JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner vs. JESUS SIMANGAN, respondent.

G.R. No. 170141

April 22, 2008
REYES R.T., J.
FACTS:
In 1991, respondent Jesus Simangan decided to donate a kidney to his ailing cousin, Loreto Simangan, in UCLA
School of Medicine in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. Respondent needed to go to the United States to complete his
preliminary work-up and donation surgery. Hence, to facilitate respondent's travel to the United States, UCLA wrote a
letter to the American Consulate in Manila to arrange for his visa. In due time, respondent was issued an emergency U.S.
visa by the American Embassy in Manila. Then, respondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from petitioner JAL for
US$1,485.00 and was issued the corresponding boarding pass.
On July 29, 1992, the date of his flight, respondent went to Ninoy Aquino International Airport. He was allowed
to check-in at JAL's counter. His plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles were subjected to rigid
immigration and security routines. After passing through said immigration and security procedures, respondent was
allowed by JAL to enter its airplane. While inside the airplane, JAL's airline crew suspected respondent of carrying a
falsified travel document and imputed that he would only use the trip to the United States as a pretext to stay and work
in Japan.
The stewardess asked respondent to show his travel documents. Shortly after, the stewardess along with a
Japanese and a Filipino haughtily ordered him to stand up and leave the plane. Respondent protested, explaining that he
was issued a U.S. visa. Just to allow him to board the plane, he pleaded with JAL to closely monitor his movements when
the aircraft stops over in Narita. His pleas were ignored. He was then constrained to go out of the plane.
Respondent went to JAL's ground office and waited there for three hours. Meanwhile, the plane took off and he
was left behind. Afterwards, he was informed that his travel documents were, indeed, in order. Respondent was
refunded the cost of his plane ticket less the sum of US$500.00 which was deducted by JAL. Subsequently, respondent's
U.S. visa was cancelled.
Respondent filed an action for damages against JAL with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Valenzuela City. He
claimed he was not able to donate his kidney to Loreto; and that he suffered terrible embarrassment and mental
anguish. He prayed that he be awarded P3 million as moral damages, P1.5 million as exemplary damages and
P500,000.00 as attorney's fees.
JAL denied the material allegations of the complaint. It argued, among others, that its failure to allow
respondent to fly on his scheduled departure was due to "a need for his travel documents to be authenticated by the
United States Embassy because no one from JAL's airport staff had encountered a parole visa before. It posited that the
authentication required additional time; that respondent was advised to take the flight the following day, July 30, 1992.
JAL alleged that respondent agreed to be rebooked on July 30, 1992.
On September 21, 2000, the RTC presided by Judge Floro P. Alejo rendered its decision in favor of respondent
(plaintiff) ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, the amount of
P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and the amount of P250,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the cost of suit.
In a Decision dated May 31, 2005, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification in that it lowered
the amount of moral and exemplary damages and deleted the award of attorney's fees. Appellant JAPAN AIR LINES is
ordered to pay appellee JESUS SIMANGAN the reduced sums, as follows: Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as
moral damages, and Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00) as exemplary damages.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not JAL is guilty of contract of carriage; (2) whether or not respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages; and (3) whether or not JAL is entitled to its counterclaim for damages.
RULING:
 1. JAL is guilty of breach of contract of carriage.
JAL justifies its action by arguing that there was "a need to verify the authenticity of respondent's travel
document." It alleged that no one from its airport staff had encountered a parole visa before. It further contended that
respondent agreed to fly the next day so that it could first verify his travel document, hence, there was novation. It
maintained that it was not guilty of breach of contract of carriage as respondent was not able to travel to the United
States due to his own voluntary desistance. We cannot agree. JAL did not allow respondent to fly. It informed
respondent that there was a need to first check the authenticity of his travel documents with the U.S. Embassy.56 As
admitted by JAL, "the flight could not wait for Mr. Simangan because it was ready to depart."
