IMOVE D1.1 Guidelines For Successful Multistakeholder Partnerships v2.3

This report is part of a project that has received funding by the European Union’s Horizon 2020
research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 723314.

The content of this report reflects only the authors’ view. The Innovation and Networks Executive
Agency (INEA) is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
Due date of deliverable: 31/12/2017
Actual submission date: 13/07/2018
Dissemination Level
PU Public X
CO Confidential, restricted under conditions set out in Model Grant Agreement
CI Classified, information as referred to in Commission Decision 2001/844/EC
Start date of project: 01/06/2017 Duration: 30 months
This report is part of a project that has received funding by the European Union’s Horizon
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2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 723314.
Deliverable number: D1.1
Deliverable responsible: RISE Viktoria AB
Work package: WP1
Main editor: Steven Sarasini
Editor name Organisation

Hans Arby UBIGO Innovation AB
Paul Curtis Vectos (South) Limited
Emanuela Vanacore RISE Viktoria AB
Alessandro Barisone Softeco Sismat SRL
Document Revision History

Modifications Introduced
Version Date Reason Editor
1.0 04/12/2017 First version Steven Sarasini
2.0 04/01/2018 Integrated version (D1.1+D1.2) Steven Sarasini
2.1 10/01/2018 Final version (after peer review) Steven Sarasini
Final layout (split into two separate
2.2 19/01/2018 Steven Sarasini
documents)
2.3 13/07/2018 Header/footer reformatting Alessandro Barisone
The information in this document is provided “as is”, and no guarantee or warranty is given that the information
is fit for any particular purpose. The above referenced consortium members shall have no liability to third
parties for damages of any kind including without limitation direct, special, indirect, or consequential damages
that may result from the use of these materials subject to any liability which is mandatory due to applicable
law. © 2017 by IMOVE Consortium.
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Mobility as a Service (MaaS) is a radical concept that is currently depicted as bundled transport services within
a single, seamless offer that is made available to users via smartphone applications. MaaS aims to provide a
valid alternative to private car ownership and usage, and thus has the potential to bring about a sustainable
reorientation of the transport system by encouraging people to travel via more sustainable, shared transport
modes. At present, MaaS is generating widespread interest across the globe from different actors within and
around the transport sector. It represents a massive innovation opportunity linked to the further digitalisation
of transport, and is subject to powerful driving forces such as the emergence of the sharing economy,
urbanisation, improved accessibility, and problems such as climate change and transport congestion. As the
potential for sustainability gains become more known, actors within the private and public sectors are jumping
on the MaaS bandwagon, with numerous pilots either planned or underway.
As with all sustainable transitions, MaaS is also subject to a range of barriers and obstacles to innovation. At
present, the two most significant barriers are related to the need for new forms of cross-sector collaboration,
and the need for new business models. MaaS services are underpinned by a new type of ecosystem –a
network of actors that have previously not worked together, yet who must play a key role in co-creating the
services that will convince car owners to change their mobility patterns. Overcoming these barriers is not easy,
and requires a set of tools and methods that are tailored to the task at hand.
This document (D1.1), together with its companion deliverable D1.2 ([40]), focus on two key themes in
transforming MaaS from concept to viable service: promoting multi-stakeholder collaborations and interactions
within urban settings, and developing sustainable MaaS business models.
More precisely:
 This document (D1.1) provides a background regarding the state-or-the-art in MaaS developments,
and outlines the key guiding principles, theoretical perspectives and concepts that can be deployed to
develop sustainable MaaS offers within Living Labs.
 The companion document D1.2 –“Sustainable MaaS Business Models: a typology (part 1)– outlines a
set of tools and methods for promoting multi-stakeholder collaborations within each IMOVE Living Lab,
and for developing sustainable MaaS business models. The tools and methods are part of an iterative,
stepwise approach to developing MaaS services that focus on users’ needs and preferences, with the
overarching goal of ensuring that IMOVE Living Labs play a key role in promoting sustainable travel
behaviour and improving accessibility.
Although the guiding principles, tools and methods outlined in the two documents are designed to support
MaaS developments within the scope of the IMOVE project, in practice we hope that they can support
developments after the project has finished and in settings outside the project. That is, we aimed to create a
set of guidelines for generic use when the aim is to develop sustainable forms of Mobility as a Service.
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API Application Programming Interface
IoT Internet of Things
ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems
MLP Multi-Level Perspective
P2P Peer-to-peer
PTA Public Transport Authority
PTO Public Transport Operator
SBM Sustainable Business Model
TM Transition Management
UTL Urban Transition Lab
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Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 9
1 Background .............................................................................................................................................. 10
1.1 The MaaS Topology .......................................................................................................................... 10
1.2 The Mobility Market: Diverse, Low-margin and Local ....................................................................... 11
1.3 Drivers and Barriers of MaaS Developments .................................................................................... 12
1.4 The MaaS Ecosystem ....................................................................................................................... 14
1.4.1 Developing the MaaS Ecosystem .............................................................................................. 15
2 Theoretical Perspectives and Key Concepts ........................................................................................... 17
2.1 Transition Management .................................................................................................................... 17
2.1.1 The Multi-Level Perspective....................................................................................................... 17
2.2 Case Study: The Go:Smart Project ................................................................................................... 21
2.3 Developing Business Models ............................................................................................................ 23
2.3.1 What Is a Business Model? ....................................................................................................... 23
2.3.2 Sustainable Business Models .................................................................................................... 24
2.3.3 The Business Model Canvas ..................................................................................................... 25
2.3.4 Examples of Different Types of Business Models ..................................................................... 29
2.3.5 MaaS Business Models ............................................................................................................. 33
2.3.6 Customer Development ............................................................................................................. 35
2.3.7 Agile Development – Test While You Build ............................................................................... 37
2.3.8 Case Study: The Development of the UbiGo Business Model .................................................. 37
Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................................... 41
References ...................................................................................................................................................... 42
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Figure 1. The MaaS topology (Sochor et al. 2017 [5]) .................................................................................... 11
Figure 2. The MaaS Ecosystem ...................................................................................................................... 15
Figure 3. Key stakeholders within the MaaS ecosystem during the initiation phases (Kamargianni et al. 2016)
......................................................................................................................................................................... 16
Figure 4. The landscape, regime and niche levels within the MLP ................................................................. 18
Figure 5. The regime associated with automobility ......................................................................................... 19
Figure 6. The regime associated with public transport .................................................................................... 19
Figure 7. The nine building blocks of the business model canvas .................................................................. 26
Figure 8. The Facebook business model ........................................................................................................ 29
Figure 9. Business model for Gothenburg cable car ....................................................................................... 30
Figure 10. The Zazcar business model ........................................................................................................... 31
Figure 11. Uber's business model ................................................................................................................... 32
Figure 12. The MaaS topology (recalled) ........................................................................................................ 33
Figure 13. Lean start-up methodologies .......................................................................................................... 36
Figure 14. UbiGo business model ................................................................................................................... 38
Figure 15. Platform operator business model.................................................................................................. 39
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Table 1. Potential ways in which MaaS business models can create and capture sustainable value ............ 25
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INTRODUCTION
Within the IMOVE project, work package 1 (Scalability Unlockers) provides inputs to MaaS developments
within Living Labs. The inputs consist of a range of guiding principles, tools and methods focusing on four key
areas:
1. Promoting multi-stakeholder collaborations within each Living Lab.
2. Developing sustainable MaaS business models.
3. Stimulating and encouraging sustainable travel behaviour.
4. Governance frameworks.
This document focuses on the first two areas, and is structured into two main sections:
 The first section (chapter 1) provides a background regarding the state-or-the-art in MaaS
developments. It characterises the concept in topological terms, focusing on different types of services
that must be integrated into bundled services, and it provides some background information related to
the MaaS ecosystem –a network of actors that must collaborate and interact in new ways to develop
and deliver MaaS services. The information provided in the background section aims to set the scene
for MaaS developments within IMOVE Living Labs.
 The remainder of the document (chapter 2) provides an overview of guiding principles, key theoretical
perspectives and concepts that can be deployed to develop sustainable MaaS offers within Living
Labs. It is intended as background reading for those interested in gaining a deeper insight into the
processes outlined in the companion deliverable D1.2 –“Sustainable MaaS Business Models: a
typology (part 1)” ([40]).
The two documents together target internal project stakeholders and practitioners within each Living Lab. The
main authors of this document are Vectos (UK), UbiGo Innovation (SE) and RISE Viktoria (SE), with important
contributions from the entire IMOVE project team.
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1 BACKGROUND
Mobility as a Service (MaaS) is a radical concept, a significant innovation opportunity and a potentially feasible
means to reorient urban mobility towards a more sustainable path. There is currently a high level of interest
on MaaS, both in and around the transport sector, as numerous stakeholders from the public, private and
research sectors have enlisted interest in the concept. Given its novelty, there is currently little agreement on
how to define MaaS, on what constitutes a MaaS service, or on how to compare and assess different MaaS
services. Some authors note that MaaS should contribute to sustainability challenges ([1]), whereas others
see it more as a means to fulfil customer needs ([2]). This is mainly because of the novelty of the concept, and
partly because MaaS is a prospective radical innovation. Generally, when radical innovations emerge, there is
an initial ‘fluid’ phase of development that is characterised by experimentation with multiple competing
product/service designs ([3]). For example Datson ([4]) envisages two very different types of MaaS
developments –one that is automobile-based and the other based on intermodal services.
During the fluid stages of radical innovation, it is typical that uncertainties prevail and the applications of the
innovation in question are unclear. Uncertainties are usually resolved in a later, transitional phase, as the
market consolidates to select a dominant design. The current fluidity of MaaS poses at least two problems.
First, as the hype grows, and as increasing numbers of practitioners engage with MaaS, questions remain
about ‘what MaaS is’. Yet defining the MaaS concept in terms of the content of the service and its applications
can be considered, during the present, fluid stage of development, an unwise and premature undertaking.
Second, the fluidity of the concept creates challenges in terms of governing a transition to a MaaS-based
transport system. If we do not know what MaaS is, for example, how can we know what a MaaS-based
transport system can or will deliver in terms of sustainable outcomes?
1.1 THE MAAS TOPOLOGY

