MADHHAB AHL AL-BAYT IN NUSANTARA: THE PAST AND PRESENT

Umar Faruk Assegaf

The presence of Shi’ism1, the so-called Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt, in Indonesia in the past

has always been a contentious issue among historians and scholars of Islam. The main reason is

that, this subject is pertaining to the ongoing hot debate about the Islamisation process in the first

period in the region. The process was in fact very complex because it was mainly related to the

different historical perspectives of how, when and by whom Islam was first introduced into the

archipelago.

The Islamisation process might presumably be carried out by ulamas (Islamic scholars)

with different Islamic school of thoughts, including Sunnism and Shi’ism. Some researchers like

Baroroh Baried, M Yunus Jamil, A Hasyim (Hasymi 1983), asserted that Shi’ism had played a

major role within early period of the introduction of Islam into Indonesia (Azra 2000). For

instance, they found that Shi’ism had ever emerged as strong political power in the archipelago

and Shi’ism and Sunnism had engaged in an acute power competition within the corresponding

period (Hasymi 1983) . By contrast, researchers like Hamka and Azyumadi Azra and Saifuddin

Zuhri, rejected those views saying they were baseless due to the absence of convincing evidences

and any reliable references. He asserted that the influence of Shi’ism in the process of

Islamisation in Indonesia and the Southeast Asia region was even more controversial.

Nevertheless, Azra maintained that, as religious political ideology Shi’ism never existed

in Indonesia during the first introduction of Islam in the country but admitted that a “Persian

influence” in cultural and religious matters was undeniable.

1
In this paper, the term of Shi’ism indicates denomination in contrast with Sunnism while Shi‘I refers to
a follower or devotee in singular form and its plural one is Shi’is. The term Shi‘i is used both as adjective
and noun.
 The Persian influence in the Nusantara Archipelago could early been identified in

Ayuthia, Thailand during “the Age of Commerce” from 15 to 17th century (Reid 1988) . Persian

Muslim Shi’is frequented to trade offices in Thailand. The interaction between the Muslim

traders and local people, not only brought about positive impacts on local financial sector, but

also on the socio-religious discourses into the region. During that period, the Shi’i Muslims had

great influence on the local kingdom, which was reigned by Prasat Thong. Ibnu Muhammad in

his book “The Ship of Sulaiman” even more said that the Shi’i Muslims helped out King of

Siam Prasat Thong’s son, Narai, organize the annual Hasan-Hussein feast during the Islamic

month of Muharram, the month which is considered holy in Shi’ism (Mu*hammad Rab*i* ibn

Mu*hammad 1972).

The view of Persian influence was also supported by Arnold T Walker. Having observed

the robust growth of Islam in the coastal areas of Java and Sumatra at the end of 14 century, he

strongly believes that the introduction of Islam into Indonesia was under the influence of Persian

and Indian culture with the banner of Shi’ism (Arnold 1913: 368, 83). Undoubtedly, this view is

easily dismissed and clearly left a big question behind: is the Persian influence meaning the

dissemination of Shi’ism as religious ideology or not?

The Sufi Theory

With regard to the Shi’ism presence in Indonesia in the past, there was a popular

assumption, if not sufficient to call it a theory, among historians and researchers is that Shi’ism

came to Indonesia through Sufism. This assumption was closely allied with a theory proposed by

AH Johns. He writes that the spread of Islam in Indonesia was mainly carried out by Sufi (Johns

1961). Of course, this is very controversial issue throughout the history and obviously needs

further elaboration to answer a series of questions which subsequently arise in this respect. What
is the relationship between Shi’ism and Sufism? What the elements of Shi’ism influence

Sufism?. What sort or branch of Sufism which brought Shi’ism along when entering Indonesia?

In a bid to answer to the above questions, it is important firstly to elaborate “the Sufi

theory”. Johns believes in contrast to the theory emphasizing on trade activities carried out by

local people and visiting Muslim merchants, the coming of Islam to the archipelago was

successfully carried out by Sufis. His theory was also supported by other scholars like Fatimi and

Azra. He further said:

It (Sufism) was directly involved in the spread of Islam to Indonesia, it played a

significant part of this social organization of the Indonesian port towns and it was the

specific nature of Sufism which facilitated the absorption of non-muslim communities

into fold of Islam.(Johns 1961)

Although the Muslim traders had regularly visited Indonesia as of 8th century, the wide

spread of Islam in the region only gained its momentum during 13th century. This was because of

the fact that the Sufism did not appears to be a significant influencing factor in the Muslim world

until the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258. Citing Gibbs, Johns underscores that, after the

fall of the Caliphate, the Sufis played an increasingly role in preserving the unity of the Islamic

world, counteracting the tendency of the territories of the Caliphate to divide into Arabic, Persian

and Turkish linguistic regions (Johns 1961). In addition, Escaping from Mongols onslaught, the

Sufi missionaries were forced to leave Baghdad off to the east where they could develop their

orientation (Koentjaraningrat 1984). In addition, Johns describes:

“they were peripatetic preachers ranging over the whole known world, voluntarily

espousing poverty; they were frequently associated with trade or craft guilds, according

to the order (tariqa) to which they belonged; they taught a complex syncretic theosophy
 largely familiar to the Indonesians, but which was subordinate to, although an

enlargement on the fundamental dogmas of Islam; they were proficient in magic and

possessed powers of healing; and not least, consciously or unconsciously, they were

prepared to preserve continuity with the past, and to use the terms and elements of pre-

Islamic culture in an Islamic context (Johns 1961) .

