LABOR Termination (11 20)

LABOR STANDARDS
Termination of Employment
AGABON vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 158693; November 17, 2004; Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and constr uction materials. It
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employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they
were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims and on December 28, 1999,
the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work, and were not entitled to
backwages and separation pay. The other money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also denied for lack of evidence.Upon denial of their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals in turn ruled th at the dismissal of the petitioners
was not illegal because they had abandoned their employment but ordered the payment of money claims. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
HELD: NO. To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give the
employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination by the
employer: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the latter's representative in connection
with the employee's work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the em ployee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or his duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just
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cause for termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more
determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more int ention to work. The intent to
discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.
In February 1999, petitioners were frequently absent having subcontracted for an installation work for another company. Subcontracting for
another company clearly showed the intention to sever the employer-employee relationship with private respondent. This was not the first time they did
this. In January 1996, they did not report for work because they were working for another company. Private respondent at that time warned petitioners that
they would be dismissed if this happened again. Petitioners disregarded the warning and exhibited a clear intention to sever their employer-employee
relationship. The record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted out to him. Hence, petitioner’s
terminations were for a just and valid cause.
(the important part of the ruling) Thereafter, the Court determines if the procedures for dismissal were observed. Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal
is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportun ity to be heard if requested
by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard
and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283
and 284, the employer must give the employee and the DOLE written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.
From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an
authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized
cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just
or authorized cause but due process was not observed.
In the first situation, the dismissal is undoubtedly valid and the employer will not suffer any liability. In the second and third situations where the
dismissals are illegal, Article 279 mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time
of actual reinstatement.
In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal.
However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that th e petitioners
abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending
notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is
not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-
compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
A review and re-examination of the relevant legal principles is appropriate and timely to clarify the various rulings on employment termination in
the light of Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission.
SuperDuperDigests (2009) Arriola, EJ. Cayaban, IFE. Laxamana, AA. Lumanglas, C. Macaraeg, TJ. Navarra, C. Tecson, JM. Tupaz, K. Villalon, AA. 1
LABOR STANDARDS
Prior to 1989, the rule was that a dismissal or termination is illegal if the employee was not given any notice. In the 1989 case of Wenphil Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, we reversed this long-standing rule and held that the dismissed employee, although not given any notice and
hearing, was not entitled to reinstatement and backwages because the dismissal was for grave misconduct and insubordination, a just ground for
termination under Article 282. The employee had a violent temper and caused trouble during office hours, defying superiors wh o tried to pacify him. We
concluded that reinstating the employee and awarding backwages "may encourage him to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of
discipline that employees are required to observe.
The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the due process requirement,
the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil or
Belated Due Process Rule.
Thus, the Court believes that the ruling in Serrano did not consider the full meaning of Article 279 of the Labor Code which states:
ART. 279. Security of Tenure. – In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to
his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up
to the time of his actual reinstatement.
This means that the termination is illegal only if it is not for any of the justified or authorized causes provided by law. P ayment of backwages and
other benefits, including reinstatement, is justified only if the employee was unjustly dismissed. The fact that the Serrano ruling can cause unfairness and
injustice which elicited strong dissent has prompted the Court to revisit the doctrine.
After carefully analyzing the consequences of the divergent doctrines in the law on employment termination, the Court believes that in cases
involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and
to follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be sti ffer than
that imposed in Wenphil. By doing so, this Court would be able to achieve a fair result by dispensing justice not just to employees, but to employers as well.
The unfairness of declaring illegal or ineffectual dismissals for valid or authorized causes but not complying with statutory due process may have
far-reaching consequences. This would encourage frivolous suits, where even the most notorious violators of company policy are rewarded by invoking
due process. This also creates absurd situations where there is a just or authorized cause for dismissal b ut a procedural infirmity invalidates the
termination. Let us take for example a case where the employee is caught stealing or threatens the lives of his co-employees or has become a criminal,
who has fled and cannot be found, or where serious business losses demand that operations be ceased in less than a month. Invalidating the dismissal
would not serve public interest. It could also discourage investments that can generate employment in the local economy.
The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to the
cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right, as in this case. Certainly, an employer should not be compelled to
pay employees for work not actually performed and in fact abandoned. The employer should not be compelled to continue employing a person who is
admittedly guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance and whose continued employment is patently inimical to the employer. The law protecting the rights of the
laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.
It must be stressed that in the present case, the petitioners committed a grave offense, i.e., abandonment, which, if the requirements
of due process were complied with, would undoubtedly result in a valid dismissal. An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article
282 should not be protected by the Social Justice Clause of the Constitution. Social justice, as the term suggests, should be used only to correct an
injustice. As the eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel observed, social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about
"the greatest good to the greatest number.
Nevertheless, the violation of the petitioners' right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the
form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant
circumstances. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, the Court deems it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. The Court believes this form
of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a
vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
*Guys, you might want to read the separate opinion (which is a very long one) Hehe. Basta, Serrrano ruling is no longer controlling and inoperative na 
G.R. No. 152329 April 22, 2003
ALEJANDRO ROQUERO, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondent.
FACTS:
Roquero, along with Rene Pabayo, were ground equipment mechanics of respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL for brevity). From the evidence on
record, it appears that Roquero and Pabayo were caught red-handed possessing and using Methampethamine Hydrochloride or shabu in a raid conducted
by PAL security officers and NARCOM personnel.
LABOR STANDARDS
The two alleged that they did not voluntarily indulge in the said act but were instigated by a certain Jojie Alipato who was introduced to them by Joseph
Ocul, Manager of the Airport Maintenance Division of PAL. Pabayo alleged that Alipato often bragged about the drugs he could smuggle inside the
company premises and invited other employees to take the prohibited drugs. Alipato was unsuccessful, until one day, he was ab le to persuade Pabayo
and Roguero to join him in taking the drugs. When they started the procedure of taking the drugs, armed men entered the room, arrested Roquero and
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Pabayo and seized the drugs and the paraphernalia used. Roquero and Pabayo were subjected to a physical examination where the results showed that
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they were positive of drugs. They were also brought to the security office of PAL where they executed written confessions without the benefit of counsel.
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On March 30, 1994, Roquero and Pabayo received a "notice of administrative charge" for violating the PAL Code of Discipline. They were required to
answer the charges and were placed under preventive suspension.
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Roquero and Pabayo, in their "reply to notice of administrative charge," assailed their arrest and asserted that they were instigated by PAL to take the
drugs. They argued that Alipato was not really a trainee of PAL but was placed in the premises to instigate the commission of the crime. They based their
argument on the fact that Alipato was not arrested. Moreover, Alipato has no record of employment with PAL.
5 6
Roquero and Pabayo were dismissed by PAL. Thus, they filed a case for illegal dismissal.
In the Labor Arbiter's decision, the dismissal of Roquero and Pabayo was upheld. The Labor Arbiter found both parties at fault —Nonetheless, the Labor
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Arbiter awarded separation pay and attorney's fees to the complainants.
While the case was on appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the complainants were acquitted by the Regi onal Trial Court (RTC)
Branch 114, Pasay City, in the criminal case which charged them with "conspiracy for possession and use of a regulated drug i n violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act 6425," on the ground of instigation.
The NLRC ruled in favor of complainants as it likewise found PAL guilty of instigation. It ordered reinstatement to their former positions but without
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backwages. Complainants did not appeal from the decision but filed a motion for a writ of execution of the order of reinstatement. The Labor Arbiter
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granted the motion but PAL refused to execute the said order on the ground that they have filed a Petition for Review before this Court.
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, PAL, and Pabayo filed a Motion to Withdraw/Dismiss the case with respect to Pabayo, after
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they voluntarily entered into a compromise agreement. The motion was granted in a Resolution promulgated by the Former Thirteenth Division of the
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Court of Appeals on January 29, 2002.
The Court of Appeals later reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter insofar as it upheld the dismiss al of Roquero.
However, it denied the award of separation pay and attorney's fees to Roquero on the ground that one who has been validly dismissed is not entitled to
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those benefits.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the instigated employee shall be solely responsible for an action arising from the instigation perpetrated by the employer;
2. Can the executory nature of the decision, more so the reinstatement aspect of a labor tribunal's order be halted by a petition having been filed
in higher courts without any restraining order or preliminary injunction having been ordered in the meantime?
3. Would the employer who refused to reinstate an employee despite a writ duly issued be held liable to pay the salary of the subject employee
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from the time that he was ordered reinstated up to the time that the reversed decision was handed down?
HELD: 1. There is no question that petitioner Roquero is guilty of serious misconduct for possessing and using shabu. He violated Chapter 2, Article VII,
section 4 of the PAL Code of Discipline which states: "Any employee who, while on company premises or on duty, takes or is under the
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influence of prohibited or controlled drugs, or hallucinogenic substances or narcotics shall be dismissed."
Serious misconduct is defined as "the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a derel iction of duty, willful in
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character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." For serious misconduct to warrant the dismissal of an employee, it (1) must be
serious; (2) must relate to the performance of the employee's duty; and (3) must show that the employee has become unit t o continue working for the
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employer.
It is of public knowledge that drugs can damage the mental faculties of the user. Roquero was tasked with the repair and main tenance of PAL's airplanes.
He cannot discharge that duty if he is a drug user. His failure to do his job can mean great loss of lives and properties. Hence, even if he was instigated to
take drugs he has no right to be reinstated to his position. He took the drugs fully knowing that he was on duty and more so that it is prohibited by company
rules. Instigation is only a defense against criminal liability. It cannot be used as a shield against dismissal from employment especially when the position
involves the safety of human lives.
Petitioner cannot complain he was denied procedural due process. PAL complied with the twin-notice requirement before dismissing the petitioner. The
twin-notice rule requires (1) the notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is being sought along with
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the opportunity for the employee to air his side, and (2) the subsequent notice of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Both were given by respondent
PAL.
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HELD 2 & 3: Article 223 (3rd paragraph) of the Labor Code as amended by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, and Section 2 of the NLRC
22
Interim Rules on Appeals under RA No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code, provide that an order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is immediately
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executory even pending appeal. The rationale of the law has been explained in Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC:
"In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismiss ed or separated
employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
on labor and the working man.
LABOR STANDARDS
These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and
meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms with equal intensity. Labor is
an indispensable partner for the nation's progress and stability.
. . . In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution
pending appeal.
. . . Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending ap peal, of a
decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be
decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separat ed employee and his
family."
The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of
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his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a restraining order
issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was
mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to,
as if he was reinstated, from the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of this Court.
We reiterate the rule that technicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner and only to
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effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat them. Hence, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it
is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher
court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee
is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the dismissal of petitioner Roquero is AFFIRMED, but respondent PAL is ordered to pay the wages to which Roquero is entitled from
the time the reinstatement order was issued until the finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
HYATT TAXI SERVICES INC., vs. RUSTOM M. CATINOY

