Crump 2011 Negotiation Process PDF

International Negotiation 16 (2011) 197–227 brill.
nl/iner
Negotiation Process and Negotiation Context
Larry Crump*
Department of International Business, Griffith University, Brisbane, Qld 4111, Australia
(E-mail: L.Crump@griffith.edu.au)
Received 17 May 2009; accepted 10 November 2009
Abstract
This article examines how external events grounded in a negotiation’s relevant environment (i.e., negotia-
tion context) influence negotiation process and outcome. Multilateral, regional and bilateral environ-
ments are examined through linkage theory to gain understanding about the impact of external events or
context on negotiation process and outcome. Linkages between a negotiation and its context are exam-
ined through five trade negotiations: the WTO Doha round (multilateral-global); the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (multilateral-regional); EU–Mercosur (bilateral-regional); EU–Chile (bilateral); and US–
Chile (bilateral). In addition to developing greater understanding about the strategic relationship between
a negotiation and its context this article establishes a theoretic framework that defines the known universe
of linkage dynamics. The impact of multilateral environments on the regional negotiation process and
outcome is of particular interest, as is the strategic use of bilateral environments in seeking to achieve
multilateral geopolitical ends.
Keywords
negotiation process, negotiation context, negotiation environment, linkage theory, trade negotiation
The outcome of a single negotiation can have multiple explanations depending

on the variables selected for analysis.1 Negotiation research normally explains
process and outcome based on internal dynamics within a specific negotiation
(e.g., interests, position, power, strategy), but what about the environment or
context within which a specific negotiation exists? “Context” is that set of facts or
*) Larry Crump specializes in the study of complex negotiations and developing methodology to
conceptualize such phenomena. He has won awards for his teaching and research – most recently the
2010 Outstanding Book Award presented by the International Association for Conflict Management for
Multiparty Negotiation (Sage, 2008), co-edited with Lawrence Susskind. He serves on the International
Advisory Board of International Negotiation, the Editorial Advisory Board of the Negotiation Journal, and
the Editorial Board of the journal, Negotiation and Conflict Management Research.
1)
I wish to thank Griffith University, the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), and the
European-Australian Asia-Pacific Nexus for supporting this research project. Assistance received from the
Australian Trade Commission, TAFMO (Australia), and Latino Australia Education (Chile) was greatly
appreciated. I especially wish to thank ambassadors, diplomats and government officials in Brussels,
Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago and Washington DC for their willingness to be interviewed
for this research program.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011 DOI: 10.1163/138234011X573011
198 L. Crump / International Negotiation 16 (2011) 197–227
circumstances that surround a negotiation. What is the relationship between a

negotiation and its context such as a second discrete negotiation occurring con-
currently with the negotiation of empirical interest? Can such environmental fac-
tors halt, suspend, support or advance that negotiation we seek to explain? How
might these environmental factors influence negotiation process and outcome,
and what strategies are available to manage such influence? That these questions
receive so little attention is curious (Crump 2006a; Sebenius 1996; Watkins and
Passow 1996) as some negotiated outcomes cannot adequately be explained with-
out examining the relationship or linkage between a negotiation and its context.
Brief examples are presented as illustrations.2
Chile and the United States (US) began trade negotiations in 1994 (as part of
the Four-Amigo Talks), as Chilean leaders linked their national trade aspirations
to the recently concluded North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Complications between US President Clinton and the US Congress did not allow
negotiations to proceed even though talks had begun. When the US and Singa-
pore announced joint intentions to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement in
November 2000, Chilean leaders immediately reminded the US that they had
been waiting at the front of this line for five years. Shortly thereafter, the US was
concurrently negotiating two separate bilateral trade agreements with Chile and
Singapore. Near the end of these negotiations, the US began to delay the nego-
tiation process to purposely pressure Chile to vote (as a non-permanent member
of the UN Security Council) in support of a US proposal to initiate war against
Iraq. Chile was unwilling to link their trade negotiations to this US initiative, but
still had to manage US attempts to link these issues. Treaty conclusion was delayed
but the document was finally signed (in Miami rather than at the White House)
in June 2003.
Across the Atlantic, the European Union (EU) began discussions with Merco-
sur (a customs union including Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay) in
1999 about possibly negotiating a formal treaty. When Chilean leaders learned of
this development the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted a diplomat to
the EU primarily because he was a specialist in Chile–Mercosur economic rela-
tions. When the EU learned of Chile’s interests in also negotiating a formal treaty,
the EU recommended that Chile join Mercosur. At that time, the EU did not
realize that this proposal was not viable. Chile suggested that a single process
within EU–Mercosur negotiations would be possible; however, it was proposed
that this single process should have two parts initially. The EU accepted this pro-
posal and ran parallel but separate negotiations with Mercosur and Chile. Today,
Chile has a formal treaty with the EU, although Mercosur has yet to finalize an
2)
The present study examines Chile’s separate negotiations with the US and EU in detail, although the
ensuing illustration only considers commencement and conclusion of these two negotiations. The data
collection protocol is explained in the Methods section.
L. Crump / International Negotiation 16 (2011) 197–227 199
agreement. Reaching an agreement with a party as complex as the EU is not easy,