One way to deal with this uncertainty is to develop a characterisation of MaaS that embraces the fluidity of the
concept. This approach has been taken by Sochor et al. ([5]), who have developed a MaaS ‘topology’ (Figure
1). The topology builds on differing degrees of integration. It consists of five different levels. Level 0 represents
the status quo in several cities across the developed world, and is characterised by fragmented mobility
services that each compete for customers. Level 1 refers to integrated informational services, such as
multimodal travel planners (e.g. Google), which provide information on available mobility services and routes
in different cities. Level 2 refers to services that facilitate online bookings and payments, such as
Hannovermobil. Level 3, which is the current focus of much attention in and around the transport sector, refers
to the integration of different mobility services into a single, seamless offering that is made available to users
via subscription-based smartphone applications ([6]). Organisations such as MaaS Global (FI) and UbiGo
Innovation (SE) are active at level 3. Finally, level 4 refers to the integration of societal goals such as transport
policy objectives and sustainability into MaaS ecosystems and respective services at levels 0-3.
Rather than seeing MaaS as a fixed object, addressing it in topological terms is useful in that it allows for
variance in the concept in both spatial and network terms ([7]). That is, a topology allows for variance in the
way the MaaS concept is applied, what services it entails, the networks that support its development and
operation, and with regard to geographical differences. The topology is intended as a tool to include different
elements whose flexibility allows for variance in the application of the concept, acknowledging that MaaS may
mean different things in different contexts. This is important given that MaaS will be adapted by those who
adopt it –namely the multitude of different organisations that contribute to sustainable innovations. Variance is
highly relevant for different applications of the MaaS concept in different Living Labs within IMOVE.
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Figure 1. The MaaS topology (Sochor et al. 2017 [5])
One aspect that is overlooked by the topology is the interactions between passengers and goods. Within Living
Labs (cities) where space is a scarce resource, MaaS could be designed in a manner that serves to integrate
passenger and goods transport using intermodal services that serve to resolve the ‘last-mile’ problem for
passengers and goods. One of the main reasons for our dependence on privately owned vehicles is the
opportunity to move bulky consumer goods such as groceries, furniture and electronics alongside personal
belongings such as baggage and sports equipment whenever needed. Whilst the integration of passengers
and goods may not be a central focal point at present, it may be crucial to convincing potential users that MaaS
is a viable alternative to car ownership.
1.2 THE MOBILITY MARKET: DIVERSE, LOW-MARGIN AND LOCAL

MaaS is often referred to as the Netflix or Spotify of mobility. This is a good way to describe the aggregated
functionality of integrating offers from many providers into a single service using a digital platform. Yet as with
all analogies, it could also be misleading.
Netflix offers purely digital products, whereas mobility services are linked to physical objects given the need to
transport people and goods using hardware that, by comparison, consumes a lot of energy and requires more
human intervention. The marginal cost of adding users or for increased usage of Netflix is small, whereas the
marginal cost of a trip with a taxi or an hour in a car sharing car is relatively high. Further, Netflix has content
that is available according to more or less the same terms and conditions, whereas mobility services are very
different in terms of business logics, pricing models, division of responsibilities and types of supplier.
Low-margins
Mobility is mostly a mature market. The margins are low, zero, or negative. Nobody really gets rich by renting
out cars, running taxis or by operating a fleet of shared vehicles, nor is public transport a lucrative venture. It
requires a bold person to step in and say: “I want to be the middleman and keep 10 per cent of what you are
making”, without creating significant added value for existing transport service providers.
The margins associated with some new mobility platforms and can be higher, but the reason is usually that
these are peer-to-peer-services (P2P). The alternative for individual drivers is no business at all. This is not
the case for well-established taxi or car rental companies, not to mention a public transport authorities. Even
P2P car rental platforms such as SnappCar do not commend large discounts for third-party retailers. After
insurance costs, P2P platforms usually retain around 10% of the overall revenue, which must be shared with
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a possible MaaS-operator. Low margins mean that commercial MaaS-operators must aim for large market
shares in order to be lucrative.
Local markets
There are many examples of global mobility service operators. These operators must handle tax legislation,
licencing and other regulations at each site, but the ecosystem and value chain is quite small and similar from
site to site, with many alternative partners so choose from. This is not the case for MaaS. Public Transport
must to be part of the offer in order for it to be cost competitive. But public transport is typically a subsidised,
politically governed, local monopoly. Considering how public transport is organised in different European cities
reveals a multitude of variants that will have direct effect on how (and when) the integration of mobility services
can happen for a particular city. Cities can (and should) impose that MaaS services are governed in alignment
with local policy goals. In addition, the IT-maturity of different transport service providers must be aligned -
particularly public transport. If one actor lacks digital ticketing, the whole value chain may suffer.
Old, new, borrowed and blue
Integrating different mobility services and delivering them in a unified way appears to be straightforward in
principle. Unfortunately, it is not simple in practice, especially when several actors want to lead and seek to
define MaaS according to their own strengths.
The mobility ecosystem consists of many private and public actors at local, regional, national and international
levels, many of which have or aim to have direct contact with customers. These actors also differ in terms of
their vertical and horizontal integration.
Whilst automakers primarily sell cars, many also own rental or car sharing companies (e.g. DriveNow, Sunfleet,
Europecar); multimodal platforms (e.g. Free2Move, Moovel); and some sell cars-as-a-service in addition to
traditional leasing contracts. Public transport operators run procured services and commercial lines and invest
in MaaS-related companies (e.g. MaaS Global). In the future, the role of public transport and public transport
authorities may change drastically. Cities will likely take better control of how public spaces are used and roll
out infrastructure-as-a-service platforms. New mobility service providers are increasingly challenging
established players and legislators.
Big players from other sectors are also entering the mobility market. Google sells mobility-related information
to advertisers and other service providers, and is testing self-driving taxis.
Fully autonomous vehicles will likely revolutionise the mobility market, leaving just two modes to integrate –
dynamic, individual or shared, destination-based transport and timetabled, direction-based public transit within
and around urban areas. The dynamics of this transition –when and how it will happen, the interplay between
modes, and the business models –will play a big role in determining how cities look and how people move.
1.3 DRIVERS AND BARRIERS OF MAAS DEVELOPMENTS

