G.R. No.
150666               August 3, 2010
LUCIANO BRIONES and NELLY BRIONES, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE MACABAGDAL, FE D. MACABAGDAL and VERGON REALTY
INVESTMENTS CORPORATION, Respondents.
Facts:
Respondent Spouses Macabagdal purchased from Vergon Realty Investments
Corporation (Vergon) Lot No. 2-R located in Vergonville Subdivision. On the
other hand, Briones, the petitioners are the owners of Lot No. 2-S, which is
adjacent to Lot No. 2-R.
Sometime in 1984, after obtaining the necessary building permit and approval,
Briones constructed a house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was Lot No. 2-
S. After being informed of the mix up by Vergon’s manager, Spouses
Macabagdal immediately demanded Briones to demolish the house and vacate
the property. Briones, however, refused to heed their demand. Thus, Spouses
Macabagdal filed an action to recover ownership and possession of the said
parcel of land with the RTC of Makati City.3
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Macabagdal and found that petitioners’
house was undoubtedly built on Lot No. 2-R.
The RTC further ordered Briones to remove the improvements they have made
on the disputed property or to pay Spouses Macabagdal the prevailing price of
the land as compensation.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s finding.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by
the appellate court.9 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Briones posited that they must not bear the damage alone. They insist that
they relied with full faith and confidence in the reputation of Vergon’s agents
when they pointed the wrong property to them. Even the President of Vergon,
Felix Gonzales, consented to the construction of the house when he signed the
building permit.11 Also, Briones are builders in good faith.12
The petition is partly meritorious.
We find that the trial court nonetheless erred in outrightly ordering petitioners
to vacate the subject property or to pay respondent spouses the prevailing
price of the land as compensation.
Article 52714 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to
show that the mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be
presumed to have built the house in good faith.
When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of
the Civil Code governs.
Said article provides,
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546
and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of
the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
The above-cited article covers cases in which the builders, sowers or planters
believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title
thereto.15  the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed
The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice
between:
1. appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity; or
2. obliging the builder to pay the price of the land.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the
principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the
other way around.
However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one.16 He cannot, for instance,
compel the owner of the building to remove the building from the land
without first exercising either option.
It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to
purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements,
that the owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is
entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the
other party fails to pay for the same.17
Moreover, Briones have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and
useful expenses they may have made on the subject property. Articles 546 and
548 of the Civil Code provide,
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only
therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the
same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession
having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the
increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to
the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he
has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his
successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.
In the case at bar, Spouses Macabagdal have the option to appropriate the
house on the subject land after payment to Briones of the appropriate
indemnity or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value
is considerably more than the value of the structures, in which case Briones
shall pay reasonable rent.
In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao, 18 this case must be remanded to the RTC
which shall conduct the appropriate proceedings to assess the respective
values of the improvement and of the land, as well as the amounts of
reasonable rentals and indemnity, fix the terms of the lease if the parties so
agree, and to determine other matters necessary for the proper application of
Article 448, in relation to Articles 546 and 548, of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 11, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 48109 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The award of
moral damages in favor of respondent-spouses Jose and Fe Macabagdal and
the award of compensatory damages and attorney’s fees to respondent
Vergon Realty Investments Corporation are DELETED. The case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, for
further proceedings consistent with the proper application of Articles 448, 546
and 548 of the Civil Code, as follows:
1. The trial court shall determine:
a. the present fair price of the respondent-spouses’ lot;
b. the amount of the expenses spent by petitioners for the building of their
house;
c. the increase in value ("plus value") which the said lot may have acquired by
reason thereof;
d. whether the value of said land is considerably more than that of the house
built thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence,
the Regional Trial Court shall render judgment, as follows:
a. The trial court shall grant the Spouses Macabagdal a period of fifteen (15)
days within which to exercise their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
whether to appropriate the house as their own by paying to petitioners either
the amount of the expenses spent by petitioners for the building of the house,
or the increase in value ("plus value") which the said lot may have acquired by
reason thereof, or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of said land.
The amounts to be respectively paid by the respondent-spouses and
petitioners, in accordance with the option thus exercised by written notice of
the other party and to the Court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15)
days from such notice of the option by tendering the amount to the Court in
favor of the party entitled to receive it;
b. The trial court shall further order that if the respondent-spouses exercises
the option to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land but the latter
rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial court, the value of the land
is considerably more than that of the house, petitioners shall give written
notice of such rejection to the respondent-spouses and to the Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the respondent-spouses’ option to sell the
land.
