1. G.R. No.

107303 February 21, 1994

Emmanuel Oñate and Econ Holdings Corporation v Abrogar and Sunlife Insurance
Company of Canada

FACTS:

Sun Life filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for the immediate issuance
of a writ of attachment against petitioners Onate and Dino. Respondent Judge granted the prayer
and the writ was correspondingly issued. After the summons were eventually served upon
petitioners, the latter filed motions to discharge/dissolve the attachment. Meanwhile, Sun Life
filed motions for examination of petitioners’ bank accounts. Respondent judge ruled in all the
motions in favor of Sun Life. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but were denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing ex
parte the original and amended writs of preliminary attachment and the corresponding notices of
garnishment and levy on attachment pending acquisition of the jurisdiction of the RTC.

RULING:

No. It is clear from the provision of Section 10, Rule 57 (ROC) that notice need only be
given to the garnishee, but the person who is holding property or credits belonging to the
defendant. The provision does not require that notice be furnished the defendant himself, except
when there is a need to examine said defendant “for the purpose of giving information respecting
his property. Furthermore, Section 10 Rule 57 is not incompatible with Republic Act No. 1405,
as amended, (Bank Deposits Secrecy Law) for Section 2 therefor provides an exception “in cases
where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. The examination of
the bank records is not a fishing expedition, but rather a method by which Sun Life could trace
the proceeds of the check it paid to petitioners

2. JARDINE-MANILA FINANCE v. CA
GR No. 55272, Apr 10, 1989

FACTS:

On September 28, 1979, petitioner Jardine-Manila Finance, Inc. (JARDINE) filed a

complaint in the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against private respondents Impact
Corporation (IMPACT), Ricardo de Leon and Eduardo de Leon, to collect various sums of
money allegedly due from therein defendant IMPACT under a credit accommodation by way of
a discounting line agreement. It was alleged that IMPACT assigned its receivables to JARDINE
on the condition that IMPACT was to collect them on their due dates from their issuers and remit
the collected amounts to JARDINE and/or repurchase the assigned receivables;but despite the
fact that IMPACT had collected the amounts due on said receivables, it failed or refused to turn
over the amounts so collected to JARDINE.

JARDINE thus demanded payment of P1,000,212.64, the total amount due under said
various deeds of assignment, plus interest of P16,614.64 as of September 6, 1979 and 25% of the
aforesaid amount as attorney's fees, exemplary damages and other expenses of litigation.
Likewise contained in said complaint is petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary
attachment against private respondents. On the basis of the foregoing allegations, the lower court
granted JARDINE's petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not noncompliance with the formal requirements invalidate the writ of
attachment.

RULING:

Yes. The failure to allege in the affidavit the requisites prescribed for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary attachment, renders the writ of preliminary attachment issued against the
property of the defendant fatally defective, and the judge issuing it is deemed to have acted in
excess of his jurisdiction.[26] In fact, in such cases, the defect cannot even be cured by
amendment. Considering that petitioner's application for the subject writ of preliminary
attachment did not fully comply with the requisites prescribed by law, said writ is, as it is hereby
declared null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

3. TAN VS. ZANDUETA AND TIU CHAY

61 PHIL., 526 , JUNE 15, 1935

FACTS:

Tan Lit and Tan Kia won 50k in a sweepstakes. However, Tan Lit kept the whole amount
to himself. Thus, Kia filed a recovery suit for the 22.5k. After filing a 5kbond, Kia obtained an
attachment from the Judge. Tan Lit later managed to have the writ dissolved by posting a
counter-bond of 5k. After the attachment was dissolved, he withdrew 23,500 from PNB (most
this amount was previously attached).After an application by Kia, the judge again issued another
order requiring Tan Lit to pay an additional 12k counterbond. Failing to do this, Tan Lit was held
incontempt and was held in confinement until he posted the 12k. Tan Lit now argues that :1the
preliminary attachment was irregular and illegal

ISSUE:
WON the preliminary attachment was irregular and illegal

RULING:
 The writ of preliminary attachment in this case was issued in strict conformity to the law,
because the complaint wherein it was issued alleged that the petitioner after collecting the prize
of a ticket in the last sweepstakes, consisting of the amount of P50,000, belonging to the two,
that is, the petitioner and the respondent T. C. (alias T. K.) appropriated the entire prize
exclusively for himself, in complete disregard of said T. C. (alias T. K.) knowing that one-half
thereof did not belong to him but to said respondent; that he was merely a depository or agent of
the latter as to said half, and that the petitioner acted in the manner stated notwithstanding the
fact that he was required to turn over to the respondent the part of the prize won corresponding to
the latter. The allegations to this effect are found in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the complaint of
said T. C.

4. FILINVEST vs. RELOVA

117 SCRA 420

FACTS:
On August 2, 1977, Filinvest Credit Corporation (hereinafter referred to as FILINVEST) filed a
complaint in the lower court against defendants Rallye Motor Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
RALLYE) and Emesto Salazar for the collection of a sum of money with damages and
preliminary writ of attachment.
Praying for a writ of preliminary attachment, FILINVEST submitted with its complaint the
affidavit
of one Gil Mananghaya.
Judge Jorge R. Coquia (now Justice of the Court of Appeals), then presiding Judge of the lower
court, granted the prayer for a writ of attachmen.
More than a year later, in an Urgent Motion dated December 11, 1978,
4
defendant Salazar
prayed that the writ of preliminary attachment issued ex parte and implemented solely against
his property be recalled and/or quashed. He argued that when he signed the promissory note
and chattel mortgage on May 5, 1977 in favor of RALLYE, FILINVEST was not yet his creditor
or obligee, therefore, he could not be said to have committed fraud when he contracted the
obligation on May 5, 1977. Salazar added that as the motor vehicle which was the object of the
chattel mortgage and the consideration for the promissory note had admittedly not been
delivered to him by RALLYE, his repudiation of the loan and mortgage is more justifiable.
FILINVEST filed an Opposition, but on February 2, 1979, the court a quo, this time presided
over by herein respondent Judge, ordered the dissolution and setting aside of the writ of
preliminary attachment issued on August 17, 1977 and the return to defendant Salazar of all his
properties attached by the Sheriff by virtue of the said writ.
Petioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied.
On August 2, 1977, Filinvest Credit Corporation (hereinafter referred to as FILINVEST) filed a
complaint in the lower court against defendants Rallye Motor Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
RALLYE) and Emesto Salazar for the collection of a sum of money with damages and
preliminary writ of attachment.
Praying for a writ of preliminary attachment, FILINVEST submitted with its complaint the
affidavit
of one Gil Mananghaya.
Judge Jorge R. Coquia (now Justice of the Court of Appeals), then presiding Judge of the lower
court, granted the prayer for a writ of attachmen.
More than a year later, in an Urgent Motion dated December 11, 1978,
4
defendant Salazar
prayed that the writ of preliminary attachment issued ex parte and implemented solely against
his property be recalled and/or quashed. He argued that when he signed the promissory note
and chattel mortgage on May 5, 1977 in favor of RALLYE, FILINVEST was not yet his creditor
or obligee, therefore, he could not be said to have committed fraud when he contracted the
obligation on May 5, 1977. Salazar added that as the motor vehicle which was the object of the
chattel mortgage and the consideration for the promissory note had admittedly not been
delivered to him by RALLYE, his repudiation of the loan and mortgage is more justifiable.
FILINVEST filed an Opposition, but on February 2, 1979, the court a quo, this time presided
over by herein respondent Judge, ordered the dissolution and setting aside of the writ of
preliminary attachment issued on August 17, 1977 and the return to defendant Salazar of all his
properties attached by the Sheriff by virtue of the said writ.
Petioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied.

Filinvest Credit Corporation filed a complaint in the lower court against defendants
Rallye Motor Corp and Ernesto Salazar for the collection of a sum of money with damages and
writ of preliminary attachment. Praying for a writ of preliminary attachment, Filinvest submitted
with its complaint the affidavit of one Gil Managhaya. The presiding judge granted the prayer for
a writ of attachment. Thereafter Defendant Salazar prayed that the writ of preliminary attachment
issued ex parte and implemented solely against his property be recalled and or quashed. He
argued that when he signed the promissory note and chattel mortgage in favour of Rallye,
Filinvest was not yet his creditor or obligee, therefore he could not be said to have been
committed fraud when he contracted the obligation. Salazar added that as the motor vehicle
which was the object of the chattel mortgage and the consideration for the promissory note had
admittedly not been delivered to him by Rallye. Filinvest filed an opposition.

ISSUE :

Won the writ of Preliminary Attachment was improperly or irregularly issued for being
issued ex-parte without notice to him and proper hearing

RULING

No. We do not agree with the contention of private respondent. Nothing in the Rules of
Court makes notice and hearing indispensable and mandatory requisites for the issuance of a writ
of attachment. As clarified in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, a writ of
attachment may be issued ex parte. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 57, merely require that an applicant
for an order of attachment file an affidavit and a bond: the affidavit to be executed by the
applicant himself or some other person who personally knows the facts and to show that (1) there
is a sufficient cause of action, (2) the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 57, (3)
there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced, and (4) the amount
claimed in the action is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal
counterclaims; and the bond to be "executed to the adverse party in an amount fixed by the
judge, not exceeding the applicant's claim, conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs which
may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto.

