De Veritate

Thomas Aquinas: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate: English https://isidore.co/aquinas/QDdeVer1.
htm
Question One: Truth

Primo quid est veritas. 1. What is truth?
Secundo utrum veritas principalius inveniatur in 2. Is truth found principally in the intellect
intellectu quam in rebus. or in things?
Tertio utrum veritas sit tantum in intellectu 3. Is truth only in the intellect joining and
componente et dividente. separating?
Quarto utrum sit tantum una veritas qua omnia 4. Is there only one truth by which all
sunt vera. things are true?
Quinto utrum aliqua alia veritas praeter primam 5. Is some truth besides the First Truth
veritatem sit aeterna. eternal?
Sexto an veritas creata sit immutabilis. 6. Is created truth immutable?
Septimo utrum veritas in divinis dicatur 7. Is truth as applied to God predicated
essentialiter vel personaliter. personally or essentially?
Octavo utrum omnis veritas sit a veritate prima. 8. Is every other truth from the First Truth?
Nono utrum veritas sit in sensu. 9. Is truth in sense?
Decimo utrum res aliqua sit falsa. 10. Is there any false thing?
Undecimo utrum falsitas sit in sensibus. 11. Is falsity in sense?
Duodecimo utrum falsitas sit in intellectu. 12. Is falsity in the intellect?
ARTICLE I
The problem under discussion is truth,

and in the first article we ask:
What is truth?
[Cf. S.T., I. 16, aa. 1, 3; I Sent., 19, 5, 1; C.G., I, 60; I Perih., lect. 3, nn. 3-10; VI
Metaph., lect. 4, nn. 1230-44.]
Quaestio est de veritate. Et primo Difficulties

quaeritur quid est veritas?
Videtur autem quod verum sit omnino It seems that the true is exactly the same as
idem quod ens. being, for
Augustinus in Lib. Solil. dicit, quod 1. Augustine says: “The true is that which
verum est id quod est. Sed id quod est, is.” But that which is, is simply being. The
nihil est nisi ens. Ergo verum significat true, therefore, means exactly the same as
omnino idem quod ens. being.
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Thomas Aquinas: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate: English https://isidore.co/aquinas/QDdeVer1.htm
Respondens dicebat quod sunt idem 2. It was said in reply that the true and
secundum supposita, sed ratione being are the same materially but differ
differunt. Contra, ratio cuiuslibet rei est formally.—On the contrary the nature of a
id quod significatur per suam thing is signified by its definition; and the
definitionem. Sed id quod est, assignatur definition of the true, according to
ab Augustino, ut definitio veri, Augustine, is ”that which is.” He rejects all
quibusdam aliis definitionibus reprobatis. other definitions. Now, since the true and
Cum ergo secundum id quod est, being are materially the same, it seems that
conveniant verum et ens, videtur quod they are also formally the same.
sint idem ratione.
Praeterea, quaecumque differunt ratione, 3. Things which differ conceptually are so

ita se habent quod unum illorum potest related to each other that one of them can
intelligi sine altero: unde Boetius in libro be understood without the other. For this
de hebdomadibus dicit, quod potest reason, Boethius says that the existence of
intelligi Deus esse, si separetur per God can be understood if for a moment we
intellectum paulisper bonitas eius. Ens mentally separate His goodness from His
autem nullo modo potest intelligi si existence. Being, however can in no way
separetur verum: quia per hoc intelligitur be understood apart from the true, for being
quod verum est. Ergo verum et ens non is known only in so far as it is true.
differunt ratione. Therefore, the true and being do not differ
conceptually.
Praeterea, si verum non est idem quod 4. If the true is not the same as being, it
ens, oportet quod sit entis dispositio. Sed must be a state of being. But it cannot be a
non potest esse entis dispositio. Non state of being. It is not a state that entirely
enim est dispositio totaliter corrumpens, corrupts—otherwise, this would follow: “It
alias sequeretur: est verum, ergo est non is true. Therefore, it is non-being”—as it
ens; sicut sequitur: est homo mortuus, follows when we say: “This man is dead.
ergo non est homo. Therefore, this is not a man.”
Similiter non est dispositio diminuens, Similarly, the true is not a state that limits.
alias non sequeretur: est verum, ergo est; If it were, one could not say: “It is true.
sicut non sequitur: est albus dentes, ergo Therefore it is.” For one cannot say that a
est albus. Similiter non est dispositio thing is white simply because it has white
contrahens, vel specificans: quia sic non teeth. Finally, the true is not a state which
converteretur cum ente. Ergo verum et contracts or specifies being, for it is
ens omnino sunt idem. convertible with being. It follows,
therefore, that the true and being are
entirely the same.
Praeterea, illa quorum est una dispositio, 5. Things in the same state are the same.
sunt eadem. Sed veri et entis est eadem But the true and being are in the same state.
dispositio. Ergo sunt eadem. Dicitur Therefore, they are the same. For Aristotle
enim in II Metaphysic.: dispositio rei in writes: “The state of a thing in its act of
esse est sicut sua dispositio in veritate. existence is the same as its state in truth.”
Ergo verum et ens sunt omnino idem. Therefore, the true and being are entirely
the same.
Praeterea, quaecumque non sunt idem, 6. Thing not the same differ in some
aliquo modo differunt. Sed verum et ens respect. But the true and being differ in no
nullo modo differunt: quia non differunt respect. They do not differ essentially, for
per essentiam, cum omne ens per every being is true by its very essence. And
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essentiam suam sit verum; nec differunt they do not differ in any other ways, for
per aliquas differentias, quia oporteret they must belong to some common genus.
quod in aliquo communi genere Therefore, they are entirely the same.
convenirent. Ergo sunt omnino idem.
Item, si non sunt omnino idem, oportet 7. If they were not entirely the same, the
quod verum aliquid super ens addat. Sed true would add something to being. But the
nihil addit verum super ens, cum sit true adds nothing to being, even though it
etiam in plus quam ens: quod patet per has greater extension than being. This is
philosophum, IV Metaphys., ubi dicit borne out by the statement of the
quod: verum definientes dicimus quod Philosopher that we define the true as:
dicimus esse quod est; aut non esse quod “That which affirms the existence of what
non est; et sic verum includit ens et non is, and denies the existence of what is not.”
ens. Ergo verum non addit aliquid super Consequently, the true includes both being
ens; et sic videtur omnino idem esse and non-being; since it does not add
verum quod ens. anything to being, it seems to be entirely
the same as being.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Nugatio est eiusdem inutilis repetitio. Si 1. Useless repetition of the same thing is
ergo verum esset idem quod ens, esset meaningless; so, if the true were the same
nugatio, dum dicitur ens verum; quod as being, it would be meaningless to say:
falsum est. Ergo non sunt idem. “Being is true.” This, however, is hardly
correct. Therefore, they are not the same.
Item, ens et bonum convertuntur. Sed 2. Being and the good are convertible. The
verum non convertitur cum bono; true and the good, however, are not
aliquod est enim verum quod non est interchangeable, for some things, such as
bonum, sicut aliquem fornicari. Ergo nec fornication, are true but not good. The true,
verum cum ente convertitur, et ita non therefore, and being are not
sunt idem. interchangeable. And so they are not the
same.
Praeterea, secundum Boetium in libro de 3. In all creatures, as Boethius has pointed

hebdomadibus: in omnibus creaturis out, “to be is other than that which is.”
diversum est esse et quod est. Sed verum Now, the true signifies the existence of
significat esse rei. Ergo verum est things. Consequently, in creatures it is
diversum a quod est in creatis. Sed quod different from that which is. But that which
est, est idem quod ens. Ergo verum in is, is the same as being. Therefore, in
creaturis est diversum ab ente. creatures the true is different from being.
Praeterea, quaecumque se habent ut prius 4. Things related as before and after must
et posterius, oportet esse diversa. Sed differ. But the true and being are related in
verum et ens modo praedicto se habent, the aforesaid manner; for, as is said in The
quia, ut in libro de causis dicitur, prima Causes: “The first of all created things is
rerum creatarum est esse; et the act of existence.” In a study of this
Commentator in eodem libro dicit quod work, a commentator writes as follows:
omnia alia dicuntur per informationem “Everything else is predicated as a
de ente, et sic ente posteriora sunt. Ergo specification of being.” Consequently,
verum et ens sunt diversa. everything else comes after being.
Therefore, the true and being are not the
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same.
Praeterea, quae communiter dicuntur de 5. What are predicated of a cause and of

causa et causatis, magis sunt unum in the effects of the cause are more united in
causa quam in causatis, et praecipue in the cause than in its effects—and more so
Deo quam in creaturis. Sed in Deo ista in God than in creatures. But in God four
quatuor, ens, unum, verum et bonum, hoc predicates—being, the one, the true, and
modo appropriantur: ut ens ad essentiam the good—are appropriated as follows:
pertineat, unum ad personam patris, being, to the essence; the one, to the
verum ad personam filii, bonum ad Father; the true, to the Son; and the good,
personam spiritus sancti. Personae autem to the Holy Spirit. Since the divine Persons
divinae non solum ratione, sed etiam re are really and not merely conceptually
distinguuntur; unde de invicem non distinct, these notions cannot be predicated
praedicantur. Ergo multo fortius in of each other; if really distinct when
creaturis praedicta quatuor debent verified of the divine Persons, the four
amplius quam ratione differre. notions in question are much more so when
verified of creatures.
Respondeo. REPLY
Dicendum, quod sicut in When investigating the nature of anything,

demonstrabilibus oportet fieri one should make the same kind of analysis
reductionem in aliqua principia per se as he makes when he reduces a proposition
intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est to certain self-evident principles.
unumquodque; alias utrobique in Otherwise, both types of knowledge will
infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino become involved in an infinite regress, and
scientia et cognitio rerum. science and our knowledge of things will
perish.
Illud autem quod primo intellectus Now, as Avicenna says, that which the
concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod intellect first conceives as, in a way, the
conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens, ut most evident, and to which it reduces all its
Avicenna dicit in principio suae concepts, is being. Consequently, all the
metaphysicae. Unde oportet quod omnes other conceptions of the intellect are had by
aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur additions to being. But nothing can be
ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non possunt added to being as though it were something
addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum not included in being—in the way that a
quo differentia additur generi, vel difference is added to a genus or an
accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura accident to a subject—for every reality is
est essentialiter ens; unde probat etiam essentially a being. The Philosopher has
philosophus in III Metaphys., quod ens shown this by proving that being cannot be
non potest esse genus, sed secundum hoc a genus. Yet, in this sense, some predicates
aliqua dicuntur addere super ens, in may be said to add to being inasmuch as
quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis they express a mode of being not expressed
qui nomine entis non exprimitur. Quod by the term being. This happens in two
dupliciter contingit: ways.
uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis First, the mode expressed is a certain
specialis modus entis. Sunt enim diversi special manner of being; for there are
gradus entitatis, secundum quos different grades of being according to
accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et iuxta which we speak when we speak of different
hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum levels of existence, and according to these
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genera. Substantia enim non addit super grades different things are classified.
ens aliquam differentiam, quae designet Consequently, substance does not add a
aliquam naturam superadditam enti, sed difference to being by signifying some
nomine substantiae exprimitur specialis reality added to it, but substance simply
quidam modus essendi, scilicet per se expresses a special manner of existing,
ens; et ita est in aliis generibus. namely, as a being in itself. The same is
true of the other classes of existents.
Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit Second. some are said to add to being
modus generalis consequens omne ens; because the mode they express is one that
et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest: uno is common, and consequent upon every
modo secundum quod consequitur being. This mode can be taken in two
unumquodque ens in se; alio modo ways: first, in so far as it follows upon
secundum quod consequitur unum ens in every being considered absolutely; second,
ordine ad aliud. Si primo modo, hoc est in so far as it follows upon every being
dupliciter quia vel exprimitur in ente considered in relation to another. In the
aliquid affirmative vel negative. Non first, the term is used in two ways, because
autem invenitur aliquid affirmative it expresses something in the being either
dictum absolute quod possit accipi in affirmatively or negatively. We can,
omni ente, nisi essentia eius, secundum however, find nothing that can be
quam esse dicitur; et sic imponitur hoc predicated of every being affirmatively
nomen res, quod in hoc differt ab ente, and, at the same time, absolutely, with the
secundum Avicennam in principio exception of its essence by which the being
Metaphys., quod ens sumitur ab actu is said to be. To express this, the term thing
essendi, sed nomen rei exprimit is used; for, according to Avicenna, ”thing
quidditatem vel essentiam entis. Negatio differs from being because being gets its
autem consequens omne ens absolute, est name from to-be, but thing expresses the
indivisio; et hanc exprimit hoc nomen quiddity or essence of the being.” There is,
unum: nihil aliud enim est unum quam however, a negation consequent upon every
ens indivisum. being considered absolutely: its
undividedness, and this is expressed by
one. For the one is simply undivided being.
Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo If the mode of being is taken in the second
modo, scilicet secundum ordinem unius way—according to the relation of one
ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter. being to another—we find a twofold use.
Uno modo secundum divisionem unius The first is based on the distinction of one
ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen being from another, and this distinctness is
aliquid: dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud expressed by the word something, which
quid; unde sicut ens dicitur unum, in implies, as it were, some other thing. For,
quantum est indivisum in se, ita dicitur just as a being is said to be one in so far as
aliquid, in quantum est ab aliis divisum. it is without division in itself, so it is said to
Alio modo secundum convenientiam be something in so far as it is divided from
unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non others. The second division is based on the
potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod correspondence one being has with another.
natum sit convenire cum omni ente: hoc This is possible only if there is something
autem est anima, quae quodammodo est which is such that it agrees with every
omnia, ut dicitur in III de anima. In being. Such a being is the soul, which, as is
anima autem est vis cognitiva et said in The Soul, “in some way is all
appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad things.” The soul, however, has both
appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum, ut knowing and appetitive powers. Good
in principio Ethic. dicitur quod bonum expresses the correspondence of being to
est quod omnia appetunt. Convenientiam the appetitive power, for, and so we note in
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vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc the Ethics, the good is “that which all
nomen verum. Omnis autem cognitio desire.” True expresses the correspondence
perficitur per assimilationem of being to the knowing power, for all
cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod knowing is produced by an assimilation of
assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis: the knower to the thing known, so that
sicut visus per hoc quod disponitur assimilation is said to be the cause of
secundum speciem coloris, cognoscit knowledge. Similarly, the sense of sight
colorem. knows a color by being informed with a
species of the color.
Prima ergo comparatio entis ad The first reference of being to the intellect,
intellectum est ut ens intellectui therefore, consists in its agreement with the
concordet: quae quidem concordia intellect. This agreement is called “the
adaequatio intellectus et rei dicitur; et in conformity of thing and intellect.” In this
hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc conformity is fulfilled the formal
est ergo quod addit verum super ens, constituent of the true, and this is what the
scilicet conformitatem, sive true adds to being, namely, the conformity
adaequationem rei et intellectus; ad quam or equation of thing and intellect. As we
conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur said, the knowledge of a thing is a
cognitio rei. Sic ergo entitas rei praecedit consequence of this conformity; therefore,
rationem veritatis, sed cognitio est it is an effect of truth, even though the fact
quidam veritatis effectus. that the thing is a being is prior to its truth.
Secundum hoc ergo veritas sive verum Consequently, truth or the true has been
tripliciter invenitur diffiniri. Uno modo defined in three ways. First of all, it is
secundum illud quod praecedit rationem defined according to that which precedes
veritatis, et in quo verum fundatur; et sic truth and is the basis of truth. This is why
Augustinus definit in Lib. Solil.: verum Augustine writes: “The true is that which
est id quod est; et Avicenna in sua is”; and Avicenna: “The truth of each thing
Metaphysic.: veritas cuiusque rei est is a property of the act of being which has
proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei; been established for it.” Still others say:
et quidam sic: verum est indivisio esse, “The true is the undividedness of the act of
et quod est. Alio modo definitur existence from that which is.” Truth is also
secundum id in quo formaliter ratio veri defined in another way—according to that
perficitur; et sic dicit Isaac quod veritas in which its intelligible determination is
est adaequatio rei et intellectus; et formally completed. Thus, Isaac writes:
Anselmus in Lib. de veritate: veritas est “Truth is the conformity of thing and
rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis. intellect”; and Anselm: “Truth is a rectitude
Rectitudo enim ista secundum perceptible only by the mind.” This
adaequationem quamdam dicitur, et rectitude, of course, is said to be based on
philosophus dicit in IV Metaphysic., some conformity. The Philosopher says
quod definientes verum dicimus cum that in defining truth we say that truth is
dicitur esse quod est, aut non esse quod had when one affirms that “to be which is,
non est. and that not to be which is not.”
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Tertio modo definitur verum, secundum The third way of defining truth is according
effectum consequentem; et sic dicit to the effect following upon it. Thus, Hilary
Hilarius, quod verum est declarativum et says that the true is that which manifests
manifestativum esse; et Augustinus in and proclaims existence. And Augustine
Lib. de vera Relig.: veritas est qua says: “Truth is that by which that which is,
ostenditur id quod est; et in eodem libro: is shown”; and also: “Truth is that
veritas est secundum quam de according to which we, judge about inferior
inferioribus iudicamus. things.”
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod 1. That definition of Augustine is given for

definitio illa Augustini datur de veritate the true as it has its foundation in reality
secundum quod habet fundamentum in and not as its formal nature is given
re, et non secundum id quod ratio veri complete expression by conformity of thing
completur in adaequatione rei ad and intellect. An alternative answer would
intellectum. Vel dicendum, quod cum be that in the statement, “The true is that
dicitur, verum est id quod est, li est non which is,” the word is is not here
accipitur ibi secundum quod significat understood as referring to the act of
actum essendi, sed secundum quod est existing, but rather as the mark of the
nota intellectus componentis, prout intellectual act of judging, signifying, that
scilicet affirmationem propositionis is, the affirmation of a proposition. The
significat, ut sit sensus: verum est id meaning would then be this: “The true is
quod est, id est cum dicitur esse de that which is—it is had when the existence
aliquo quod est, ut sic in idem redeat of what is, is affirmed.” If this is its
definitio Augustini cum definitione meaning, then Augustine’s definition
philosophi supra inducta. agrees with that of the Philosopher
mentioned above.
Ad secundum patet solutio ex dictis. 2. The answer is clear from what has been
said.
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Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliquid 3. “Something can be understood without

intelligi sine altero, potest accipi another” can be taken in two ways. It can
dupliciter. Uno modo quod intelligatur mean that something can be known while
aliquid, altero non intellecto: et sic, ea another remains unknown. Taken in this
quae ratione differunt, ita se habent, quod way, it is true that things which differ
unum sine altero intelligi potest. Alio conceptually are such that one can be
modo potest accipi aliquid intelligi sine understood without the other. But there is
altero, quod intelligitur eo non existente: another way that a thing can be understood
et sic ens non potest intelligi sine vero, without another: when it is known even
quia ens non potest intelligi sine hoc though the other does not exist. Taken in
quod concordet vel adaequetur this sense, being cannot be known without
intellectui. Sed non tamen oportet ut the true, for it cannot be known unless it
quicumque intelligit rationem entis agrees with or conforms to intellect. It is
intelligat veri rationem, sicut nec not necessary, however, that everyone who
quicumque intelligit ens, intelligit understands the formal notion of being
intellectum agentem; et tamen sine should also understand the formal notion of
intellectu agente nihil intelligi potest. the true—just as not everyone who
understands being understands the agent
intellect, even though nothing can be
known without the agent intellect.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod verum est 4. The true is a state of being even though
dispositio entis non quasi addens aliquam it does not add any reality to being or
naturam, nec quasi exprimens aliquem express any special mode of existence. It is
specialem modum entis, sed aliquid quod rather something that is generally found in
generaliter invenitur in omni ente, quod every being, although it is not expressed by
tamen nomine entis non exprimitur; unde the word being. Consequently, it is not a
non oportet quod sit dispositio vel state that corrupts, limits, or contracts.
corrumpens vel diminuens vel in partem
contrahens.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod dispositio 5. In this objection, condition should not be

non accipitur ibi secundum quod est in understood as belonging to the genus of
genere qualitatis, sed secundum quod quality. It implies, rather, a certain order;
importat quemdam ordinem; cum enim for those which are the cause of the
illa quae sunt causa aliorum essendi sint existence of other things are themselves
maxime entia, et illa quae sunt causa beings most completely, and those which
veritatis sint maxime vera; concludit are the cause of the truth of other things are
philosophus, quod idem est ordo alicui themselves true most completely. It is for
rei in esse et veritate; ita, scilicet, quod this reason that the Philosopher concludes
ubi invenitur quod est maxime ens, est that the rank of a thing in its existence
maxime verum. Unde nec hoc ideo est corresponds to its rank in truth, so that
quia ens et verum ratione sunt idem, sed when one finds that which is most fully
quia secundum hoc quod aliquid habet de being, he finds there also that which is
entitate, secundum hoc est natum most fully true. But this does not mean that
adaequari intellectui; et sic ratio veri being and the true are the same in concept.
sequitur rationem entis. It means simply that in the degree in which
a thing has being, in that degree it is
capable of being proportioned to intellect.
Consequently, the true is dependent upon
the formal character of being.
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Ad sextum dicendum, quod verum et ens 6. There is a conceptual difference between

differunt ratione per hoc quod aliquid est the true and being since there is something
in ratione veri quod non est in ratione in the notion of the true that is not in the
entis; non autem ita quod aliquid sit in concept of the existing—not in such a way,
ratione entis quod non sit in ratione veri; however, that there is something in the
unde nec per essentiam differunt, nec concept of being which is not in the
differentiis oppositis ab invicem concept of the true. They do not differ
distinguuntur. essentially nor are they distinguished from
one another by opposing differences.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod verum non 7. The true does not have a wider extension
est in plus quam ens; ens enim aliquo than being. Being is, in some way,
modo acceptum dicitur de non ente, predicated of non-being in so far as non-
secundum quod non ens est apprehensum being is apprehended by the intellect. For,
ab intellectu; unde in IV Metaphys., dicit as the Philosopher says, the negation or the
philosophus, quod negatio vel privatio privation of being may, in a sense, be
entis uno modo dicitur ens; unde called being. Avicenna supports this by
Avicenna etiam dicit in principio suae pointing out that one can form propositions
metaphysicae, quod non potest formari only of beings, for that about which a
enuntiatio nisi de ente, quia oportet illud proposition is formed must be apprehended
de quo propositio formatur, esse by the intellect. Consequently, it is clear
apprehensum ab intellectu; ex quo patet that everything true is being in some way.
quod omne verum est aliquo modo ens.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties
Ad primum vero eorum, quae contra 1. The reason why it is not tautological to
obiiciuntur, dicendum, quod ideo non est call a being true is that something is
nugatio cum dicitur ens verum, quia expressed by the word true that is not
aliquid exprimitur nomine veri quod non expressed by the word being, and not that
exprimitur nomine entis; non propter hoc the two differ in reality.
quod re differant.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis 2. Although fornication is evil, it possesses

istum fornicari sit malum, tamen some being and can conform to intellect.
secundum quod aliquid habet de entitate, Accordingly, the formal character of the
natum est hoc conformari intellectui, et true is found here. So it is clear that true is
secundum hoc consequitur ibi ratio veri; coextensive with being.
et ita patet quod nec verum excedit nec
exceditur ab ente.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum dicitur: 3. In the statement, “To be is other than that
diversum est esse, et quod est, which is,” the act of being is distinguished
distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui ille from that to which that act belongs. But the
actus convenit. Nomen autem entis ab name of being is taken from the act of
actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui existence, not from that whose act it is.
convenit actus essendi, et ideo ratio non Hence, the argument does not follow.
sequitur.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod secundum 4. The true comes after being in this
hoc verum est posterius ente, quod ratio respect, that the notion of the true differs
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veri differt ab entis ratione modo from that of being in the manner we have
praedicto. described.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod ratio illa 5. This argument has three flaws. First,
deficit in tribus. Primo, quia quamvis although the Persons are really distinct, the
personae divinae re distinguantur, things appropriated to each Person are only
appropriata tamen personis non differunt conceptually, and not really, distinct.
re, sed tantum ratione. Secundo, quia etsi Secondly, although the Persons are really
personae realiter ad invicem distinct from each other, they are not really
distinguantur, non tamen realiter ab distinct from the essence; so, truth
essentia distinguuntur; unde nec verum appropriated to the Person of the Son is not
quod appropriatur personae filii, ab ente distinct from the act of existence He
quod se tenet ex parte essentiae. Tertio, possesses through the divine essence.
quia, etsi ens, unum, verum et bonum Thirdly, although being, the true, the one,
magis uniantur in Deo quam in rebus and the good are more united in God than
creatis, non tamen oportet, quod ex quo they are in created things, it does not
distinguuntur in Deo, quod in rebus follow from the fact that they are
creatis etiam distinguantur realiter. Hoc conceptually distinct in God that they are
enim contingit de illis quae non habent really distinct in created beings. This line
ex ratione sua quod sint unum secundum of argument is valid only when it is applied
rem, sicut sapientia et potentia, quae, to things which are not by their very nature
cum in Deo sint unum secundum rem, in one in reality, as wisdom and power,
creaturis realiter distinguuntur: sed ens, which, although one in God, are distinct in
unum, verum et bonum secundum creatures. But being, the true, the one, and
rationem suam habent quod sint unum the good are such that by their very nature
secundum rem; unde ubicumque they are one in reality. Therefore, no matter
inveniantur, realiter unum sunt, quamvis where they are found, they are really one.
sit perfectior unitas illius rei secundum Their unity in God, however, is more
quam uniuntur in Deo, quam illius rei perfect than their unity in creatures.
secundum quam uniuntur in creaturis.
ARTICLE II
In the second article we ask:

Is truth found principally in the intellect or in things?
[Parallel readings: C.G., I, 59; III De anima, lect. 11, nn. 746-51, 760-64; S.T., I, 16, 2.
See also readings given for preceding article.]
Secundo quaeritur utrum veritas Difficulties

principalius inveniatur in intellectu quam
in rebus.
Et videtur quod non. It seems that it is found principally in

things, for:
Verum enim, ut dictum est, convertitur 1. It was pointed out that the true is
cum ente. Sed ens principalius invenitur in convertible with being. But being is
rebus quam apud animam. Ergo et verum. found more principally in things than in
the soul. The true, therefore, is
principally outside the soul.
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Praeterea, res sunt in anima non per 2. Things are not in the soul through their
essentiam, sed per suam speciem, ut dicit essences but, as pointed out by the
philosophus in III de anima. Si ergo veritas Philosopher, through species. If,
principaliter in anima invenitur, non erit therefore, truth is found principally in the
essentia rei sed similitudo et species eius, soul, truth will not be the essence of a
et verum erit species entis extra animam thing but merely its likeness or species;
existentis. Sed species rei existens in and the true will be the species of a being
anima, non praedicatur de re quae est extra existing outside the soul. But the species
animam, sicut nec cum ipsa convertitur: of a thing existing in the soul is not
converti enim est conversim praedicari; predicated of a thing outside the soul and
ergo nec verum convertetur cum ente; is not convertible with it; for, if this were
quod est falsum. so, the true could not be converted with
being—which is false.
Praeterea, omne quod est in aliquo, 3. That which is in something is based

consequitur id in quo est. Si ergo veritas upon that in which it is. If truth, then, is
principaliter est in anima, tunc iudicium de principally in the soul, judgments about
veritate erit secundum aestimationem truth will have as their criterion the soul’s
animae; et ita redibit antiquorum estimation. This would revive that error
philosophorum error, qui dicebant, omne of the ancient philosophers who said that
quod quis opinatur in intellectu esse any opinion a person has in his intellect is
verum, et duo contradictoria simul esse true and that two contradictories can be
vera; quod est absurdum. true at the same time. This, of course, is
absurd.
Praeterea, si veritas principaliter est in 4. If truth is principally in the intellect,

intellectu, oportet quod aliquid quod ad anything which pertains to the intellect
intellectum pertinet, in definitione veritatis should be included in the definition of
ponatur. Sed Augustinus huiusmodi truth. Augustine, however, sharply
definitionem reprobat in Lib. Solil., sicut criticizes such definitions, as, for
istam: verum est quod ita est ut videtur: example, “The true is that which is as it is
quia secundum hoc, non esset verum quod seen.” For, according to this definition,
non videtur; quod patet esse falsum de something would not be true if it were not
occultissimis lapillis, qui sunt in visceribus seen. This is clearly false of rocks hidden
terrae; et similiter reprobat et improbat deep in the earth. Augustine similarly
istam: verum est quod ita est ut cognitori criticizes the following definition: “The
videtur, si velit et possit cognoscere, quia true is that which is as it appears to the
secundum hoc non esset aliquid verum, knower, provided he is willing and able
nisi cognitor vellet et posset cognoscere. to know.” For, according to this
Ergo et eadem ratio esset de quibuscumque definition, something would not be true
aliis definitionibus in quibus aliquid ad unless the knower wished and were able
intellectum pertinens poneretur. Ergo to know. The same criticism can be
veritas non est principaliter in intellectu. leveled against other definitions that
include any reference to intellect. Truth,
therefore, is not principally in the
intellect.
To the Contrary
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Contra. Philosophus dicit in VI 1. The Philosopher says: “The true and

Metaphysic.: non est falsum et verum in the false are not in things but in the
rebus sed in mente. mind.”
Praeterea, veritas est adaequatio rei et 2. Truth is “the conformity of thing and
intellectus. Sed haec adaequatio non potest intellect.” But since this conformity can
esse nisi in intellectu. Ergo nec veritas est be only in the intellect, truth is only in the
nisi in intellectu. intellect.
REPLY
Solutio. Dicendum, quod non oportet in When a predicate is used primarily and
illis quae dicuntur per prius et per posterius secondarily of many things, it is not
de multis, quod illud prius recipiat necessary that that which is the cause of
praedicationem communis, quod est ut the others receive the primary predication
causa aliorum, sed illud in quo est primo of the common term, but rather that in
ratio illius communis completa; sicut which the meaning of the common term
sanum per prius dicitur de animali, in quo is first fully verified. For example,
primo perfecta ratio sanitatis invenitur, healthy is primarily predicated of an
quamvis medicina dicatur sana ut effectiva animal, for it is in an animal that the
sanitatis. Et ideo, cum verum dicatur per nature of health is first found in its fullest
prius et posterius de pluribus, oportet quod sense. But inasmuch as medicine causes
de illo per prius dicatur in quo primo health, it is also said to be healthy.
invenitur completa ratio veritatis. Therefore, since truth is predicated of
many things in a primary and a secondary
sense, it ought to be primarily predicated
of that in which its full meaning is
primarily found.
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Complementum autem cuiuslibet motus Now, the fulfillment of any motion is

vel operationis est in suo termino. Motus found in the term of the motion; and,
autem cognitivae virtutis terminatur ad since the term of the motion of a
animam: oportet enim quod cognitum sit in cognitive power is, the soul, the known
cognoscente per modum cognoscentis: sed must be in the knower after the manner of
motus appetitivae terminatur ad res; inde the knower. But the motion of an
est quod philosophus in III de anima ponit appetitive power terminates in things. For
circulum quemdam in actibus animae, this reason the Philosopher speaks of a
secundum, scilicet, quod res quae est extra sort of circle formed by the acts of the
animam, movet intellectum, et res soul: for a thing outside the soul moves
intellecta movet appetitum, et appetitus the intellect, and the thing known moves
tendit ad hoc ut perveniat ad rem a qua the appetite, which tends to reach the
motus incepit. Et quia bonum, sicut dictum things from which the motion originally
est, dicit ordinem entis ad appetitum, started. Since good, as mentioned
verum autem dicit ordinem ad intellectum; previously, expresses a relation to
inde est quod philosophus dicit VI appetite, and true, a relation to the
Metaphys., quod bonum et malum sunt in intellect, the Philosopher says that good
rebus, verum autem et falsum sunt in and evil are in things, but true and false
mente. Res autem non dicitur vera nisi are in the mind. A thing is not called true,
secundum quod est intellectui adaequata; however, unless it conforms to an
unde per posterius invenitur verum in intellect. The true, therefore, is found
rebus, per prius autem in intellectu. secondarily in things and primarily in
intellect.
Sed sciendum, quod res aliter comparatur Note, however, that a thing is referred
ad intellectum practicum, aliter ad differently to the practical intellect than it
speculativum. Intellectus enim practicus is to the speculative intellect. Sine the
causat res, unde est mensura rerum quae practical intellect causes things, it is a
per ipsum fiunt: sed intellectus measure of what it causes. But, since the
speculativus, quia accipit a rebus, est speculative intellect is receptive in regard
quodammodo motus ab ipsis rebus, et ita to things, it is, in a certain sense, moved
res mensurant ipsum. Ex quo patet quod by things and consequently measured by
res naturales, a quibus intellectus noster them. It is clear, therefore, that, as is said
scientiam accipit, mensurant intellectum in the Metaphysics, natural things from
nostrum, ut dicitur X Metaph.: sed sunt which our intellect gets its scientific
mensuratae ab intellectu divino, in quo knowledge measure our intellect. Yet
sunt omnia sicut omnia artificiata in these things are themselves measured by
intellectu artificis. Sic ergo intellectus the divine intellect, in which are all
divinus est mensurans non mensuratus; res created things—just as all works of art
autem naturalis, mensurans et mensurata; find their origin in the intellect of an
sed intellectus noster mensuratus et non artist. The divine intellect, therefore,
mensurans res quidem naturales, sed measures and is not measured; a natural
artificiales tantum. thing both measures and is measured; but
our intellect is measured, and measures
only artifacts, not natural things.
Res ergo naturalis inter duos intellectus A natural thing, therefore, being placed
constituta, secundum adaequationem ad between two intellects is called true in so
utrumque vera dicitur; secundum enim far as it conforms to either. It is said to be
adaequationem ad intellectum divinum true with respect to its conformity with
dicitur vera, in quantum implet hoc ad the divine intellect in so far as it fulfills
quod est ordinata per intellectum divinum, the end to which it was ordained by the
ut patet per Anselmum in Lib. de Verit. et divine intellect. This is clear from the
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per Augustinum in Lib. de vera religione, writings of Anselm and Augustine, as

et per Avicennam in definitione inducta, well as from the definition of Avicenna,
scilicet: veritas cuiusque rei est proprietas previously cited: “The truth of anything is
sui esse quod stabilitum est ei; a property of the act of being which has
been established for it.”
secundum autem adaequationem ad With respect to its conformity with a

intellectum humanum dicitur res vera, in human intellect, a thing is said to be true
quantum est nata de se facere veram in so far as it is such as to cause a true
aestimationem; sicut e contrario falsa estimate about itself; and a thing is said to
dicuntur quae sunt nata videri quae non be false if, as Aristotle says, “by nature it
sunt, aut qualia non sunt, ut dicitur in V is such that it seems to be what it is not,
Metaphysic. or seems to possess qualities which it
does not possess.”
Prima autem ratio veritatis per prius inest In a natural thing, truth is found
rei quam secunda, quia prius est eius especially in the first, rather than in the
comparatio ad intellectum divinum quam second, sense; for its reference to the
humanum; unde, etiam si intellectus divine intellect comes before its reference
humanus non esset, adhuc res verae to a human intellect. Even if there were
dicerentur in ordine ad intellectum no human intellects, things could be said
divinum. Sed si uterque intellectus, rebus to be true because of their relation to the
remanentibus per impossibile, divine intellect. But if, by an impossible
intelligeretur auferri, nullo modo ratio supposition, intellect did not exist and
veritatis remaneret. things did continue to exist, then the
essentials of truth would in no way
remain.
Responsio ergo ad primum quod, sicut ex 1. As is clear from the discussion, true is
iam dictis patet, verum per prius dicitur de predicated primarily of a true intellect
intellectu vero, et per posterius de re sibi and secondarily of a thing conformed
adaequata; et utroque modo convertitur with intellect. True taken in either sense,
cum ente, sed diversimode, quia secundum however, is interchangeable with being,
quod dicitur de rebus, convertitur cum ente but in different ways. Used of things, it
per praedicationem: omne enim ens est can be interchanged with being through a
adaequatum intellectui divino, et potens judgment asserting merely material
adaequare sibi intellectum humanum, et e identity, for every being is conformed
converso. with the divine intellect and can be
Si autem accipiatur prout dicitur de conformed with a human intellect. The
intellectu, sic convertitur cum ente quod converse of this is also true.
est extra animam, non per praedicationem, But if true is understood as used of the
sed per consequentiam; eo quod cuilibet intellect, then it can be converted with
intellectui vero oportet quod respondeat being outside the soul—not as
aliquod ens, et e converso. denominating the same subject, but as
expressing conformity. For every true act
of understanding is referred to a being,
and every being corresponds to a true act
of understanding.
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Per hoc patet solutio ad secundum. 2. The solution of the second argument is
clear from the solution of the first.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud quod est 3. What is in another does not depend on
in aliquo non sequitur illud in quo est, nisi that other unless it is caused by the
quando causatur ex principiis eius; unde principles of that other. For example,
lux quae causatur in aere ab extrinseco, even though light is in the air, it is caused
scilicet sole, sequitur motum solis magis by something extrinsic, the sun; and it is
quam aerem. Similiter et veritas quae est in based on the motion of the sun rather than
anima causata a rebus, non sequitur on air. In the same way, truth which is in
aestimationem animae, sed existentiam the soul but caused by things does not
rerum: quoniam eo quod res est vel non depend on what one thinks but on the
est, dicitur oratio vera vel falsa similiter et existence of things. For from the fact that
intellectus. a thing is or is not, a statement or an
intellect is said to be true or false.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Augustinus 4. Augustine is speaking of a thing’s

loquitur de visione intellectus humani, a being seen by the human intellect. Truth,
qua rei veritas non dependet. Sunt enim of course, does not depend on this, for
multae res quae nostro intellectu non many things exist that are not known by
cognoscuntur; nulla tamen res est quam our intellects. There is nothing, however,
intellectus divinus non cognoscat actu, et that the divine intellect does not actually
intellectus humanus in potentia; cum know, and nothing that the human
intellectus agens dicatur quo est omnia intellect does not know potentially, for
facere, intellectus possibilis quo est omnia the agent intellect is said to be that “by
fieri. Unde in definitione rei verae potest which we make all things knowable,” and
poni visio in actu intellectus divini, non the possible intellect, as that “by which
autem intellectus humani nisi in potentia, we become all things.” For this reason,
sicut ex superioribus patet. one can place in the definition of a true
thing its actually being seen by the divine
intellect, but not its being seen by a
human intellect, except potentially, as is
clear from our earlier discussion.
ARTICLE III
In the third article we ask:

Is truth only in the Intellect joining and separating?
[Parallel readings: De ver., I, 9; S. T. I, 16, 2; I Sent., 19, 5, 1; C.G. I, 59; III De anima,
lect. 11, nn. 746-51, 760-64; I Perih., lect. 3, nn. 3-10; VI Metaph., lect. 4, nn. 1233-44;
IX Metaph., lect. 11, n. 1896 seq.]
Tertio quaeritur utrum veritas sit tantum Difficulties

in intellectu componente et dividente.
Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for
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Verum enim dicitur secundum 1. The true is predicated from the relation
comparationem entis ad intellectum. Sed of being to intellect. But the first operation
prima comparatio qua intellectus by which an intellect is related to things is
comparatur ad res, est secundum quod that in which the intellect forms the
format quidditates rerum, concipiendo quiddities of things by conceiving their
definitiones earum. Ergo in ista definitions. Truth, therefore, is principally
operatione intellectus principalius et and more properly found in that operation
prius invenitur verum. of the intellect.
Praeterea, verum est adaequatio rerum et 2. The true is a “conformity of thing and
intellectus. Sed sicut intellectus intellect.” Now, although the intellect, in
componens et dividens potest adaequari joining and separating, can be conformed
rebus, ita intellectus intelligens with things, it can also be conformed with
quidditates rerum. Ergo veritas non est things in understanding their quiddities.
tantum in intellectu componente et Truth, therefore, is not merely in the
dividente. intellect joining and separating.
Est quod dicitur in VI Metaph.: verum et 1. In the Metaphysics we read: “The true
falsum non sunt in rebus, sed in mente; and the false are not in things but in the
in simplicibus autem, et quod quid est, mind. In regard to simple natures and
nec in mente. quiddities, however, it is not in the mind.”
Praeterea, in III de anima, indivisibilium 2. In The Soul the statement is made that the
intelligentia in illis est in quibus non est true and the false are not to be found in
verum et falsum. simple apprehension.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod sicut verum per prius Just as the true is found primarily in the
invenitur in intellectu quam in rebus, ita intellect rather than in things, so also is it
etiam per prius invenitur in actu found primarily in an act of the intellect
intellectus componentis et dividentis joining and separating, rather than in an act
quam in actu intellectus quidditatem by which it forms the quiddities of things.
rerum formantis. Veri enim ratio For the nature of the true consists in a
consistit in adaequatione rei et conformity of thing and intellect. Nothing
intellectus; idem autem non adaequatur becomes conformed with itself, but
sibi ipsi, sed aequalitas diversorum est; conformity requires distinct terms.
unde ibi primo invenitur ratio veritatis in Consequently, the nature of truth is first
intellectu ubi primo intellectus incipit found in the intellect when the intellect
aliquid proprium habere quod res extra begins to possess something proper to itself,
animam non habet, sed aliquid ei not possessed by the thing outside the soul,
correspondens, inter quae adaequatio yet corresponding to it, so that between the
attendi potest. Intellectus autem formans two—intellect and thing—a conformity
quidditatem rerum, non habet nisi may be found. In forming the quiddities of
similitudinem rei existentis extra things, the intellect merely has a likeness of
animam, sicut et sensus in quantum a thing existing outside the soul, as a sense
accipit speciem sensibilis; sed quando has a likeness when it receives the species
incipit iudicare de re apprehensa, tunc of a sensible thing. But when the intellect
ipsum iudicium intellectus est quoddam begins to judge about the thing it has
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proprium ei, quod non invenitur extra in apprehended, then its judgment is
re. Sed quando adaequatur ei quod est something proper to itself—not something
extra in re, dicitur iudicium verum; tunc found outside in the thing. And the
autem iudicat intellectus de re judgment is said to be true when it
apprehensa quando dicit aliquid esse vel conforms to the external reality. Moreover,
non esse, quod est intellectus the intellect judges about the thing it has
componentis et dividentis; apprehended at the moment when it says
that something is or is not. This is the role
of “the intellect composing and dividing.”
unde dicit etiam philosophus in VI For these reasons, the Philosopher says that
Metaph., quod compositio et divisio est composition and division are in the
in intellectu, et non in rebus. Et inde est intellect, and not in things. Moreover, this is
quod veritas per prius invenitur in why truth is found primarily in the joining
compositione et divisione intellectus. and separating by the intellect, and only
Secundario autem dicitur verum et per secondarily in its formation of the
posterius in intellectu formante quiddities of things or definitions, for a
quiditates rerum vel definitiones; unde definition is called true or false because of a
definitio dicitur vera vel falsa, ratione true or false combination. For it may
compositionis verae vel falsae, ut happen that a definition will be applied to
quando scilicet dicitur esse definitio eius something to which it does not belong, as
cuius non est, sicut si definitio circuli when the definition of a circle is assigned to
assignetur triangulo; vel etiam quando a triangle. Sometimes, too, the parts of a
partes definitionis non possunt componi definition cannot be reconciled, as happens
ad invicem, ut si dicatur definitio when one defines a thing as “an animal
alicuius rei animal insensibile, haec entirely without the power of sensing.” The
enim compositio quae implicatur, judgment implied in such a definition
scilicet aliquod animal est insensibile, —“some animal is incapable of sensing”—
est falsa. Et sic definitio non dicitur vera is false. Consequently, a definition is said to
vel falsa nisi per ordinem ad be true or false only because of its relation
compositionem, sicut et res dicitur vera to a judgment, as a thing is said to be true
per ordinem ad intellectum. because of its relation to intellect.
Patet ergo ex dictis quod verum per prius From our discussion, then, it is clear that
dicitur de compositione vel divisione the true is predicated, first of all, of joining
intellectus; secundo dicitur de and separating by the intellect; second, of
definitionibus rerum, secundum quod in the definitions of things in so far as they
eis implicatur compositio vera vel falsa; imply a true or a false judgment. Third, the
tertio de rebus secundum quod true may be predicated of things in so far as
adaequantur intellectui divino, vel aptae they are conformed with the divine intellect
natae sunt adaequari intellectui humano; or in so far as, by their very nature, they can
quarto dicitur de homine, propter hoc be conformed with human intellects.
quod electivus est verorum vel facit Fourth, true or false may be predicated of
existimationem de se vel de aliis veram man in so far as he chooses to express truth,
vel falsam per ea quae dicit vel facit. or in so far as he gives a true or false
Voces autem eodem modo recipiunt impression of himself or of others by his
veritatis praedicationem, sicut intellectus words and actions; for truth can be
quos significant. predicated of words in the same way as it
can be predicated of the ideas which they
convey.
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Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod 1. Although the formation of a quiddity is

quamvis formatio quidditatis sit prima the first operation of the intellect, by it the
operatio intellectus, tamen per eam non intellect does not yet possess anything that,
habet intellectus aliquid proprium quod properly speaking, is its own and can be
possit rei adaequari; et ideo non est ibi conformed to the thing. Truth, accordingly,
proprie veritas. is not found in it.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum. 2. From this the solution of the second
difficulty is clear.
ARTICLE IV
In the fourth article we ask:

Is there only one truth by which all things are true?
[Parallel readings: De ver., 21, 4, ad 5; 27, 1, ad 7; S.T., I, 16, 6; I-II, 33, 1, ad 3; C.G.,
III, 47; Quodl., X, 4, 7; I Sent., 19, 5, 2.]
Quarto quaeritur utrum sit tantum una Difficulties

veritas qua omnia sunt vera.
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that this is so, for
Anselmus enim dicit in libro de veritate 1. Anselm says that the relation of truth to all
quod sicut tempus se habet ad true things is like that of time to all temporal
temporalia, ita veritas ad res veras. Sed things. But there is only one time to which
tempus ita se habet ad omnia all temporal things are related. Therefore
temporalia quod est unum tempus there will be only one truth to which all true
tantum. Ergo ita se habebit veritas ad things are related.
omnia vera quod erit tantum una
veritas.
Sed dicebat, quod veritas dupliciter 2. But it was said that truth is used in two
dicitur. Uno modo secundum quod est ways. In one, it means the entity of a thing,
idem quod entitas rei, ut definit eam as when Augustine says: “The true is that
Augustinus in Lib. Solil.: verum est id which is.” If truth be understood in this
quod est; et sic oportet esse plures sense, then there should be as many truths as
veritates secundum quod sunt plures there are essences of things. In the second
essentiae rerum. Alio modo prout way in which truth is used, it signifies truth
exprimit se in intellectum, prout definit as it is expressed in the intellect.
eam Hilarius: verum est declarativum Consequently, Hilary writes: “The true
esse; et hoc modo, cum nihil possit affirms existence.” But since nothing can
aliquid manifestare intellectui nisi manifest anything to the intellect except in
secundum virtutem primae veritatis virtue of the first divine truth, all truths are,
divinae, omnes veritates quodammodo in some sense, one, inasmuch as they all
sunt unum in movendo intellectum, move the intellect—just as colors are one in
sicut et omnes colores sunt unum in moving the sense of sight, since they all
movendo visum, in quantum movent move it because of one thing: light.
ipsum, in ratione scilicet unius On the contrary, however, time, the measure
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luminis.- of all temporal things, is numerically one;