given its many members and multiple interests. Just as EU–Mercosur played an
important role in initiating EU–Chile negotiations, the 2nd EU–Latin America
and Caribbean Summit (an event that brought 50 heads of state and government
to Madrid in 2002), served as a deadline to achieve substantive agreement so that
the EU could attend the Summit with a tangible demonstration of its commit-
ment to the region.
Negotiations can be quite difficult to initiate, maintain and conclude, so the
importance of linking this process to something with momentum is a technique
that has utility (Devereaux et al. 2006). NAFTA or EU–Mercosur negotiations
did not, on their own, initiate US–Chile and EU–Chile negotiations respectively,
but each played an important role. Grounded in a negotiation’s context, a state of
affairs may evolve or be designed in a relevant environment to create an action
forcing event such as a deadline (Watkins 1998), but a state of affairs can also
obstruct negotiation processes via issue linkage (Sebenius 1983; Tollison and Wil-
lett 1979). Linkages may be most potent in the commencing and concluding
stages of a negotiation, as this is where opportunity is first created and finally
secured, but linkage opportunity and challenges may be observed throughout the
negotiation process.
It is not unusual to find a single international negotiation grounded in a net-
work of negotiations involving the same parties, negotiating over the same issues
in bilateral, regional and multilateral settings (Crump 2007; Devereaux et al.
2006). This network is one type of relevant environment or context although a
relevant environment may also emerge through circumstances that contain a log-
ically coherent relationship. For example, a logically coherent relationship between
US–Chile negotiations and the UN Security Council is not at all apparent until
near the end of these trade negotiations when Chile was elected as a non-permanent
Council member in September 2002 (three months before US–Chile negotia-
tions substantively concluded). Upon Chile’s election, the UN Security Council
was still not necessarily a relevant environment for US–Chile negotiations
although now it held potential to become relevant. The UN Security Council only
became a relevant environment or context for US–Chile negotiations once the
US purposely began to delay US–Chile negotiation process by linking trade
negotiation progress to Chilean support for a US proposal before the UN Security
Council.
A negotiation and its relevant environment or context exists in a symbiotic
relationship, as each provides a degree of meaning to the other. Imbedded in a
network of connected negotiations or through two separate events containing a
logically coherent relationship, linkage theory can describe and prescribe negotia-
tion behavior to strategically manage the relationship between a specific negotiation
and its context. Linkage is defined as the way one event influences or determines
the process or outcome of another event. When each event is a negotiation, this
constitutes “negotiation linkage” (Crump 2006a), while one negotiation is the