In that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such
notice of rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give
the Court formal written notice of such agreement and its provisos.
If no agreement is reached by the parties, the trial court, within fifteen (15)
days from and after the termination of the said period fixed for negotiation,
shall then fix the terms of the lease . Upon expiration of the two (2)-year period,
or upon default by petitioners in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive
months, the respondent-spouses shall be entitled to terminate the forced
lease, to recover their land, and to have the house removed by petitioners or at
the latter’s expense. The rentals herein provided shall be tendered by
petitioners to the Court for payment to the respondent-spouses, and such
tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made G.R. No. L-16218           November 29, 1962
within the period fixed by the Court.
ANTONIA BICERRA, DOMINGO BICERRA, BERNARDO BICERRA,
CAYETANO BICERRA, LINDA BICERRA, PIO BICERRA and EUFRICINA
BICERRA, plaintiffs-appellants,
c. In any event, petitioners shall pay the respondent-spouses reasonable vs.
compensation for the occupancy of the respondent-spouses’ land for the TOMASA TENEZA and BENJAMIN BARBOSA, defendants-appellees.
period counted from the year petitioners occupied the subject area, up to the
commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the preceding This case is before us on appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
paragraph; Abra dismissing the complaint filed by appellants, upon motion of defendants-
appellate on the ground that the action was within the exclude (original)
jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court of Lagangilang, of the same
province.

The complaint alleges in substance that appellants were the owners of the
house, worth P200.00, built on and owned by them and situated in the said
municipality Lagangilang; that sometime in January 1957 appealed forcibly
demolished the house, claiming to be the owners thereof; that the materials of
the house, after it was dismantled, were placed in the custody of the barrio
lieutenant of the place; and that as a result of appellate's refusal to restore the
house or to deliver the material appellants the latter have suffered actual
damages the amount of P200.00, plus moral and consequential damages in the
amount of P600.00. The relief prayed for is that "the plaintiffs be declared the
owners of the house in question and/or the materials that resulted in (sic) its
dismantling; (and) that the defendants be orders pay the sum of P200.00, plus
P600.00 as damages, the costs."

The issue posed by the parties in this appeal is whether the action involves title
to real property, as appellants contend, and therefore is cognizable by the
Court of First Instance (Sec. 44, par. [b], R.A. 296, as amended), whether it
pertains to the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court, as stated in the
order appealed from, since there is no real property litigated, the house having
ceased to exist, and the amount of the demand does exceed P2,000.00 (Sec.
88, id.)1
The dismissal of the complaint was proper. A house is classified as immovable
property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Art. 415, par.
1, Civil Code). This classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house
may be situated on land belonging to a different owner. But once the house is
demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist as such and hence its character as
an immovable likewise ceases. It should be noted that the complaint here is for
recovery of damages. This is the only positive relief prayed for by appellants.
G.R. No. 181435
To be sure, they also asked that they be declared owners of the dismantled
house and/or of the materials. However, such declaration in no wise
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
constitutes the relief itself which if granted by final judgment could be
vs.
enforceable by execution, but is only incidental to the real cause of action to
ROSARIO L. NICOLAS, Respondent
recover damages.
DECISION
The order appealed from is affirmed. The appeal having been admitted
in  forma pauperis, no costs are adjudged.
SERENO, CJ.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the

Philippines to assail the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 and Resolution3 in CA-
GR. CV No. 81678. The CA affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Decision,4 which granted the Petition5 filed by respondent Rosario L. Nicolas for
the registration of title to a parcel of land located in Barangay (Brgy.) San
Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal.6 The appellate court agreed with the conclusion of the
RTC that respondent had convincingly established her ownership of the land
and was therefore entitled to judicial confirmation and registration of title. 7

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 22 March 1996, respondent filed a Petition before the RTC of San Mateo,
Rizal,8 seeking to register her title over Lot 2 of Survey Plan Psu-213331, a
parcel of land located in Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, with an area of
118,448 square meters.9 She asserted that she was entitled to confirmation and
registration of title, as she had been in "natural, open, public, adverse,
continuous, uninterrupted" possession of the land in the concept of an owner
since October 1964.10

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an Opposition 11 to the Petition. It

contended that (a) neither respondent nor her predecessors-ininterest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land since
12 June 1945;12 (b) the Tax Declarations attached to the Petition did not
constitute sufficient evidence of the acquisition or possession of the
property;13 (c) respondent failed to apply for registration of title within six
months from 16 February 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. (P.D.)
