Consti-Midterm Reviewer

Midterm Reviewer (Constitutional Law II) ConCom: Pernites, Raz; Alcoriza, Rhen; Aton, Zoila
II. INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

TAXATION
A. Definition, Nature, Purpose and Basis
Definition:
TAXES are the enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the
State by virtue of its sovereignty, for the support of government and for all public needs.
TAXATION is the method by which these contributions are exacted.
Importance of Taxation
The importance of taxation derives from the unavoidable obligation of the government to
protect the people and extend the benefits in the form of public projects and services. In
exchange for these, the people are subjected to the reciprocal duty of sharing the expenses to
be incurred therefore through the payment by them of taxes. [Cruz]
The obligation to pay taxes is not based on contract. It is a duty imposed upon the individual by
the mere fact of his membership in the body politic and his enjoyment of the benefits available
from such membership. [Cruz]
Taxes v. Licenses
Taxes are distinguished from licenses in the sense that the former are levied to raise
revenues; whereas the latter are imposed for regulatory purposes only. Licenses are justified
under the police power, and the amount of the fees required is usually limited only to the cost
of regulation.
The Power to Tax is the Power to Destroy
The power to tax may include the power to destroy if it is used validly as an implement of the
police power in discouraging and in effect ultimately prohibiting certain things or enterprises
inimical to the public welfare. Thus, if massage parlors are found to be mere fronts for
prostitution, they may be subjected to such onerous taxes as to practically force them to stop
operating.
But:
Where the power to tax is used solely for the purpose of raising revenues, the modern view is
that it cannot be allowed to confiscate or destroy. If this is sought to be done, the tax maybe
successfully attacked as an inordinate and unconstitutional exercise of the discretion that is
usually vested exclusively in the legislature in ascertaining the amount of the tax.
Due Process and Taxation

Taxation is subject to the requirements of due process. It has already been observed that
taxes will not be allowed if they are confiscatory except when they intend precisely for
destruction as an instrument of the police power.
From procedural viewpoint, due process does not require previous notice and hearing before a
law prescribing fixed or specific taxes on certain article may be enacted. But where the tax to
be collected is to be based on the value of the taxable property, the taxpayer is entitled to be
notified of the assessment proceedings and to be heard therein on the correct valuation to be
given the property.
Equal Protection and Taxation
Taxation is subject to the general requirements of the equal protection clause. Additionally, it is
provided in the Constitution that “the rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.”
Uniformity in Taxation means that persons or things belonging to the same class shall be
taxed at the same rate.
Equality of Taxation means that the tax shall be strictly proportional to the relative value of
the property.
The above rules require a valid classification in the selection of the objects of taxation.
Equitable Taxation connotes that taxes should be apportioned among the people according
to their capacity to pay.
Public Purpose
To sustain a tax, it is necessary to show that the proceeds are devoted to public purpose.
Revenues derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive
benefit of private persons. The phrase “public purpose” as applied to taxation is now given the
broadest interpretation so as to include even indirect public advantage or benefit.
Taxes are the lifeblood of government (Life Blood Theory)
 “The Bureau of Internal Revenue should be given, in instances like the case at bar, the
necessary discretion to avail itself of the most expeditious way to collect the tax ….
because taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and certain availability
is an imperious need..” CIR v. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105
 “Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without
unnecessary hindrance…….It is said that taxes are what we pay for civilization society.
Without taxes, the government would be paralyzed for lack of the motive power to
activate and operate it. Hence, despite the natural reluctance to surrender part of one's
hard earned income to the taxing authorities, every person who is able to must
contribute his share in the running of the government. The government for its part, is
expected to respond in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve
the lives of the people and enhance their moral and material values. This symbiotic
relationship is the rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that it is
an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of power.”CIR v. Algue, L-28896,
17 February 1988
B. When exercised by legislature; When exercised by LGU
LGU’s derive their authority to Tax from the Constitution subject to limitations as may
be provided for by law (Under the 1987 Constitution)
 Congress, therefore cannot pass a law saying that LGU’s do not have the power to tax.
However, as to what to tax or as to what not to tax maybe a subject matter of legislation.
Example, when Congress passes a law that exempts certain establishments from
taxation, then LGU’s must have to abide to such exemptions.
 The power of taxation is inherent in the State. Primarily vested in the national
legislature, it may now also be exercised by the local legislative bodies, no longer by
virtue of a valid delegation as before pursuant to a direct authority conferred by:
ARTICLE X, Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution
“Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to
levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local governments.”
ARTICLE X, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution
“The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different
local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.”
 “Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution (Art. X, Sec.
5, 1987 Constitution) will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument…..The
power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations
which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an operative law until
amended, repealed or revoked (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its exemption
clause remains as an exemption to the exercise of the power of local governments to
impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather consistent with the
principle of local autonomy.” Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52
C. Elements for Valid Exercise
ARTICLE VI, Sec. 28, 1987 Constitution
1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.
4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
ARTICLE VI, Sec. 29 (3), 1987 Constitution
3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special
fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was
created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government.
 “Petitioner invoke the kindred concept of uniformity. According to the Constitution: the
rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. This requirement is met according to
Justice Laurel in Philippine Trust Co. V. Yatco, decided in 1940, when the tax operates
with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found. He
likewise added, the rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect
equality because this is hardly attainable. The problem of classification did no present
itself in that case. It did not arise until nine years later, when the SC held: Equality and
uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make
reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation... As clarified by Justice
Tuason, where the differentiation complained of conforms to the practical dictates of
justice and equity it is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and therefore
uniform. There is quite similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all that is
required is tat the tax applies to all persons, firms and corporations places in similar
situations.” Sison v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 58431, Jul 25, 1984
 “Petitioner intimates that RA No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that
taxation shall be uniform and equitable in that the law would now attempt to tax single
proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on
corporations and partnerships. The contention clearly forgets, however, that such a
system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to RA No.
7496.”
“Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all
subjects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and
liabilities. Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as (1) the standards that are
used therefore are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to
achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present
and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging
to the same class.” Tan v. Del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324
D. Tax Exemptions
ARTICLE XIV, Sec. 4 (3)
3. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties.
Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their
assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be
entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by law, including restrictions
on dividends and provisions for reinvestment.
ARTICLE VI, Sec. 28 (3) and (4)
3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.
4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority
of all the Members of the Congress. //rhen
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