The spectacular spread of Islam in 13th century in the region was inseparable to particular

approaches applied by Sufi which were typically flexible and in what Johns said: “a

characteristic of the Sufi Apostolate was a readiness to build on the past and to enroll elements

of local belief and custom into the service of Islam”. (Johns 1961).

As Sufism is assumed to be a driving force of the Islamisation process in the Malay-

archipelago, some scholars speculate that Shi’ism came into Indonesia through Sufism

mainstream where the influence of both Sunni and Shi’i are converging (Azra 2000). In this

regard, Christoph Marcinkowski asserted that Shi’i Islam has a long-standing historical footing

in what is now Indonesia. "Philosophical Sufism" and Wujudiyyah Tarekat2, as well as certain

aspects of classical Malay literature, such as the hikayat genre, according to him, had strong Shi’i

undercurrents as well (Marcinkowski 2008).

For instance, Hamzah Fansuri (1593), a North Sumatran mystic and poet, gained

enlightenment through the Wujudiyyah Tarekat in Ayuthia where Shi’i rulers ever reigned

((Drewes and Brakel 1986). He eventually embraced a particular formulation of Sufi theosophy,

based on Ibn Arabi’s tradition which may be included Shi’i elements.

Actually, this controversial pantheism was initially established by Al Hallaj (244/858-

309/921), which was later on adopted by Ibn Arabi, Muhyyidin Abu Abdallah Muhammad

2
Wujudiyyah or Wahdatul Wujud (the "Unity of Being") is a Sufi philosophy stressing that ‘there is no
true existence except the Ultimate Truth (God).
Hatemi At Tha’i (560/165-638/240). Louis Massignon in his 4 volume books about Al Hallaj,

writes that Al Hallaj was strongly influenced by Shi’ism. Under the Caliphate Abbassyiah Al

Muktadirbillah, he was allegedly accused of triggering public unrest by promoting the doctrine

of “Da’wa Rububiya”, meaning the supreme power of God would only be invested through the

prophets and Imams to establish government states. Such as the theory, according to Massignon,

is no doubt about its Shi’i origin (Massignon 1982). In conformity, Hamka also attributed the

doctrine of Al Hallaj to Ismailite of Shi’ism, commonly called Bathiniyah which upholds the

belief that the universe was controlled by “Imamul Ghaib” (the Hidden Imam) (Hamka 1962).

However, Hamka later revised his view by adding that Sufism at the time it spread in Indonesia

was in accordance with Sunnism (Hamka 1976).

The doctrine of the Hidden Imam, what the so-called as Imam Mahdi by Sunnism and

Imam Zaman by Shi’ism, and his eventual return to the world constitutes a basic belief in

Shi’ism. The Sufi doctrine of Imam Mahdi was propagated by Ibn Arabi in chapter 366 of his

Al-futuhat Al Makkiyah. (Gibb The Encyclopaedia of Islam)).

Some years following the Ibn Arabi era, this view was further developed within the Sufi

circle which are mostly of Shi’i schools of taught. In contrast, Sunni theologians have never been

attracted so much on this belief. They accept the concept of Imam Mahdi with caution and

suspicion (Eliade and Adams The Encyclopedia of religion). Al Ghazali, for instance, did not

write much about this belief. Distinctively, such a messianic belief is in fact still common in the

Muslim community in Indonesia. More interestingly, rather similar messianic belief was also

well-known within Hinduism which was prevalent in Indonesia during pre-Islamic era.

Therefore, the root of messianic belief in the Indonesian society might indirectly also

give the pathway for the successful process of Islamisation in Indonesia. In short, we can
speculate that the Sufi propagators at that time might inclusively adopt the local Hindu-based

tradition of messianism or even more possibly apply the concept of Ibn Al Arabi of Shi’ism. Of

course, these possibilities confined with the basic characteristics of Sufi which is the flexible and

opened-minded as being described by Johns, Shihab, Azra and Fatimi (Shihab 2001).

Having said that Shi’i cultural and religious traditions was already famous among local

people since 15 century, it is safe to say that Shi’ism as an Islamic school of thought or a

religious doctrine was not as popularly acceptable as Sunnism in Indonesia3. This could be seen

that the development of Shi’ism in the country underwent “a stage of quietism” until the Islamic

revolution of Iran in 1979 when the global Islamic revivalism has been commencing to flourish.

In modern Indonesia, some Shi’I cultural and religious aspects has so far been underway

a process of syncretism with local culture. This process is easily observable in a number of

religious symbols and practices in Indonesia. Even until nowadays, these practices are still vivid

in Muslim community in Indonesia. Some are regarded as traditional and cultural events,

commonly performed by Indonesian people such as Acara Tabot in Bengkulu and Bulan Suro in

Java, or the same kind of rituals are also found in Ternate, Maluku.