Since JAL definitely declared that the flight could not wait for respondent, it gave respondent no choice but to
be left behind. Damage had already been done when respondent was offered to fly the next day on July 30, 1992 . Said
offer did not cure JAL's default. Considering that respondent was forced to get out of the plane and left behind against
his will, he could not have freely consented to be rebooked the next day. In short, he did not agree to the alleged
novation.
Apart from the fact that respondent's plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles already
passed the rigid immigration and security routines, JAL, as a common carrier, ought to know the kind of valid travel
documents respondent carried. As provided in Article 1755 of the New Civil Code: "A common carrier is bound to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances." Thus, We find untenable JAL's defense of "verification of
respondent's documents" in its breach of contract of carriage. It bears repeating that the power to admit or not an
alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by JAL.
In an action for breach of contract of carriage, all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of such
contract and its non-performance by the carrier through the latter's failure to carry the passenger safely to his
destination. Respondent has complied with these twin requisites.
2. Respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees plus legal interest.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract
for it is not one of the items enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.64 As an exception, such damages are
recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Article 1764, in relation
to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in
Article 2220.
The acts committed by JAL against respondent amounts to bad faith. As found by the RTC, JAL breached its
contract of carriage with respondent in bad faith. JAL personnel summarily and insolently ordered respondent to
disembark while the latter was already settled in his assigned seat. He was ordered out of the plane under the alleged
reason that the genuineness of his travel documents should be verified.
Clearly, JAL is liable for moral damages. It is firmly settled that moral damages are recoverable in suits
predicated on breach of a contract of carriage where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, as in
this case. Inattention to and lack of care for the interests of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration,
particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages.
What the law considers as bad faith which may furnish the ground for an award of moral damages would be bad faith in
securing the contract and in the execution thereof, as well as in the enforcement of its terms, or any other kind of
deceit.
JAL is also liable for exemplary damages as its above-mentioned acts constitute wanton, oppressive and
malevolent acts against respondent. Exemplary damages, which are awarded by way of example or correction for the
public good, may be recovered in contractual obligations, as in this case, if defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.68
Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behaviour that is socially
deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against such behaviour. In requiring
compliance with the standard of extraordinary diligence, a standard which is, in fact, that of the highest possible degree
of diligence, from common carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law seeks to compel
them to control their employees, to tame their reckless instincts and to force them to take adequate care of human
beings and their property.
The assessment of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages in respondent's
favor is, in Our view, reasonable and realistic. This award is reasonably sufficient to indemnify him for the humiliation
and embarrassment he suffered. This also serves as an example to discourage the repetition of similar oppressive acts.
With respect to attorney's fees, they may be awarded when defendant's act or omission has compelled plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest.
The Court, in Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Estrella, citing Traders Royal Bank
Employees Union-Independent v. National Labor Relations Commission, elucidated thus:
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an
attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this
compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.
In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a
litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code,
and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or
as part thereof.74
It was therefore erroneous for the CA to delete the award of attorney's fees on the ground that the record is
devoid of evidence to show the cost of the services of respondent's counsel. The amount is actually discretionary upon
the Court so long as it passes the test of reasonableness. They may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages
when exemplary damages are awarded and whenever the court deems it just and equitable, as in this case. Considering
the factual backdrop of this case, attorney's fees in the amount of P200,000.00 is reasonably modest. , in addition to
the said total amount of P800,000.00, JAL is liable to pay respondent legal interest. Pursuant to the above ruling of the
Court, the legal interest is 6% and it shall be reckoned from September 21, 2000 when the RTC rendered its judgment.
From the time this Decision becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% until its satisfaction.
3. JAL is not entitled to its counterclaim for damages .
This compulsory counterclaim of JAL arising from the filing of the complaint may not be granted inasmuch as the
complaint against it is obviously not malicious or unfounded. We reiterate case law that if damages result from a party's
exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.81 Lawful acts give rise to no injury.