A. BILL OF RIGHTS- enumeration of rights and privileges which the Constitution
protects.
B. KINDS OF RIGHTS
1. Inherent - by reason of human existence
- does not need Constitutional conferment
Inherent/ Human Rights
a. civil
b. political
c. economic
d. social
e. cultural
2. Constitutional – conferred by the Constitution; also includes inherent rights
3. Statutory rights – dependent upon the existence of a statute; get the statute and the
right disappears, thus, it is the least of all rights.
C. NATURE OF THE PROVISIONS
 “self-executing, mandatory….” (Mla Prince v. GSIS)
D. Enforceable Against Whom?
 “The constitutional issues raised by Domasian do not affect the decision in this case. His claim that he
was arrested without warrant and then tortured and held incommunicado to extort a confession from him
does not vitiate his conviction. He never gave any confession. As for the allegation that the seizure of the
documents used for comparison with the ransom note was made without a search warrant, it suffices to
say that such documents were taken by Agra himself and not by the NBI agents or other police
authorities. We held in the case of People vs. Andre Marti, 20 that the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked
against acts of private individuals, being directed only against the government and its law-enforcement
agencies and limitation on official action.” (People v. Domasian)

IV. DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Article III, Section 1, Consti. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
NOTE: The first phrase which states that “no person xxx” connotes that the provision is
MANDATORY.
The word “person” refers to the inhabitants:
a. Natural persons – citizens and aliens
b. Juridical persons – limited to property
 “Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be
stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what
ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.” (Lao Gi v.
CA)
 “xxx binding not only upon the Government but to everyone of its branches, agencies, instrumentalities
xxx” (Halili v. Public Service)