Tabot is a communal ceremony (ritual) to honor Imam Hussein, the second imam in

Shi’ism, Hussein was cruelly killed in Karbala. The word of Tabot is derived from an Arabic

word “tabut” which literally means “woden box” or “case”. The procession of ritual is taking

place about 10 days in Month of Muharram (the Islamic lunar calendar). Especially in Bengkulu,

3
Ironically, many propagators of Islam in Indonesia in the past who have Shiite inspired doctrine, like
Hamzah Fansuri and his students, Siti Syekh Jenar, one of nine Wali Songo, were accused to promote
deviant Islamic teachings. Even more, some of them were prosecuted and bunt alive. In this regard, I am
of the opinion that this pressure and accusation have in turn brought negative impacts on the
developments of Shi’ism in the following era. Therefore, I assumed that followers of such a teaching
would probably feel traumatic and frightened to publicly exercise their beliefs.
Tabot has completely blended to be a local tradition. This ritual is also found in Pariaman dan

Padang, West Sumatera and also in Ternate, Maluku (Kuncaraningrat 1990). As no strong

written evidences when Tabot ritual began to be known in Bengkulu and West Sumatera, it was

said that Tabot was introduced by British soldiers called Sipahi, or Sepoy4. They are Muslim

soldiers of Indian origin, hired by Sir Stanford Raffles to fortify British rule in the region

(Sumbar 1982). The procession of this ceremony was called Ashura.

Ashura is significant distinctiveness of Shi’ism. This central beliefs of Shi’i community

is Karbala tragedy where, Hussein, the third Imam of Shi’ism and the grandson of the Prophet,

killed brutally by Yazid of Umayyads. This happened precisely on October 10, 680 (Muharram

10, 61 AH). At the time, Yazid was in power, seeking the Bay'ah (allegiance) from Hussein.

The drama actually began when Hussein and his group, including companions and family

members of no more than 100 men, was intercepted on their way to Kufa, Iraq, by a large army

of about 100.000 strong-men of Yazid. At this stage, Husayn was forced to give his Bay’ah for

Yazid but refused it. Consequently, in an unbalanced fighting, Hussein and all of his men were

killed and their bodies, including that of Hussein, were mutilated. This day was commemorated

by Shi’i followers as a sad event, which is commonly called Ashura.

Ashura is of particular significance to Shi’i Muslim all over the world. A quite few of

them would make pilgrimages to the Mashhad al-Hussein, the shrine in Karbala, Iraq that is

Hussein's tomb. On this day, all Shi’i followers are wearing mourning attire, mostly black in

color. They refrain themselves from music because it is a time for sorrow, respect of the demise

and self reflection. They express mourning by crying as well as listening to poems about the

tragedy. All of these activities are intended to connect them with Hussein's suffering and his

4
Sepoy is (from the Persian word ‫ سپاهی‬Sipahi meaning "soldier’ ) is native of India. Muslim soldier
allied to British power.
sacrifices in keeping Islam alive. Hussein's martyrdom is basically interpreted by Shi’ism as a

symbol of the struggle against injustice and oppression.

Indeed, religious ritual and gatherings are among key practices in Shi’ism. As Allamah

Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Taba’taba’i his book “Shia” that there are certain religious practices

besides the basic rites which are specifically Shi’ism. Despite stressing the importance of those

rites he revealed that some of those rites might be also familiar to Sunnism (Taba’taba’i 1981).

In contrast, Vali Nasr maintained that what is setting apart Shi’i followers from their

fellow Sunni friends is “the great feast of mourning, remembrance and atonement that is Ashoura

(the tenth of Muharram) (Nasr 2006). He believed that those rites are uniquely Shi’ia. Even

more Graham describes that “a reference of textual and rituals ….religious observances many of

which are peripheral to the doctrines, has been woven into the fabric of Shi’i collective

consciousness, endowing it with a rich and distinctive iconography ” (Graham E. Fuller and

Rend Rahim Francke 1999).

Azra and Hamka however insisted that some Shi’ism inspired-festivals and traditions,

like Tabot in Bengkulu, Tabuik in Padang, or in any other parts of Indonesia, like Ternate and

South Sulawesi, nowadays have lost its religious meanings. Both scholars suggested that, unlike

those of Iran, Tabot festivals in Indonesia for instance, no longer reflect religious manifestation

and spirituality, they are merely popular celebrations. In response to that view, I argued that,

either Tabot in Indonesia or Ta’ziyeh in Iran, however, still originally root into the Shi’i religious

tradition and culture and uniquely could be found in Shi’ism. It is only among Shi’i believers

that the Tabot or “ta’zeyah” ceremonies were performed. If we have an opportunity to take a

close a look and compare Tabot ceremonies which are usually performed in Indonesia with those

in other countries, like Pakistan, Lebanon and Iran, we might easily come to the very conclusion
that both ceremonies have the same root of culture. It is true, I have to underscore here that the

Tabot festival in Indonesia has been undergoing a socio-cultural transformation which might

cause it loose its religious meaning but as a cultural festival, it is still popular performed by local

people.

In addition to Tabot, some ritual East Java, like “secret ritual” (sedekah sirr) and some

religious recitation (dzikir) which are usually performed and read between Isya (evening) prayer

up to midnight, are thought to be parts of the Shi’i aspects. The recitation (dzikir) Five of the

Cloak5 especially, means that they have five people who can help them out of the hellfire in the

day of Judgement, namely, Al Mustafa (the Prophet), Al Murtada (Ali ibn Abi Talib), the two

siblings (Hasan dan Hussien) and the daughter (Fatima). The dzikir is read loudly by a group of

Muslims which definitely claim themselves as Sunni (Karim 2007). Indeed, accurately

Marcinkowski describes this situation with the statement as “Shi’i-inspired festivals are still

encountered in the Archipelago, even if many of their mostly Sunnite participants might not be

aware of their origins or connotations” (Marcinkowski 2008).