During the trial, however, JAL presented a witness who testified that JAL suffered further damages. Allegedly,
respondent caused the publications of his subject complaint against JAL in the newspaper for which JAL suffered
damages.
Nevertheless, JAL's counterclaim cannot be granted. JAL is a common carrier. JAL's business is mainly with the
traveling public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers.84 Since JAL deals with the
public, its bumping off of respondent without a valid reason naturally drew public attention and generated a public
issue. The publications involved matters about which the public has the right to be informed because they relate to a
public issue. This public issue or concern is a legitimate topic of a public comment that may be validly published.
 JUANITO ANG, for and in behalf of SUNRISE MARKETING (BACOLOD), INC.,* Petitioner vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO
and RACHEL ANG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 201675
June 19, 2013
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
Sunrise Marketing (Bacolod), Inc. (SMBI) is a duly registered corporation owned by the Ang family. Juanito Ang
(Juanito) and Roberto Ang (Roberto) are siblings. Anecita Limoco-Ang (Anecita) is Juanito’s wife and Jeannevie is their
daughter. Roberto was elected President of SMBI, while Juanito was elected as its Vice President. Rachel Lu-Ang (Rachel)
and Anecita are SMBI’s Corporate Secretary and Treasurer, respectively.
On 31 July 1995, Nancy Ang (Nancy), the sister of Juanito and Roberto, and her husband, Theodore Ang
(Theodore), agreed to extend a loan to settle the obligations of SMBI and other corporations owned by the Ang family.
Nancy and Theodore issued a check in the amount of $1,000,000.00 payable to "Juanito Ang and/or Anecita Ang and/or
Roberto Ang and/or Rachel Ang." There was no written loan agreement, in view of the close relationship between the
parties. Part of the loan was also used to purchase real properties for SMBI, for Juanito, and for Roberto.
Thereafter, Juanito claimed that payments to Nancy and Theodore ceased sometime after 2006. On 24
November 2008, Nancy and Theodore, sent a demand letter to "Spouses Juanito L. Ang/Anecita L. Ang and Spouses
Roberto L. Ang/Rachel L. Ang" for payment of the principal amounting to $1,000,000.00 plus interest at ten percent
(10%) per annum, for a total of $2,585,577.37 within ten days from receipt of the letter. Roberto and Rachel replied to
the letter refusing to comply because they have not personally contracted a loan from Nancy and Theodore.
On 8 January 2009, Juanito and Anecita executed a Deed of Acknowledgment and Settlement Agreement
(Settlement Agreement) and an Extra-Judicial Real Estate Mortgage (Mortgage). Under the foregoing instruments,
Juanito and Anecita admitted that they, together with Roberto and Rachel, obtained a loan from Nancy and Theodore
for $1,000,000.00 on 31 July 1995 and such loan shall be secured by: a) Juanito and Anecita’s fifty percent share over a
parcel of land registered in the name of SMBI; b) a parcel of land registered in the name of Juanito Ang; c) Juanito’s fifty
percent share in 7 parcels of land registered in his and Roberto’s name; d) a parcel of land registered in the name of
Roberto; e) a parcel of land registered in the name of Rachel; and f) Roberto and Rachel’s fifty percent share in 2 parcels
of land registered in the name of their son, Livingstone L. Ang (Livingstone), and in another lot.
Thereafter, Juanito filed a "Stockholder Derivative Suit with prayer for an ex-parte Writ of
Attachment/Receivership" (Complaint) before the RTC Bacolod on 29 January 2009. He alleged that "the intentional and
malicious refusal of defendant Sps. Roberto and Rachel Ang to settle their 50% share x x x of the total obligation x x x will
definitely affect the financial viability of plaintiff SMBI."