892;14 and (d) the land in question was part of the public domain and not
subject to private appropriation.15
After the conduct of proceedings to confirm compliance with jurisdictional
requisites,16 the RTC directed respondent to submit documents to establish
that (a) the property that was the subject of the application for registration of
title was not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the
Government; (b) there were no tenants on the property; and (c) the land was
not subject to any homestead, free patent, or grant of title from the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), the Bureau of Lands, or the Department of
Agrarian Reform.17 Respondent was also directed to begin the presentation of
her evidence.18
In line with this directive, the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) submitted a Report19 on the results of its verification of the
existing records on the subject property. The Report stated that the land
"appears to be [n]ot covered by any public land application nor embraced by
any administrative title."20 However, the entry with respect to whether the land
was within the alienable and disposable zone was left blank with a notation
that the area was "not projected due to [u]navailability of coordinates re[:] Tala
Estate Tie-Line."21
The LRA likewise submitted a Report 22 stating that it "was not in a position to
verify whether or not the parcel of land subject of registration is already
covered by land patent and is within the area classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain." 23 Hence, the LRA recommended that
the CENRO of Antipolo, Rizal, be ordered to submit a report on the status of
the land.24 This proposal was adopted by the RTC in an Order 25 dated 28
December 1998.
During trial, respondent presented three witnesses to prove her right to
register the property: Leonila Alfaro, her daughter and attorney-in-fact, who
testified that respondent had occupied the land since 1940 and had paid the
real estate taxes therefor since 1969; 26 Santiago Eulin, who was allegedly hired
by respondent to plant vegetables and fruit trees on the land and who acted as
its caretaker since 1942;27 and Roberto M. Valdez of the LRA, who identified the
original tracing cloth plan for the property.28
The following documents were likewise submitted to the trial court: Survey
Plan PSU-213331,29 a Surveyor's Certificate 30 and technical descriptions of the
property,31 which purportedly proved that the land had been duly surveyed by
the Land Management Sector; various Tax Declarations and receipts; 32 and a
Certification issued by the CENRO that the land applied for was not covered by
any public land application.33
Petitioner, on the other hand, decided to have the case submitted for
resolution without any further submission.34
THE RULING OF THE RTC
In a Decision dated 31 July 2002, the RTC granted the Petition and ordered the
issuance of a Decree of Registration in favor of respondent. 35 It declared that
she had acquired ownership of the land by way of open, continuous, public,
adverse, actual and bona fide possession in the concept of an owner since
1940.36
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. In the Appellant's Brief, 37 the
Republic argued that respondent had failed to clearly and convincingly
establish that she had actual, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required by Section 14(1) of
P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. 38 Petitioner further asserted that
there was no basis for the finding of the RTC that she had occupied the land
since 1940.39
Respondent failed to file an appellee's brief. 40 Consequently, the CA considered
the case submitted for resolution.41
THE RULING OF THE CA
On 23 August 2007, the CA dismissed petitioner's appeal. 42 According to the
appellate court, the evidence presented proved that respondent had occupied
the land since 1940. Even assuming that her possession of the property started
only when she had it privately surveyed in 1964, she had been its occupant for
more than 30 years. 43 As such, she was still entitled to registration of title under
Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529.
The CA further characterized the land as private property:
 The fact that the subject land is covered by a private survey
(PSU) (EXH. "J") way back in 1964, which survey was approved
on April 1965 by Director Nicanor Jorge of the then Bureau of
Lands, is a clear indication that it is already private in nature.
Moreover, applicant's evidence consisting of the DENR-CENRO
Certifications (Exhs. "O" and "P") that Lot 2 of PSY 213331 is
not covered by any public land application and that its
equivalent is Lot No, 10549 of the Montalban Cadastre have
substantial probative value which established (sic) that the
land is alienable and disposable and not covered by any land
grant from the government.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Decision. 44 The CA, however,
denied the motion in a Resolution 45 dated 22 January 2008, prompting
petitioner to elevate the case to this Court.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
In its Petition for Review, the Republic argues that (a) the decision of the CA
and the RTC to confirm the title of respondent to the land based on her
possession and occupation thereof was not supported by evidence; and (b) the
testimonial and documentary evidence she presented did not establish
possession of the property in the manner and period required by law, that is,
her possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Petitioner also
emphasizes that the lower courts gave undue importance to the Tax
Declarations and receipts presented, 46 as well as to the testimonies of
respondent's witnesses, notwithstanding the inconsistencies in their
statements.