5. G.R. No. L-34589 June 29, 1988

ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION INCORPORATED,  vs. NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
ECI filed a complaint for damages against the NPC alleging that it suffered damages to
its facilities and equipment due to the inundation of its campsite as a direct result of the improper
and careless opening by NPC of the spillway gates of Angat Dam at the height of typhoon
"Welming". The trial court found NPC liable and ECI moved for the execution upon posting a
bond. The court granted the motion and the deputy sheriff garnished in favor of ECI all amounts
due and payable to NPC which were then in possession of MERALCO. NPC and MERALCO
appealed the said decision and filed separate petitions for review before this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners, including the sheriff, are bound to restore to npc the judgment
amount which has been delivered to eci in compliance with the writ of garnishment

RULING:
YES. Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging
to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. Applying the foregoing
to the case at bar, MERALCO, as garnishee, after having been judicially compelled to pay the
amount of the judgment represented by funds in its possession belonging to the judgment debtor
or NPC, should be released from all responsibilities over such amount after delivery thereof to
the sheriff. To expose garnishees to risks for obeying court orders and processes would only
undermine the administration of justice.

6. GR. No. 55381. March 26, 1984

SPOUSES JULIETA SALGADO and JOSE SALGADO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK
FACTS:
The Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank filed an action against petitioners to
recover on a promissory note in the amount of P1,510,905.96. The Bank further prayed for the
issuance of a writ of attachment on the ground that petitioners had fraudulently misappropriated
and/or converted to their own personal use and benefit the sugar proceeds given as security for
the payment of the indebtedness, which was granted. Petitioners Salgado moved to quash the
writ of attachment on the ground that respondent Bank made fraudulent misrepresentation in
securing the writ. The trial court granted petitioner’s motion and lifted the writ of attachment
which was also affirmed by the CA upon appeal. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the writ of execution is proper

RULING:
NO. The chief purpose of the remedy of attachment is to secure a contingent lien on
defendant’s property until plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have
such property applied to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured debts in cases
where the means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or
improperly disposed of or concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors. The
grounds upon which attachment may issue are set forth in Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court. The reason for the rule prohibiting attachment where indebtedness was already secured is
to prevent the secured creditors from attaching additional property and thus tying up more of the
debtor’s property than was necessary to secure the indebtedness. In the instant case, It is
undisputed that the note sued upon "is fully secured by a series of valid and existing real estate
mortgages duly registered and annotated in the titles of the affected real property in favor of the
plaintiff Bank." Since attachment is a harsh and rigorous remedy which exposes the debtor to
humiliation and annoyance, the rule authorizing its issuance must be strictly construed in favor
of the defendant.

7. G.R. No. L-53772 October 4, 1990

ZOSIMO RIVAS and NORDY P. DIPLOMA
vs.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, EZEKIEL F. TOEG ORLANDO C.
DULAY, MIGUEL S. ARAMBULO, JR., RODOLFO H. DULAY, RODRIGO C. REYES,
EMIGDIO S. TANJUATCO, JR., JACOB (JAMES) ISAAC and TEODORO BUNDANG

FACTS:
 Petitioners filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a petition for
nullification of transfer of shares and of directors election, with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction alleging that Respondent Toeg and other respondents steal petitioner
Diploma’s stock certificate when Diploma entrusted to Toeg the key to the safety deposit box
containing the deposited stock certificates. SEC Hearing Officer issued a restraining order and
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents from voting the shares derived from
Diploma’s stock certificates and enjoining respondents from exercising any of the powers and
functions of directors and officers. Private respondents appealed said order and while their
appeal was pending with the SEC en banc, private respondents filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order, to
annul and set aside the orders of the Hearing Officer. However, the Court dismissed the petition
for lack of merit.
Private respondents filed with the SEC en banc a Manifestation and Motion calling its
attention to a letter-directive of the Minister of Justice, then Hon. Ricardo C. Puno, which
reversed the findings of the City Fiscal of Manila and directed the fiscal to move for the
dismissal of the criminal case for theft against therein respondents. SEC en banc reversed the
appealed order and the writ of preliminary injunction is hereby lifted and dissolved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of the SEC en banc of the order disturb the status quo of the
corporate situation

RULING:
The issuance of the SEC en banc questioned order did not also disturb the status quo,
which is the last actual peaceable uncontested status quo which preceded the controversy. The
sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the main
case can be heard. In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the Hearing Officer did not
maintain the status quo but restored the corporate situation preceding the status quo. The lifting
by the SEC en banc of the writ of preliminary injunction merely restored the status quo.

8. G.R. No. L-30070 August 29, 1980

FEDERICO DECANO
vs.
ROMEO F. EDU, as Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation and CIPRIANO
POSADAS, as Acting Registrar, Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan City Agency
FACTS:

The Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications issued to Federico Decano

(Decano) a temporary appointment to the position of janitor in the Motor Vehicles Office. The
appointment having been approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service, the said appointee
assumed office and served therein for almost four years when Cipriano Posadas (Posadas), as
Acting Registrar, Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan City, received a telegram from
Romeo F. Edu, in his then capacity as Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation
Commission (LTC), terminating his (Decano's) services effective as of the close of business on
that day.

Thereafter, Decano filed before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a petition for
"Mandamus and Injunction" claiming that the aforementioned officials of the LTC acted without
power and in excess of authority in removing him from the service. A writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by the trial court at the commencement of the proceedings commanding
respondents "to desist and refrain from disturbing, molesting or otherwise ousting the petitioner
from his position as janitor in the Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan City Agency, and
to pay the petitioner his corresponding salary from the date of notice of said preliminary
injunction, until further orders from the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court acted without jurisdiction as the petition for mandamus
with injunction was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan while respondent Edu
holds office in Quezon City

HELD:

In seeking reversal of the trial court's decision, respondents make capital of the fact that
the petition for mandamus with injunction was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
while respondent Edu holds office in Quezon City which, they claim, is beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the said court. Here, petitioner seeks primarily the annulment of the dismissal
order issued by respondent Edu, mandamus and injunction being then merely corollary remedies
to the main relief sought, and what is prayed to be enjoined, as in fact the trial court did enjoin by
preliminary injunction, is the implementation of the termination order against the petitioner. It is
true that the order of dismissal was issued by respondent Edu, but it was to be implemented in
Dagupan City by his subordinate officer, respondent Acting Registrar of the LTC stationed at
Dagupan City. Insofar, therefore, as respondent Edu is concerned, the order terminating the
services of respondent was a fait accompli and this he had done without authority. The injunction
is question, consequently, must be taken only to restrain the implementation of respondent Edu's
order by his co-respondent whose official station at Dagupan City is within the territorial
boundaries of the trial court's jurisdictional district.

9. G.R. No. L-31135 May 29, 1970

THE DIRECTOR OR OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE BUREAU OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, LEON CERVANTES, in his capacity as Regional
Superintendent of Region IV, Bureau of Telecommunications, Iloilo City, and VIVENCIO
ALAGBAY, in his capacity as Chief Operator, Bureau of Telecommunications, Roxas City 
vs.
HON. JOSE A. ALIGAEN, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Capiz,
Branch II, and JOSE, M. F. BELO

FACTS:
Jose Belo owned a congressional franchise, pursuant to the said franchise he had put up
in Roxas, an automatic telephone system which had been operating and rendering good service
with 410 telephones and sufficient reserves for additional lines.
Bureau of Telecommunications, was starting to establish maintain and operate the same within
the geographical area of Roxas City another local telephone system. This prompted Belo to file
with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, a verified petition for “Injunction with Preliminary
Injunction”.
Belo posted a bond in the amount of P 5,000.00, accordingly a writ of injunction was issued. On
the same date, respondent offers a counter bond in the amount of P 20,000.00 for the dissolution
of injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not filing of counter bond dissolves the effect of injunction
RULING:
No, The mere filing of a counterbond does not necessarily warrant the dissolution of the
writ of preliminary injunction. Under Section 6 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the court is
called upon to exercise its discretion in determining or weighing the relative damages that may
be suffered by the parties. If the damages that may be suffered by the defendant by the
continuance of the injunction outweigh the damages that may be suffered by the plaintiff by the
dissolution of the injunction, then the injunction should be dissolved.