Sed contra, tempus est unum numero and if truth is related to true things as time is
omnium temporalium. Si ergo ita se related to temporal things, the truth of all
habet veritas ad res veras sicut tempus true things must also be numerically one. It
ad temporalia, oportet omnium verorum will not be sufficient for all truths to be one
unam esse numero veritatem; nec in their action of moving the intellect or to
sufficit omnes veritates esse unum in be one in their exemplary cause.
movendo, vel esse in exemplari unam.
Praeterea, Anselmus in Lib. de veritate 3. Anselm argues as follows: If there are as

sic argumentatur: si plurium verorum many truths as there are true things, then
sunt plures veritates, oportet veritates truths should change as true things change.
variari secundum varietates verorum. But truths do not change with the changes of
Sed veritates non variantur per true things, for, even when true and correct
variationem rerum verarum, quia things are destroyed, the truth and
destructis rebus veris vel rectis adhuc correctness by which they are true or correct
remanet veritas et rectitudo, secundum remain. There is, therefore, only one truth.
quam sunt vera vel recta. Ergo est una He proves the minor from this: When a sign
tantum veritas. Minorem probat ex hoc is destroyed, the correctness of the
quia, destructo signo, adhuc remanet signification remains, for it remains correct
rectitudo significationis, quia rectum that the sign should signify that which it did
est ut significetur hoc quod illud signify. For the same reason, rectitude or
signum significabat; et eadem ratione, truth remains even when a true or correct
destructo quolibet vero vel recto, eius thing has been destroyed.
rectitudo vel veritas remanet.
Praeterea, in creatis nihil est id cuius 4. With regard to created things, nothing is
est veritas, sicut veritas hominis non est identical with that whose truth it is. The truth
homo, nec veritas carnis est caro. Sed of a man is not the man; the truth of flesh is
quodlibet ens creatum est verum. Ergo not the flesh. But every created thing is true.
nullum ens creatum est veritas; ergo No created thing, therefore, is truth.
omnis veritas est increatum, et ita est Consequently, every truth is uncreated, and
tantum una veritas. so there is only one truth.
Praeterea, nihil est maius mente 5. As Augustine says, only God is greater
humana nisi Deus, ut dicit Augustinus. than the human mind. But, as he proves
Sed veritas, ut probat Augustinus in elsewhere, truth is greater than the human
Lib. Solil., est maior mente humana, mind, for truth certainly cannot be said to be
quia non potest dici quod sit minor. Sic less than the human mind. If this were so, it
enim haberet mens humana de veritate would be within the competence of the mind
iudicare, quod falsum est. Non enim de to pass judgment on truth. This, of course, is
ea iudicat, sed secundum eam, sicut et false, for the mind does not judge truth but
iudex non iudicat de lege, sed judges according to the truth, like a
secundum eam, ut idem dicit in Lib. de magistrate who does not pass judgment upon
vera Relig. Similiter nec etiam dici the law but, as Augustine himself says,
potest quod sit ei aequalis, quia anima judges according to the law. Similarly, the
iudicat omnia secundum veritatem; non mind of man cannot be said to be equal to
autem iudicat omnia secundum truth, for it judges everything according to
seipsam. Ergo veritas non est nisi Deus; truth. It does not judge everything according
et ita est tantum una veritas. to itself. Truth, therefore, must be God
Alone, and so there is only one truth.
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Praeterea, Augustinus probat in Lib. 6. Augustine has proved that truth is not
LXXXIII quaestionum, quod veritas perceived by any bodily sense. His proof is
non percipitur sensu corporis, hoc that nothing is perceived by sense unless it is
modo: nihil percipitur a sensu nisi changeable. But truth is unchangeable.
mutabile. Sed veritas est immutabilis. Truth, therefore, is not perceived by sense.
Ergo sensu non percipitur. One could similarly argue that everything
Similiter argui potest: omne creatum est created is changeable. But truth is not
mutabile. Sed veritas non est mutabilis. changeable. Therefore, it is not a creature but
Ergo non est creatura; ergo est res is something uncreated. Consequently, there
increata; ergo est tantum una veritas. is only one truth.
Praeterea, ibidem Augustinus 7. Augustine offers another proof in the same

argumentatur ad idem hoc modo: place: “There is no sensible thing that does
nullum sensibile est quod non habeat not have some similarity to what is false,
aliquid simile falso, ita ut internosci and, as a result, the two cannot be
non possit; nam, ut alia praetermittam, distinguished. To mention only one example:
omnia quae per corpus sentimus, etiam all that we sense through the body. Even
cum ea non adsunt sensibus, imagines when these objects are not present to the
tamen eorum patimur tamquam prorsus senses, we experience their images as though
adsint, velut in somno, vel in furore. they were present, as when we are asleep or
Sed veritas non habet aliquid simile become delirious.” Truth, however, has no
falso. Ergo veritas sensu non percipitur. resemblance to what is false. Therefore, truth
Similiter argui potest: omne creatum is not perceived by a sense.
habet aliquid simile falso, in quantum One could similarly argue that every created
habet aliquid de defectu. Ergo nullum thing has some similarity to what is false in
creatum est veritas; et sic est una so far as it has some defect. Nothing created,
tantum veritas. therefore, is truth, and so there is only one
truth.
Augustinus in libro de vera religione: 1. Augustine writes: “As likeness is the form
sicut similitudo est forma similium, ita of like things, so truth is the form of true
veritas est forma verorum. Sed plurium things.” But for many like things there are
similium plures similitudines. Ergo many likenesses. Therefore, for many true
plurium verorum plures veritates. things there are many truths.
Praeterea, sicut omnis veritas creata 2. Just as every created truth is derived from
derivatur a veritate increata the uncreated truth as its model, and has its
exemplariter, et ab ea suam veritatem truth from it, so all intelligible light is
habet, ita omne lumen intelligibile a derived from the first uncreated light as from
prima luce increata derivatur its exemplary cause, and from it possesses its
exemplariter, et vim manifestandi power of making things known. But we say
habet. Dicimus tamen esse plura lumina that there are many intelligible lights, as is
intelligibilia, ut patet per Dionysium. clear from the writings of Dionysius.
Ergo videtur consimili modo Therefore, following this analogy, it seems
concedendum simpliciter esse plures we must likewise simply concede that there
veritates. are many truths.
Praeterea, colores quamvis habeant ex 3. Although all colors are able to affect the
virtute lucis quod moveant visum, sense of sight in virtue of light, nevertheless,
tamen simpliciter dicuntur esse plures in themselves colors are distinct and
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colores et differentes, nec possunt dici different, and cannot be said to be one,
esse unum nisi secundum quid. Ergo except from a particular point of view.
quamvis et omnes veritates creatae se Consequently, even though all created truths
intellectui exprimant virtute primae manifest themselves in the intellect by virtue
veritatis, non tamen ex hoc dici poterit of the first truth, we cannot for this reason
una veritas nisi secundum quid. say that there is one truth, unless considered
under this one aspect.
Praeterea, sicut veritas creata non 4. Just as a created truth can manifest itself
potest se intellectui manifestare nisi to the intellect only by virtue of the
virtute veritatis increatae, ita nulla uncreated truth, so no power in a creature
potentia in creatura potest aliquid agere can act except by virtue of the uncreated
nisi virtute potentiae increatae. Nec power. Yet we do not say that somehow or
aliquo modo dicimus esse unam other there is one power for all powers; so,
potentiam omnium habentium in the same manner, we should not say that
potentiam. Ergo nec dicendum est in some way there is one truth for all truths.
aliquo modo esse unam veritatem
omnium verorum.
Praeterea, Deus comparatur ad res in 5. God as a cause is related to things in three

habitudine triplicis causae: scilicet ways: as an efficient, an exemplary, and as a
effectivae, exemplaris et finalis; et per final cause. Consequently, by a kind of
quamdam appropriationem entitas appropriation, the entity of things is referred
rerum refertur ad Deum ut ad causam to God as efficient cause, their truth to Him
efficientem, veritas ut ad causam as an exemplary cause, their goodness to
exemplarem, bonitas ut ad causam Him as a final cause—even though, properly
finalem, quamvis etiam singula possunt speaking, each single one could be referred
ad singula referri secundum locutionis to each single cause. But in no manner of
proprietatem. Sed non dicimus aliquo speaking do we say that there is one
modo locutionis esse unam bonitatem goodness for all good things, or one entity
omnium bonorum, aut unam entitatem for all beings. Therefore, we should not say
omnium entium. Ergo nec dicere that there is one truth for all true things.
debemus unam veritatem omnium
verorum.
Praeterea, quamvis sit una veritas 6. Although there is one uncreated truth from
increata, a qua omnes veritates creatae which all created truths take their model,
exemplantur, non tamen eodem modo these truths are not modeled on it in the same
exemplantur ab ipsa; quia, quamvis way. For while it is true that the uncreated
ipsa similiter se habeat ad omnia, non truth has the same relation to all, all do not
tamen similiter omnia se habent ad have the same relation to it—as pointed out
ipsam, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis; unde in The Causes. Necessary and contingent
alio modo exemplatur ab ipsa veritas truths are modeled on the uncreated truth in
necessariorum et contingentium. Sed quite different ways. But different ways of
diversus modus imitandi exemplar imitating the divine model cause diversity
divinum facit diversitatem in rebus among created things. Consequently, there
creatis, ergo sunt simpliciter plures are many created truths.
veritates creatae.
Praeterea, veritas est adaequatio rei et 7. Truth is “the conformity of thing and
intellectus. Sed diversorum specie non intellect.” But since things differ specifically,
potest esse una adaequatio rei ad there cannot be a single conformity to the
intellectum. Ergo, cum res verae sint intellect. So, since true things are
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specie diversae, non potest esse una specifically different, there cannot be one
veritas omnium verorum. truth for all true things.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in libro XII 8. Augustine writes as follows: “One must
de Trinitate: credendum est, mentis believe that the nature of the human mind is
humanae naturam rebus intelligibilibus so connected with intelligible things that it
sic esse connexam, ut in quadam luce gazes upon all it knows by means of a
sui generis omnia quae cognoscit, unique light.” Now, the light by whose
intueatur. Sed lux per quam anima means the soul knows all things is truth.
cognoscit omnia, est veritas. Ergo Truth, therefore, belongs to the same genus
veritas est de genere ipsius animae, et as the soul and must be a created thing.
ita oportet veritatem esse rem creatam; Consequently, in different creatures there are
unde in diversis creaturis erunt diversae different truths.
veritates.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod sicut ex praedictis, art. From our previous discussion it is clear that
2, patet, veritas proprie invenitur in truth is properly found in the human or
intellectu humano vel divino, sicut divine intellect, as health is found in an
sanitas in animali. In rebus autem aliis animal. In things, however, truth is found
invenitur veritas per relationem ad because of some relation to intellect—just as
intellectum, sicut et sanitas dicitur de health is said to be in things other than
quibusdam aliis in quantum sunt animals in so far as they bring about or
effectiva vel conservativa sanitatis preserve animal health. Truth, therefore, is
animalis. Est ergo veritas in intellectu properly and primarily in the divine intellect.
divino quidem primo et proprie; in In the human intellect, it exists properly but
intellectu vero humano proprie quidem secondarily, for it exists there only because
sed secundario; in rebus autem of a relation to either one of the two truths
improprie et secundario, quia non nisi just mentioned.
per respectum ad alteram duarum
veritatum.
Veritas ergo intellectus divini est una In his gloss on these words of Psalm 11 (v.
tantum, a qua in intellectu humano 2), “Truths are decayed from among the
derivantur plures veritates, sicut ab una children of men,” Augustine writes” that the
facie hominis resultant plures truth of the divine intellect is one, and from
similitudines in speculo, sicut dicit it are drawn the many truths that are in the
Glossa super illud: diminutae sunt human intellect—“just as from one man’s
veritates a filiis hominum. Veritates face many likenesses are reflected in a
autem quae sunt in rebus, sunt plures, mirror.” Now, there are many truths in
sicut et rerum entitates. Veritas autem things, just as there are many entities of
quae dicitur de rebus in comparatione things. But truth predicated of things because
ad intellectum humanum, est rebus of their relation to the human intellect is, as
quodammodo accidentalis, quia posito it were, accidental to those things; for,
quod intellectus humanus non esset nec supposing that the human intellect did not or
esse posset, adhuc res in sua essentia could not exist, things would still remain
permaneret. Sed veritas quae de eis essentially the same. But truth predicated of
dicitur in comparatione ad intellectum things because of their relation to the divine
divinum eis inseparabiliter intellect is inseparably attendant on them, for
communicatur: cum nec subsistere they cannot exist except by reason of the
possint nisi per intellectum divinum eas divine intellect which keeps bringing them
in esse producentem. Per prius etiam into being. Again, truth is primarily in a
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inest rei veritas in comparatione ad thing because of its relation to the divine
intellectum divinum quam humanum, intellect, not to the human intellect, because
cum ad intellectum divinum it is related to the divine intellect as to its
comparetur sicut ad causam, ad cause, but to the human intellect as to its
humanum autem quodammodo sicut ad effect in the sense that the latter receives its
effectum, in quantum intellectus knowledge from things. For this reason, a
scientiam a rebus accipit. thing is said to be true principally because of
its order to the truth of the divine intellect
rather than because of its relation to the truth
of a human intellect.
Sic ergo res aliqua principalius dicitur So, if truth in its proper sense be taken as
vera in ordine ad veritatem intellectus that by which all things are primarily true,
divini quam in ordine ad veritatem then all things are true by means of one
intellectus humani. Si ergo accipiatur truth, the truth of the divine intellect. This is
veritas proprie dicta secundum quam the truth which Anselm writes about. But if
sunt omnia principaliter vera, sic omnia truth in its proper sense be taken as that by
sunt vera una veritate, scilicet veritate which things are said to be true secondarily,
intellectus divini; et sic Anselmus de then there are many truths about many true
veritate loquitur in Lib. de veritate. Si things, and even many truths in different
autem accipiatur veritas proprie dicta, minds about one true thing. Finally, if truth
secundum quam secundario res verae in its improper sense be taken as that by
dicuntur, sic sunt plurium verorum which all things are said to be true, then
plures veritates et etiam unius veri there are many truths for many true things,
plures veritates in animabus diversis. Si but only one truth for one true thing.
autem accipiatur veritas improprie
dicta, secundum quam omnia dicuntur
vera, sic sunt plurium verorum plures
veritates; sed unius veri tantum una
veritas.
Denominantur autem res verae a Things are called true from the truth in the
veritate quae est in intellectu divino vel divine or human intellect, just as food is
in intellectu humano, sicut denominatur called healthy, not because of any inherent
cibus sanus a sanitate quae est in form, but because of the health which is in
animali, et non sicut a forma an animal. If, however, a thing is called true
inhaerente; sed a veritate quae est in because of the truth in the thing, which is
ipsa re, quae nihil aliud est quam simply its entity conformed with intellect,
entitas intellectui adaequata, vel then it is so called because of something
intellectum sibi adaequans, inhering in it after the manner of a form, as
denominatur sicut a forma inhaerente, food is said to be healthy because of a
sicut cibus denominatur sanus a quality of its own—which is the reason for
qualitate sua, a qua sanus dicitur. its being said to be healthy.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod 1. Time is related to temporal things as a

tempus comparatur ad temporalia sicut measure is related to the measured. It is
mensura ad mensuratum; unde patet clear, therefore, that Anselm is referring to
quod Anselmus loquitur de illa veritate that truth which is only the measure of all
quae est mensura omnium rerum true things. There is only one such truth
verarum; et ista est una numero tantum, numerically, just as there is only one time—
sicut tempus unum, ut in II arg. as the second argument concludes. However,
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concluditur. Veritas autem quae est in the truth in the human intellect or in things
intellectu humano vel in ipsis rebus, themselves is not related to things as an
non comparatur ad res sicut mensura extrinsic or common measure is related to
extrinseca et communis ad mensurata, those it measures. It is related as a measured
sed vel sicut mensuratum ad mensuram, thing is related to a measure, for such is the
ut est de veritate intellectus humani, et relation of truth in a human intellect to
sic oportet eam variari secundum things, and it must, as a consequence, vary as
varietatem rerum; vel sicut mensura things vary. Or, it is related as an intrinsic
intrinseca, sicut est de veritate quae est measure to the thing itself, as is the case with
in ipsis rebus: et has etiam mensuras the truth that is in things themselves.
oportet plurificari secundum Intrinsic measures must be multiplied as the
pluralitatem mensuratorum, sicut number of things measured is multiplied—
diversorum corporum sunt diversae just as dimensions must be multiplied with
dimensiones. the multiplicity of bodies.
Secundum concedimus. 2. We concede the second argument.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod veritas 3. The truth which remains after things are
quae remanet destructis rebus, est destroyed is the truth of the divine intellect,
veritas intellectus divini; et haec and this is numerically one. However, the
simpliciter est una numero: veritas truth which is in things or in the soul is
autem quae est in rebus vel in anima, diversified according to the diversity of
variatur ad varietatem rerum. things.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum 4. The proposition “Nothing is its own truth”
dicitur: nulla res est sua veritas: is understood of things having a complete act
intelligitur de rebus quae habent esse of existence in reality. It is likewise said that
completum in natura; sicut et cum “Nothing is its own act of existence,” yet the
dicitur: nulla res est suum esse: et act of existence of a thing is, in a sense,
tamen esse rei quaedam res creata est; something created. In the same way, the truth
et eodem modo veritas rei aliquid of a thing is something created.
creatum est.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod veritas 5. The truth by which the soul passes
secundum quam anima de omnibus judgment on all things is the first truth; for,
iudicat, est veritas prima. Sicut enim a just as from the truth of the divine intellect
veritate intellectus divini effluunt in there flow into the angelic intellects those
intellectum angelicum species rerum intelligible species by which angels know all
innatae, secundum quas omnia things, so does the truth of the first principles
cognoscunt; ita a veritate intellectus by which we judge everything proceed from
divini procedit exemplariter in the truth of the divine intellect as from its
intellectum nostrum veritas primorum exemplary cause. Since we can judge by
principiorum secundum quam de means of the truth of these first principles
omnibus iudicamus. Et quia per eam only in so far as this truth is a likeness of the
iudicare non possemus nisi secundum first truth, we are said to judge everything
quod est similitudo primae veritatis, according to the first truth.
ideo secundum primam veritatem
dicimur de omnibus iudicare.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod veritas illa 6. That immutable truth is the first truth,
immutabilis, est veritas prima; et haec which is neither perceptible by sense nor
neque sensu percipitur, neque aliquid something created.
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creatum est.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod ipsa 7. Although every creature has some

etiam veritas creata non habet aliquid similarity to what is false, created truth itself
simile falso, quamvis creatura quaelibet does not have this similarity. For a creature
aliquid simile falso habeat; in tantum has some similarity to what is false in so far
enim creatura aliquid simile falso as it is deficient. Truth, however, does not
habet, in quantum deficiens est. Sed depend on a creature in so far as it is
veritas non ex ea parte rem consequitur deficient, but in so far as it rises above its
creatam qua deficiens est, sed deficiency by being conformed to the first
secundum quod a defectu recedit truth.
primae veritati conformata.
Ad primum vero eorum quae contra 1. Properly speaking, when two things are
obiiciuntur, dicendum est, quod similar, likeness is found in both. Truth,
similitudo proprie invenitur in utroque however, being a certain agreement of
similium; veritas autem, cum sit intellect and thing, is not, properly speaking,
quaedam convenientia intellectus et rei, found in both, but only in intellect; and since
non proprie invenitur in utroque, sed in all things are true and said to be true in so far
intellectu; unde, cum sit unus as they are in conformity with one intellect,
intellectus, scilicet divinus, secundum the divine intellect, everything must be true
cuius conformitatem omnia vera sunt et according to one truth, even though in many
dicuntur, oportet omnia vera esse Eke things there are many different
secundum unam veritatem, quamvis in likenesses.
pluribus similibus sint diversae
similitudines.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis 2. Although intelligible light has the divine
lumen intelligibile exempletur a lumine light for its exemplary cause, light is
divino, tamen lumen proprie dicitur de nevertheless predicated in the proper sense
intelligibilibus luminibus creatis; non of created intelligible lights. Truth, however,
autem veritas proprie dicitur de rebus is not predicated in the proper sense of
exemplatis ab intellectu divino; et ideo things having the divine intellect as their
non dicimus unum lumen, sicut exemplary cause. Consequently, we do not
dicimus, unam veritatem. say that there is one light in the same way
that we say that there is one truth.
Et similiter dicendum ad tertium de 3. Our reply given immediately above will

coloribus; quia colores etiam proprie answer the argument taken from colors, for
visibiles dicuntur, quamvis non visible is properly predicated of colors, also,
videantur nisi per lucem. even though they are not seen except by
means of light.
Et similiter dicendum ad quartum de 4-5. Our answer to the fourth argument

potentia, et ad quintum de entitate. (from the nature of power) and to the fifth
(from the nature of being) is the same.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis 6. Even though things are modeled in

exemplentur difformiter a veritate different ways upon the divine truth, this
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divina, non tamen propter hoc does not keep things from being true in the
excluditur quin res una veritate sint proper sense of the term by a single truth—
verae, et non pluribus, proprie not by many truths. For that which is
loquendo; quia illud quod diversimode received in different ways in the things
recipitur in rebus exemplatis, non modeled upon the exemplar is not properly
proprie dicitur veritas, sicut proprie called truth with the same propriety as truth
dicitur veritas in exemplari. is said to be in the exemplar itself.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis 7. Although things differing specifically are

ea quae sunt diversa specie, ex parte not on their own part conformed with the
ipsarum rerum una adaequatione non divine intellect by one conformity, the divine
adaequentur divino intellectui, intellect to which all things are conformed is
intellectus tamen divinus, cui omnia one, and on its part there is one conformity
adaequantur, est unus; et ex parte eius with all things—even though all things are
est una adaequatio ad res omnes, not conformed to it in the same way. The
quamvis non omnia sibi eodem modo truth of all things, therefore, is one in the
adaequentur; et ideo modo praedicto manner described.
omnium rerum veritas una est.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod 8. Augustine is speaking of truth in our mind

Augustinus loquitur de veritate quae est as it is modeled upon the divine mind as the
exemplata ab ipsa mente divina in likeness of a face is reflected in a mirror;
mente nostra, sicut similitudo faciei and, as we said, there are many reflections of
resultat in speculo; et huiusmodi the first truth in our souls. Or one can say
veritates resultantes in animabus nostris that the first truth belongs to the genus of the
a prima veritate, sunt multae, ut dictum soul if genus be taken in a broad sense,
est. Vel dicendum, quod veritas prima namely, in so far as everything intelligible or
quodammodo est de genere animae incorporeal is said to belong to one genus.
large accipiendo genus, secundum quod Genus is used in this way in the Acts of the
omnia intelligibilia vel incorporalia Apostles (17:2 8) where we read: “For we
unius generis esse dicuntur, per modum are also his offspring [ genus ].”
quo dicitur Act., XVII, 28: ipsius enim
Dei et nos genus sumus.
ARTICLE V
In the fifth article we ask:

Is some truth besides the first truth eternal?
[Parallel readings: S.T., I, 10, 3, ad 3; 16,7; I Sent., 19, 5, 3; C. G., II, cc. 36, 83-84; De
pot, 3,17, ad 27-29.]
Quinto quaeritur utrum aliqua alia Difficulties

veritas praeter primam veritatem sit
aeterna
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that there is some such truth, for
Anselmus enim in Monologion, de 1. When treating the truth of propositions,

veritate enuntiabilium loquens dicit: Anselm says: “Whether truth be said to
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sive intelligatur veritas habere, sive have, or whether it is understood not to

dicatur veritas non habere principium have, a beginning or end, it cannot be
vel finem, nullo claudi potest veritas circumscribed by a beginning or end.”’ But
principio vel fine. Sed omnis veritas every truth is understood either to have or
intelligitur habere principium vel finem, not to have a beginning or end. Therefore,
vel non habere principium vel finem. no truth is circumscribed by a beginning or
Ergo nulla veritas clauditur principio et end, and, since anything like this is eternal,
fine. Sed omne quod est huiusmodi, est every truth is eternal.
aeternum. Ergo omnis veritas est
aeterna.
Praeterea, omne illud cuius esse sequitur 2. Anything whose existence is a

ad destructionem sui esse, est aeternum, consequence of the destruction of its
quia sive ponatur esse, sive non esse, existence is eternal; for, whether it is taken
sequitur quod est: et oportet secundum as existing or not existing, it follows that it
quodcumque tempus ponere de is. Moreover, at any given time each and
unoquoque quod sit vel non sit. Sed ad every thing must be held as either existing
destructionem veritatis sequitur or not existing. Now, a consequence of the
veritatem esse; quia si veritas non est, destruction of truth is that truth is; for, if
veritatem non esse est verum, et nihil truth is not, the fact that truth is not is true,
potest esse verum nisi veritate. Ergo and nothing can be true except by truth.
veritas est aeterna. Therefore, truth is eternal.
Praeterea, si veritas enuntiabilium non 3. If the truth of propositions is not eternal,

est aeterna, ergo erat assignare quando then a time must be assigned when their
non erat enuntiabilium veritas. Sed tunc truth was not. But at that time it was true to
hoc enuntiabile erat verum, nullam say: “There is no truth of propositions.”
veritatem enuntiabilium esse. Ergo Therefore, truth of propositions exists
veritas enuntiabilium erat; quod est —which contradicts the supposition.
contrarium ei quod fuit datum. Ergo non Therefore, one cannot say that the truth of
potest dici veritatem enuntiabilium non propositions is not eternal.
esse aeternam.
Praeterea, philosophus probat materiam 4. The Philosopher’s proof that matter is

esse aeternam in I Phys., (quamvis hoc eternal (which is false) rests on the fact that
falsum sit), per hoc quod remanet post matter remains after its corruption and exists
sui corruptionem, et est ante suam prior to its generation, since, if it corrupts, it
generationem; eo quod si corrumpitur, corrupts into something, and if it is
in aliquid corrumpitur, et si generatur, generated, it is generated out of something.
ex aliquo generatur; illud autem ex quo But that from which something is generated
aliquid generatur, et illud in quod and that into which it corrupts is matter. The
aliquid corrumpitur, est materia. Sed same would be true of truth if it were said to
similiter veritas si ponatur corrumpi vel undergo corruption or generation: it would
generari, sequitur quod sit ante suam exist before its generation and after its
generationem et post suam corruption. If it were generated, it would be
corruptionem; quia si generatur, mutata changed from non-being to being, and if it
est de non esse in esse, et si corrumpitur, corrupted, it would change from being to
mutata est de esse in non esse. Quando non-being. However, when truth did not
autem non est veritas, verum est exist, it would have been true that it did not
veritatem non esse, quod utique non exist—which could not be unless there was
potest esse, nisi veritas sit. Ergo veritas truth. Therefore, truth is eternal.
est aeterna.
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Praeterea, omne quod non potest 5. Whatever cannot be conceived as not