The participation of Sunni followers in some Shi’i inspired activities was also admitted

by Azra. In an interview with a researcher which was conducted Jakarta in 1998, Azra admitted

that some groups of the Tareqat Mu’tabaroh of Sunnism (Sunni major branch of Sufism) has an

intimate relationship with that of Shi’ism, especially regarding the admiration to Hasan and

Husayn (grandsons of the Prophet) (Basyar 1999).

Considering the above explanation, it is not an exaggeration to say that cultural aspects of

Shi’ism have been present in parts of Indonesia long before the Islamic Revolution of Iran in

979. Nevertheless, it is true that it would be difficult to ascertain the presence of Shi’i religiosity

5
This dzikir is based on the most widespread tradition of the Prophet (hadist), accepted by both Sunni as well Shia,
in relation to the interpretation of Al Qur’an (33:33) which is the so-called Hadist Al Kisa’, futher explanation about
this see, Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an, volume four, pp 50.
in Indonesia just only looking at the Shi’i-inspired festive. This implies that there is hardly

evidence to support that Shi’ism has ever been a strong religious political orientation in

Indonesia in the past. However, it is also improper to deny that Shi’ism has culturally been

existing in the archipelago for as long as 15th century.

Contemporary Indonesia

During 1970s, a series of successes has been taking place in the Muslim world during

1970s such as the 1973 Egyptian-Israeli War, the Arab oil embargo as well as the 1979 Islamic

Iranian Revolution. “These successes of the seventies resonated with an idealized perception of

early Islam…” (Esposito 1992). In addition, a number of social and political events have also

been underway, including the imposition of Islamic law in Pakistan and Libya, the Islamic

opposition movements in Egypt and Turkey as well as Muslim movement against Soviet

invasion in Afghanistan. Other similar events related to this encouraging development have been

also in progress in Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco and Malaysia.

Certainly, these events created a great expectation among Muslims that an Islamic

reawakening era was emerging. These events have boosted the spirit of Islamic revivalism

sweeping all over the Muslim world, including Indonesia.

The late twentieth century revivalist spirit prevalent simultaneously in most Muslim

countries was similar in a number of ways. In spite of a long and an endless argument on

definition of the Islamic revivalism among social scientists, to my understanding, it was basically

inspired by a single conception that was “Islam is a complete system of life theologically and

politically”. However, admittedly, in many cases, this spirit successfully restored credibility to

Islam as a code of life superior to other ideologies, at once weakened the influence of the West

up on young Muslims and helped to limit the influence of Western ideas and culture. Indeed, as
Esposito described, that this revival spirit led to a higher profile of Islam in Muslim politics and

society.

The indices of Islamic reawakening in personal life are many: increased attention to

religious observances (mosque attendance, prayer, fasting), proliferation of religious

programming and publication, more emphasis upon Islamic dress and values and the

revitalization of Sufism (Von Der Mehden 1990).

Inescapably, the Islamic movements in Indonesia during 1970s also followed the global

trends. The spirit of global Islamic revivalism not only gave great impetus to the Islamic

movements in Indonesia but also brought positive impact on social religious activities as well as

personal life of each Muslims in the country.

Meanwhile, in contrary to the global trends, the Islamic activism in Indonesia during the

corresponding period was marked with a feeling of disappointment. Muslim community in

Indonesia was frustrated with a series of political failures since the defeat of Masyumi Party 6 up

to the general elections 1971 and 1977. The dismay of Islamic activists reached its peak when

the New Order regime introduced Pancasila as the only one basis for mass-organizations. As the

effect, many Islamic political elite changed strategically their struggle and social role from

political into cultural interest. They tended to choose education or social foundation, for instance,

instead of political parties in a bid to articulate their existing aspirations. Majority of the

Indonesian Islamic community no longer regarded political participation as the only one pathway

to contribute for the benefit of the nation and the religion.

6
Masyumi Party (Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia) (Council of Indonesian Muslim
Associations) was a major Islamic political party during 1950s. It included the Islamic organizations such
as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Masyumi came second in the 1995 election. It won 7,903,886
votes, representing 20.9% of the popular vote, resulting in 57 seats in parliament. In 1958, some Masyumi
members joined a rebellion against the incumbent President Sukarno. As a result, in 1960 Masyumi was
banned.
 During that period, there was a phenomenon of the emergence and development of

various Islamic movements in the country such as Hizbut Tahrir, Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Jamaah

Tabligh and Darul Arqam. These movements, not attached to formal Islamic organizations, were

mostly pioneered by young intellectual Muslims and some of them were even called

underground movements. (Rosyad 1995).

Like other Islamic movements in Indonesia, such as Muhammadiyah and PERSIS which

were deeply influenced by international developments, Shi’ism has been early growing in

Indonesia. It has gone along with other Islamic strands in Indonesia as the effects of the dynamic

spirit of Islamic revivalism during the beginning of the 15th century of Islamic calendar

(hijriah), which was expected to be ‘the Century of Islamic Resurgence’ (Abad Kebangkitan

Islam).

Undeniably, as one the striking experiences in the Muslim world, the Islamic Revolution

of Iran in 1979 has further influenced not only Islamic activists in Indonesia but, indeed, also

throughout the globe (Von Der Mehden 1990). Particularly, Khomeini, a prominent Islamic

scholar of Iran who led the revolution had been successful in creating a state based on Islamic

ideology. Not surprisingly, this revolution greatly attracted the attention of Indonesian Muslim

scholars.