G.R. No. 143204 June 26, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Facts:
Complainant was hired on October 10, 1992 as a taxi driver by the Respondent Hyatt Taxi Services, Inc. Complainant is also a member and
officer (Secretary) of Respondent, Hyatt Taxi Employees Association, the exclusive bargaining representative of all taxi drivers of Respondent Hyatt Taxi
Service, Inc. Respondent Jaime Dublin is the President and Chairman of the Board of the Respondent association.
As a taxi driver, complainant works every other day for 15 days in a month earning P800.00 more or less a day after remitting to the respondent
company his boundary (P650.00/day) during carbarn time 1:00 a.m. Being the Secretary of the Union/association, complainant keeps all the records and
documents of the association in the drawer of his desk at the Union Office which is located inside the premises of Respondent company.
On August 21, 1995 at about past 10:00 a.m., complainant went inside the union office and to his surprise found his drawer to have been forcibly
opened. Since he saw the acting President of the Union, Mr. Tomas Saturnino inside the office together with two rice suppliers namely Melencio Reyes and
Ms. Rosalinda Balahan, complainant asked Saturnino who opened his drawer. Saturnino replied that he was the one who forcibly opened the drawer to
retrieve some documents particularly the list of union members. An argument ensued and complainant even reminded Saturnino th at he should respect the
rights and functions of other officers of the association. Saturnino then approached the complainant and shoved him. Complainant retaliated with fist blow
but it failed to hit Saturnino and the latter hit him twice in the face causing one of his tooth to fall. The aggression of S aturnino was only interrupted when
the Operations Manager of the respondent company Mr. Caraig intervened and told him (Saturnino) to stop. Complainant was brought to the hospital by
Ms. Balahan and Mr. Reyes due to the bleeding that occurred due to the loss of his tooth. After securing medical treatment, complainant on the same day
filed a criminal complaint for physical injuries with the fiscal's Office and Saturnino was arrested by the police for investigation.
Asst. Vice-President of the Respondent company Melchor Acosta, Jr. issued a memorandum preventively suspending for 30 days the services of
the complainant and Saturnino pending investigation in response to the recommendation of the Chairman of the Board of the Ass ociation.
Complainant aggrieved by the preventive suspension since he was not the aggressor, filed a complaint for illegal suspension, unpaid wages, and
damages against both the association-union and management before the NLRC.
After the lapse of his 30 days preventive suspension, complainant reported for work but he was not allowed to resume his duties as a taxi driver
allegedly, since he is pursuing the criminal complainant for physical injuries against Saturnino, the associations' President and the complaint for the illegal
suspension with the National Labor Relations Commission.
On October 12, 1995, since there was no response from Respondent company, complainant decided to amend his complaint to inclu de
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constructive dismissal as an additional cause of action since he was not allowed to resume his employment after t he lapse of his preventive suspension."
About 25 union members requested the chairman of the Board of the Association to suspend the complainant and Saturnino for en gaging in a
fist fight since both are officers of the union which should be models of discipline for the rank and file employees.1âwphi1
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of illegal preventive suspension, requiring it to pay the wag e equivalent of the
suspension, and further finding petitioner guilty of illegal constructive dismissal, ordering petitioner to reinstate respondent and to pay him backwages and
attorney's fees.
Petitioner and the Union Association then filed a Joint Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC. NLRC issued a Decision affirming the decision
of the Arbitration Branch. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration urging the NLRC to review the finding of facts of the Arbitration Branch.
On October 30, 1998, the NLRC acting on said Motion for Reconsideration, issued a Decision granting in part the motion. The Decision of the
NLRC modified its earlier decision when it deleted the award of backwages on the ground that there was "no concrete showing t hat complainant was
constructively dismissed".
Respondent filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration of said Decision which the NLRC denied. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
CA.
LABOR STANDARDS
On December 27, 1999, the CA issued the now assailed Decision that set aside and annulled the October 30, 1998 Decision of the NLRC and
reinstated the earlier decision of the NLRC. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the CA which the CA then denied. Hence, this
petition for review.
Issue:
Whether THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT INSISTED THAT CATINOY WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED WHEN THE NLRC
HAD ALREADY RULED THAT THERE WAS NO CONCRETE SHOWING OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.
Held:
No. Clearly, constructive dismissal had already set in when the suspension went beyond the maximum period allowed by law. Sec tion 4, Rule
XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules provides that preventive suspension cannot be more than the maximum period of 30 days. Hence, we have ruled that
after the 30-day period of suspension, the employee must be reinstated to his former position because suspension beyond this maximum period amounts
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to constructive dismissal.
Petitioner denies that it constructively dismissed respondent and alleges that it was respondent who went AWOL and who refused to resume his
work because he could not account for union funds. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC rejected petitioner's claims. We affirm the rejection. It bears
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stressing that in illegal dismissal cases, it is the employer who has the burden of proof. Since petitioner claims that respondent abandoned his work,
petitioner has to establish the concurrence of the following: (1) the employee's intention to abandon employment and (2) overt acts from which such
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intention may be inferred—as when the employee shows no desire to resume work. Petitioner failed to make out its case of abandonment. Even the
NLRC in its modified decision confirmed that there were no overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that respondent had no intention of returning to work
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anymore. Also, the fact that respondent filed a complaint against his employer within a reasonable period of time belies abandonment.
Petitioner implores this Court to respect the modified decision of the NLRC. While it is true that the essence of a motion for reconsideration is a
second review of the facts, this theory does not apply in the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner before the NLRC contained no factual basis that could support the NLRC's change of heart. The evidence as it stands shows that after the lapse
of the 30-day suspension period, respondent reported for work but he was not allowed to resume his duties as a taxi driver. To reiterat e, from the time that
the 30-day suspension period had expired, respondent can be already deemed as constructively dismissed.
Second, the strict adherence by the NLRC to the definition of constructive dismissal is erroneous. Apparently, the NLRC ruled out constructive
dismissal in this case mainly because according to it "constructive dismissal consists in the act of quitting because continued employment is rendered
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impossible, unreasonable or unlikely as in the case of an offer involving demotion in rank and a diminution in pay". Based on this definition, the NLRC
concluded that since respondent neither resigned nor abandoned his job and the fact that respondent pursued his reinstatement negate constructive
dismissal. What makes this conclusion tenuous is the fact that constructive dismissal does not always involve forthright dismissal or diminution in rank,
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compensation, benefit and privileges. There may be constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer
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becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.
Here, what made it impossible or unacceptable for respondent to resume work was petitioner's insistence that respondent first desist from filing
his criminal complaint against the acting president of the union and to withdraw his complaint for illegal suspension against petitioner before he could be
allowed to return to work. Respondent refused and amended his complaint to include constructive dismissal. Respondent's refus al to yield to petitioner's
conditioned offer to take him back is understandable for respondent has every right not to bargain away his right to prosecute his complaints in exchange
for the employment to which he was in the first place rightfully entitled.
In acting on the motion for reconsideration of petitioner, the NLRC gave credence to petitioner's contention that petitioner's failure to reinstate
respondent to his job was merely a result of a miscommunication between the two parties since petitioner was willing to take back respondent as its
employee.
We disagree. Instead, we are in full accord with the Court of Appeals that the predicament respondent faced was not just a product of
miscommunication, an argument that the NLRC had in fact branded in its earlier decision as a mere afterthought. Respondent had written the assistant
vice president of petitioner to complain about his non-reinstatement after the lapse of his preventive suspension. Petitioner failed to reply, and it is actually
from petitioner's inaction where the supposed miscommunication sprung.
Moreover, from the time that petitioner failed to recall respondent to work after the expiration of the suspension period, taken together with
petitioner's precondition that respondent withdraw the complaints against the acting president of the union and against petitioner itself, respondent's
security of tenure was already undermined by petitioner. Petitioner's actions undoubtedly constitute constructive dismissal. 1âwphi1.nêt
ALFARO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No.140812; August 28, 2001; Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Petitioner was employed as a helper/operator of private respondent since November 8, 1990. From November 23, 1993 until Decemb er 5, 1993,
he took a sick leave. When he reported back to work on December 6, 1993, he was surprised to find out that another work er was recruited to take his
place, and instead, he was transferred to [the] wrapping section where he was required to work with overtime up to 9:30 PM, f rom his regular working
hours of from 7:00 a.m., to 4:00 p.m., despite the fact that he had just recovered from illness. On December 7, 1993, he was given a new assignment
where the work was even more difficult[;] when he complained o[f] what he felt was rude treatment or sort of punishment since he was being exposed to
hard labor notwithstanding his predicament of just coming from sickness, petitioner was told to look for another job because he was dismissed effective on
said date, December 7, 1993, when petitioner was seeking his 13th month pay and fifteen (15) days sick leave pay [o]n the aft ernoon of the same day, he
was ignored when he refused to sign documents which indicated that he was renouncing claims against private respondent. Befor e Christmas of 1993,
petitioner sought private respondent to pay his 13th month pay and [his] 15 days sick leave pay, but he was told to come next year.
On January 12, 1994, petitioner came to private respondent for his aforestated money claims. During that occasion, private respondent dangled
to petitioner a check worth P3,000.00 which [would] be released to him, only if he [signed] the documents, being forced upon him to sign on December 7,
1993. Desperate for the money to support his subsistence, and against his will, petitioner was constrained to sign the said d ocuments which contained no
amount of money released to him. The actual sum of money received by petitioner from private respondent amounted to P3,000.00 in the form of check,
while his claims for 15 days sick leave pay was secured by him from the Social Security System. "The documents forced upon th e petitioner to sign were a
'resignation letter, and a Release and Quit Claim'.
'To the Personal Manager