10. G.R. No. L-21988            September 30, 1966

ALICIA S. GONZALES, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, HUMBERTO DE LOS
SANTOS
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, DISTRICT
ENGINEER, Province of Davao and  LUCIA O. TOLENTINO

FACTS:
The records show that, acting upon a letter-complaint filed by Lucia O. Tolentino, and
after hearing Alicia S. Gonzales, among others, the Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications rendered, on July 11, 1961, a decision ordering the demolition of certain dams
constructed by Gonzales and three other persons across Cabatan River and seemingly enclosing
Gonzales' fishponds in Magbongcogon, Lupon, Davao. On subsequent motion of Gonzales, this
decision was reconsidered by the Head of said Department on September. However, on appeal
taken by Tolentino, the last action thus 'taken by said Department Head was, on December 1,
1961, reversed by the Office of the President, which ordered the dams aforementioned
demolished. Accordingly, said Department directed the District Engineer of Davao to proceed
with the demolition of the dams. A reconsideration of the decision of the Executive having been,
subsequently, denied, on January 16, 1962, the District Engineer of Davao advised Gonzales that
the former's representatives would execute said decision.
This prompted the petitioner to file an action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary
injunction and/or preliminary mandatory injuction, to prevent the demolition of petitioner’s dam.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of First Instance of Davao had jurisdiction to entertain said Case No.
3689, considering that its main purpose was to prevent the enforcement of a decision of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, who is in Manila.
RULING:
Yes, the CFI of Davao has jurisdiction over the petition for injunction. Citing the case of
Samar Mining Co. vs. Arnaldo, G.R. No. L-17709 (June 30, 1961) and Acosta vs.. Alvendia,
G.R. No. L-14598 (October 31, 1960), is not correct. The Acosta case referred to a writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila restraining the Sheriff of
Nueva Ecija from enforcing or executing the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations in a
tenancy case involving lands situated in Nueva Ecija. The Supreme Court held that the said
Court of First Instance had overstepped its authority in issuing said writ. The Samar Mining case
involved a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila, to restrain the Regional Administrator and the Labor Attorney of the
Department of Labor in its Regional Office No. VI, established in the City of Cebu, from further
proceedings in a given Workmen's Compensation case in that City. Applying Section 44 (h) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296) and Rule 67, Sec. 4, of the Rules of Court, we held that
said Court had no authority to issue the writ prayed for.
In this case, the acts sought to be restrained were about to be performed within the
territorial boundaries of the province of Davao, in which the lower court is sitting. Hence, the
above cases uphold the jurisdiction of the said court to hear this case and decide whether or not
the relief prayed for by petitioner-appellant may or should be granted.

11. (22 Phil 433. March 28, 1912)

M. E. R. & L. Co. vs. Del Rosario and Jose

FACTS:

One Doroteo Jose had a contract with the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company,
by virtue of which Jose received, and the Light Company furnished electricity for lighting
purposes for several years. Thereafter the Light Company presented a bill but Jose frefused to
pay. The company cut the wire connecting Jose's residence with its power house, and refused
thereafter to furnish electric current to Jose.

Thereupon Jose filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for a
writ of mandamus and produced, ex parte, the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction
directing the Light Company to continue furnishing electricity to Jose upon the terms and
conditions set forth in the complaint, pending the final determination of the mandamus
proceedings.

The Light Company is now before us, praying that a writ of certiorari issue to the judge
of the court below who granted the preliminary mandatory injunction, on the ground that in
doing so he exceeded his jurisdiction, or rather that he was without jurisdiction to issue an
injunction of this nature.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s contention was correct

RULING:

The power to grant preliminary injunctions, both preventative and mandatory, is a logical
and necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon Courts of First Instance in these
Islands, as courts of record of general and unlimited original jurisdiction, both legal and
equitable.

The power to issue injunctions generally, including, as we hold, mandatory as well as

preventative injunctions, is not only a logical and essential incident of the general and unlimited
equitable and legal jurisdiction conferred upon Courts of First Instance, but is expressly
conferred upon them under the provisions of section 55 of Act No.. 136, with the single proviso,
that this jurisdiction is to be exercised in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.

12. 31 Phil 618. October 6, 1915

Escario vs. Regis

FACTS:

Gregorio Escario filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Cebu declaring that the land
and warehouses described in his complaint belong to him; praying for a judgment in his favor
and for the issuance of a preliminary injunction ordering the defendant Antero Regis to refrain in
the future from taking the possession of his manager of the keys of his two warehouses. As
ground therefor plaintiff alleged that he possessed under title of ownership. A preliminary
injunction was issued.
 In a written answer, he alleged that since the month of July, 1899, when Fausta Regis, the
absolute owner of the property, died, it had all belonged to her heirs; that in the lifetime of Fausta
Regis the plaintiff had by fraudulent means secured from the Spanish government in his own
name by composition with the state a title to the said lands, but, in order to escape the
consequences of the fraud he had perpetrated, the plaintiff in good faith executed and signed on
December 29, 1893, a deed of gift inter vivos transferring the title and absolute ownership of all
the said lands to Fausta Regis; that after the latter's death the defendant Antero Regis had been
appointed administrator of her estate by her legal heirs, and as such he is entitled to possession
and administration of her property

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff was the sole owner

RULING:

YES. The possessor of a title issued in due form has in his favor the legal presumption
that in the issuance thereof all the requisites prescribed therefor by law have been fulfilled. If
titles duly issued by the Government under the laws in force could be destroyed or invalidated by
purely parol evidence nobody would be secure in his property, and even one who had the very
best title would be in danger of losing it, if parol evidence could in any manner prevail as a
general rule over documentary proof. The sum of the parol evidence adduced by the defendants
has not satisfactorily demonstrated that said composition title was fraudulently obtained or
vitiated by any defect that would nullify it, and therefore no legal reason exists to declare it null
and void.

For these reasons the judgment appealed from must be reversed and Gregorio Escario
must be declared, as we do so declare, the sole owner of the lands in litigation, with their
improvements, by virtue of the composition title he secured from the government under the
former sovereignty; without special finding as to the costs in either instance.

13. G.R. No. L-60800 October 18, 1982

JAIME PELEJO and BELEN C. ZABALLERO

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PATERNO C. ZABALLERO and AURORA
GONZALES

FACTS:
Petitioners filed Civil Casefor Annulment of Deed, Title, Reconveyance and Damages.
According to petitioners, respondents Paterno C. Zaballero and his wife Aurora Gonzales
Zaballero approached them sometime in 1974 for assistance. They borrowed the title TCT No. T-
49125, covering the property so that they could have a collateral for a loan from the Monte de
Piedad Bank, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed in
favor of Mr. and Mrs. Paterno C. Zaballero. The Zaballeros took the Deed of Sale to mean what
it stated and had the title transferred to their names. As a consequence, TCT No. T-49125 was
cancelled and TCT No. 130117 was issued in the names of the Zaballeros.

Respondents denied the allegations. Case was DISMISSED but it was not appealed or
otherwise elevated to an appellate court. Instead, petitioners filed a new complaint for
"Annulment of Deed, Title, Reconveyance and Damages" assigned to another branch of the
Manila Court of First Instance. DISMISSED. Private respondents filed a motion for the issuance
of a Writ of Possession which was granted As a consequence, the possession of the property in
question was turned over to herein respondents .

ISSUE:

Won mandatory injunction may be granted in favor of the respondents.

RULING:
A mandatory injunction is granted only on a showing that (a) the invasion of the right is
material and substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is
an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. Petitioners' right over
the property is not clear. As stated above, the title to the property in question is already in the
names of private respondents who, therefore, have better right to the possession thereof.

The procedural error incurred by private respondents in not asking for affirmative relief
in the dispositive portion of the lower court's order dismissing the case and which led to the
dispute surrounding the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession is a mere technicality
which would not prevail over considerations of substantial justice. There is no point in
prolonging the litigation when private respondents are the owners of the property and therefore
are entitled to its possession. It would be an injustice to allow petitioners to continue holding
subject property. DISMISSED.

14. G.R. No. 87913 May 6, 1991

LEONOR A. OLALIA and her husband JESUS G. OLALIA
vs.
LOLITA O HIZON, represented by her Atty. In Fact, ATTY. ABRAHAM P. GOROSPE

FACTS:
Lolita O. Hizon filed a complaint for unfair competition with damages and prayer for
preliminary injunction against her brother's wife, petitioner Leonor A. Olalia. Hizon claimed that
she had been using the business name Pampanga's Best since 1974 and that her goodwill had
been impaired because of the petitioner's use of the name Pampanga's Pride for her own
products. Judge Natividad issued the a preliminary injunction. The petitioner, without filing a
motion for reconsideration, immediately went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and asked
that the order be set aside. The respondent court issued a temporary restraining order, then a
preliminary injunction. ultimately, the petition was denied on the principal ground that the trial
court had not committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order. The appellate
court1 declared that the conclusions reached by the trial court were if at all, only errors of
judgment that were not correctible in a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether, on the basis of the evidence submitted at the hearings on the motion for
preliminary injunction, the Order of November 28, 1988, was correctly issued.