On 29 January 2009, the RTC Bacolod issued an Order granting the application for an ex-parte writ of attachment
and break open order. In her Verified Answer Ad Cautelam which was filed on 10 February 2009, Rachel prayed that the
Complaint be dismissed as it was not a bona fide derivative suit as defined under the Interim Rules. According to
Rachel, the Complaint, although labelled as a derivative suit, is actually a collection suit since the real party in interest is
not SMBI, but Nancy and Theodore. Rachel also argued that the Complaint failed to allege that Juanito "exerted all
reasonable efforts to exhaust all intra-corporate remedies”
On 27 September 2010, the RTC Bacolod issued an Order ruling that the present action is a DERIVATIVE SUIT and
the Motion to Dismiss based on Affirmative Defenses raised by defendants is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order
likewise stated that the requirement of exhaustion of intra-corporate remedies is no longer necessary since Rachel and
Roberto exercised complete control over SMBI.
Aggrieved, Rachel filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA-Cebu. On 20 September 2011, the CA-Cebu
promulgated its Decision which reversed and set aside the Order of the RTC Bacolod dated 27 September 2010.
According to the CA-Cebu, the Complaint filed by Juanito should be dismissed because it is a harassment suit, and not a
valid derivative suit as defined under the Interim Rules. The CA-Cebu also found that Juanito failed to exhaust intra-
corporate remedies and that the loan extended by Nancy and Theodore was not SMBI’s corporate obligation.
ISSUE:
Whether based on the allegations of the complaint, the nature of the case is one of a derivative suit or not.
Corollary to the above, whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ordering the dismissal of the Complaint
on the ground that the case is not a derivative suit.
RULING:
The petition has no merit
We uphold the CA-Cebu’s finding that the Complaint is not a derivative suit. A derivative suit is an action brought
by a stockholder on behalf of the corporation to enforce corporate rights against the corporation’s directors, officers or
other insiders. Under Sections 23 and 36 of the Corporation Code, the directors or officers, as provided under the by-
laws, have the right to decide whether or not a corporation should sue. Since these directors or officers will never be
willing to sue themselves, or impugn their wrongful or fraudulent decisions, stockholders are permitted by law to bring
an action in the name of the corporation to hold these directors and officers accountable. In derivative suits, the real
party ininterest is the corporation, while the stockholder is a mere nominal party.
Section 1, Rule 8 of the Interim Rules imposes the following requirements for derivative suits:
(1) The person filing the suit must be a stockholder or member at the time the acts or transactions subject of the
action occurred and the time the action was filed;
(2) He must have exerted all reasonable efforts, and alleges the same with particularity in the complaint, to
exhaust all remedies available under the articles of incorporation, by-laws, laws or rules governing the
corporation or partnership to obtain the relief he desires;
(3) No appraisal rights are available for the act or acts complained of; and
(4) The suit is not a nuisance or harassment suit.
Applying the foregoing, we find that the Complaint is not a derivative suit. The Complaint failed to show how the
acts of Rachel and Roberto resulted in any detriment to SMBI. The CA-Cebu correctly concluded that the loan was not a
corporate obligation, but a personal debt of the Ang brothers and their spouses. The check was issued to "Juanito Ang
and/or Anecita Ang and/or Roberto Ang and/or Rachel Ang" and not SMBI. The proceeds of the loan were used for
payment of the obligations of the other corporations owned by the Angs as well as the purchase of real properties for
the Ang brothers. SMBI was never a party to the Settlement Agreement or the Mortgage. It was never named as a co-
debtor or guarantor of the loan. Both instruments were executed by Juanito and Anecita in their personal capacity, and
not in their capacity as directors or officers of SMBI. Thus, SMBI is under no legal obligation to satisfy the obligation
The fact that Juanito and Anecita attempted to constitute a mortgage over "their" share in a corporate asset
cannot affect SMBI. The Civil Code provides that in order for a mortgage to be valid, the mortgagor must be the
"absolute owner of the thing mortgaged." Corporate assets may be mortgaged by authorized directors or officers on
behalf of the corporation as owner. However, the wording of the Mortgage reveals that it was signed by Juanito and
Anecita in their personal capacity as the "owners" of a pro-indiviso share in SMBI’s land and not on behalf of SMBI.