intelligi non esse, est aeternum, quia existing is eternal, for whatever is able not
quicquid potest non esse, potest intelligi to exist can be conceived as not existing.
non esse. Sed veritas etiam The truth of propositions, however, cannot
enuntiabilium, non potest intelligi non be conceived as not existing, because the
esse, quia intellectus non potest intellect cannot understand anything unless
intelligere aliquid, nisi intelligat hoc it understands it to be true. Therefore, the
esse verum. Ergo veritas etiam truth of propositions is eternal.
enuntiabilium est aeterna.
Praeterea, illud quod est futurum semper 6. That which is future always was future,
fuit futurum, et quod est praeteritum and that which is past will always be past.
semper erit praeteritum. Sed ex hoc Consequently, a proposition about the future
propositio de futuro est vera, quia is true since something is future, and a
aliquid est futurum; et ex hoc propositio proposition about the past is true since
de praeterito est vera, quia aliquid est something is past. Therefore, the truth of a
praeteritum. Ergo veritas propositionis future proposition always was, as the truth
de futuro semper fuit, et veritas of a proposition concerning the past always
propositionis de praeterito semper erit; will be. Hence, not only the first truth is
et ita non solum veritas prima est eternal, but also many other truths are
aeterna, sed etiam multae aliae. eternal.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de 7. St. Augustine says that nothing is more
libero arbitrio, quod nihil magis est eternal than the nature of a circle and that
aeternum quam ratio circuli, et duo et two and three are five. Since these are
tria esse quinque. Sed horum veritas est created truths, some truth besides the first
veritas creata. Ergo aliqua veritas truth is eternal.
praeter primam veritatem est aeterna.
Praeterea, ad veritatem enuntiationis 8. For a proposition to be true, it is not

non requiritur quod actu enuntietur necessary that something be actually stated.
aliquid, sed sufficit quod sit illud de quo It is sufficient that something exist about
potest enuntiatio formari. Sed antequam which a proposition can be formed. But,
mundus esset, fuit aliquid de quo potuit even before the world existed, there was
enuntiari etiam praeter Deum. Ergo something, even apart from God, about
antequam mundus fieret, fuit which a proposition could be formed.
enuntiabilium veritas. Quod autem fuit Hence, before the world existed, the truth of
ante mundum, est aeternum. Ergo propositions existed, and, since what existed
enuntiabilium veritas est aeterna. before the world is eternal, the truth of
Probatio mediae. Mundus factus est ex propositions is eternal. The minor is proved
nihilo, id est post nihil. Ergo antequam thus: The world is made from nothing, that
mundus esset, erat eius non esse. Sed is, after nothing. Hence, before the world
enuntiatio vera non solum formatur de was, there was its non-existence. But a true
eo quod est, sed etiam de eo quod non proposition is formed not only about that
est, sicut enim contingit vere enuntiari which is, but also about that which is not;
quod est, esse, ita contingit vere for, just as what is, is truly stated to be, so
enuntiari quod non est, non esse, ut patet that which is not is truly stated not to be—as
in I Periher. Ergo antequam mundus is clearly shown in Interpretation. Hence,
esset, fuit unde vera enuntiatio formari before the world existed, there was that
potuit. from which a true proposition could be
formed.
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Praeterea, omne quod scitur, est verum 9. Whatever is known is true while it is
dum scitur. Sed Deus ab aeterno scivit known. But from all eternity God knew all
omnia enuntiabilia. Ergo omnium possible propositions. Therefore, from all
enuntiabilium veritas est ab aeterno; et eternity the truth of all propositions has
ita plures veritates sunt aeternae. existed, and so there are many eternal truths.
Sed dicebat, quod ex hoc non sequitur 10. It was said, however, that from this it
quod illa sint vera in seipsis, sed in follows that those propositions are true in
intellectu divino.- Sed contra, secundum the divine intellect—not in themselves.—
hoc oportet aliqua esse vera secundum On the contrary, things must be true in the
hoc quod sunt scita. Sed ab aeterno way in which they are known. But from
omnia sunt scita a Deo non solum eternity all things are known by God not
secundum quod sunt in mente eius, sed only in so far as they are in His mind, but
etiam in propria natura existentia. Eccli. also as they exist in their proper nature; for
cap. XXIII, 29: domino Deo nostro, Sirach (23:29) says: “All things were known
antequam crearentur, nota sunt omnia, to the Lord God before they were created:
sic et post perfectum cognoscit omnia; so also after they were perfected, he beholds
et ita non aliter cognoscit res postquam all things.” He accordingly knows things in
perfectae sunt quam ab aeterno no other way after they are perfected than
cognoverit. Ergo ab aeterno fuerunt He did from eternity. Therefore, from
plures veritates non solum in intellectu eternity there were many truths existing not
divino, sed secundum se. only in the divine intellect but in
themselves.
Praeterea, secundum hoc dicitur esse 11. A thing is said to exist simply in so far
aliquid simpliciter, secundum quod est as it is in that which gives it its formal
in sui complemento. Sed ratio veritatis perfection. But the character of truth finds
completur in intellectu. Si ergo in its formal perfection in the intellect. Hence,
intellectu divino fuerunt ab aeterno if from eternity there were many things
plura vera simpliciter, concedendum est simply true in the divine intellect, it must be
plures veritates esse aeternas. granted that there are many eternal truths.
Praeterea, Sapient., I, 15: iustitia 12. Wisdom (1:15) states: “For justice is
perpetua est et immortalis. Sed veritas perpetual and immortal.” As Cicero says,
est pars iustitiae, ut dicit Tullius in however, truth is a part of justice. Hence,
rhetorica. Ergo est perpetua et truth is perpetual and immortal.
immortalis.
Praeterea, universalia sunt perpetua et 13. Universals are perpetual and immortal.
incorruptibilia. Sed verum est maxime But the true is most universal, for it is
universale, quia convertitur cum ente. interchangeable with being. Therefore, truth
Ergo veritas est perpetua et is perpetual and immortal.
incorruptibilis.
Sed dicebat, quod universale non 14. It was said, however, that, although a
corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens.- universal does not cease of itself, it may
Sed contra, magis debet denominari cease accidentally.—On the contrary, a thing
aliquid per id quod convenit ei per se, ought to be denominated by that which
quam per id quod convenit ei per belongs to it essentially rather than by that
accidens. Si ergo veritas per se loquendo which belongs to it accidentally. Therefore,
est perpetua et incorruptibilis, non if truth taken essentially is perpetual and
autem corrumpitur vel generatur nisi per incorruptible, and does not cease or begin to
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accidens, concedendum est quod veritas be except accidentally, truth taken

universaliter dicta sit aeterna. universally must be eternal.
Praeterea, ab aeterno Deus fuit prior 15. Since from eternity God was prior to the
mundo. Ergo relatio prioritatis in Deo world, this relation of priority in God was
fuit ab aeterno. Sed posito uno eternal. But when one member of a relation
relativorum, necesse est poni et is posited, the other must also be posited.
reliquum. Ergo ab aeterno fuit Therefore, from eternity the posteriority of
posterioritas mundi ad Deum. Ergo ab the world with respect to God existed;
aeterno fuit aliquid aliud extra Deum cui consequently, there was from all eternity
aliquo modo competit veritas; et sic something outside of God to which truth
idem quod prius. belonged in some way. Hence, our original
position stands.
Sed dicebat, quod illa relatio prioritatis 16. It must be said that that relation of
et posterioritatis non est aliquid in rerum before and after is not something in nature
natura, sed in ratione tantum.- Contra but merely a rational relation.—On the
sicut dicit Boetius in fine de Consolat., contrary, as Boethius says, God is by nature
Deus est prior mundo natura, etsi prior to the world, even if the world had
mundus semper fuisset. Ergo illa relatio always existed. Therefore, that relation of
prioritatis est relatio naturae, et non priority is a relation of nature and not of
rationis tantum. reason alone.
Praeterea, veritas significationis est 17. The truth of signification is correctness

rectitudo significationis. Sed ab aeterno of signification. But from eternity it was
fuit rectum aliquid significari. Ergo correct that something is signified.
veritas significationis fuit ab aeterno. Therefore, the truth of signification was
from eternity.
Praeterea, ab aeterno fuit verum, patrem 18. From eternity it was true that the Father
genuisse filium, et spiritum sanctum generates the Son, and that the Holy Spirit
processisse ab utroque. Sed ista sunt proceeds from both. Since these are a
plura vera. Ergo plura vera sunt ab number of truths, a number of truths exist
aeterno. from eternity.
Sed dicebat, quod ista sunt vera una 19. It was said, however, that these are true
veritate; unde non sequitur plures by one truth; hence, it does not follow that
veritates esse ab aeterno.- Sed contra, several truths existed from eternity.—On the
alio pater est pater et generat filium; alio contrary, that by which the Father is Father
filius est filius et spirat spiritum and generates the Son is not that by which
sanctum. Sed eo quo pater est pater, the Son is Son and breathes the Holy Spirit.
haec est vera: pater generat filium, vel But by that by which the Father is Father it
pater est pater; eo autem quo filius est is true that the Father generates the Son, or
filius, haec est vera: filius est genitus a that the Father is the Father; and by that by
patre. Ergo huiusmodi propositiones non which the Son is the Son it is true that the
sunt una veritate verae. Son is generated by the Father. Hence,
propositions of this kind are not true by one
truth.
Praeterea, quamvis homo et risibile 20. Although man and capable of laughter
convertantur, non tamen est eadem are interchangeable, the same truth is not
veritas utriusque semper istarum found in each of the two following
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propositionum: homo est homo; et: propositions: “Man is man” and “Man is
homo est risibile; propter hoc quod non capable of laughter”; for the property which
est eadem proprietas quam praedicat hoc the word man predicates is not the same as
nomen homo, et quam praedicat hoc that predicated by capable of laughter.
nomen risibile: sed similiter non est Similarly, the property implied in the word
eadem proprietas quam importat hoc Father is not that implied in the word Son.
nomen pater, et hoc nomen filius. Ergo Therefore, the truth is not the same in the
non est eadem veritas dictarum propositions mentioned above.
propositionum.
Sed dicebat, quod istae propositiones 21. It was said, however, that those
non fuerunt ab aeterno.- Sed contra, propositions were not from eternity.—On
quandocumque est intellectus qui potest the contrary, whenever there is an intellect
enuntiare, potest esse enuntiatio. Sed ab able to make a proposition, there can be a
aeterno fuit intellectus divinus proposition. But from eternity the divine
intelligens patrem esse patrem, et filium intellect existed, understanding the Father to
esse filium, et ita enuntians sive dicens; be the Father, and the Son to be the Son, and
cum, secundum Anselmum, summo thus forming propositions or speaking
spiritui idem sit dicere quod intelligere. —since, according to Anselm, “for the most
Ergo enuntiationes praedictae fuerunt ab high Spirit to speak is the same as to
aeterno. understand.” Therefore, the propositions
previously mentioned existed from eternity.
Nullum creatum est aeternum. Veritas 1. No creature is eternal, and every truth,
omnis praeter primam est creata. Ergo except the first, is created. Therefore, only
sola prima veritas est aeterna. the first truth is eternal.
Praeterea, ens et verum convertuntur. 2. Being and the true are interchangeable.
Sed solum unum ens est aeternum. Ergo But only one being is eternal. Therefore,
sola una veritas est aeterna. only one truth is eternal.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod sicut prius dictum est, As mentioned previously, truth means a
veritas adaequationem quandam et proportion and commensuration. Hence,
commensurationem importat; unde something is said to be true just as
secundum hoc denominatur aliquid something is said to be commensurate. A
verum, sicut et denominatur aliquid body, however, is measured both by an
commensuratum. Mensuratur autem intrinsic measure, such as a line, surface, or
corpus et mensura intrinseca, ut linea, depth, and by an extrinsic measure, such as
vel superficie, vel profunditate, et happens when a located body is measured
mensura extrinseca, sicut locatum loco, by place, or when motion is measured by
et motus tempore, et pannus ulna. Unde time, or a piece of cloth by an elbow length.
et aliquid potest denominari verum Similarly, a thing can receive the name true
dupliciter: uno modo a veritate in two ways: by its inherent truth or by an
inhaerente; alio modo ab extrinseca extrinsic truth. In this latter way, all things
veritate: et sic denominantur omnes res receive the name true from the first truth;
verae a prima veritate. Et quia veritas and since truth in the intellect is measured
quae est in intellectu, mensuratur a by things themselves, it follows that not
rebus ipsis; sequitur quod non solum only the truth of things, but also the truth of
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veritas rei, sed etiam veritas intellectus, the intellect or of a proposition signifying
vel enuntiationis, quae intellectum what is understood, gets its name from the
significat, a veritate prima denominetur. first truth.
In hac autem adaequatione vel In this commensuration or conformity of

commensuratione intellectus ac rei non intellect and thing it is not necessary that
requiritur quod utrumque extremorum each of the two actually exist. Our intellect
sit in actu. Intellectus enim noster potest can be in conformity with things that,
nunc adaequari his quae in futurum although not existing now, will exist in the
erunt, nunc autem non sunt; aliter non future. Otherwise, it would not be true to
esset haec vera: Antichristus nascetur; say that “the Anti-Christ will be born.”
unde hoc denominatur verum a veritate Hence, a proposition is said to be true
quae est in intellectu tantum, etiam because of the truth that is in the intellect
quando non est res ipsa. Similiter etiam alone even when the thing stated does not
intellectus divinus adaequari potuit ab exist. Similarly, the divine intellect can be in
aeterno his quae ab aeterno non fuerunt, conformity with things that did not exist
sed in tempore sunt facta; et sic ea quae eternally but were created in time; thus,
sunt in tempore, denominari possunt those in time can be said to be true from
vera ab aeterno a veritate aeterna. eternity because of the eternal truth.
Si ergo accipimus veritatem creatorum If we take truth, therefore, as meaning the

verorum eis inhaerentem, quam inherent truth of true created things—the
invenimus in rebus, et intellectu creato, truth we find in things and in a created
sic veritas non est aeterna, nec rerum, intellect—then truth is not eternal whether it
nec enuntiabilium; cum ipsae res, vel be that of things or that of propositions; for
intellectus, quibus ipsae veritates neither the things themselves nor the
inhaerent, non sint ab aeterno. Si autem intellect in which these truths inhere exists
accipiatur veritas verorum creatorum, from all eternity. On the other hand, if we
qua denominantur omnia vera, sicut take it to mean the truth of true created
extrinseca mensura, quae est veritas things, by which all are said to be true—
prima, sic omnium, et rerum, et their extrinsic measure, as it were, which is
enuntiabilium, et intellectuum, veritas the first truth then the truth of everything—
est aeterna; et huiusmodi veritatis of things, propositions, and intellects—is
aeternitatem venatur Augustinus in Lib. eternal. Both Augustine and Anselm search
Soliloq. et Anselmus in Monolog.; unde for an eternal truth of this sort; the latter
Anselmus in libro de veritate: intelligere writes: “You can understand how I have
potes quomodo summam veritatem in proved in my Monologion that the highest
meo Monologio probavi non habere truth does not have a beginning or end from
principium vel finem, per veritatem the truth that is in speech.”
orationis.
Haec autem veritas prima non potest This first truth must be one for all things.
esse de omnibus nisi una. In intellectu For in our intellect truth is multiplied in
enim nostro non diversificatur veritas only two ways: first, by the multiplicity of
nisi dupliciter: uno modo propter the things known, for this results in a
diversitatem cognitorum, de quibus multiplicity of conceptions upon which
diversas cognitiones habet quas diversae there follows a multiplicity of truths in our
veritates in anima consequuntur; alio soul; second, by the multiplicity of our ways
modo ex diverso modo intelligendi. of knowing, for even though Socrates’
Cursus enim Socratis est res una, sed running is one thing, the soul understands
anima quae componendo et dividendo time along with it by joining and
cointelligit tempus, ut dicitur in III de separating—as it is said in The Soul.
anima, diversimode intelligit cursum Consequently, the soul knows his running as
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Socratis ut praesentem, praeteritum, et present, as past, and as future—each in a

futurum; et secundum hoc diversas different way. Accordingly, it forms separate
conceptiones format, in quibus diversae conceptions in which separate truths are
veritates inveniuntur. Uterque autem found. In divine knowledge, however,
dictorum modorum diversitatis inveniri neither of these two kinds of diversity can
non potest in divina cognitione. Non be found. For God does not have separate
enim de diversis rebus diversas acts of knowing for separate things, but by
cognitiones habet; sed una cognitione one act He knows all, since He knows all by
cognoscit omnia, quia per unum, scilicet a single principle, that is, by His essence, as
per essentiam suam, omnia cognoscit, Dionysius points out, and He does not direct
non singulis suam cognitionem His act of knowing toward things one by
immittens, ut dicit Dionysius in libro de one. Similarly, too, His own act of knowing
divinis nominibus. Similiter etiam sua does not involve time, since it is measured
cognitio non concernit aliquod tempus, by eternity, which abstracts from all time
cum aeternitate mensuretur, quae inasmuch as it embraces all. It remains,
abstrahit ab omni tempore, omne therefore, that there are not many truths
tempus continens. Unde relinquitur from eternity, but one alone.
quod non sunt plures veritates ab
aeterno.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut 1. As Anselm explains his meaning in

Anselmus seipsum exponit in libro de another place, he said that the truth of
veritate, ideo dixit quod veritas statements is not circumscribed by a
enuntiationum non clauditur principio et beginning or end, “not because the
fine, non quia absque principio oratio statement itself has no beginning but
fuerit, sed quia non potest intelligi because no time can be conceived at which
quando oratio esset, et veritas illi the statement could exist. and truth be
deesset; illa scilicet oratio de qua absent from it.” The statement referred to
agebat, qua significatur vere aliquid esse here is one discussed previously, namely,
futurum. Unde per hoc apparet quod one by which it is truly signified that
noluit adstruere veritatem rei creatae something will take place in the future.
inhaerentem, vel orationem, esse sine Hence, it is quite clear that Anselm did not
principio et fine; sed veritatem primam, want to imply that either the truth inherent
a qua sicut a mensura extrinseca in a created thing or a proposition itself is
enuntiatio vera dicitur. without a beginning and end. Be held
simply that the first truth by which a
proposition is said to be true by a sort of
extrinsic measure is without beginning or
end.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod extra 2. Outside the mind we find two things: the
animam duo invenimus, scilicet rem thing itself, and its privations and negations.
ipsam, et negationes et privationes rei; These two are not related to truth in the
quae quidem duo non eodem modo se same way, for they do not have the same
habent ad intellectum. Res enim ipsa ex relation to intellect. Because of the species it
specie quam habet, divino intellectui possesses, the thing itself is proportioned to
adaequatur, sicut artificiatum arti; et ex the divine intellect as a product of art is to
virtute eiusdem speciei nata est sibi art. Because of the same species, moreover,
intellectum nostrum adaequare, in the thing is able to conform our intellect to
quantum, per similitudinem sui it, in so far as its likeness, being received
receptam in anima, cognitionem de se into the soul, causes the thing itself to be
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facit. Sed non ens extra animam known. But non-being, considered outside
consideratum, neque habet aliquid unde the soul, has nothing by which it can be
intellectui divino coaequetur, neque proportioned to the divine intellect or cause
unde cognitionem sui faciat in intellectu itself to be known in our intellects. Hence, if
nostro. Unde quod intellectui cuicumque non-being is in conformity with any
aequetur, non est ex ipso non ente, sed intellect, it is not because of itself but
ex ipso intellectu, qui rationem non entis because of the intellect which forms within
accipit in seipso. itself the notion of non-being.
Res ergo quae est aliquid positive extra Anything existing positively outside the
animam, habet aliquid in se unde vera soul has something in itself by which it can
dici possit. Non autem non esse rei, sed be called true; but this is not the case with
quidquid veritatis ei attribuitur est ex the nonexistence of a thing: whatever truth
parte intellectus. Cum dicitur ergo: is attributed to it comes from the intellect.
veritatem non esse, est verum; cum When it is said, therefore, “It is true that
veritas quae hic significatur, sit de non truth does not exist,” the truth here signified
ente, nihil habet nisi in intellectu. Unde has no reality except in the intellect, since it
ad destructionem veritatis quae est in re, is about a non-being. Hence, from the fact
non sequitur nisi esse veritatem quae est that the truth in a thing is destroyed nothing
in intellectu. Et ita patet quod ex hoc follows except that there is a truth which is
non potest concludi nisi quod veritas in the intellect. And so it is clear that from
quae est in intellectu, est aeterna; et this argument we can conclude only that the
oportet utique quod sit in intellectu truth which is in the intellect is eternal. This
aeterno; et haec est veritas prima. Unde truth must, of course, be in an eternal
ex praedicta ratione ostenditur, sola intellect, and it is the first truth.
veritas prima esse aeterna. Consequently, from the argument given only
the first truth is shown to be eternal.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium et 3-4. The explanation just given also makes
quartum. clear the solution to the third and fourth
arguments.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod non potest 5. Truth, taken without any qualification,
intelligi simpliciter veritatem non esse; cannot be understood as not existing; but all
potest tamen intelligi nullam veritatem created truth can be conceived as not
creatam esse, sicut et potest intelligi existing, just as it can be conceived that no
nullam creaturam esse. Intellectus enim creature exists. For the intellect can
potest intelligere se non esse et se non conceive itself as not existing and not
intelligere, quamvis numquam intelligat understanding, even though it can never
sine hoc quod sit vel intelligat; non enim conceive without existing or understanding.
oportet quod quidquid intellectus It is not necessary, however, that, in its act
intelligendo habet, intelligendo of understanding, the intellect understand
intelligat, quia non semper reflectitur everything that it has in its act of
super seipsum; et ideo non est understanding, because it does not always
inconveniens, si veritatem creatam, sine reflect upon itself. Hence, there is no
qua non potest intelligere, intelligat non contradiction if it understands created truth
esse. as not existing, even though, without it, it
cannot understand.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod illud quod 6. Since the future as such is not, and the
est futurum, in quantum est futurum, past as such is not, the same reasoning holds
non est, et similiter quod est for the truth of the past and future as for the
praeteritum, in quantum huiusmodi. truth of non-being. From this, as has been
Unde eadem ratio est de veritate said, the eternity of no truth other than the
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praeteriti et futuri, sicut et de veritate first can be concluded.

non entis; ex qua non potest concludi
aeternitas alicuius veritatis, nisi primae,
ut dictum est supra.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod verbum 7. The words of Augustine must be