Mr. Michael Philip Elizalde
LABOR STANDARDS
Star Paper Corporation
46 Joy St., Grace Village, Q.C.
Dear Sir,
Ako po si Candido Alfaro ay nagbibigay ng aking resignation letter dahilan po sa aking sakit. Umaasa po ako na mabigyan ng tulong.
Lubos na gumagalang
(sgd) Candido Alfaro'
As submitted by private respondent in its pleadings on record, petitioner allegedly tendered said resignation letter on January 12, 1994, on the
basis of which, the former maintains that the latter was not illegally dismissed, was paid [his] separation pay of P8,455.50, and t hat he voluntarily resigned
from his job effective January 12, 1994.
Labor Arbiter found for the private respondent. On appeal, the respondent court likewise ruled in favor of the private respondent, that petitioner
was not illegally dismissed and that he voluntarily resigned. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed.
2) Whether or not petitioner did not voluntarily resign from work.
HELD: No to both. The factual findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, reveal that petitioner resigned fr om his work due to his
illness, with the understanding that private respondent would give him separation pay. Unfortunately, it seems that private respondent did not keep its
promise to grant the separation pay, prompting petitioner to institute the present action for illegal dismissal. It was only for this reason that the Court gave
due course to this Petition.
18
Generally, an employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is not entitled to separation pay. In the present case, however, upon the
request of petitioner, private respondent agreed to a scheme whereby the former would receive separation pay despite having resigned voluntarily. Thus,
the terms and conditions they both agreed upon constituted a contract freely entered into, which should be performed in good faith, as it constituted the law
between the parties.
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable
settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned, simply because of a change of mind The position tak en by petitioner on the alleged
illegal dismissal was vacillating and indecisive, as correctly found by the labor arbiter who provided a ratiocination on the matter as follows:
"Thus, after a careful perusal of the evidence on hand, we are of the opinion that the position taken by the respondent corporation is more
credible than that of complainant. This is evident from the fact that the complaint filed by complainant on June 14,1996, or more than two (2)
years from his alleged dismissal on December 7, 1993, was only payment of separation pay. It was only on August 1, 1996 when complainant
abandoned his claim for separation pay and instead filed an amended complaint claiming that he was, illegally dismissed.
"To our mind, therefore, the foregoing coupled with the fact that there is practically no evidence on record which shows that complainant was
pressured and made to sign a resignation letter and Release and Quitclaim against his will [and] better judgment only shows t hat his claim of
illegal dismissal is unsubstantiated and is a mere afterthought.
"Moreover, if indeed complainant was illegally dismissed, he should have pursued his claim against the respondent corporation by immediately
filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. As it is, however, complainant filed a complaint for separation pay against the respondent corporation only
after two (2) years from his alleged dismissal which complaint was amended for the purpose of claiming illegal dismissal almost two (2) months
thereafter."
Voluntary resignation is defined as the act of an employee, who finds himself in a situation in which he believes that personal reasons
cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service; thus, he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. As
discussed above, petitioner negotiated for a resignation with separation pay as the manner in which his employment relations with private respondent
would end. He was already suffering from a lingering illness at the time he tendered his resignation. His continued employment would have been
detrimental not only to his health, but also to his performance as an employee of private respondent. Hence, the termination of the employment relations of
petitioner with private respondent was ultimately, if not outrightly inevitable. Resignation with separation pay was the best option for him under the
circumstances. Rightly so, this was the mode adopted and agreed upon by the parties, as evidenced by the Release and Quitclai m petitioner executed in
connection with his resignation.
Clearly then, the claim of petitioner that he was illegally dismissed cannot be sustained, considering that his voluntary res ignation has been
indubitably established as a fact by the three tribunals below. Indeed, illegal dismissal and voluntary resignation are adversely opposed modes of
terminating employment relations, in that the presence of one precludes that of the other.
Although the Supreme Court has, more often than not, been inclined towards the workers and has upheld their cause in their conflicts with the
employers, such inclination has not blinded it to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts
and applicable law and doctrine. An employee who resigns and executes a quitclaim in favor of the employer is generally estopped from filing any further
LABOR STANDARDS
money claims against the employer arising from the employment. However, private respondent has not complied with its obligation to give petitioner's
separation pay in the amount of P8,542.50. It was this deliberate withholding of monetary benefits that necessitated the long, litigious and lethar gic
proceedings in this case. Had private respondent simply paid the measly amount of P8,452.50 as separation pay to petitioner, this legal controversy could
have been avoided and the court dockets unclogged.
INTERTROD MARITIME INC. and TROODOS SHIPPING CO. Vs. NLRC

