defense of denial.
Since the case involves the death penalty, the matter has been
elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Accused-appellant was charged in an Information docketed as
Criminal Case No. C-4629 for the crime of Statutory Rape,
reading as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, upon prior authority and approval
of the Provincial Prosecutor, and the original
complaint filed by the guardian of the
offended party, accuses JOERAL GALLENO
of the crime of STATUTORY RAPE,
committed as follows:
That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of August 16, 1994, at Brgy. Balighot,
Maayon, Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the said accused did, then and
there, wilfully and feloniously, and without
the permission of anyone, enter the house of
EVELYN OBLIGAR, a five-year old child,
and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
her thereby inflicting upon the latter a vaginal
laceration which caused continuous bleeding
and her admission of five (5) days at the
Roxas Memorial Hospital.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p. 9, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued, resulting in a judgment of conviction, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING
ESTABLISHED FACTS, the Court finds
accused JOERAL
GALLENO GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt under Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Accordingly, accused JOERAL GALLENO is
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty
of DEATH and to indemnify the victim
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.
Let this DECISION serve as clear signal,
warning the perverts, the misguided elements
of our society, especially their lackadaisical
parents in their innate moral obligation and
responsibility in educating their children that
in this corner of the world the wheels of
justice is not asleep and its unforgiving hands
and watchful eyes are as vigilant as ever.
(pp. 44-45, Rollo.)
In flashback, let us visualize the events.
Evelyn Obligar Garganera is the 5-year old daughter of Rosita
Obligar Garganera who had to leave the province to find work
in Manila after separating from her husband. Evelyn, together
with her younger brother, 3-year old Eleazar, was thus left under
the care and custody of their uncle, Emeterio Obligar, and aunt,
Penicola Obligar.
Less than a kilometer away from their place of residence lived
accused-appellant, 19-year old Joeral Galleno, known well to
Evelyn's family due to his frequent visits at the Obligars' abode
as he was paying court to Emeterio's eldest child, Gina.
On August 16, 1994, Emeterio and Penicola left their residence
to work at the sugarcane plantation owned by Magdalena
Dasibar. Their three children had all earlier left for school. The
only persons left in the house were niece Evelyn and nephew
Eleazar.
At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant was on
his way to his Lola Esing to have his pants tailored. Since it was
drizzling, he passed by the Obligars' residence and found the
two children left to themselves. The prosecution and the defense
presented conflicting versions on what occurred at said
residence. However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained a
laceration in her vagina which resulted in profuse, and to our
mind, life-threatening bleeding due to her tender age.
The prosecution's version of what took place at the Obligars'
residence is based on the testimony of Evelyn herself, her uncle
Emeterio, and the doctors who examined and treated her. The
Solicitor General summarized the same in this wise:
2. Appellant took advantage of the situation
by sexually molesting Evelyn. After lowering
her shorts, he made Evelyn sit on his lap,
facing him. Then he forcibly inserted his penis
into her vagina. As Evelyn was only five-
years old while appellant was a fully-grown
man, the penetration caused the child's vagina
to bleed, making her cry in pain. (pp. 10-11
and 18-25, tsn, Garganera, January 10, 1995).
3. Appellant tried to stop the bleeding by
applying, with his finger, the sap of "madre de
cacao" leaves on her vagina. Unsuccessful in
his attempt, he left Evelyn grimacing and
crying in pain. (pp. 14-15, tsn, Garganera,
January 10, 1995; pp. 6-7, tsn, Obligar,
February 7, 1995).
4. Shortly, Emeterio and Penicola came home
from work. The spouses were laborers in a
sugarcane plantation about two kilometers
away from their house. They arrived to find
Evelyn crying. Emeterio noticed that there
was blood in Evelyn's dress and she was
pressing a rug against her genital organ. (pp.
11-12, tsn, Obligar, January 10, 1995; pp. 8-9,
tsn, Obligar, February 7, 1995).
5. Emeterio asked Evelyn what happened but
she did not answer. Emeterio spread the
child's legs and saw that her vagina had been
lacerated and blood was oozing therefrom. He
summoned a "quack" doctor who applied
herbal medicine on Evelyn's vagina but this
did not stop the bleeding. (pp. 12-14, tsn,
Obligar, January 12, 1995).
6. The following day, August 17, 1994,
Emeterio brought Evelyn to the clinic of Dr.
Alfonso D. Orosco, the Rural Health
Physician of Maayon, Capiz. Dr. Orosco
reported, upon examining Evelyn, that he
found (1) clotted blood, about 1 centimeter in
diameter, in her vaginal opening, and (2) a
vaginal laceration, measuring 1.0 centimeter x
0.5 centimeter, between the 3:00 o'clock and
6:00 o'clock position. He also affirmed that
Evelyn's vaginal laceration could have been
caused by a blunt instrument inserted into the
vagina, that it was possible that a human penis
in full erection had been forcibly inserted into
her vagina and that a human penis in full
erection is considered a blunt instrument. (pp.
4-7, tsn, Orosco, November 28, 1994; p. 14,
tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
7. While he was examining Evelyn, Dr.
Orosco asked Evelyn what caused her injuries.
The child told him that a penis was inserted
into her vagina and that its insertion caused
her pain. (pp. 9-10, 14 and 18-19, tsn, Orosco,
November 28, 1994).
8. Since his clinic lacked the proper medical
facilities needed to treat Evelyn, Dr. Orosco,
after dressing the victim's wound which
continued to bleed, advised Emeterio and
Penicola to bring the child to the hospital for
further medical treatment (p. 8, tsn, Orosco,
November 28, 1994; pp. 14-16, tsn, Obligar,
January 12, 1995).
9. On August 18, 1994, Emeterio brought
Evelyn to the Roxas Memorial General
Hospital where she was examined by resident
physician Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, Dr.
Lañada, upon examining Evelyn, found that
"there was a 3 cm. lacerated wound at the left
anterior one-third of the vagina" and "the
presence of about 10-15 cc of blood" at the
vaginal vault. Dr. Lañada recommended that
Evelyn be admitted for confinement in the
hospital because the wound in her vagina,
which was still bleeding, had to be repaired.
Due to financial constraints, Evelyn was not
admitted into the hospital that day and went
home with Emeterio to Barangay Balighot.
(pp. 6-8, tsn, Lañada January 4, 1995; pp. 15-
16, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
10. Upon her examination of the victim on
August 18, 1994, Dr. Lañada opined that "a
lot of things will cause the lacerated wound in
the vagina." (p. 9, tsn, Lañada, January 4,
1995). According to Dr. Lañada, the vaginal
laceration may be caused (1) by trauma to the
area, when a girl falls and hits her genital area
on a blunt instrument; (2) by medical
instrumentation, like the insertion of a
speculum into the vagina; or (3) by the
insertion of a blunt foreign object into the
vagina, like a finger of a penis of a man in full
erection. (pp. 8-10, tsn, Lañada, January 4,
1995).
11. On August 19, 1994, Emeterio brought
Evelyn back to the Roxas Memorial General
Hospital where she was attended to by Dr.
Machel Toledo, the resident physician on
duty, who found blood clots and minimal
bleeding in the genital area. Dr. Toledo ". . .
pack(ed) the area to prevent further bleeding
and (he) . . . admitted the patient for possible
repair of that laceration and blood transfusion
because she has anaemia 2ndary to bleeding."
Two hundred five (255) cc of blood was
transfused to Evelyn and she was given
antibiotics to prevent infection. However, she
was no longer operated on because the
laceration had healed. Five days later, Evelyn
was discharged and sent home with
medication. (pp. 11-13, 17 and 26, tsn,
Toledo, December 2, 1994).
12. Upon his examination of Evelyn on
August 19, 1994, Dr. Toledo disclosed that the
child suffered severe compound laceration
which could have been caused by a normal
and fully developed penis of a man in a state
of erection that was forcibly inserted into her
vagina and that the insertion caused her
vagina to hemorrhage which thus required the
transfusion of 255 cc of blood. (pp. 14-16 and
26, tsn, Toledo, December 2, 1994).
13. Prior to her confinement in the Roxas
Memorial General Hospital on August 19,
Emeterio and Penicola Obligar brought
Evelyn to the Maayon Police Station on
August 18, 1994, where they reported the
crime to SPO1 Paulino Durana. That same
day, appellant was apprehended in a house
near the Balighot Elementary School and
brought to the police station. (pp. 17-19, tsn,
Obligar, January 12, 1995; pp. 5-9, 16-17 and
21, tsn, Durana, January 16, 1995).
(pp. 164-171, Rollo.)
Denial is presented as the defense. Accused-appellant testified
that when he arrived at the Obligar residence that afternoon of
August 16, 1994, he found the two children, Evelyn and Eleazar
(also referred to in the record as Pilfo). While seated at the
balcony, accused-appellant was approached by Evelyn, who
knew him (tsn, April 5, 1995, pp. 5 and 8). He cajoled her by
throwing her up and down, his right hand holding the child and THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING
his left hand covering her vagina (Ibid., p. 21). Upon lifting up FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
the child the first time, his left ring finger was accidentally TESTIMONIES OF THE MEDICAL
inserted into the vagina of the child since his fingernail was long DOCTORS WHEN THE SAME FAILED TO
and the child was not wearing any underwear. Consequently, CONCLUSIVELY AND SUFFICIENTLY
Evelyn began to cry because her vagina started to bleed. Upon ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF THE
seeing this, he immediately went down the house and got some LACERATION IN THE OFFENDED
bark or leaves of a madre de cacao tree and applied the sap on PARTY'S VAGINA
the child's wound. The bleeding ceased and Evelyn stopped
crying. Thereafter, accused-appellant went home. (Ibid., pp. 9- THE TRIAL COURT SHOWED MANIFEST
10). BIAS THEREBY DEPRIVING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO A FAIR AND
Accused-appellant further testified that on August 18, 1994, at IMPARTIAL TRIAL AND DISREGARDED
around 9 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested. On the same THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE
day, Emeterio Obligar asked him to admit the offense so that he PRESUMED INNOCENT, WHEN HE
could be released the next day, but accused-appellant did not do ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE
so (Ibid., pp. 26-27). CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE
ACCUSED
Accused-appellant's father Raul Galleno was also called to the
witness stand and he testified that he learned about the arrest of THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
his son on August 18, 1994 (tsn, May 12, 1995 p. 6). The DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS
following day, he went to the house of the Obligars to ask ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AS
Evelyn what happened to her. The child allegedly answered that UNJUSTIFIED
a finger was accidentally inserted into her genital organ, but that
Penicola who was then present, butted into the conversation and THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
told Raul Galleno that the penis of accused-appellant was INTERPRETING THE FINANCIAL
likewise inserted (Ibid., p. 8). ASSISTANCE EXTENDED BY THE
PARENTS OF THE ACCUSED TO THE
The trial court did not accord credence to the version of the OFFENDED PARTY AS AN IMPLIED
defense, pointing out in its decision that accused-appellant's ADMISSION OF GUILT.
defense of denial hinged on the argument that the statement of
Evelyn as to how she sustained her vaginal laceration was a (pp. 81-82, Rollo.)
mere concoction and a plain distortion of facts by her guardian.
The trial court called this a "desperate attempt of the defense to One can not escape the feeling of utmost compassion for any
becloud the charge of rape." rape victim, and more especially so for a 5-year old statutory
rape victim. However, in our consideration of the matter before
The trial court believed and accepted the testimony of Police us, we set aside emotion and observe impartiality and coldness
Officer Paulino Durana that during the interrogation of Evelyn in drawing conclusions.
which he conducted at the PNP Station of Maayon, Emeterio
and Penicola Obligar did not interfere with the responses of Under the first assigned error, accused-appellant contends that
Evelyn, although, true enough, it was difficult to obtain answers the testimony of the three expert witnesses presented by the
from her because of her tender age. prosecution, namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes
Lañada, and Dr. Machael Toledo, which convinced the trial
The trial court deemed the following circumstances significant court that rape was committed against the offended party, is not
in finding accused-appellant culpable: impeccable considering that they found that there was no
presence of spermatozoa, and that they were not sure as to what
1. Accused-appellant failed to explain how his left ring finger caused the laceration in the victim's vagina; that Dr. Lañada
accidentally came in contact with Evelyn's vagina, while in the herself testified that Evelyn told her that it was the finger of
process of throwing her up and down. Besides, the prosecution accused-appellant which caused the laceration. In addition,
was able to establish that Evelyn was wearing shorts. And accused-appellant banks on the victim's testimony on cross-
assuming for the sake of argument that Evelyn was not wearing examination, that it was the finger of accused-appellant which
any pants or underwear at that time, accused-appellant failed to caused the laceration; and that she even disclosed this to
explain how his finger could possibly penetrate the victim's accused-appellant's father, Raul Galleno.
vagina by about one-fourth of an inch (p. 23, tsn, April 5, 1995).
We are not persuaded.
2. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant left the victim with
her 3-year old brother, in pain and bleeding. As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw
conclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw
3. Evelyn's statement given to Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, the conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts
physician who examined her at the Roxas Memorial General proved (Francisco, Pleadings and Trial Practice, Vol. 1, 1989
Hospital, that it was accused-appellant's finger which injured ed., pp. 889-890). However, conclusions and opinions of
her, was a consequence of the victim's confusion. witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to
expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of
4. The formal offer of settlement made by accused-appellant's the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because
father Raul Galleno militates against the cause of the defense. of the nature of the subject matter under observation, or for
other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a
Hence, the instant appeal and review, with accused-appellant judgment (Ibid., p. 886).
assigning the following errors:
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not
only with the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave
their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration,
but also the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses,
especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did
not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such
expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of
its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts
enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration
does not mean that the trial court's inference is wrong.
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not
negate the conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in
the victim's vagina (People vs. Cañada, 253 SCRA 277 [1996]).
In rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen
but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ
(People vs. Dones, 254 SCRA 696 [1996]). Verily, it is entirely
probable that climax on the part of accused-appellant was not
reached due to the cries of pain of the victim and the profuse
bleeding of her vagina.
As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declarations,
particularly as to what really caused the laceration, we are
convinced that the child, due to her tender age, was just
confused. This is best exemplified by the testimony of Dr.
Lourdes Lañada on cross-examination, as follows:
Q Now, Doctor, at the time
that you conducted your
examination, you were
aware that this child was
only five years old?
A Yes, sir.
Q And at that tender age,
Doctor, is it possible that the
child may not know the
difference or distinction
between fingers of the hands
and a finger protruding
between the legs of a
person?
A Yes, sir, it is possible.
Q So that it is possible,
Doctor, that the child may
have referred to a finger that
is between the legs?
which is not in accord with ordinary human experience. We thus
can not help expressing sentiments similar to those of the trial
court when it said:
The contention of accused Joeral Galleno
raises serious doubts to his credibility. He
failed to explain how his ring finger
accidentally came in contact with the genitalia
of Evelyn, while in the process of throwing
her up and down, when it was established by
the prosecution that at that time Evelyn was
wearing shorts. Even assuming "ex gratia
argumente" that Evelyn was pantyless, how
could it be possible for his finger to penetrate
the vagina for about one-fourth of an inch . . .
when she was in shorts. The Supreme Court,
in People vs. Fulgencio Baquiran, 20 SCRA
451, (held that) evidence, to be believed must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself.
Human perception can be warped by the
impact of events and testimony colored by the
unconscious workings of the mind. No better
test has yet been found to measure the value
of a witness' testimony than its conformity to
the knowledge and common experience of
mankind.
(pp. 42-43, Rollo.)
Sec. 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "(e)vidence
must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief
in its existence or non-existence." This simply means that
relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic and human
experience (Regalado, Remedial law Compendium, Vol. II,
1988 ed., p. 434). There is no precise and universal test of
relevancy provided by law. However, the determination of
whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely at the
discretion of the court, which must be exercised according to the
teachings of logic and everyday experience (Sibal and Salazar;
Compendium on Evidence, 1995 ed., p. 6, citing Alfred Asmore
Pope Foundation vs. New York 138 A. 444, 106 Conn. 432).
There is no explanation how the left ring finger (allegedly with a
long fingernail) of accused-appellant penetrated the victim's
vagina by a depth of one fourth of an inch. Admittedly, accused-
appellant's right hand held the child while his left hand
supposedly held her in the vagina area. Why would he hold the
child's vagina if his only intention was to frolic and kid around
with her?