Generally, two sets of drivers support MaaS developments. The first is linked to sustainability, where the
transport system is pressed to resolve problems related to climate change, oil dependency, air pollution, traffic
congestion, traffic safety, and the underutilisation of passenger and goods vehicles. In urban settings, where
space and infrastructure are increasingly regarded as scarce resources, problems such as congestion,
pollution and traffic-related injuries and deaths are conflated with inefficiencies in ‘last mile’ logistics ([8]). MaaS
is increasingly seen as a means to shift towards a more sustainable transport system, and is linked to better
urban management; improvements in energy efficiency and urban air quality; greater use of renewable fuels;
reduced congestion and improved accessibility ([9]).
The second set of drivers is linked to the notion that MaaS is a significant innovation opportunity that can
harness the power of different ‘megatrends’ –global forces that can be felt across industries and sectors ([10]).
Urbanisation is one such megatrend. People increasingly move to cities, which can lead to more congestion,
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but has also resulted in a more acute focus on land use, ‘attractive’ urban development and sustainability in
urban planning. A further trend is the emergence of the sharing economy. By harnessing collaborative modes
of production and consumption, the sharing economy is currently challenging dominant logics within the field
of transport following the successes of AirBnB, crowdfunding, the maker movement and numerous applications
in the field of transport itself (e.g. peer-to-peer vehicle sharing, vehicle pools and ride-sharing). As regards
goods movement, potentially disruptive services like Shippies, Amazon Flex, Uber Rush and MyWays are
likely to grow in the near future. These services rely on crowdsourced deliveries via individuals that deliver
packages to other individuals or retailers, enabled by smartphone apps. Coupled to the sharing economy is a
growing interest in servitised product offerings (e.g. sales of ‘mobility’ as a function rather than sales of
automobiles) ([11]), whereby some demographic groups are showing less interest in owning products. A
growing interest in sustainability among individuals is also partly responsible for changes in attitudes about
shared ownership or non-ownership have made possible the growth of services for car sharing and ride sharing
([12]) and attitudinal changes linked to health and the environment have accelerated everyday cycling ([13]).
One final megatrend of relevance is linked to digitalisation, which has emerged following technological
developments in the fields of embedded systems, wireless networking and automation, and is currently
unfolding across industries and sectors in innovative applications that can be grouped under the umbrella term
‘Internet of Things’ (IoT).
Despite the considerable set of forces that are driving MaaS developments, Level 3 services (i.e. those which
focus on combining different mobility services into a single offer) are hindered by a set of key challenges and
issues that must be resolved. These relate to:
1. Overcoming barriers to collaboration in MaaS ecosystems and networks.
2. Proving and legitimising the MaaS concept via pilots and trials.
3. Developing and validating MaaS business models.
4. Creating collective visions regarding what MaaS should aim to do and its potential.
5. Understanding what motivates customers in different segments to adopt MaaS.
6. Creating incentives for sustainable travel behaviour.
7. Creating institutional conditions that foster MaaS developments, including linkages between relevant
policy areas.
8. Evaluating and assessing the sustainability impacts of MaaS.
Known barriers and obstacles to collaboration in MaaS ecosystems

The perceived risk of cannibalisation
The perceived risk to brands
The perceived risk of losing existing customer relationships
The lack of a shared vision for MaaS
A lack of understanding of what MaaS is within key organisations
The pervasive role of existing roles and identities
Misaligned values within different organisations
Uncertainties regarding the MaaS business case and associated business models
A lack of key competences within certain organisations
The lack of an entrepreneurial mindset, or “not invented here” syndrome
A lack of understanding related to users’ wants and preferences
A lack of understanding related to key customer segments
A lack of understanding related to willingness-to-pay and overall market demand for MaaS
IMOVE aims to resolve many, if not all of these issues. In this document, however, we focus on issues 1-4
since these are of primary concern with regard to collaboration in MaaS ecosystems and networks, and to the
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concurrent development of MaaS business models. Mobility service providers that are key level 3 integration
are currently averse to ecosystem collaboration due to a set of known barriers and obstacles.
These barriers to ecosystem collaboration are manifested via the unwillingness of some key organisations to
share data via open channels and standards, and to allow third parties (MaaS service providers) to resell
services/tickets. Overcoming barriers to ecosystem collaboration is fundamental to MaaS developments, and
will likely allow for business model innovations to flourish.
1.4 THE MAAS ECOSYSTEM

MaaS business models require new forms of partnership between actors that may not traditionally interact.
The business model is situated within a ‘business ecosystem’ that includes the MaaS value chain and other
key stakeholders. A ‘business ecosystem’ is defined as follows:
“An economic community supported by a foundation of interacting organizations and individuals
–the organisms of the business world. The economic community produces goods and services of
value to customers, who are themselves members of the ecosystem. The member organisms
also include suppliers, lead producers, competitors, and other stakeholders. Over time, they
coevolve their capabilities and roles, and tend to align themselves with the directions set by one
or more central companies” ([14]).
A generic model of the MaaS ecosystem is shown in Figure 2. The ecosystem consists of the MaaS value
chain (left side) and key stakeholders (right side). In order to deliver a MaaS service, the following actors must
collaborate in the value chain:
 Transport Service Providers: Actors that provide single transport services as part of a combined
offer. Examples include public transport, taxis, car clubs, car rental and bicycle pools.
 MaaS Platform Integrator: An actor that provides a digital platform that serves to integrate tickets
and distribute payments
 MaaS Service Provider: an actor that integrates (bundles) different transport services into a single,
seamless offer. The MaaS service provider is the customer-facing organisation that takes
responsibility for the delivery of a MaaS service to different types of users.
 Users: Actors that utilise MaaS services. Note that in some instances users can be distinguished from
customers. The customer is the actor that purchases the MaaS service, whereas the user is the actor
that utilises the service. In practice customers may be private firms, and users may be employees.
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Figure 2. The MaaS Ecosystem
1.4.1 DEVELOPING THE MAAS ECOSYSTEM

In recent years, a debate has ensued regarding the configuration of the MaaS ecosystem. The debate centres
on the roles and responsibilities of existing actors in the ecosystem, and particularly on the benefits and
drawbacks of different types of public-private partnerships ([15]). In many cities, public transport authorities
and operators are pivotal to MaaS developments, as public transport is typically regarded as the backbone of
the MaaS system. Hence public transport has until now played a critical role in enabling or impeding MaaS
developments. In practice, however, the set of actors that can impede MaaS developments during the initial
phases includes other key stakeholders (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Key stakeholders within the MaaS ecosystem during the initiation phases (Kamargianni et
al. 2016)
Over time, the set of stakeholders that can influence MaaS developments will likely change and will include
the media, marketing actors, consultants and standardising bodies. However, during the initial phases of MaaS
developments, multi-stakeholder dialogues are required (and are currently ongoing) to examine the
appropriate and legitimate division of roles.
One key role is that of the MaaS service provider. This is a new role, as no single actors has previously bundled
different services in the field of passenger transport. In practice, several actors may take this role, as any
existing transport provider could in principle bundle others’ offers if the appropriate conditions are in place
(open APIs and ticketing). However, the debate centres mainly on two actors taking this role –public transport
operators and new commercial operators such as UbiGo and MaaS Global. There is limited evidence regarding
the benefits and drawbacks of these two approaches, though it is generally accepted that commercial
operators may be more innovative than public transport operators.
The latter may, by comparison, seek to develop more sustainable MaaS business models given their status
as publicly-owned bodies.
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2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND KEY CONCEPTS
In this section we provide a brief overview to some of the theoretical perspectives, concepts and principles that
underpin the guidelines provided in the companion deliverable D1.2 –“Sustainable MaaS Business Models: a
typology (part 1)" ([40]). Please note that this section is intended as background reading for those who wish to
gain a deeper understanding of such processes; for those less interested, please move on to D1.2 directly.
2.1 TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

Transition management (TM) is a governance approach drawn from the field of study that concerns sustainable
transitions. Aside from TM, this field comprises theories such as innovation systems, the Multi-Level
Perspective (MLP) and strategic niche management. A commonality among these theories is that they each
deal with the complexities associated with sustainable transformations of sociotechnical systems such as
energy supply, water and transport. TM offers an encompassing governance programme that:
1. Proposes a collaborative approach by acknowledging the potential roles of multiple stakeholders from
different societal sectors (government, industry, research, consultancy, civil society, grassroots
movements, etc.) in sustainable transitions.
2. Analyses the system by identifying the various opportunities, drivers, barriers and obstacle to change.
3. Provides a simplified and iterative four-step process for governing transitions.
2.1.1 THE MULTI-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE

Transition Management draws on the Multi-Level Perspective in order to examine and identify the set of
opportunities, drivers, barriers and obstacle to change. The MLP consists of three analytical levels (Figure 4)
that exist in a nested hierarchy which can be used as a heuristic device in examining the dynamics of radical
innovation.
Landscapes
The landscape refers to the ‘material context of society’, including things like cities, factories and electricity
infrastructures, and other “heterogeneous factors, such as oil prices, economic growth, wars, emigration, broad
political coalitions, cultural and normative values, environmental problems” ([16]). These exist within and
outside the sociotechnical system in question, such that landscape pressures are experienced as generic
forces for change.
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Figure 4. The landscape, regime and niche levels within the MLP
Sociotechnical Regimes
By contrast, sociotechnical regimes are a major source of stability, inertia and lock-in effects, and are thus the
source of many of the barriers and obstacles to sustainable transitions. Regimes are multi-actor networks,
where the propensity of regime actors to utilise existing search heuristics results predominantly in incremental
rather than radical innovation. The structuring qualities of regimes issue from numerous sources. First, actors
are embedded within a system of institutional arrangements that enables and constrains certain activities.
Second, the actors within ST regimes are bound by interdependencies between organisations and networks.
Third, artefacts and material elements of ST regimes acquire a certain durability over time. The artefactual
elements of large technical systems such as electricity infrastructures, for instance, acquire ‘a logic of their
own’ due to complementarities with other system elements and sunk costs ([17]).
MaaS – key megatrends