RULING:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final
judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act.2 As the term itself suggest, it is
merely temporary, subject to the final disposition of the principal action. The justification for the
preliminary injunction is urgency. It is based on evidence tending to show that the action
complained of must be stayed lest the movant suffer irreparable injury or the final judgment
granting him relief sought become ineffectual. Necessarily, that evidence need only be a
"sampling," as it were, and intended merely to give the court an idea of the justification for the
preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. The evidence submitted at
the hearing on the motion for the preliminary injunction is not conclusive of the principal action,
which has yet to be decided.

While, to reiterate, the evidence to be submitted at the hearing on the motion for
preliminary injunction need not be conclusive and complete, we find that the private respondent
has not shown, at least tentatively, that she has been irrepairably injured during the five month
period the petitioner was operating under the trade name of Pampanga's Pride. On this ground
alone, we find that the preliminary injunction should not have been issued by the trial court. It
bears repeating that as a preliminary injunction is intended to prevent irreparable injury to the
plaintiff, that possibility should be clearly established, if only provisionally, to justify the
restraint of the act complained against. No such injury has been shown by the private respondent.
Consequently, we must conclude that the issuance of the preliminary injunction in this case,
being utterly without basis, was tainted with grave abuse of discretion that we can correct on
certiorari.

15. 36 SCRA 534, No. L-27905 December 28, 1970

Republic vs. Cloribel,
FACTS:
On October 24, 1958, a petition for prohibition and injunction was filed by the Republic
of the Philippines and/or the Central Bank of the Philippines against Pedro Hernaez, as Secretary
of Commerce and Industry, several other government officials, and Bienvenido Y. Aguilar, in
Civil Case No. 38224 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking to enjoin the respondents
and all persons actively under their direction from releasing the consumers and producers goods
and commodities imported by respondent Aguilar under a license issued to him by the No-Dollar
Import Office of petitioner Central Bank of the Philippines. Subsequently, however, the
petitioners agreed to the release of the goods on the undertaking of surety bonds in the total
amount of P1,351,000.00, the approximate value of the goods so imported.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 1, 1965 dismissing the petition. Appeal to
the Supreme Court was filed with the lower court by petitioners Republic and Central Bank.
Prior, however, to the transmitted of the record of the case to this Court, the parties arrived at an
amicable settlement, and submitted to the court their Compromise Agreement. On its face, it
appears that one of the considerations for the said Trade Assistance Agreement, as included in
the said Compromise Agreement, was the projected filing of a joint motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 38224 by Aguilar and the Central Bank, among others. Alleging that the Trade Assistance
Agreement was being assailed in certain quarters as immoral, illegal and ultra vires on the part of
the NAMARCO, thereby placing him in a bad light, Aguilar filed with the court below a petition
praying that the December 2, 1966 decision approving the Compromise Agreement be set aside.
The court denied Aguilar's petition. In view of the denial of his petition, he filed with the lower
court a motion for execution praying that court, among others, to command the petitioners in the
case and the NAMARCO to take the necessary steps to comply with the terms of the
Compromise Agreement by implementing the Trade Assistance Agreement.
Respondent Judge issued an order on July 5, 1967, for the issuance of a writ of execution
as prayed for by herein respondent Aguilar, i.e., including the implementation of the Trade
Assistance Agreement.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of July 5, 1967, for the issuance of a writ
of execution insofar as it concerns the implementation of the NAMARCO-Aguilar Trade
Assistance Agreement.

RULING:
After examining carefully the record of the case and weighing the arguments of the
parties, we have come to the conclusion that respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
including the implementation of the Trade Assistance Agreement among the matters which
should be executed.
The Trade Assistance Agreement entered into by and between the NAMARCO and
respondent Bienvenido Y. Aguilar on November 17, 1966, is not a binding and perfected
contract. The said agreement not having been approved by the President, it stands to reason that
the same is not a perfected and operative contract.
 Moreover, the General Manager of the NAMARCO did not have the authority to submit
the NAMARCO to the jurisdiction of the court in Civil Case No. 38224, or to sign the
Compromise Agreement which was later approved by the court in its December 2, 1966
decision. As we have already stated above, the only authority given by the NAMARCO Board of
Directors to the General Manager was to enter into a trade assistance agreement with Aguilar
Enterprises. The General Manager was not authorized to sign any compromise agreement in
Civil Case No. 38224. Although the text of the Trade Assistance Agreement shows that one of
the consideration for its execution was the filing by the Central Bank and respondent Aguilar of a
joint motion to dismiss, the NAMARCO was not in a position to legally bind the Central Bank,
which, in spite of the terms of the Trade Assistance Agreement, was still free to decide for itself
whether or not to enter into an amicable settlement of the case, as well as the terms of such
settlement.

16. 65 SCRA 336, No. L-25434 July 25, 1975

Roldan, Jr. vs. Arca

FACTS:
On April 3, 1964, respondent company filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
civil case docketed as No. 56701 against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan,
Jr., for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which
had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine
Navy.
On April 10, 1964, respondent company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction with respondent court, but said prayer was, however, denied. On April 28, 1964, the
Court of First Instance of Manila set aside its order of April 10, 1964 and granted respondent
company’s motion for reconsideration praying for preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus,
respondent company took possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from herein petitioners by virtue
of the abovesaid writ.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge has acted in grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of the writ?
RULING:
We rule that the respondent Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance acted without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when he issued on October 18, 1965 the order
directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and when he refused to
reconsider the same.
When the respondent Judge issued the challenged order on October 18, 1965 and the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction pursuant thereto, the fishing vessels were already under the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Palawan by virtue of its orders of October 2 and 4,
1965, upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal, directing the Philippine Navy to detain said vessels,
which are subject to forfeiture as instruments of the crime, to be utilized as evidence in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3417 for illegal fishing pending in said court. The said vessels were seized while
engaging in prohibited fishing within the territorial waters of Palawan and hence within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, in obedience to the rule that “the place
where a criminal offense was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction over the vessels acquired by the Palawan Court
of First Instance cannot be interfered with by another Court of First Instance. Only the Palawan
court can order the release of the two vessels. Not even the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources nor the Fisheries Commissioner can direct that the fishing boats be turned over to
private respondent without risking contempt of court.

17. G.R. No. 84324. April 5, 1990

SANTIAGO AQUINO, TERENCIO YUMANG, JR. and FULGENCIO ICARO

v.
HON. GUILLERMO R. LUNTOK, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XXIX,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur and LUDOVICO B. PERALTA

FACTS:
In this special civil action for certiorari, with an application for preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order, petitioners seek the annulment of the following orders of respondent
judge in Civil Case No. L-361 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur, entitled "Ludovico
B. Peralta v. Henry B. Rañola, Et Al.," to wit: (1) Temporary restraining order, dated August 27,
1987, enjoining petitioners herein for a period of twenty (20) days from proceeding or taking
action against herein private respondent; (2) Order, dated September 16, 1987, extending the
efficacy of said TRO for another period of twenty (20) days; (3) Order, dated October 6, 1987,
indirectly extending the efficacy of the TRO for an uncertain period; (4) Order, dated November
4, 1987, granting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction; and (5) Order, dated
November 5, 1987, approving the bond filed by private respondent which led to the eventual
issuance of the writ of November 11, 1987.
Petitioners asseverate that the questioned writ of preliminary injunction is null and void,
it being in reality a fourth restraining order issued beyond the 20-day effectivity of the
preceeding TRO. 15 Further, petitioners claim that the injunction was issued in utter disregard of
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, private respondent having brought the
action below pending his request for reinvestigation with the Commission on Audit. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction is null and void
HELD:
 We are disposed to sustain the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction in question.
A temporary restraining order, while being in effect a species of injunction, is in some respects to
be distinguished therefrom. It is an interlocutory order or writ issued by the court as a restraint on
the defendant until the propriety of granting a preliminary injunction can be determined, thus
going no further in its operation than to preserve the status quo until that determination. When
such determination is made, the whole force of the order ceases by its own limitations and
become functus officio, having by then served its purpose. On this basis lies the mootness of the
issue on the propriety of the issuance of successive restraining orders upon the approval of the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, as ruled by the Court of Appeals. With the grant
of the writ, hearing the petition which sought the annulment of the three antecedent TROs would
be inutile as the writ has been substituted for and subserves the purpose of the prior restraining
orders.

18. G.R. No. 78265               January 22, 1990

SPOUSES ESTANISLAO and EDNA CARBUNGCO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH DIVISION, and SPOUSES ELIAS and ISIDRA
CUNANAN, respondents.

FACTS:
Respondents were required to comment on the petition in a resolution of this Court dated
May 20, 1987. For failure of respondents to file their comment, petitioners filed a Motion for
judgment on the pleadings which was received by this Court on August 5, 1987. Respondents
were ordered to comment on the aforesaid motion, in a resolution dated August 26, 1987. Again,
respondents failed to file their comment. The Court, in a resolution dated February 15, 1988,
gave due course to the petition and considered this case submitted for deliberation.
Petitioners invoke the corrective powers of this Court to set aside the second restraining
order which had been allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
This petition is impressed with merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals may issue another temporary restraining
order of indefinite duration after the first had automatically expired on the twentieth (20th) day
of its issuance without private respondents having taken steps to obtain a preliminary injunction.