(1) Whether the CA erroneously allowed the judicial
confirmation of respondent's title to the property under
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529; and
(2) Whether the CA erred in declaring that respondent is
likewise entitled to registration of title based on ownership by
acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529.
OUR RULING
We GRANT the Petition.
Applications for registration of title to land, both public and private, are
governed by Section 14 of P.D. 1529:
SECTION 14. Who May Apply. -The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under
the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall
file the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the
vendor a retro may file an application for the original
registration of the land, provided, however, that should the
period for redemption expire during the pendency of the
registration proceedings and ownership to the property
consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be
substituted for the applicant and may continue the
proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original
registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited
by the instrument creating the trust.
Each paragraph of Section 14 refers to a distinct type of application depending
on the applicable legal ground. Since each type is governed by its own set of
legal principles, the framework for analysis to be used in resolving an
application would vary depending on the paragraph invoked. 51 Hence, it is
important for the Court to first determine the exact legal ground used by an
applicant for registration.52
In this case, we note that the application filed by respondent before the RTC
did not state the exact legal basis of her request. At best, the pleading implied
that her claim was one for registration and confirmation of title based on
her possession and occupation of the property:
COMES NOW Petitioner Rosario L. Nicolas, of legal age,
widow, Pilipino [sic] with address at Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez
(formerly Montalban), Rizal Province, Philippines, by her
undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully
petitions to have the land hereinafter described below brought
under the operation of the Land Registration Act and to have
said land titled, registered and confirmed in her name and
further declares that:
xxxx
6. Petitioner acquired the subject parcel of land by way of
occupation and has been in natural, open, public, adverse,
contin[u]ous, uninterrupted and in the concept of an
owner/possessor thereof since October 1964 up to the
present.53 (Emphases supplied)
From the foregoing allegations, it appears that the claim of respondent is
anchored on either of the first two paragraphs of Section 14. However, it is
unclear whether she sought judicial confirmation and registration of her title
pursuant to Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529, or of the registration of her title on the
ground of acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of the same law.
Similarly, no specific provision in P.D. 1529 was identified by the RTC when it
granted the Petition.54 Its mention of the Civil Code, however, seems to
indicate an application of the principle of acquisitive prescription. The CA, for
its part, delineated the differences between the first two paragraphs of Section
14, but decided to apply both clauses. In its Decision, it ruled that respondent
is entitled to register her title under either paragraph:
From the evidence adduced, applicant-appellee has
convincingly established her registrable title to the subject
land, which is entitled to confirmation and registration by the
trial court. As testified by the daughter of applicant, her
mother commenced occupying the subject land since 1940
and up to the present which (sic) has been planted with fruit-
bearing trees and vegetables by their caretaker. Her testimony
was corroborated by Santiago Eulin, their caretaker since 1942
who took over after his father, the original caretaker. These
witnesses declared that they even stayed on the land in
question where the applicant has a hut. It was also established
that the applicant had the property surveyed in 1964 resulting
in the approval of Plan PS U 213 31 by the Bureau of Lands.
This qualifies applicant under Section 14, par. 1 of the Property
Registration Decree.
Even assuming that applicant's occupation and possession of
the subject land did not start on July 12, 1945 or earlier but
only in 1964 when she had it surveyed, still she can apply for
registration of title under Sec. 14, par. 2 of the Property
Registration Decree as she has been occupying the land
continuously for more than thirty (30) years from the time the
application was filed in 1996.55 (Emphases supplied)
Given these findings, the Court has examined the application for registration in
this case under the legal framework of both Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. 1529.
We find that respondent has failed to sufficiently establish the requisites of
both paragraphs; in particular, with respect to the classification and the
character of the land in question. Hence, we are constrained to reverse the CA
and the RTC Decisions allowing the registration of her title to the property.
Respondent has failed to prove that the property is alienable and disposable
agricultural land that may be registered under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 governs applications for registration of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. This paragraph operationalizes Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. 56 This provision grants
occupants of public land the right to judicial confirmation of their title. Based
on these two provisions and other related sections of C.A. 141, registration is
allowed provided the following requisites have been complied with:
1. The applicant is a Filipino citizen.57
2. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property since 12 June
1945.58
3. The prope1ty has been declared alienable and disposable as
of the filing of the application.59
4. If the area applied for does not exceed 12 hectares, the
application should be filed by 31 December 2020.60
As earlier stated, respondent failed to establish the third requisite, i.e., that the
property subject of the application is alienable and disposable agricultural
land.