WITNESS Accused-appellant likewise failed to explain why after injuring

Evelyn (and after applying to the wound the sap of madre de
cacao), he left her in the company of an even younger child, the
You mean the penis?
victim's 3-year old brother. He did not even make an effort to
immediately inform Emeterio and Penicola of what had
PROSECUTOR OBIENDA happened. Instead, he went home and kept mum about the
incident.
Yes.
Accused-appellant also said that after the alleged accident,
WITNESS before going home, he removed Eleazar's shorts and put them on
Evelyn. Assuming this to be true, this only shows that the child
It is possible. was still bleeding. Why then would he leave the child
considering that there was no adult to attend to her?
(tsn, p. 27 March 30, 1995.) Significantly, his act of immediately leaving the place, when
considered in the light of the other evidence, reflects his fear
Of vital consideration and importance too is the unreliability, if because of what he had done. The proverb "the wicked fleeth
not the outright incredulity of the version of accused-appellant even when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a
lion" was correctly adopted by the trial court in drawing its ATTY. DISTURA
conclusions.
Agreeable, Your Honor.
All of these loopholes are palpable and manifest, and clearly
work against the credibility of accused-appellant's story on FISCAL OBIENDA
which his defense is based.
Q What did Joeral Calleno
Besides, the trial court's conclusions find support in the do with his Pitoy (Penis) to
testimony of accused-appellant's own witness, Dr. Lourdes your vagina (Putay)?
Lañada (who was earlier presented during the trial as a
prosecution witness), who testified that a laceration is caused by A It was inserted (ginsulod)
a blunt instrument and that a fingernail is not a blunt but a sharp to my vagina (Putay).
instrument (tsn, pp. 32-33, March 30, 1995).
Q When Joeral Galleno
As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's inserted his penis (Pitoy) to
testimony is just a concocted story of what really happened, we your vagina (Putay), that
apply the rule that the revelation of an innocent child whose was the reason why it bleed?
chastity was abused deserves full credence (People vs. Cagto,
253 SCRA 455 [1996]). We likewise consider the fact that her A Yes, sir.
uncle and aunt, virtually her foster parents, themselves support
her story of rape. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring
Q And it was very painful?
as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to
embarrassment and even stigma (People vs. Dones, supra.).
A Yes, Sir.
Accused-appellant's father, Raul Galleno, tried to destroy the
credibility of Evelyn when he took the stand and testified that Q And you cried because of
the child disclosed to him that it was accused-appellant's finger the pain?
which was inserted into her vagina. Nevertheless, this testimony
cannot prevail over the testimony of the victim, to wit: A Yes, Sir.

FISCAL OBIENDA FISCAL OBIENDA

Q You said that Joeral Q And you were brought to

Galleno the accused in this the Doctor and admitted to
case hurt you while you the hospital because of that?
were in the farm, can you
tell the Honorable Court A Yes, Sir.
which part of your body was
hurt by Joeral Galleno? (tsn, pp. 10-12, January 10, 1995.)

A (Witness pointing to her Under the second assigned error, accused-appellant alleges that
vagina) he was deprived of a fair and impartial trial since the trial court
showed bias by discounting his testimony, and by actually
Here. participating in the cross-examination of accused-appellant.

Q When you said you were We recently pronounced in People vs. Malabago (265 SCRA
hurt did you bleed? 198 [1996]) that a judge may properly intervene in the
presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary
WITNESS waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details after
the witness has given direct testimony. And such discretion to
A Yes, Sir. question witnesses in order to clear obscurities in their
testimony cannot be assailed as a specie of bias.
FISCAL OBIENDA
Of course, we are aware of Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides:
Q What was used by Joeral
Galleno in hurting your
sexual organ? While a judge may, to promote justice,
prevent waste of time or clear up some
obscurity, properly intervene in the
A His (Pitoy). Penis.
presentation of evidence during the trial, it
should always be borne in mind that undue
COURT interference may prevent the proper
presentation of the cause or the ascertainment
Make the translation of of truth.
"Pitoy" into Penis. Do you
agree that the translation of And there is undoubtedly undue interference if the judge
Pitoy is Penis in English? extensively propounds questions to the witnesses which will
have the effect of or will tend to build or bolster the case for one
of the parties. We have, however, carefully examined the record A Yes, Your Honor.
and transcript of stenographic notes of the instant case. The trial
court judge, the Honorable Salvador S. Gubaton, did propound Q How long after August
questions but this was done only for clarification purposes and 19, 1994, that your
not to build the case for one of the parties. For instance, Comareng Pening returned
accused-appellant, in his brief, refers to the questions to you the amount of Four
propounded by the trial court on his act of cajoling the child. A Hundred Pesos (P400.00)?
perusal of the line of questioning referred to hardly shows bias
on the part of the trial court, but pure clarification. A A week after when
Evelyn had already checked
In the third assigned error, accused-appellant questions the up from the hospital.
validity of his arrest.
Q It was given by you or as
It is settled jurisprudence that any objection involving a warrant voluntary financial
of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of assistance, why did you
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before receive the amount or the
he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived payment returned to that
(People vs. Lopez, Jr., 245 SCRA 95 [1995]). An accused amount of Four Hundred
should question the validity of his arrest before he enters his Pesos (P400.00)?
plea in the trial court (Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA
222 [1996]). He is estopped from questioning any defect in the A That was telling me that
manner of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the they refused already for the
information before the trial court (People vs. Compil, 244 settlement of the case.
SCRA 135 [1995]) or if he voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea and by participating Q And that is why they
in the trial (People vs. De Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 [1993]; returned the amount of Four
People vs. Lopez, Jr., supra). Hundred Pesos (P400.00).