G. R. No. 81097 June 19, 1991
Padilla J.
FACTS:
On 10 May 1982, private respondent Ernesto de la Cruz signed a shipboard employment contract with petitioner Troodos Shipping Company as
principal and petitioner Intertrod Maritime, Inc., as agent to serve as Third Engineer on board the M/T "BREEDEN" for a period of twelve (12) month. He
eventually boarded a sister vessel, M/T "AFAMIS" and proceeded to work as the vessel's Third Engineer under the same terms and conditions of his
employment contract previously referred to.
On 26 August 1982, while the ship (M/T "Afamis") was at Port Pylos, Greece, private respondent requested for relief, due to "personal reason." The Master
of the ship approved his request but informed private respondent that repatriation expenses were for his account and that he had to give thirty (30) days
notice in view of the Clause 5 of the employment contract so that a replacement for him could be arranged. Only four days after the request for relief, while
the vessel was at Port Said in Egypt, the Master ―signed off‖ the private respondent. The Master paid him in cash all amounts due him less the amount of
US$780.00 for his repatriation expenses, as evidenced by the wages account signed by the private respondent.
On his return to the Philippines, private respondent filed a complaint with the National Seamen Board (NSB)(now POEA) charging petitioners for breach of
employment contract and violation of NSB rules and regulations. He alleged that his request for relief was made in order to take care of a Filipino member
of the crew of M/T "AFAMIS" who was hospitalized on 25 August 1982 in Athens, Greece. However, the Master of the ship refused to let him immediately
disembark in Greece so that the reason for his request for relief ceased to exist. Hence, when the Master of the ship forced him to step out in Egypt despite
his protestations to the contrary, there being no more reason to request for relief, an illegal dismissal occurred and he had no other recourse but to return
to the Philippines at his own expense.
POEA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. However, on appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and ruled against the employer.
The NLRC held that the immediate approval of private respondent's request for relief should have resulted in his disembarkati on in Port Pylos, Greece; that
failure of the Master to allow disembarkation in Greece nullified the request for relief and its approval, such that private respondent's subsequent
disembarkation in Egypt is no longer his doing but rather an illegal dismissal on the part of the Master.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employee Ernesto dela Cruz was illegally terminated.
HELD: NO.
The resolution of the NLRC fails to consider the clear import of the provisions of the employment contract between the employ er and employee. Under the
provisions of the employment contract, private respondent Ernesto de la Cruz was required by the employment contract not only to pay his own
repatriation expenses but also to give thirty (30) days notice should he decide to terminate his employment prior to the expiration of the period
provided in the contract. When the Master approved his request for relief, the Master emphasized that private respondent was required to give
thirty (30) days notice and to shoulder his own repatriation expenses. Approval of his request for relief, therefore, did not constitute a waiver by
petitioners of the provisions of the contract.
The Court also did not sustain the claim of Dela Cruz that his request for relief was only for the reason of taking care of a fellow member of the crew so
much so that when he was not allowed to disembark in Port Pylos, Greece, the reason no longer existed and, therefore, when he was forced to "sign off" at
Port Said, Egypt even when he signified intentions of continuing his work, he was illegally dismissed.
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who "finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of
the exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment." The employer has no control over resignations
and so, the notification requirement was devised in order to ensure that no disruption of work would be involved by reason of the resignation. This practice
has been recognized because "every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits by adopting a device or means designed towards that goal."
Once a voluntary resignation has been accepted, it may not be withdrawn without the consent of the employer. In the instant c ase, the Master had already
accepted the resignation and, although the private respondent was being required to serve the thirty (30) days notice provided in the contract, his
resignation was already approved. Private respondent cannot claim that his resignation ceased to be effective because he was not immediately discharged
in Port Pylos, Greece, for he could no longer unilaterally withdraw such resignation. When he later signified his intention of continuing his work, it was
already up to the petitioners to accept his withdrawal of his resignation. The mere fact that they did not accept such withdrawal did not constitute illegal
dismissal for acceptance of the withdrawal of the resignation was their (petitioners') sole prerogative.
Once an employee resigns and his resignation is accepted, he no longer has any right to the job. If the employee later changes his mind, he must ask for
approval of the withdrawal of his resignation from his employer, as if he were re-applying for the job. It will then be up to the employer to determine whether
or not his service would be continued. If the employer accepts said withdrawal, the employee retains his job. If the employer does not, as in this case, the
employee cannot claim illegal dismissal for the employer has the right to determine who his employees will be.
Under the terms of the employment contract, it is the ship's Master who determines where a seaman requesting relief may be "signed off." It is, therefore,
erroneous for private respondent to claim that his resignation was effective only in Greece and that because he was not i mmediately allowed to disembark
LABOR STANDARDS
in Greece (as the employer wanted compliance with the contractual conditions for termination on the part of the employee), th e resignation was to be
deemed automatically withdrawn.
The decision of the NLRC is therefore set aside. To sustain it would be to authorize undue oppression of the employer. After all, "the law, in protecting the
rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer."
San Miguel Corporation v. Caroline C. del Rosario
G.R. Nos. 168194 & 168603 DEC 13, 2005
On April 17, 2000, respondent was employed by petitioner as key account specialist. On March 9, 2001, petitioner informed respondent that her
probationary employment will be severed. On March 13, 2001, respondent was refused entry to petitioner’s premises.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and underpayment/non-payment of monetary benefits. Respondent alleged
that petitioner feigned an excess in manpower because after her dismissal, it hired new recruits.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that respondent was a probationary employee whose services were terminated as a result of the excess
manpower that could no longer be accommodated by the company. Respondent was allegedly employed temporary reliever. Anticipating an increase in
sales volume, petitioner hired respondent as an account specialist on a probationary status and was assigned at petitioner’s Greater Manila Area-Key
Accounts Group (GMA-KAG) Beer Sales Group. However, petitioner’s expected business growth did not materialize, hence, it reorganized the GMA-KAG,
and created the Centralized Key Accounts Group. This restructuring led to an initial excess of 49 regular employees, who were redeployed to other
positions, including the one occupied by respondent.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring respondent a regular employee because her employment exceeded six months and holding that she
was illegally dismissed as there was no authorized cause to terminate her employment.
On appeal by petitioner to the NLRC, the latter modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter holding that respondent is a regul ar employee whose
termination from employment was valid but ineffectual f or petitioner’s failure to comply with the 30-day notice to the employee and the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE). Thereafter, petitioner and respondent filed separate petitions with the Court of Appeals.
In the first petition, the CA granted the respondent’s petition and reinstated with modification the Labor Arbiter’s decision finding her to be an
illegally dismissed regular employee, but deleted the award for holiday pay for lack of basis. In second petition, the CA dis missed the company’s petition
and affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
Issue: (Friends, main issue here is the payment of monetary benefits. I believe Dean will dwell on this issue)
1) Whether or not respondent is a regular employee of petitioner

2) Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed
3) If so, whether or not respondent is entitled to any monetary benefit.
HELD:
First Issue: Private respondent is a regular employee
In termination cases, like the present controversy, the burden of proving the circumstances that would justify the employee’s dismissal rests with
the employer. The best proof that petitioner should have presented to prove the probationary status of respondent is her empl oyment contract. None,
having been presented, the continuous employment of respondent as an account specialist for almost 11 months, from April 17, 2000 to March 12, 2001,
means that she was a regular employee and not a temporary reliever or a probationary employee.
And while it is true that by way of exception, the period of probationary employment may exceed six months when the parties so agree, such as
when the same is established by company policy, or when it is required by the nature of the work, none of these exceptional c ircumstance were proven in
the present case. Hence, respondent whose employment exceeded six months is undoubtedly a regular employee of petitioner.
Second Issue: Private respondent was illegally dismissed
Having ruled that respondent is a regular employee, her termination from employment must be for a just or authorized caus e, otherwise, her
dismissal would be illegal. Petitioner tried to justify the dismissal of respondent under the authorized cause of redundancy. It thus argued in the alternative
that even assuming that respondent qualified for regular employment, her services still had to be terminated because there are no more regular positions in
the company. Undoubtedly, petitioner is invoking a redundancy which allegedly resulted in the termination not only of the trainees, probationers but also of
some of its regular employees.
In Asufrin, Jr. v. San Miguel Corporation, it was held that the determination that the employee’s services are no longer necessary or sustainable
and, therefore, properly terminable is an exercise of business judgment of the employer. The wisdom or soundness of this judgment is not subject to
discretionary review of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, provided there is no violation of law and no showing that it was prom pted by an arbitrary or
LABOR STANDARDS
malicious act. In other words, it is not enough for a company to merely declare that it has become overmanned. It must produce adequate proof of such
redundancy to justify the dismissal of the affected employees.
In Panlilio v. NLRC, it was held that the following evidence may be proffered to substantiate redundancy, to wit: the new staffing pattern,
feasibility studies/proposal, on the viability of the newly created positions, job description and the approval by the management of the restructuring.
In the case at bar, petitioner presented an affidavit of its Sales Manager and a memorandum of the company both to the effect that there is a
need to redeploy its regular employees and terminate the employment of temporary employees, in view of an excess in manpower. These documents,
however, do not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For one, the
other signatories to the memorandum were not even identified. For another, the said memorandum and affidavit are self-serving.
Moreover, the lingering doubt as to the existence of redundancy or of petitioner’s so called ―restructuring, realignment or reorgani zation‖ which
resulted in the dismissal of not only probationary employees but also of regular employees, is highlighted by the non-presentation by petitioner of the
required notice to the DOLE and to the separated employees. If there was indeed a valid redundancy effected by petitioner, th ese notices and the proof of
payment of separation pay to the dismissed regular employees should have been offered to establish that there was excess manpower in petitioner’s
GMA-KAG caused by a decline in the sales volume.
What further militated against the alleged redundancy advanced by petitioner is their failure to refute respondent’s assertion that after her
dismissal, it hired new recruits and re-employed two of her batch mates. Other than the lame excuse that it is respondent who has the burden of proving
the same, it presented no proof to fortify its denial.
Third Issue: Private respondent is entitled to REINSTATEMENT and PAYMENT OF FULL BACKWAGES
Considering that respondent was illegally dismissed, she is entitled not only to reinstatement but also to payment of full backwages, computed
from the time her compensation was actually withheld from her on March 13, 2001, up to her actual reinstatement. As a regular employee of petitioner
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from the date of her employment. she is likewise entitled to other benefits, i.e., service incentive leave pay and 13 month pay computed from such date
also up to her actual reinstatement. Respondent is not, however, entitled to holiday pay because the records reveal that she is a monthly paid regular
employee.
Anent attorney’s fees, it was held in San Miguel Corporation v. Aballa, et al., that in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was
forced to litigate and thus incurred expenses to protect his rights and interests, a maximum of 10% of the total monetary award by way of attorney’s fees is
justifiable. The award of attorney’s fees is proper and there need not be any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld
the wages. There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were not paid accordingly, as in the instant controversy.
Finally, the Court cannot sustain the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of respondent. Moral and exemplary damages cannot be
justified solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his employee without cause or due process. The termination must be attended with bad
faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy and, of course, th at social humiliation,
wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted therefrom. Similarly, exemplary damages are recoverable only when the dismissal was effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner. To merit the award of these damages, additional facts must be pleaded and proved. In the present case, respondent did
not proffer substantial evidence that would overcome the legal presumption of good faith on the part of petitioner. The award of moral and exemplary
damages should therefore be deleted.
ASSOCIATION OF INTEGRATED SECURITY FORCE OF BISLIG (AISFB) – ALU vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PAPER INDUSTRIES
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 140150. August 22, 2005; CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
- Petitioner Association of Integrated Security Force of Bislig–ALU (AISFB-ALU) is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE). Its members are the regular company hired security guards composing the Company Guard Force maintained and
operated by private respondent Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP). The Company Guard Force provided security services to PICOP’s
facilties at its mill site.
-Private respondent PICOP is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of paper and timber products, with principal place of op erations at Tabon, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur
- The complainants are regular company hired security guards who composed the so-called Company Guard Force, a security force maintained and
operated by respondent PICOP.
-In 1990, the said security guards formed a labor union called the Association of Integrated Security Force of Bislig-ALU, which was duly registered with
DOLE. On May 4, 1990, a petition for certification election was conducted where ALU-TUCP was proclaimed the exclusive bargaining agent of the
company security guards. On April 1, 1991, The Philippine Constabulary (PC) Civil Security Force Command, District II, based in Davao City, through Lt.
Col. Jose B. Maneja, Jr., District Director, advised respondent PICOP ―to desist from utilizing your Company Guard Force in c onducting security activities‖
for its failure to renew its license to operate. Because of this, respondent PICOP, through R.D. Azucena, Assistant Vice-President, Administration Group,
relayed the said information to all security guards and security officers of its security department in a memo dated April 4, 1991. In the same memo,
respondent PICOP directed the security guards and security officers ―to continue with your assigned postings until further notice.‖
-On the same day, the PC Civil Security Force Command, District II, enforced the directive. Respondent PICOP’s firearms were c onfiscated and its armory
was padlocked. Respondent PICOP was constrained to close its security force. On April 6, 1991, complainants were sent notices of termination to take
effect May 7, 1991. Respondent PICOP explained that the phase-out and closure of its security force was due to the non-approval of its application for the
renewal of its license by the PC Civil Security Force Command.
-Respondent PICOP’s license expired on March 31, 1991. It applied for renewal of its license as early as January 1991. However, difficulties were
allegedly encountered in complying with the requirements, particularly the firearms clearance, since some firearms issued to the security guards were
missing and could not be accounted for. Likewise, PICOP believed that another factor contributed to the non-approval of its security license was the strong
LABOR STANDARDS
suspicion that some of its security field personnel were sympathizers of the rebels (NPA) which were confirmed by repeated in telligence information fed by
the intelligence community in Bislig to the PC Civil Security Force Command.
-Thus, complainants filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) Region XI. The required strike vote was obtained
only on April 13, 1991. However, complainants failed to stage a strike allegedly because of fear that the NPA’s might take advantage of such volatile
situation and its adverse effects charged against them.
-Respondent, on the other hand, believed that complainants did not push through with their plan to stage a strike because more than one half of their
members (103 to be exact out of the original 204) already accepted the closure of the security force and in fact were already paid their separation benefits
in full. Respondent then claimed that even complainant Guimary and his group have collected more than 50% of their separation benefits. Besides, most of
the complainants applied for absorption or transfer to other departments of respondent PICOP. 88 were re-employed and absorbed in the other operating
departments of respondent company.
-However, the remaining complainants still strongly assert that their termination of employment was the result of their having formed a union, a clear case
of union busting. Respondent PICOP allegedly deliberately refused to comply with the requirements for the renewal of its security license. And, because
complainants were illegally terminated from employment, they are entitled to reinstatement, backwages, damages, attorney’s fees and other monetary
benefits.
-Thedispute was certified to NLRC for compulsory arbitration; it rendered its questioned decision dismissing the complaint for illegal dism issal; Said
decision was affirmed by the CA
ISSUE: W/N there was an illegal dismissal
HELD: NO (procedural and substantive flaws)