focus of intellectual interest and the other is part of the relevant environment
(each negotiation can be a part of the relevant environment or context for the
other negotiation). Understanding when, how, and why a negotiation is influ-
enced by its context – multilateral, regional and bilateral – is possible through
linkage theory.
Background
“The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a
two-level game” (Putnam 1988: 434). Although the theoretical framework for
this insight was established by others (Walton and McKersie 1965; Druckman
1977) this metaphor inspired substantial research into linkages between domestic
politics and international relations. For example, studies use Putnam’s two-level
theory to examine links between domestic politics and regional integration
(Huelshoff 1994), to integrate issue linkage and linkages across players (Lohm-
ann 1997) and to demonstrate how issue linkage makes it possible for national
leaders to adopt international policy decisions over the protests of influential
domestic lobbies (Davis 2004).
The study of issue linkage precedes the two-level games literature. “Issue link-
age” is a negotiating device for making trades among diverse issues within a single
negotiation or between separate but linked negotiations involving the same par-
ties (Crump 2007). Jensen (1963) was the first to document issue linkage in his
study of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning
nuclear arms. Other subsequent studies examine the forces motivating parties to
engage in linkage (Tollison and Willett 1979), strategic choices in employing
linkage (Keohane and Nye 1989) and related matters. Li (1993) concludes that
issue linkage is a widespread practice in international relations, and Odell (2000)
observes that issue linkage is found in every negotiation except those that con-
sider only a single issue.
Issue linkage is one linkage type. In the illustrations presented at the beginning
of this article, US attempts to link its Middle East agenda and its South American
agenda is the only issue linkage example, as other illustrations link events rather
than issues. Two-level games move beyond issue linkage, but its theoretical frame-
work is restricted to a single dimension: links between international affairs and
domestic politics. The purpose of this article is to move past these familiar linkage
forms to investigate other structural forms, which may assist in enhancing our
knowledge of linkage dynamics and ultimately, the relationship between a nego-
tiation and its context.
Analysis of case data, derived from international trade negotiations, will seek
answers to a range of questions. What impact might a multilateral negotiation
sponsored by the World Trade Organization (WTO) have on regional negotia-

tions such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) or EU–Mercosur?
What about linkages between regional and bilateral negotiations? The illustrative
example presented at the beginning of this article demonstrates linkages between
EU–Mercosur and EU–Chile negotiations initially. Did such dynamics continue?
What about linkages between bilateral negotiations? Chile concurrently con-
ducted negotiations with the EU and the US. What opportunities and challenges
did each party confront based on such linkages?3
This article seeks to expand understanding about the relationship between a
negotiation and its context via linkage theory, as issue linkage and international–
domestic linkage are theoretically insufficient for explaining this complex rela-
tionship. This study is an exploratory investigation given the developmental
nature of this field of research. Fig. 1 introduces the data on which this article is
built, although other relevant negotiations are cited as examples occasionally.
Methods
A multiple-case design was employed with a structured focused case-comparison
approach. Analysis from a multiple-case design can strengthen (substantiate or
refute) observations arrived at through analysis of each individual case (Druck-
man 2005; Yin 1989). I also used a qualitative embedded design that includes
three levels of analysis (Eisenhardt 1989) by examining: (1) a single negotiation;
(2) linkages between negotiations or within a single case; and (3) cross-case
analysis.
Data are derived from five negotiations but it is the interaction or linkage
between negotiations that is the primary unit of analysis in this study. As such,
the five negotiations are treated as data, NOT cases, and linkage dynamics or
behavior connecting two negotiations are treated as cases. Within each case one
negotiation is the focus of empirical interest or the dependent (outcome) variable
and other negotiations are its relevant environment (i.e., context) or the indepen-
dent (explanatory) variable.
Each pair of linked negotiations is also identified by its fundamental structure.
Table 1 lists four structural types: multilateral–regional negotiations; multilateral–
3)
Research setting: Basic background information about the field research setting will enhance reader
understanding. The international trade negotiation paradigm has shifted from predominately multilateral
trade strategy to a multilateral–regional/bilateral trade strategy over the last ten years (Crump 2006b). For
example, in the period 1948–1994, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) received 124
notifications of bilateral or regional trade agreements. But since the 1995 establishment of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) to replace GATT, 243 bilateral and regional trade agreements have been
notified to the WTO (Fiorentino et al. 2007). By 2010 around 400 of these agreements are projected to
be operational (Regional Trade Agreements 2008). This trend makes trade an ideal laboratory for research
into linkage theory and the relationship between a negotiation and its context.
202
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Negotiations
US–Chile (USCFTA) 12/00 12/02 6/03 1/04