It does not appear in the record that accused-appellants raised (tsn, pp. 29-30, May 12, 1995.)
this matter before entering his plea of "not guilty" to the charge
(pp. 63 & 67, Record). Further, this issue was not even touched
From the above-stated clarificatory questions by the trial court,
during the trial.
it may be gleaned that Raul Galleno no longer had any interest
in aiding the victim when he found that the Obligar spouses
Lastly, accused-appellant, in his fourth assigned error, argues would still pursue the case against his son, accused-appellant,
that the trial court misinterpreted the financial assistance and hence he found that his offer for settlement was unavailing.
extended by his parents as an attempt to settle the case. Hence, on this point we likewise agree with the trial court when
Accused-appellant even banks on the alleged close relationship it took the financial assistance to mean an act of settling the
between Emeterio Obligar and Raul Galleno as compadres, and case. This act does manifest a father's attempt to rescue his
the fact that Emeterio borrowed forty pesos from Raul Galleno, guilty son from sure incarceration.
despite the fact that Emeterio already knew that accused-
appellant caused the laceration in Evelyn's vagina.
The nightmare that was forced into the tender mind of 5-year
old Evelyn Obligar Garganera may unfortunately haunt her all
Accused-appellant also draws attention to two incidents her life. Justice may not be able to save her from this nightmare
involving alleged financial assistance extended by Raul Galleno but it can calm and assure her that her tormentor and abuser
to the spouses Emeterio and Penicola Obligar. First, Emeterio shall undoubtedly face retribution.
Obligar, whom Raul Galleno said is his compadre, borrowed
P40.00 for fare going to Roxas City where Evelyn was confined.
Four members of the Court - although maintaining their
Second, on August 20, 1994, Raul Galleno and his wife and one
adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs.
of the brothers of Penicola Obligar went to Roxas Memorial
Echegaray (G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997) that Republic
General Hospital. There he gave P400.00 financial assistance to
Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty is
Penicola Obligar. Raul Galleno later admitted that the sum of
unconstitutional - nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court,
P440.00 was returned to him by the spouses. Accused-appellant
by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the
insists that these offers of financial assistance were not attempts
death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
at an amicable settlement but were prompted out of a sincere
desire on the part of Raul Galleno to help the offended party.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant
justified by the evidence on record, the assailed decision is
We find no merit in me above-stated argument. It may be
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
inferred that Raul Galleno wanted to settle the case by offering
an amount to the spouses Obligar, to wit:
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659,
amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of
Q Now, according to you,
this decision, let the record of the case be forthwith forwarded to
you were paid in the amount
the Office of the President for the possible exercise of the
of Four Hundred Pesos
pardoning power.
(P400.00) then you expected
your Comareng Pening as
financial assistance to SO ORDERED.
Evelyn Garganera, isn't it?
G.R. No. 173476               February 22, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or
parricide that meets the conditions of admissibility under the
Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either
as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for
murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was
ultimately found guilty of the felony by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September 23, 2004. On appeal,
his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA)
through its decision promulgated on November 24, 2005.1
Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing
to challenge the credibility of the witnesses who had
incriminated him.
The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993
Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in
Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran
away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his
uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek help; that his uncle
rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that
on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it was
Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually
succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical
attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally
witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years,
who was in the complex at the time.2
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded
arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for his arrest being
issued. He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained
at the Manila City Jail.
After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:
The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who
delivered two (2) stabbing blows to the victim while holding
Johnny Bolanon with his left arm encircled around Bolanon’s
neck stabbing the latter with the use of his right hand at the right
sub costal area which caused Bolanon’s death. Not only because
it was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by
Rodolfo Estaño, the victim’s uncle who brought Bolanon to the
hospital and who relayed to the court that when he aided
Bolanon and even on their way to the hospital while the latter
was suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to
say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.3
The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of
Prosecution witness Mendoza on how Salafranca had effected
his attack
against Bolanon, observing that by "encircling his (accused) left
arm, while behind the victim on the latter’s neck and stabbing
the victim with the use of his right hand," Salafranca did not
give Bolanon "any opportunity to defend himself." 4 The RTC
noted inconsistencies in Salafranca’s and his witness’
testimonies, as well as the fact that he had fled from his
residence the day after the incident and had stayed away in
Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that had
he not been hiding, there would be no reason for him to
immediately leave his residence, especially because he was also
working near the area.5
The RTC disposed thus:
With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo
Salafranca is hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder defined
and punished under Article 248 as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659 in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
with the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery (248 par. 1 as amended) without any mitigating nor
other aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission,
Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive
imprisonment under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of
the Bureau of Correction, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa
City thru the City Jail Warden of Manila.
He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the
sum of ₱50,000.00 representing death indemnity.
There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is
hereby made.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the
RTC,7 citing the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to
Salafranca as his assailant,8 and Salafranca’s positive
identification as the culprit by Mendoza.9 It stressed that
Salafranca’s denial and his alibi of being in his home during the
incident did not overcome the positive identification, especially
as his unexplained flight after the stabbing, leaving his home
and employment, constituted a circumstance highly indicative of
his guilt.10
Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the
State did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal lacks merit.
Discrediting Mendoza and Estaño as witnesses against
Salafranca would be unwarranted. The RTC and the CA
correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estaño were credible and
reliable. The determination of the competence and credibility of
witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC as the trial court
due to its unique and unequalled position of observing their
deportment during testimony, and of assessing their credibility
and appreciating their truthfulness, honesty and candor. Absent
a substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessment
made and conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the
reviewing court was bound by such assessment and
conclusions,11 considering that the CA as the appellate court
could neither substitute its assessment nor draw different
conclusions without a persuasive showing that the RTC
misappreciated the circumstances or omitted significant
evidentiary matters that would alter the result.12 Salafranca did
not persuasively show a misappreciation or omission by the
RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo
or to contradict the findings of the RTC and the CA, which were
entitled to great weight and respect.13
Salafranca’s denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his
positive identification by Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon.
The lower courts properly accorded full faith to such
incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca did not
even project any ill motive that could have impelled Mendoza to
testify against him unless it was upon the truth.14
Based on Mendoza’s account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon
from behind and had "encircled his left arm over the neck (of
Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow using the right(hand)
and coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and another one
encircling the blow towards below the left nipple." 15 Relying on
Mendoza’s recollection of how Salafranca had attacked
Bolanon, the RTC found treachery to be attendant in the killing.
This finding the CA concurred with. We join the CA’s
concurrence because Mendoza’s eyewitness account of the
manner of attack remained uncontested by Salafranca who
merely insisted on his alibi. The method and means Salafranca
employed constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon
from behind and included an aggressive physical control of the
latter’s movements that ensured the success of the attack
without any retaliation or defense on the part of Bolanon.
According to the Revised Penal Code,16 treachery is present
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.
The Court further notes Estaño’s testimony on the utterance by
Bolanon of statements identifying Salafranca as his assailant
right after the stabbing incident. The testimony follows:
Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?
A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left
chest.
Q What time was that?
A 12:50 a.m.
Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he
say?
A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako."
Q What did you do?
A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.
Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?
A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed
him?, and he answered, Rod Salafranca.
Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How long have you known him?
A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami."
Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to
identify him?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you look around and point him to us?
A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of
Rod Salafranca.)
COURT
When he told you the name of his assailant what was his
condition?
A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk
anymore because he will just suffer more.
Q What happened when you told him that?
A He kept silent.
Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?
A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at
that time.
Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?
A He was brought to Emergency Room.
Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?
A He was pronounced dead.17
It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone
to the residence of Estaño, his uncle, to seek help right after
being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estaño had hurriedly dressed
up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by
taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estaño had asked
Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estaño
that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the
utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time
breathing, causing Estaño to advise him not to talk anymore;
and that about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency
ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been
pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of
Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res
gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that the
statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after
the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying
declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an
exception to the hearsay rule.18
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as
evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be
admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that
the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a
witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case
for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a
victim.19
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his
ante-mortem statement to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the
person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement,
Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having
sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estaño,
was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon
succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from
admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing.
There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief
in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s
own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the
nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the
opinion of his physician.20 Bolanon would have been competent
to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived.
Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal
prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae
and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.21
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res
gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the
assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling
occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then
on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and
thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as
the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him
was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling
occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified
Salafranca as the perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances
which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act
and which are admissible when illustrative of such act."22 In a
general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate
its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication.23 The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were
made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. 24 The
test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.25
We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the
RTC to only the death indemnity of ₱50,000.00. We declare
that the surviving heirs of Bolanon were entitled by law to more
than such indemnity, because the damages to be awarded when
death occurs due to a crime may include: (a) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim (which was granted herein);
(b) actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d)
exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.26
We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted
moral damages which were different from the death
indemnity.27 The death indemnity compensated the loss of life
due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages
would justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional
sufferings of the surviving family of the victim.28 Although
mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving heirs
were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court
must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the
heirs of Bolanon to their moral status quo ante. Given the
circumstances, the amount of ₱50,000.00 is reasonable as moral
damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, 29 we are
bound to award despite the absence of any allegation and proof
of the heirs’ mental anguish and emotional suffering. The
rationale for doing so rested on human nature and experience
having shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s
family.1âwphi1 It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment,
pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a
violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not
only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life,
deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but
often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has
been done to them.30
The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in
their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of Bolanon to
temperate damages. It is already settled that when actual
damages for burial and related expenses are not substantiated by
receipts, temperate damages of at least ₱25,000.00 are
warranted, for it would certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs
of the victim to deny them compensation by way of actual
damages.31
Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may
be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability "when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances."32 The Civil Code permits such damages to be
awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good,
in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages."33 Conformably with such legal provisions, the CA
and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs
of the victim to exemplary damages because of the attendance of
treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant
circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed
in murder. The Court explained so in People v. Catubig:34
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code,
the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its
broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a
two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social
order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal
sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the
penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation
of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for
the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary
but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction
that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than
to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil
aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of
₱30,000.00 is deemed reasonable and proper,35 because we
think that a lesser amount could not result in genuine
exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on November 24, 2005, but MODIFIES
the awards of civil damages by adding to the amount of
₱50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages; ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which
awards shall bear interest of 6% per annum from the finality of
this decision.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177809               October 16, 2009
SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300: 1 (1)
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 274, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 04-0052;2 and (2)
reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case
No. 2001-315.3
First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different
lower courts.
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie
Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a
commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner
Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque City.
On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera
Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a
contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed
by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.1
a vv p h ! 1
The contract of lease reads:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Contract of Lease is entered into by and
between:
ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Filipino, of
legal age, married with office at 2/F
JOFERXAN Building, F.B. Harrison St.,
Brgy. Baclaran, Parañaque City, and
hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,
- and -
OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA
LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal age with
address at 24 Anahan St. RGV Homes
Parañaque City, and hereinafter referred to as
the LESSEES.
WITNESSETH
1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the
commercial building erected at the lot of the
Toribio G. Reyes Realty, Inc. situated at 158
Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road,
Barangay Baclaran in Parañaque Ctiy;
2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2)
cubicles located at the 1st & 2nd Floor, of said
building with an area of 56 square meters
under the following terms and conditions, to
wit:
a. That the monthly rental of the two (2)
cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND
(₱60,000.00), Philippine Currency. However,
due to unstable power of the peso LESSEES
agrees to a yearly increase of ten (10%)
percent of the monthly rental;
b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid
before the expiration of the contract to the
LESSOR;
c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own
water and electric consumptions in the said
premises;
d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or
make any alteration in the cubicles without a
written permission from the LESSOR.
Provided, however, that at the termination of
the Contract, the lessee shall return the two
cubicles in its original conditions at their
expenses;
e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the
cubicles in a safe and sanitary conditions, and
shall not keep any kinds of flammable or
combustible materials.
f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the
monthly rental every time it falls due or
violate any of the above conditions shall be
enough ground to terminate this Contract of
Lease. Provided, further, that, if the LESSEES
pre-terminate this Contract they shall pay the
rentals for the unused month or period by way
of liquidated damages in favor of the
LESSOR.
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6)
yrs. only starting from December _____, 1999
or up to December ______, 2005.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have
hereunto affixed their hands this ___th day of
December, 1999 at City of Manila,
Philippines.
 (sgd.) 1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00
(sgd.)
ROSALIE PALAÑA- (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip &
MOSHIERA LATIEF
CHUA Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2
LESSEE
LESSOR cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner
Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[arañ]aque
City. ROFERLAND5 Bldg. with the terms 6
(sgd.)
yrs. Contract.
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE
(sgd.)
____________________
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
Rosalie Chua
₱2,000,000.00
(sgd.) (sgd.) CHECK # 3767924
1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua FAR EAST BANK
(sgd.)
____________________
Republic of the Philippines) Ferdinand Chua
City of Manila)s.s.
2. Received cash
ACKNOWLEDGMENT ₱500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the
City of Manila personally appeared the (sgd.)
following persons: Rosalie Chua
12/10/99
____________________
Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Received by
Parañaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief
with CTC No. 12885654 at Parañaque City on
11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 3. Received cash
12885653 Parañaque City on Nov. 11, 1999. ₱70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
known to me and to me known to be the same
persons who executed this instrument (sgd.)
consisting of two (2) pages duly signed by 12-11-99 ____________________
them and the two (2) instrumental witnesses Received by:6
and acknowledged to me that the same is their
free and voluntarily acts and deeds. Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999,
Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in
IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during
have hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalie’s offer to
Seal this ____th day of December, 1999 at the purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under
City of Manila, Philippines. construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the
immediate payment of ₱2,570,000.00 would be used to finish
ATTY. CALIXTRO B. construction of the building giving them first priority in the
RAMOS occupation of the finished cubicles.
Doc. No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
Page No. _____ Until December 31, 2000 Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were
Book No. LXV PTR # 374145-1/11/99/- finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for the
Series of 1999 Mla. completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that
IBP # 00262-Life the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their
Member4 purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were
surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalie’s counsel and
the subsequent filing of a complaint against them.
A year after the commencement of the lease
and with Spouses Latip already occupying the The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:
leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent
the spouses a letter demanding payment of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and
back rentals and should they fail to do so, to all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to
vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses VACATE the property subject of this case located at the 1st and
Latip did not heed Rosalie’s demand, she 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building situated at No. 158 Quirino
instituted the aforesaid complaint. Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran,
Parañaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered to PAY
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY
Rosalie’s claims. They averred that the lease THOUSAND PESOS (₱720,000.00) as rent arrearages for the
of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid period of December 1999 to December 2000 and thereafter to
in full as evidenced by receipts showing PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND
payment to Rosalie of the total amount of PESOS (₱72,000.00) per month from January 2001 to
₱2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each and
Rosalie’s handwriting, read:
every succeeding years thereafter as stipulated in paragraph 2(a)
of the Contract of Lease x x x, until the [Spouses Latip] have
completely vacated the leased premises subject of this lease.
Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY
[Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱20,000.00) as attorney’s fees and TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(₱2,000.00) per [Rosalie’s] appearance in Court as appearance
fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.
[Spouses Latip’s] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.7
In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor
of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the contract
of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other
substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC
noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of
Ferdinand Chua, Rosalie’s husband; (2) the signatures of
Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the specific dates for
the term of the contract which only stated that the lease is for
"six (6) y[ea]rs only starting from December 1999 or up to
December 2005"; (4) the exact date of execution of the
document, albeit the month of December and year 1999 are
indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit
or advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big
commercial lease contracts.
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract
of lease was modified and supplemented; and the entire lease
rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already been
paid by Spouses Latip in the amount of ₱2,570,000.00. As to
Rosalie’s claim that her receipt of ₱2,570,000.00 was simply
goodwill payment by prospective lessees to their lessor, and not
payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this
down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations,
Rosalie did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. On
the whole, the RTC declared an existent lease between the
parties for a period of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by
Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be ejected from
the leased premises until expiration of the lease period.
The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed
decision of the [MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is reversed as
judgment is hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip] and against
[Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay the former –
(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court
appearance as and for attorney’s fees; and
(4) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned,
reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The
CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature
of Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete and valid
contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the
alleged defects in the contract of lease did not render the
contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount of
₱2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money,
the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area
of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church.
According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was
bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at
Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to
Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on
Rosalie’s appeal, the CA disposed of the case:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for
Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of RTC
Parañaque City Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the January 13, 2004
decision of the MeTC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en
toto.
SO ORDERED.9
Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.
The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip
should be ejected from the leased cubicles.
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and
upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of
the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area
to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
We disagree.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when
the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the
courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure
of time, and the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known
to judges because of their judicial functions.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro10 is instructive:
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and
discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to
be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records
and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely
another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be
dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise
acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so
notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not
judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge
is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not
generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.
Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are
"commonly" known.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial
notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or
they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind
as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person.11
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial
notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,12 which cited State Prosecutors:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records
and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is
either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of
the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial
notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or
they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind
as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide,
a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as
being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take
judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the
existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.1avvphi1
From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon,
it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took
judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To
begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed
practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran
area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even
ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of
"common knowledge" or notoriously known.
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from
her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that
the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of
goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her
petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration
under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they
had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this
score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence
provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129,
specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of
the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously
known, it will not be disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the
necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint
Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalie’s appeal before the CA.
In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie;
contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court –
What need not be proved.
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had
knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the
Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and
judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial
notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable
doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of
judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.
Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be
ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the
documentary evidence signed by both parties – the contract of
lease and the receipts evidencing payment of ₱2,570,000.00.