The Court has emphasized in a long line of cases 61 that an applicant for
registration under Section 14(1) must prove that the subject property has been
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land by virtue of a positive
act of the Executive Department. In Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 62 we
declared:
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of
the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution,
but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the
Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and
the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing
laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.
xxx Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or
the President declares that the State no longer intends the
land to be used for public service or for the development of
national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
In this case, we note that both the RTC and the CA glossed over this
requirement. The RTC, for instance, only made a general conclusion as to the
classification and alienability of the property, but without any discussion of the
evidence presented:
From the evidence adduced, applicant-appellee has
convincingly established her registrable title to the subject
land which is entitled to confirmation and registration by the
trial court. x x x It was also established that the applicant had
the property surveyed in 1964 resulting in the approval of Plan
PSU-213331 by the Bureau of Lands. This qualifies applicant
under Sec. 14, par. 1 of the Property Registration Decree. 63
The CA, on the other hand, simply relied on the fact that the property had
been the subject of a private survey in 1964:
From the evidence adduced, the following facts have been
duly proved:
xxxx
That the land applied for is neither subject to any water,
oil/nor (sic) mineral rights, not within any government
reservation, naval or military, or mineral rights, within the
forest zone, and neither is it part of the inalienable or
undisposable land of the public domain nor covered by the
Code on Comprehensive Agrarian Reform or subject to any
subsisting Public Patent application;
xxxx
That the said parcel of land applied for is duly surveyed for
registration (Exh. "J"), classified as agricultural; that they
planted mangoes, buko, sometimes corn in the area through
their caretaker x x x.64
While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is generally limited to a
review of errors of law, the Court may conduct its own review of the evidence if
the findings of the lower courts are bereft of legal and factual bases. 65 In this
case, the conclusions of the RTC and the CA are not only contradicted by the
evidence on record; they are likewise contrary to law and jurisprudence. As a
result, the Court is constrained to set aside these pronouncements.
To prove that the property subject of an application for original registration is
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, applicants
must "identify a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes."66 To sufficiently establish this positive act, they
must submit (1) a certification from the CENRO or the Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Office (PENRO); and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records.67
Here, respondent presented the following pieces of evidence to establish her
claim that the land had been classified as agricultural and considered alienable
and disposable:
(1) A CENRO Report68 stating that the land was not covered by
any public land application or embraced by any administrative
title, but with a notation that that the alienability of the land
was "[n]ot projected due to [u]navailability of coordinates re:
Tala Estate Tieline'';
(2) A CENRO Certification69 that the lot "is not covered by any
kind of public land application";
(3) A Report70 from the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
declaring that it was "not in a position to verify whether or not
the parcel of land subject of registration is already covered by
land patent and is within the area classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain"; and
(4) The testimonies of Leonila Alfaro,71 her daughter, and
Santiago Eulin72 (the caretaker of the land) confirming that the
property is agricultural in nature.
It is evident from the foregoing enumeration that respondent not only
neglected to submit the required CENRO/PENRO certification and DENR
classification, but also presented evidence that completely failed to prove her
assertion.
First, the testimonies of Leonila and Santiago on the classification of the land
have very little evidentiary value. That they consider the property agricultural in
nature is irrelevant, as their statements are mere opinions bereft of any legal
significance.
Second, none of the documents submitted by respondent to the trial court
indicated that the subject property was agricultural or part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. At most, the CENRO Report and
Certification stated that the land was not covered by any kind of public land
application. This was far from an adequate proof of the classification of the
land. In fact, in Republic v Lualhati, 73 the Court rejected an attempt to prove
the alienability of public land using similar evidence:
Here, respondent failed to establish, by the required evidence,
that the land sought to be registered has been classified as
alienable or disposable land of the public domain. The records
of this case merely bear certifications from the DENR-CENRO,
Region IV, Antipolo City, stating that no public land
application or land patent covering the subject lots is pending
nor are the lots embraced by any administrative title. Said
CENRO certifications, however, do not even make any
pronouncement as to the alienable character of the lands in
question for they merely recognize the absence of any
pending land patent application, administrative title, or
government project being conducted thereon. But even
granting that they expressly declare that the subject lands
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, these certifications remain insufficient for purposes of
granting respondent's application for registration. As
constantly held by this Court, it is not enough for the CENRO
to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant
for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the
 approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. Unfortunately for respondent, the evidence
submitted clearly falls short of the requirements for original
registration in order to show the alienable character of the
lands subject herein.