Augustini est intelligendum, quod illa understood in the sense that the truths
sunt aeterna secundum quod sunt in mentioned are eternal in so far as they are in
mente divina; vel accipit aeternum pro the divine mind. Or Augustine takes eternal
perpetuo. in the sense of perpetual.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod quamvis 8. Although a true proposition can be made

enuntiatio vera fiat de ente et de non about being and non-being, being and non-
ente, non tamen ens et non ens eodem being are not similarly related to truth, as is
modo se habent ad veritatem, ut ex clear from what was said above. From it,
praedictis patet; ex quibus patet solutio also, the solution to this difficulty is clear.
eius quod obiicitur.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod ab aeterno 9. Although God knew many propositions

scivit Deus plura enuntiabilia, sed tamen from eternity, He knew them by one act of
illa plura scivit una cognitione. Unde ab knowing. Hence, from eternity there was
aeterno non fuit nisi una veritas, per only one truth by which the divine cognition
quam divina cognitio vera fuit de rebus was true of many things that would come
pluribus futuris in tempore. about in time.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod sicut ex 10. As is clear from our previous discussion,
praedictis patet, intellectus non solum intellect is in conformity not only with
adaequatur his quae sunt in actu, sed things actually existing but also with those
etiam his quae actu non sunt, praecipue not actually existing—especially the divine
intellectus divinus, cui nihil est intellect to which the past and the future are
praeteritum et futurum. Unde quamvis the same. Hence, although things did not
res non fuerint ab aeterno in propria exist from eternity in their own proper
natura, intellectus tamen divinus fuit nature, the divine intellect was conformed
adaequatus rebus in propria natura with things in their proper nature even
futuris in tempore; et ideo veram though they would come into being in time.
cognitionem habuit de rebus ab aeterno In this way, from eternity, God had true
etiam in propria natura, quamvis rerum knowledge of things, even in their proper
veritates ab aeterno non fuerint. natures, although the truths of things did not
exist from eternity.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod 11. Truth finds its formal perfection in the
quamvis ratio veritatis compleatur in intellect, but a thing does not. Hence,
intellectu, non tamen ratio rei in although we must concede without
intellectu completur. Unde quamvis qualification that the truth of all things was
concedatur simpliciter, quod veritas from eternity, since it was in the divine
rerum omnium fuit ab aeterno, per hoc intellect, we cannot concede without
quod fuit in intellectu divino; non tamen qualification that there were true things
potest concedi simpliciter quod res from eternity merely because they existed in
verae fuerint ab aeterno, propter hoc the divine intellect.
quod fuerunt in intellectu divino.
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Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod illud 12. The definition refers to divine justice;
intelligitur de iustitia divina; vel si or, if it refers to human justice, then it is
intelligatur de iustitia humana, tunc said to be perpetual in the way in which
dicitur esse perpetua, sicut et res natural things are said to be perpetual. For
naturales dicuntur esse perpetuae, sicut example, we say that fire always moves
dicimus quod ignis semper movetur upwards, unless impeded, because of its
sursum propter inclinationem naturae, natural inclination. Now, because a virtue is,
nisi impediatur; et quia virtus, ut dicit as Cicero says, “a habit resembling a nature
Tullius, est habitus in modum naturae and in harmony with reason,” in so far as
rationi consentaneus; quantum ex natura the nature of the virtue goes, it has an
virtutis est, habet indeficientem unfailing inclination to its act, even though
inclinationem ad actum suum, quamvis this is sometimes impeded. Hence, in the
aliquando impediatur; et ideo etiam in Digest one reads that justice is: “the
principio Digestorum dicitur, quod constant and perpetual will to give each one
iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas his due.” However, the truth which is a part
unicuique ius suum tribuens. Et tamen of justice is found in the testimony of legal
veritas de qua nunc loquimur, non est trials. But we are not now discussing that
pars iustitiae, sed veritas quae est in kind of truth.
confessionibus in iudicio faciendis.
Ad tertium decimum dicendum, quod 13. The statement that a universal is

hoc quod dicitur, universale perpetuum perpetual and incorruptible is explained by
esse et incorruptibile, Avicenna Avicenna in two ways. First, a universal is
dupliciter exponit: uno modo ut dicatur said to be incorruptible and perpetual
esse perpetuum et incorruptibile, ratione because, according to those who hold the
particularium, quae nunquam inceperunt eternity of the world, particulars had no
nec deficient secundum tenentes beginning and will have no end. For,
aeternitatem mundi; generatio enim ad according to the philosophers, generation is
hoc est, secundum philosophos ut for the purpose of conserving the perpetual
salvetur perpetuum esse in specie, quod existence of the species—since it cannot be
in individuo salvari non potest. Alio preserved by the individual. Second, a
modo ut dicatur esse perpetuum, quia universal is said to be perpetual in so far as
non corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens it does not cease of itself but accidentally
ad corruptionem individui. —because of the corruption of the
individual.
Ad quartum decimum dicendum, quod 14. A thing is predicated of another

aliquid attribuitur alicui per se essentially in two ways. First, it is done
dupliciter. Uno modo positive, sicut igni positively, as when we say of fire that it is
attribuitur ferri sursum; et a tali per se carried upwards. A thing gets its name from
magis denominatur aliquid quam ab illo this kind of essential predicate rather than
quod est per accidens; magis enim from an accidental predicate; for we say
dicimus ignem sursum ferri, et esse rather that fire is carried upwards and
eorum quae sursum feruntur, quam belongs to the class of things carried
eorum quae deorsum, quamvis ignis per upwards than that it belongs to the class of
accidens aliquando deorsum feratur, ut those that are carried downwards, even
patet in ferro ignito. though it may happen, accidentally, that fire
Quandoque vero attribuitur aliquid per is carried downwards—as would evidently
se alicui per modum remotionis, per hoc be the case of red-hot iron.
scilicet quod removentur ab eo illa quae The second type of essential predication is
nata sunt contrariam dispositionem by “removal”—when there is removed from
inducere. Unde si per accidens aliquid a thing those things which bring on a
eorum adveniat, illa dispositio contraria contrary disposition. If one of those things
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simpliciter enunciabitur; sicut unitas per should happen to be present, the contrary
se attribuitur materiae primae, non per disposition will be predicated absolutely.
positionem alicuius formae unientis, sed For example, unity is predicated essentially
per remotionem formarum of first matter, not by positing some
diversificantium. Unde quando unifying form, but by removing diversifying
adveniunt formae distinguentes forms. Hence, when forms occur which
materiam, magis simpliciter dicitur esse differentiate matter, we say, without
plures materias quam unam. Et sic est in qualification, that there are several matters
proposito; non enim dicitur universale rather than that there is only one. Such is the
incorruptibile, quasi habeat aliquam case in the difficulty; for a universal is said
formam incorruptionis, sed quia non to be incorruptible, not because it possesses
conveniunt ei secundum se dispositiones some form giving it incorruptibility, but
materiales, quae sunt causa corruptionis because those material qualities which cause
in individuis; unde universale in rebus corruption in individuals do not belong to it
particularibus existens simpliciter as a universal. Hence, a universal existing in
dicitur corrumpi in hoc et in illo. particular things is said, without
qualification, to be corrupted in this or that
individual.
Ad quintum decimum dicendum, quod 15. All genera as such, with the exception of
cum alia genera, in quantum huiusmodi, relation, posit something in reality. For
aliquid ponant in rerum natura example, quantity by its very nature posits
(quantitas enim ex hoc ipso quod something. But relation, alone, because of
quantitas est, aliquid dicit), sola relatio what it is, does not posit anything in reality,
non habet, ex hoc quod est huiusmodi, for what it predicates is not something but to
quod aliquid ponat in rerum natura, quia something. Hence, there are certain relations
non praedicat aliquid, sed ad aliquid. which posit nothing in reality, but only in
Unde inveniuntur quaedam relationes, reason. This occurs in four ways, as can be
quae nihil in rerum natura ponunt, sed in seen in the writings of the Philosopher and
ratione tantum; quod quidem Avicenna.
quadrupliciter contingit, ut ex dictis First, there occurs a relation merely in
philosophi et Avicennae sumi potest. reason when a thing is referred to itself; for
Uno modo, ut quando aliquid ad example, when we say that a thing is
seipsum refertur, ut cum dicitur idem identical with itself. If this relation posited
eidem idem; si enim haec relatio aliquid something in reality in addition to the thing
in rerum natura poneret additum ei quod which is declared to be identical with itself,
dicitur idem, esset in infinitum we should have an infinite process in
procedere in relationibus, quia ipsa relations; for the very relation by which
relatio per quam aliqua res diceretur something is said to be identical with itself
eadem, esset eadem sibi per aliquam would also be identical with itself through
relationem, et sic in infinitum. Secundo, an added relation, and so on to infinity.
quando ipsa relatio ad aliquid refertur. Second, a relation existing only in reason
Non enim potest dici quod paternitas occurs when the relation itself is referred to
referatur ad subiectum suum per something. For example, one cannot say that
aliquam relationem mediam, quia illa paternity is referred to its subject by some
etiam relatio media indigeret alia media intermediate relation; for that mediate
relatione, et sic in infinitum. Unde illa relation would need another intermediate
relatio quae significatur in comparatione relation, and so on to infinity. Consequently,
paternitatis ad subiectum, non est in the relation signified when paternity is
rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum. compared to its subject is not real but only
Tertio, quando unum relativorum pendet rational. Third, a relation existing in reason
ab altero, et non e converso, sicut alone occurs when one of the related things
scientia dependet a scibili, et non e depends on the other and not conversely.
converso; unde relatio scientiae ad For example, knowledge depends on the
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scibile est aliquid in rerum natura, non thing known but not the other way about.
autem relatio scibilis ad scientiam, sed Hence, the relation of knowledge to a thing
in ratione tantum. Quarto, quando ens known is something real, but the relation of
comparatur ad non ens; ut cum dicimus, the thing known to knowledge is merely
quod nos sumus priores his qui sunt rational. Fourth, a rational relation occurs
futuri post nos; alias sequeretur quod when a being is compared with a non-being.
possent esse infinitae relationes in For example, we say that we are prior to
eodem, si generatio in infinitum those who are to come after us. If this were
protenderetur in futurum. a real relation, it would follow (if future
Ex duobus igitur ultimis apparet quod generations were infinite) that there could
relatio illa prioritatis nihil ponit in rerum be an infinite number of relations in the
natura, sed in intellectu tantum; tum same thing.
quia Deus non dependet a creaturis, tum From the last two types it is clear that that
quia talis prioritas dicit comparationem relation of priority posits nothing in reality
entis ad non ens. Unde ex hoc non but only in the intellect, because God does
sequitur quod sit aliqua veritas aeterna, not depend on creatures and because such a
nisi in intellectu divino, qui solus est priority is a relation of being to non-being.
aeternus; et haec est veritas prima. From this argument, therefore, it does not
follow that there is an eternal truth except in
the divine intellect, which alone is eternal.
This is the first truth.
Ad sextum decimum dicendum, quod 16. Although God is prior by nature to

quamvis Deus natura prior sit rebus created beings, it does not follow that this
creatis, non tamen sequitur quod illa relation is real. Since it arises merely from a
relatio sit relatio naturae; sed quia consideration of what is naturally prior and
intelligitur ex consideratione naturae, what is naturally posterior—in the way in
eius quod prius dicitur, et eius quod which a thing known is said to be naturally
posterius dicitur; sicut et scibile dicitur prior to knowledge—the relation of the
prius natura quam scientia, quamvis thing known to knowledge is not a real
relatio scibilis ad scientiam non sit relation.
aliquid in rerum natura.
Ad septimum decimum dicendum, quod 17. The statement that, even when
cum dicitur: significatione non existente signification does not exist, it is
rectum est aliquid significari; intelligitur nevertheless correct that something is
secundum ordinationem rerum in signified, is taken with respect to the order
intellectu divino existentem; sicut arca of things existing in the divine intellect. For
non existente rectum est arcam example, even when a trunk does not exist,
cooperculum habere, secundum it is correct to say that a trunk has a lid
dispositionem artis in artifice. Unde nec according to the plan conceived by the
ex hoc haberi potest quod alia veritas sit craftsman. Consequently, this argument also
aeterna quam prima. does not prove that there is an eternal truth
other than the first.
Ad duodevicesimum dicendum, quod 18. The intelligible character of the true is

ratio veri fundatur supra ens. Quamvis based upon being. Although several persons
autem in divinis ponantur plures and properties are posited in God, only one
personae et proprietates; non tamen act of being is posited in Him, for the act of
ponitur ibi nisi unum esse, quia esse in being is predicated essentially of Him; so,
divinis nonnisi essentialiter dicitur; et all those propositions, such as that the
omnium istorum enuntiabilium: patrem Father is or generates, and that the Son is or
esse vel generare, et filium esse vel is generated, and so on,—in so far as they
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genitum esse et similium; secundum are related to the divine essence—all have
quod ad rem referuntur, est veritas una, one truth, the first and eternal truth.
quae est prima et aeterna veritas.
Ad undevicesimum dicendum, quod 19. Although that by which the Father is

quamvis alio pater sit pater, et filius sit Father, and that by which the Son is Son, are
filius, quia hoc est paternitate, illud different, since one is paternity, the other,
filiatione; tamen idem est quo pater est, filiation, that by which the Father is, and
et quo filius est, quia utrumque est per that by which the Son is, is the same. For
essentiam divinam, quae est una. Ratio each is because of the divine essence, which
autem veritatis, non fundatur super is one. Moreover, the intelligible character
rationem paternitatis et filiationis in of truth is not based upon the character of
quantum huiusmodi, sed super rationem paternity and sonship as such, but upon the
entitatis; paternitas autem et filiatio sunt character of being. Here, moreover,
una essentia et ideo una est veritas paternity and sonship are the one essence.
utriusque. Therefore, there is one truth for both.
Ad vigesimum dicendum, quod 20. The property predicated by man and

proprietas quam praedicat hoc nomen capable of laughter is not the same
homo, et hoc nomen risibile, non sunt essentially, nor does it have one act of
idem per essentiam, nec habent unum existence, as is the case of paternity and
esse, sicut est de paternitate et filiatione; sonship. Hence, there is no analogy.
et ideo non est simile.
Ad vigesimum primum dicendum, quod 22. The divine intellect knows things, no
intellectus divinus, quantumcumque matter how diverse they be, by one act of
diversa non cognoscit nisi unica knowing, even if they have different truths
cognitione, et quae in seipsis habent considered in themselves. Hence, He knows
diversas veritates. Unde multo amplius with only one act of knowing all the various
non cognoscit nisi una cognitione omnia propositions about the persons even to a
huiusmodi quae de personis greater degree. Consequently, there is only
intelliguntur. Unde etiam omnium one truth for these, also.
eorum non est nisi una veritas.
ARTICLE VI
In the sixth article we ask:

Is created truth immutable?
[Parallel readings: S.T., I, 16, 8; I Sent., 19,5, 3; Quodl., X, 4,7.]
Sexto quaeritur an veritas creata sit Difficulties

immutabilis.
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that it is, for
Anselmus in Lib. de veritate dicit: video 1. Anselm says: “By this argument, I see
hac ratione probari veritatem immobilem that truth persists immutable.”’ The
permanere. Praemissa autem ratio fuit de argument he refers to is that taken from the
veritate significationis, ut ex praemissis, truth of Signification, which we discussed
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apparet. Ergo veritas enuntiabilium est earlier. Hence, the truth of propositions is
immutabilis; et eadem ratione veritas rei immutable; for the same reason, so is the
quam significat. truth of the thing which it signifies.
Praeterea, si veritas enuntiationis 2. If the truth of a proposition changes; it

mutatur, maxime mutatur ad mutationem changes especially when a thing changes.
rei. Sed re mutata, veritas propositionis But when a thing has been changed, the
manet. Ergo veritas enuntiationis est truth of the proposition remains. Therefore,
immutabilis. Probatio mediae. Veritas, the truth of a proposition is immutable.
secundum Anselmum est rectitudo Proof of the minor: Truth according to
quaedam, in quantum aliquid implet hoc Anselm is “a certain correctness
quod accepit in mente divina. Sed haec —inasmuch as the thing fulfills that which
propositio: Socrates sedet; accepit in it receives in the divine mind. But the fact
mente divina ut significaret sessionem that the proposition, “Socrates is sitting,”
Socratis, quam significat etiam Socrate signifies the sitting of Socrates comes from
non sedente. Ergo etiam Socrate non the divine mind, and this proposition will
sedente manet in ea veritas; et ita veritas signify his sitting even when Socrates does
praedictae propositionis non mutatur, not sit. Therefore, even when Socrates does
etiam si res mutetur. not sit, truth remains in that proposition.
Consequently, the truth of the proposition is
not changed, even if the thing be changed.
Praeterea, si veritas mutatur, hoc non 3. If truth is changed, this can be only
potest esse nisi mutatis his quibus veritas because the subjects in which truth inheres
inest, sicut nec aliquae formae mutari have previously been changed—just as
dicuntur nisi suis subiectis mutatis. Sed certain forms cannot be said to be changed
veritas non mutatur ad mutationem unless their subjects have changed. But
verorum, quia destructis veris, adhuc truth is not changed with the change of true
remanet veritas, ut Augustinus et things; for, as both Augustine and Anselm
Anselmus probant. Ergo veritas est prove, when true things have been
omnino immutabilis. destroyed, truth still remains. Therefore,
truth is entirely immutable.
Praeterea, veritas rei causa est veritatis 4. The truth of a thing is the cause of the
propositionis; ex eo enim quod res est truth of a proposition, for a statement is
vel non est, dicitur oratio vera vel falsa. said to be true or false in so far as a thing
Sed veritas rei est immutabilis. Ergo exists or does not exist. But the truth of a
veritas propositionis. Probatio mediae. thing is immutable. Therefore, the truth of a
Anselmus in Lib. de veritate probat proposition is also immutable. Proof of the
veritatem enuntiationis immobilem minor: Anselm proves that the truth of a
permanere, secundum quam implet illud proposition remains fixed to the extent that
quod accepit in mente divina. Sed it fulfills that which it has received in the
similiter quaelibet res implet illud quod divine mind. But each thing likewise
accepit in mente divina ut haberet. Ergo fulfills that which it has been ordained in
cuiuslibet rei veritas est immutabilis. the divine mind to have. Therefore, the
truth of each and every thing is immutable.
Praeterea, illud quod semper manet omni 5. That which always remains when every
mutatione perfecta, nunquam mutatur; in change has been made is never changed.
alteratione enim colorum non dicimus For example, when colors are changed, we
superficiem mutari, quia manet qualibet do not say that the surface is changed, for it
mutatione colorum facta. Sed veritas remains no matter what change of colors is
manet in re, qualibet rei mutatione facta, made. Now, truth remains in a thing, no
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quia ens et verum convertuntur. Ergo matter what change a thing undergoes, for
veritas est immutabilis. being and the true are interchangeable.
Therefore, truth is immutable.
Praeterea, ubi est eadem causa, et idem 6. Where there is the same cause, there is
effectus. Sed eadem est causa veritatis the same effect. But the same thing is the
harum trium propositionum: Socrates cause of the truth of these three
sedet; sedebit; et sedit: scilicet Socratis propositions: “Socrates sits,” “Socrates will
sessio. Ergo eadem est earum veritas. sit,” and “Socrates sat”—namely, the sitting
Sed si unum trium praedictorum est of Socrates. Therefore, the truth of each is
verum, oportet similiter alterum duorum the same. Now, if one of these three
semper esse verum; si enim aliquando propositions is true, one of the other two
est verum: Socrates sedet; semper fuit et must always be true; for, if at some time it
erit verum: Socrates sedit vel Socrates is true that Socrates sits, it always was true
sedebit. Ergo una veritas trium and will be true that Socrates sat or will sit.
propositionum semper uno modo se Therefore, one truth remains constant for
habet, et ita est immutabilis; ergo eadem the three propositions, and, consequently, is
ratione quaelibet alia veritas. immutable. For the same reason, any other
truth is immutable.
Sed contra, To the Contrary
mutatis causis mutantur effectus. Sed res, Effects are changed when their causes are
quae sunt causa veritatis propositionis, changed. But things, which cause the truth
mutantur. Ergo et propositionum veritas of a proposition, undergo changes.
mutatur. Therefore, the truth of propositions
changes.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum est, quod aliquid dicitur A thing is said to be changed in two ways.
mutari dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est First, because it is the subject of a change,
subiectum mutationis, sicut dicimus as when we say that a body is changeable.
corpus esse mutabile, et sic nulla forma In this meaning, no form is said to be
est mutabilis; et sic dicitur quod forma changeable. Consequently, a form is said to
est invariabili essentia consistens; unde, be something steadfast in an unchanging
cum veritas significetur per modum essence; since truth consists in a form, the
formae, praesens quaestio non est, an present question is not whether truth is
veritas sit mutabilis hoc modo. Alio mutable in this sense. Second, a thing is
modo dicitur aliquid mutari, quia said to be changed because something else
secundum ipsum fit mutatio, sicut changes according to it, as when we say
dicimus albedinem mutari, quia that whiteness is changed because a body is
secundum ipsam corpus alteratur; et sic changed in its whiteness. It is in this sense
quaeritur de veritate, an sit mutabilis. that we ask whether or not truth is
changeable.
Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod To clarify this point, we should note that
illud secundum quod est mutatio, the thing according to which there is a
quandoque quidem mutari dicitur, change is sometimes said to be changed
quandoque autem non. Quando enim est and sometimes not. For, when it is inhering
inhaerens ei quod movetur secundum in a thing which is affected in its respect,
ipsum, tunc et ipsum mutari dicitur, sicut then it is said to be changed itself—as
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albedo vel quantitas mutari dicuntur, whiteness or quantity is said to be changed

quando aliquid secundum ipsa mutatur, when something is changed in their respect
eo quod ipsamet secundum hanc because they succeed each other in a
mutationem succedunt sibi invicem in subject. When, however, that according to
subiecto. Quando autem illud, secundum which the change occurs is extrinsic, the
quod est mutatio est extrinsecum, tunc in thing itself is not changed but remains
illa mutatione non movetur, sed unaffected throughout the whole change.
immobile perseverat, sicut locus non For example, a place is not said to be
dicitur moveri quando aliquis secundum moved when a thing moves with respect to
locum movetur. Unde et in III Physic. it. For this reason, it is said in the Physics
dicitur, quod locus est immobilis that place is “the unchangeable boundary of
terminus continentis, eo quod per the container,” because local motion does
localem motum non dicitur esse not mean a succession of loci in regard to
successio locorum in uno locato, sed one located body, but a succession of many
magis multorum locatorum in uno loco. located bodies in one place.
Sed formarum inhaerentium, quae mutari Now, there are two ways in which inhering
dicuntur ad mutationem subiecti, duplex forms are said to be changed with respect to
est mutationis modus; aliter enim a change of their subject; for general forms
dicuntur mutari formae generales, et are said to be changed in one way and
aliter formae speciales. Forma enim special forms in another. After a change, a
specialis post mutationem non remanet special form does not remain the same
eadem nec secundum esse nec secundum either according to its act of existing or
rationem, sicut albedo, facta alteratione, according to its intelligible character. For
nullo modo manet; sed forma generalis example, when a qualitative change has
facta mutatione manet eadem secundum been made, whiteness does not remain at
rationem, sed non secundum esse; sicut all. But, after a change has been made, a
facta mutatione de albo in nigrum, manet general form retains the same intelligible
quidem color secundum communem character, though not the same act of
rationem coloris, sed non eadem species existing. For example, after a change from
coloris. white to black has taken place, color,
according to the general character of color,
remains unchanged; but the same species of
color does not remain.
Dictum est autem superius quod aliquid It was noted previously,” however, that a
denominatur verum veritate prima quasi thing is said to be true by the first truth as
mensura extrinseca, sed veritate by an extrinsic measure; but it is said to be
inhaerente quasi mensura intrinseca. true by an inherent truth as by an intrinsic
Unde res creatae variantur quidem in measure. Consequently, created things
participatione veritatis primae; ipsa change in their participation of the first
tamen veritas prima, secundum quam truth, yet the first truth itself, according to
dicuntur vera, nullo modo mutatur; et which they are said to be true, does not
hoc est quod Augustinus dicit in Lib. de change in any way. This is what Augustine
libero Arbit.: mentes nostrae aliquando says: “Our minds sometimes see more,
plus, aliquando minus vident de ipsa sometimes less, of truth itself; but truth
veritate; sed ipsa in se manens nec itself remains, and neither increases nor
proficit nec deficit. decreases.”
Si autem accipiamus veritatem If we take truth as inherent in things,

inhaerentem rebus, sic veritas mutari however, then truth is said to be changed
dicitur, secundum quod aliqua secundum inasmuch as some things are said to be
veritatem mutantur. Unde, ut prius changed with respect to truth. For, as
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dictum est, veritas in creaturis invenitur pointed out previously, truth in creatures is
in duobus: in rebus ipsis, et in intellectu: found in two different subjects: in things
veritas enim actionis sub veritate rei themselves and in intellect. The truth of an
comprehenditur, et veritas enuntiationis action is included in the truth of a thing,
sub veritate intellectus quam significat. and the truth of a proposition is included in
Res autem dicitur vera et per the truth of the understanding which it
comparationem ad intellectum divinum signifies. A thing, however, is said to be
et humanum. true by its relation to intellect, divine and
human.
Si ergo accipiatur veritas rei secundum Consequently, if the truth of a thing is

ordinem ad intellectum divinum, tunc considered according to its reference to the
quidem mutatur veritas rei mutabilis non divine intellect, then, indeed, the truth of a
in falsitatem sed in aliam veritatem, changeable thing is changed into another
veritas enim est forma maxime generalis, truth, but not into falsity. For truth is a most
cum verum et ens convertantur: unde general form because the true and being are
sicut facta qualibet mutatione res manet interchangeable. Hence, just as, even after
ens, quamvis alia secundum aliam any change has been made, a thing
formam, per quam habet esse; ita semper nevertheless remains a being, although it is
remanet vera, sed alia veritate, quia, other as a result of the other form by which
quamcumque formam, vel privationem it has existence; so, also, a thing always
acquirat per mutationem, secundum eam remains true—but by another truth; for, no
intellectui divino conformatur, qui eam matter what form or what privation it
ita cognoscit ut est secundum acquires through the change, it is
quamcumque dispositionem. conformed in that respect to the divine
intellect, which knows it as it is, whatever
may be its state.
Si autem consideretur veritas rei in If, however, the truth of a thing is