We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which
documents were executed first or if there was a novation of the
contract of lease. As had been found by the RTC, the lease
contract and the receipts for the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 can
be reconciled or harmonized. The RTC declared:
Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two
(2) cubicles of the 1st and 2nd floors of Roferxane (Roferland)
Building, a commercial building located at 158 Quirino Avenue,
corner Redemptorist Road, Baclaran, Parañaque City and
belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease agreement is for a term of six
(6) years commencing in December 1999 up to December 2005.
This agreement was embodied in a Contract of Lease x x x. The
terms of this lease contract, however, are modified or
supplemented by another agreement between the parties
executed and or entered into in or about the time of execution of
the lease contract, which exact date of execution of the latter is
unclear.13
We agree with the RTC’s holding only up to that point. There
exists a lease agreement between the parties as set forth in the
contract of lease which is a complete document. It need not be
signed by Ferdinand Chua as he likewise did not sign the other
two receipts for ₱500,000.00 and ₱70,000.00, respectively,
which contained only the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is
undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in Roferxane
Bldg.; thus, doing away with the need for her husband’s
consent. The findings of the three lower courts concur on this
fact.
The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing
in December 1999. This fact is again buttressed by Spouses
Latip’s admission that they occupied the property forthwith in
December 1999, bearing in mind the brisk sales during the
holiday season.
On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the
receipts amounting to ₱2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice
of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an
inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able
to provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly
submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of Roferxane Bldg.,
the said amount was simply for the payment of goodwill money,
and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.
In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the
Civil Code provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting
parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they
shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct
and cases that are different from those which the parties
intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of
several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import
which is most adequate to render it effectual.
The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that
the receipts for ₱2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the
contract of lease. However, it made a quantum leap when it
ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the two (2)
cubicles for the entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe to
this finding. To obviate confusion and for clarity, the contents of
the receipts, already set forth above, are again reproduced:
1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 (two million pesos)
from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2
cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,]
Baclaran P[arañ]que City. ROFERLAND Bldg. with the terms 6
yrs. Contract.
(sgd.)
____________________
Rosalie Chua
₱2,000,000.00
CHECK # 3767924
FAR EAST BANK
(sgd.)
____________________
Ferdinand Chua
2. Received cash
₱500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip
(sgd.)
Rosalie Chua
12/10/99
____________________
Received by
3. Received cash
₱70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
(sgd.)
12-11-99 ____________________
Received by:14
There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment
and receipt of ₱2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals
for the whole period of the lease. All three receipts state
Rosalie’s receipt of cash in varying amounts. The first receipt
for ₱2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but
this cannot mean full payment of rentals for the entire lease
period when there are no words to that effect. Further, two
receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact
that the ₱2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus,
since the contract of lease remained operative, we find that
Rosalie’s receipt of the monies should be considered as
advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is
bolstered by the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the
lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the commencement
of the lease.
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently,
Spouses Latip can be ejected from the leased premises. They are
liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of the two (2)
cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in the
Contract of Lease. However, the amount of ₱2,570,000.00,
covering advance rentals, must be deducted from this liability of
Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar
and Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie Chua for
unpaid rentals minus the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 already
received by her as advance rentals. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122480. April 12, 2000.]
BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., Petitioner, v. COURT
OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty
in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standard against
itself in refunding excess payments. When it is undisputed that a
taxpayer is entitled to a refund the State should not invoke
technicalities to keep money not belonging to it. No one, not
even the State, should enrich oneself at the expense of
another.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the March 31, 1995
Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
34240, which affirmed the December 24, 1993 Decision 2 of the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CA disposed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit." 3
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the CTA Decision
affirmed by the CA reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in [view of] all the foregoing, Petitioner’s
claim for refund is hereby DENIED and this Petition for Review
is DISMISSED for lack of merit." 4
Also assailed is the November 8, 1995 CA Resolution 5 denying
reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of this case were summarized by the CA in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of
P112,491.00 representing petitioner’s tax withheld for the year
1989.
In its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for the year 1989,
the following items are reflected:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Income P1,017,931,831.00
Deductions P1,026,218,791.00
Net Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00)
Taxable Income (Loss) P8,286,960.00
Less:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1988 Tax Credit P185,001.00
1989 Tax Credit P112,491.00
————————
TOTAL AMOUNT P297,492.00
REFUNDABLE
"It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that
petitioner had a total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive
of the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund in the present
case. However, petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income
Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of P297,492.00
will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.
"On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund
in the amount of P112,491.00 with the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue alleging that it did not apply
the 1989 refundable amount of P297,492.00 (including
P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other
tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for
the same year.
"Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to act on the claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition
for review with respondent Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the
refund of the amount of P112.491.00.
"The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner’s
petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as
evidence its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to
establish the fact that petitioner had not yet credited the amount
of P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00 which is
the subject of the present controversy) to its 1990 income tax
liability.chanrobles.com : law library
"Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the
same was denied by respondent court in its Resolution dated
May 6,1994." 6
As earlier noted, the CA affirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition.
7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the CTA, the Court of Appeals ruled as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show proof that it has not
credited to its 1990 Annual income Tax Return, the amount of
P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00), so as to refute its
previous declaration in the 1989 Income Tax Return that the
said amount will be applied as a tax credit in the succeeding
year of 1990. Having failed to submit such requirement, there is
no basis to grant the claim for refund. . . .
"Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, they
are regarded as in derogation of sovereign authority and to be
construed strictissimi juris against the person or entity claiming
the exemption. In other words, the burden of proof rests upon
the taxpayer to establish by sufficient and competent evidence
its entitlement to the claim for refund." 8
Issue
In their Memorandum, respondents identify the issue in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the refund of P112,491.00, representing excess
creditable withholding tax paid for the taxable year 1989." 9
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner Entitled to Refund
It is undisputed that petitioner had excess withholding taxes for
the year 1989 and was thus entitled to a refund amounting to
P112,491. Pursuant to Section 69 10 of the 1986 Tax Code
which states that a corporation entitled to a refund may opt
either (1) to obtain such refund or (2) to credit said amount for
the succeeding taxable year, petitioner indicated in its 1989
Income Tax Return that it would apply the said amount as a tax
credit for the succeeding taxable year, 1990. Subsequently,
petitioner informed the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that it
would claim the amount as a tax refund, instead of applying it as
a tax credit. When no action from the BIR was forthcoming,
petitioner filed its claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.
The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for tax refund.
Since petitioner declared in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it
would apply the excess withholding tax as a tax credit for the
following year, the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed
to have done so. The CTA and the CA ruled that petitioner
failed to overcome this presumption because it did not present
its 1990 Return, which would have shown that the amount in
dispute was not applied as a tax credit. Hence, the CA
concluded that petitioner was not entitled to a tax
refund.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
We disagree with the Court of Appeals. As a rule, the factual
findings of the appellate court are binding on this Court. This
rule, however, does not apply where, inter alia, the judgment is
premised on a misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate
court failed to notice certain relevant facts which if considered
would justify a different conclusion. 11 This case is one such
exception.
In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to prove its
claim that it did not apply the amount as a tax credit. During the
trial before the CTA, Ms. Yolanda Esmundo, the manager of
petitioner’s accounting department, testified to this fact. It
likewise presented its claim for refund and a certification issued
by Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioner’s vice-president, stating that the
amount of P112,491 "has not been and/or will not be
automatically credited/offset against any succeeding quarters’
income tax liabilities for the rest of the calendar year ending
December 31, 1990." Also presented were the quarterly returns
for the first two quarters of 1990.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert
petitioner’s claim. In fact, it presented no evidence at all.
Because it ought to know the tax records of all taxpayers, the
CIR could have easily disproved petitioner’s claim. To repeat, it
did not do so.
More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990
was attached to petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration filed
before the CTA. 12 A final adjustment return shows whether a
corporation incurred a loss or gained a profit during the taxable
year. In this case, that Return clearly showed that petitioner
incurred P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990. Clearly, it could not
have applied the amount in dispute as a tax credit.
Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return.
It did not even file an opposition to petitioner’s Motion and the
1990 Final Adjustment Return attached thereto. In denying the
Motion for Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said
Return. In the same vein, the CA did not pass upon that
significant document.
True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the
submission of the Return after the trial. The law creating the
Court of Tax Appeals, however, specifically provides that
proceedings before it "shall not be governed strictly by the
technical rules of evidence." 13 The paramount consideration
remains the ascertainment of truth. Verily, the quest for orderly
presentation of issues is not an absolute. It should not bar courts
from considering undisputed facts to arrive at a just
determination of a controversy.
In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for
Reconsideration clearly showed that petitioner suffered a net
loss in 1990. Contrary to the holding of the CA and the CTA,
petitioner could not have applied the amount as a tax credit. In
failing to consider the said Return, as well as the other
documentary evidence presented during the trial, the appellate
court committed a reversible error.
It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure
is to secure a just determination of every action. They are tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. 14 But there can
be no just determination of the present action if we ignore, on
grounds of strict technicality, the Return submitted before the
CTA and even before this Court. 15 To repeat, the undisputed
fact is that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990; accordingly, it
incurred no tax liability to which the tax credit could be applied.
Consequently, there is no reason for the BIR and this Court to
withhold the tax refund which rightfully belongs to the
petitioner.chanrobles.com : chanrobles.com.ph
Public respondents maintain that what was attached to
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was not the final
adjustment Return, but petitioner’s first two quarterly returns for
1990. 16 This allegation is wrong. An examination of the
records shows that the 1990 Final Adjustment Return was
attached to the Motion for Reconsideration. On the other hand,
the two quarterly returns for 1990 mentioned by respondent
were in fact attached to the Petition for Review filed before the
CTA. Indeed, to rebut respondents’ specific contention,
petitioner submitted before us its Surrejoinder, to which was
attached the Motion for Reconsideration and Exhibit "A"
thereof, the Final Adjustment Return for 1990. 17
CTA Case No. 4897
Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done
before the CTA, to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in
CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year
1990. In that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a
net loss for the taxable year 1990 . . .’’ 18 Respondent, however,
urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said case. 19
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or
are actually pending before the same judge." 20
Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may
take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes
that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached
to the Petition for Review filed before this Court. Significantly,
respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was
fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the
contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court
cannot take judicial notice thereof.chanrobles.com :
virtuallawlibrary
To our mind, respondents’ reasoning underscores the weakness
of their case. For if they had really believed that petitioner is not
entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily proved that it did
not suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that
respondents opted not to assail the fact appearing therein — that
petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 — in the same way that it
refused to controvert the same fact established by petitioner’s
other documentary exhibits.
In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole
basis of petitioner’s case. It is merely one more bit of
information showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its
1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990.
Finally, respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of
tax exemptions and are to be construed strictissimi juris against
the claimant. Under the facts of this case, we hold that petitioner
has established its claim. Petitioner may have failed to strictly
comply with the rules of procedure; it may have even been
negligent. These circumstances, however, should not compel the
Court to disregard this cold, undisputed fact: that petitioner
suffered a net loss in 1990, and that it could not have applied the
amount claimed as tax credits.
Substantial justice, equity and fair play are on the side of
petitioner. Technicalities and legalisms, however exalted, should
not be misused by the government to keep money not belonging
to it and thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding
citizens. If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and
honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standard
against itself in refunding excess payments of such taxes.
Indeed, the State must lead by its own example of honor, dignity
and uprightness.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is ordered to refund to petitioner the amount of
P112,491 as excess creditable taxes paid in 1989. No
costs.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157177             February 11, 2008
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner,
vs.
JESUSA P. REYES and CONRADO B.
REYES, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated October 29, 2002 as well as its
Resolution2 dated February 12, 2003, which affirmed with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 142, in Civil Case No. 91-3453,3 requiring Bank
of Philippine Islands (petitioner) to return to spouses Jesusa P.
Reyes and Conrado B. Reyes (respondents) the amount
of P100,000.00 plus interest and damages.
The conflicting versions of the parties are aptly summarized by
the trial court, to wit:
On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m., plaintiff Jesusa
Reyes together with her daughter, Joan Reyes, went to BPI
Zapote Branch to open an ATM account, she being interested
with the ongoing promotions of BPI entitling every depositor
with a deposit amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket with a car as
its prize to be raffled every month.
She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank manager Mr.
Nicasio, by Cicero Capati (Pats) who was an employee of the
bank and in charge of the new accounts and time deposits
characteristically described as having homosexual inclinations.
They were entertained by Capati and were made to sit at a table
occupied by a certain Liza.
Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM
account for the amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which
shall be withdrawn from her exiting savings account with BPI
bank which is account no. 0233-2433-88 and the
other P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip
for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings
account with said bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing
in good faith that Capati prepared the papers with the correct
amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures.
While she was being entertained by Capati, her daughter Joan
Reyes was filling up the signature cards and several other forms.
Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati
returned to where the plaintiff was seating and informed the
latter that the withdrawable balance could not
accommodate P200,000.00.
Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount
of P100,000.00 only and then changed and correct the figure
two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto
signifying the change, afterwhich the amount of P100,000.00 in
cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces of P500.00 peso bill
were given to Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the
same. Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00
in the name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new account no.
0235-0767-48 and brought the same to the teller's booth.
After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her
duplicate copy of her deposit to account no. 0235-0767-48
reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp
showing December 7, as the date.
Plaintiff and daughter then left.
On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa received her express teller
card from said bank.
Thereafter on December 26, 1990, plaintiff left for the United
States (Exhs. "T", "U"- "U-1") and returned to Manila on
January 31, 1991 (Exhs. "V"-"V-1").
When she went to her pawnshop, she was made aware by her
statement of account sent to her by BPI bank that her ATM
account only contained the amount of P100,000.00 with interest.
She then sent her daughter to inquire, however, the bank
manager assured her that they would look into the matter.
On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed Efren Luna, one of her
employees, to update her savings account passbook at the BPI
with the folded deposit slip for P200,000.00 stapled at the outer
cover of said passbook. After presenting the passbook to be
updated and when the same was returned, Luna noticed that the
deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and validated at
the back portion thereof.
Thereafter, Luna returned with the passbook to the plaintiff and
when the latter saw the validation, she got angry.
Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was
validated, whereupon the manager assured her that the matter
will be investigated into.
When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the
bank, Mrs. Reyes sent two (2) demand letters thru her lawyer
demanding return of the missing P100,000.00 plus interest
(Exhs. "B" and "C"). The same was received by defendant on
July 25, 1991 and October 7, 1991, respectively.
The last letter prompted reply from defendant inviting plaintiff
to sit down and discuss the problem.
The meeting resulted to the bank promising that Capati will be
submitted to a lie detector test.
Plaintiff, however, never learned of the result of said test.
Plaintiff filed this instant case.
Defendant on the other hand claimed that Bank of the Philippine
Island admitted that Jesusa Reyes had effected a fund transfer in
the amount of P100,000.00 from her ordinary savings account to
the express teller account she opened on December 7, 1990
(Exhs. "3" to "3-C"), however, it was the only amount she
deposited and no additional cash deposit of P100,000.00 was
made. That plaintiff wanted to effect the transfer of P200,000.00
but the balance in her account was not sufficient and could not
accommodate the same. Plaintiff thereafter agreed to reduce the
amount to be withdrawn from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with
plaintiff’s signature superimposed on said corrections; that the
original copy of the deposit slip was also altered
from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00, however, instead of plaintiff
signing the same, the clerk-in-charge of the bank, in this case
Cicero Capati, signed the alteration himself for Jesusa Reyes
had already left without signing the deposit slip. The documents
were subsequently machine validated for the amount
of P100,000.00 (Exhs. "2" and "4").
Defendant claimed that there was actually no cash involved with
the transactions which happened on December 7, 1990 as
contained in the bank’s teller tape (Exhs."1" to "1-C").
Defendant further claimed that when they subjected Cicero
Capati to a lie detector test, the latter passed the same with
flying colors (Exhs. "5" to "5-C"), indicative of the fact that he
was not lying when he said that there really was no cash
transaction involved when plaintiff Jesusa Reyes went to the
defendant bank on December 7, 1990; defendant further alleged
that they even went to the extent of informing Jesusa Reyes that
her claim would not be given credit (Exh. "6") considering that
no such transaction was really made on December 7, 1990. 4
On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision5 upholding the
versions of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds in favor of
the plaintiff Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado Reyes and against
defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands ordering the latter to:
1. Return to plaintiffs their P100,000.00 with interest at 14% per
annum from December 7, 1990;
2. Pay plaintiffs P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Pay plaintiffs P350,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Pay plaintiffs P250,000.00 for and attorney's fees.6
The RTC found that petitioner's claim that respondent Jesusa
deposited only P100,000.00 instead of P200,000.00 was hazy;
that what should control was the deposit slip issued by the bank
to respondent, for there was no chance by which respondent
could write the amount of P200,000.00 without petitioner's
employee noticing it and making the necessary corrections; that
it was deplorable to note that it was when respondent Jesusa's
bankbook was submitted to be updated after the lapse of several
months when the alleged error claimed by petitioner was
corrected; that Article 1962 of the New Civil Code provides that
a deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a
thing belonging to another with the obligation of safely keeping
it and of returning the same; that under Article 1972, the
depositary is obliged to keep the thing safely and to return it
when required to the depositor or to his heirs and successors or
to the person who may have been designated in the contract.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which in a Decision
dated October 29, 2002 affirmed the RTC decision with
modification as follows:
Nonetheless, the award of 14% interest per annum on the
missing P100,000.00 can stand some modification. The interest
thereon should be 12% per annum, reckoned from May 12,
1991, the last day of the five day-grace period given by plaintiff-
appellees' counsel under the first demand letter dated May 6,
1991 (Exhibit B), or counted from May 7, 1991, the date when
defendant-appellant received said letter. Interest is demandable
when the obligation consist in the payment of money and the
debtor incurs in delay.
Also, we have to reduce the P1 million award of moral damages
to a reasonable sum of P50,000.00. Moral damages are not
intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of a defendant. They
are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's
culpable action. The award of moral damages must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
In addition, we have to delete the award of P350,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The absence of malice and bad faith, as in
this case, renders the award of exemplary damages improper.
Finally, we have to reduce the award of attorney's fees to a
reasonable sum of P30,000.00, as the prosecution of this case
has not been attended with any unusual difficulty.
WHEREFORE, with the modifications thus indicated, the
judgment appealed from is in all other respects AFFIRMED.
Without costs.7
In finding petitioner liable for the missing P100,000.00, the CA
held that the RTC correctly gave credence to the testimonies of
respondent Jesusa and Joan Reyes to the effect that aside from
the fund transfer of P100,000.00 from Jesusa's savings account,
Jesusa also made a cash deposit of P100,000.00 in the afternoon
of December 7, 1990; that it is unlikely for these two to concoct
a story of falsification against a banking institution of the stature
of petitioner if their claims were not true; that the duplicate copy
of the deposit slip showed a deposit of P200,000.00; this,
juxtaposed with the fact that it was not machine-validated and
the original copy altered by the bank's clerk from P200,000.00
to P100,000.00 with the altered amount "validated," is indicative
of anomaly; that even if it was bank employee Cicero Capati
who prepared the deposit slip, Jesusa stood her ground and
categorically denied having any knowledge of the alteration
therein made; that petitioner must account for the
missing P100,000.00 because it was the author of the loss; that
banks are engaged in business imbued with public interest and
are under strict obligation to exercise utmost fidelity in dealing
with its clients, in seeing to it that the funds therein invested or
by them received are properly accounted for and duly posted in
their ledgers.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated February 12, 2003.
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
A. In affirming the decision of the trial court holding BPI liable
for the amount of P100,000.00 representing an alleged
additional deposit of respondents, the Honorable Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion by resolving the issue
based on a conjecture and ignoring physical evidence in favor of
testimonial evidence.
B. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, being as
it is contrary to law, in holding BPI liable to respondents for the
payment of interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
C. This Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion, being as
it is contrary to law, in holding BPI liable for moral damages
and attorney's fees at the reduced amounts of P50,000.00
and P30,000.00, respectively. 8
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in
sustaining the RTC's finding that respondent Jesusa made an
initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her newly opened Express
Teller account on December 7, 1990.
The issue raises a factual question. The Court is not a trier of
facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of
law that may have been committed by the lower courts. 9 As a
rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the
CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal
by this Court, as long as they are borne out by the record or are
based on substantial evidence.10 Such rule however is not
absolute, but is subject to well-established exceptions, which
are: 1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; 2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; 3)
when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the CA is based on a
misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; 6) when the CA, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case, and those findings are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7) when the
findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; 8)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; 9) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of fact of the
CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.11 We hold that this case
falls under exception Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 9 which constrain us to
resolve the factual issue.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove
his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence
required by law.12 In civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence,13 or
that evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing
than that which is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute
truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more
believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of
truth is on one side than on the other.14
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the
guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence, thus:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.- In
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon
the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses,
though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater
number.
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on
hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had heard and
seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned
the decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies himself, the
trial judge or the appellate court would not be in a better
position than this Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on
the basis of their demeanor.
Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the
transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and examined the pieces
of evidence on record.
After a careful and close examination of the records and
evidence presented by the parties, we find that respondents
failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that
respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her
Express Teller account.
Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the
outset, respondent Jesusa told Capati that she was opening an
Express Teller account for P200,000.00; that she was going to
withdraw and transfer P100,000.00 from her savings account to
her new account, and that she had an additional P100,000.00
cash. However, these assertions are not borne out by the other
evidence presented. Notably, it is not refuted that Capati
prepared a withdrawal slip15 for P200,000.00. This is contrary to
the claim of respondent Jesusa that she instructed Capati to
make a fund transfer of only P100,000.00 from her savings
account to the Express Teller account she was opening. Yet,
respondent Jesusa signed the withdrawal slip. We find it strange
that she would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in the
first place was to withdraw only P100,000.00 from her savings
account and deposit P100,000.00 in cash with her.
Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the
withdrawal slip without looking at the amount indicated therein
fails to convince us, for respondent Jesusa, as a businesswoman
in the regular course of business and taking ordinary care of her
concerns,16 would make sure that she would check the amount
written on the withdrawal slip before affixing her signature.
Significantly, we note that the space provided for her signature
is very near the space where the amount of P200,000.00 in
words and figures are written; thus, she could not have failed to
notice that the amount of P200,000.00 was written instead
of P100,000.00.
The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer the
amount of P200,000.00 from her savings account to her new
Express Teller account was further established by the teller's
tape presented as petitioner's evidence and by the testimony of
Emerenciana Torneros, the teller who had attended to
respondent Jesusa's transactions.
The teller's tape,17 Exhibit "1" unequivocally shows the
following data:
151159 07DEC90 1370 288A 233324299
151245 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.0018 152107 07DEC90 1601 288A 3333241381