(Intention to negotiate
announced 12/1994) Negotiations Substantive Treaty signed &
begin conclusion entry into force
EU–Chile (EUCAA) 4/00 4/02 11/02 2/03

announced 6/1999) Negotiations Substantive Treaty signed &
begin conclusion entry into force
EU–Mercosur (EUMIA) 4/00 10/04

announced 6/1999) Negotiations Negotiations drift away after failure to
begin achieve agreement at 10/04 deadline
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
12/1994 4/1998 4/2001 1/2004 11/2005
FTAA Launch Santiago Quebec Monterrey Mar del Plata

in Miami Summit Summit Summit Argentina Summit
L. Crump / International Negotiation 16 (2011) 197–227
World Trade Organization (WTO) Developments
1/1995 12/1996 5/1998 12/1999 11/2001 9/2003 7/2004 12/2005 7/2008 12/2009
WTO Singapore Geneva Seattle Doha Cancún July Hong Kong July 2008 Geneva
Established Ministerial Ministerial Ministerial Ministerial Ministerial Package Ministerial Package Ministerial
Fig. 1. A temporal overview of negotiation process: USCFTA, EUCAA, EUMIA, FTAA and WTO developments.
Table 1. Structural Type and Case Study Construction*

Multilateral–Regional Negotiations
Case 1: WTO & EU–Mercosur
WTO Developments
– linked to –
EU and Mercosur (EU–Mercosur Interregional Association negotiation or EUMIA)
Case 2: WTO & FTAA
WTO Developments
– linked to –
Free Trade Area of the Americas
Multilateral–Bilateral Negotiations
Case 3: WTO & US–Chile
WTO Developments
– linked to –
US and Chile (U.S.–Chile Free Trade Agreement of 2003 or USCFTA)
Bilateral–Bilateral Negotiations
Case 4: US–Chile–EU
Chile and US (U.S.–Chile Free Trade Agreement of 2003 or USCFTA)
– linked to –
Chile and EU (EU–Chile Association Agreement of 2002 or EUCAA)
Bilateral–Regional Negotiations
Case 5: Mercosur–EU–Chile
EU and Chile (EU–Chile Association Agreement of 2002 or EUCAA)
– linked to –
EU and Mercosur (EU–Mercosur Interregional Association negotiation or EUMIA)
* Four structural types and five linkage case studies.
bilateral negotiations; bilateral–bilateral negotiations; and bilateral–regional

negotiations (see Table 1). Within cross-case analysis, negotiation structure is
established as an independent or explanatory variable, and negotiation process is
identified as a dependent or outcome variable in the present study.
Each structural type has two negotiations in a single case (see Table 1). The year
is noted only if negotiations produced a signed treaty. Cases sometimes are referred
to in an abbreviated form. For example, Case 4 is referred to as US–Chile–EU.
Within this study, bilateral linkage structures and some regional structures can
be explained through role theory (the reason for this observation is considered in
the conclusion). Cases 4 and 5 can be explained through role theory, as these cases
only include negotiations that are bilateral or regional in structure.
Case 4 Case 5
EU Chile
EUCAA EUCAA
Chile (Linked EU (Linked

(Link-pin party) Parties) (Link-pin party) Parties)
USCFTA EUMIA
US Mercosur
Fig. 2. Linkage structure and role theory: EUCAA, USCFTA and EUMIA.
Wager (1972) developed the concept of the link-pin role and the linked role, and
Watkins and Passow (1996) demonstrated the utility of these two roles to the
field of negotiation. The “link-pin party” creates the potential for linkage by con-
ducting two or more discrete negotiations at the same time, while each party that
negotiates with the link-pin party is a “linked party” (i.e. parties indirectly linked
to each other through their separate interaction with the link-pin party). Func-
tional roles emerge in such settings because each role type confronts different
strategic opportunities and challenges (e.g. in two level games, a national govern-
ment is the link-pin party and the linked parties are its international partner and
its domestic lobbies).
Fig. 2 presents a visual image of Cases 4 and 5 through the application of role
theory. In Case 5 the EU is the link-pin party, and Mercosur and Chile are each
linked parties. Note the solid lines and dashes in Fig. 2. In Case 5, the EU is
linked to Mercosur and to Chile with solid lines to demonstrate that two discrete
negotiations were undertaken. The link between Mercosur and Chile is depicted
with dashes, as EUMIA negotiations were relevant and of apparent interest to
Chilean negotiators, and EUCAA negotiations were relevant and of apparent
interest to Mercosur negotiators. Case 4 is presented in the same manner and
identifies Chile as the link-pin party and the US and the EU as linked parties.
Please note how each negotiation exits as a relevant environment or context for
the other depending on the negotiation of empirical interest.
Data Sources
Although the unit of analysis is negotiation linkage, central to examining such
linkage is an understanding of the process and outcome of each negotiation of
Table 2. Field Research Interviews