Having observed the Khomeini’s success in Iran, Indonesian Muslims intellectuals and

politicians were amazed and motivated to imitate him in search for a new political posture in the

country. Seemingly, Indonesian activists found an alternative, if not a cure for their political

disappointment, in the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

The impact of the Islamic revolution in Iran on the early development of Islamic youth

resurgence movement are clear despite the fact that the revolution in Iran was a
 revolution of the Shiite (Shi'ah) Muslims. It is a quite interesting fact that regardless of

differences, Indonesian Sunni Muslims accepted revolutionary ideas from the Shi' ite

Muslims in Iran. (Rosyad 1995)

Of course, as normally and traditionally happening in the first stage of its development,

any Islamic movement spread its influence through academic discussions in campuses.

Academics and learned-people sphere become nursery and fertile ground for the early

development of Islamic movement (Fox 2004). Some religious discussions were held in secular

campuses. In short, despite censorship imposed by the New Order regime, secular campuses, like

ITB (Institute of Technology Bandung) and University of Indonesia (UI), served as good

breeding grounds for almost all of the Islamic movements during the corresponding period. For

instance, ITB’s mosque Salman, was regularly become the venue for Muslim students to gather

and discuss socio-religious issues.

Thus, the spread of Shi’ism in Indonesia at that time occurred on university campuses,

and one of the most important factors behind this phenomenon was the spread of Islamic

literature. (Azra et al. 2006). Over the last decades of the twentieth century, a boom in religious

publication enterprises became visible through the appearance of translations of numerous works

of Islamic thinkers from outside Indonesia, including like Muhammad Iqbal, Maududi, and

Fazlur Rahman. Over the 1980s there was also a strong growth in the number of Indonesian

translations of the works of Ali Shari’ati, Sayyid Tabataba’i and Ayatollah Mutahhari, Khomeini

and other Shi’i thinkers. Through such translations, the influence of Shi’i thought was to surface

in a wide variety of intellectual currents of the Indonesian Islamic discourse (Van Bruinessen

2002).
 “The ideas that made perhaps the strongest intellectual impact, however, were those of

the Iranian thinkers Ali Shari`ati and, a few years later, Murtaza Mutahhari. These two authors

appealed especially strongly to students and young intellectuals. Their attraction was in part due,

no doubt, to their association with the Iranian revolution, which fascinated many young

Indonesians,” Martin van Bruinessen said. He asserted that students and the gradually emerging

Muslim middle class showed a great eagerness for Islamic reading, numerous discussion circles

were formed where books were critically discussed.

Works by, and studies on, the great Sufis and Muslim philosophers were translated, and a

growing number of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals published collections of their lectures,

speeches and sermons — oral communication remains the primary form — as books, which

found an avid readership.

One of the most significant manifestations of this era was the flourishing of Islamic

intellectual discourses and the emergence of young Muslim intellectuals, especially on university

campuses. In his book, Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia, Michael Feener has pointed

out that despite the Suharto government’s political pressure concerning the effects of Iran’s

Islamic revolution in Indonesia, the influence of Iranian Muslim thought was clearly visible

among young students in the years following the 1979 Iranian revolution (Feener 2007). Indeed,

a number of Indonesian students were clearly and increasingly inclined towards Shi’ism at that

time. Most of them graduated from Western-style educational institutions, and as a result of

coming from such a background they became successful in introducing Shi’ism to the educated

Indonesian middle class. In addition to seminars and discussions, they also encouraged the

translation and publication of Shi’i thinkers’ books as a part of their contributions to the

dissemination of Shi’ism.
 This group capitalized on deep transformations in Muslims’ attitudes and understandings

of ‘Islamic activism’ occurring in the 1980s–1990s. If previously, political involvement was seen

as the only way to contribute to the benefit of the nation and of religion, at this point in time,

cultural interests, intellectual debates and philosophy gained a new position, as important loci of

Islamic revival (Djamaluddin Malik 1998). In addition, a hallmark of this new mode of Islamic

revival, was the emphasis placed upon putting aside religious fanaticism and myopic views on

various religious matters to develop, instead, an attitude of openness, and the spread of a popular

motto of non-sectarianism (Feener 2007).

An exemplary figure of this phenomenon is Jalaluddin Rakhmat, a lecturer at Universitas

Pajajaran (Pajajaran University, UNPAD) in Bandung, West Java. In 1988, together with his

colleagues, Haidar Bagir, Ahmad Tafsir, Agus Effendi and Ahmad Muhajir, he established the

Muthahhari Foundation in Bandung, which was an institution that focused on da’wa and

publishing. Since 1992 the foundation has expanded its scope to include the establishment of

high schools across Java 7. Since the 1980s, Jalaluddin Rakhmat has been widely recognised as

the most active intellectual in spreading Shi’ismon campuses and more broadly to the educated

middle class of Indonesian Muslims. In the post-Suharto era Rakhmat also took leadership of the

Shi’a community by establishing the Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bayt Indonesia (IJABI). Other campus

figures incline toward Shi’isminclude Dimitri Mahayana (a lecturer at Institute of Technology

Bandung (ITB) and former chairman of IJABI), Hadi Swastio (a lecturer at the Communication

College and former general secretary of IJABI) and Yusuf Bakhtiar (formerly, a deputy chief of

Muthahhari Senior High School, and currently, a political activist in Amien Rais’ National

7
These high schools are well known as senior highs schools plus. The attribute, ‘plus’, is used because its
programmes combine a number of subjects from the national curriculum with Islamic teachings and a
focus on fostering moral conduct. See SMA Plus Muthahhari, available online at: http://www.smuth.net/
(last accessed 26 May 10).
Mandate Party), as well as Sayuti Asshatri in University of Indonesia (UI), Agus Abu Bakar

(UI)8, Zulvan Lindan (University of Jayabaya) and Haidar Bagir (ITB).