ordine ad intellectum humanum, vel e considered in its reference to a human
converso, tunc quandoque fit mutatio de intellect, or conversely, then sometimes
veritate in falsitatem, quandoque autem there is a change from truth into falsity,
de una veritate in aliam. Cum enim sometimes from one truth to another. For
veritas sit adaequatio rei et intellectus, ab truth is “an equation of thing and intellect”;
aequalibus autem si aequalia tollantur, and, if equal amounts are taken from things
adhuc aequalia remanent quamvis non that are equal, these things remain equal,
eadem aequalitate, oportet quod quando although the equality is not the same.
similiter mutatur intellectus et res, Hence, when intellect and thing are
remaneat quidem veritas, sed alia; sicut similarly changed, truth remains; but it is
si Socrate sedente intelligatur Socrates another truth. For example, when Socrates
sedere, et postmodum non sedente sits, what is understood is that Socrates is
intelligatur non sedere. Sed quia ab uno sitting. Afterwards, when he does not sit,
aequalium si aliquid tollatur, et nihil a what is understood is that he is not sitting.
reliquo, vel si ab utroque inaequalia But, if something is taken from one of two
tollantur, necesse est inaequalitatem equal things, and nothing from the other, or
provenire, quae se habet ad falsitatem if unequal amounts are taken from each,
sicut aequalitas ad veritatem; then inequality must result; and this
corresponds to falsity, just as equality
corresponds to truth.
inde est quod si intellectu vero existente Consequently, if an intellect is true, and it is
mutetur res non mutato intellectu, vel e not changed when a thing is changed, or
converso, aut utrumque mutetur, sed non vice versa, or if each is changed but not
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similiter, proveniet falsitas; et sic erit similarly, falsity results, and there will be a
mutatio de veritate in falsitatem, sicut si change from truth to falsity. For example,
Socrate existente albo, intelligatur esse if, when Socrates is white, he is understood
albus, verus est intellectus; si autem to be white, the intellect is true. If,
postea intelligat eum esse nigrum, however, the intellect later understands him
Socrate albo remanente, vel e converso to be black, although Socrates still is white;
Socrate mutato in nigredinem, adhuc or if, conversely, he is still understood to be
albus intelligatur; vel eo mutato in white, although he has turned black; or if,
pallorem, intelligatur esse rubeus, when he has turned pale, he is understood
falsitas erit in intellectu. Et sic patet to be reddish—then there will be falsity in
qualiter veritas mutetur, et qualiter the intellect. Accordingly, it is clear how
veritas non mutatur. truth changes and how it does not.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod 1. Anselm is speaking here of the first truth
Anselmus ibi loquitur de veritate prima, according to which all things are said to be
prout secundum eam omnia dicuntur true as by an extrinsic measure.
vera quasi mensura extrinseca.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quia 2.Since the intellect reflects upon itself and
intellectus reflectitur in seipsum, et knows itself as it knows other things (as
intelligit se sicut et alias res, ut dicitur in said in The Soul), the things belonging to
III de anima; ideo quae ad intellectum the intellect as regards the intelligible
pertinent, secundum quod ad rationem character of truth can be considered in two
veritatis spectat, possunt dupliciter ways. First, in so far as they are things; in
considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod this way, truth is predicated of them in the
sunt res quaedam; et sic eodem modo same way in which it is predicated of other
dicitur de eis veritas sicut de aliis rebus; things. Consequently, as a thing is said to
ut scilicet, sicut res dicitur vera, quia be true because it fulfills what was assigned
implet hoc quod accepit in mente divina to it in the divine mind by retaining its own
retinendo naturam suam, ita enuntiatio nature, so a proposition is also said to be
dicatur vera retinendo naturam suam true by retaining its own nature, which was
quae est ei dispensata in mente divina, also allotted to it in the divine mind; and
nec potest ab ea removeri, enuntiatione this cannot be taken from it as long as the
ipsa manente. Alio modo secundum proposition itself remains. Second, these
quod comparantur ad res intellectas, et may be considered in their reference to
sic dicitur enuntiatio vera quando things that are known. In this way, a
adaequatur rei; et talis veritas mutatur ut proposition is said to be true when it is
dictum est. proportioned to a thing. This kind of truth
is changed, as has been said.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod veritas quae 3. Truth which remains after true things
remanet destructis rebus veris, est veritas have been destroyed is the first truth, which
prima, quae etiam rebus mutatis non does not change even when things change.
mutatur.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod manente re, 4. As long as a thing remains, no change

non potest fieri circa eam mutatio can take place in it concerning its
quantum ad ea quae sunt sibi essentialia, essentials. For example, it is essential to a
sicut enuntiationi est essentiale ut proposition that it signify that which it has
significet illud ad quod significandum est been made to signify. Consequently, it does
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instituta. Unde non sequitur quod veritas not follow that the truth of a thing is in no
rei nullo modo sit mutabilis, sed quod sit way changeable, but only that it is
immutabilis quantum ad essentialia rei unchangeable with respect to the essentials
remanente re. In quibus tamen accidit of the thing while the thing remains.
mutatio per rei corruptionem. Sed Nevertheless, in those cases in which a
quantum ad accidentalia, mutatio potest change occurs through corruption of a
accidere etiam manente re; et ita thing, but only with respect to its
quantum ad accidentalia potest fieri accidentals, this accidental change can take
mutatio veritatis rei. place even though the thing remains. In this
way, a change can take place in the truth of
a thing in regard to its accidentals.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod facta omni 5. When every change has been made, truth
mutatione, manet veritas, sed non eadem, remains, but not the same truth—as is clear
ut ex praedictis patet. from what has been said.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod identitas 6. The identity of the truth depends not
veritatis non tantum dependet ex only on the identity of the thing but also on
identitate rei, sed ex identitate the identity of the intellect—the same way
intellectus, sicut et identitas effectus that identity of an effect depends on the
dependet ex identitate agentis et identity of the agent and that of the patient.
patientis. Quamvis autem sit eadem res Moreover, even though the same thing is
quae significatur illis tribus signified by those three propositions, the
propositionibus, non tamen est idem understanding of each is not the same; for
intellectus earum, quia in intellectus time enters into the intellect’s conjunctive
compositione adiungitur tempus; unde operation, and the understandings of things
secundum variationem temporis sunt differ with the differences of time.
diversi intellectus.
ARTICLE VII
In the seventh article we ask:

Is truth as applied to god predicated personally or essentially?
[Parallel readings: S.T., I, 16, 5, ad 2; 39, 8.]
Septimo quaeritur utrum veritas in Difficulties

divinis dicatur essentialiter vel
personaliter
Et videtur quod dicatur personaliter. It seems that it is predicated personally, for
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Quidquid enim in divinis importat 1. In regard to God, whatever implies the

relationem principii, personaliter relation of origin is predicated personally. But
dicitur. Sed veritas est huiusmodi, ut truth belongs to this class, as is clear from
patet per Augustinum in Lib. de vera Augustine;’ for he says that the divine truth is
religione: ubi dicit, quod veritas divina “the greatest possible likeness of its source,
est summa similitudo principii sine without any unlikeness” from which falseness
ulla dissimilitudine, unde falsitas arises. Therefore, truth is predicated
oritur. Ergo veritas in divinis personally of God.
personaliter dicitur.
Praeterea, sicut nihil est sibi simile, ita 2. Just as nothing is similar to itself, so also,
nihil est sibi aequale. Sed similitudo in nothing is equal to itself. But, according to
divinis importat distinctionem Hilary, from the fact that nothing is similar to
personarum, secundum Hilarium, ex itself, likeness in God implies a distinction of
hoc quod nihil est sibi simile. Ergo persons. The same reasoning can be applied
eadem ratione, et aequalitas. Sed to equality. But truth is a certain equality.
veritas est aequalitas quaedam. Ergo Therefore, truth implies a distinction of
importat personalem distinctionem in persons in God.
divinis.
Praeterea, omne quod importat in 3. Whatever implies procession in God is

divinis emanationem, personaliter predicated personally of Him. But truth
dicitur. Sed veritas importat quamdam implies a certain procession since it signifies
emanationem, quia significat an intellectual concept just as a word does.
conceptionem intellectus, sicut et Therefore, just as the Word is predicated
verbum. Ergo, sicut et verbum personally, so also is truth.
personaliter dicitur, ita et veritas.
trium personarum est una veritas, ut Augustine says that of the three Persons there
dicit Augustinus in Lib. VIII de is but one truth. Therefore, it is something
Trinitate. Ergo est essentiale, et non essential, not personal.
personale.
REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod veritas in In regard to God, truth can be taken in two
divinis dupliciter accipi potest: uno ways: properly and, as it were,
modo proprie, alio modo quasi metaphorically. If truth is taken properly, then
metaphorice. Si enim proprie it will imply an equality of the divine intellect
accipiatur veritas, tunc importabit and of a thing. Since the first thing the divine
aequalitatem intellectus divini et rei. intellect knows is its own essence, through
Et quia intellectus divinus primo which it knows all other things, truth in God
intelligit rem quae est essentia sua, per principally implies an equality between the
quam omnia alia intelligit, ideo et divine intellect and a thing which is its
veritas in Deo principaliter importat essence; and, in a secondary sense, truth
aequalitatem intellectus divini et rei, likewise implies an equality of the divine
quae est essentia eius, et consequenter intellect with created things.
intellectus divini ad res creatas.
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Intellectus autem divinus et essentia The divine intellect and the divine essence are
sua non adaequantur ad invicem sicut not, however, made equal to each other in the
mensurans et mensuratum, cum unum way in which a measure is related to what is
non sit principium alterius, sed sunt measured, since one is not the source of the
omnino idem; unde veritas ex tali other, but both are entirely identical.
aequalitate resultans nullam principii Consequently, the truth resulting from such
rationem importat, sive accipiatur ex equality does not involve its having the
parte essentiae, sive ex parte character of a source, whether it be
intellectus, quae una et eadem ibi est; considered from the standpoint of the essence
sicuti enim ibi est idem intelligens et or from that of the intellect, since both in this
res intellecta, ita est ibi eadem veritas case are one and the same. For, just as in God
rei et veritas intellectus, sine aliqua the knower and the thing known are the same,
connotatione principii. so also in Him the truth of the thing and that
of intellect are the same, without any
connotation of origin.
Sed si accipiatur veritas intellectus But if the truth of the divine intellect be
divini secundum quod adaequatur considered in its conformity to created things,
rebus creatis, sic adhuc remanebit the same truth will still remain; for God
eadem veritas, sicut per idem intelligit knows Himself and other things through the
Deus se et alia; sed tamen additur in same means. However, there is added to the
intellectu veritatis ratio principii ad concept of truth the note of origin with
creaturas, ad quas intellectus divinus respect to creatures, to which the divine
comparatur ut mensura et causa. Omne intellect is compared as a measure and cause.
autem nomen quod in divinis rationem Moreover, in theological matters every name
principii vel quod est a principio, non which does not imply the notion of origin or
importat, vel etiam importans rationem of being from a principle is predicated
principii ad creaturas, essentialiter essentially. And even if the name implies the
dicitur. Unde in divinis si veritas notion of origin of creatures, it still is also
proprie accipiatur, essentialiter dicitur; predicated essentially. Consequently, if truth
tamen appropriatur personae filii, sicut is taken properly in whatever pertains to God,
ars et cetera quae ad intellectum it is predicated essentially; yet it is
pertinent. appropriated to the person of the Son, as are
also art and all else pertaining to intellect.
Metaphorice vel similitudinarie Truth is taken metaphorically or figuratively

accipitur veritas in divinis, quando in divine matters when we take it according to
accipimus eam ibi secundum illam that formal character by which truth is found
rationem qua invenitur in rebus creatis, in created things. For in these, truth is said to
in quibus dicitur veritas, secundum exist inasmuch as a created thing imitates its
quod res creata imitatur suum source, the divine intellect. Similarly, when
principium, scilicet intellectum truth is applied to God and is said to be the
divinum. Unde et similiter hoc modo highest possible imitation of its principle, this
veritas dicitur in divinis summa is attributed to the Son. Taken in this way,
imitatio principii, quae filio convenit; truth properly belongs to the Son and is
et secundum hanc acceptionem predicated personally; and this, too, is what
veritatis, veritas proprie convenit filio, Augustine says.
et personaliter dicitur; et sic loquitur
Augustinus in Lib. de vera religione.
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Unde patet responsio ad primum. 1. The response is clear from the reply.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod 2. When equality is referred to divine things it

aequalitas in divinis quandoque sometimes implies a relation that indicates a
importat relationem quae designat distinction of Persons—as when we say that
distinctionem personalem, sicut cum the Father and the Son are equal. In this
dicimus, quod pater et filius sunt respect a real distinction is understood in the
aequales; et secundum hoc, in nomine word equality. Sometimes, however, a real
aequalitatis, realis distinctio distinction is not understood in the word
intelligitur. Quandoque autem in equality, but merely a rational distinction, as
nomine aequalitatis non intelligitur when we say that the divine wisdom and the
realis distinctio, sed rationis tantum, divine goodness are equal. Hence, equality
sicut cum dicimus sapientiam et does not necessarily imply a distinction of
bonitatem divinam esse aequales. persons. Such also is the distinction implied
Unde non oportet quod distinctionem in the word truth, since truth is an equality of
personalem importet; et talis est intellect and essence.
aequalitas importata per nomen
veritatis, cum sit aequalitas intellectus
et essentiae.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis 3. Although truth is conceived by the

veritas sit concepta per intellectum, intellect, the notion of a concept is not
nomine tamen veritatis non exprimitur expressed by the word truth as it is by the
ratio conceptionis, sicut nomine verbi; term word. Hence, no analogy can be drawn.
unde non est simile.
ARTICLE VIII
In the eighth article we ask:

Is every other truth from the first truth?
[Parallel readings: De ver., 21, 4, ad 5; 27, 1, ad 7; S.T., I, 16, aa. 5-6; C.G., III, 47;
Quodl., X, 4,7; I Sent., 19,5, aa- 1-2; II Sent., 37, 1, 2, ad 1; X Metaph., lect. 2, nn.
1956-59.]
Octavo quaeritur utrum omnis veritas Difficulties

alia sit a veritate prima.
Istum enim fornicari est verum; sed hoc 1. Fornication is a true thing; yet it is not
non est a veritate prima. Ergo non omnis from the first truth. Therefore, not every
veritas est a veritate prima. truth is from the first truth.
Sed dicebat, quod veritas signi vel 2. The answer was given that fornication is
intellectus, secundum quam hoc dicitur said to be true by reason of the truth of the
verum, est a Deo, non autem secundum sign or concept, and this is from God. Its
quod refertur ad rem.- Sed contra, truth as a thing, however, is not from
praeter veritatem primam non solum est God.—On the contrary, besides the first
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veritas signi, aut intellectus, sed etiam truth, there is not only the truth of the sign
est veritas rei. Si ergo hoc verum non sit or of the concept, but also the truth of the
a Deo secundum quod refertur ad rem, thing. Therefore, if its truth as a thing is not
haec veritas rei non erit a Deo; et sic from God, then there is a truth of a thing not
habetur propositum, quod non omnis from God, and our proposition that not
veritas alia sit a Deo. every truth other than the first is from God
will have to be granted.
Praeterea, sequitur: iste fornicatur; ergo 3. From “He fornicates,” it follows that
istum fornicari est verum; ut fiat “fornication is true.” Therefore, a transition
descensus a veritate propositionis ad can be made from the truth of a proposition
veritatem dicti, quae exprimit veritatem to the truth of what is said, which in turn
rei. Ergo veritas praedicta consistit in expresses the truth of the thing.
hoc quod iste actus componitur isti Consequently, the truth mentioned consists
subiecto. Sed veritas dicti non esset ex in this: that that act is joined to that subject.
compositione talis actus cum subiecto, But the truth of what is said would not arise
nisi intelligeretur compositio actus sub from the conjunction of such an act with a
deformitate existentis. Ergo veritas rei subject unless the conjunction of the act,
non solum est quantum ad ipsam which has the deformity, were understood.
essentiam actus, sed etiam quantum ad Therefore, the truth of the thing regards not
deformitatem. Sed actus sub deformitate only the very essence of an act but also its
consideratus nullo modo est a Deo. Ergo deformity. But an act considered as having a
non omnis veritas rei est a Deo. deformity is by no means from God. Not all
truth of things, therefore, is from God.
Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, quod res 4. Anselm says that a thing is called true if
dicitur vera secundum quod est ut debet it is as it ought to be. Among the ways in
esse; et inter modos quibus potest dici which a thing can be said to be what it
quod debet esse res, ponit unum, ought to be he mentions one, namely, that it
secundum quem dicitur, quod res debet happens with God’s permission. Now,
esse, quia Deo permittente accidit. Sed God’s permission extends even to the
permissio Dei extendit se etiam ad deformity in an act. Therefore, the truth of
deformitatem actus. Ergo veritas rei the thing reaches as far as that deformity.
etiam ad deformitatem illam pertingit. But deformity is in no way from God.
Sed deformitas illa nullo modo est a Therefore, not every truth is from God.
Deo. Ergo non omnis veritas est a Deo.
Sed dicebat, quod sicut deformitas, vel 5. It was said, however, that just as a
privatio dicitur ens non simpliciter, sed deformity or privation cannot be called a
secundum quid, ita et dicitur habere being without qualification, but only a
veritatem, non simpliciter, sed secundum being in a certain respect, so also a
quid; et talis veritas secundum quid non deformity or privation cannot be said to
est a Deo.- Sed contra, verum addit have truth without qualification, but only in
supra ens ordinem ad intellectum. Sed a certain respect. Such a restricted truth is
deformitas vel privatio, quamvis in se not from God.—On the contrary, to being,
non sit simpliciter ens, tamen est the true adds a reference to intellect. Now,
simpliciter apprehensa per intellectum. although privation or deformity in itself is
Ergo, quamvis non habeat simpliciter not being absolutely, it is apprehended
entitatem, habet tamen simpliciter absolutely by the intellect. Therefore, even
veritatem. though it does not have entity absolutely, it
does have truth absolutely.
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Praeterea, omne secundum quid ad 6. Everything qualified is reduced to

simpliciter reducitur; sicut hoc quod est something unqualified. For example, “An
Aethiopem esse album dente, reducitur Ethiopian is white with respect to teeth” is
ad hoc, quod est dentem Aethiopis esse reduced to this: “The teeth of an Ethiopian
album simpliciter. Si ergo aliqua veritas are white without qualification.”
secundum quid, non est a Deo, non Consequently, if some limited truth is not
omnis simpliciter veritas erit a Deo; from God, then not every qualified truth
quod est absurdum. will be from God—which is absurd.
Praeterea, quod non est causa causae, 7. What is not the cause of the cause is not
non est causa effectus; sicut Deus non the cause of the effect. For example, God is
est causa deformitatis peccati, quia non not the cause of the deformity of sin, for He
est causa defectus in libero arbitrio, ex is not the cause of the defect in a free choice
quo deformitas peccati accidit. Sed sicut from which the deformity of sin arises.
esse est causa veritatis affirmativarum Now, just as the act of existing is the cause
propositionum, ita non esse of the truth of affirmative propositions, so
negativarum. Cum ergo Deus non sit non-existing is the cause of negative
causa eius quod est non esse, ut dicit propositions. Now, as Augustine says, since
Augustinus in Lib. LXXXIII God is not the cause of this non-existing, it
quaestionum, relinquitur quod Deus non follows that He is not the cause of negative
sit causa negativarum propositionum; et propositions. Hence, not every truth is from
sic non omnis veritas est a Deo. God.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in libro Solil. 8. Augustine says: “The true is that which is
quod verum est quod ita se habet ut as it appears.”3 Now, an evil thing is as it
videtur. Sed malum aliquod ita se habet appears. Therefore, something evil is true.
ut videtur. Ergo aliquod malum est But no evil is from God. Therefore, not
verum. Sed nullum malum est a Deo. every true thing is from God.
Ergo non omne verum est a Deo.
Sed dicebat, quod malum non videtur 9. But it was said that evil is not seen
per speciem mali, sed per speciem boni.- through the species of evil but through the
Sed contra. Species boni nunquam facit species of a good.—On the contrary, the
apparere nisi bonum. Si ergo malum non species of a good never makes anything
videtur nisi per speciem boni, nunquam appear but that good. Consequently, if evil
appareret malum nisi bonum; quod est is seen only through the species of a good,
falsum. evil will appear only as a good. But this is
false.
I Cor. super illud, nemo potest dicere 1. Commenting on the text, “And no man
etc., dicit Ambrosius: omne verum, a can say the Lord Jesus...” (1 Cor. 12:3),
quocumque dicatur, a spiritu sancto est. Ambrose says: “Every true thing, no matter
who says it, is from the Holy Spirit.”
Praeterea, omnis bonitas creata, est a 2. All created goodness is from the first
prima bonitate increata, quae est Deus. uncreated goodness, God. For the same
Ergo eadem ratione omnis alia veritas reason, all other truth is from the first truth,
est a prima veritate, quae est Deus. God.
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Praeterea, ratio veritatis completur in 3. The formal character of truth finds its
intellectu. Sed omnis intellectus est a completion in the intellect. But every
Deo. Ergo omnis veritas est a Deo. intellect is from God. Hence, every truth is
from God.
Praeterea, Augustinus in Lib. Solil. dicit 4. Augustine says: “The true is that which
quod verum est id quod est. Sed omne is.” But every act of existing is from God.
esse est a Deo. Ergo omnis veritas. Therefore, every truth is from Him.
Praeterea, sicut verum convertitur cum 5. just as the one is interchangeable with
ente, ita et unum et e converso. Sed being, so is the true, and conversely. But all
omnis unitas est a prima unitate ut dicit unity is from the first unity, as Augustine
Augustinus in libro de vera religione; says. Therefore, every truth also is from the
ergo et omnis veritas est a prima first truth.
veritate.
REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod in rebus As is clear from what has been said among
creatis invenitur veritas in rebus et in created things truth is found both in things
intellectu, ut ex dictis patet: in intellectu and in intellect. In the intellect it is found
quidem secundum quod adaequatur according to the conformity which the
rebus quarum notionem habet; in rebus intellect has with the things whose notions
autem secundum quod imitantur it has. In things it is found according as they
intellectum divinum, qui est earum imitate the divine intellect, which is their
mensura, sicut ars est mensura omnium measure—as art is the measure of all
artificiatorum; et alio modo secundum products of art—and also in another way,
quod sunt natae facere de se veram according as they can by their very nature
apprehensionem in intellectu humano, bring about a true apprehension of
qui per res mensuratur, ut dicitur in X themselves in the human intellect, which, as
Metaph. Res autem existens extra is said in the Metaphysics, is measured by
animam, per formam suam imitatur things. By its form a thing existing outside
artem divini intellectus, et per eandem the soul imitates the art of the divine
nata est facere veram apprehensionem in intellect; and, by the same form, it is such
intellectu humano, per quam etiam that it can bring about a true apprehension
formam unaquaeque res esse habet; unde in the human intellect. Through this form,
veritas rerum existentium includit in sui moreover, each and every thing has its act
ratione entitatem earum, et superaddit of existing. Consequently, the truth of
habitudinem adaequationis ad existing things includes their entity in its
intellectum humanum vel divinum. Sed intelligible character, adding to this a
negationes vel privationes existentes relation of conformity to the human or
extra animam non habent aliquam divine intellect. But negations or privations
formam, per quam vel imitentur existing outside the soul do not have any
exemplar artis divinae, vel ingerant sui form by which they can imitate the model
notitiam in intellectu humano; sed quod of divine art or introduce a knowledge of
adaequantur intellectui, est ex parte themselves into the human intellect. The
intellectus, qui earum rationes fact that they are conformed to intellect is
apprehendit. due to the intellect, which apprehends their
intelligible notes.
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Sic ergo patet quod cum dicitur lapis It is clear, therefore, that when a stone and
verus et caecitas vera, non eodem modo blindness are said to be true, truth is not
veritas se habet ad utrumque: veritas related to both in the same way; for truth
enim de lapide dicta claudit in sui predicated of the stone includes in its notion
ratione lapidis entitatem, et superaddit the entity of the stone, adding a reference to
habitudinem ad intellectum, quae intellect, which is also caused by the thing
causatur etiam ex parte ipsius rei, cum itself since it has something by which it can
habeat aliquid secundum quod referri be referred to intellect. As predicated of
possit; sed veritas dicta de caecitate non blindness, however, truth does not include
includit in seipsam privationem quae est in itself that privation which is blindness,
caecitas, sed solummodo habitudinem but only the relation of blindness to
caecitatis ad intellectum; quae etiam non intellect. This relation, moreover, is not
habet aliquid ex parte ipsius caecitatis in supported by anything in the blindness
quo sustentetur, cum caecitas non itself, since blindness is not conformed to
aequetur intellectui ex virtute alicuius intellect by virtue of anything which it has
quod in se habeat. in itself.
Patet ergo quod veritas in rebus creatis Hence, it is clear that the truth found in
inventa nihil aliud potest comprehendere created things can include nothing more
quam entitatem rei, et adaequationem rei than the entity of a thing and conformity of
ad intellectum vel aequationem the thing to intellect or conformity of
intellectus ad res vel ad privationes intellect to things or to the privations of
rerum; quod totum est a Deo, quia et things. All this is entirely from God,
ipsa forma rei, per quam adaequatur, a because both the very form of a thing,
Deo est, et ipsum verum sicut bonum through which it is conformed, is from God,
intellectus; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. quia and the truth itself in so far as it is the good
bonum uniuscuiusque rei consistit in of the intellect, as is said in the Ethics; for
perfecta operatione ipsius rei. Non est the good of any thing whatsoever consists
autem perfecta operatio intellectus, nisi in its perfect operation. But since the
secundum quod verum cognoscit; unde perfect operation of the intellect consists in
in hoc consistit eius bonum, in quantum its knowing the true, that is its good in the
huiusmodi. Unde, cum omne bonum sit sense just mentioned. Hence, since every
a Deo, et omnis forma, oportet absolute good and every form is from God, one must
dicere, quod omnis veritas sit a Deo. say, without any qualification, that every
truth is from God.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum 1. The argument—“Every true thing is from
sic arguitur: omne verum est a Deo; God. But to fornicate is true. Therefore.”
istum fornicari est verum; ergo etc., —falls into the fallacy of accident. For, as is
incidit fallacia accidentis, ut enim ex evident from our discussion above,* when
iam dictis patere potest. Cum dicimus: we say that fornicating is true, we do not
istum fornicari est verum; non hoc imply that the defect involved in the act of
dicimus quasi ipse defectus qui fornication is included in the notion of
implicatur in actu fornicationis truth. True predicates merely the conformity
includatur in ratione veritatis: sed verum of that act to an intellect. Hence, one cannot
praedicat tantum adaequationem huius conclude that fornicating is from God, but
ad intellectum. Unde non debet merely that its truth is from God.
concludi: istum fornicari est a Deo; sed
quod veritas eius sit a Deo.
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Ad secundum dicendum, quod 2. As is clear from our reply just above,