EU Chile US Brazil Argentina Uruguay Total
WTO 12 8 9 5 6 5 45
US–Chile: USCFTA 13 15 28
EU–Chile: EUCAA 17 12 29
EU–Mercosur 21 7 6 5 39
FTAA 8 13 8 12 4 45
In total, 312 pages of typed interview notes were prepared during this research program.
empirical interest. Negotiation field research was conducted by indirect methods –

archival records and interviews – as direct observation of a trade treaty negotia-
tion for theoretical purposes is virtually impossible (Odell 2006). A search of
electronic archives at the official website of each national government or govern-
ing body was conducted, followed by interviews with trade negotiators, diplo-
mats and ambassadors. I conducted 97 interviews with respondents who were
directly involved in one or more of the five negotiations (see Table 2). Forty-five
respondents were directly involved in WTO developments, 39 were directly
involved in EU–Mercosur negotiations, 45 were directly involved in FTAA nego-
tiations, 29 were directly involved in EU–Chile negotiations and 28 respondents
were directly involved in US–Chile negotiations. Field research was conducted at
six sites: Brussels (EU) in 2005, and Buenos Aires, Brasilia, Montevideo (Merco-
sur), Santiago and Washington DC in 2006.
Interviews were secured through snowballing techniques. A national negotia-
tion team includes a Chief Negotiator and 20–100 government officials (negotia-
tors) in any given trade negotiation. Chief Negotiators are executive-level
managers and strategists for their governments. Each team is normally organized
into 10–20 issue-focused groups (e.g. goods, services, investment, telecommuni-
cations, etc.), usually one group per treaty chapter. Interviews were sought with
anyone directly involved in the negotiation in addition to relevant embassy staff.
Interviews were semi-structured and began with questions about a respondent’s
role in a negotiation. Such questions flowed into observations about linkage
dynamics or a negotiation and its context. Confidentiality was assured to each
respondent.
Data Analysis
Using a structured focused comparison approach, I was able to impose the logic
of experimentation on a small number of cases. In contrast to a single case, multiple
cases provide a stronger basis for theory-building, as multiple-case methodology
enables comparison between cases and results in a broader exploration of the
research question and theory elaboration (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). After
documenting negotiation process and outcome for each case, I applied pattern-
matching analytical procedures to determine linkage event-categories or themes
within each case. The purpose of this procedure was to build a plausible – although
provisional – explanation for the linkage events identified in the five cases (i.e.,
relationship between a negotiation and its relevant environment or context).
Cross-case comparison was also conducted to strengthen the validity of such
explanations (Druckman 2005; Yin 1989).
Data were analyzed at three levels to establish content validity. Interview and
archival data were evaluated for consistency (1) within each negotiation side,
(2) between sides engaged in a negotiation, and (3) between linked negotiations
comprising a single case. Where a contradiction in the data was identified at any
level of analysis, all data relevant to that contradiction were discarded from the
results.
Interview notes, field observations and relevant archival documents were
separated into (1) data concerning negotiation process and outcome for each
of the five negotiations, (2) data demonstrating linkage events based on the inter-
action between two negotiations and (3) data for a structured focused compara-
tive analysis between the five cases. This analytical procedure is consistent with
basic research protocol relevant to within-case analysis and cross-case analysis
(Druckman 2005; Eisenhardt 1989). The methodology used in this three-part
procedure follows.
First, summaries of each negotiation were prepared to gain an overall under-
standing of negotiation process and outcome. Data identifying the fundamental
characteristics of each negotiation were extracted from these summaries and orga-
nized in tabular form (to be presented shortly). Second, data relevant to negotia-
tion linkage dynamics were identified through pattern-matching logic. Linkage
observations for one side in a negotiation were isolated and compared with link-
age observations from the other side in a negotiation. The same protocol was
conducted with both sides when conducting analysis of a linked negotiation. For
example, four sets of linkage observations were prepared for Case 4 based on
interview and archival data: (1) US linkage observations of Chile–US negotia-
tions; (2) Chilean linkage observations of Chile–US negotiations; (3) Chilean
linkage observations of Chile–EU negotiations; and (4) EU linkage observations
of Chile–EU negotiations. Many linkage event-categories or themes emerged
through this analysis, although similarity and consistency in linkage observations
was sought between sides in a single negotiation and between linked negotiations.
This four-part analysis serves as the foundation for the linkage narrative devel-
oped in this article for a single case. In conducting this exercise, iteration between
data and plausible causal explanations occurred throughout analysis (Eisenhardt
1989; Yin 1989). Third, event-categories that appeared across two or more cases
were identified using structured focused cross-case analysis. This process strength-
ened the plausible causal explanations developed in the second phase of analysis
(Druckman 2005). Iteration between data and possible causal explanations were
conducted throughout the third phase of analysis, further strengthening the con-
nection between data-based events and an explanation of these events.
Limitations
Research design, collection of data through interviews and the analysis of inter-
view and archival data were conducted by a single researcher, the author. Inter-
views were conducted in English with native speakers and with diplomats who
acquired English as a second language. The potential for misunderstanding can
occur in either setting but is more likely in the latter setting. Multiple cultures are
also a variable that can interfere with the accurate collection of data, but this is
less prominent than it might appear to be initially because a diplomatic culture
tends to be embraced by members of the international trade policy community,
which weakens but does not remove the impact of national culture on its mem-
bers. Each of these factors, inherent to the present study, exists as a study limita-
tion that must be taken into consideration.
The fundamental characteristics of the five negotiations under examination are
presented in tabular form. Table 3 presents an overview to the multilateral-global
negotiation, Table 4 offers a synopsis of the multilateral-regional negotiation,
Table 5 provides an introduction to a bilateral-regional negotiation and Table 6
presents an overview of the bilateral negotiations. Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 are
self-explanatory.
Results
Case analysis and cross-case analysis establish how external events grounded in a
negotiation’s relevant environment or context influence negotiation process and
outcome through the application of negotiation linkage theory. Case description
and analysis, and theoretical and practical implications, are considered together,
as this is a most effective method for presenting empirical findings in studies
involving multiple cases (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). Case identification is
essential for understanding study results (see Table 1); treaty titles or chapters are
often cited (e.g. USCFTA, Chapter 3) and parties are identified by name at
times.
Multilateral–Regional Structural Linkages: Case 1