Hawza

Another major stream in the development of Shi’ism in modern Indonesia has flowed

through the more traditional institutions of Islamic education, including that of the Shi’i hawza.

Since the 1960s, there has been an increasingly active exchange of visits between Iranian-style

pesantern, the so-called hawzas, and various Indonesian pesantren. For example, in 1962 a

leading Shi’i scholar from Iraq, Muhammad Reza Ja’fari, came to Indonesia to visit the al-

Khairiyya school in Bondowoso, and to meet local Muslim leaders such as Hussein al-Habsyi

(1921–1994). The discussion lasted for four days, and following that event, some teachers

converted to Shi’ism (Zulkifli 2009). This relationship between hawza and Indonesian pesantren

intensified after the Revolution in 1979. Despite the mounting political pressure of the Suharto

regime, this sort of exchanges continued during the 1980s in connection with the Iranian ulamas’

mission of exporting the principles of the Islamic revolution. These connections contributed

greatly to the dissemination of Shi’ism in Indonesia, as the increasing familiarity of local ulama

with their Shi’i counterparts overseas made it possible to dispatch Indonesian students to hawzas

in Iran. In this regard, two Hadrami Arabs of the most important figures were Ahmad al-Habsyi

(d. 1994), leader of Pesantren ar-Riyadh in Palembang (South Sumatra), and Hussein al-Habsyi,

who established the Yayasan Pesantren Islam at Bangil (East Java) in 1976.

8
Agus Abubakar Arsal Al-Habsyi was born in Makassar, South Sulawesi, on 6 August 1960, to a
Hadrami migrant family. He was a Shi’i student well-known in the early 1980s, and was active at the Arif
Rahman Hakim Mosque of the UI. He was a student at the Physics Department. His intensive learning of
Shi<i teachings took place at the university. He was also familiar with Shi’ism, as it was known before
the Iranian revolution, due to the existence of some Shi’is in a village in South Sulawesi, who also acted
as factors in his conversion. See Zulkifli, The Struggle of the Shi’is in Indonesia (Leiden: 2009).
 Ahmad al-Habsyi, in Palembang, had established early contacts with hawzas in Iran, and

had sent his students Umar Shahab and Hussein Shahab to study in Qum in 1974 and 1979,

respectively (Ali 2002). The activities of Hussein al-Habsyi’s pesantren in Bangil greatly

contributed to the spread of Shi’ism in Indonesia, and any analysis of Shi’i genealogy in the

archipelago would not be complete without the mention of him9. Born in Surabaya on April 21

1921, Hussain al-Habsyi started his primary education at the Madrasah Al Khairiyah -- the oldest

Islamic educational institution in Surabaya, and the same school where he later came to teach. In

1970, he set up a boarding school in Bondowoso, and another boarding school for boys in

Kenep-Beji, Bangil. According to his acquaintances, this occurred after the Iranian revolution,

but it is possible that he had already become interested in this manifestation of Islam before

1979. In fact, it appears that when teaching at the al-Khairiyya, he, with the other teachers and

students of the school, often encountered Middle Eastern figures with whom he could discuss

Islamic teachings, including Shi’i doctrines (Zulkifli 2009). In the post-revolution years, Ahmad

al-Habsyi and Hussein al-Habsy fostered the rapid growth of Shi’ism in Indonesia through their

acquaintances with Iranian scholars. In 1982, a delegation from Iran, consisting of Ayatollah

Ibrahim Amini, Ayatollah Masduqi and Hujjat al-Islam Mahmudi, visited the YAPI. As a result

of this meeting with Hussein al-Habsyi, the hawza ‘ilmiyya in Qum agreed to accept ten

Indonesian students from his school in Bangil each year. The following year, Muhsin Labib,

Ibrahim al Habsyi, Rusdi Alaydrus, Thoyyib Nafis, Mukhtar al Jufri, Umar Alatas, Ahmad

Baragbah, Hasan Tono, Muhammad and Musam were sent to Qum (Ali 2002). On their return,

after several years of study, these students became the leading preachers of Shi’ism in Indonesia.

9
Ustadz Husein Bin Abu Bakar Alhabsyi Yang Pejuang‘ published on 3 Ocotber 2008 by Republika daily
newspaper , last accessed on 29 Ocotber 2009, available online at:
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/6668/ustadz_husein_bin_abu_bakar_alhabsji_ustadz_yang_pejuang,(last
accessed on October 2009).
Since then, the number of Indonesian students in Qum has increased, so that after a decade, Qum

graduates in Indonesia numbered more than a hundred (Ali 2002).