 “The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It
does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor
Code. This is plain from the text of Art. III, 1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. . . ." The reason is simple: Only the State has authority
to take the life, liberty, or property of the individual. The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to
ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with what are considered civilized methods.”
(Serrano v. NLRC)
NOTE: due process emanates not only from the Constitution but also in statutes
(Statutory due process), e.g. Labor Code.
I. In general
 "Due process of law" is process or proceedings according to the law of the land. "Due process of law" is
not that the law shall be according to the wishes of all the inhabitants of the state, but simply
First. That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government;
Second. That this law shall be reasonable in its operation;
Third. That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
Fourth. That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class.
(U.S. v LING SU FAN)
NOTE: first and second requirements refer to substantive due process while the third
and fourth requirements refer to procedural due process.
II. Substantive Due Process
 Test: 1. Reasonableness – lawful subject & lawful means
2. Void-for-vagueness – “The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process
of law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms." (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan)

3. Publication. “Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by
the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication."
The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is
that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to
comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws
as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate. “ (Tanada v. Tuvera)
III. PROCEDURAL ASPECT: (proper method) theirs a law and it is enforced correctly.
a. Judicial Proceedings
As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due
process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely;
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject
of the proceeding;
(3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
(Banco Espanol v Palanca)
Note: congress decides as to what court should hear the case
Simply stated:
1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter : authority to hear and decide the case
- Acquired by filing the case
2. Jurisdiction over the person
- Issue summon, informing defendant about the case.
- The moment he receives it, court acquires jurisdiction over the person.
EXCEPTION: if non-resident: publish and send to his last known address
NOTE: CRIMINAL: Importance of Warrant of Arrest
CIVIL: Inform through notice

3. Notice and OPPORTUNITY to be heard
-all that it grants is opportunity and not that you must be heard
- if after receiving the summon he does not answer then he loses his opportunity to be
heard
4. Judgment after hearing
NOTE: Along with the above mentioned requirements is that court should be IMPARTIAL and
APPEAR TO BE IMPARTIAL (NEUTRALITY OF THE JUDGE)
b. Administrative Proceedings
 (1)The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. (Ang Tibay
v. CIR)
Note: In administrative proceedings the evidence must be substantial.
What is substantial evidence?
 It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." (ANG TIBAY V CIR)
c. Academic due process

 “But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process.
And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The
proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary
to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met
to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed
in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shag have the right to answer
the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.” (GUZMAN v NATIONAL UNIVERSITY)

SIMPLY STATED
1. Publication : information dissemination (memo’s, university manual)
2. Reasonable : there is some causal link between the rules and educational objectives of
the school sought to be achieved.
3. Just, authorized or recognized causes
4. Appropriate procedure
5. Appropriate penalty
Note: penalty imposed should that have been published
-when you commit MINOR offenses in the presence of school officials or academic personnel,
they can impose penalties right away
-SERIOUS OFFENSES: there must be a complaint first
OTHER INFRACTIONS RECOGNIZED IN COURT DECISIONS:
*Attendance in hazing activities even if students did not lay hands on neophytes
*Deliberately withholding material information in a scholarship application
*Even if offense done outside the school if it affects the suitability of the students, the school
has jurisdiction to apply the penalty.
*You retain your freedom of expression even if you’re inside the school but it exercise of such
must be balanced with school rules and regulations
-permit must be sought ( fixing the time and place of assembly)
-must avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work
Article XIV sec 3 (2)
Article 218 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Article 2180 CIVIL CODE
BASIS: constitution, jurisprudence and contract of the school and students

Must parents be informed of charges against their children?
-School not duty bound to do so.
What is appropriate penalty?
There must be proportionality between offense committed and the sanction imposed.
Penalties of serious infractions:
*exclusion: your school drops your name from their list of students
*expulsion: you cannot anymore enroll in any school
V. EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS

a. Guaranty of equal protection, Generally
 Is it part of due process?
YES
 Why?
“The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play.” (PHIL. JUDGES ASSOC. v
PRADO)
 Why is it made separate?
 “It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide
for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular
act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down
is the equal protection clause.” (PHIL. JUDGES ASSOC. v PRADO)

 What is equal protection of laws?
“According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
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situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others.”(PHIL. JUDGES ASSOC. v PRADO)

 Does it require universal application of the laws?
“The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law
prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but
violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
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certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. ” (PHIL. JUDGES
ASSOC. v PRADO)
 What requires a valid classification?
The "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification
under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.
(DE GUZMAN v COMELEC)
Note: substantial distinction must be essential to the attainment of the objective. //zoila 
VI. RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Art. III, Section 2, Consti. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
A. In the absence of a Constitution, can the people assert their rights under Article
III (Bill of Rights)?
 “During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law
because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of
the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives
and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
during the interregnum. xxx
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect
during the interregnum.” (Republic v. Sandiganbayan)