HELD:
 There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals may issue a temporary restraining order as
held in the case of Delbros Hotel Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 72566,
April 12, 1988). In that case, this Court held that Sec. 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court as
amended by BP Blg. 224.
Under the said provision, a judge (or justice) may issue a temporary restraining order
with a limited life of 20 days from date of issue. In the case of Board of Transportation
v. Castro, 125 SCRA 410, We held:
If before the expiration of the 20-day period the application for preliminary injunction is
denied, the temporary restraining order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no
action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said 20 days,
the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of
law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary. A temporary restraining order CAN
NO LONGER EXIST INDEFINITELY for it has become truly temporary. (p. 5, Rollo)

The second restraining order issued is therefore a patent nullity.

19. G.R. No. L-27829 August 19, 1988

PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION

vs.
HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch IV (Quezon City) and TIMOTEO A. SEVILLA, doing business under the name
and style of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATED RESOURCES and PRUDENTIAL BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY

FACTS:
Sevilla, proprietor and General Manager of the Philippine Associated Resources (PAR)
was awarded in a public bidding the right to import Virginia leaf tobacco. The Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) and Sevilla entered into a contract for the importation
of 85 million kilos of Virginia leaf tobacco and a counterpart exportation of 2.53 million kilos of
tobacco and 5.1 million kilos of farmer’s and tobacco at P3.00 a kilo. Sevilla purchased from
PVZTA and exported 2,101.470 kilos of tobacco, paying the PVTA the sum of P2,482,938.50
and leaving a balance of P3,713,908.91. Before respondent Sevilla could import the counterpart
blending Virginia tobacco, amounting to 525,560 kilos, Republic Act No. 4155 was passed and
took effect on June 20, 1 964, authorizing the PVTA to grant import privileges at the ratio of 4 to
1 instead of 9 to 1 and to dispose of all its tobacco stock at the best price available.
The agreement was amended because Sevilla will be exporting at a loss subject to
condition that Sevilla would open an irrevocable letter of credit with the Prudential Bank and
Trust Co. in favor of the PVTA to secure the payment of said balance, drawable upon the release
from the Bureau of Customs of the imported Virginia blending tobacco. As Sevilla negotiated for
the reduction of the procurement cost of the kilos of Tobacco already exported, PVTA prepared
drafts to be drawn against the letter of credit for amounts that have already become due and
demandable. Sevilla then filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against the
petitioner. The court sided with Sevilla, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by
respondent judge enjoining PVTA from drawing against the letter of credit. Subsequently,
respondent judge issued an order directing the Prudential Bank & Trust Co. to make the
questioned release of funds from the Letter of Credit to Sevilla and before petitioner could file a
motion for reconsideration of said order, respondent Sevilla was able to secure the release of
P300,000.00 and the rest of the amount.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge act with grave abuse of discretion when he issued the order to
make the questioned release of funds from the Letter of Credit to Sevilla.
RULING:
Yes. In issuing the Order, respondent Judge violated the irrevocability of the letter of
credit issued by respondent Bank in favor of petitioner. An irrevocable letter of credit cannot
during its lifetime be cancelled or modified without the express permission of the beneficiary or
PVTA in this case. Furthermore, the question of whether or not Sevilla or PAR is entitled to a
reduction of the amount of the payment due must be answered first before the release of funds
from the Letter of Credit be granted to Sevilla for the extra amounts it allegedly paid. This avoids
the situation wherein the trial court disallows of a reduction on the amounts that needed to be
paid by Sevilla upon a finding that R.A. 4155 is inapplicable. Sevilla would then still have an
unpaid balance, an obligation which is now unsecured, which the Court seeks to prevent.

20. G.R. No. L-3937             April 27, 1951

GO TECSON, ET AL.
vs.
HON. HIGINO MACADAEG, ET AL.

FACTS:
Go Checo died intestate leaving as legal heirs his eight children of two marriages, among
them these plaintiffs and Paulino P. Gocheco, the eldest son. Paulino instituted Intestate
Proceedings when herein plaintiffs, then in China, were purposely kept ignorant thereof by
Paulino, who was administrator. Paulino made them understand that their father had died in
penury until Go Chi Gun managed to come to the Philippines in January 1948 and thereby, she
discovered that their father had left substantial cash and resources in Manila. The plaintiffs sued
the successors of their deceased brother Paulino and asserted co-ownership rights over some
properties of their commons ancestor Go Checo, particularly certain lots and buildings on
Azcarraga and Aguilar Streets in the City of Manila. By a sworn petition they requested for
receivership over said realities alleging, in short, that these had been mortgaged; that although
the buildings earned sufficient rentals, the indebtedness had been negligently left unpaid; that the
mortgage was under foreclosure, and there was grave danger the property would be lost thru a
forced sale, unless a receiver was appointed to collect the rents and apply them to release the
encumbrance.
The receivership was granted but discontinued upon the motion for reconsideration
calling the court's attention to the circumstances that Paulino’s estate was in process of
settlement. Plaintiffs sought intervention in the said inestate proceedings, presenting a motion for
the removal and substitution of the administration because he negligently failed to liquidate the
aforesaid mortgage. The probate court denied the motion for the reason that the realties involved
were no longer under the administrator. Plaintiffs in civil case No. 5436 renewed their petition
for receivership, and the court reinstated the receivership. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of receivership is proper

RULING:
Yes. Under the rules, the provisional remedy of receivership may be secured whenever it
appears that the party applying for it has interest in the property which is the subject of the action
and that such property is in danger of being lost unless a receiver is named, or whenever it
appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and feasible means of
preserving, administering or disposing of the property in litigation.
In this case, plaintiffs thru the machinations, active fraud and continuous deception of
Paulino were kept out of court and deprived of their rightful heritage, and that they came to
discover the deceit only in April 1948 i. e. one month before they submitted their complaint. If
these allegations are provisionally admitted for the purpose of this case, as they should be,
plaintiffs have a subsisting cause of action what with the fiduciary ties that have allegedly been
abused. Inasmuch as Go Checo used their hereditary share in building up his business they
became co-owners thereof.
The undenied allegations in the petition for receivership were prima facie adequate. They
exhibited either diversion of funds or mal-administration. It is inconceivable that property
renting P4,500 monthly should not yield in so many years (since 1927 and/or 1937) enough
money to wipe out two mortgages amounting to P50,000, or at least to forestall foreclosure
proceedings. Further, there is already an express declaration of the probate court that these
properties are not under the management of the administrator appointed by it. Hence the danger
of dual control suggested by petitioners does not actually exist. Hence, the grant of receivership
is proper.
23. G.R. No. L-252             March 30, 1946
TRANQUILINO CALO and DOROTEO SAN JOSE
vs.
ARSENIO C. ROLDAN, Judge of First Instance of Laguna, REGINO RELOVA and
TEODULA BARTOLOME

FACTS:
A complaint filed in the case No. 7951,plaintiffs spouses alleged that they are the
possessor and owner of the parcel of the unplanted rice land and the coconut land which was by
use of force, stealth, threats and intimidation, Defendants intend or are intending to enter and
work or harvest whatever existing fruits may now be found in the lands, as such Plaintiff filed a
writ of Preliminary Injunction before the CFI of Laguna presided by respondent Judge Relova.
Defendants filed an oppositions thereto, that they are the owners and possessors of the
said land and reiterate to their answer to the complaint filed ion August 14,1945.
Respondent Judge denied the petition on the ground that the defendants were in actual
possession of said lands.
Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and for appointment of a receiver of the
properties described in the complaint.
Respondents Judge Roldan, decided that the court would consider the motion for
reconsideration in due time, and granted the petition for appointment of and appointed a receiver
in the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the order appointing a receiver in the case No. 7951 of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna.
HELD:
YES. The respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in appointing a receiver in
case No. 7951 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
Relief by way of receivership is equitable in nature, and a court of equity will not
ordinarily appoint a receiver where the rights of the parties depend on the determination of
adverse claims of legal title to real property and one party is in possession.
In this case, the litigation or issue raised by plaintiffs in their complaint is not the
ownership or possession of the lands and their fruits. It is whether or not defendants intend or
were intending to enter or work or harvest whatever existing fruits could then be found in the
lands described in the complaint, alleged to be the exclusive property and in the actual
possession of the plaintiffs. It is a matter not only of law but of plain common sense that a
plaintiff will not and legally can not ask for the appointment or receiver of property which he
alleges to belong to him and to be actually in his possession. For the owner and possessor of a
property is more interested than persons in preserving and administering it.

24. ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

CAMILO F. BORROMEO
FACTS:
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Petitioner appealed the Appellate Court's decision to
this Court by a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner is the actual possessor of the disputed property, and the registered owner
thereof, as evidenced by TCTs Nos. 24790, 24791, and 24792 issued in her name by the Register
of Deeds of Mandaue City on December 3, 1987.
Respondent Camilo Borromeo, a realtor, filed against petitioner a civil complaint for the
recovery of three (3) parcels of land and the house built. He alleged that he purchased the
property on July 11, 1991 from Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian national and former lover of the
petitioner for many years until he deserted her in 1991 for the favors of another woman. Based
on the deed of sale which the Austrian made in his favor as such Borromeo filed an action to
recover the ownership and possession of the house and lots from Descallar and asked for the
issuance of new transfer certificates of title in his name.
Descallar alleged that the property belongs to her as the registered owner thereof; that
Borromeo's vendor, Wilhelm Jambrich, is an Austrian, hence, not qualified to acquire or own
real property in the Philippines. He has no title, right or interest whatsoever in the property which
he may transfer to Borromeo.
Borromeo asked the trial court to appoint a receiver for the property during the pendency
of the case. Despite the petitioner's opposition, Judge Mercedes Golo-Dadole granted the
application for receivership and appointed her clerk of court as receiver with a bond of
P250,000.00.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order, but it was DENIEFD.
She also sought relief in the Court of Appeals by a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No.
27977 "Antonietta O. Descallar vs. Hon. Mercedes G. Dadole, as Judge, RTC of Mandaue City,
Branch 28, and Camilo F. Borromeo"), but was DISMISSED.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in appointing a receiver for real
property registered in the name of the petitioner in order to transfer its possession from the
petitioner to the court-appointed receiver?
HELD:
YES. Title and possession cannot be defeated by mere verbal allegations that although
she appears in the deed of sale as vendee of the property, it was her Austrian lover, Jambrich,
who paid the price of the sale of the property (Sinoan vs. Soroñgan, 136 SCRA 407). Her
Torrens certificates of title are indefeasible or incontrovertible (Sec. 32, P.D. 1529).
Only when the property is in danger of being materially injured or lost, as by the
prospective foreclosure of a mortgage thereon for non-payment of the mortgage loans despite the
considerable income derived from the property, or if portions thereof are being occupied by third
persons claiming adverse title thereto, may the appointment of a receiver be justified (Motoomul
vs. Arrieta, 8 SCRA 172
In this case, there is no showing that grave or irremediable damage may result to
respondent Borromeo unless a receiver is appointed. The property in question is real property,
hence, it is neither perishable or consummable. Even though it is mortgaged to a third person,
there is no evidence that payment of the mortgage obligation is being neglected. In any event, the
private respondent's rights and interests, may be adequately protected during the pendency of the
case by causing his adverse claim to be annotated on the petitioner's certificates of title.

25. 10 SCRA 59, GR L-14951

Ventosa v. Fernan

FACTS:
La Paz Ice Plant and Cold Storage Co. Inc. were leased by the petitioner its franchise,
factory and equipments and its premises and allegedly operated the same. Respondents Hodges
and Gurrea filed an action in CFI Iloilo against the President and Secretary of the Corporation
praying for appointment of ex-parte of a receiver for the properties. Jose Dineros was appointed
receiver and took possession of the plant.
Petitioner wrote a letter to Dineros stating he could not deliver the possession of the
properties and requesting him not to interfere with the management thereof. Dineros continued to
possess and refused to return the possession of the plant. Petitioner filed a motion for an order
from the respondent Judge, directing the receiver not to interfere with the management of the
corporation, claiming that the ice plant was leased to him and the receiver had no legal right to
deprive him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD:
 No. It is also held that property under receivership is property in custodia legis which
should remain under the administration and control of the receivership court, through its
creation, the receiver, for the purpose of preservation and for the benefit of the party who may be
adjudged entitled to it; that the effect of the appointment of a receiver is to remove the parties to
the suit from the possession of the property. These principles of law being true, there must be
hearing of some form or a regular trial of the issues in the said civil case No. 4994, as between
respondents Gurrea and Hodges, on one hand, and the petitioner herein, on the other, as
intervenor therein, so as to determine the party who is legally entitled to the possession and
control of the ice plant in question; and until such party is adjudged that right, the property must
remain under the control and supervision of the court, through its receiver.

26. 32 Phil 278, GR 10106

Dela Riva v. Salvador

FACTS:
In the year 1905 the defendant Rafael Molina Salvador began an action against the
plaintiff for the recovery of about P42,000, and, in that action, secured the appointment of
Joaquin Navarro, another of the defendants in this action, receiver of real and personal property
owned by De la Riva in the Island of Catanduanes. The receiver took possession of the property
and gave a bond in the sum of P50,000 conditioned for the faithful performance of the duties of
his office, the other defendants, Juan Garcia and Fernando Martinez, becoming sureties thereon.
The receiver was appointed in August, 1905, and in January, 1907, the Supreme Court set
aside the order appointing a receiver on the ground thai, under the provisions of law relative to
receiver-ships, there was no authority for the appointment of a receiver in the action named.
The property was inventoried at the time possession was taken by the receiver and the
value, as set out in the inventory, was something more than P231,000. After the reversal by
the Supreme Court of the order appointing the receiver the latter began a proceeding to
account. The record does not disclose what became of this proceeding or of the objections
presented therein and we find nothing further in connection therewith. It appears, however, that
the property, both real and personal, which the receiver had in his possession at the termination
of the receivership was seized by the sheriff of Albay under executions issued on judgments
against De la Riva, in favor of Gibbs, Gale & Carr and Enrique F. Somes, and was duly sold at
public sale under said executions. It further appears that the proceeds of the sale of such
property were not sufficient to pay the judgments under which the levies were made.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action can be filed against the receiver
HELD:
No. It is the relationship which exists between the court and the receiver which has led to
the general rule, followed in jurisdictions where statutes have not been passed to the contrary,
that no action can be brought against a receiver without leave of the court appointing him. And
this rule applies as well where suit is brought to recover a money judgment merely as where it is
to take from the receiver specific property whereof he is in possession by order of the court. If
actions against him are permitted indiscriminately, the interests of those concerned in the
property held by the receiver will suffer and the court will be hampered and limited in its control
over him. One who feels himself sufficiently aggrieved by acts of a receiver to warrant active
intervention should take the matter into the court which appointed the receiver and ask either for
an accounting or take some other proceeding, and ask for the consequent judgment of the court
on the acts complained of, or for leave to bring action directly. If, under the facts presented, it
is the judgment of the court that the interests of all concerned will be best observed by such a suit
or by any other proceeding, permission will be given to bring it.

27. G.R. No. L-18359             March 26, 1965

CALIXTO DUQUE, FLORENCIO SELGA, ALBERTO RAMOS, MANUEL BUENAFE,

CLARO LIZARDO and the Spouses SUSANA and JOSE COCHINGYAN, SR.
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, Branch I, LORENZO B. CAMINS
and RAMON SAURA

FACTS:

A derivative suit filed by minority stockholders of the World War Veterans Enterprises,
Inc., seeking to annul and set aside certain agreements entered into by the directors of the
corporation and Jose and Susana Cochingyan. By order of September 6, 1960, the Court of First
Instance of Manila had, upon motion, appointed one Ramon E. Saura as receiver of the
properties of the corporation. On January 31, 1961, defendants and intervenors filed charges
against the receiver Saura and sought his suspension, praying further that a co-receiver be
appointed, and this was approved by the SC, appointing Macario Ofilada, Clerk of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, as second receiver. Upon resignation of Saura as receiver, Ofilada was
requested to be the permanent receiver, which was opposed by Lorenzo Camins, proposed that
the Philippine Veterans Bank be appointed receiver. This was denied by the trial court, thus,
Camins and Pilar Normandy resorted to the Court for a writ of certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the parties may decide who will be the receiver in the proceedings

RULING:
 No. The appointment and discharge of receivers are matters primarily addressed to, and
resting largely on, the discretion of the trial court, not being a matter of strict right, and a
reviewing court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion unless convinced that the
same has been abused. The petitioner stresses that this Court, has taken cognizance of the fact
that as a Clerk of Court Mr. Ofilada had considerable official duties to perform, and, for that
reason, appointed him only as temporary receiver. Such action does not preclude a more accurate
appraisal by the trial court three years later, whether or not the official duties of Mr. Ofilada, as
the Clerk of that same court, impaired his efficient discharge of the functions of a receiver,
taking into account his actuations as temporary receiver from 1961 to 1964; and the Court sees
no evidence that in concluding that Mr. Ofilada could well perform the work of a permanent
receiver, despite his official duties, the lower court's decision was so arbitrary and capricious a
determination as to warrant intervention of the appellate court.