This structural linkage examines the relationship between a negotiation and its
context in a multilateral–regional context. Case 1: WTO and EU–Mercosur
negotiations are considered initially, followed by Case 2: WTO and FTAA nego-
tiations in the next section.
Table 3. Fundamental Negotiation Characteristics:

Multilateral-Global Negotiation
Characteristics World Trade Organization (including the Doha
Development Agenda)
Parties About 150 members during study (153 members currently)

Lead organizations Ministerial Conference brings together all WTO members
every two years
General Council includes all members and meets regularly
in Geneva
Coordinating body WTO Secretariat, the Director-General and four Deputy
Director-Generals
Responsible agencies Member Diplomatic Missions to Geneva often with an
Ambassador to the WTO
Number of The Trade Negotiations Committee operates under the
negotiation groups General Council and was established to organize Doha
negotiations; in so doing it has appointed three groups and
a number of committees and working parties
Number of Six Ministerials since WTO formation in 1995 and many
negotiation rounds formal and informal meetings
Primary location Mostly in Geneva but Ministerials occur all over the world
of negotiation rounds
Table 4. Fundamental Negotiation Characteristics:

Multilateral-Regional Negotiation
Characteristics Free Trade Area of the Americas
Parties 34 national governments in North and South America
Lead organizations Rotating chairmanship among parties until 2002 and then
the US and Brazil appointed co-chairs until negotiation
conclusion
Coordinating body Rotating FTAA Secretariat with official Secretariat site never
selected
Responsible agencies External Affairs, Foreign Affairs or Trade agency in each of
34 nations
Number of Nine working groups
negotiation groups
Number of Five Summits and eight Ministerial meetings
negotiation rounds
Primary location Summit and Ministerial occur all over North and South
of negotiation rounds America. Technical meetings held in country of (rotating)
Secretariat.
Table 5. Fundamental Negotiation Characteristics: Bilateral–Regional Negotiation