Note: In the absence of a Constitution which grants the people their rights against
encroachment and abuse by the government, they cannot invoke its protection under
the Constitution BUT they can invoke such right under international agreements and
treaties such as the ICCPR and UNDHR, for they form generally accepted principles of
international law and customary international law which is deemed binding upon every
State.
B. With regards the word INVIOLABLE, does this mean that the right granted under
Art. III, Sec. 2 is absolute?
 Yes, the right is absolute as to UNREASONABLE searches and seizures.
Note: This means that a person can be searched and certain items can be seized if the
search and seizure is REASONABLE.
C. Who are entitled to the rights against unreasonable search and seizures?
 “Available to ALL persons, including aliens. Artificial persons are also entitled to the guarantee.
(Moncada v. People’s Court)
Note: The right is personal; it can be invoked only by the person entitled to it . (Stonehill v. Diokno)
D. To whom is the right directed against?
 “In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellant's
father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable”. (People v.
Mendoza)
Note: The right is directed against the government its branches, departments and
instrumenatlities.
E. Definitions
 Section 1. Search warrant defined. – A search warrant is an order in writing issued in
the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it
before the court.(Sec. 1, Rule 126 of the RRC)
 Section 1. Definition of arrest. – Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.(Sec. 1, Rule 113 of
the RRC)
F. How can there be a REASONABLE search and seizure?
 General Rule: a search or a seizure is reasonable upon presentation of a VALID
WARRANT.
Exceptions: 1. valid warrantless arrest
2. valid warrantless searches (Manalili v. CA)
G. What are the requisites for a VALID WARRANT?
 no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon:
1. probable cause
2. probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
3. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and
4. particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
H. Probable Cause
With probable cause
COMPLAINT
Counter affidavit information proper court
Pongot v.
Prosecutor
Bernabe
reply affidavit resolution
Clarificatory hearing
without probable cause dismissed
a. What is the difference between PROBABLE CAUSE determined by a

PROSECUTOR and PROBABLE CAUSE determined by a JUDGE?
 The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be
made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other
hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is
a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus,
even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no
confusion as to their distinct objectives.(Ho v. People, cited in Abdula v. Guiani)

b. Definition
 “Probable cause is defined as referring to such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the
warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious person to rely on them, and to act in
pursuance thereof.” (People v. CA)

 “In turn, probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.” (Agcaoli v. Molina)

 “xxx to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, the
applicant must show "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched." (People v. Estrada)

 “xxx of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws.” (Stonehill v. Diokno)

I. Probable cause to be determined personally by the judge.
a. Warrant of arrest- there is personal determination if the judge has personally evaluated
the supporting documents or affidavits and is PERSONALLY SATISFIED that probable
cause exist.
b. Search Warrant- The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (Sec. 5, Rule 126
of the RRC); disregard the prosecutor’s findings.
Note: The reason for the distinction is in SW there is still no tangible document to
review. The prosecution is still building the case and the things that will be seized will
become the evidence against the accused BUT in WA there is already an established
case.
c. Who can issue a warrant of arrest?
 “xxx only judges are vested with authority to issue warrants for the arrest of persons, including ALIENS.
Even if it is assumed that the commissioner of the CID is authorized to issue a warrant of arrest, this is
limited only to those cases where a final order of deportation had already been issued by the
BOC, and only for the purpose of implementing such order.” (Jackson v. Macalino)
Note: the warrant of arrest contemplated in Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution refers to
an arrest to bring the accused to answer in court.
J. After examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce.
 “The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for
damages caused” (Alvarez v. CFI); otherwise it is a HEARSAY evidence.