deformitates et alii defectus non habent deformities and other defects do not possess
veritatem sicut et aliae res, ut ex truth in the same say that other things do.
praedictis patet; et ideo, quamvis veritas Consequently, even though the truth of
defectuum sit a Deo, non ex hoc potest defects is from God, it does not follow that
concludi, quod deformitas sit a Deo. the deformity is from God.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod secundum 3. According to the Philosopher, truth does

philosophum, VI Metaph., veritas non not consist in the composition found in
consistit in compositione quae est in things but in that made by the soul. Hence,
rebus, sed in compositione quam facit truth does not consist in this, that the act
anima; et ideo veritas non consistit in with its deformity inheres in a subject (for
hoc quod iste actus cum deformitate sua this is proper, rather, to the character of
inhaeret subiecto, hoc enim pertinet ad good and evil). It consists in the conformity
rationem boni vel mali, sed ex hoc quod of the act, inherent in its subject, to the
actus sic inhaerens subiecto soul’s apprehension.
apprehensioni animae adaequatur.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod bonum, 4. The good, the due, the right, and all other
debitum, et rectum, et huiusmodi omnia things of this sort are related in one way to
alio modo se habent ad permissionem the divine permission, and in another, to
divinam, et alio modo ad alia signa other manifestations of the divine will. In
voluntatis. In aliis enim refertur et ad id the latter, there is a reference to the object
quod cadit sub actu voluntatis, et ad of the will act, as well as to the will act
ipsum voluntatis actum; sicut cum Deus itself. For example, when God commands
praecipit honorem parentum; et ipse that parents be honored, both the honor to
honor parentum bonum quoddam est, et be given parents and the act of commanding
ipsum etiam praecipere bonum est. Sed are goods. But in a divine permission there
in permissione refertur tantum ad actum is a reference only to the subjective act of
permittentis, et non ad id quod sub permitting, and not to the object of the
permissione cadit; unde rectum est quod permission. Hence, it is right that God
Deus permittat deformitates incidere; should permit deformities, but it does not
non tamen sequitur ex hoc quod ipsa follow from this that the deformity itself has
deformitas aliquam rectitudinem habeat. some rectitude.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod veritas 5. The qualified truth which belongs to

secundum quid quae competit negations and defects is reducible to that
negationibus et defectibus, reducitur ad unqualified truth which is in the intellect
veritatem simpliciter, quae est in and from God. Consequently, the truth of
intellectu, quae a Deo est; et ideo veritas defects is from God, although the defects
defectuum a Deo est, quamvis ipsi themselves are not from Him.
defectus a Deo non sint.
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Ad sextum dicendum, quod non esse 6. Non-existing is not the cause of the truth
non est causa veritatis propositionum of negative propositions in the sense that it
negativarum quasi faciens eas in causes them to exist in the intellect. The
intellectu; sed ipsa anima hoc facit soul itself does this by conforming itself to
conformans se non enti, quod est extra a non-being outside the soul. Hence, this
animam; unde non esse extra animam non-existing outside the soul is not the
existens, non est causa efficiens veritatis efficient cause of truth in the soul, but, as it
in anima, sed quasi exemplaris. Obiectio were, its exemplary cause. The difficulty is
autem procedebat de causa efficiente. based upon the efficient cause.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis 7. Although evil is not from God, that evil
malum non sit a Deo, tamen quod is seen to be what it is, is from God. Hence,
malum videatur tale quale est, est the truth by which it is true that there is evil
quidem a Deo; unde veritas qua verum is from God.
est malum esse, est a Deo.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod quamvis 8. Although evil does not act on the soul
malum non agat in animam nisi per except through the species of good,
speciem boni; quia tamen est bonum nevertheless, since evil is a deficient good,
deficiens, anima deprehendit in se the soul grasps t e intelligible character of
rationem defectus, et in hoc concipit the defect, and so conceives the character of
rationem mali; et sic malum videtur evil. Accordingly, evil is seen as evil.
malum.
ARTICLE IX
In the ninth article we ask:

Is truth in sense?
[Parallel readings: S.T., I, 16, 2; 17, 2; 85, 6; III De anima, lect. 6, n. 660 seq.; IV
Metaph., lect. 12, nn. 67 3, 68 1 seq.]
Nono quaeritur utrum veritas sit in sensu. Difficulties
Et videtur quod non. It seems that it is not, for
Anselmus enim dicit, quod veritas est 1. Anselm says: “Truth is a correctness
rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis. Sed perceivable only by the mind.”’ But sense
sensus non est de natura mentis. Ergo does not have the same nature as the mind.
veritas non est in sensu. Hence, truth is not in sense.
Praeterea, Augustinus probat in libro 2. Augustine proves that truth is not

LXXXIII quaestionum, quod veritas known by the bodily senses, and his
corporeis sensibus non cognoscitur; et reasons were set down above. Hence, truth
rationes eius supra positae sunt. Ergo is not in sense.
veritas non est in sensu.
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Augustinus, in libro de vera religione, Augustine says: “Truth manifests that

dicit, quod veritas est qua ostenditur id which is.” But that which is, is manifested
quod est. Sed id quod est, ostenditur non not only to the intellect, but also to sense.
tantum intellectui, sed etiam sensui. Ergo Therefore.
veritas non solum est in intellectu sed
etiam in sensu.
REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod veritas est in Truth is both in intellect and in sense, but
intellectu et in sensu, sed non eodem not in the same way. It is in intellect as a
modo. In intellectu enim est sicut consequence of the act of the intellect and
consequens actum intellectus, et sicut as known by the intellect. Truth follows
cognita per intellectum. Consequitur the operation of the intellect inasmuch as
namque intellectus operationem, it belongs to the intellect to judge about a
secundum quod iudicium intellectus est de thing as it is. And truth is known by the
re secundum quod est. Cognoscitur autem intellect in view of the fact that the
ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus intellect reflects upon its own act—not
reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum merely as knowing its own act, but as
secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, knowing the proportion of its act to the
sed secundum quod cognoscit thing. Now, this proportion cannot be
proportionem eius ad rem: quae quidem known without knowing the nature of the
cognosci non potest nisi cognita natura act; and the nature of the act cannot be
ipsius actus; quae cognosci non potest, known without knowing the nature of the
nisi natura principii activi cognoscatur, active principle, that is, the intellect itself,
quod est ipse intellectus, in cuius natura to whose nature it belongs to be
est ut rebus conformetur; unde secundum conformed to things. Consequently, it is
hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod because the intellect reflects upon itself
supra seipsum reflectitur. that it knows truth.
Sed veritas est in sensu sicut consequens Truth is in sense also as a consequence of
actum eius; dum scilicet iudicium sensus its act, for sense judges of things as they
est de re, secundum quod est; sed tamen are. Truth is not in sense, however, as
non est in sensu sicut cognita a sensu: etsi something known by sense; for, although
enim sensus vere iudicat de rebus, non sense judges truly about things, it does not
tamen cognoscit veritatem, qua vere know the truth by which it truly judges.
iudicat: quamvis enim sensus cognoscat Although sense knows that it senses, it
se sentire, non tamen cognoscit naturam does not know its own nature;
suam, et per consequens nec naturam sui consequently, it knows neither the nature
actus, nec proportionem eius ad res, et ita of its act nor the proportion of this act to
nec veritatem eius. things. As a result, it does not know its
truth.
Cuius ratio est, quia illa quae sunt The reason for this is that the most perfect
perfectissima in entibus, ut substantiae beings, such as, for example, intellectual
intellectuales, redeunt ad essentiam suam substances, return to their essence with a
reditione completa: in hoc enim quod complete return: knowing something
cognoscunt aliquid extra se positum, external to themselves, in a certain sense
quodammodo extra se procedunt; they go outside of themselves; but by
secundum vero quod cognoscunt se knowing that they know, they are already
cognoscere, iam ad se redire incipiunt, beginning to return to themselves, because
quia actus cognitionis est medius inter the act of cognition mediates between the
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cognoscentem et cognitum. Sed reditus knower and the thing known. That return
iste completur secundum quod is completed inasmuch as they know their
cognoscunt essentias proprias: unde own essences. Hence, it is said in The
dicitur in Lib. de causis, quod omnis Causes: “A being which is such as to
sciens essentiam suam, est rediens ad know its own essence returns to it by a
essentiam suam reditione completa. complete return.”
Sensus autem, qui inter cetera est Since sense is closer to an intellectual
propinquior intellectuali substantiae, substance than other things are, it begins
redire quidem incipit ad essentiam suam, to return to its essence; it not only knows
quia non solum cognoscit sensibile, sed the sensible, but it also knows that it
etiam cognoscit se sentire; non tamen senses. Its return, however, is not
completur eius reditio, quia sensus non complete, since it does not know its own
cognoscit essentiam suam. Cuius hanc essence. Avicenna” has given the reason
rationem Avicenna assignat, quia sensus for this by pointing out that the sense
nihil cognoscit nisi per organum knows nothing except through a bodily
corporale. Non est autem possibile ut organ, and a bodily organ cannot be a
organum corporale medium cadat inter medium between a sensing power and
potentiam sensitivam et seipsam. Sed itself. But powers without any ability to
potentiae insensibiles nullo modo redeunt sense cannot return to themselves in any
super seipsas, quia non cognoscunt se way, for they do not know that they are
agere, sicut ignis non cognoscit se acting. For example, fire does not know
calefacere. that it is heating.
Et ex his patet solutio ad obiecta. From this discussion the solutions to the
difficulties are clear.
ARTICLE X
In the tenth article we ask:

Is there any false thing?
[Parallel readings: S.T., I, 16, aa. 1, 6; I Sent., 19, 5, 1; IV Metaph., lect. 12, n. 681 seq.;
V Metaph., lect. 22, nn. 1128-29; VI Metaph., lect, 4, n. 1237 seq.]
Decimo quaeritur utrum aliqua res sit Difficulties

falsa.
Augustinus enim dicit in Lib. Solil., 1. According to Augustine: “The true is that
verum est id quod est. Ergo falsum est which is.”’ Hence, the false is that which is
id quod non est. Sed quod non est, non not. Now, what is not is not a thing.
est res aliqua. Ergo nulla res est falsa. Therefore, no thing is false.
Sed dicebat, quod verum est differentia 2. It was said that the true is a differentia of
entis; et ita, sicut verum est quod est, ita being; consequently, the false, like the true,
et falsum.- Sed contra, nulla differentia is that which is.—On the contrary, no
divisiva convertitur cum eo cuius est dividing differentia is interchangeable with
differentia. Sed verum convertitur cum that whose differentia it is. Now, as was
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ente, ut supra dictum est. Ergo verum said, the true is interchangeable with being.
non est differentia divisiva entis, ut res Consequently, the true is not a dividing
aliqua falsa dici possit. differentia of being, for this would make it
possible to call some thing false.
Praeterea, veritas est adaequatio rei et 3. Truth is a conformity of thing and

intellectus. Sed omnis res est adaequata intellect. Now, an things are conformed to
intellectui divino, quia nihil potest esse the divine intellect, since in itself nothing
in se aliter quam intellectus divinus can be other than it is known to be by the
cognoscit. Ergo omnis res est vera; ergo divine intellect. Hence, all things are true,
nulla res est falsa. and nothing is false.
Praeterea, omnis res habet veritatem a 4. All things possess truth from their forms.
forma sua; ex hoc enim homo dicitur For example, one is said to be a true man if
verus, quod habet veram hominis he has the true form of a man. But there is
formam. Sed nulla est res quae non nothing which does not have some form, for
habeat aliquam formam, quia omne esse every act of existing comes from form.
est a forma. Ergo quaelibet res est vera; Hence, everything is true, and there is no
ergo nulla res est falsa. thing which is false.
Praeterea, sicut se habet bonum et 5. Good and evil are related as true and false
malum, ita se habet verum et falsum. are related. Now, since evil is found in
Sed quia malum invenitur in rebus, things, it has concrete reality only in
malum non substantificatur nisi in bono, something good, as Dionysius and
ut Dionysius et Augustinus dicunt. Ergo Augustine say. Therefore, if falseness is
si falsitas invenitur in rebus, falsitas non found in things, it can have reality only in
substantificabitur nisi in vero; quod non what is true. But this does not seem
videtur esse possibile, quia sic idem possible, for then the same thing would be
esset verum et falsum, quod est both true and false; but this is impossible.
impossibile; sicut idem est homo et This would mean, for example, that man and
album, propter hoc quod albedo white are the same because whiteness is
substantificatur in homine. made real in a man.
Praeterea, Augustinus in Lib. Soliloq. 6. Augustine proposes the following

sic obiicit. Si aliqua res nominatur falsa: difficulty. If a thing is called false, it is
aut hoc est ex eo quod est simile, aut ex either because it is similar or because it is
eo quod est dissimile. Si ex eo quod est dissimilar. “If because it is dissimilar, there
dissimile, nihil est quod falsum dici non is nothing that cannot be called false, for
possit; nihil enim est quod alicui there is nothing that is not unlike something
dissimile non sit. Si ex eo quod simile, else. If because it is similar, all things loudly
omnia reclamant, quae ex eo vera sunt protest, for they are true because they are
quo similia. Ergo nullo modo falsitas in similar.” Therefore, falsity cannot be found
rebus inveniri potest. in things in any way.
Augustinus ita definit falsum: falsum 1. Augustine defines the false as follows:
est quod ad similitudinem alicuius “The false is that which approaches the
accommodatum est, et non pertingit ad likeness of something else without being
illud cuius similitudinem gerit. Sed that whose likeness it bears. But every
omnis creatura gerit similitudinem Dei. creature bears the likeness of God.
Ergo cum nulla creatura pertingat ad Therefore, since no creature is identical with
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ipsum Deum per modum identitatis, God Himself, it seems that every creature is
videtur quod omnis creatura sit falsa. false.
Praeterea, Augustinus, in libro de vera 2. Augustine says that “Every body is a true
religione: omne corpus est verum body and a false unity. Now, a body is said
corpus, et falsa unitas. Sed hoc pro tanto to be false because it imitates unity, yet is
dicitur, quia imitatur unitatem, et tamen not a unity. Therefore, since every creature,
non est unitas. Cum ergo quaelibet in so far as it is perfect, imitates the divine
creatura, secundum quamlibet sui perfection, and, nevertheless, in any
perfectionem, divinam perfectionem perfection which it has, remains infinitely
imitetur et ab eo nihilominus in distant from it, it seems that every creature
infinitum distet; videtur quod quaelibet is false.
creatura sit falsa.
Praeterea, sicut verum convertitur cum 3. The good, like the true, is interchangeable
ente, ita et bonum. Sed ex hoc quod with being. But the interchangeability of the
bonum convertitur cum ente, non good and being does not stand in the way of
prohibetur quin aliqua res inveniatur a thing’s being evil. Therefore, the fact that
mala. Ergo nec ex hoc quod verum the true is interchangeable with being does
convertitur cum ente, prohibetur quin not stand in the way of a thing’s being false.
aliqua res inveniatur falsa.
Praeterea, Anselmus dicit in libro de 4. Anselm says that there are two kinds of
veritate quod duplex est propositionis truth in propositions. “The first type occurs
veritas; una quia significat quod accepit when the proposition has the meaning which
significare, sicut haec propositio: was given to it.” For example, this
Socrates sedet; significat Socratem proposition, “Socrates sits,” means that
sedere, sive Socrates sedeat, sive non Socrates is sitting, whether he is actually
sedeat; alia, quando significat illud ad sitting or not. “The second type of truth
quod facta est; est enim ad hoc facta ut occurs when the proposition signifies that
significet esse, quando est; et secundum for which it was formed”—and it has been
hoc proprie dicitur enuntiatio vera. formed to signify that something is when it
Ergo, eadem ratione, quaelibet res is. In this respect, a proposition is properly
dicetur vera, quando implet hoc ad quod said to be true. In the same way, a thing may
est; falsa autem quando non implet. Sed be called true when it fulfills its purpose,
omnis res quae deficit a fine suo, non and false when it does not do so. But
implet illud propter quod est. Cum ergo everything which falls short of its end does
multae res sint tales, videtur quod not fulfill its purpose; and, since there are
multae sint falsae. many things of this sort, it seems that many
things are false.
REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod sicut Just as truth consists in an equation of thing

veritas consistit in adaequatione rei et and intellect, so falsity consists in an
intellectus, ita falsitas consistit in eorum inequality between them. Now, as was said,
inaequalitate. Res autem comparatur ad a thing is related to divine and human
intellectum divinum et humanum, ut intellects. In regard to everything that is
supra dictum est; intellectui autem positively predicated of things or found in
divino comparatur uno modo sicut them, it is related to the divine in one way as
mensuratum mensurae, quantum ad ea the measured to its measure; for all such
quae in rebus positive dicuntur vel things come from the divine intellect’s art. A
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inveniuntur, quia omnia huiusmodi ab thing is related in another way to the divine
arte divini intellectus proveniunt; alio intellect: as a thing known is related to the
modo sicut cognitum ad cognoscens; et knower. In this way even negations and
sic etiam negationes et defectus divino defects are equated to the divine intellect,
intellectui adaequantur, quia omnia since God knows all these even though He
huiusmodi Deus cognoscit, quamvis ea does not cause them. It is clear, then, that a
non causet. Patet ergo quod res thing is conformed to the divine intellect in
qualitercumque se habeat sub whatever way it exists, under any for in
quacumque forma existat, vel privatione whatsoever or even under a privation or a
aut defectu, intellectui divino defect. Consequently, it is clear that
adaequatur. Et sic patet quod res everything is true in its relation to the divine
quaelibet in comparatione ad intellect. Hence, Anselm says: “There is,
intellectum divinum vera est, unde then, truth in the essence of all things which
Anselmus dicit in Lib. de veritate: est are, for they are what they are in the highest
igitur veritas in omnium quae sunt truth.” Therefore, in its relation to the divine
essentia, quia hoc sunt quod in summa intellect, nothing can be false.
veritate sunt. Unde per comparationem
ad intellectum divinum nulla res potest
dici falsa;
sed secundum comparationem ad In its relation to a human intellect, however,

intellectum humanum invenitur an inequality of thing with intellect, caused
interdum inaequalitas rei ad intellectum in some way by the thing, is occasionally
quae quodammodo ex ipsa re causatur; found; for a thing makes itself known in the
res enim notitiam sui facit in anima per soul by its exterior appearance, since our
ea quae de ipsa exterius apparent, quia cognition takes its beginning from sense,
cognitio nostra a sensu initium sumit, whose direct object is sensible qualities. For
cui per se obiectum sunt sensibiles this reason it is said in The Soul: “Accidents
qualitates; unde et in I de anima dicitur, greatly contribute to our knowledge of the
quod accidentia magnam partem quiddity.” Consequently, when there are
conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid manifested in any object sensible qualities
est: et ideo quando in aliqua re apparent indicating a nature which does not actually
sensibiles qualitates demonstrantes underlie them, that thing is said to be false.
naturam quae eis non subest, dicitur res Hence, the Philosopher says that those
illa esse falsa; unde Philos. dicit VI things are called false “which are such as to
Metaph., quod illa dicuntur falsa quae seem to be what they are not, or of a kind
nata sunt videri aut qualia non sunt, aut which they are not.” For example, that is
quae non sunt; sicut dicitur aurum called “false” gold which has in its external
falsum, in quo exterius apparet color appearance the color and other accidents of
auri, et alia huiusmodi accidentia, cum genuine gold, whereas the nature of gold
tamen interius natura auri non subsit. does not interiorly underlie them. But a
Nec tamen res est hoc modo causa thing is not to be the cause of falsity in the
falsitatis in anima, quod necessario soul in the sense that it necessarily causes
falsitatem causet; quia veritas et falsitas falsity; for truth and falsity exist principally
praecipue in iudicio animae existunt, in the soul’s judgment; and the soul,
anima vero in quantum de rebus iudicat, inasmuch as it judges about things, is not
non patitur a rebus, sed magis acted upon by things, but rather, in a sense,
quodammodo agit. Unde res non dicitur acts upon them. Hence, a thing is not said to
falsa quia semper de se faciat falsam be false because it always of itself causes a
apprehensionem, sed quia nata est false apprehension, but rather because its
facere per ea quae de ipsa apparent. natural appearance is likely to cause a false
apprehension.
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Sed quia, ut dictum est comparatio rei As was pointed out previously,” however,
ad intellectum divinum est ei essentialis, the relation to the divine intellect is essential
et secundum eam per se dicitur vera; to a thing; and in this respect a thing is said
sed comparatio ad intellectum to be true in itself. Its relation to the human
humanum est ei accidentalis, secundum intellect is accidental to it; and in this
quam non dicitur absolute vera sed respect a thing is not true, absolutely
quasi secundum quid et in potentia, ideo speaking but, as it were, in some respect and
simpliciter loquendo omnis res est vera, in potency. Therefore, all things are true
et nulla res est falsa; sed secundum absolutely speaking, and nothing is false.
quid, scilicet in ordine ad intellectum But in a certain respect, that is, with
nostrum, aliquae res dicuntur falsae; et reference to our intellect, some things are
ita oportet rationibus utriusque partis said to be false. Hence, it is necessary to
respondere. answer the arguments of both sides.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ista 1. The definition, “The true is that which
definitio, verum est id quod est, non is,” does not perfectly express the
perfecte exprimit rationem veritatis, sed intelligible character of truth. It expresses it,
quasi materialiter tantum, nisi as it were, only materially, unless is here
secundum quod li esse significat signifies the affirmation of a proposition,
affirmationem propositionis, ut scilicet and means that a thing is said to be true
dicatur id esse verum quod sic esse when it is said to be or to be understood as it
dicitur vel intelligitur ut in rebus est; et is in reality. Taken in this sense, the false
sic etiam falsum dicatur quod non est, id may be said to be that which does not exist;
est quod non est ut dicitur vel it is not as it is said or understood to be. And
intelligitur; et hoc in rebus inveniri this type of falsity can be found in things.
potest.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod verum, 2. Properly speaking, the true cannot be a

proprie loquendo, non potest esse differentia of being, for being does not have
differentia entis; ens enim non habet any differentia, as is proved in the
aliquam differentiam, ut probatur in III Metaphysics. But in some sense the true, as
Metaph.; sed aliquo modo verum se well as the good, is related to being in the
habet ad ens per modum differentiae, manner of a differentia, since it expresses
sicut et bonum; in quantum, videlicet, something about being which is not
exprimunt aliquid circa ens quod expressed by the noun being; and in this
nomine entis non exprimitur; et sense the meaning of being is indeterminate
secundum hoc intentio entis est with respect to the meaning of the true.
indeterminata respectu intentionis veri; Consequently, the meaning of the true is
et sic intentio veri comparatur ad compared to the notion of being somewhat
intentionem entis quodammodo ut as a differentia is compared to its genus.
differentia ad genus.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa 3. That argument must be conceded, since it
concedenda est; procedit enim de re in treats a thing in its relation to the divine
ordine ad intellectum divinum. intellect.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis 4. All things have some form, yet not
quaelibet res habeat aliquam formam, everything has that form whose
non tamen omnis res habet illam characteristics are externally manifested by
formam cuius indicia exterius sensible qualities; and it is in regard to these
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ostenduntur per sensibiles qualitates; et that a thing is said to be false if it is

secundum haec falsa dicitur, in quantum naturally apt to produce a false estimation
de se falsam existimationem facere apta about itself.
nata est.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod aliquid 5. As is clear from what has been said,
existens extra animam pro tanto dicitur something outside the soul is said to be false
falsum, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet, if it is naturally such as to give a false
quia natum est de se facere falsam impression of itself. But what is nothing is
existimationem, quod autem nihil est not capable of making any impression, since
non est natum de se facere aliquam it does not move a knowing power. What is
extimationem quia non movet virtutem said to be false, therefore, must be a being;
cognitivam; unde oportet quod illud and since every being, in so far as it is a
quod falsum dicitur, aliquod ens sit. being, is true, falsity must exist in things and
Unde cum omne ens, in quantum be based upon some truth. For this reason
huiusmodi, sit verum, oportet falsitatem Augustine says” that a tragedian
in rebus existentem, supra aliquam representing true persons in dramas would
veritatem fundari; unde dicit Augustinus not be false without being a true tragedian.
in Lib. Soliloquiorum, quod tragoedus Similarly, a painting of a horse would not be
qui repraesentat alienas personas in a false horse were it not a true picture. It
theatris, non esset falsus, (Hector) nisi does not follow, however, that
esset verus tragoedus; similiter equus contradictories are true, because the
pictus non esset falsus equus, nisi esset affirmation and the negation in expressing
pura pictura. Nec tamen sequitur the true and the false do not refer to the
contradictoria esse vera, quia affirmatio same reality.
et negatio, secundum quas dicitur verum
et falsum, non referuntur ad idem.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod res falsa 6. A thing is said to be false in so far as, by
dicitur secundum quod nata est fallere; its nature, it is likely to deceive. When I say
cum autem fallere dico, significo deceive, however, I mean an action that
actionem quamdam defectum brings on some defect; for nothing can act
inducentem. Nihil autem natum est except to the extent that it is being, and
agere nisi secundum quod est ens; every defect is non-being. Moreover,
omnis autem defectus est non ens. everything has some likeness to the true to
Unumquodque autem, secundum quod the extent that it is a being; and in so far as it
est ens, habet similitudinem veri; does not exist it departs from this likeness.
secundum autem quod non est, recedit Consequently, this deceiving as implying
ab eius similitudine. Et ideo hoc quod action arises from likeness; but the defect it
dico fallere, quantum ad id quod implies (and in which the intelligible
importat de actione, originem habet ex character of falsity formally consists) arises
similitudine; sed quantum ad id quod from unlikeness. Hence, Augustine says that
importat defectum, in quo formaliter falsity arises from unlikeness.
ratio falsitatis consistit, ex
dissimilitudine surgit; et ideo dicit
Augustinus in Lib. de vera religione,
quod ex dissimilitudine falsitas oritur.
Ad primum ergo eorum quae contra 1. The soul is not so constituted as to be

obiiciuntur, dicendum, quod non ex deceived by any likeness whatsoever, but
qualibet similitudine nata est anima only by a considerable resemblance which
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decipi, sed ex magna similitudine, in makes it difficult to discover the unlikeness.