BIG AMOUNT ***5000.00

151251 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388 152322 07DEC90 1601 288A 233314374

***200000.00 ***2000.00

151309 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388 152435 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076764

***200000.00 152506 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076764

PB BALANCE ERROR ***4000.00 ***4000.00

BAL. 229,257.64 152557 07DEC90 1601 288A 233069469

151338 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388 ***2000.00

***200000.00 152736 07DEC90 1601 288A 233254584

BIG AMOUNT ***2000.00

151344 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388 152849 07DEC90 0600 288A 231017585

***200000.00 ***3150.00 686448

151404 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388 152941 07DEC90 1790 288A 3135052255

***200000.00 ***2800.00 ***2800.00

TOD 153252 07DEC90 1601 288A 233098264

151520 07DEC90 1601 288A 233320145 (Emphasis supplied)

***2000.00 The first column shows the exact time of the transactions; the
second column shows the date of the transactions; the third
151705 07DEC90 1789 288A 233324299 column shows the bank transaction code; the fourth column
shows the teller's code; and the fifth column shows the client's
***22917.00 account number. The teller's tape reflected various transactions
involving different accounts on December 7, 1990 which
151727 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388 included respondent Jesusa's Savings Account No. 233243388
and her new Express Teller Account No. 235076748. It shows
that respondent Jesusa's initial intention to
***100000.00
withdraw P200,000.00, not P100,000.00, from her Savings
Account No. 233324299 was begun at 3 o'clock, 12 minutes and
BIG AMOUNT 45 seconds as shown in Exhibit "1-c."