K. Particularity of Description
a. Rationale
 “To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion
of peace officers.” (Stonehill v. Diokno)

Note: this will prevent the police officer’s discretion on who to arrest and what to seize.
b. Particularity in Warrant of Arrest
“John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding the essential
requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and about blank warrants, that a
warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or
"Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of
the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a
warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or
persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or
persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and
peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which
he can be identified.” (People v. Veloso)

Note: for a warrant of arrest to pass the test of particularity it should state:
1. Name and description of the accused
2. Desriptio personae
3. Assumed appellation (John Doe, Richard Roe, Jane Doe)
c. Particularity in Search Warrant
As to place to be searched:
 “This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. In the present case, it must be noted
that the application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch of the compound at 516 San Jose
de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private
respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are residences of other
people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have been
very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to
segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant
merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo,
Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the
specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of
private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a
general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement. (People v. Estrada)

 In the instant case there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument,
arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for
the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the
Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This
should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from
that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the
warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their
supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in
the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs
they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers' theory, in the context of
the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been
fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own
personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the
warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would
concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated
in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing
a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The
particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge,
and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the
search.” (People v. CA)

As to things to be searched
 “xxx provide that the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for determining whether
probable cause exists and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a particular description of
the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. These provisions are mandatory and
must be strictly complied with (Munch vs. U. S., 24 Fed. [2d], 518; U. S. vs. Boyd, 1 Fed. [2d], 1019; U.
S. vs. Carlson, 292 Fed., 463; U. S. vs. Borkowski, 268 Fed., 408; In re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co., 253
Fed., 605; People vs. Mayen, 188 Cal., 237; People vs. Kahn, 256 Ill. App., 415); but where, by the
nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a
technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue (People vs. Rubio,
57 Phil., 284; People vs. Kahn, supra). The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented
to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists,
chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious
rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it
is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because
it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially
complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby
placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.” (Alvarez v. CFI)

“The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description
is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the
identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere
roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as
they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for. Any description of the place or thing to be
searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or
thing is sufficient.
However, the requirement that search warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes
general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant. Thus, the specific property to be searched for should be so particularly described as to preclude
any possibility of seizing any other property.” (Vallejo v. CA)
As to the offense
A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.(Sec. 4, Rule
126 of the RRC)

“The questioned warrant in this case is a scatter-shot warrant for having been issued for more than one
offense - Falsification of Land Titles under Article 171 and Article 213 of the Revised Penal Code, and
violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A warrant
must be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. In fact, a careful perusal of
the application for the warrant shows that the applicant did not allege any specific act performed by the
petitioner constituting a violation of any of the aforementioned offenses.” (People v. Vallejo)


Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued
upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to
the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this
case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference
to any determinate provision of said laws. (Stonehill v. Diokno)

Note: Particularity of Description aims to limit the discretion of the law enforcers on who to
arrest and what items to be seized
d. Time of serving the Warrant of Arrest
 Sec. 6. Time of making arrest. – An arrest may be made on any day and at any time
of the day or night. (Sec. 6, Rule 113 of the RRC)
e. Time of serving the Search warrant
 Sec. 9. Time of making search. – The warrant must direct that it be served in the day
time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place
ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at
any time of the day or night.
L. Valid Warrantless Arrest

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112. ( Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the RRC)

Note: a – in flagrante delicto. Here two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.(People v. Elamparo)
Or (1) mens rea; (2) actus reus
b – hot pursuit. [Note: time of arrest must be close to the time of commission; there
should be no let up/ interruption from the time of the commission]
c – escapee

“None of these circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. The accused was merely
walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police
officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused was not committing any visible
offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or
that he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that
the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. And the
handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not give an outward indication of a concealed gun if
placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting officers had no
information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him in
possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Xxx Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car
were without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any of the
exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is therefore,
unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty.” (People v. Laguio)


Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually
being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. 7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was
made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime .
(People v.Malmstead)

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government,
the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even
expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v.
Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and
seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they
did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because
the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a
"search warrant was not necessary." Xxx
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was
only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect
and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. (People v. Aminudin)


It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the place of
"Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs. Sucro 44 we held that when a police
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds
at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a),
Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5,
par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the
consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted
rule since he was arrested on the day following the commission of the robbery with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and, (2) the person making
the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it.
Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and
the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is
also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts
45
indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime. Again, the arrest of del
Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after
the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just
committed" at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense since they were
not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the
driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation. (People v. Del Rosario)

As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for
his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without
warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. (Umil v. Ramos)