- the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of judgment on the merits is appeal; Records, however, disclose that petitioner received the Decision of the
Court of Appeals on 27 July 1999, consequently, it had 15 days from said date of receipt of assailed judgment, or until 11 August 1999, within which to file
a petition for review on certiorari, the reglementary period prescribed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to avail of said act ion. On 24 September 1999, close
to two months after said receipt, petitioner filed its petition for certiorari. Evidently, petitioner has lost its remedy of appeal; petitioner likewise failed to file a
motion for reconsideration
Substantial Issue:
- It is petitioner’s theory that the termination of its members was ―effected as a consequence of their having formed and organized a union, and ultimately
won in the workers electoral process for purposes of collective bargaining agreement. … Evidence show that PICOP never pursued the renewal of its
permit to operate after it received a notice from PCSUCIA.‖
- It could not comply with the requirements specifically the firearms clearance because some of the firearms issued to the security force were missing and
could not be accounted for. Efforts were exerted by respondent to locate the missing firearms as but to no avail
-NLRC correctly ruled that the closure of the security force of PICOP was valid and is considered a cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking
not due to serious business losses or financial reverses as provided for under Article 283 of the Labor Code
-For its part, PICOP maintains that it had no other choice but to comply with the order of the PC Civil Security Force Command of District II, Davao City.
Had it done otherwise, it would have risked criminal liability for itself, as well as for the members of petitioner and the other security guards. In addition, it
asserts that there was never any attempt on its part to intentionally fail in securing the renewal of its license, as it made every effort to submit the
requirements of the said government office
- petitioner would have the Court re-evaluate the factual veracity and probative value of the evidence submitted before the NLRC. The first two issues
raised in the instant petition inquire into the factual findings of the court a quo contrary to the dictates of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which states that only
questions of law may be raised and resolved on the petition. (Court not a trier of facts..)
- An employer may close or cease his business operations even if he were not suffering from business losses or financial reverses as long as he complies
with the necessary payment of separation pay and the required notices;
- Labor law discourages interference with an employer’s judgment in the conduct of his business. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the
employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. As long as the company’s exercise of the
same is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid
agreements, such exercise will be upheld.
-By and large, the determination of whether to maintain or phase out an entire department or section or to reduce personnel lies with the management.
The cessation of operation of its security force was a business judgment properly within the exercise of the management prerogative of private respondent
PICOP especially considering the need for continuous security around the premises of the private respondent in view of insurgents in the area, a fact which
was never challenged by petitioner. Being a valid exercise of management prerogative, the need by private respondent PICOP to close its own security
force and the ensuing resolution to hire out the vacant positions, we are proscribed from inquiring or probing into the wisdom of such decisions as we have
ascertained that private respondent PICOP has exercised said right fairly, practically and in accordance with law.
-Finally, the records of the instant case verify that private respondent PICOP had sufficiently complied with the requirements for valid termination: (a)
serving a written notice to the affected workers and the DOLE at least one month before the effective date of the closure; and (b) payment of separation
pay equivalent to one month or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, with a fraction of at least six (6) months to be
considered one whole year. It informed the DOLE and the security guards of the cessation of the operation of its Company Guard Force effective 07 May
1991 in a letter dated 06 April 1991, issued by Mr. Manolo Medrano, Manager of private respondent PICOP’s Security Department. The employees were
likewise informed of the availability or the release of funds for their separation pay. Unfortunately, only 103 out of the 20 4 employees availed of said
benefit, while 88 of the 204 opted to re-apply and were, subsequently, re-hired in private respondent PICOP’s other departments. The rest chose to file the
instant case.
HEAVYLIFT MANILA INC. VS. CA

G.R. No. 154410
FACTS: Petitioner Heavylift, a maritime agency, thru a letter signed by petitioner Josephine Evangelio, Administrative and Finance Manager of Heavylift,
informed respondent Ma. Dottie Galay, Heavylift Insurance and Provisions Assistant, of her low performance rating and the neg ative feedback from her
team members regarding her work attitude. The letter also notified her that she was being relieved of her other functions except the development of the
new Access program. Galay was terminated for alleged loss of confidence. Thereafter, she filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and
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nonpayment of service incentive leave and 13 month pay against petitioners. Before the labor arbiter, petitioners alleged that Galay had an attitude
problem and did not get along with her co-employees for which she was constantly warned to improve. Petitioners aver that Galay’s attitude resulted to the
decline in the company’s efficiency and productivity. Petitioners presented a letter dated February 23, 1999 and a notice of termination dated August 16,
1999.
LABOR STANDARDS
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Petitioners assert that Galay’s attitude problem is analogous to loss of trust and confidence. They aver that respondent
did not deny the strained and irreconcilable relationship between them, in effect, admitting the same. petitioners aver that having lost their trust and
confidence on Galay, they could no longer make her in-charge of the confidential Crew Information System which accounts for the personnel, management
and professional records of all the employees of and seamen connected with the company and that because of Galay’s attitude, the company’s work
atmosphere had become very strained and had gravely affected the workers and their outputs. Galay’s dismissal, according to petitioners, was merely an
act of self-preservation. Petitioners explained that they sent Galay a letter of notice dated February 23, 1999, apprising her of her low performance and her
attitude problem, before the letter of her termination dated August 16, 1999. Petitioners claim that the company waited for six months, to give Galay a
chance to undergo counseling before dismissing her from the service.
GALAY’S CONTENTION: petitioners failed to show a just and valid cause for her termination, and that letters of notice and termination did not comply with
the twin requirement of notice and hearing. Galay argues that the letter dated February 23, 1999 neither informed her of her infraction of any company rule
that warrants disciplinary action; nor required her to submit an explanation.
Labor Arbiter: Galay was illegally terminated for petitioners’ failure to prove that she violated any company regulation, and for failure to give the proper
notice as required by law.
NLRC: It denied the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. MR was likewise denied.
CA (elevated the case by certiorari): petitioners failed to: state the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners; attach the copies of all pleadings
and supporting documents; properly verify the petition; and certify against forum-shopping. Due to procedural lapses, it was dismissed. CA denied the MR.
ISSUE: (1) Were the petitioners denied due process with the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the petition on technical grounds? (2) Is ―attitude problem‖ a
valid ground for the termination of an employee? (3) If in the affirmative, was this sufficiently proved? (4) Were the procedural requirements for an
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effectual dismissal present? and (5) Were the awards of service incentive pay and 13 month pay proper?
HELD:
(1) YES. Greater interest of justice would be served if the petition is adjudicated on its meritsThe Rules of Court require that the petition for certiorari
shall be verified, contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, accompanied by a certified true copy of the
subject decision, order or resolution and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto, and be submitted with the certification of non-forum
shopping signed by the principal. Rules of Court are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases. Verification of a pleading is a
formal, not a jurisdictional requisite. It is intended to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not the
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The rule on c ertification against forum-shopping
requires strict compliance. The requirement underscores its mandatory nature such that it cannot be altogether dispensed with. However, under
justifiable circumstances, the Court does allow substantial compliance.
(2) YES. An employee who cannot get along with his co-employees is detrimental to the company for he can upset and strain the working
environment. Without the necessary teamwork and synergy, the organization cannot function well. Thus, management has the prerogative to
take the necessary action to correct the situation and protect its organization. When personal differences between employees and management
affect the work environment, the peace of the company is affected. Thus, an employee’s attitude problem is a valid ground for his termination. It
is a situation analogous to loss of trust and confidence that must be duly proved by the employer.
(3) NO. The court was not convinced that in the present case, petitioners have shown sufficiently clear and convincing evidence to justify Galay’s
termination. Though they are correct in saying that in this case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, still there must be subst antial
evidence to support the termination on the ground of attitude. The mere mention of negative feedback from her team members, and the letter
dated February 23, 1999, are not proof of her attitude problem. Likewise, her failure to refute petitioners’ allegations of her negative attitude
does not amount to admission. Technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. The burden of proof is not on the employee but on
the employer who must affirmatively show adequate evidence that the dismissal was for justifiable cause.
(4) NO. The February 23, 1999 letter does not constitute the required notice. The letter did not inform her of the specific acts complained of and their
corresponding penalty. The law requires the employer to give the worker to be dismissed two written notices before terminating his employment,
namely, (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent
notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. It denied Galay due process as it never gave her an opportunity to
explain herself. Galay was illegally dismissed, because petitioners failed to show adequately that a valid cause for terminat ing respondent exists,
and because petitioners failed to comply with the twin requirement of notice and hearing.
(5) YES. They were properly prayed for by Galay. These were subsumed in the complaint and under the position paper’s general prayer of ―such
other relief as are just and equitable under the law‖. Petitioners failed to present evidence that these benefits were already paid. Moreover, this
issue involves a question of fact which is not proper in a petition for certiorari and the determinations of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are
afforded great weight and respect by the courts on these matters, when these findings are supported by substantial evidence, and devoid of any
unfairness or arbitrariness.
King of Kings Transport Inc. vs Mamac