151730 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***100000.00
151746 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***100000.0019
151810 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076748
151827 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076748
***100000.00 ***100000.0020
151903 07DEC90 1301 288A 233282405
151914 07DEC90 1690 288A 235008955
***1778.05
In explaining the entries in the teller's tape, Torneros testified
that when she was processing respondent Jesusa's withdrawal in
the amount of P200,000.00, her computer rejected the
transaction because there was a discrepancy;21 thus, the word
"BIG AMOUNT" appeared on the tape. "Big amount" means
that the amount was so big for her to approve, 22 so she keyed in
the amount again and overrode the transaction to be able to
process the withdrawal using an officer's override with the
latter's approval.23 The letter "J" appears after Figure 288 in the
fourth column to show that she overrode the transaction. She
then keyed again the amount of P200,000.00 at 3 o'clock 13
minutes and 9 seconds; however, her computer rejected the
transaction, because the balance she keyed in based on
respondent Jesusa's passbook was wrong;24 thus appeared the
phrase "balance error" on the tape, and the computer produced
the balance of P229,257.64, and so she keyed in the withdrawal
of P200,000.00.25 Since it was a big amount, she again had to
override it, so she could process the amount. However, the
withdrawal was again rejected for the reason "TOD,
overdraft,"26 which meant that the amount to be withdrawn was
more than the balance, considering that there was a debited
amount of P30,935.16 reflected in respondent Jesusa's passbook,
reducing the available balance to only P198,322.48.27
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told him of the
insufficiency of respondent Jesusa's balance.28 Capati then
motioned respondent Jesusa to the teller's cage; and when she
was already in front of the teller's cage, Torneros told her that
she could not withdraw P200,000.00 because of overdraft; thus,
respondent Jesusa decided to just withdraw P100,000.00.29
This explains the alteration in the withdrawal slip with the
superimposition of the figure "1" on the figure "2" and the
change of the word "two" to "one" to show that the withdrawn
amount from respondent Jesusa's savings account was
only P100,000.00, and that respondent Jesusa herself signed the
alterations.
The teller's tape showed that the withdrawal of the amount
of P100,000.00 by fund transfer was resumed at 3 o'clock 17
minutes and 27 seconds; but since it was a big amount, there
was a need to override it again, and the withdrawal/fund transfer
was completed. At 3 o'clock 18 minutes and 27 seconds, the
amount of P100,000.00 was deposited to respondent Jesusa's
new Express Teller Account No. 235076748.
The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent
Jesusa's original intention to withdraw the amount
of P200,000.00, and not P100,000.00 as she claims, from her
savings account, to be transferred as her initial deposit to her
new Express Teller account, the insufficiency of her balance in
her savings account, and finally the fund transfer of the amount
of P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express
Teller account. We give great evidentiary weight to the teller's
tape, considering that it is inserted into the bank's computer
terminal, which records the teller's daily transactions in the
ordinary course of business, and there is no showing that the
same had been purposely manipulated to prove petitioner's
claim.
Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her
daughter, that the former deposited P100,000.00 cash in addition
to the fund transfer of P100,000.00, is not established by
physical evidence. While the duplicate copy of the deposit
slip30 was in the amount of P200,000.00 and bore the stamp
mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show that
there was a cash deposit of P100,000.00. An examination of the
deposit slip shows that it did not contain any entry in the
breakdown portion for the specific denominations of the cash
deposit. This demolishes the testimonies of respondent Jesusa
and her daughter Joan.
Furthermore, teller Torneros's explanation of why the duplicate
copy of the deposit slip in the amount of P200,000.00 bore the
teller's stamp mark is convincing and consistent with logic and
the ordinary course of business. She testified that Capati went to
her cage bringing with him a withdrawal slip for P200,000.00
signed by respondent Jesusa, two copies of the deposit slip
for P200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa's name for her new
Express Teller account, and the latter's savings passbook
reflecting a balance of P249,657.6431 as of November 19,
1990.32 Thus, at first glance, these appeared to Torneros to be
sufficient for the withdrawal of P200,000.00 by fund transfer.
Capati then got her teller's stamp mark, stamped it on the
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, and gave the duplicate to
respondent Jesusa, while the original copy33 of the deposit slip
was left in her cage.34 However, as Torneros started processing
the transaction, it turned out that respondent Jesusa's balance
was insufficient to accommodate the P200,000.00 fund transfer
as narrated earlier.
Since respondent Jesusa had signed the alteration in the
withdrawal slip and had already left the teller's counter
thereafter and Capati was still inside the teller's cage, Torneros
asked Capati about the original deposit slip and the latter told
her, "Ok naman iyan,"35 and Capati superimposed the figures
"1" on "2" on the deposit slip36 to reflect the initial deposit
of P100,000.00 for respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller
account and signed the alteration. Torneros then machine-
validated the deposit slip. Thus, the duplicate copy of the
deposit slip, which bore Torneros’s stamp mark and which was
given to respondent Jesusa prior to the processing of her
transaction, was not machine-validated unlike the original copy
of the deposit slip.
While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit slip was
signed by Capati and not by respondent Jesusa herself was a
violation of the bank's policy requiring the depositor to sign the
correction,37 nevertheless, we find that respondents failed to
satisfactorily establish by preponderance of evidence that indeed
there was an additional cash of P100,000.00 deposited to the
new Express Teller account.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth,
and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 38 We
have, on many occasions, relied principally upon physical
evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where the physical evidence
on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule that the physical
evidence should prevail.39
In addition, to uphold the declaration of the CA that it is
unlikely for respondent Jesusa and her daughter to concoct a
false story against a banking institution is to give weight to
conjectures and surmises, which we cannot countenance.
In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by
preponderance of evidence.
Considering the foregoing, we find no need to tackle the other
issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002 as well as its
Resolution dated February 12, 2003 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by
respondents, together with the counterclaim of petitioner,
is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995
ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN,
RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO
TAMAYO, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO
PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS,
and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused-appellants.
PUNO, J.:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political
polarization in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution.
This was the time when the newly-installed government of
President Corazon C. Aquino was being openly challenged in
rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos
loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Tension and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes
broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder
of Stephen Salcedo, a known "Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed
in court against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists
charging them with the murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No.
86-47322 was filed against Raul Billosos y de Leon and Gerry
Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No. 86-47617 against Romeo
Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero;
Criminal Case No. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y
Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito
Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal Case No. 86-48931 against
Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat. Also filed were Criminal Cases
Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as
accomplices to the murder of Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XLIX, Manila. All of the accused pleaded not
guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The
prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including two
eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the
police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the
incident. In support of their testimonies, the prosecution
likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of
newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs
taken during the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was
scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists.
Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally but their
application was denied by the authorities. Despite this setback,
three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the
Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led by
Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an
impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered
speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy
Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked
the leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced.
Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes to
disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this
was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said
"Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty.
Nuega added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then
pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and truncheons to disperse
them. The loyalists scampered away but some of them fought
back and threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd fled
towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized.1
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the
Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie
Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President
Marcos, jogging around the fountain. They approached her and
informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered
them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she
continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin,
Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos,
Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied
"Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by
the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti, tayo
ngayon!" A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette
vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color
of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt.2 He then
saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of
persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in
the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be
Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked
and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the
group but they again pounced on him and pummelled him with
fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body.
Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta,
rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he
could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued
Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists.
Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed
to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and
Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them. But accused
Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man
boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also
boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was
already fallen.3 Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan
boxed him on the left side of his head and ear. 4 Accused Nilo
Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory
Iyan. Patayin!"5 Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter
lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed
Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell.
Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on
the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed
him.6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but
did not notice what he did.7
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and
wipe off the blood from his face. He sat on some cement
steps8 and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the
sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo
Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process. Salcedo
pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin.
Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang
pulis?"9
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued
along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost
consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help
of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the Medical Center
Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to the
Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He
sustained various contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and
skull fractures as revealed in the following post-mortem
findings:
Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal
region, right side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left side; 5.0 x
4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm.,
nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0 x 4.0 cm. left
suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm.,
upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal region;
right temporal region; occipital region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior cranial
fossa; right anterior cranial fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials and
fluid.10
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and
several press people, both local and foreign. The press took
pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news
the following day, capturing national and international attention.
This prompted President Aquino to order the Capital Regional
Command and the Western Police District to investigate the
incident. A reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put
up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for
persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the
killers.11 Several persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and
Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the basis of
their identification, several persons, including the accused, were
apprehended and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their
participation in the mauling of the victim and offered their
respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was
not in any of the photographs presented by the
prosecution12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in
Quezon City.13 Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta
Theater at the time of the
incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was
allegedly at his office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures
to be developed at that time. 15 He claimed to be afflicted with
hernia impairing his mobility; he cannot run normally nor do
things forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos admits he was at the
Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting
Salcedo. 17 He said that he merely watched the mauling which
explains why his face appeared in some of the
photographs. 18 Unlike the other accused, Nilo Pacadar admits
that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y Pilipino
Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day.
According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like
Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the incident. 19 His face
was in the pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop
hitting Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify
the maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The maulers however
ignored him. 21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and
Annie Ferrer opted not to testify in their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision
finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los
Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of
murder qualified by treachery and sentenced them to 14 years
10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was
likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however, found
that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused
and thus acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando
Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the
aforementioned cases as follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery," Criminal
Case No. 86-47322, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed
to prove the guilt of the two (2) Accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of said
charge;
2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case No.
86-47617, the Court finds the Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo
Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principals for the crime of Murder, defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and, there being no other mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, hereby imposes on each of them an
indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14)YEARS, TEN
(10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion
Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion
Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Maximum;
3. In "People versus Richard de los Santos," Criminal Case No.
86-47790, the Court finds the Accused Richard de los Santos
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of
Murder defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and,
there being no other extenuating circumstances, the Court
hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY
(20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY
(20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum;
4. In "People versus Joselito Tamayo," Criminal Case No. 86-
48538 the Court finds the Accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal, for the crime of "Murder" defined in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes on him an
indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN
(10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
5. In "People versus Rolando Fernandez," Criminal Case No.
86-4893l, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the
guilt of the Accused for the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt and hereby acquits him of said charge;
6. In "People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.," Criminal Case No.
86-49007, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove
the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged and hereby acquits them of said charge;
7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 86-
49008, the Court finds the said Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the crime of Murder under
Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
and hereby imposes on her an indeterminate penalty of NINE
(9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Mayor, as
Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and
ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los
Santos, Joel Tan, Joselito Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are hereby
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of Stephen
Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as actual damages and
the amount of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and
one-half (1/2) of the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo
Sison, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo had
been under detention during the pendency of these cases shall be
credited to them provided that they agreed in writing to abide by
and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City
Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to
release the Accused Gerry Nery, Raul Billosos and Rolando
Fernandez from the City Jail unless they are being detained for
another cause or charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has
become moot and academic. The Petition for Bail of the
Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito Tamayo is denied
for lack of merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega are hereby cancelled. 22
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992,
modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Annie
Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused,
except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate
court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the
information against him did not allege the said qualifying
circumstance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y
Abe, Joel Tan y Mostero and Richard de los Santos are hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and are
each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength and, as a consequence, an indeterminate penalty of
TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as Minimum to
TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as Maximum is
hereby imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of
being an accomplice to the crime of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has
been imposed in the instant consolidated cases, the said cases
are now hereby certified to the Honorable Supreme Court for
review. 24
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court inasmuch as Joselito Tamayo was not
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was
certified to us for automatic review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals against the four accused-appellants sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.
Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following
errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT NOTED THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED
TO CITE ANYTHING ON RECORD TO SUPPORT THEIR
AVERMENT THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES WHO
HAVE COME FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF STEPHEN SALCEDO.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE,
DOUBTFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND INCONCLUSIVE
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO
SUMILANG.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY OF
THE ACCUSED CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT
INSTRUMENT, THE ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE
HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF THE
DECEASED.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY
AMONG THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS
MURDER AND NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A
TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY. 25
In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN REACHING A CONCLUSION OF FACT
UTILIZING SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, NON-
SEQUITUR CONCLUSIONS, AND EVEN THE DISPUTED
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE
VALIDITY OF THE VERY SAME JUDGMENT, ALL
CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ADMITTING EXHIBITS "D", "G", "O", "P", "V", TO "V-48",
"W" TO "W-13", ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY
IDENTIFIED.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED
IN THE CASE AT BAR DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER
THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS
MURDER, NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN TUMULTUOUS
AFFRAY SIDESTEPPING IN THE PROCESS THE
FACTUAL GROUNDS SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT. 26
Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the testimonies of the two in prosecution
eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because
they are unreliable, doubtful and do not deserve any credence.
According to them, the testimonies of these two witnesses are
suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was
announced by General Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted
three sworn statements to the police geared at providing a new
or improved version of the incident. On the witness stand, he
mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another case as
accused Rolando Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive
and unresponsive prompting the trial court to reprimand him
several times. 28
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of
the reward announced by General Lim, much less that both or
either of them ever received such reward from the government.
On the contrary, the evidence shows that Sumilang reported the
incident to the police and submitted his sworn statement
immediately two hours after the mauling, even before
announcement of any reward. 29 He informed the police that he
would cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants if
he saw them again. 30
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not
make them and his testimony incredible. The sworn statements
were made to identify more suspects who were apprehended
during the investigation of Salcedo's death. 31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times
by the trial court on the witness stand for being argumentative
and evasive. 32 This is not enough reason to reject Sumilang's
testimony for he did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all
throughout his testimony. On the whole, his testimony was
correctly given credence by the trial court despite his
evasiveness at some instances. Except for compelling reasons,
we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of
witnesses considering their visual view of the demeanor of
witnesses when on the witness stand. As trial courts, they can
best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a
witness' testimony.
Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the
accused does not make him an entirely untrustworthy
witness. 33 It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An
honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony.
Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with
imperfect senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the
testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts but
disbelieved with respect to the others. 34
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the
witnesses' testimonies corroborate each other on all important
and relevant details of the principal occurrence. Their positive
identification of all petitioners jibe with each other and their
narration of the events are supported by the medical and
documentary evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, testified that the victim had various
wounds on his body which could have been inflicted by pressure
from more than one hard object. 35 The contusions and abrasions
found could have been caused by punches, kicks and blows
from rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage
was a result of fractures in Salcedo's skull which may have been
caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as fistblows,
kicks and a blunt wooden instrument. 37
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and
punched. Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo was pummeled
by his assailants with stones in their hands. 38
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court
correctly disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and "P," it erroneously
gave evidentiary weight to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48,"
"W," "W-1" to "W-13." 39 Exhibit "O" is the Joint Affidavit of
Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police intelligence-operatives
who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat.
Flores properly identified Exhibit "O" as his sworn statement
and in fact gave testimony corroborating the contents
thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit merely reiterates what the
other prosecution witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat.
Bautista is a surplusage. If appellants wanted to impeach the
said affidavit, they should have placed Pat. Flores on the witness
stand.
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the
victim as he was being mauled at the Luneta — starting from a
grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along
Roxas Boulevard, 41 — as he was being chased by his
assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his assailants. 43 Exhibits
"W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the
mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as
the Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily
Inquirer, 46 and the Malaya. 47 The admissibility of these
photographs is being questioned by appellants for lack of proper
identification by the person or persons who took the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented
in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its
production and testified as to the circumstances under which
they were produced. 48 The value of this kind of evidence lies in
its being a correct representation or reproduction of the
original, 49 and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in
portraying the scene at the time of the crime. 50 The
photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify
the pictures he has taken. 51 The correctness of the photograph as
a faithful representation of the object portrayed can
be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person
who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the
court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its
accuracy. 52 Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the
photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify
to its exactness and accuracy. 53
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the
photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel
Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack
of proper identification. 54 However, when the accused presented
their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused
Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to
"V-48" to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures
and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the
victim. 55 The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito
Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits.
And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other
accused per understanding with their respective counsels,
including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent
hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine
all the accused who took the witness stand. 56 No objection was
made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro
appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing
objection to their admissibility. 57
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the
photographs is anchored on the fact that the person who took the
same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of
these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged
non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness
and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful
representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when
appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan
identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence
thereat. 58
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's
testimonies reveal that only three of the appellants, namely,
Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be
readily seen in various belligerent poses lunging or hovering
behind or over the victim. 59 Appellant Romeo Sison appears
only once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown
merely running after the
victim. 60Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of
the pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the
photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not
capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only
segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and
Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by
Sumilang and
Banculo61Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their
eyeball identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the
existence of conspiracy among the principal accused and in
convicting them of murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength, not death in tumultuous affray.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the
Revised Penal code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. — When, while
several persons, not composing groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is
killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall
be punished by prison mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical
injuries on the deceased, the penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all
those who shall have used violence upon the person of the
victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be
several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized
for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted
one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone
was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the
person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who
used violence can be identified.62
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between
several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous
affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded
and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was
between one distinct group and one individual. Confusion may
have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but
this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to
Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal
that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one
defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns
in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no
confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a
reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.64
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were
numerous by as much as fifty in number65 and were armed with
stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of
their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any
attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. They followed
Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument
several meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he was
already fallen on the ground. There was a time when Salcedo
was able to get up, prop himself against the pavement and wipe
off the blood from his face. But his attackers continued to
pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor
could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save
him from his assailants but they continued beating him, hitting
Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they
ignored his pleas until he finally lost consciousness. The
deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a
defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in
the instant case. There is no proof that the attack on Salcedo was
deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the assailants'
safety from any defense the victim could have made. True, the
attack on Salcedo was sudden and unexpected but it was
apparently because of the fact that he was wearing a yellow t-
shirt or because he allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign against
the rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate
court well found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the
temper of the rallyists and run away from them but he,
unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence of treachery
is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person being attacked. 66
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was
alleged in the information against Joselito Tamayo. Evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case because the
attack against Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous, spurred by
the raging animosity against the so-called "Coryistas." It was not
preceded by cool thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among
appellants. At the time they were committing the crime, their
actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a
concerted effort to bring about the death of Salcedo. Where a
conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as to who among
the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to
sustain a conviction. 67 Each of the conspirators is liable for all
acts of the others regardless of the intent and character of their
participation, because the act of one is the act of all. 68
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as
actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
and one half of the costs of the suit. At the time he died on July
27, 1986, Salcedo was twenty three years old and was set to
leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi Arabia. 69 The
reckless disregard for such a young person's life and the anguish
wrought on his widow and three small children, 70 warrant an
increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00.
The indemnity of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the
death of the victim.71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and
Richard de los Santos are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder without any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the
generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
and, as a consequence, he is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as
minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
maximum;
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the following amounts:
(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 138874-75               January 31, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO;"
JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
"WESLEY;" ALBERT CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;"
ARIEL BALANSAG; DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias
'TISOY TAGALOG;" JAMES ANTHONY UY alias
"WANGWANG;" and JAMES ANDREW UY alias
"MM," Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Most jurisdictions recognize age as a barrier to having full
responsibility over one’s action.1 Our legal system, for instance,
does not punish a youth as it would an adult, and it sees youthful
misconduct as evidence of unreasoned or impaired judgment.
Thus, in a myriad of cases, we have applied the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68 of
the Revised Penal Code -- the rationale of which is to show
mercy and some extent of leniency in favor of an accused who,
by reason of his age, is presumed to have acted with less
discernment. The case at bar is another instance when the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority must apply.
For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration 2 filed by
brothers James Anthony and James Andrew, both surnamed Uy,
praying for the reduction of the penalties we imposed upon the
latter on the ground that he was a minor at the time the crimes
were committed.
A brief review of the pertinent facts is imperative.
On February 3, 2004, we rendered a Decision3 convicting the
Uy brothers, together with Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman
Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag of
the crimes of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with homicide and rape; and (b) simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU 45303 and
45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO
JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO;’ JOSMAN
AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN
PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW
UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO
JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO’; JOSMAN
AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN
PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW
UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES
ANTHONY UY who was a minor at the time the crime was
committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal
Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in
its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as MAXIMUM;
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs
of Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts
of (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages; (c) ₱150,000.00 as moral damages;
and (d) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA
7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority
that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of
this Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded
to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her
Excellency’s pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
On March 23, 2004, the Uy brothers filed a motion for
reconsideration anchored on the following grounds:
I perpetua should be reduced to twelve (12) years of prision
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY
WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER
JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT
THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR
ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY
16, 1997;
II
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY
OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-
AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18,
1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY
ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR
ITS EXHUMATION FOR DNA
TESTING.4
The issues raised in the above motion being intertwined with
those raised by Larrañaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Caño and Balansag
in their separate motions for reconsideration, we deemed it
appropriate to consolidate the motions. After a painstaking
evaluation of every piece and specie of evidence presented
before the trial court in response to the movants’ plea for the
reversal of their conviction, still we are convinced that the
movants’ guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
in our Resolution dated July 21, 2005, we denied all the
motions. However, left unresolved is the issue of James
Andrew’s minority.
Hence, this disquisition.
In their motion, the Uy brothers claim that James Andrew was
only seventeen (17) years and two hundred sixty two (262) days
old at the time the crimes were committed. To substantiate such
claim, he begs leave and pleads that we admit at this stage of the
proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. In the
ultimate, he prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of
his brother James Anthony.
Considering that the entry of James Andrew’s birth in the
proffered Certificate of Live Birth is not legible, we required the
Solicitor General (a) to secure from the City Civil Registrar of
Cotobato, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and
legible copy of James’ Certificate of Live Birth, and thereafter,
(b) to file an extensive comment on the Uy brothers’ motion,
solely on the issue of James Andrew’s minority.
On November 17, 2005, the Solicitor General submitted his
comment.1âwphi1 Attached therewith are clear and legible
copies of James’ Certificate of Live Birth duly certified by the
Office of the City Civil Registrar of Cotobato and the National
Statistics Office. Both documents bear the entry October 27,
1979 as the date of his birth, thus, showing that he was indeed
only 17 years and 262 days old when the crimes were
committed on July 16, 1997.
Consequently, the Solicitor General recommended that the
penalty imposed on James Andrew be modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 for the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and
rape, the death penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, for the crime of simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the penalty of reclusion
mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum,
similar to the penalty imposed on his brother James Anthony in
Criminal Case No. CBU-45303.
The motion is meritorious.
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 68. – Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen
years of age. – When the offender is a minor under eighteen
years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the
paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the
following rules shall be observed:
xxx
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period.
Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his
minority, is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. The
penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape, being death, one
degree lower therefrom is reclusion perpetua.5 On the other
hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower
therefrom is reclusion temporal.6 There being no aggravating
and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on
James Andrew is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.7
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon James Andrew;
while in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, the imposable penalty
upon him is twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum
period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. Our Decision dated February 3, 2004 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case
No. CBU-45303, James Andrew Uy is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal Case No. CBU-
45304, the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its
maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-64507 April 25, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
NESTOR GANDUMA, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Nestor Ganduma, was convicted of the
crime of rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the victim, Eva Comista, for
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 in a decision rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Leyte through the Honorable Judge
Fortunate B. Cuna.
The lower court's decision was based on the testimonies of the
following witnesses for the prosecution: Eva Cornista, the
alleged offended party, Eugenia Afiano, Cornista's aunt, and
Dr.Virgilio Gernale, Cornista's examining physician. The
testimonies of the foregoing witnesses proferred to establish the
following facts:
At about 3:00 in the afternoon of September 8, 1980, while Eva
Cornista, a 15-year old lass, was attending to her two brothers
aged three and one at the yard of her house, the accused
appellant aged 21 years old, passed by and suddenly pointed a
bolo at the girl's breast. Threatening the girl with death if she
shouted, the accused-appellant dragged her to the bushes which
was about 10 meters from her house, then pushed her to the
ground. When Eva fell face upward, the appellant placed
himself on top of her. Still holding the bolo with his right hand,
and pointing it at the girl's breast, the appellant removed the
girl's underwear, then his trousers with his left hand, and
successfully had carnal knowledge of her. Eva screamed and
this was heard by her aunt Eugenia. Responding to the scream,
Eugenia proceeded to the place where she witnessed the
appellant sexually abusing Eva. Surprised, the appellant picked
up his clothes then fled.
The examining physician testified as to the presence of some
linear abrasions on the inside of the girl's left thigh, the
prominence of rugosities in and the laxity of the vaginal wall.
The girl's hymen was, however, found intact as it was flexible.
The physician further testified that the girl might actually have
had sexual intercourse near or at the time of the commission of
the crime of rape.
On the other hand, the appellant in his testimony declared that
Eva was as sweetheart, their love affair having started some two
years before the alleged crime happened, that is, when the
appellant was still employed as a helper in the household of
Eva. The appellant's employment was terminated sometime later
by Eva's father because of his (appellant's) failure to pay the
amount of P50.00 loan. On the day of the alleged crime, the
appellant testified, he went to Eva's house upon the invitation of
the latter. When asked how the invitation was relayed to him,
the appellant declared that Eva called his name and beckoned
him with her hand towards the direction of her house. (The
houses of Nestor and Eva were some 25 meters apart.) As soon
as Nestor arrived at the house, the two began sharing intimacies
in the sala until the latter suggested that they should not do it at
her house because her "father might see." Both, thus, proceeded
to the bushes where they continued kissing and caressing each
other. Eva later suggested that they undress. It was while they
were removing their clothes that Eugenia Añano, Eva's aunt,
surprised them. Nestor recalled Eugenia's statement, "You
Eva ..., that is what you are doing whenever your parents are
away. I am going to tell your parents about this." Thereupon,
Eva urged the defendant to leave saying, "Nestor, you go ahead
of me because we will not stop if you will not leave me."
This case is now with us on appeal. The appellant assigned the
following errors:
1. That the decision of the trial court was rendered without
jurisdiction;
2. That the decision of the trial court is contrary to law and
therefore null and void.
The appellant anchors his appeal on the alleged absence of a
complaint as required by Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
He does not dispute the findings of fact of the trial court. If,
indeed, there was no complaint, such would have been ground
enough for the acquittal of the accused. The records of the case,
however, show that there was indeed a complaint signed by Eva
Cornista dated September 26, 1980.
While the findings of facts here are not disputed by the appellant
and his defense of an alleged procedural infirmity is now
overthrown, we nevertheless reverse the judgment of the lower
court on the ground of reasonable doubt.
We are not unmindful of the fact that ordinarily, the question of
credibility is for the trial court to resolve. But when there are
circumstances on record that point to the possibility that the
appraisal of the evidence by the trial court was tainted, this
Court has the duty to weigh the evidence anew and reverse the
decision if need be. As Justice Malcolm said in People v.
Otero: 1
After everything is said and done, we come back, as we
invariably do in cases of this nature, to a recognition of the rule
that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgment of
the trial court in passing on the credibility of the opposing
witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.
A thorough evaluation of the records of the case discloses
certain matters in the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution which, to our minds, render doubtful the
commission of the crime charged. This being the case, reversal
is but proper.
1. We are not convinced that the complainant offered a
tenacious resistance to the alleged sexual assault.
While she was being dragged to the bushes, which was some 10
meters away, she allegedly struggled to free herself from the
grip of the accused-appellant. It was for this reason that she fell
twice and sustained bruises on her knees and left arm. But while
all these allegedly happened to her which undoubtedly, must
have caused her great pain, she never shouted, cried nor even
whimpered. For if she did, her aunt, witness Añano, would have
heard her at that very moment, considering that Añano was only
some distance away (35 meters).
Moreover, the examining physician's findings pointed to the
presence of some linear abrasions inside of the complainant's
thigh but none on her arms or legs. The said bruises, if there
were indeed any, could not have been missed by the physician
for he had the duty to examine physically the complainant.
Neither could the alleged bruises have already healed for the
physical examination was conducted barely a week after the
alleged crime of rape was committed. Physical evidence being
of the highest order, this absence of external injuries belies the
complainant's testimony that she was dragged to the bushes thus
rendering her credibility in doubt.2 It is, therefore, a possibility
that the complainant might not actually have tripped while she
was allegedly being dragged to the bushes against her wig. It is
more plausible that she went with the appellant to the bushes
willingly.
2. As to the presence of the linear abrasions of 3.0 cm. in length
found inside the left thigh of the complainant, we cannot
appreciate those as indications of force and violence. As pointed
out by the counsel for the appellant, the wounds may have been
caused by blades of grass or by some hard object while the
complainant and the appellant were caressing each other by the
bushes. Nonetheless, the wounds were too superficial to
corroborate the complainant's allegation that she resisted the
appellant's sexual advances which compelled the latter to use
brute force. In a rape case, the testimony of the complainant
must be corroborated by physical evidence showing use of
force. 3
3. The testimony of Eugenia Añano does not show that the
crime charged was committed.We note the fact that Añano
merely declared that she surprised the appellant and the
complainant while the former was on top of the latter doing the
push and pull motion. She never said anything about a struggle.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And when you arrived at that place, what did you see there, if
any?
A I saw Nestor Ganduma without lower garment, without pants.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now after seeing that when you reached that place you saw
Nestor Ganduma without pants and making a push and pull
motion on Eva Cornista, now, when you arrived there what was
the position of Eva Cornista?
A Lying down face upward.
Q What was the position of Nestor Ganduma?
A He was on top face downward making a push and pull
motion. 4
Nor did the witness mention seeing a knife or any deadly
weapon at the scene of the supposed crime at the moment of
discovery and even when the appellant supposedly fled.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now after seeing that to Nestor Ganduma, what happened?
A He stood up immediately and brought along his pants and ran
away, picked up his pants and ran. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, witness Añano heard only one shout ("ouch or agui")
which may actually not have been a cry of resistance or a cry for
help but a cry of discomfort or pain naturally felt by a woman
who was experiencing sexual intercourse in such venue.
4. If the appellant indeed entertained lustful intentions towards
the complainant and the latter never reciprocated any advances
that he must have made, he would have committed the crime
charged while he was still employed in the complainant's house.
For then, the satisfaction of his sexual urges through the use of
force was easier to accomplish considering that both were then
living under the same roof Certainly, there were many instances
when only the two of them were left in the house and what
better opportunities did he have than those moments when he
could have pounced upon the unsuspecting complainant and
abuse her sexually.
But as the prosecution would like us to believe, it was only
months after the services of the appellant were terminated that
the latter decided to force himself upon her. And the means he
allegedly employed to achieve his end was by brute force,
highly unusual for a man who had known, and in fact, served
the woman for years. We are likewise baffled by the suddenness
of the alleged attack. From nowhere, the appellant appeared
before the complainant's eyes and for no apparent reason but
lust which must have seethed all those years, pointed a bolo at
the complainant's breast, dragged her to the bushes and
thereupon ravished her. Again, we say that such was unusual.
And when the alleged crime was discovered by Añano and the
appellant fled from the scene of the crime, we find it, likewise,
unusual that the appellant never even bothered to hide in order
to escape the ire of complainant's father as wen as the strong
arm of the law.
From the preceding, we can but conclude that the complainant
and the appellant, as the latter claims, were lovers and that the
sexual act was but a product of their passions inflamed. Their
physical accessibility for each other borne out by the fact that
both lived under the same roof for quite some time must have
given rise to what developed as sexual intimacy. This is not an
uncommon result of mere propinquity.
While this Court has, in numerous cases, affirmed the judgments
of conviction rendered by the trial court in rape charges
especially where the offended parties were very young and
presumptively had no ill motives to concoct a story if only to
secure indictments for a crime as grave as rape, this Court
likewise reversed judgments of conviction and acquitted the
accused when there were strong indications pointing to the
possibility that the rape charges were merely motivated by some
factors except the truth as to their commission.
In People v. Berdaje, 6 this Court considered the case an
exception to the general belief that a 15-year old girl would not
expose herself to the ordeal of a public trial if she were not
motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit who had
ravished and shamed her placed behind bars. The evidence in
the said case showed that the alleged victim voluntarily
submitted to the sexual intercourse. She was motivated to file
the case if only to escape the indignation of her family as well as
the social disrepute that goes with the act.
Also, in People v. Lopez, 7 this Court, speaking through the then
Chief Justice Fernando, acquitted the accused of the crime of
rape of a 13-year old girl because of want of force and
intimidation as borne out by the fact that the girl, in obedience
to the wishes of the appellant, submitted herself to him.
Furthermore, this Court found that the filing of the charge was
motivated by an ulterior motive, i.e., that the alleged victim bore
a grudge towards the accused because he courted her elder
sister.
In this case, we cannot but suspect the motive that impelled the
complainant to file the rape case. Suffice it to say that no less
than the complainant's aunt discovered the appellant and the
complainant while in sexual congress. Expectedly, the matter
was reported by Añano to the complainant's parents. More
because of fear for her father's wrath for her having carried on a
relationship with a man who was not only her family's former
helper but also the man her father disliked utterly, as well as the
social consequences, than for any affection that she may have
had for the appellant, the complainant had to report to her father
that she was sexually abused. Thus, this case for rape which saw
the conviction of the appellant in the lower court.
Considering the above circumstances, we are, to a great extent,
doubtful whether the crime charged was, in fact, committed.
The prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the constitutional
presumption of innocence not having been successfully
overcome, it should prevail. The appellant, hence, is entitled to
acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated April 18,
1983 is REVERSED and the appellant ACQUITTED of the
crime of rape. With costs de oficio.
G.R. No. 109775 November 14, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE ENCARNACION
MALIMIT alias "MANOLO", accused-appellant.
 