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person. 29 Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle
figured in a hit and run � an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who
then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require
that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created
thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." (Padilla v. CA)

Note: use not only the visual but also the auditory (hearing) sense. [according to Santi,
and BINGO!]
M. Warrantless Search
a. Incident to a lawful arrest

The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed. (People v. Laguio)


In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
36
was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a
valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the
latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which
was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence,
38
or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light
of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the
part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to
be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on
petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest . (Malacat v. CA)
Note: The search will be lawful if the arrest will fall under any of the circumstance
provided in Section 5, Rule 113.
Note: Permissible area of search: only the area within which the person arrested
(1)could reach for weapon; (2)reach for evidence to destroy it.
b. Stop and frisk
Note: The right of the police officer to:
1. Stop the citizen on the street on genuine reason, not mere suspicion
2. Interrogate him
3. Pat for weapons
4. Search is limited to search of outer clothing
5. To ensure safety of police officer and others

“We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the
landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right
of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):. . . (W)here a
police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against
the person from whom they were taken.” (Manalili v. CA)

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
41
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a
two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause;
and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to
bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as
a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search
petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his
companions had to be chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares
otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately
collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" � an observation which leaves us incredulous since
Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk.
Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or
trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination:
Q And what were they doing?
A They were merely standing.
Q You are sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create
any commotion.
A None, sir.
Q Neither did you see them create commotion?

A None, sir. 42
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front
waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge,
assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the
trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a handgrenade
was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person (Malacat v. CA)
c. Search of a moving vehicle

“Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle. In connection therewith, a warrantless search is
constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein
petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.” (Padilla v. CA)

Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search and seizure may be
conducted by peace officers. The only issue we should determine is whether there was probable cause to
justify such warrantless search and seizure.
We recall that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a confidential informer disclosed to SPO2 Ngina
that a passenger jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine lumber was at Km. 96, Atok,
Benguet. The lumber was covered with assorted vegetables. A PNP roadblock was then placed in Acop,
Tublay, Benguet to intercept the jeepney. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same day, the police spotted the
vehicle. They flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it reached
Shilan, La Trinidad. A search of the vehicle disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber.
Petitioners could not produce the required DENR permit to cut and transport the same.
In People v. Vinecarao,10 we ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing a checkpoint and even after
having been flagged down by police officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with
their inspection, there exists probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that the
persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law or that the vehicle contained objects which were
instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely applies to the present case. (Epie v. Ulat-Marredo)
d. Search under customs law

“The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code
to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or
envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a
dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." It is our considered view, therefor, that except in
the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law
may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.” (Papa v.
Mago)

Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF operatives
was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL
personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and
his co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected the search
and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs law.
(Salvador v. People)
e. Seizure in plain view
Elements:
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

“The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came
within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in
petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero.
The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately
apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally
near the driver's seat.” (Padilla v. CA)


The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their
discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that
upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants.
Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was
needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand."
The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply .(People v. Valdez)
Note: even if the item was inside a container but based on your experience, its
configuration suggest that it is an evidence against the crime it can be considered as
evidence in plain view because it is “open to the eye or to the hand”.

The evidence clearly shows that on the basis of an intelligence information that a carnapped vehicle was
driven by ABDUL, who was also a suspect of drug pushing, the members of the CIDG of Laguna went
around looking for the carnapped car.25 They spotted the suspected carnapped car, which was indeed
driven by ABDUL. While ABDUL was fumbling about in his clutch bag for the registration papers of the car
the CIDG agents saw four transparent sachets of shabu.26 These sachets of shabu were therefore in
"plain view" of the law enforcers.
Under the "plain view" doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. Nonetheless,
the seizure of evidence in plain view must comply with the following requirements: (a) a prior valid
intrusion in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 27
We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt under the circumstances above discussed that all the
elements of seizure in plain view exist in the case at bar. Thus, the warrantless search and seizure
conducted on ABDUL, as well as his warrantless arrest, did not transgress his constitutional rights .
(People v. Macalaba)