Urbanisation
The sharing economy
Digitalisation and servitisation of transport
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TM advocates the use of the MLP –particularly the concept of a regime– to understand the various drivers and
barriers of radical innovation within relevant sociotechnical systems. The system related to automobility (that
is, the system that encompasses private ownership of automobiles) is embedded in a multi-layered institutional
context that contains various regulations, norms and cultural understandings, and which also relies upon
different types of physical infrastructure, markets and the automobile as an artefact of itself (Figure 5).
Figure 5. The regime associated with automobility

One may argue that Level 3 MaaS developments must overcome barriers that issue from the automobility
regime and existing regimes associated with public transport. In fact, MaaS has been characterised as “a niche
caught between two regimes” ([18]) (Figure 6).
Figure 6. The regime associated with public transport
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Niches
Within the MLP, niches are defined as ‘protected spaces’ that are incubated from market forces and which
facilitate various forms of learning to allow radical innovations to take root. Niches also provide the opportunity
to create social networks such as user-producer relationships that support innovations, and to create visions
and expectations regarding future trajectories ([19]). These three levels exist in a nested hierarchy, where
changes at the landscape level create ‘windows of opportunity’ for system changes to the ST regime. The MLP
describes developments at each of these three levels (landscape, regime and niche) as central to processes
of co-evolutionary systemic transformation.
Transition Management Activities
Once the drivers and barriers of innovation are analysed and understood, TM advocates an iterative, four-step
governance programme for managing transitions. The four steps are represented by different activities:
1. Strategic activities (envisioning), i.e. creation of adaptable, long-term visions that acknowledge the
complexities of societal problems. Visions are desired future states based on current sustainability
problems, shared by collectives. Strategic activities are thus collaborative, inter-organisational, multi-
stakeholder processes which aim to ensure that long-term visions are embedded among relevant
actors.
2. Tactical activities serve to link individual actor strategies to the shared long-term visions created via
strategic activities, aiming to overcome short-termism within different societal sectors (e.g. politics,
business). They also aim to tackle the difficulties in implementing solutions by acknowledging complex
sources of inertia within regimes, and directing activities such as political action and lobbying towards
the reformation of such structures. Here backcasting is a useful tool.
3. Operational activities aim to link everyday activities, such as innovative experiments, to long-term
visions, broader policies and change agendas. Innovations can occur in several dimensions –in terms
of new goods and services such as MaaS, within politics (e.g. experiments with new parking policies)
or social innovation.
4. Reflexive activities include the ongoing monitoring, assessment and evaluation of experimental
policies and practices as a means to revise overarching visions and plans where necessary.
Assessments and evaluations, when shared and disseminated effectively, can also lead to broader
changes outside the system in question (translation).
TM proposes a long-term perspective whereby iterations unfold over a period of decades to fully realise a
transition. Further, as is probably evident from what is written above, TM is a process management tool, not
focusing on the innovation itself but on the policies and practices that support it. The overall aim is social and
societal learning ([20]).
Urban Transition Labs
The tenets of TM have been applied to urban settings using the term Urban Transition Lab (UTL). A UTL is a
“hybrid, flexible and transdisciplinary platform” or a localised incubator for radical innovations, similar to Living
Labs within IMOVE. In a UTL, transition teams work within cities to apply TM principles to persistent
sustainability problems. The main task of transition teams is to facilitate interactions between relevant actors
and stakeholders in different TM activities, to analyse systemic problems and innovation opportunities, and to
nurture transparency and social learning. In addition to Living Lab coordinators, transition teams consist of key
local stakeholders that can act as neutral facilitators and coordinators of transition activities, such as city
administrators and relevant local experts (e.g. transport experts) ([21]).
Linking Actors at Multiple Geographical Scales
In addition to transition teams within Living Labs, it is useful to consider the importance of creating relational
ties with relevant stakeholders within different organisations at different levels of society. Research has shown
that these types of relational ties are critical to transitions, such that locally embedded activities must be linked
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to appropriate regional, national and international networks ([22]). Whilst cities may play a key role in governing
transitions by, for instance, creating niches for experimentation, scholars have also noted that cities do not act
alone in seeking to transform regimes, and those which succeed have ties with national governments and
other supranational entities ([23]). Such relational ties are also key to establishing a set of institutional
arrangements that are conducive to the development and diffusion of radical innovations.
Case studies of Finland, which is regarded as a pioneer MaaS developments, have shown that action at the
city level is supported by networks of stakeholders that act at the national level (within the Finnish Ministry of
Transport and Communications, ITS Finland and the Finnish Innovation Agency). Ties are now being made at
the international level via the MaaS Alliance, whose location in Brussels reflects the ambition of influencing EU
organs. In Finland, national networks have allowed for the creation of a strong and robust vision for MaaS and
the creation of legislation and policies that support MaaS developments. In practice this implies that
stakeholder engagements that extend beyond the setting of individual Living Labs can boost MaaS
developments significantly.
2.2 CASE STUDY: THE GO:SMART PROJECT

The UbiGo Gothenburg pilot was conducted as part of the project Go:Smart between 2012-2014, led by
Lindholmen Science Park with partners such as AB Volvo, City of Gothenburg, Västra Götaland Region,
Chalmers university, and Rise Viktoria and Arby Kommunikation. The overall goal was to test two things: (i) if
it is possible to offer a MaaS service that is attractive enough to compete with private car ownership, and (ii) if
it is possible to develop a viable business model.
Background
The pilot ran for 6 months, from November 2013 to April 2014. 70 paying households relied on a fully integrated
MaaS service for their everyday travel, with access to all public transport, car rental and car sharing, taxi, city
bikes and 24/7 support.
The subscription was flexible in the sense that each household could freely select their desired public transport
and shared car usage in daily/hourly increments. Days (public transport) and hours (car) not used during one
month could be transferred to the next month, and extra days and hours could be added during the month.
The average cost for the subscription was 130€ per month. Users were free to adjust usage levels or cancel
the subscription at will. The success of the project is reflected in the fact that not a single user cancelled their
subscription.
All members had access to a common account through an app for booking and ticketing. The pilot also tested
an incentive scheme for using more sustainable transport modes based on the Volvo Commute Green concept,
with users receiving a bonus for every kilogram of CO2 saved compared to private car usage.
Pilot customers consisted of fairly typical transport users in terms of how they lived, numbers of children, level
of education, car ownership and so on, with ages ranging between youths to retirees. The majority may be
regarded as early adopters, which was likely due to the recruiting process –the pilot was marketed as a chance
to be among the first to trial a novel service. At the outset, the main reason for joining was curiosity, but after
the pilot the main reason to continue was convenience (NB: not economical or environmental reasons).
The project was able to cover the fixed costs of storing 20 cars, allowing 20 households to experiment with a
car-free lifestyle. Other households kept their car or did not own one, but wanted to test if they could live without
the perks of car ownership.
Go:Smart focused on a MaaS level 3 service and although it was not referred to as ‘MaaS’ at the time, it was
the first MaaS level 3 service ever tested under real conditions. Today it remains one of the most thoroughly
evaluated. The first results were presented during the spring of 2014 at the European ITS conference in
Helsinki.
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Testing under real conditions
Prior to the pilot a pre-study entitled “The flexible traveller” served to develop the business model and the
service concept via interactions with multiple stakeholders. One of the methods was an email-based Delphi
process, in which a few hypotheses regarding key business model elements were presented, reviewed and
quantified through several iterations.
Key stakeholders felt that the business model was viable but none wanted to adopt the role of MaaS-operator,
paving the way for third-party to take this role. Another conclusion was that, given its novelty, the service should
be tested under real conditions. It is of little use to ask people on the street whether they have no real
experience of.
This meant that when the Go:Smart project was approved, most of the groundwork was already done. The
service design was finalised within six months, and implementing the IT system, signing contracts with
suppliers, setting up support functions, marketing and recruiting of customers and so on took another six
months to finalise before the 170 triallists were on board.
The project was either blessed with a great deal of luck, or maybe good decisions were made without really
knowing it. Regardless, a number of lessons can be drawn for other pilots:
 Testing under real conditions: this is probably one of the most important success factors. Not only did
it mean that we could get real answers, we also created a strong sense of commitment within the
project as well as among suppliers. We did not have people testing an app –real households paid real
money for a real service, relying on us to take care of their everyday travel. Price levels were based
on real assumptions and real contracts, support was contracted, the service was marketed as a service
and not a test, and customers were treated as real customers. The brand UbiGo operated as a virtually
real company.
 Focus on the business model and service concept, not the technology: there are of course cases
where technology is the core of an innovation, and in our case the user interface is important and must
be tested. Yet compared to the complexity of the mobility ecosystem, the technical implementation is
relatively straightforward. If the goals are to see how a service can change users’ behaviour and
preferences and test the viability of the business model, then there must be a well-defined (multi
stakeholder) business model and well defined service concept to start with. They are the hypotheses
that will be tested, verified, modified or thrown away following lessons learned. In fact, the UbiGo app
did not include a travel planner –there already existed a good one for public transport and one for
biking in Gothenburg. The problem was not so much planning a trip, as it was to get easy access to
different mobility services.
 The idea was sold to transport service providers: the public transport authority and their fully owned
operator were the only ‘suppliers’ that were also project partners. The rest were approached on
commercial grounds, with the selling point of having the chance to be part of something new. The fact
that suppliers committed only to a pilot period probably lowered the barriers to signing a contract. They
were probably more flexible in resolving problems, supportive of technical integration and they took
part in a few project activities like risk assessment workshops, a pilot kick-off, a specific supplier
meetings and so on. Besides that, we tried to keep the relations as they would be between a supplier
and a reseller under real conditions. Price levels were based on potential volumes for a commercial
MaaS operator. Responsibility for customer support was divided using principles that should also hold
in the long run. We tested new, more integrative price models together and suppliers received access
to usage data and all the results from the evaluation. This is likely the nature of close partnerships in
real commercial situations.
 The project didn’t have a plan A: the downside of pilots is that they tend to result in reports or another
project, but to seldom lead to commercially viable product or service –especially if the innovation
requires a new type of actor. Hence contingency plans that focus on learning and refinement are
usually the modus operandi. One thing that was overlooked was a plan A –what to do if the pilot is
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successful and can lead to the establishment of a commercial service. This requires that all project
partners have a clear understanding of what to expect and what role they may take, preferably
expressed in the project agreement. The lack of a plan for success was one reason that, despite the
positive mid-term results from the pilot, the fact that almost all customers wanted to continue after the
test period and that a company was formed, the service had to be concluded (as planned). Aside from
the challenge of finding investors or other means of finance on very short notice, the public transport
authority and operator were unclear about their role and also expressed a strong interest in taking the
role as MaaS operator.
Using the potential of a pilot
The upside of a pilot is that almost everything is possible. It is a confined reality in which public and private
organisations can work together without public procurement and where routines and some rules can be
bypassed. In a pilot, there is no use in worrying about all external factors before we know the basic hypotheses
hold. We focused on the value chain –the inner circle of the ecosystem. That was probably a success factor
considering that was enough of unchartered territory to cover, but it also meant that we postponed some of
the broader ecosystem questions. There was no political discussion about reselling of public transport, which
gave us the chance to test it, but left some hard questions unresolved.
The project group was solution oriented –we had customers that we had promised a service, so what were the
options? This was our baby, and the “what if” attitude made it possible to invent new public transport ticket
products to cover the fixed cost of private cars, to replace one of the suppliers at a late stage, to develop and
test the IT-platform in half a year, and to get the 70 households on board in an even shorter period.
Thorough evaluation
The evaluation process started on day one of the project, setting the goals and methods of the evaluation.
Researchers were present in all major decisions during the development of the service, the recruiting of
customers, and so on. There were three surveys addressing periods before, during and at the end of the pilot
–plus an extra survey six months after the pilot ended. 30 participants completed travel diaries, which were
complemented by focus groups and interviews with both participants and non-participants. All support errands
were logged in addition to aggregated user data.
Most of the published research papers can be found at www.ubigo.me. The short version is as follows: people
changed behaviour and were happy with the service, as were the commercial transport service providers.
2.3 DEVELOPING BUSINESS MODELS
2.3.1 WHAT IS A BUSINESS MODEL?