Applying these standards to the instant case, we declare that the RTC did not
have sufficient basis for its finding that the property in question was alienable
and disposable.
The Court also finds that the ruling of the CA on the evidentiary value of the
private survey is untenable. The fact that the land has been privately surveyed
is not sufficient to prove its classification or alienable character. While the
conduct of a survey and the submission of the original tracing cloth plan are
mandatory requirements for applications for original registration of land under
P.D. 1529, they only serve to establish the true identity of the land and to
ensure that the property does not overlap with another one covered by a
previous registration.74 These documents do not, by themselves, prove
a1ienability and disposability of the property. In fact, in several cases, 75 the
Court has declared that even a survey plan with a notation that the property is
alienable cannot be considered as sufficient evidence of alienability. Here, the
survey plan and original tracing cloth plan submitted by respondent does not
even bear that notation. Consequently, it was grave error for the CA to
consider the mere conduct of a private survey as proof of the classification and
the alienability of the land.
Respondent has failed to prove that the land subject of the
application is part of the patrimonial property of the State
that may be acquired by prescription under Section 14(2)
of P.D. 1529.
As previously noted, the CA also allowed the registration of the property under
Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 based on the following findings: (1) the property is
"private in nature" as shown by the fact that it is "covered by a private
survey";76 (2) respondent had occupied the land continuously for more than 30
years from the time of the filing of the application in 1996; 77 and (3) the land is
not covered by any public land application based on the DENR-CENRO
Certifications submitted by respondent.78
We do not agree. The Court fields no sufficient basis to allow the registration
of the property under Section 14(2).
By express provision of the law, only private lands that have been acquired by
prescription under existing laws may be the subject of applications for
registration under Section 14(2). The starting point of the Court's evaluation
must, therefore, be whether the property involved falls within the scope of the
paragraph.
Under the Civil Code, all things within human commerce are generally
susceptible of prescription.79 Properties of the public dominion, or those
owned by the State, are expressly excluded by law from this general
rule,80 unless they are proven to be patrimonial in character. As the Court
explained in Republic of the Philippines v. Tan:
Only private property can be acquired by prescription.
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of
man.1âwphi1 It cannot be the object of prescription because
prescription does not run against the State in its sovereign
capac.ty. However, when property of public dominion is no
longer intended for public use or for public service, it becomes
part of the patrimonial property of the State. When this
happens, the property is withdrawn from public dominion and
becomes property of private ownership, albeit still owned by
the State. The property is now brought within the commerce
of man and becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal
possession and prescription.81 (Emphasis supplied)
To establish that the land subject of the application has been converted into
patrimonial property of the State, an applicant must prove the following:
l. The subject property has been classified as agricultural
land.82
2. The property has been declared alienable and disposable. 83
3. There is an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial, or is no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth. 84
It must be emphasized that without the concurrence of these three conditions,
the land remains part of public dominion and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription.85

Here, the records show that respondent has failed to allege or prove that the
subject land belongs to the patrimonial property of the State.1âwphi1 As
earlier discussed, the evidence she has presented does not even show that the
property is alienable and disposable agricultural land. She has also failed to
G.R. No. 178902               April 21, 2010
cite any government act or declaration converting the land into patrimonial
property of the State.
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, Petitioners,
vs.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the DENR-CENRO Certifications submitted by
CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL
respondent are not enough; they cannot substitute for the three conditions
and PILAR MALCAMPO, Respondents.
required by law as proof that the land may be the subject of prescription under
the Civil Code. For the same reason, the mere conduct of a private survey of a
DECISION
property - even with the approval of the Bureau of Lands - does not convert
the lot into private land or patrimonial property of the State. Clearly, the
ABAD, J.:
appellate court erred when it relied on the survey to justify its conclusion that
the land is private in nature.
This case is about a husband’s sale of conjugal real property, employing a
challenged affidavit of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim valid
Considering the absence of sufficient evidence that the subject land is a
consent, loss of right to declare nullity of sale, and prescription.
patrimonial property of the State, we must consider it part of public dominion
and thus immune from acquisitive prescription.