FRANCISCO, J.:
Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with 1 and
convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, 2 was meted by the trial court 3 the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the cost. 4
In this appeal, appellant asks for his acquittal alleging that the
trial court committed the following errors, to wit:
I (Ibid., pp. 16-17). 6
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES ON THEIR ALLEGED
IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS
THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME DESPITE THE FACT
(SIC) THEY REVEALED THEIR ALLEGED
"KNOWLEDGE" OF TH6E CRIME MORE THAN FIVE
MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS
EVIDENCE THE WALLET AND ITS CONTENTS
ALTHOUGH THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LEAD TO
ITS PRODUCTION WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. 5
The following is the recital of facts as summarized by the
appellee in its Brief, and duly supported by the evidence on
record:
On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, [Onofre]
Malaki was attending to his store. Malaki's houseboy Edilberto
Batin, on the other hand, was busy cooking chicken for supper
at the kitchen located at the back of the store (TSN, June 19, 199
(sic), p. 14).
Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store
of Malaki. Rondon was to purchase chemical for his rice farm
(TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 19). Rondon came from his house,
approximately one hundred and fifty (150) meters distant from
Malaki's store (Ibid., p. 24).
Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the
kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store to ask his employer
(Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the
store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant coming out of
the store with a bolo (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 14), while his boss,
bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor "struggling
for his life" (hovering between life and death) (Ibid.).
Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from
the store, also saw appellant Jose Malimit (or "Manolo") rushing
out through the front door of Malaki's store with a blood-stained
bolo (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by the illumination
coming from a pressure lamp ("petromax") inside the store,
Rondon clearly recognized Malimit (Ibid., p. 22).
Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside
the store, he met Rondon (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 15). After a
brief conversation, both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby
house of Malaki's brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and informed
Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along
with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless
body of Malaki in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor.
Beloy readily noticed that the store's drawer was opened and
ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket
In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the
credibility of prosecution witnesses Florencio Rondon and
Edilberto Batin by pointing out their alleged delay in revealing
what they knew about the incident. He posits that while the
crime took place on April 15, 1991, it was only on September
17, 1991 when these witnesses tagged him as the culprit.
We find these contentions bereft of merit. Appellant
haphazardly concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated the
appellant to this gruesome crime only on September 17, 1991.
The aforementioned date however, was merely the date 7 when
Rondon and Batin executed their respective
affidavits, 8 narrating that they saw the appellant on the night of
April 15, 1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood and rushing
out of Malaki's store. As to appellant's claim of delay, suffice it
to state that extant from the records are ample testimonial
evidence negating appellant's protestation, to wit: (1) after
having discovered the commission of the crime, Rondon and
Batin immediately looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki's brother-
in-law, and informed him that appellant was the only person
they saw running away from the crime scene; 9 (2) Beloy and
Batin reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment in their
barangay where Batin declared that it was appellant who robbed
Malaki on that fateful night; 10 and (3) Batin again made a
similar statement later at the Silago Police Station.11
Next, appellant derided the non-presentation by the prosecution
of the police blotter which could prove if appellant was indeed
implicated right away by Batin to the crime. 12 We do not
believe, however, that it was necessary for the prosecution to
present as evidence a copy of the aforementioned police blotter.
Neither was its non-presentation in court fatal to the
prosecution's case. Entries in the police blotter are merely
corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted testimony of Batin
that he identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime
before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as evidence is
not indispensable. 13 Besides, if appellant believed that he was
not identified therein, then he should have secured a copy
thereof from the Silago Police Station and utilized the same as
controverting evidence to impeach Batin's credibility as
witness. 14 Having failed to do so, appellant cannot now pass the
blame on the prosecution for something which appellant himself
should have done.
Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the
appellant only on September 15, 1991, or after the lapse of five
months from commission of the crime, this fact alone does not
render their testimony less credible. The non-disclosure by the
witness to the police officers of appellant's identity immediately
after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human
experience. 15 In fact the natural reticence of most people to get
involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors,
as in this case, 16 is of judicial notice. 17 At any rate, the
consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of
the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are
given weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate
court. 18 This is the established rule of evidence, as the matter of
assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is a function best
performed by the trial court which can weigh said testimony in
the light of the witness" demeanor, conduct and attitude at the
trial. 19 And although the rule admits of certain exceptions,
namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of
witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the
conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the
evidence, 20 we found none in this case.
In his second assignment of error, appellant asseverates that the
admission as evidence of Malaki's wallet 21 together with its
contents, viz., (1) Malaki's residence certificate; 22 (2) his
identification card;23 and (3) bunch of keys, 24 violates his right
against self-incrimination. 25 Likewise, appellant sought for their
exclusion because during the custodial investigation, wherein he
pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he hid
Malaki's wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights.
We are not persuaded. The right against self-incrimination
guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in
this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt
vs. United States, 26 ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is
simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from
the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his
guilt. 27 It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but
an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question now
before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:
If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his
[physical control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his
physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be
possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with
all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of
the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained
by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the
surrender of the evidential articles — a clear reduction ad
absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the
kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion  28
Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned
pieces of evidence pursuant to the provision of the Constitution
under Article III, Section 12, viz:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Sec. 17 hereof, shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded
by our men in uniform. However, infractions thereof render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during custodial investigation. The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the
issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, 29 is not
affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation. Concededly, appellant was not informed of his
right to remain silent and to have his own counsel by the
investigating policemen during the custodial investigation.
Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in
accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless,
these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility of
Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence certificate and
keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the
crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it
was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the
robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and keys
found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to
prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore,
even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are
inadmissible, the same will not detract from appellant's
culpability considering the existence of other evidence and
circumstances establishing appellant's identity and guilt as
perpetrator of the crime charged.
We, now come to appellant's third assignment of error where he
demurs on the prosecution's evidence, contending that they are
insufficient to sustain his conviction.
Our close scrutiny of the record reveals otherwise. Time and
again, we ruled that there can be a verdict of conviction based
on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form
an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the
others, as the perpetrator of the crime. 30 In order that
circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same
must comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. 31 In this case, there were at least five (5)
circumstances constituting an unbroken chain of events which
by their "concordant combination and cumulative effect", satisfy
the requirements for the conviction of the
appellant, 32 specifically: (1) appellant was seen by Rondon and
Batin, whose credibilities were untarnished, holding a bolo in
his right hand and rushing out of Malaki's store seconds prior to
their discovery of the crime; 33 (2) Malaki sustained multiple
stab wounds 34 and he died of "cardiac arrest, secondary to
severe external hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds", 35 (3)
witness Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on August 6, 1991,
accompanied by some policemen, retrieve Malaki's wallet
underneath a stone at the seashore in Barangay
Hingatungan; 36 (4) appellant himself admitted in his testimony
that on August 6, 1991, he accompanied several policemen to
the seashore where he hid Malaki's wallet; 37 and (5) appellant's
flight and his subsequent disappearance from Hingatungan
immediately after the incident. 38
On the other hand, appellant's version of the story does not
inspire belief. He maintains that on that fateful night he was in
his house together with his wife. He claims that they had just
arrived from a gambling spree allegedly in the house of a certain
Maui Petalcorin. Surprisingly, however, the defense did not
bother to call appellant's wife to the witness stand to corroborate
appellant's alibi. Neither did it present as witness Maui
Petalcorin, or any other person who may have seen the appellant
in the said place, if only to provide a semblance of truth to this
assertion. As the defense of alibi is weak in view of the positive
identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses, 39 it
becomes weaker because of the unexplained failure of the
defense to present any corroboration. 40 Furthermore, proof that
appellant was in his house when the crime was committed is not
enough. Appellant must likewise demonstrate that he could not
have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its
vicinity, at the time of its commission. 41 In this case, appellant
himself admitted that his house was just about eighty (80)
meters away from the house of
Malaki. 42 It was, therefore, not impossible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the commission of the crime,
as in fact, no evidence to negate this possibility was ever
adduced by him at the trial.
Appellant's insistence that he merely found Malaki's wallet by
chance while gathering shells along the seashore, and that he
feared being implicated in the crime for which reason he hid the
wallet underneath a stone, hardly inspires belief. We are at a
loss, just as the trial court was, as to why appellant should fear
being implicated in the crime if indeed he merely found
Malaki's wallet by chance. No inference can be drawn from
appellant's purported apprehension other than the logical
conclusion that appellant had knowledge of the crime. Besides,
proof that appellant is in possession of a stolen property gives
rise to a valid presumption that he stole the same. 43
In fine, as the killing of Malaki took place on the occasion of
robbery, appellant was correctly convicted by the trial court of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, defined
and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204894               March 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y
FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS y DELANTAR, and
ROGER JALANDONI y ARI, Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged
appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold Gomez y
Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y Delantar (Santos), and
Roger Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with murder before the Las
Pifias Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case 06-0854.1
PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (P02 Gregorio) testified that at
around 10:30 in the evening of August 29, 2006, he and P02
Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the
vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they
spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila
Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza and
Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers approached the taxi and
asked the driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for his
documents. The latter complied but, having entertained doubts
regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they asked
him to come with them to the police station in their mobile car
for further questioning.2
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and
left his taxi behind. On reaching the 7-11 convenience store on
the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they stopped and PO2
Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he
approached the store’s door, however, he came upon two
suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan
shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to
escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an
armed man whom he saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw
another man, who came from the Jollibbee outlet, run towards
Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The
latter returned fire but the men were able to take a taxi and
escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance.
On returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas,
the taxi driver they had with them had fled.
P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation
Division of the Las Piñas Police, testified that he and PO2
Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately responded to PO2
Gregorio’s urgent call. Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi
driver who fled, was involved in the attempted robbery, they
searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that
Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel
Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages.3
The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2
Pangilinan had killed was someone named Reynaldo Mendoza
who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The police found
spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the crime scene. Follow-up
operations at nearby provinces resulted in finding the dead body
of one of the suspects, Alex Angeles, at the Metro South
Medical Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.4
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the
messages in accused Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing as
Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then
conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of
accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were
also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The
prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text
messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.5
The victim’s father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that his son
was at the time of his death 28 years old, unmarried, and was
receiving police pay of ₱8,000.00 to ₱10,000.00 per month.
Ricardo spent ₱99,999 for burial expense, ₱16,000.00 for the
interment services, and ₱50,000.00 for purchase of the cemetery
lot.6
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any
evidence or testify in the case, 7 the accused opted to instead file
a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for their defense. They
pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since they
were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text
messages were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.
On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment,8 finding all the
accused guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation and
use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance of
use of unlicensed firearms. It thus sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the possibility of parole
and to indemnify the heirs of PO2 Pangilinan with ₱165,999.00
as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00
as exemplary damages, and ₱2,080,000.00 as compensation for
loss of earning capacity.
Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the
Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed in
toto the conviction of the accused.9 The CA, however, found the
absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution failed to
prove that the several accused planned the crime before
committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to this
Court.10
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present
direct evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or
Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.11 This may
be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by
circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is
more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.12
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution
presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the
accused. Thus:
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the
driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila
Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with them to
the police station because of the questionable documents he
showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab
yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained messages which
led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who were
also taxicab drivers.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the
cab to go to the police station where he was about to be taken
for questioning, tending to show that he had something to hide.
He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to clear up the
matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of
the men he saw running away from the scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of those who
engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages also
referred to "Kua Justin" as the one who was hit in such shootout
and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages
linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators
succeeded in entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and
Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi
driven by Enojas clearly made references to the 7-11 shootout
and to the wounding of "Kua Justin," one of the gunmen, and his
subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were
members of an organized group of taxicab drivers engaged in
illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession
of mobile phones with call numbers that corresponded to the
senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that
accused Enojas left in his taxicab.13
The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the
aggravating circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use of
unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to
murder. In "aid of armed men," the men act as accomplices
only. They must not be acting in the commission of the crime
under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they
are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use
of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating
circumstance that is not among the circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide
to murder.14 Consequently, the accused in this case may be held
liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use of unlicensed
firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted
them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying
the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.15 Text
messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was
a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. 16 Here,
PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text
messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap
them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the
mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on
them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid
warrant of arrest.1âwphi1 But, assuming that this was so, it
cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but
for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them
after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest,
a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been
committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the
investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed
it.17 The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the
scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the
participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police
caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.
The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified to
conform to current jurisprudence.18
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals
Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03377. The
Court instead FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit,
Arnold Gomez y Fabregas, Fernando Santos y Delantar, and
Roger Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the lesser crime of
HOMICIDE with the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the Court SENTENCES each of them to 12 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The Court also MODIFIES the award of exemplary
damages by increasing it to ₱30,000.00, with an additional
₱50,000.00 for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 212196               January 12, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RAMIL DORIA DAHIL and ROMMEL CASTRO y
CARLOS, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 27, 2013 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05707, which
affirmed the July 17, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 57, Angeles City (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos.
DC 02-376, DC 02-377 and DC 02-378, finding accused Ramil
Doria Dahil (Dahil) and Rommel Castro (Castro) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5 and 11 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
The Facts
On October 1, 2002, Dahil and Castro were charged in three (3)
separate Informations before the RTC. In Criminal Case No. DC
02-376, Dahil and Castro were charged with violation of Section
5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the sale of 26.8098 grams of
marijuana in the Information which reads:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in the City of
Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to
a poseur buyer six (6) tea bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops
weighing TWENTY SIX GRAMS AND EIGHT THOUSAND
NINETY EIGHT TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM
(26.8098), which is a dangerous drug, without authority
whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-377, Dahil was charged with
possession of 20.6642 grams of marijuana in violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in the Information
which reads: That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002,
in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and custody and control Five (5) tea bags of dried
marijuana fruiting tops weighing TWENTY GRAMS AND SIX
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY TWO TEN
THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (20.6642), which is a
dangerous drug, without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-378, Castro was charged with
possession of 130.8286 grams of marijuana in violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in the Information
which reads: That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002,
in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and custody and control One (1) brick in form
wrapped in masking tape of dried marijuana fruiting tops
weighing ONE HUNDRED THIRTY GRAMS and EIGHT
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX TEN
THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (130.8286), which is a
dangerous drug, without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On November 14, 2002, Castro was arraigned and he pleaded
not guilty. Dahil, on the other hand, filed a motion for
reinvestigation and his arraignment was deferred. Trial ensued
and the prosecution presented PO2 Arieltino Corpuz (PO2
Corpuz)and SPO1 Eliseo Licu (SPO1 Licu), as witnesses.
On August 6, 2009, the RTC discovered that Dahil was never
arraigned through inadvertence.6 The RTC informed the parties
of the situation and the defense counsel did not interpose any
objection to the reopening of the case and the arraignment of
Dahil. The latter was then arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, the public prosecutor manifested that he was
adopting all the evidence already adduced.
Version of the Prosecution
Evidence of the prosecution tended to show that, for a couple of
weeks, the agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), Region 3, conducted surveillance and casing
operations relative to the information they received that a certain
alias "Buddy" and alias "Mel" were trafficking dried marijuana
in TB Pavilion, Marisol Subdivision, Barangay Ninoy Aquino,
Angeles City. On September 29, 2002, the Chief of PDEA
formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team was
composed of four (4) police officers, namely, Sergeant Juanito
dela Cruz (Sergeant dela Cruz), as team leader; and PO2
Corpuz, SPO1 Licu and PO2 Javiar, as members. PO2 Corpuz
was designated as the poseur-buyer while SPO1 Licu was
assigned as his back-up.
The team proceeded to the target place at around 8:00 o’clock in
the evening. Upon arriving, PO2 Corpuz together with the
informant went to the house of Dahil which was within the TB
Pavillon compound. When PO2 Corpuz and the informant were
in front of the house, they met Dahil and Castro. The informant
then introduced PO2 Corpuz as the buyer of marijuana. Dahil
asked PO2 Corpuz how much would he be buying and the latter
answered that he would buy ₱200.00 worth of marijuana. At
this juncture, Dahil took out from his pocket six (6) plastic
sachets of marijuana and handed them to PO2 Corpuz. After
checking the items, PO2 Corpuz handed two (2) ₱100.00
marked bills to Castro.
Immediately thereafter, PO2 Cruz took off his cap to signal that
the sale had been consummated. The rest of the buy-bust team
then rushed to their location and arrested Castro and Dahil. PO2
Corpuz frisked Dahil and recovered from his possession another
five (5) plastic sachets containing marijuana while SPO1 Licu
searched the person of Castro and confiscated from him one (1)
brick of suspected marijuana.
Both Castro and Dahil, together with the confiscated drugs,
were then brought by the buy-bust team to the PDEA office.
There, the seized items were marked by PO2 Corpuz and
SPO1Licu. First, the six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana which
were sold by Dahil to PO2 Corpuz were marked with "A-1" to
"A-6" and with letters "RDRC," "ADGC" and "EML." Second,
the five (5) plastic sachets recovered from Dahil were marked
with "B-1" to "B-5" and with letters "RDRC," "ADGC" and
"EML." Finally, the marijuana brick confiscated from Castro
was marked "C-RDRC." Sergeant dela Cruz then prepared the
request for laboratory examination, affidavits of arrest and other
pertinent documents. An inventory of the seized items7 was also
prepared which was signed by Kagawad Pamintuan. Thereafter,
PO2 Corpuz brought the confiscated drugs to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination,
which subsequently yielded positive results for marijuana.
The prosecution and defense entered into stipulation as to the
essential contents of the prospective testimony of the forensic
chemist, to wit:
1. That a laboratory examination request was prepared by PO3
Dela Cruz;
2. That said letter request for laboratory examination was sent to
the PNP Crime Laboratory,Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga;
3. That Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran David is a forensic chemist;
4. That said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the
substance subject of the letter request with qualification that said
request was not subscribedor under oath and that the forensic
chemist has no personal knowledge as from whom and where
said substance was taken;
5. That the result of the laboratory examination is embodied in
Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002; and
6. The findings and conclusion thereof.8
The prosecution was ordered to formally offer its evidence on
March 7, 2007.9 After much delay, the public prosecutor was
finally able to orally submit his formal offer of exhibits after
almost two years, or on January 6, 2009.10 He offered the
following documentary evidence: (1) Joint Affidavit of Arrest,
(2) Custodial Investigation Report, (3) Photocopy of the marked
money, (4) Brown envelope containing the subject illegal drugs,
(5) Inventory of Property Seized, (6) Laboratory Examination
Request, and (7) Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002.
Version of the Defense
In his defense, Dahil claimed that on September 29, 2002, a
tricycle driver came looking for him after he had arrived home.
He saw the tricycle driver with another man already waiting for
him. He was then asked by the unknown man whether he knew
a certain Buddy in their place. He answered that there were
many persons named Buddy. Suddenly, persons alighted from
the vehicles parked in front of his house and dragged him into
one of the vehicles. He was brought to Clark Air Base and was
charged with illegal selling and possession of marijuana.
For his part, Castro testified thaton September 29, 2002, he was
on 4th Street of Marisol, Barangay Ninoy Aquino, Angeles City,
watching a game of chess when he was approached by some
men who asked if he knew a certain Boy residing at Hardian
Extension. He then replied that he did not know the said person
and then the men ordered him to board a vehicle and brought
him to Clark Air Base where he was charged withillegal
possession of marijuana.
RTC Ruling
In its Decision,11 dated July 17, 2012, the RTC found both
accused liable for violating Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165,
and imposed upon them the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of ₱500,000.00 each for the crime of illegal sale of
marijuana;Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day, as minimum, to
Fourteen (14) Years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and a
fine of ₱300,000.00 each for the crime of illegal possession of
marijuana.
The RTC was convinced that the prosecution was able to prove
the case of selling and possession of illegal drugs against the
accused. All the elements of the crimes were established. To the
trial court, the evidence proved that PO2 Corpuz bought
marijuana from Dahil. The latter examined the marijuana
purchased and then handed the marked money to Castro.
The marked money was lost in the custody of the police officers,
but the RTC ruled that the same was not fatal considering that a
photocopy of the marked money was presented and identified by
the arresting officers.12 It did not give credence to the defense of
frame-up by Dahil and Castro explaining that it could easily be
concocted with no supporting proof.
CA Ruling
The accused then appealed to the CA. In their Brief for the
Accused-Appellants,13 they argued that there were irregularities
on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
illegal items seized from them. The prosecution witnesses
exhibited gross disregard of the procedural safeguards which
generated clouds of doubts as tothe identity of the seized items
presented in evidence.14
In its Brief for the Appellee, 15 the OSG contended that the
prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime of
illegal sale and possession of marijuana. As to the chain of
custody procedure, it insists that the prosecution witnesses were
able to account for the series of events that transpired, from the
time the buy-bust operation was conducted until the time the
items were presented in court.
The CA denied the appeal in its Decision, dated September 27,
2013. In its view, the prosecution was able to establish that the
illegal sale of marijuana actually took place. As could be
gleaned from the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, there was an actual
exchange as Dahil took out from his pocket six (6) sachets
containing marijuana, while PO2 Corpuz handled out the two
(2) ₱100.00 marked bills, after they agreed to transact ₱200.00
worth of the illegal drug.16 The charge of illegal possession of
marijuana, was also thus established by the
prosecution.17 Another five (5) plastic sachets of marijuana were
recovered from Dahil’s possession while one (1) brick of
marijuana from Castro’s possession.18
It was likewise proven that the illicit drugs confiscated from the
accused during the buy-bust operation were the same drugs
presented before the RTC. As testified to by PO2 Corpuz, the
six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana, which were sold by Dahil
toPO2 Corpuz were marked "A-1" to "A-6" and with letters
"RDRC," "ADGC"and "EML," the five (5) plastic sachets
recovered in the possession of Dahil were marked "B-1" to "B-
5" and with the initials "ADGC" and "EML," while the
marijuana brick confiscated from Castro was marked "C-
RDRC."19
It was also held that the prosecution was able to establish the
chain of custody. PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu testified that the
said drugs were marked at the police station. An inventory of
the seized items was made as shown by the Inventory Report of
Property Seized, duly signed by Kagawad Pamintuan. The
Request for Laboratory Examination revealed that the
confiscated drugs were the same items submitted to the PNP
crime laboratory for examination. On the other hand, Chemistry
Report No. D-0518-2002 showed that the specimen gave
positive results to the test of marijuana. The accused failed to
show that the confiscated marijuana items were tampered with,
or switched, before they were delivered to the crime laboratory
for examination.20
Hence, this appeal.
This appeal involves the sole issue of whether or not the law
enforcement officers substantially complied with the chain of
custody procedure required by R.A. No. 9165.
The Court’s Ruling
Let it be underscored that appeal incriminal cases throws the
whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate
court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed
judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.21 Considering that what is at stake here is no less
than the liberty of the accused, this Court has meticulously and
thoroughly reviewed and examined the records of the case and
finds that there is merit in the appeal. The Court holds that that
there was no unbroken chain of custody and that the prosecution
failed to establish the very corpus delicti of the crime charged.
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this
kind of operation has been proven to be an effective way to
flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted
covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust operation has a significant
downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the
law. It is susceptible topolice abuse, the most notorious of which
is its use as a tool for extortion.22
The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is
material if not indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal
sale and possession of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of
the dangerous drugs should be established beyond doubt by
showing that the items offered in court were the same
substances boughtduring the buy-bust operation. This rigorous
requirement, known under R.A. No. 9165 as the chain of
custody, performs the function of ensuring thatunnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. 23 In
People v. Catalan,24 the Court said:
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the Prosecution must prove
the corpus delicti.That proof is vital to a judgment of conviction.
On the other hand, the Prosecution does not comply with the
indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section 5
of Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs are missing
but also when there are substantial gapsin the chain of custody
of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the
authenticity of the evidence presented in court.
Although R.A. No. 9165 does not define the meaning of chain
of custody, Section 1(b) of Dangerous DrugsBoard Regulation
No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165,
explains the said term as follows:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized
item shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.
As a means of ensuring the establishment of the chain of
custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies that:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photographthe same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Specifically, Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR)of R.A. No. 9165 enumeratesthe
procedures to be observed by the apprehending officers
toconfirm the chain of custody, to wit:
xxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrantis
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items;
 xxx
The strict procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not
complied with.
Although the prosecution offered inevidence the Inventory of
the Property Seized signed by the arresting officers and
Kagawad Pamintuan, the procedures provided in Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 were not observed. The said provision requires
the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to
immediately (1) conduct a physically inventory; and (2)
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/orseized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be
required tosign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
First,the inventory of the property was not immediately
conducted after seizure and confiscation as it was only done at
the police station. Notably, Article II, Section 21(a) of the IRR
allows the inventory to be done at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending team whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures. In this case,
however, the prosecution did not even claim that the PDEA
Office Region 3 was the nearest office from TB Pavilion where
the drugs were seized. The prosecution also failed to give
sufficient justification for the delayed conduct of the inventory.
PO2 Corpuz testified, to wit:
Q: What documents did you ask Kgd. Abel Pamintuan to sign?
A: The inventory of the property seized, sir.
Q: And did he sign that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was he when he signed that?
A: In our office, sir.
Q: Already in your office?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who prepared the inventory of the property seized?
A: Our investigator, sir.
Q: And that was prepared while you were already at your
office?
A: Yes, sir, because we did not bring with us the material or
equipment for the preparation of the documents so, we invited
him to our office.25
PO2 Corpuz gave the flimsy excusethat they failed to
immediately conduct an inventory because they did not bring
with them the material or equipment for the preparation of the
documents. Such explanation is unacceptable considering that
they conducted a surveillance on the target for a couple of
weeks.26 They should have been prepared with their equipment
even before the buy-bust operation took place.
Second,there is doubt as to the identity of the person who
prepared the Inventory of Property Seized. According to the CA
decision, it was Sergeant dela Cruzwho prepared the said
document.27 PO2 Cruz on the other hand, testified that it was
their investigatorwho prepared the document while SPO1 Licu’s
testimony was that a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their
investigator.28
Third, there were conflicting claims on whether the seized items
were photographed in the presence of the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the DOJ, and any elected public official. During the cross-
examination, PO2 Corpuz testified: Q: After you arrested Ramil
Dahil,did you conduct the inventory of the alleged seized items?
A: Yes, sir (sic).
Q: Where did you conduct the inventory?
A: In our office, ma’am
Q: Were pictures takenon the alleged seized items together with
Ramil Dahil?
A: No, ma’am.29
[Emphases supplied]
SPO1 Licu when cross-examined on the same point, testified
this was:
Q: After you conducted the alleged buy-bust operation, did you
conduct an inventory of the alleged seized items?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Were the accused assisted by counsel at the time you conduct
the inventory?
A: No, ma’am.
Q: Were pictures taken on them including the alleged seized
items?
A: Pictures were takenon the accused, ma’am.
[Emphasis supplied]
In other words, when questioned on the conduct of the
inventory, PO2 Corpuz testified that no pictures of the seized
items were taken while SPO1 Licu said that pictures of the
accused were taken. From the vague statements of the police
officers, the Court doubts that photographs of the alleged drugs
were indeed taken. The records are bereft of any document
showing the photos of the seized items. The Court notes that
SPO1 Licu could have misunderstood the question because he
answered that "pictures were taken on the accused" when the
question referred to photographs of the drugs and not of the
accused.
The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved.
Notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to establish the
rigorous requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165,
jurisprudence dictates that substantial compliance is sufficient.
Failure to strictly comply with the law does not necessarily
render the arrestof the accused illegal or the items seized or
confiscated from him inadmissible.30 The issue of non-
compliance with the said section is not of admissibility, but of
weight to be given on the evidence.31 Moreover, Section 21 of
the IRR requires "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect
adherence," as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.32
To ensure that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are preserved, the proper chain of custody of the
seized items must be shown. The Court explained in People v.
Malillin33 how the chain of custody or movement of the seized
evidence should be maintained and why this must be shown by
evidence, viz:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody
rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of
the same.
In People v. Kamad,34 the Court identified the links that the
prosecution must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation to be as follows: first, the seizure and marking,
ifpracticable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized bythe apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug
to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized
by the forensic chemist to the court.
First link: Marking of the Drugs Recovered from the Accused
by the Apprehending Officer
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the
seized drugs or other related items immediately after they have
been seized from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by
the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials
and signature on the items seized. Marking after seizure is the
starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the
seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markingsas reference.
The marking of the evidence serves to separate the
markedevidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until
they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus,
preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence.35
It must be noted that marking isnot found in R.A. No. 9165 and
is different from the inventory-taking and photography under
Section 21 of the said law. Long before Congress passed R.A.
No. 9165, however, this Court had consistently held that failure
of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would
cast reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.36
In the present case, PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu claimed that
they had placed their initials on the seized items. They,
however, gave little information on how they actually did the
marking. It is clear, nonetheless, that the marking was not
immediately done at the place of seizure, and the markings were
only placed at the police station based on the testimony of PO2
Corpuz, to wit: Q: So, after recovering all those marijuana
bricks and plastic sachets of marijuana and the marked money
from the accused, what else did you do?
A: We brought the two (2) suspects and the evidence and
marked money to our office, sir.
Q: So, in your office, what happened there?
A: Our investigator prepared the necessary documents, sir, the
request for crime lab examination, joint affidavit of arrest,
booking sheet, and all other documents necessary for the filing
of the case against the two (2), sir.
xxx
Q: What about the marijuana, subject of the deal, and the one
which you confiscated from the accused, what did you do with
those?
A: Before sending them to Olivas, we placed our markings, sir.37
Hence, from the place of the seizure to the PDEA Office Region
3, the seized items were not marked. It could not, therefore, be
determined how the unmarked drugs were handled. The Court
must conduct guesswork on how the seized drugs were
transported and who took custody of them while in transit.
Evidently, the alteration of the seized items was a possibility
absent their immediate marking thereof.
Still, there are cases whenthe chain of a custody rule is relaxed
such as when the marking of the seized items is allowed to be
undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest
for as long as it is done in the presence of the accused in illegal
drugs cases.38 Even a less stringent application of the
requirement, however, will not suffice to sustain the conviction
of the accused in this case. Aside from the fact that the police
officers did not immediately place their markings on the seized
marijuana upon their arrival at the PDEA Office, there was also
no showing that the markings were made in the presence of the
accused.
PO2 Corpuz testified that they only placed their markings on the
drugs when they were about to send them to Camp Olivas for
forensic examination. This damaging testimony was
corroborated by the documentary evidence offered by the
prosecution. The following documents were made at the PDEA
Office: (1) Joint Affidavit of Arrest, (2) Custodial Investigation
Report, (3) Inventory of Property Seized, and (4) Laboratory
Examination Request. Glaringly, only the Laboratory
Examination Request cited the markings on the seized drugs.
Thus, it could only mean that when the other documents were
being prepared, the seized drugs had not been marked and the
police officers did not have basis for identifying them.
Considering that the seized drugs wereto be used for different
criminal charges, it was imperative for the police officers to
properly mark them at the earliest possible opportunity. Here,
they failed in such a simple and critical task. The seized drugs
were prone to mix-up at the PDEA Office itself because of the
delayed markings.
Worse, not all of the seized drugs were properly marked. As
noted by the RTC, Exhibit B-3 RC RD,39 Exhibit A-5 RC RD
and Exhibit A-6 RD RC40 did not have the initials of the
apprehending officers on the back. Bearing in mind the
importance of marking the seized items, these lapses in the
procedure are too conspicuous and cannot be ignored. They
placed uncertainty as to the identity of the corpus delicti from
the moment of seizure until it was belatedly marked at the
PDEA Office.
Similarly, in People v. Garcia, 41 the Court considered the belated
marking of the seized drug by the apprehending officer in
acquitting the accused in the case. The officer testified that he
marked the confiscated items only after he had returned tothe
police station. Such admission showed that the marking was not
done immediately after the seizure of the items, but after the
lapse of a significant intervening time.
Second Link: Turnover of the Seized Drugs by the
Apprehending Officer to the Investigating Officer
The second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the
seized drugs by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer. Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected
substance turns it over to a supervising officer, who will then
send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for
testing.42 This is a necessary step in the chain of custody because
it will be the investigating officer who shall conduct the proper
investigation and prepare the necessary documents for the
developing criminal case. Certainly, the investigating officer
must have possession of the illegal drugs to properly prepare the
required documents.
The investigator in this case was a certain SPO4
Jamisolamin.43 Surprisingly, there was no testimony from the
witnesses as to the turnover of the seized items to SPO4
Jamisolamin. It is highly improbable for an investigator in a
drug-related case toeffectively perform his work without having
custody of the seized items. Again, the case of the prosecution is
forcing this Court to resort to guesswork as to whether PO2
Corpuz and SPO1 Licu gave the seized drugs to SPO4
Jamisolamin as the investigating officer or they had custody of
the marijuana all night while SPO4 Jamisolamin was conducting
his investigation on the same items.
44
In People v. Remigio,  the Court noted the failure of the police
officers to establish the chain of custody as the apprehending
officer did not transfer the seized items to the investigating
officer. The apprehending officer kept the alleged shabu from
the time of confiscation until the time he transferred them to the
forensic chemist. The deviation from the links in the chain of
custody led to the acquittal of the accused in the said case.
Third Link: Turnover by the Investigating Officer of the Illegal
Drugs to the Forensic Chemist
From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the
forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at the forensic
laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and
verify the nature of the substance. In this case, it was only
during his cross-examination that PO2 Corpuz provided some
information on the delivery of the seized drugs to Camp Olivas,
to wit:
Q: How about the alleged marijuana, you stated that the same
was brought to the crime laboratory, who brought the same to
the crime lab?
A: Me and my back-up, ma’am.
Q: When did you bring the marijuana to the crime lab for
examination?
A: I think it was the following day, ma’am.45
As can be gleaned from the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, very little
detail was offered on how the seized marijuana was handled and
transferred from the PDEA Office in Angeles City to the crime
laboratory in Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. PO2
Corpuz kept possession of the seized drugs overnight without
giving detailson the safekeeping of the items. The most palpable
deficiency of the testimony would be the lack of information as
to who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas.
Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran, the forensic chemist who conducted
the tests on the subject drugs, did not appear in court despite the
numerous subpoenas sent to her.46 Instead, the prosecution and
the defense agreed to stipulate on the essential points of her
proffered testimony. Regrettably, the stipulated testimony of the
forensic chemist failed to shed light as to who received the
subject drugs in Camp Olivas. One of the stipulations was "that
said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the
substance of the letter-request with qualification that said
request was not subscribed or under oath and that forensic
chemist has no personalknowledge as from whom and where
said substance was taken."47 This bolsters the fact that the
forensic chemist had no knowledge as to who received the
seized marijuana at the crime laboratory.
The recent case of People v. Beran 48 involved irregularities in
the third link. The police officer, who both served as
apprehending and investigating officer, claimed that he
personally took the drug to the laboratory for testing, but there
was no showing who received the drug from him. The records
also showed that he submitted the sachet to the laboratory only
on the next day, without explaining how he preserved his
exclusive custody thereof overnight. All those facts raised
serious doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized item have not been fatally compromised. Hence, the
accused inthe said case was also acquitted.
Fourth Link: Turnover of the Marked Illegal Drug Seized by the
Forensic Chemist to the Court.
The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the
forensic chemist to the court when presented as evidence in the
criminal case. No testimonial or documentary evidence was
given whatsoever as to how the drugs were kept while in the
custody of the forensic chemist until it was transferred to the
court. The forensic chemist should have personally testified on
the safekeeping of the drugs but the parties resorted to a general
stipulation of her testimony. Although several subpoenae were
sent to the forensic chemist, only a brown envelope containing
the seized drugs arrived in court.49 Sadly, instead of focusing on
the essential links in the chain of custody, the prosecutor
propounded questions concerning the location of the misplaced
marked money, which was not even indispensable in the
criminal case.
The case of People v. Gutierrez50 also had inadequate
stipulations as to the testimony of the forensic chemist. No
explanation was given regarding the custody of the seized drug
in the interim - from the time it was turned over to the
investigator up to its turnover for laboratory examination. The
records of the said case did not show what happened to the
allegedly seized shabu between the turnover by the investigator
to the chemist and its presentation in court. Thus, since there
was no showing that precautions were taken to ensure that there
was no change in the condition of that object and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have possession thereof, the
accused therein was likewise acquitted.