A business model can be seen as a realisation of a business idea, typically by a commercial organisation. It
answers the basic questions about what is offered to specific customer segments, how it is delivered, which
the key activities, resources and partners are needed to make and deliver the service or product, and what the
revenues and costs for doing all this are. In other words, a business model describes how value is created,
delivered and captured by firms and their networks (customers included).
Business models capture value in different ways. It is not always the user that pays for the service –Google
and Facebook are free for users. These companies make money by selling access to targeted user groups to
advertisers, and by selling platform functions to developers of other services. Public transport users typically
pay half of the actual cost –taxpayers pay the other half because of the value created for society by replacing
the need for car trips.
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Business models play a crucial role in understanding why some services survive whereas others do not. There
are a lots of examples of concepts which look good on paper and which perform well in market surveys, yet
fail in the real world because of the lack of a viable business model. This is often the case in pilots which
neglect the business aspects. User ratings and environmental impacts are irrelevant if it is impossible to run a
sustainable business to offer the service in question. Even in cases where businesses fail, a business model
perspective can help to find new mechanisms to capture the value the service creates outside the existing
value chain.
2.3.2 SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS MODELS

Traditional business models are developed with profit as the overarching aim. Sustainable Business Models
(SBMs) aim to broaden the definition of value creation by integrating social and environmental performance
into the fabric of business. SBMs are thus defined in terms of their ability to internalise the three sustainability
dimensions into the core of business:
“A business model for sustainability helps [in] describing, analysing, managing, and
communicating (i) a company’s sustainable value proposition to its customers, and all other
stakeholders, (ii) how it creates and delivers this value, (iii) and how it captures economic value
while maintaining or regenerating natural, social, and economic capital beyond its organizational
boundaries” ([24])
And:
“…a sustainable business model is one which is both sufficiently profitable and that results in a
process of comparative absolute or relative reductions in environmental and socioeconomic
burdens through the delivery of socially relevant products and services. Sustainability is not an
absolute end-point, but rather an improvement process whereby future generations are
progressively less prejudiced by contemporary practices” ([25])
These definitions are successful in acknowledging the negative social, economic and environmental
externalities of business, and note that SBMs are those which either reduce existing burdens (make things
less bad) or have positive impacts (make things good).
Whilst the creation of social and environmental value is desirable from a sustainability perspective, the question
of how firms can capture these types of value is not always clear. Traditionally, business models allow firms
to directly capture value via sales of products or services, whose utility fulfils a customer need or want. Value
capture is conducted through the market, where business models serve to assign prices to goods (products or
services). Capturing value becomes much more complex when a market does not exist, such that some
services are uncommodifiable. This is arguably the case for many services that generate social and
environmental value, hence the economic terms ‘market failure’ and ‘externality’. Even in cases where public
sector organisations create mechanisms to internalise externalities, such as subsidies for public transport, one
can argue that a market exists. Hence public transport, which typically captures the social and environmental
value inherent in its offering via ticket sales and subsidies, can be seen to have a financially viable business
model. Where markets do not exist (e.g. creating social value for future generations) due to a lack of paying
customers, designing financially viable SBMs is much more challenging.
The main challenge in capturing sustainable value is related to the concept of merit goods. A merit good is
defined in terms of the private and public benefits inherent in its consumption, where the latter outweighs the
former ([26]). In other words, the consumption of a merit good generates positive externalities (or less bad
negative externalities) that are greater than private benefits perceived the individual consuming the good. An
example may be the treatment of a contagious (but not life-threatening) disease via medication, where the
benefits of vaccination may be of greater benefit to the public than to the individual that is inoculated. The fact
that the public benefit is greater than the private means that individuals under-consume merit goods in a free
market, warranting state (or other third-party) intervention. The importance of merit goods has been noted in
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studies on business models for shared mobility ([27]). Further, the public good aspect of public transport is
what in many cases warrants support from the state coffers.
In a study that examines how MaaS business models can create and capture sustainable value, Sarasini et
al. ([28]) outline the following types of value and potential mechanisms for capture (Table 1). The listed
mechanisms are only a starting point –in practice others may be feasible and can be identified during business
model development.
Table 1. Potential ways in which MaaS business models can create and capture sustainable value
Potential mechanisms
Classification Private value Public value
for value capture
Mobility services Affordability, flexibility and Reduced congestion and Bundled mobility services,
convenience. emissions following available to individual
sustainable modal shifts. customers.
Improved accessibility.
Data-based Trip planning, booking Real-time traffic Sales of data analytics to
services and payment. management. MaaS operators, transport
service providers and
Mobility service Urban planning.
public sector
optimisation.
organisations.
Travel time savings and
Provisional/brokerage
lower mobility costs.
fees for individual
transactions.
Advertising
Resource Lower mobility costs. Reduced congestion and Cost savings due to lower
efficiency I: emissions in vehicles’ use operational costs.
Environment phase.
friendly vehicle
technologies
Resource Lower mobility costs. Reduced environmental Cost savings due to lower
efficiency II: impacts in vehicles’ cost of vehicle production.
Material production phase.
recirculation
2.3.3 THE BUSINESS MODEL CANVAS