A number of these YAPI alumni returned from their time in Qom to establish and run

their own pesantren, and to take active roles in several Indonesian Islamic organizations. Among

them, the most prominent were Zahir Yahya (leader of the Al-Kautsar Foundation in Malang,

East Java, and former head of YAPI, Miqdad (head of Pesantren Darut Taqrib in Jepara, Central

Java), Fathoni Hadi (founder of the Al-Hujjah Foundation in Jember, East Java, and, currently

member of staff at the Islamic College for Advanced Studies, the London branch of Islamic

higher education in Jakarta), Muhammad Amin Sufyan (head of the Samudera Foundation in

Surabaya), Abdurrahman Bima (elected in 2009 as member of Parliament from the Democratic

Party), Husein Alkaff (adviser at the Al-Jawad Foundation in Bandung), Herman al-Munthahhar

(head of the Amirul Mukminin Foundation in Pontianak, West Kalimantan), Muhammad al-Jufri,

and Abdul Aziz al-Hinduan. The arrival of Qum alumni in the late 1970s and early 1980s helped

consolidate the growing Shi’i movement in Indonesia, as they also directly engaged other

Muslims in informal religious gatherings (pengajian), which were held in specific locations and

attended by a limited circle. On these occasions, Qum Alumni also performed Shi’i rituals

(majlis), like Kumayl supplication, Ashura commemorations, and so on (Ali 2002).

Post Soeharto Era

The student led reformation in 1998 had delivered a democratic system in Indonesia and

created favorable national socio-political climate for minority group to survive. Such dynamic

political and social changes happening in Indonesia have widely opened more windows for

Shi’ite followers. Thus, the situation unleashed the acceleration of Shi’ism in the country.
Consequently, the Shi’ite movement has turned to be more opened. Its followers have been

confidently promoting their beliefs to others and holding religious ceremonies in the public

phere.

As the result of current democratic system, the Shi’ite practitioners had no longer to

conceal their beliefs; they could publicly hold their religious congregation at will wherever they

want. They obviously showed their identity. No political pressure, or despite still social

constraints but very minimum, they freely exercised their beliefs. They seemed to have

exercised freedom in expressing their religious beliefs and therefore they began to show their

real identity.

The development of Shi’I community in Indonesia has indicated a tremendous progress

after the reformation era following the fall of Soeharto in May 1998. Although it is strongly

believed the Islamic Revolution of Iran (IRI) which delivered the rise of Khomeini’s regime in

Iran, affecting the spread of Shiism in Indonesia, the favourable domestic socio-economic and

political situation has indeed contributed greatly to the rapid growth of Shi’ism in the

Archipelago.

The phenomena in mushrooming of Shi’i community are conspicuously visible in

middle-to-upper sphere of society in the archipelago country, including scholars and academics.

The number of Shi’a affiliated-institutions comprising of social foundations or schools, including

higher education, has been clearly observable nowadays all over the region from Aceh in the

western part of Indonesia to the remote area of Papua in the most eastern of the country.

However, as minority in the mainstream Sunnism in Indonesia, Shi’ite community are

really aware that the top priority of their social agenda is to consolidate their own organizations

in a bid to gain a wider social recognition.

 More importantly, although they have obtained a tick of approval from the government,

they are still facing challenges because of a lack of clarification from the Council of Indonesian

Ulema (MUI) about the status of Shi’ism, whether it is regarded as deviant group or not. The

last decree of MUI was issued in 1984, warning Indonesia Muslims to be mindful about Shi’ism.

So far, there has no more decree yet from this council.

Undoubtedly, this unclear status has actually generated mixed reactions from the majority

Sunnite followers in Indonesia which at least could be classified into three attitudes. Firstly,

those who adopt soft (lenient) attitude believe that there is no fundamental difference between

Shi’ism and Sunnism. Therefore, the differences could be easily put aside for the shakes of

united community. Obviously, this group include some leading scholars (ulama) for instance

Quraish Shihab who writes “Sunnah-Syiah bergandengan tangan! Mungkinkah? : Kajian atas

Konsep ajaran dan Pemikiran,”. Abdurrahman Wahid and some NU leaders seem to belong to

this group. In addition to their soft attitude, they also often appear to come and attend Shi’ite

congregations and share some of the views with their Shi’ite counterparts.

The major part in the society in Indonesia showed a moderate stance towards Shi’ism.

This part includes elites of some major mass-organization, like NU and Muhammadiyah. Despite

of awareness about the differences between Shi’ism and Sunnism, they try to avoid a horizontal

conflict or public debate with Shi’ism. Basically, they believed that Shi’ism still within the

corridor of Islam. 10

The last social group is those who consider Shi’ism as un-Islamic. The most active

cluster of anti-Shi’ism is Al Bayyinat of Surabaya which chaired by a Hadhramawt origin,

Thohir Alkaf. Ironically, he is one of alumni from the famous Shi’ite pesantern of YAPI in

10
During the recent interview, Chairman of NU Hasyim Muzadi and Chairman of
Muhammadiyah Din Syamsuddin revealed and shared this view.
Bangil. So, he is a former student of the noted Shi’ite scholar, Hussein Al-Habsyi. Thohir Alkaf

believes that not only Shi’ite followers are infidels but also their blood is eligible to be spilt.

Considering the mixed reactions of Muslims in Indonesia, Shi’ite community in some

extent is still facing public resistance like the ones in Madura, Bondowoso and Bangil, East Java.

For instance, on December 24, 2006, 500 angry villagers in Jambesari village,

Bondowoso Regency, East Java attacked 150 IJABI members conducting routine prayers,

destroying three houses, a small mosque and a car belonging to the local IJABI’s chairman.