Since damage to the corporation was not sufficiently proven by Juanito, the Complaint cannot be considered a
bona fide derivative suit. A derivative suit is one that seeks redress for injury to the corporation, and not the
stockholder. No such injury was proven in this case. The Complaint also failed to allege that all available corporate
remedies under the articles of incorporation, by-laws, laws or rules governing the corporation were exhausted, as
required under the Interim Rules.
The CA-Cebu correctly ruled that the Complaint should be dismissed since it is a nuisance or harassment suit
under Section 1(b) of the Interim Rules. Section 1(b) thereof provides:
b) Prohibition against nuisance and harassment suits. - Nuisance and harassment suits are prohibited. In
determining whether a suit is a nuisance or harassment suit, the court shall consider, among others, the
following:
(1) The extent of the shareholding or interest of the initiating stockholder or member;
(2) Subject matter of the suit;
(3) Legal and factual basis of the complaint;
(4) Availability of appraisal rights for the act or acts complained of; and
(5) Prejudice or damage to the corporation, partnership, or association in relation to the relief sought.
In case of nuisance or harassment suits, the court may, motu proprio or upon motion, forthwith dismiss the
case. Records show that Juanito, apart from being Vice President, owns the highest number of shares, equal to those
owned by Roberto. Also, as explained earlier, there appears to be no damage to SMBI if the loan extended by Nancy and
Theodore remains unpaid. The CA-Cebu correctly concluded that "a plain reading of the allegations in the Complaint
would readily show that the case was mainly filed to collect a debt allegedly extended by the spouses Theodore and
Nancy Ang to [SMBI]. Thus, the aggrieved party is not SMBI but the spouses Theodore and Nancy Ang, who are not even
stockholders.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 September 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals-Cebu
in CA-G.R. SP No. 05546.
-JV FERMIN
 VICENTE S. ALMARIO, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 170928
September 11, 2007
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
On October 21, 1988, petitioner, Vicente S. Almario (Almario), was hired by respondent, Philippine Airlines, Inc.
(PAL), as a Boeing 747 Systems Engineer. On April 28, 1995, Almario, then about 39 years of age and a Boeing 737 (B-
737) First Officer at PAL, successfully bid for the higher position of Airbus 300 (A-300) First Officer. Since said higher
position required additional training, he underwent, at PAL’s expense, more than five months of training consisting of
ground schooling in Manila and flight simulation in Melbourne, Australia.
After completing the training course, Almario served as A-300 First Officer of PAL, but after eight months of
service as such or on September 16, 1996, he tendered his resignation, for "personal reasons," effective October 15,
1996.
A letter from PAL was sent to Almario stating that the Company invested heavily on his professional training in
the estimated amount of PHP786,713.00 on the basis that he continue to serve the Company for a definite period of
time which is approximately three (3) years or thirty-six (36) months. In view of the foregoing, the company urges
Almario to reconsider his proposed resignation otherwise he will be required to reimburse the Company an amount
equivalent to the cost of his professional training and the damaged caused to the Company.
Despite receipt of the letter, Almario pushed through with his resignation. Then, by letter of October 9, 1996,
Almario’s counsel sought PALs explanation behind its September 27, 1996 letter considering that Almario did not sign
anything regarding any reimbursement. PAL did not reply, prompting Almario’s counsel to send two letters following-up
PAL’s reply, as well as the release of Almario’s clearances which he needed to avail of his benefits.
PAL filed a Complaint against Almario before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC), for reimbursement of
P851,107 worth of training costs, attorneys fees equivalent to 20% of the said amount, and costs of litigation. PAL
invoked the existence of an innominate contract of do ut facias (I give that you may do) with Almario in that by spending
for his training, he would render service to it until the costs of training were recovered in at least three (3) years. Almario
having resigned before the 3-year period, PAL prayed that he should be ordered to reimburse the costs for his training.