One of the most popular concepts for developing, refining and understanding business models is the business
model canvas, introduced by Alex Osterwalder ([29]). It supports a creative and qualitative process that can
involve relevant actors and delivers a visual overview of the mechanisms of the proposed business. The
canvas describes the structure of business models and how they create, deliver and capture value. The canvas
comprises nine building blocks: a value proposition (a product or service that is offered to customers), a
customer interface, distribution channels, a financial model (i.e. a cost and revenue structure that distributes
benefits across business model stakeholders), key partners, resources and activities (Figure 7).
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Figure 7. The nine building blocks of the business model canvas
There are other ways of describing business models. For example, Zott and Amit ([30]) focus on the “total
value creation for all parties involved” (i.e. suppliers, partners and customers) and characterise business
models as ‘activity systems’, describing business models in terms of their content (what is done), structure
(how it is done) and governance (who does it).
Both the activity system approach and the Osterwalder canvas can be used to explore the network of contracts
and agreements within different MaaS services, in other words how value is created, delivered and captured
via value chain collaborations. Uber, for instance, relies on privately-owned assets (vehicles) that are made
accessible to users via multi-sided platforms. Uber captures the value generated via provisional fees on each
transaction made via the platform. By contrast, MaaS Global and UbiGo aim to create value via a set of
contractual arrangements with different service providers and by repackaging and bundling these services into
a single offer. This value is captured via subscription-based payment models.
Value proposition and customer segment
The starting point when developing a business is typically the core of a business model are the value
proposition and targeted customer segments. What do we offer to our customers? Or rather, what is the value
does our product or service generate for specific users? The value proposition is not the product itself, but
rather a statement about how using the product will benefit the customer by resolving problems and fulfilling
needs.
Different customer segments buy the same product for different reasons. Hence the value proposition for a
given product or service can be different for different types of customers. Readers of newspapers can benefit
by being informed or amused (or both), which means that advertisers can increase sales by reaching different
types of customers.
The public transit app Moovit makes it easy to find the best trip in most large cities all over the world for free,
and thus generates benefits for different types of users. The same platform can be used for data analytics that
help transit agencies to improve their services. The navigational app Waze provides similar benefits for drivers
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and city traffic management, and has just recently added a ridesharing option including settlements between
riders and drivers.
The value proposition focuses on relieving pains or enabling gains. What are the pains of owning a car, or of
not having access to a car or mobility at all? What can be gained by trusting a service to act as your personal
travel assistant?
When describing the value proposition, it is useful to divide customers into different segments, even if the value
proposition is the same for each segment, and especially if distribution channels or customer relations differs
between segments. These aspects correspond to extra costs, such that we may need to prioritise certain
groups over others when implementing the business model. For instance, reaching a limited number of
customers outside urban areas substantially increases the cost for a limited extra revenue.
Revenue streams
This building block refers to the way in which value is captured via different sources of income. How can we
make money by offering value to different customer segments? What are they prepared to pay for? And how
much, roughly, are they prepared to pay? The value of platforms such as Uber or AirBnB or other peer-to-peer
services where users can find producers is quite high, since the alternative is no business at all and that there
are no big external cost such as salaries. In that case margins or commissions up to 20-30% might be OK.
This is not the case for large commercial operations such as rental car or taxi companies with very small
margins and established brands. Besides identified customers, there are probably other stakeholders that will
benefit from MaaS services. What is the value of not having to build parking lots and for whom? Maybe real
estate developers and offices are important customers.
Identified revenue streams will, together with the knowledge of customers, evolve into pricing models when
we move in to the design of the service.
Channels and customer relationships
The building block channels refers to ways the company communicates and engages with its customer
segment(s) to deliver a value proposition. Channels are therefore about how customers gain access to the
service or product and pay for it. How and where do they want buy it and have it delivered? Do we need work
with a reseller? In practice, channels can physical outlets, smartphone applications, online services or
televisions.
The building block customer relations is about interactions with users and customers. Should we create
memberships, activate groups on social media, offer personal assistance or facilitate self-service? How do we
recruit, retain and increase numbers of users? In sum, channels are about getting the product or service to the
customer, customer relations are about getting the customers to the company.
Key activities, key resources and key partners
Key activities are those which are necessary to successfully create and deliver the value to the customer –and
capture it in the form of revenues. Activities can be performed within the organisation, together with key
partners or outsourced to third-party suppliers.
If activities are conducted within the company, they likely relate to key resources such as personnel, patents,
trademarks and other forms of IPR, production facilities, funding, and so on. Key resources confer some kind
of strategic advantage. For example, if the IT-platform is of strategic value (as it is for Facebook, Google and
Uber) we need to own and control it. If we run a car sharing service or public transport, however, we will
probably buy the platform from a specialised software company.
Key partners are crucial for our success and are hard to replace. These are stakeholders that we need to keep
close and make sure that they benefit from our success in some way. They can be suppliers in the value chain
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that make up strategic parts of our product or service –the IT-provider; cities; and other public organisations,
unions or trade associations.
Cost structure
The cost structure is about identifying the most important costs inherent in our business model and the most
expensive key activities and key resources.
Interdependencies between building blocks
The four building blocks to the right of the canvas (value proposition, channels, customer relations and
customer segments) are about desirability –offering something that the customer wants. By contrast, the three
to the left (key partners, activities and resources) are about operations –making it possible to deliver value.
The two blocks at the bottom (cost structure and revenue streams) are about viability –does it all sum up, is
the business model workable?
All the building blocks are connected and making these connections explicit allows for the development of a
business. Can we save on costs by excluding a customer segment or by outsourcing an activity? Can we find
extra revenue streams by offering by-products to existing or new customer segments, without increasing the
cost?
Interdependences are not limited to individual business models. No business model can survive on a stand-
alone basis, and most are open in the sense that some benefits will occur outside the organisation and the
value chain. A big problem with complex ecosystems, like the mobility industry, is that value can be created
and delivered but not captured within the boundaries of an individual business model or related ecosystem.
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2.3.4 EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF BUSINESS MODELS
Social media
The business model of Facebook –a typical double-sided business model. Users can connect with friends for
free, which many do, creating a huge market for advertisers that are willing to pay for targeted advertisement
because it is more cost-effective than other channels. Note that the colours identify which value proposition is
connected to which customer segment, revenue stream, relationships and channels. Since it is a pure platform
business, the key activities are about developing and operating the platform, not marketing or other related
activities (Figure 8).
Figure 8. The Facebook business model
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Cable car
One possible business model for a cable car in over the river in central Gothenburg. In this scenario, it is run
by a commercial operator that has a contract with the PTA for holders of monthly pass. The operator is able
to sell tickets directly and capture value via advertisements, sponsorship, renting gondolas for tourists and
events, etc. The different colours connect value propositions, customer segments and revenue streams (Figure
9).
Figure 9. Business model for Gothenburg cable car
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Fixed car-sharing
A business model canvas for the Brazilian car-sharing service Zazcar, published by Thiago Paiva. The cost
structure is extensive, since Zazcar takes the investment and risks for its users (and maintenance etc.). This
means that the level of usage is crucial. To succeed, they need both private and business customers. Having
the right number of cars at the right place means that providers of parking places in urban areas are key
partners (Figure 10).
startupbizmodel.com 24 apr - 2012
Key Key Value Customer Customer

Partners Activities Proposition Relationships Segments
Self-service system People who

Fleet maintenance and
growth with reserves through preferred to not own
site and phone a car either for
Insurance company Analyze of new car
A easy way to have convenience, cost
points
independence without reduction or
needing to own a car Self-service system sustainability
Marketing
with reserves through
site and phone
Scheduling
Parking Places management
Key Alternative way to Channels

have company’s cars Companies that
Resources
resulting in a cheaper don’t use to much
Cars points in the city Cars points in the city
and sustainable car for services
Gas Station Site, Twitter, Facebook
operation
Fleet of cars
and Blog
Scheduling platform Cars points in the city

Site, Twitter, Facebook
Unblock technology
and Blog
Cost Insurance Revenue Membership + Rent fee

Structure Steams per hour
Fleet of cars Fuel Call Center

Membership + Rent fee
Car’s Human per hour per car
Parking
maintenance Resources
Figure 10. The Zazcar business model
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Ride-hailing/Transport Network Company
A business model canvas for Uber. A multi-sided business model with one customer segment being
passengers paying for rides to Uber that forwards it to independent contractors (drivers) minus 20-30%
commission. The value proposition to passengers is especially strong in cities with poor public transport,
regulated and conservative taxi market. The drivers are attracted by the opportunity to make extra money by
using an existing asset –their car. The platform and marketing shows up in two key blocks and in the cost
structure (Figure 11).
Figure 11. Uber's business model
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2.3.5 MAAS BUSINESS MODELS
The business models for MaaS services at different levels of integration will be different. Some characteristics
of these are described as follows.
Figure 12. The MaaS topology (recalled)