The Facts and the Case
As a final note, the Court must point out that proof of the classification,
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga
alienability and disposability of the subject property is of particular significance
City. On October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano)
in applications for the registration of land. Given the general rule that public
under a deed of absolute sale. 1 But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the
lands may not be alienated,86 it is the burden of applicants to prove that the
registered title transferred to his name.
land they seek to register falls within the classifications enumerated in Section
14 of P.D. 1529; in particular, the specific paragraph they invoke as basis for
Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel
registration.87 Absent that proot: no length of possession or occupation would
and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the office
vest any right of ownership over the property, 88 and registration under P.D.
of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale.
1529 cannot be sanctioned by this Court.
They later signed an agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared 2 dated April
29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
months.
dated 23 August 2007 and Resolution dated 22 January 2008
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's application for land registration
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment
is DENIED for lack of merit.
of ₱60,000.00 for the transfer of the lot’s title to him. And, within six months,
Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the
consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon
Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take
possession of the lot and pay him an additional ₱140,000.00 or ₱160,000.00,
depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing
on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes
spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and
payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on
the other requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see
Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of
consent.3 As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized
Rosario’s affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a
deed of absolute sale 4 in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the
additional ₱140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued in
the name of the spouses 5 who immediately constructed a building on the lot.
On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who
died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely,
respondents Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal,
together with Tarciano’s sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her son, John
Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Civil Case 4707. The Rocas claimed that
the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her
consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They
thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of
the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano. 6
The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who
testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence in
Paco, Manila, on September 15, 1988. He admitted, however, that he notarized
the document in Zamboanga City four months later on January 11, 1989. 7 All
the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was
personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year
prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already
lapsed.
Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts at the
trial. Comparing Rosario’s standard signature on the affidavit with those on
various documents she signed, the Rocas’ expert testified that the signatures
were not written by the same person. Making the same comparison, the
spouses’ expert concluded that they were. 8
On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It ruled
that the action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas for
annulling the sale, forgery or fraud, already prescribed under Article 1391 of
the Civil Code four years after its discovery. In this case, the Rocas may be
deemed to have notice of the fraud from the date the deed of sale was
registered with the Registry of Deeds and the new title was issued. Here, the
Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost nine years after the title was issued to
the Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989.9
Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the
fraud. Mere variance in the signatures of Rosario was not conclusive proof of
forgery.10 The RTC ruled that, although the Rocas presented a handwriting
expert, the trial court could not be bound by his opinion since the opposing
expert witness contradicted the same. Atty. Plagata’s testimony remained
technically unrebutted.11
Finally, the RTC noted that Atty. Plagata’s defective notarization of the affidavit
of consent did not invalidate the sale. The law does not require spousal
consent to be on the deed of sale to be valid. Neither does the irregularity
vitiate Rosario’s consent. She personally signed the affidavit in the presence of
Atty. Plagata.12
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA found
sufficient evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagata’s
testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat said
differently. Also, upon comparing the questioned signature with the specimen
signatures, the CA noted significant variance between them. That Tarciano and
Rosario had been living separately for 30 years since 1958 also reinforced the
conclusion that her signature had been forged.
Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their
property relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for
annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by
the wife during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction.
Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within
10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale.
Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano
was merely voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to
reimbursement of what they paid him plus legal interest computed from the
filing of the complaint until actual payment. Since the Fuentes spouses were
also builders in good faith, they were entitled under Article 448 of the Civil
Code to payment of the value of the improvements they introduced on the lot.
The CA did not award damages in favor of the Rocas and deleted the award of
attorney’s fees to the Fuentes spouses. 13
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court by
petition for review.14
The Issues Presented
The case presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her
husband Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was
forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to
the spouses already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could
bring the action to annul that sale.
The Court’s Rulings
First. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the
document of consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the
fact that she gave her consent to her husband’s sale of the conjugal land
would render the other issues merely academic.
The CA found that Rosario’s signature had been forged. The CA observed a
marked difference between her signature on the affidavit of consent 15 and her
specimen signatures.16 The CA gave no weight to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that
he saw Rosario sign the document in Manila on September 15, 1988 since this
clashed with his declaration in the jurat that Rosario signed the affidavit in
Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989.
The Court agrees with the CA’s observation that Rosario’s signature strokes on
the affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures,
on the other hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way
the letters "R" and "s" were written is also remarkably different. The variance is
obvious even to the untrained eye.
Significantly, Rosario’s specimen signatures were made at about the time that
she signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable
standards for comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that
Rosario suffered from any illness or disease that accounted for the variance in
her signature when she signed the affidavit of consent. Notably, Rosario had
been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958. And she resided
so far away in Manila. It would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just
forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her consent to
the sale or demand a stiff price for it.