In view of all the foregoing, the Court can only conclude that,
indeed, there was no compliance with the procedural
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 because of the
inadequate physical inventory and the lack of photography of
the marijuana allegedly confiscated from Dahil and Castro. No
explanation was offered for the non-observance of the rule. The
prosecution cannot apply the saving mechanism of Section 21 of
the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 because it miserably failed to prove
that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
were preserved. The four links required to establish the proper
chain of custody were breached with irregularity and lapses.

The Court cannot either agree with the CA that the evidentiary
rule involving the presumption of regularity of the performance
of official duties could apply in favor of the police officers. The
regularity of the performance of duty could not be properly
presumed in favor of the police officers because the records
were replete with indicia of their serious lapses.51 The
presumption stands when no reason exists in the records by
which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official
duty. And even in that instance, the presumption of regularity
will never be stronger than the presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will
defeat the constitutionally enshrined right of an accused to be
presumed innocent.52

Given the procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the

identity of the seized marijuana that the prosecution presented as
evidence before the Court. In effect, the prosecution failed to
fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a
reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.53

For said reason, there is no need to discuss the specific defenses

raised by the accused. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED.
The September 27, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05707 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The accused-appellants, Ramil Doria Dahil and Rommel Castro
y Carlos, are ACQUITTED of the crime charged against them
and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless they
are being held for some other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to

implement this decision and to inform this Court of the date of
the actual release from confinement of the accused within five
(5) days from receipt of copy.

SO ORDERED.