Level 1: Integration of information
The value proposition for travellers is finding the best trip options. It has a single trip focus and has users rather
than customers. Today, most travel planners or other types of mobility information sites or apps are financed
by ads or taxpayers’ money. End users are typically not prepared to pay for travel information, targeted or not,
no matter the perceived value.
The aggregated information can also consist of price and reservation information and, by forwarding a user to
the chosen provider, an information market platform operator has the chance to get a small commission.
There is a niche for local, publically operated travel planners and traffic information sites. In this case, the value
proposition for cities or PTAs is more satisfied users, usage data and possibly a more effective transport
system and therefore a public funding can be justified.
However, the market will most likely be controlled by a few global players with user bases large enough to
attract advertisers, e.g. Google. Not only is the online user base large, Google also know a lot about the
behaviour and interest of the users. The information that global actors collect can be sold to cities for traffic
management or infrastructure planning, which is an already established revenue source for actors like Moovit.
Level 2: Integration of booking and payment
A level 2 service could be a natural extension to a travel planner, adding public transport ticketing, taxi, or
other transport services where possible.
The value proposition to users is to make it easier use different transport services, i.e. a one-stop shop where
the user can find, book, and pay with the same app (e.g. with a preregistered payment card).
The value proposition for transport service providers is to reach new users. Revenue can thus come from
brokerage fees, commissions, or from fixed supplier memberships. It is unlikely that users will be willing to pay
for assistance in buying trips if is not combined with some extra service.
Although transport service providers gain a cost-effective exposure to the user base, since they will be offered
side by side with competitors, the value will be highest for new, small, or niche services that can win market
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shares. It is possible that some of the more established suppliers will be less interested in being part of a
‘mobility bazaar’, especially if it comes at a cost, but this of course depends on how dominant the service is or
if there are local regulations forcing suppliers to collaborate.
The cost and complexity of integrating many suppliers can be high, depending on the level of standardisation.
More suppliers also means more contracts. If the service/platform is operated by a public entity such as a
public transport authority, it will likely need to be open to all suppliers or be subjected to a quite complicated
procurement process.
The operator needs responsibility for valid tickets, accurate bookings, updated user data (e.g. driver license),
and payment for damages or extra fees from the users. Low margins, high costs of integrating many services,
and costs related to support can make running a level 2 service difficult (as a separate business, that is). It
could however add value to an existing, non-mobility-based business. If hotels, event companies, shopping
malls, and so on could integrate transport into their offers, the perceived value of their service may be much
higher than the cost of integration. One service to include in tickets, campaigns, and other travel or rental
services is public transport. In that case commissions are not really of any importance, which means that there
may be a niche for a B2B aggregator –a clearing house that offers easy access to multiple transport services
for businesses. It would be like Amadeus for air travel, but with much smaller transactions and more local
suppliers.
Wienerlinien has, at least for now, solved transaction and legal issues by just offering a booking interface, not
by taking care of payments. This means that users are directly registered with each transport service provider
(except public transport) but can access to them via a single app. This might be defined as a level 1.5 service.
If there is an open market, the creation of such a service might also make it easier to establish level 2 and
level 3 services.
As an informational service with a large user base, aggregated data on users’ behaviour may be sold to cities
for traffic and mobility management. In addition, an integrated service involving economic transactions can
also be used to mediate incentives for choosing more sustainable modes of transport, changing travel times
to off-peak hours, etc.
A level 2 service will make travel easier for those who are already multi- or intermodal users, but the offer is
probably not comprehensive enough to make households to sell their first or second car and attract new
customers.
Level 3: Integration of service offer and contracts (subscription, bundling)
The value proposition for users of a level 3 service is easy everyday travel without the drawbacks of owning a
car, meeting urbanites’ or households’ complete mobility needs via a comprehensive subscription or other
kinds of bundling. The value proposition to individual transport service providers is to reach new customer
segments and a more efficient use of their resources. For example, if the MaaS operator grow the total
customer base of a car sharing service and increase the overall usage of the shared cars, this could boost
profits for car sharing firms.
Revenues come from the bottom-line difference between repackaged services and volume agreements with
the transport service providers. This means that suppliers will gain extra customers, although with a smaller
margin (and smaller cost) than from direct, existing customers. The MaaS operator takes responsibility for the
service delivered to its customers –and for its customers towards the suppliers. It typically works more closely
with one preferred supplier per mode in order to create a greater value for suppliers and, with that, better deals
for customers.
The MaaS operator’s business is based on a “swings and roundabouts” principle –some trips or modes are
resold with high margins and some at a loss. The pricing is non-transparent –what the customer pays to the
MaaS operator is not directly linked to what the operator pays to the supplier, and the price models can be
different from what the suppliers themselves market to their own customers. It is much like an all-inclusive
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charter trip as opposed to the travel agency approach in level 2, as the traveller does not know the cost of
separate items (flight, hotel, dinner, tours, etc.). For an operator that is skilled in negotiation and understanding
customer needs, this opens up for higher average margins.
There are other customer segments besides B2C. The value proposition for organisations is an easier
administration of local and regional business trips for which handling the receipts can cost more than the actual
trips and the control of the use of private vehicles is weak. In this case, the customer also pays for the use of
the platform or outsourcing the administration. There is less need for subscriptions for business trips, but
subscription package can be offered as company benefits to employees instead of company cars.
The B2B-market (or rather B2B2C) can be further developed. A MaaS operator can be the equivalent to a
facility manager for real estate developers and owners, making sure that the people living there are happy
without having access to expensive parking lots. The possibility to trade parking lots for mobility services with
city planners is a strong value proposition to real estate companies with strong willingness to pay.
In a level 1 or 2 service, the business is based on the IT-platform, or the platform is actually the business and
need to be filled by producers and consumers. In a level 3 service the IT-platform is needed to run the business.
The content of the platform is a key resource, but not the platform itself. The development and operation of the
platform can thus be outsourced and also shared with MaaS operators in other cities, enabling roaming
functions.
2.3.6 CUSTOMER DEVELOPMENT

The traditional approach for launching a business starts with writing a business plan –a document that identifies
a market and a problem, proposes a solution and illustrates financial projections in terms of income, profits
and cash flow on a medium-term basis. Very often a business plan is compiled by entrepreneurs as a result
of a desktop exercise which contains no indication of direct interaction with potential customers ([31]).
“Everybody has a plan until they get punched in the mouth!”

(Mike Tyson on his opponents’ prefight strategies as quoted by Steve Blank, 2013).
Business plans rarely survive first contact with customers –around 75% of start-ups fail (with a peak of 97% of
consumer hardware start-ups) and up to 90% of ideas for new products and services never see the light ([32]).
Start-ups usually fail due to the lack of product-market fit ([33]). This is because business plans are usually
underpinned by a series of untested hypotheses. To resolve this issue, new methods that focus on testing
products, services, business models, processes, and strategies in a nimble and economical way have emerged
([34]).
Among these, customer development (CD) alongside a set of formalised concepts and tools has been
developed by the American serial entrepreneur and academic Steve Blank ([35]). Customer development is a
scientific approach through which entrepreneurs are encouraged to systematically identify, test and evaluate
their business hypotheses by designing and running experiments in an iterative way until they validate all their
entrepreneurial ‘guesses’ through interactions with potential customers. This should equip entrepreneurs with
enough robust evidence to prevent them from incurring in out-of-control and fatal situations such as managing
by crisis (situations in which unforeseen events, disruptions, problems, or emergencies dictate priorities and
actions) or premature scaling.
There are no facts inside your building, so get the heck outside!
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Customer development is defined as “the process to organise the search” for a repeatable and scalable
business model ([36]). This is achieved by collecting customer feedback on key business elements such as
product, channels, key stakeholders, price and positioning which can be refined and tested in an iterative way
until clear insights is gained (to shape the new business model) and high level of investment readiness is
reached and implemented.
The customer development approach, together with the use of a business model canvas, can be used in
combination with agile development as part of the lean start-up methodology. The latter is a methodology that
promotes experimentation, customer feedback and iterative design in place of elaborate planning, intuition,
and traditional design approaches ([37]). Despite customer development having been conceived for start-up
companies, it has been widely adopted by larger corporations that have embraced a lean start-up
methodology.
Customer development comprises four steps that are typically performed iteratively:
1. Customer discovery: the founder’s vision is captured and translate into business hypotheses, planning
and executing tests of minimum viable products.
2. Customer validation: continuing to validate and refine hypotheses or “pivot” using feedback from early
orders or product usage.
3. Customer creation: product refinement.
4. Company building.
The first two steps make up a search phase during which the company searches for a business model by
trying to falsify hypotheses. In cases where hypotheses are incorrect, they need to be revised or changed
completely (i.e. the entrepreneur must pivot). The critical question for an entrepreneur is: “What are we selling
and to whom”? The aim is to find the right product/market fit.
The last two steps make up the execution phase. On the basis of a proven model, the organisation starts to
transition from a concept to a real business, focusing on scalability and growth (Figure 13).
Figure 13. Lean start-up methodologies

Entrepreneurship is an art for which there is no checklist that will ensure success. There is no book or set of
guidelines that can foresee and contain all the answers that fit every business situation. What can be applied
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is a systematic approach for developing a business. An evidence-based approach such as the customer
development that seeks to ascertain needs, features, and functionalities for new products or services certainly
increase the chances of success ([37]). The key point is that through customer development the
entrepreneurial focus shifts from an executing mode to a searching one.
2.3.7 AGILE DEVELOPMENT – TEST WHILE YOU BUILD