28. G.R. No. L-28611             January 30, 1929

ILDEFONSO DE LA ROSA, and GO KEE 

vs.
FRANCISCO DE BORJA

FACTS:

Ildefonso de la Rosa, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of the deceased Go Lio,
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against one Enrique Go Cotay for
the liquidation and partition of a partnership alleged to have been formed by Go Lio and the also
deceased Go Cosing, the father of Go Cotay. Thereafter, the trial court, on motion of the
plaintiff, appointed a receiver to take charge of the property in question, but on his own
representations, Go Cotay was intrusted with the care of the property in controversy upon the
filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000. on December 13, 1924, the Court of First Instance issued
an order in which it was recite that all of the property of the partnership had disappeared, due to
losses sustained during the period from 1918 until 1922 and that therefore, the plaintiff could
recover nothing from the defendant. From that order both parties appealed to this court, the
plaintiff appealing from the order of December 13, 1924, in which it was declared that the
partnership had no assets. 
The court further held that while Go Cotay was a manager of the partnership prior to
August 3, 1918, he must be classified as a receiver (depositario) subsequent to that date and,
consequently, was responsible for the losses during that receivership, that the losses were due to
the fact that Go Cotay continue the business of the partnership while it was in liquidation; that
the continuation of the business after he had been appointed receiver was not authorized by the
court and that he, therefore, was bound to indemnify the estate of Go Lio for one-half of the
losses incurred during that period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not principal Go Cotay was never appointed as receiver for the property and
affairs of the partnership, thus, there was no valid principal obligation; and that consequently
under the provisions of article 1824 of the Civil Code, there could be no valid bond.

RULING:
It is true that the principal Go Cotay was formally appointed receiver in equity, but he
virtually assumed the obligation of a common law receiver and as such was bound to account for
the assets of the partnership placed under his care. That obligation was perfectly valid and it was
no error to require a bond for its fulfillment. It is true that the court had no power to compel the
execution of the bond, but it had the power to appoint a receiver in equity, and if Go Cotay chose
to give the bond rather than to submit to such a receivership, he is bound by such bond and,
together with his sureties, must take the consequences.
While the principal Go Cotay was not formally named receiver, it is evident from the
bond itself, as well as from the previous stipulations, that he assumed a receiver's responsibility
for the care and conversation of the property left in his possession and that responsibility was not
confined to acts of negligence or abandonment on his part; "any other inexcusable cause" would
render him liable, and no excuse has been offered for his failure to account for the property and
assets in his possession and under his control. The losses may have been due to unfortunate
business ventures, but acting in the place of a receiver, Go Cotay had no authority or right to use
the assets of the partnership for that purpose and misfortunes of that character can, therefore, not
serve as excuses.

29. 21 SCRA 1275 December 8, 1967

Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez

FACTS:
The RTC of Manila presided by Judge Santos issued a search warrant which resulted to
seizure of an automobile which was then held by the latter in custodia legis. Now, Norberto
Dayrit filed a replevin in RTC Cebu presided by Judge Gomez who then directed petitioner (NBI
supervising agent) to turn over the seized car to the Sheriff of Cebu City. Petitioner was
threatened to be held in contempt of court and was forced to turn over the car to the Cebu Sheriff
which was later turned over to Dayrit. When the RTC Manila sought the car, petitioner filed an
MR in RTC Cebu setting aside the replevin order which was however denied. He filed a petition
for certiorari with SC. SC issued Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a court of first instance of one district in a replevin proceeding may
ignore a search warrant issued by another court of first instance.
HELD:
No. Once a Court of First Instance has been informed that a search warrant has been
issued by another court of first instance, it cannot require a sheriff or any proper officer of the
court to take the property subject of the replevin action, if theretofore it came into custody of
another public officer by virtue of a search warrant. Only the court of first instance that issued
such a search warrant may order its release. A contrary ruling would be subversive of a doctrine
steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial
actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction
are permitted to interfere with each other’s lawful orders.

30. 198 SCRA 614 June 27, 1991

Bagalihog vs. Fernandez

FACTS:
Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death shortly after disembarking at the Masbate
Airport. On the same day, petitioner’s house was searched with his consent to see if the killers
had sought refuge there. Two (2) days later, Capt. Julito Roxas and his men from the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) seized the petitioner’s motorcycle and took it to the PC Head Quarters in
Masbate without any search warrant. After investigation, the petitioner and several others were
charged with multiple murder and frustrated murder for killing Espinosa and three (3) of
his bodyguards. Petitioner filed a complaint against Capt. Roxas for the recovery of the
motorcycle with an application for Writ of Replevin with damages but was dismissed by Judge
Fernandez stating that property seized in enforcing criminal laws is in the custody of the law and
cannot be replevied until such custody is ended.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property may be replevied.
HELD:
Yes. The rule that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied
applies only where the property is lawfully held that is seized in accordance with the rule against
warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. It is true that property held as
evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the rule applies only where the property is
lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless searches and seizures
or its accepted exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis.
As the Court said in Tamisin v. Odejar, “A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has
been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his
execution of a legal writ.” Only when property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it
considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.
31. CHUA v. Court of Appeals
222 SCRA 85
FACTS:
By virtue of a search warrant issued by RTC-Cebu Branch 13, an Isuzu dump truck
owned by petitioner Romeo Chua was seized by respondent 2LT Dennis Canoy. Romeo Chua
thereafter filed an action for Replevin before the RTC-Cebu Branch 8. Judge Cañares of Branch
8 issued a Writ of Replevin. Canoy appealed to the CA which reversed Branch 8 and dismissed
the action for Replevin. The CA applied the ruling in the case of Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez which
held that “Once a CFI has been informed that a search warrant has been issued by another CFI, it
cannot require a sheriff or any proper officer of the court to take the property subject of the
replevin action, if theretofore it came into custody of another public officer by virtue of a search
warrant. Only the court of first instance that issued such a search warrant may order its release”.
The SC agreed with the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA properly dismissed the action for Replevin
HELD:
Yes. It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia
legis. However, where there is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the filing of
a criminal action, as in the case at bar where the case for carnapping was “dismissed
provisionally, without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved in favor
of complainant”, thus, the Branch 8 erred when it ordered the transfer of possession of the
property seized to petitioner when the latter filed the action for replevin. It should have dismissed
the case since the virtue of the “provisional dismissal” of the carnapping case there is still a
probability that a criminal case would be filed, hence a conflict in jurisdiction could still arise.
The basic principle that a judge who presides in one court cannot annul or modify the orders
issued by another branch of the same court because they are co-equal and independent bodies
acting coordinately, must always be adhered to.

32. 140 SCRA 255

Nonato v IAC

FACTS:
On June 28, 1976, defendant spouses Restituto Nonato and Ester Nonato purchased one
unit of Volkswagen Sakbayan from the People's Car, Inc., on installment basis. To secure
complete payment, the defendants executed a promissory note and a chattel mortgage in favor of
People's Car, Inc. The latter assigned its rights and interests over the note and mortgage in favor
of plaintiff Investor's Finance Corporation (IFC). For failure of defendants to pay two or more
installments, despite demands, the car was repossessed by plaintiff on March 20, 1978. Despite
repossession, plaintiff demanded from defendants that they pay the balance of the price of the
car.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a vendor, or his assignee, who had cancelled the sale of a motor vehicle
for failure of the buyer to pay two or more of the stipulated instalments, may also demand
payment of the balance of the purchase price.

HELD:
No. The applicable law in the case at bar, involving as it does a sale of personal property
on installment, is Article 1484 of the Civil Code. The meaning of the provision has been
repeatedly enunciated in a long line of cases. Thus: Should the vendee or purchaser of a personal
property default in the payment of two or more of the agreed installments, the vendor or seller
has the option to avail of any of these three remedies-either to exact fulfillment by the purchaser
of the obligation, or to cancel the sale, or to foreclose the mortgage on the purchased personal
property, if one was constituted. These remedies have been recognized as alternative, not
cumulative, that the exercise of one would bar the exercise of the others.

33. G.R. No. 10953. December 12, 1916

Panlilio vs. Victorio

FACTS:
The counsel for Adriano Panlilio filed a written complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, alleging that the plaintiff, being the owner, was entitled to the possession of the
furniture, shelving, glassware, medicines, drugs and other chemicals, perfumery, toilet powder,
and other movable and immovable property pertaining to drug and perfumery stores; that the
defendant sheriff of said province, Esteban Victorio, was unlawfully detaining the said personal
property, the subject matter of the complaint; that he had seized the same by virtue of a writ or
preliminary attachment issued, at the request of the defendants Stahl and Rumcker, against the
property of the defendant Mariano Torres, as the result of a civil action brought by the said Stahl
and Rumcker against the said Mariano Torres, among others.

Upon the plaintiff's furnishing bond, the court, by order, directed the seizure of the
property, described in the complaint, which was delivered to the plaintiff. The defendant sheriff
Esteban Victorio entered his appearance and denied the allegations contained in the complaint. In
special defense he set forth that the property in litigation had been attached in compliance with a
lawful and valid order, and that therefore he requested to be held exempt from all liability.

The defendants Stahl and Rumcker answered the aforementioned complaint by a general
and specific denial of the allegations. contained in each and all of its paragraphs, and in special
defense set forth that on May 6, 1914, they filed a complaint in the court of First Instance of
Pampanga against Mariano Torres Pamintuan in connection with the property in question, among
others.