G.R. No. 166208
Facts: Petitioner KKTI is a corporation engaged in public transportation and managed by Claire Dela Fuente and Melissa Lim.
Respondent Mamac was hired as bus conductor of Don Mariano Transit Corporation (DMTC) on April 29, 1999. Pending the holding of a
certification election in DMTC for their union, petitioner KKTI was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission which acquired new buses.
Many DMTC employees were subsequently transferred to KKTI and excluded from the election. The KKTI employees later organized the Kaisahan ng mga
Kawani sa King of Kings (KKKK) which was registered with DOLE. Respondent was elected KKKK president.
LABOR STANDARDS
Respondent was required to accomplish a ―Conductor’s Trip Report‖ and submit it to the company after each trip. As a background, this report
indicates the ticket opening and closing for the particular day of duty. After submission, the company audits the reports. Once an irregularity is discovered,
the company issues an ―Irregularity Report‖ against the employee, indicating the nature and details of the irregularity. Thereafter, the concerned employee
is asked to explain the incident by making a written statement or counter-affidavit at the back of the same Irregularity Report. After considering the
explanation of the employee, the company then makes a determination of whether to accept the explanation or impose upon the employee a penalty for
committing an infraction. That decision shall be stated on said Irregularity Report and will be furnished to the employee.
Upon audit of the October 28, 2001 Conductor’s Report of respondent, KKTI noted an irregularity. It discovered that respondent declared
several sold tickets as returned tickets causing KKTI to lose an income of eight hundred and ninety pesos. While no irregular ity report was prepared on
the October 28, 2001 incident, KKTI nevertheless asked respondent to explain the discrepancy. In his letter, respondent said that the erroneous
declaration in his October 28, 2001 Trip Report was unintentional. He explained that during that day’s trip, the windshield of the bus assigned to them was
smashed; and they had to cut short the trip in order to immediately report the matter to the police. As a result of the incident, he got confused in making
the trip report.
On November 26, 2001, respondent received a letter,terminating his employment effective November 29, 2001. The dismissal letter alleged that
the October 28, 2001 irregularity was an act of fraud against the company. KKTI also cited as basis for respondent’s dismissal the other offenses he
allegedly committed since 1999.
On December 11, 2001, respondent filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, nonpayment of 13th-month pay, service incentive
leave, and separation pay. He denied committing any infraction and alleged that his dismissal was intended to bust union activities. Moreover, he claimed
that his dismissal was effected without due process.
In its April 3, 2002 Position Paper,KKTI contended that respondent was legally dismissed after his commission of a series of misconducts and
misdeeds. It claimed that respondent had violated the trust and confidence reposed upon him by KKTI. Also, it averred that it had observed due process
in dismissing respondent and maintained that respondent was not entitled to his money claims such as service incentive leave and 13th-month pay
because he was paid on commission or percentage basis.
Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing respondent’s Complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC modified the LA’s decision in that respondent King of
Kings (KoK)Transport Inc. is hereby ordered to indemnify complainant in the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000) for failure to comply with due
th
process prior to termination. The other findings are AFFIRMED. CA said that KoK failed to comply with due process and that respondent is entitled to 13
month pay.
Issues: WON the King of Kings failed to comply with the due process requirement before termination.
th
WON respondent is entitled to 13 month pay.
Held: 1. NO. Due process under the Labor Code involves two aspects: first, substantive––the valid and authorized causes of termination of employment
under the Labor Code; and second, procedural––the manner of dismissal. To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the services of
employees:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a
directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. ―Reasonable opportunity‖ under the
Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequatel y for their
[15]
defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opport unity to study
the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defens es they will raise against the
complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration
of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly,
the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 28 2 is being charged against
the employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the
opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the
evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves
personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an
opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating
that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the
severance of their employment.
In the instant case, KKTI admits that it had failed to provide respondent with a ―charge sheet.‖However, it maintains that it had substantially
complied with the rules, claiming that ―respondent would not have issued a written explanation had he not been informed of th e charges against him.
The Court is not convinced.
First, respondent was not issued a written notice charging him of committing an infraction. The law is clear on the matter. A verbal appraisal of
the charges against an employee does not comply with the first notice requirement. In Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRC, the Court held that consultations
or conferences are not a substitute for the actual observance of notice and hearing.
Second, even assuming that petitioner KKTI was able to furnish respondent an Irregularity Report notifying him of his offense, such would not
comply with the requirements of the law. We observe from the irregularity reports against respondent for his other offenses that such contained merely a
general description of the charges against him. The reports did not even state a company rule or policy that the employee had allegedly
violated. Likewise, there is no mention of any of the grounds for termination of employment under Art. 282 of the Labor Code. Thus, KKT I’s ―standard‖
charge sheet is not sufficient notice to the employee.
Third, no hearing was conducted. Regardless of respondent’s written explanation, a hearing was still necessary in order for him to clarify and
present evidence in support of his defense. Moreover, respondent made the letter merely to explain the circumstances relating to the irregularity in
LABOR STANDARDS
his October 28, 2001 Conductor’s Trip Report. He was unaware that a dismissal proceeding was already being effected. Thus, he was surprised to
receive the November 26, 2001 termination letter indicating as grounds, not only his October 28, 2001 infraction, but also his previous infractions.
As stated earlier, after a finding that petitioners failed to comply with the due process requirements, the CA awarded full b ackwages in favor of
[20]
respondent in accordance with the doctrine in Serrano v. NLRC. However, the doctrine in Serrano had already been abandoned in Agabon v. NLRC by
[21]
ruling that if the dismissal is done without due process, the employer should indemnify the employee with nominal damages.
Thus, for non-compliance with the due process requirements in the termination of respondent’s employment, petitioner KKTI is sanctioned to pay
respondent the amount of thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000) as damages.
th
2. As to the 13 month pay: respondent himself admitted that he was paid on a purely commission basis. Moreover, this fact is supported by his pay slips
which indicated the varying amount of commissions he was receiving each trip. Thus, he was excluded from receiving the 13th-month pay benefit.
G.R. Nos. 142753-54 December 4, 2007