“It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises
when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the
object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are
obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. 127 In other words, if the
package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the
prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. 128 It must be immediately apparent to the police
that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. ”
(People v. Doria)
f. Waiver or consent
Elements:
1. It must appear that the right exists
2. The accused had knowledge(actual or constructive) of the existence of such right
3. The person has actual intention to relinquish such right

“It is fundamental, however, that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that the right exists; secondly,
that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly,
that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. CHUA never exhibited that he knew,
actually or constructively of his right against unreasonable searches or that he intentionally conceded the
same.” (People v. Chua Ho San)


With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered them to the police. 55 This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against
the alleged search and seizure 56, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from
assailing any purported defect. (Padilla v. CA)

g. Routine Airport Security Procedure

 “This is not the first time we recognize a search conducted pursuant to routine airport security procedure
as an exception to the proscription against warrantless searches.xxx
"Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness,
the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs and notices in
their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are
found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures."” (People v. Suzuki)

 “The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures”. (People v. Leila Johnson)
h. Checkpoint searches
 “This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of
public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine
checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’ right to "free passage without interruption," but it
cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle’s
occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual
search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable
search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.” (People
v. Usana/Escano)
 “Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a
search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of
the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient
to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful
search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take
judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in
the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.”
(Valmonte v. Gen. de Villa)

i. Exigent circumstances
N. Immunity from Arrest

 “It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, 8 and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer
of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction.” Xxx
the Philippine Government is bound by the procedure laid down in Article VII of the Convention on the
14
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations for consultations between
the Host State and the United Nations agency concerned to determine, in the first instance the fact of
occurrence of the abuse alleged, and if so, to ensure that no repetition occurs and for other recourses.
This is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government and as such, has the force
and effect of law.” (WHO v. Aquino)
O. Effect of invalid search and seizure

Art. III, Section 3, Constitution.
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Note: Pieces of evidence seized in violation of Sec 2 is inadmissible in any court
proceeding for they are fruits of a poisonous tree. This is referred to as the
EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
a. Rationale
 “As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In
earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but
that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.” (Stonehill v. Diokno)
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Midterm Reviewer (Constitutional Law II) ConCom: Pernites, Raz; Alcoriza, Rhen; Aton, Zoila

II. INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

Due Process and Taxation

III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

agencies and limitation on official action.” (People v. Domasian)

xxx” (Halili v. Public Service)

freedoms." (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan)

CIVIL: Inform through notice

c. Academic due process

authorities to hear and decide the case.” (GUZMAN v NATIONAL UNIVERSITY)

BASIS: constitution, jurisprudence and contract of the school and students

V. EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS

is the equal protection clause.” (PHIL. JUDGES ASSOC. v PRADO)

discriminate against others.”(PHIL. JUDGES ASSOC. v PRADO)

during the interregnum.” (Republic v. Sandiganbayan)

a. What is the difference between PROBABLE CAUSE determined by a

confusion as to their distinct objectives.(Ho v. People, cited in Abdula v. Guiani)

pursuance thereof.” (People v. CA)

has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.” (Agcaoli v. Molina)

offense are in the place sought to be searched." (People v. Estrada)

given provision of our criminal laws.” (Stonehill v. Diokno)

damages caused” (Alvarez v. CFI); otherwise it is a HEARSAY evidence.

of peace officers.” (Stonehill v. Diokno)

he can be identified.” (People v. Veloso)

general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement. (People v. Estrada)

search.” (People v. CA)

any possibility of seizing any other property.” (Vallejo v. CA)

petitioner constituting a violation of any of the aforementioned offenses.” (People v. Vallejo)

to any determinate provision of said laws. (Stonehill v. Diokno)

L. Valid Warrantless Arrest

112. ( Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the RRC)

unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty.” (People v. Laguio)

pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. (People v. Aminudin)

thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." (Padilla v. CA)

reversed. (People v. Laguio)

the person from whom they were taken.” (Manalili v. CA)

Q Neither did you see them create commotion?

near the driver's seat.” (Padilla v. CA)

same.” (People v. Chua Ho San)

assailing any purported defect. (Padilla v. CA)

g. Routine Airport Security Procedure

procedures."” (People v. Suzuki)

(Valmonte v. Gen. de Villa)

N. Immunity from Arrest

and effect of law.” (WHO v. Aquino)

O. Effect of invalid search and seizure

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