The defendants Stahl and Rumcker therefore prayed the court either to annul the sale of
the litigated property by Pamintuan to the plaintiff, or else to declare the said sale rescinded in so
far as it be prejudicial to the rights, credits and interests of these defendants; to order the said
property returned to the sheriff so that he might go on with its sale and with these proceeds pay
Stahl and Rumcker the amount of the judgment obtained by them against Pamintuan; and to
order the plaintiff to pay them the amount of their losses and damages as well as the costs of the
suit.

After the hearing of the case and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the
decision aforementioned was rendered, to which the plaintiff excepted and in writing moved for
a reopening of the proceedings and the holding of a new trial. This motion was overruled,
exception was taken by the appellant and, upon prescription of the proper bill of exceptions, the
same was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, as a result of such a finding and sentence, the defendants Stahl and
Rumcker are entitled to ask for the execution of the judgment, obtained by them on June 20,
1914, against their debtor Mariano Torres Pamintuan, for the sale of the effects contained in his
drug store in Bacolor and attached on petition of the said defendants, his creditors.

RULING:
The effects sold by Pamintuan were under attachment by the defendants Stahl and
Rumcker when the plaintiff obtained from the court an order for their delivery to him, through
means of the complaint filed in this suit, and if, as shown by the record, the plaintiff in turn sold
these effects to a third person, and if it was impossible for him afterwards to return them to the
sheriff, as he was ordered to do in the judgment, of course their value must be reimbursed to the
defendants Stahl and Rumcker, inasmuch as, the sale having been rescinded on account of its
being fraudulent, these creditors have an indisputable right to the value of the effects that were
the subject of the fraud — a right recognized by a final judgment.

The fact of the plaintiff having proceeded to sell the pharmaceutical effects fraudulently
acquired by him from Pamintuan while the present suit was still pending and no final decision
had as yet been rendered therein, shows a glaring lack of good faith on the part of the plaintiff
who had not been declared the absolute owner of the effects that had been fraudulently sold to
him by Pamintuan, and he well knew that these effects, when they were delivered to him, were
under an attachment obtained by the defendants Stahl and Rumcker.

With reference to the fourth assignment of error referred to in the affidavit subscribed by
the plaintiff's counsel, Pedro Abad Santos, on January 15, 1915, and the order issued by Judge P.
M. Moir, of April 29 of the same year, it is disclosed by the report submitted by the honorable
judge who decided the case that the latter did not receive any written report whatever from
Attorney Aguas in connection with the present suit, and it would not be proper to qualify the said
judge's procedure as erroneous because of his having received from this attorney a volume of the
Philippine Reports containing a decision of this Supreme Court, applicable, in that attorney's
opinion, to the case at bar, and because he permitted Aguas to invite his attention to certain
points of the testimony of the witnesses examined during the trial. These acts could not be
rejected by the judge at their beginning, and by his tolerating them even for courtesy's sake he
neither prejudged the issues nor shoed partiality, nor does it appear that he decided the suit
contrary to law and without due regard for the evidence.

34. G.R. No. 99425. March 3, 1997

Ramos vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Petitioners Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda M. Perez, Norma C. Castillo, and the Baliuag
Market Vendors Association, Inc. filed a petition before the court a quo docketed as Civil Case
No. 264-M-9 for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances and the contract of lease
over a commercial arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan.

During the hearing on the petitioners’ motion for the issuance of preliminary injunction,
the Provincial Fiscal appeared as counsel for respondent Municipality of Baliuag, which opposed
the petition. Whereupon, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the court a quo.
Meanwhile, the provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filed an
Answer in behalf of respondent municipality.

At the pre-trial conference, Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos appeared, manifesting that he

was counsel for respondent municipality. On the same date, and on June 15, 1990, respectively,
Atty. Romanillos filed a motion to dissolve injunction and a motion to admit an Amended
Answer with motion to dismiss. Provincial Attorney Oliviano D. Regalado appeared as
collaborating counsel of Atty. Romanillos. The Provincial Fiscal did not appear. It was Atty.
Romanillos who submitted the Reply to petitioners' Opposition to respondents' motion to
dissolve injunction. It was also Atty. Romanillos who submitted a written formal offer of
evidence for respondent municipality.

During the hearing, petitioners questioned the personality of Atty. Romanillos to appear
as counsel of the respondent municipality, which opposition was reiterated on August 15, 1990,
and was put in writing in petitioners' motion of August 20, 1990 to disqualify Atty. Romanillos
from appearing as counsel for respondent municipality and to declare null and void the
proceedings participated in and undertaken by Atty. Romanillos.

Meanwhile, Atty. Romanillos and Atty. Regalado filed a joint motion stating, among
others, that Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel for respondent municipality and that
Atty. Regalado, as his collaborating counsel for respondent municipality, is adopting the entire
proceedings participated in/undertaken by Atty. Romanillos.

Respondent Judge issued the Order now being assailed which, as already stated, denied
petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos as counsel for respondent municipality and to
declare null and void the proceeding participated in by Atty. Romanillos; and on the other hand,
granted Atty. Regalado's motion "to formally adopt the entire proceedings including the formal
offer of evidence".

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was denied by respondent
Judge in his Order, the second Order now being assailed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the adoption by Atty. Regalado of the proceedings participated in by Atty.
Romanillos validate such proceedings

RULING:
We agree with public respondent that such adoption produces validity. Public respondent
stated the reasons to which we agree: Moreover, it does not appear that the adoption of
proceedings participated in or undertaken by Atty. Romanillos when he was private counsel for
the respondent municipality of Baliuag — such as the proceedings on the motion to dissolve the
injunction, wherein petitioners had even cross-examined the witnesses presented by Atty.
Romanillos in support of said motion and had even started to present their witnesses to sustain
their objection to the motion — would have resulted in any substantial prejudice to petitioners'
interest. As We see it, to declare the said proceedings null and void — notwithstanding the
formal adoption thereof by Atty. Regalado as Provincial Attorney of Bulacan in court — and to
require trial anew to cover the same subject matter, to hear the same witnesses and to admit the
same evidence adduced by the same parties cannot enhance the promotion of justice.

Further, petitioners cannot be held in estoppel for questioning the legality of the
appearance of Atty. Romanillos, notwithstanding that they questioned the witnesses of
respondent municipality during the hearing of its motion to dissolve the preliminary
injunction. Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals held that the legality of the
representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. 

35. G.R. No. L-15952 April 28, 1961

SYBIL SAMSON vs. HON. NICASIO YATCO
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition for support before the CFI of Rizal but eventually dismissed
with prejudice on the ground that petitioner Sybil Samson failed to appear on the day of hearing
on the ground that he was sick as shown in a medical certificate. The court directed health
officers to check if Sibyl was really sick but they found that he only had a slight fever.
Petitioners filed several motions for reconsideration of the order of dismissal but they were
denied by the respondent Court. When the petitioners perfected their appeal, the Court
disallowed it for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. The respondents contend that
the petition filed by the petitioners does not comply with the requirements of section 1 of Rule
67 of the Rules of Court in that it fails to state that the Court had acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not, the contention of the respondents was correct.

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that it was an error to dismiss with prejudice a petition for support
upon the flimsy ground that the minor petitioner was really sick found out that he was suffering
only from slight fever, especially because the presence of the minor was not necessary and the
only point to be determined by the respondent Court being the amount of support, the marriage
of the petitioner mother and the respondent husband, the legitimacy and filiation of the child
petitioner as one born of lawful wedlock having been admitted. Moreover, although the
computation made by the respondent Court of the period that had elapsed from the date when the
period started to run to the date when appeal was perfected appears mistaken, yet there is no need
to pass upon this point, because the petition is not for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent Court to allow the appeal or to approve the record on appeal but for a writ of
certiorari for dismissing with prejudice a petition for support without any lawful ground or
reason for so doing which amounted to an excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondent Court.

36. 42 PHIL 694

HASHIM v CONCEPCION

FACTS:
The petitioner's wife Afife Abdo Cheyban Gorayeb filed a complaint against him in the
Court of First Instance Manila, asking that the petitioner be ordered to pay her the sum of P1,000
per month for her maintenance which is granted by the Court. The defendant failed to make the
payment and a writ of execution was issued. Upon the writ being returned unsatisfied, an
examination under oath was done, however, the defendant adopted a somewhat defiant attitude
and returned evasive and very unsatisfactory answers. A charge of contempt of court was filed
against the petitioner for failure to comply with the order of the court and the respondent judge
ordered that the petitioner be confined in prison until he should comply with its order. The
defendant appears, so far successfully, to have evaded arrest and is now absconding and hiding
himself from the process of justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
YES. An action by a wife against her husband for maintenance is within the jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance, and the marriage having been proven, that court has also power to
issue an order for maintenance pendente lite.
 The petitioner's conduct in that court constituted a clear case of contempt and that the
order of arrest was fully warranted. If petitioner desires a reduction in the maintenance allowance
he should purge himself of contempt and make a full and fair disclosure of his financial
circumstances to the lower court. In the event of an adverse ruling he might have his remedy by
an appeal to this court.