Customer development and agile development go hand in hand. While agile development focuses on building
velocity, lean provides customer traction by drawing on continuous customer insights ([38]).
Agile development is an engineering approach that traces back to the world of IT and consists of building
products/services in small incremental stages such that an organisation can test and measure customer
feedback and responsiveness in each new iteration of the offer. This is the total opposite of the traditional
‘waterfall’ technique that is a top-down, relatively rigid and sequential development engineering approach.
Although agile development is typically used in engineering, it is also suitable for developing a service offer
([39]). It is particularly effective in complex projects with specific goals where a preliminary evaluation of
customers’ needs is difficult to perform. Also, as the approach encourages a high degree of collaboration, it is
suitable for multi-stakeholder project.
The agile approach consists of prioritising high value functions that can be tested with users during the
development process. This refers to a prototype of a product often called minimum viable product or a pilot for
service innovations. Such products and services are the simplest version of what one can build to validate
core assumptions by delivering actual value to potential customers. It is therefore crucial to focus on and
identify the minimum number of product/service features that are meaningful for customers. Throughout the
testing phase, errors can be quickly identified ad corrected with significant cost and time savings.
As an example, if you are building a new modular car, do not build the whole product. Instead it is possible to
start by asking people to test the seat and ask whether it is comfortable and feels safe; or whether the electric
motor functions with a certain battery package.
2.3.8 CASE STUDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UBIGO BUSINESS MODEL

The UbiGo pilot business model was developed in an iterative process inspired by the lean start-up
methodologies described above. Initial developments took place via a pre-study entitled Den flexible
trafikanten (“The flexible traveller”). This part of the study involved around ten participants in an e-mail-based
Delphi process. The editors first sent out a hypothesis about value propositions for customer segments. The
feedback was used for fine-tuning and complementing the hypothesis. The updated version of the first building
blocks was then sent out along with a first hypothesis of three more building blocks. In the last round the editors
also proposed quantified revenues and cost for a quality check.
In a Delphi process comments are anonymised, which encourages openness among participants. It is not a
democratic process and the editor has a responsibility to create something that is logical and comprehensive
–just as a journalist writing an article.
In a workshop the completed business model was presented and scrutinised by a broad set of stakeholders
and other experts. The Delphi process was well prepared. The first hypothesis was based on an analysis of
trends (general, transport-related and local) via interviews with around twenty different stakeholders from the
transport industry and adjacent sectors. This was used for formulating a first hypothetical service offer and
possible customer segments.
Pains and gains
One important customer segment identified was urban households that own a car. The private car is the
solution for different tasks, such as transporting people and belongings to different places. Pains include high
Page 37 of 44
fixed costs; finding and paying for parking; the risk of losing money when selling the car; damages and
unexpected repair costs; the need to change tyres; getting trapped in congestion, and so on.
What are the desired gains? Having access to the most suitable or most fun modes for certain errands; a more
active lifestyle leading to better health; freeing up time thanks to fewer trips; the status of gaining access to
modern cars; and so on.
How well do our pain relievers and gain generators match these pains and gains? Quite well (or at least they
did after a couple of iterations). The subscription model certainly removes all the hassles of ownership. But
since the subscription not only includes car sharing, all members can use other modes without the risk of losing
money, without the need to purchase seldom-used monthly passes or expensive single tickets, without monthly
memberships in car clubs and without the need to rent a car for longer trips, etc.
The importance of service design for a match
Many of these pain-relievers and gain creators are related to price models and other characteristics of service
design, such as the possibility to save what has not been used one month, to change the levels in the
subscription or to drop out. Low barriers to entry and alleviation from lock-in effects were important factors, as
well as treating the family as a whole, etc.
We could also see that the users were much more satisfied with their overall transport situation at the end of
the pilot than before –even those 20 households that did not use their cars for the entire duration of the pilot.
People changed their behaviour and were happy with it. The service helped to fulfil some lifestyle goals, such
as a more active lifestyle, saved time, changed status and changes in attitudes.
The business model of UbiGo was developed in the pre-study in 2011 (Figure 14). The B2B-segment was not
tested in the pilot. Note that
Example: the MaaS
UbiGo, key activities
level 3.and resources has more to do with procuring, understanding the
UITP
URBAN MOBILITY
customer and packaging than technology.
Figure 14. UbiGo business model
Page 38 of 44
The driving questions –the reasons for developing a new business model, and for designing and testing a
service under real conditions– were:
 Is it possible to offer a service that can compete with and replace the need for car ownership?
 Is it possible to make such a service commercially viable?
 Is there room for a platform-operator –a generic integrator?
In an ecosystem and platform study entitled MaaSterplan (involving Ericsson, RISE Viktoria and UbiGo
Innovation) business models for other types of actors were developed. One of these belongs to a possible
business platform operator (Figure 15), not to be confused with a supplier of the technical platform such as
Ericsson, Siemens or Fluidtime. The platform can be part of a franchising concept or a joint national platform
for resellers of mobility services.
Figure 15. Platform operator business model

It has many similarities with the business model of a MaaS-operator, but instead of having users as customers,
it has B2B-agreements with MaaS-operators or other kind of resellers of individual trips or bundles of transport
services. The platform operator has conducted a technical integration of different transport services but has
also implemented contracts with transport operators, price models, and so on –within the platform.
If the integrator is a franchiser of a certain type of MaaS service such as UbiGo or Whim, then franchisees will
pay for using the business platform. Franchisees will operate their own version of the platform and take
responsibility for the relations and contracts with local transport service providers and users.
If the integrator is a national hub (i.e. a mobility market for B2B transactions for all providers and resellers),
revenues can come from both sides that pay for using it. The value proposition to resellers is that they can
focus on value creation and gain access to many providers. The value proposition to transport service
providers that they can get reach many customers, via many resellers and in competition with each other.
Page 39 of 44
Whether the revenue for such a complex platform can sufficiently pay for development, maintenance and
operational costs depends on the perceived value by providers and resellers. This in turn depends on the
number of users and their willingness to pay, how much of the margin they have to give away, etc. A general
platform typically has the highest value for smaller players. Will large resellers and large providers sign bilateral
agreements, bypassing general agreements and even the technical platform? Do they even need to do it, since
a big part of innovation will be in price model, risk sharing and strong partnerships? And will a general platform
enable or hinder that?
Page 40 of 44
CONCLUSIONS
The guiding principles, theoretical perspectives and key concepts outlined in this document form the basis of
a set of tools and methods for engaging multiple stakeholders within the MaaS ecosystem and for developing
sustainable MaaS business models, which will be developed in the companion deliverable D1.2 –“Sustainable
MaaS Business Models: a typology (part 1)”. The two documents together are intended to support MaaS
developments within IMOVE Living Labs. In principal, however, they are designed to act as generic supporting
mechanisms for MaaS developments in urban settings. As such, we hope that this work will be useful to a
range of practitioners beyond the IMOVE project.
Page 41 of 44
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IMOVE D1.1 Guidelines For Successful Multistakeholder Partnerships v2.3

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This report is part of a project that has received funding by the European Union’s Horizon 2020

research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 723314.

Start date of project: 01/06/2017 Duration: 30 months

Editor name Organisation

Document Revision History

1.1 THE MAAS TOPOLOGY

1.2 THE MOBILITY MARKET: DIVERSE, LOW-MARGIN AND LOCAL

1.3 DRIVERS AND BARRIERS OF MAAS DEVELOPMENTS

Known barriers and obstacles to collaboration in MaaS ecosystems

1.4 THE MAAS ECOSYSTEM

1.4.1 DEVELOPING THE MAAS ECOSYSTEM

2.1 TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

2.1.1 THE MULTI-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE

MaaS – key megatrends

Figure 5. The regime associated with automobility

Figure 6. The regime associated with public transport

2.2 CASE STUDY: THE GO:SMART PROJECT

2.3 DEVELOPING BUSINESS MODELS

2.3.1 WHAT IS A BUSINESS MODEL?

2.3.2 SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS MODELS

2.3.3 THE BUSINESS MODEL CANVAS

Figure 8. The Facebook business model

Figure 9. Business model for Gothenburg cable car

Key Key Value Customer Customer

Self-service system People who

Key Alternative way to Channels

Scheduling platform Cars points in the city

Cost Insurance Revenue Membership + Rent fee

Fleet of cars Fuel Call Center

Figure 10. The Zazcar business model

Figure 11. Uber's business model

Figure 12. The MaaS topology (recalled)

2.3.6 CUSTOMER DEVELOPMENT

“Everybody has a plan until they get punched in the mouth!”

Figure 13. Lean start-up methodologies

2.3.7 AGILE DEVELOPMENT – TEST WHILE YOU BUILD

2.3.8 CASE STUDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UBIGO BUSINESS MODEL

Figure 14. UbiGo business model

Figure 15. Platform operator business model

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