Almario denied the existence of any agreement with PAL that he would have to render service to it for three
years after his training failing which he would reimburse the training costs. Almario thus prayed for the award of actual
damages on account of PAL’s withholding of the necessary clearances which he needed in order to obtain his lawful
benefits, and moral and exemplary damages for malicious prosecution and unjust harassment.
PAL hinges its arguments on its right to be reimbursed for training expenses based on Article XXIII, Section 1 of
the 1991-1994 CBA and which was taken from the decision of the Secretary of Labor that a pilot should remain in the
position where he is upon reaching the age of fifty-seven (57).
By Decision of October 25, 2000, the RTC, finding no provision in the CBA between PAL and ALPAP stipulating
that a pilot who underwent a training course for the position of A-300 First Officer must serve PAL for at least three
years failing which he should reimburse the training expenses, rendered judgment in favor of Almario. The trial court
denied Almario’s claim for moral damages, however.16 It denied too Almario’s claim for the monetary equivalent of his
family trip pass benefits (worth US$49,824), it holding that the same had been forfeited as he did not avail of them
within one year from the date of his separation.
On appeal by both parties, the Court of Appeals, by Decision dated March 31, 2005, reversed the trial courts
decision. It found Almario liable under the CBA between PAL and ALPAP, , in any event, under Article 22 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not PAL is entitled to reimbursement
2. Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that Article 22 of the Civil Code can be
applied to recover training costs which were never agreed to nor included as reimbursable expenses under the
CBA;
3. Whether the availing by petitioner of a required training is a legal ground justifying the entitlement to a benefit
and therefore, negating claims of unjust enrichment;
RULING:
The petition fails.
The pertinent provision of the CBA and its rationale aside, contrary to Almario’s claim, Article 22 of the Civil
Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him,
applies.
This provision on unjust enrichment recognizes the principle that one may not enrich himself at the expense of
another. An authority on Civil Law34 writes on the subject, viz:
Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in
money. It may consist of some positive pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony of the defendant, such as: (1)
the enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff; (2) the benefits from service rendered by the plaintiff to the
defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or personal; (4) the increase of value of property of the defendant;
(5) the improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the acquisition of a right of preference; (6) the recognition of
the existence of a right in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the conditions of life of the defendant.
The enrichment of the defendant must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage, or injury to the plaintiff.
This prejudice may consist, not only of the loss of property or the deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of non-payment
of compensation for a prestation or service rendered to the defendant without intent to donate on the part of the
plaintiff, or the failure to acquire something which the latter would have obtained. The injury to the plaintiff, however,
need not be the cause of the enrichment of the defendant. It is enough that there be some relation between them,
that the enrichment of the defendant would not have been produced had it not been for the fact from which the
injury to the plaintiff is derived.
Admittedly, PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable him to acquire a higher level of skill, proficiency,
or technical competence so that he could efficiently discharge the position of A-300 First Officer. Given that, PAL
expected to recover the training costs by availing of Almario’s services for at least three years. The expectation of
PAL was not fully realized, however, due to Almario’s resignation after only eight months of service following the
completion of his training course. He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of training without violating the
principle of unjust enrichment.
Following the computation by the appellate court which was arrived at by offsetting the respective claims of the
parties, viz:
Training Cost P851,107.00

Less: Appellee's corresponding 8 months 189,126.88

 Service after training [P850,107.00
divided by 36 months (3 years)
= P23,640.86 x 8 months]

Equals P661,980.12

Less: Accrued Benefits 102,240.22

Net Reimbursable Amount or

P559,739.9036
Appellee's Outstanding Account
*****************
Almario must pay PAL the sum of ₱559,739.90, to bear the legal interest rate of 6% per annum from the filing of
PAL’s complaint on February 11, 1997 until the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

JV FERMIN