CITIBANK, N.A., WILLIAM FERGUSON, and AZIZ RAJKOTWALA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MARILOU GENUINO, respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Genuino was employed by Citibank sometime in January 1992 as Treasury Sales Division Head with the rank of Assistant Vice-President. She
received a monthly compensation of PhP 60,487.96, exclusive of benefits and privileges. Citibank sent Genuino a letter charging her with "knowledge
and/or involvement" in transactions "which were irregular or even fraudulent." In the same letter, Genuino was informed she was under preventive
7
suspension.
Genuino wrote Citibank and asked the bank the factual and legal basis of your charges, and afford her an opportunity to explain. Citibank, through
Victorino P. Vargas, its Country Senior Human Resources Officer, sent a letter to Genuino, directing her to appear in an administrative investigation
of the matter in which she may bring a counsel if so desired. Genuino's counsel replied demanding for a bill of particulars r egarding the charges against
Genuino. Citibank's counsel replied that the bank has no intention of converting the administrative investigation of this case to a full blown trial
and that it merely seeks to give Geniuno opportunity to explain her side either in writing or in person. Genuino did not appear in the administrative
investigation. Her lawyers wrote a letter to Citibank's counsel asking "what bank clients' funds were diverted from the bank and invested in other
companies, the specific amounts involved, the manner by which and the date when such diversions were purportedly affected." I n reply, Citibank's
counsel noted Genuino's failure to appear in the investigation and gave Genuino up to September 23, 1993 to submit her written explanation.
11
Genuino did not submit her written explanation.
Citibank informed Genuino of the result of their investigation. It found that Genuino with Santos used "facilities of Genuino's family corporation,
namely, Global Pacific, personally and actively participated in the diversion of bank clients' funds to products of other companies that yielded
interests higher than what Citibank products offered, and that Genuino and Santos realized substantial financial gains, all in violation of existing
12
company policy and the Corporation Code, which for your information, carries a penal sanction."
Genuino's employment was terminated by Citibank on grounds of (1) serious misconduct, (2) willful breach of the trust reposed upon her by the bank,
13
and (3) commission of a crime against the bank.
On October 15, 1993, Genuino filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled in favor or
Genuino. The NLRC-NCR, reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision. Genuino filed a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 118023 with this Court.
Citibank's petition for certiorari, on the other hand, was docketed as G.R. No. 118667. The said petition was referred by the SC to the CA . Genuino prayed
for the reversal of the NLRC's decision insofar as it declared her dismissal valid and legal. Meanwhile, Citibank questioned the NLRC's order to pay
Genuino's salaries from the date of reinstatement until the date of the NLRC's decision. The CA promulgated its decision, den ying due course to and
dismissing both petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of genuino is for a just cause and in accordance with due process?
HELD: THE DISMISSAL WAS FOR JUST CAUSE BUT LACKED DUE PROCESS!!
I. LACK of DUE PROCESS
NOTE: The following are the procedural requirements of due process as provided for in the case of King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac:
1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive
that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period.
a) "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable
them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the
notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and
evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint.
b) Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed
narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the
charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or whic h among the grounds
under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.
b) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the
opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their d efenses; and (3) rebut
the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend
themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be
used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
c) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination
indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established
23
to justify the severance of their employment.
LABOR STANDARDS
The Labor Arbiter found that Citibank failed to adequately notify Genuino of the charges against her.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code provide that any employer seeking to dismiss a worker shall furnish the latter a written
25
notice stating the particular acts or omissions constituting the grounds for dismissal. The purpose of this notice is to sufficiently apprise the
employee of the acts complained of and enable him/her to prepare his/her defense. In this case, the letters sent by Citibank did not identify the
particular acts or omissions allegedly committed by Genuino. The August 23, 1993 letter charged Genuino with having "some knowledge and/ or
involvement" in some transactions "which have the appearance of being irregular at the least and may even be fraudulent." The extent of Genuino's
alleged knowledge and participation in the diversion of bank's clients' funds, manner of diversion, and amounts involved; the acts attributed to Genuino that
conflicted with the bank's interests; and the circumstances surrounding the alleged irregular transactions, were not specified in the notices/letters.
While the bank gave Genuino an opportunity to deny the truth of the allegations in writing and participate in the administrative investigation, the
fact remains that the charges were too general to enable Genuino to intelligently and adequately prepare her defense.
The two-notice requirement of the Labor Code is an essential part of due process. The first notice informing the employee of the charges should
neither be pro-forma nor vague. It should set out clearly what the employee is being held liable for. The employee should be afforded ample opportunity
to be heard and not mere opportunity.
As explained in King of Kings Transport, Inc., ample opportunity to be heard is especially accorded the employees sought to be dismissed
after they are specifically informed of the charges in order to give them an opportunity to refute such accusations leveled against them. Since
the notice of charges given to Genuino is inadequate, the dismissal could not be in accordance with due process.
II. JUST CAUSE FOR DISMISSAL
Art. 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate an employment for fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him/her by his/her employer or duly authorized representative. In order to constitute as just cause for dismissal, loss of confidence should relate to acts
35 36
inimical to the interests of the employer. Also, the act complained of should have arisen from the performance of the employee's duties. For loss of trust
and confidence to be a valid ground for an employee's dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on clearly established facts
37
sufficient to warrant the employee's separation from work.
[L]oss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee and proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct
is not required. It is sufficient if there is some basis for such loss of confidence or if the employer has reasonable ground to believe or to
entertain the moral conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his participation therein
38
rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
As Assistant Vice-President of Citibank's Treasury Department, Genuino was tasked to solicit investments, and peso and dollar deposits for, and
39
keep them in Citibank; and to sell and/or push for the sale of Citibank's financial products, such as the MBS, for the account and benefit of Citibank.
She held a position of trust and confidence. There is no way she could deny any knowledge of the bank's policies nor her understanding of these
policies as reflected in the survey done by the bank. She could not likewise feign ignorance of the businesses of Citibank, and of Global and Torrance.
Assuming that Citibank did not engage in the same securities dealt with by Global and Torrance; neverthel ess, it is to the interests of Citibank to retain its
clients and continue investing in Citibank. Curiously, Genuino did not even dissuade the depositors from withdrawing their monies from Citibank, and was
even instrumental in the transfers of monies from Citibank to a competing bank through Global and Torrance, the corporations under Genuino's control. All
the pieces of evidence compel us to conclude that Genuino did not have her employer's interest.
III. AGABON DOCTRINE APPLIED

In view of Citibank's failure to observe due process, however, nominal damages are in order but the amount is hereby raised to PhP 30,000 pursuant to
Agabon v. NLRC. The NLRC's order for payroll reinstatement is set aside.
IV. REGARDING THE APPPLICATION OF ART. 223

Ordinarily, the employer is required to reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal pursuant to Art. 223, paragraph 3 of the Labor Cod e. If the
decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the
dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the
accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement
42
provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to
the compensation received for actual services rendered without need of refund.
Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, then she is
not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 of the of the September 3, 1994 NLRC Decision.
LABOR STANDARDS

LABOR Termination (11 20)

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LABOR STANDARDS

AGABON vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 158693; November 17, 2004; Ynares-Santiago, J.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.

G.R. No. 152329 April 22, 2003

ALEJANDRO ROQUERO, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondent.

HYATT TAXI SERVICES INC., vs. RUSTOM M. CATINOY

ALFARO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

'To the Personal Manager

(sgd) Candido Alfaro'

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed.

2) Whether or not petitioner did not voluntarily resign from work.

INTERTROD MARITIME INC. and TROODOS SHIPPING CO. Vs. NLRC

San Miguel Corporation v. Caroline C. del Rosario

G.R. Nos. 168194 & 168603 DEC 13, 2005

1) Whether or not respondent is a regular employee of petitioner

First Issue: Private respondent is a regular employee

Second Issue: Private respondent was illegally dismissed

ISSUE: W/N there was an illegal dismissal

HELD: NO (procedural and substantive flaws)

HEAVYLIFT MANILA INC. VS. CA

King of Kings Transport Inc. vs Mamac

The Court is not convinced.

G.R. Nos. 142753-54 December 4, 2007

I. LACK of DUE PROCESS

II. JUST CAUSE FOR DISMISSAL

III. AGABON DOCTRINE APPLIED

IV. REGARDING THE APPPLICATION OF ART. 223

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