What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of
consent. That jurat declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it
in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she
supposedly signed it about four months earlier at her residence in Paco, Manila
on September 15, 1988. While a defective notarization will merely strip the
document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument, that
falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms
such document as proof of Rosario’s consent to the sale of the land. That the
Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s
consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.
Second. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to
this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario
got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes
spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect
on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of
conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165
made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article
16617 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without his
wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s consent, the sale is
not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the
sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale.
Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage,
only the value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold. Thus:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or
any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise
this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand
the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book
I of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. 18 Further,
the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing
conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. 19 Thus:
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the
effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)
Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on
January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the
Family Code.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does
not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her
husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other
spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be
void. Article 124 thus provides:
Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. x x x
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent
contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies
to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, 20 as in the case
of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent. A
void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects.
It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription. 21
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to
set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its
inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under
it.22 This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.
Thus:
Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a
contract does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold
without their mother’s (his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not
erode the right to bring such an action.
Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the transaction
as the CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an action for
annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent during the
marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that
the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11,
1989 sale. It did not yet prescribe.
The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC nullified the sale to them
based on fraud and that, therefore, the applicable prescriptive period should
be that which applies to fraudulent transactions, namely, four years from its
discovery. Since notice of the sale may be deemed given to the Rocas when it
was registered with the Registry of Deeds in 1989, their right of action already
prescribed in 1993.
But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this case, it would be the Fuentes
spouses in that they appeared to have agreed to buy the property upon an
honest belief that Rosario’s written consent to the sale was genuine. They had
four years then from the time they learned that her signature had been forged
within which to file an action to annul the sale and get back their money plus
damages. They never exercised the right.
If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document of consent
upon a false representation that the property would go to their children, not to
strangers, and it turned out that this was not the case, then she would have
four years from the time she discovered the fraud within which to file an action
to declare the sale void. But that is not the case here. Rosario was not a victim
of fraud or misrepresentation. Her consent was simply not obtained at all. She
lost nothing since the sale without her written consent was void. Ultimately, the
Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent of
their mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent.
Third. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was
not obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her
husband’s sale of conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in 1990, the year after
the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the sale declared void is forever
lost?
The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning.
Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite
that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to
their heirs, namely, the Rocas. 23 As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right,
under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment
and disposal.1avvphi1
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among
other things, to recover from Tarciano’s heirs, the Rocas, the ₱200,000.00 that
they paid him, with legal interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.
Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the
land and building improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the parties
mutually entrusted with closing and documenting the transaction, represented
that he got Rosario’s signature on the affidavit of consent. The Fuentes
spouses had no reason to believe that the lawyer had violated his commission
and his oath. They had no way of knowing that Rosario did not come to
Zamboanga to give her consent. There is no evidence that they had a
premonition that the requirement of consent presented some difficulty.
Indeed, they willingly made a 30 percent down payment on the selling price
months earlier on the assurance that it was forthcoming.
Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the Fuentes
spouses that everything was already in order when Tarciano executed a deed
of absolute sale in their favor on January 11, 1989. In fact, they paid the
balance due him. And, acting on the documents submitted to it, the Register of
Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new title in the names of the Fuentes
spouses. It was only after all these had passed that the spouses entered the
property and built on it. He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article
526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to
pay for their stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final
judgment against them.24 What is more, they are entitled under Article 448 to
indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the property with a right
of retention until the reimbursement is made. Thus:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546
and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of
the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil
Code,25 of indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements
or paying the increase in value which the property may have acquired by
reason of such improvements.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH
MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531
dated February 27, 2007 as follows:
1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T. Roca executed in
favor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, as well as the
Transfer Certificate of Title T-90,981 that the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga
City issued in the names of the latter spouses pursuant to that deed of sale are
DECLARED void;

2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate Transfer

Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married to Rosario
Gabriel;

3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal,

and Pilar Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner spouses Manuel and
Leticia Fuentes the ₱200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T. Roca, with legal
interest from January 11, 1989 until fully paid, chargeable against his estate;

4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal,

and Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to indemnify
petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for
introducing useful improvements on the subject land or pay the increase in
value which it may have acquired by reason of those improvements, with the
spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is
made; and

5. The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is DIRECTED to
receive evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to which petitioner
spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes are entitled.