Local Sunni residents objected to the presence of the Shi’ism in their community and accused

them of deviant Islamic beliefs and heresy.

Another related incidents, on April 8, 2007, in Jember, East Java, an angry crowd

surrounded a house belonging to Suwarno, the local chairman of IJABI. They demanded IJABI

not spread Shi'ite teachings.

In a rally in front of the local office of public prosecutor in May 2007, some 500 people

in Kecamatan Bangil Pasuruan, East Java, urged the government to act swiftly against “the

deviant elements” in the society. They carried a big poster “Syiah Go to Hell”.

Government’s standpoint

On November 2007, Majelis Ulama Indonesia has issued fatwa regarding nine criteria of

deviant groups (aliran sesat) in Islam. But the fatwa itself raised multi interpretations. Although

MUI has so far not mentioned Shi’ism, the prescribed guidelines set by the MUI to define

"deviant" teachings and sects are contentious. For instance, the criteria for deviance include

alternative interpretations of Al Qur’an. Under this fatwa, Shi’ism might be included as a deviant

element because some parts of Shi’ite teachings are derived from the alternative interpretations

of Al Qur’an, which are not in line with the mainstream Sunnism.

 For this reason, “Syiar” a Shi’ite affiliated magazine, made an interview in December

2007 with one of the MUI chairman Umar Shihab who reinstated that the MUI fatwa did not

mean to include any particular Islamic school of law in its fatwa. According to Umar, the

difference in religious point of views was mainly due to the different of school of law. MUI will

not involve in judging any madzhab in Islam. “If the Islamic world has already accepted Shi’ism,

why should MUI refuse it?” he said. This statement is important for Shi’ism in as a shield against

possible violent attacks from opponent groups.

However, the repercussion of Umar’s statement is actually very weak as it is only the

form of interview, not clear fatwa. For this reason, fearing that the fatwa will be misinterpreted

and misused as a main pretext to attack them as it happened with Jamaah Ahmadiyah, the Shi’ite

denomination currently continue striving to grab the heart of ummah as the pathway to gain

social legitimacy.

During the recent interview, Chairman of Komisi Fatwa MUI, Dr. Anwar Ibrahim said

that Shi’ism which proliferated in Indonesia is still within the corridor of Islam. However, he

admitted there was an element of Shi’ism might possibly be considered as a deviant (ghulat).

That is the reason, he added, that MUI issued fatwa (religious guidance) in 1984 to remind the

Islamic community (umat Islam) be aware of this element. “So far, there has been no public

concern or complaints about Shi’ite teaching in Indonesia. It is only an extreme group would

certainly create conflict in the society.” he said.

Anwar’s statement was precisely describing the position of MUI about the proliferation

of Shi’ism in Indonesia. As far as Shi’ism in Indonesia does not create public concern, MUI

would regard it as no matter.

 In line with MUI, the ministry of religious affairs also regarded Shi’ite community as the

same as other religious groups. The department has developed all means of communication with

all Islamic mass-organizations in Indonesia, including those of Shi’ite community. “We do not

discriminate one another. They ( Shi’i community) will be always welcome if they want to

establish good relationship with us,” said Secretary of Directorate General of Islam’s Social

Guidance Mudzakir.

He stressed that the case of Shi’ism in Indonesia is far different with that of Ahmadiyah

which has been punished by MUI as a deviant group. The government would always look at the

aspiration of Islamic community in general. “There is no problem with Sh’ism at all,” he said.

In addition, Head of the Research and Development Body of the Ministry of Religious

Affairs (Balitbang, Depag), Professor Atho Mudzar said, as religious group, the proliferation of

Shi’ism in Indonesia has no problem as long as it does not disseminate a political doctrine

against the state ideology, Pancasila. “If they do not uphold any political belief which is against

the state ideology, we have no problem with them,” he said.

According to Atho, one of his department’s responsibilities is to secure the harmony of

religious life (kerukunan beragama) in the country. Within this framework, the government in

one side would never limit the right of any religious groups to live but in other side the

government has to maintain the social stability and security. “If there is violent act against

minority in the country, it is not government’s initiatives but criminal’s,” he stressed.

Conclusion

Despite the long-standing debate on various theories of the Islamisation process in

Indonesia, the existence of Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt in the past in the archipelago is undeniable. Its

presence could be traced back to the first time Islam entering Indonesia. Evidently, a number of
religious symbols and practices in the country seem to have a close association with the basic

tenet of the Shi’i school of thought. Even until today, these practices are still vivid among

Muslim community in Indonesia.

However, Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt subsequently marginalized. As an Islamic school of

thought, this madhhab was not as popularly acceptable as Sunnism. For this reason, Thence, the

developments of this madhhab in Indonesia came into its lowest ebb until it gained the moment

when Khomeini led-Islamic revolution toppled Shah Pahlevi of Iran in 1979.

In this regard, one should not jump to the conclusion that the current rapid development

of Madzhab Ahl Al-Bayt in Indonesia was a logical bias of the wind of changes blown by the

success of Islamic Revolution in Iran (IRI). In fact, there were other factors, beside the Iranian

revolution influence the development of Shi’ism in Indonesia, Such factors include dynamic

domestic socio-economic and political situation in Indonesia. In addition, it would be noteworthy

to consider some dominating aspects in relation with Islamic movement as general in Indonesia

within the period of 1980s and 1990s that directly or indirectly participated in accelerating the

developments of Shi’ism among Muslim community in Indonesia.

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