qua dissimilitudo de facili inveniri non Hence, the soul is deceived by similarities,
potest; et ideo ex similitudine maiori vel more or less great, according to the varying
minori decipitur anima secundum degrees of its acuteness in discovering
maiorem vel minorem perspicacitatem unlikenesses. A thing, however, should not
ad dissimilitudinem inveniendum. Nec be said to be absolutely false because it
tamen simpliciter debet enuntiari aliqua leads into error, however much it may do
res falsa ex eo quod quemcumque in that, but only because it is such as to deceive
errorem inducit; sed ex eo quod nata est many or highly intelligent men. Now,
plures vel sapientes nata est fallere. although creatures bear some resemblance to
Creaturae autem, quamvis aliquam Dei God in themselves, so great is the
similitudinem gerant in seipsis, tamen dissimilarity between the two that only
maxima dissimilitudo subest, ut non nisi because of great stupidity could it happen
ex magna insipientia contingat quod ex that a mind would be deceived by such
tali similitudine mens decipiatur. Unde similarity. Hence, from the similarity and
ex praedicta similitudine et dissimilarity between creatures and God, it
dissimilitudine creaturarum ad Deum does not follow that all creatures should be
non sequitur quod omnes creaturae called false.
debeant dici falsae.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quidam 2. Some have thought that God is a body;
existimaverunt Deum esse corpus; et and, since He is the unity by which all
cum Deus sit unitas, qua omnia sunt things are one, they consequently thought
unum, existimaverunt per consequens that body was unity itself, because of its
corpus esse unitatem ipsam, propter likeness to unity. Therefore, a body is called
ipsam similitudinem unitatis. Secundum a false unity for this reason, that it has led or
hoc ergo corpus falsa unitas dicitur, in could lead some into the error of believing it
quantum aliquos in errorem induxit vel to be unity.
inducere potuit, ut unitas crederetur.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod duplex est 3. There are two kinds of perfection, first
perfectio; scilicet prima, et secunda: and second. First perfection is the form of
prima perfectio est forma each thing, and that by which it has its act of
uniuscuiusque, per quam habet esse; existing. Nothing is without it while it
unde ab ea nulla res destituitur dum continues in existence. Second perfection is
manet; secunda perfectio est operatio, operation, which is the end of a thing or the
quae est finis rei, vel id per quod ad means by which a thing reaches its end; and
finem devenitur et hac perfectione a thing is sometimes deprived of this
interdum res destituitur. Ex prima autem perfection. The note of truth in things results
perfectione resultat ratio veri in rebus; from first perfection; for it is because a thing
ex hoc enim quod res formam habet, has a form that it imitates the art of the
artem divini intellectus imitatur, et sui divine intellect and produces knowledge of
notitiam in anima gignit. Sed ex itself in the soul. But the note of goodness in
perfectione secunda consequitur in ipsa things results from its second perfection, for
ratio bonitatis, quae consurgit ex fine; et this goodness arises from the end.
ideo malum simpliciter invenitur in Consequently, evil, but not falsity, is found
rebus, non autem falsum. in things absolutely.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod secundum 4. According to the Philosopher,”’ the true

philosophum in VI Ethic., ipsum verum itself is the good of the intellect, for an
est bonum intellectus; secundum hoc operation of intellect is perfect because its
enim intellectus operatio est perfecta, concept is true. And since a proposition is a
quod sua conceptio est vera; et quia sign of what is understood, truth is its end.
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enuntiatio est signum intellectus, ideo But this is not the case with other things,
veritas eius est finis ipsius. Non autem and so there is no similarity.
ita est in rebus aliis; et propter hoc non
est simile.
ARTICLE XI
In the eleventh article we ask:

Is falsity in sense?
[Parallel readings: See readings given for q. 1, a. 9.]
Undecimo quaeritur utrum falsitas sit in Difficulties

sensibus.
Et videtur quod non. It seems that it is not, for
Intellectus enim semper est rectus, ut 1. As is said in The Soul: “The intellect is
dicitur in III de anima. Sed intellectus est always correct.”’ Now, since the intellect is
superior pars in homine. Ergo et aliae the superior part of man, his other parts
partes eius rectitudinem sequuntur, sicut must also pursue correctness—just as the
et in mundo maiori inferiora disponuntur disposition of lower bodies in the universe
secundum superiorum motum. Ergo et depends on the motion of the higher
sensus, qui est inferior pars animae, bodies. Therefore, sense, which is the
semper erit rectus: non ergo in eo erit inferior part of the soul, will also always be
falsitas. correct there is, then, no falsity in it.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de 2. Augustine says: “Our eyes do not

vera Relig.: ipsi oculi non fallunt nos; deceive us: they can report to the mind
non enim enuntiare possunt animo nisi only their own modification, And if all the
affectionem suam. Quod si et omnes bodily senses report as they are affected, I
corporis sensus ita enuntiant ut do not know what more we can require of
afficiuntur, quid ab eis amplius exigere them.” Hence, there is no falsity in the
debemus ignoro. Ergo in sensibus non est senses.
falsitas.
Praeterea, Anselmus in Lib. de veritate 3. Anselm says: “It seems to me that truth
dicit: videtur mihi veritas vel falsitas in or falsity is not in the sense but in opinion.”
sensu esse, sed in opinione; et sic habetur This confirms our thesis.
propositum.
Est quod Anselmus dicit: est quidem in 1. Anselm says: “Truth is, indeed, in our
sensibus nostris veritas, sed non semper; senses, but not always; for they sometimes
nam fallunt nos aliquando. deceive us.
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum in Lib. 2. According to Augustine: “A thing is

Soliloquiorum, falsum solet dici quod a called false because it is far from being a
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verisimilitudine longe abest, sed tamen likeness of the true, even though it does in
habet ad verum nonnullam imitationem. some way imitate the true.” Now, a sense
Sed sensus habet quandoque has at times a likeness of certain things
similitudinem aliquarum rerum, quae non other than they are in reality. For example,
sunt ita in rerum natura; sicut est when the eye is pressed, one thing is
quandoque quod unum duo videatur, ut sometimes seen as two. Consequently,
cum oculus comprimitur. Ergo in sensu there is falsity in sense.
est falsitas.
Sed dicebat, quod sensus non decipitur in 3. The answer was given that sense is not
propriis sensibilibus, sed de deceived with regard to proper sensibles,
communibus.- Sed contra, but only with regard to common
quandocumque aliquid apprehenditur de sensibles.—On the contrary, whenever
aliquo aliter quam sit, est apprehensio something is apprehended about a thing
falsa. Sed quando corpus album videtur other than it is, the apprehension is false.
mediante vitro viridi, sensus apprehendit Now, when a white body is seen through a
aliter quam sit, quia apprehendit illud ut green glass, the sense apprehends it other
viride, et ita iudicat, nisi superius than it is, for it sees it as green and judges
iudicium adsit, per quod falsitas accordingly—unless a higher judgment is
detegatur. Ergo sensus decipitur etiam in present, detecting the falsity. Therefore,
propriis sensibilibus. sense is deceived even with regard to
proper sensibles.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod cognitio nostra quae a Our knowledge, taking its start from things,
rebus initium sumit, hoc ordine proceeds in this order. First, it begins in
progreditur, ut primo incipiatur in sensu, sense; second, it is completed in the
et secundo perficiatur in intellectu; ut sic intellect. As a consequence, sense is found
sensus inveniatur quodammodo medius to be in some way an intermediary between
inter intellectum et res: est enim, rebus the intellect and things; for with reference
comparatus, quasi intellectus; et to things, it is, as it were, an intellect, and
intellectui comparatus, quasi res with reference to intellect, it is, as it were, a
quaedam: et ideo in sensu dicitur esse thing. Hence, truth or falsity is said to be in
veritas vel falsitas dupliciter. Uno modo sense in two respects. The first is in the
secundum ordinem sensus ad relation of sense to intellect. In this respect,
intellectum; et sic dicitur sensus esse the sense is said to be true or false as a
falsus vel verus sicut et res; in quantum, thing is, namely, in so far as it causes a true
videlicet, faciunt existimationem veram or false judgment in the intellect. The
in intellectu, vel falsam. Alio modo second respect is in the relation of sense to
secundum ordinem sensus ad res; et sic things. In this, truth and falsity are said to
dicitur esse veritas vel falsitas in sensu, be in sense as they are said to be in the
sicut et in intellectu; in quantum videlicet intellect, namely, in so far as the sense
iudicat esse quod est, vel quod non est. judges that what is, is or is not.
Si ergo loquamur de sensu secundum Hence, if we speak of a sense in the first

primum modum, sic in sensu meaning, in a way there is falsity in sense,
quodammodo est falsitas, et and in a way there is not. For sense, in
quodammodo non est falsitas: sensus itself, is a thing; and it also passes
enim et est res quaedam in se, et est judgment on other things. If, in its relation
indicativum alterius rei. Si ergo to the intellect, it is considered as a thing,
comparetur ad intellectum secundum then there is no falsity in sense; for a sense
quod est res quaedam, sic nullo modo est reveals its state to the intellect exactly as it
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falsitas in sensu intellectui comparato: is affected. Hence, Augustine says, in the

quia secundum quod sensus disponitur, passage referred to: “The senses can report
secundum hoc dispositionem suam to the mind only how they are affected.”
intellectui demonstrat; unde Augustinus On the other hand, if sense is considered in
dicit in auctoritate inducta, quod non its relation to the intellect as representing
possunt animo enuntiare nisi affectionem some other thing, it may be called false in
suam. Si autem comparetur ad view of the fact that it sometimes
intellectum secundum quod est represents a thing to the intellect other than
repraesentativum rei alterius, cum it actually is. For, in that case, as we said
quandoque repraesentet ei aliter quam sit, about things, it is such as to cause a false
secundum hoc sensus falsus dicitur, in judgment in the intellect—but not
quantum natus est facere falsam necessarily, since the intellect judges on
existimationem in intellectu, quamvis what is presented by sense just as it judges
non necessario faciat, sicut et de rebus about things. Thus, in its relation to the
dictum est: quia intellectus iudicat sicut intellect, sense always produces a true
de rebus, ita et de his quae a sensibus judgment in the intellect with respect to its
offeruntur. own condition, but not always with respect
to the condition of things.
Sic ergo sensus intellectui comparatus If sense is considered in its relation to

semper facit veram existimationem in things, however, then there are truth and
intellectu de dispositione propria, sed falsity in sense in the manner in which
non semper de dispositione rerum. Si these are in the intellect. For truth and
autem consideretur sensus secundum falsity are found primarily and principally
quod comparatur ad res, tunc in sensu est in the judgment of the intellect as it
falsitas et veritas per modum quo est in associates and dissociates, and in the
intellectu. In intellectu autem primo et formation of quiddities, only in their
principaliter invenitur veritas et falsitas relation to the judgment following upon
in iudicio componentis et dividentis; sed this formation. Hence, truth and falsity are
in formatione quidditatum non nisi per properly said to be in sense inasmuch as it
ordinem ad iudicium quod ex formatione judges about sensible objects, but inasmuch
praedicta consequitur; unde et in sensu as it apprehends a sensible object, there is
proprie veritas et falsitas dicitur not properly truth or falsity, except in the
secundum hoc quod iudicat de relation of this apprehension to the
sensibilibus; sed secundum hoc quod judgment, in so far as a judgment of this or
sensibile apprehendit, non est ibi proprie that sort naturally follows upon a particular
veritas vel falsitas sed solum secundum apprehension.
ordinem ad iudicium; prout scilicet ex
apprehensione tali natum est sequi tale
vel tale iudicium.
Sensus autem iudicium de quibusdam est The judgment of sense about certain
naturale, sicut de propriis sensibilibus; de things—for example, proper sensibles
quibusdam autem quasi per quamdam —takes place spontaneously. About other
collationem, quam facit in homine vis things, however, it takes place by means of
cogitativa, quae est potentia sensitivae a certain comparison, made in man by the
partis, loco cuius in aliis animalibus est cogitative power, a sense power, whose
aestimatio naturalis; et sic iudicat vis place in animals is taken by a spontaneous
sensitiva de sensibilibus communibus et estimation. This sensitive power judges
de sensibilibus per accidens. Naturalis about common sensibles and accidental
autem actio alicuius rei semper est uno sensibles. However, the spontaneous action
modo, nisi per accidens impediatur, vel of a thing always takes place in one way,
propter defectum intrinsecus, vel unless by accident it is impeded
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extrinsecus impedimentum; unde sensus intrinsically by some defect or extrinsically

iudicium de sensibilibus propriis semper by some impediment. Consequently, the
est verum, nisi sit impedimentum in judgment of sense about proper sensibles is
organo, vel in medio; sed de sensibilibus always true unless there is an impediment
communibus vel per accidens interdum in the organ or in the medium; but its
iudicium sensus fallitur. Et sic patet judgment about common or accidental
qualiter in iudicio sensus potest esse sensibles is sometimes wrong. Thus, it is
falsitas. clear how there can be falsity in the
judgment of sense.
Sed circa apprehensionem sensus As regards the apprehension of the senses,

sciendum est, quod est quaedam vis it must be noted that there is one type of
apprehensiva, quae apprehendit speciem apprehensive power, for example, a proper
sensibilem sensibili re praesente, sicut sense, which apprehends a sensible species
sensus proprius; quaedam vero quae in the presence of a sensible thing; but
apprehendit eam re absente, sicut there is also a second type, the imagination,
imaginatio; et ideo semper sensus for example, which apprehends a sensible
apprehendit rem ut est, nisi sit species when the thing is absent. So, even
impedimentum in organo, vel in medio; though the sense always apprehends a thing
sed imaginatio ut plurimum apprehendit as it is, unless there is an impediment in the
rem ut non est, quia apprehendit eam ut organ or in the medium, the imagination
praesentem, cum sit absens; et ideo dicit usually apprehends a thing as it is not,
philosophus in IV Metaph., quod sensus since it apprehends it as present though it is
non est dicens falsitatis, sed phantasia. absent. Consequently, the Philosopher says:
“Imagination, not sense, is the master of
falsity.”
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in 1. In the macrocosm the higher bodies do

maiori mundo superiora nihil accipiunt not receive anything from the lower. just
ab inferioribus, sed e converso; sed in the opposite occurs. In man, the
homine intellectus, qui est superior, microcosm, the intellect, which is superior,
aliquid accipit a sensu; et ideo non est does receive something from sense. Hence,
simile. no parallel can be made.
Ad alia patet solutio de facili ex dictis. 2-3- Our previous discussion will easily
answer the other difficulties.
ARTICLE XII
In the twelfth article we ask:

Is falsity in the intellect?
[Parallel readings: S.T., I, 17, 3; 58, 5; 85, 6; I Sent., 19, 5, 1, ad 7; C.G., I, 59; III, 108;
III De anima, lect. 11, nn. 746-51, 760-64; I Perih., lect. 3, nn. 3-10; VI Metaph., lect. 4,
nn. 1223 seq., esp. n. 1241; IX Metaph., lect. 11, n. 1896 seq. ]
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Duodecimo quaeritur utrum falsitas sit in Difficulties

intellectu.
Quia intellectus habet duas operationes: 1. The intellect has two operations. By one
scilicet unam qua format quidditates, in it forms quiddities, and, as the Philosopher
qua non est falsum, ut philosophus dicit says,’ the false is not in this. By the other it
in III de anima; aliam qua componit et joins and separates, and the false is not in
dividit; et in hac etiam non est falsum, ut this either, as is clear from Augustine’s
patet per Augustinum in Lib. de vera saying: “No one has intellectual knowledge
religione, qui dicit sic: nec quisquam of false things. Consequently, falsity is not
intelligit falsa. Ergo falsitas non est in in the intellect.
intellectu.
Praeterea, Augustinus in libro LXXXIII 2. According to Augustine: “Whoever is

quaestionum, quaestio 32: omnis qui deceived does not understand that in which
fallitur, id in quo fallitur, non intelligit. he is deceived. The intellect is always true,
Ergo in intellectu non potest esse falsitas. therefore, and there can be no falsity in it.
Item Algazel dicit: aut intelligimus 3. Algazel says: “Either we understand

aliquid sicut est, aut non intelligimus. something as it is or we do not understand.
Sed quicumque intelligit rem sicut est, But whoever understands a thing as it is
vere intelligit. Ergo intellectus semper est truly understands it. Therefore, the intellect
verus; ergo non est in eo falsitas. is always true, and there is no falsity in it.
Sed contra To the Contrary
est quod philosophus dicit in III de The Philosopher says: “Where there is a
anima, quod ubi est compositio joining of concepts, there the true and the
intellectuum, ibi iam verum et falsum est. false begin to be.” Hence, falsity is found
Ergo falsitas invenitur in intellectu. in the intellect.
REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod nomen The name intellect arises from the
intellectus sumitur ex hoc quod intima rei intellect’s ability to know the most
cognoscit; est enim intelligere quasi intus profound elements of a thing; for to
legere: sensus enim et imaginatio sola understand (intelligere) means to read what
accidentia exteriora cognoscunt; solus is inside a thing (intus legere). Sense and
autem intellectus ad interiora et imagination know only external accidents,
essentiam rei pertingit. Sed ulterius but the intellect alone penetrates to the
intellectus ex essentiis rerum apprehensis interior and to the essence of a thing. But
diversimode negotiatur ratiocinando et even beyond this, the intellect, having
inquirendo. Nomen ergo intellectus perceived essences, operates in different
dupliciter accipi potest. ways by reasoning and inquiring. Hence,
intellect can be taken in two senses.
Uno modo secundum quod se habet ad First, it can be taken merely according to
hoc tantum a quo primo nomen its relation to that from which it first
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impositum fuit; et sic dicimur proprie received its name. We are said to
intelligere cum apprehendimus understand, properly speaking, when we
quidditatem rerum, vel cum intelligimus apprehend the quiddity of things or when
illa quae statim nota sunt intellectui notis we understand those truths that are
rerum quidditatibus, sicut sunt prima immediately known by the intellect, once it
principia, quae cognoscimus dum knows the quiddities of things. For
terminos cognoscimus; unde et example, first principles are immediately
intellectus habitus principiorum dicitur. known when we know their terms, and for
Quidditas autem rei est proprium this reason intellect or understanding is
obiectum intellectus; unde, sicut sensus called.”a habit of principles.” The proper
sensibilium propriorum semper verus est, object of the intellect, however, is the
ita et intellectus in cognoscendo quod quiddity of a thing. Hence, just as the
quid est ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed sensing of proper sensibles is always true,
tamen per accidens potest ibi falsitas so the intellect is always true in knowing
accidere, in quantum, videlicet, what a thing is, as is said in The Soul. By
intellectus falso componit et dividit; quod accident, however, falsity can occur in this
dupliciter contingit: vel in quantum knowing of quiddities, if the intellect
definitionem unius attribuit alteri, ut si falsely joins and separates. This happens in
animal rationale mortale conciperet quasi two ways: when it attributes the definition
definitionem asini; vel in quantum of one thing to another, as would happen
coniungit partes definitionis ad invicem, were it to conceive that “mortal rational
quae coniungi non possunt, ut si animal” were the definition of an ass; or
conciperet quasi definitionem asini when it joins together parts of definitions
animal irrationale immortale; haec enim that cannot be joined, as would happen
est falsa: aliquod animal irrationale est were it to conceive that “irrational,
immortale. Et sic patet quod definitio non immortal animal” were the definition of an
potest esse falsa, nisi in quantum implicat ass. For it is false to say that some
affirmationem falsam. Hic autem duplex irrational animal is immortal. So it is clear
modus falsitatis tangitur in V Metaph. that a definition cannot be false except to
Similiter nec in primis principiis the extent that it implies a false affirmation.
intellectus ullo modo decipitur. Unde (This twofold mode of falsity is touched
patet quod si intellectus accipiatur upon in the Metaphysics. Similarly, the
secundum illam actionem a qua nomen intellect is not deceived in any way with
intellectus imponitur, non est in intellectu respect to first principles. It is plain, then,
falsitas. that if intellect is taken in the first sense—
according to that action from which it
receives the name intellect—falsity is not
in the intellect.
Alio modo potest accipi intellectus Intellect can also be taken in a second
communiter, secundum quod ad omnes sense—in general, that is, as extending to
operationes se extendit, et sic all its operations, including opinion and
comprehendit opinionem et reasoning. In that case, there is falsity in
ratiocinationem; et sic in intellectu est the intellect. But it never occurs if a
falsitas; nunquam tamen si recte fiat reduction to first principles is made
resolutio in prima principia. correctly.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta. From this discussion, the answers to the
difficulties are clear.
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Thomas Aquinas: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate: English https://isidore.co/aquinas/QDdeVer1.

Question One: Truth

The problem under discussion is truth,

Quaestio est de veritate. Et primo Difficulties

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Praeterea, quaecumque differunt ratione, 3. Things which differ conceptually are so

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Sed contra. To the Contrary

Praeterea, secundum Boetium in libro de 3. In all creatures, as Boethius has pointed

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Praeterea, quae communiter dicuntur de 5. What are predicated of a cause and of

Dicendum, quod sicut in When investigating the nature of anything,

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Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod 1. That definition of Augustine is given for

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Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliquid 3. “Something can be understood without

Ad quintum dicendum, quod dispositio 5. In this objection, condition should not be

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Ad sextum dicendum, quod verum et ens 6. There is a conceptual difference between

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis 2. Although fornication is evil, it possesses

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In the second article we ask:

Secundo quaeritur utrum veritas Difficulties

Et videtur quod non. It seems that it is found principally in

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Praeterea, omne quod est in aliquo, 3. That which is in something is based

Praeterea, si veritas principaliter est in 4. If truth is principally in the intellect,

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Contra. Philosophus dicit in VI 1. The Philosopher says: “The true and

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Complementum autem cuiuslibet motus Now, the fulfillment of any motion is

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per Augustinum in Lib. de vera religione, writings of Anselm and Augustine, as

secundum autem adaequationem ad With respect to its conformity with a

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Ad quartum dicendum, quod Augustinus 4. Augustine is speaking of a thing’s

In the third article we ask:

Tertio quaeritur utrum veritas sit tantum Difficulties

Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for

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Sed contra. To the Contrary

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Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod 1. Although the formation of a quiddity is

In the fourth article we ask:

Quarto quaeritur utrum sit tantum una Difficulties

Et videtur quod sic. It seems that this is so, for

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luminis.- of all temporal things, is numerically one;

Praeterea, Anselmus in Lib. de veritate 3. Anselm argues as follows: If there are as

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Praeterea, ibidem Augustinus 7. Augustine offers another proof in the same

Sed contra. To the Contrary

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Praeterea, Deus comparatur ad res in 5. God as a cause is related to things in three

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Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod 1. Time is related to temporal things as a

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Secundum concedimus. 2. We concede the second argument.