Characteristics European Union – Mercosur Interregional Association negotiation
|
--------------------------- ----------------------------
| |
Parties Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur) European Union (EU)
Argentine Republic
Federative Republic of Brazil
Republic of Paraguay
Oriental Republic of Uruguay
Coordinating Biregional Negotiations Committee
body (Established by EU – Mercosur Co-operation Council)
Lead Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Argentina European Commission (EC)
organizations Ministry of External Relations, Brazil
Ministry of External Relations, Paraguay
Ministry of External Relations, Uruguay
Responsible Trade and Int. Economic Relations, Argentina Directorate General
agencies Department of Int. Negotiations, Brazil External Relations
Economical Relations and Integration, Paraguay Directorate General Trade
Department of Int. Economic Matters, Uruguay
Chief Based on semi-annual rotation of President Herve Jouanjean
negotiators Pro-tempore of the Mercosur Council Karl Falkenberg
Negotiation 70–170 15–50
delegation size
Number of 17
negotiation groups
Number of 15 Formal Rounds prior to the 10/2004 EU – Mercosur
negotiation rounds Ministerial Meeting (Lisbon)
Primary location Alternating between Brussels and a Mercosur capital city
of negotiation rounds
An analysis of four time periods and turning points provides the primary focus of
attention in Case 1: (1) events prior to and after the WTO Seattle Ministerial
Conference in November 1999; (2) events prior to and after the WTO Doha
Ministerial Conference in November 2001; (3) events prior to and after the WTO
Cancún Ministerial Conference in September 2003; and (4) events prior to and
after WTO negotiations over the “July Framework Package” in July 2004 (see
Figure 1).
After many years of dialogue the EU and Mercosur announced their intention
to negotiate an Association Agreement at a June 1999 Summit Meeting in Rio de
Janeiro (Beltramino 2005), four months prior to the WTO Seattle Ministerial
Conference. At that time no one expected that this Ministerial would achieve
little and be remembered as a fiasco, as there was a clear expectation that the
Table 6. Fundamental Negotiation Characteristics: Bilateral Negotiations

Characteristics EU–Chile Association Agreement US–Chile Free Trade Agreement
| |
Parties EU----------- -----------Chile Chile------------ ------------US
Lead European Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) U.S. Trade
organizations Commission Representative
Responsible Directorate General General Directorate for International U.S. Trade
agencies External Relations/ Economic Relations, MFA Representative
Trade
Chief Herve Osvaldo Osvaldo Regina Vargo
Negotiators Jouanjean Rosales Rosales
Negotiators 15–25 70–80 90–100 40–50
on team
Number of treaty 11 24
titles or chapters
Number of treaty 112 313
pages
Number of 10 14
negotiation rounds
Primary location Brussels Santiago Washington DC Santiago
of negotiation
rounds
“WTO Seattle Round” would commence. For example, a lead European Com-
mission (EC) negotiator told me that “the European Council instructed the EC
to take into account the results of any WTO negotiations for both Mercosur and
Chile.”4 Established in mid-1999, these instructions placed restrictions on the
EC in terms of making tariff proposals in EU–Mercosur negotiations. However,
the EU eventually concluded that discussing tariff proposals in South America
would not jeopardize its WTO position, as the WTO Doha round commenced
in November 2001, four months after initial EU tariff proposals were presented
to Mercosur.
It is interesting to compare the EU–Mercosur process before and after the
WTO Doha round began. Prior to the commencement of the Doha round EU–
Mercosur held six negotiation rounds over an eighteen-month period, but in the
eighteen months after Doha was announced EU–Mercosur held three rounds.
On the surface, it appears that the commencement of the Doha round impeded
EU–Mercosur negotiations. One Argentinean trade negotiator observed: “Essen-
tially, EU–Mercosur negotiations were always conducted in the shadow of the
WTO.” A high-level EC official provided a more structured view of the relation-
ship between the Doha round and EU–Mercosur negotiations. “The pace of
negotiations and opportunities to bring closure to EU–Mercosur negotiations
4)
The European Commission is abbreviated as EC, but the European Council is always identified by
name to minimize misunderstanding.
were directly affected by the Doha round. If the Doha round advances then the
pace of EU–Mercosur negotiations slowed down. If Doha does not advance then
the pace of EU–Mercosur negotiations speeds up.” A Brazilian diplomat actively
involved in EU–Mercosur negotiations offered a specific example: “After Merco-
sur made a significant proposal to the EU in March 2003 the EU had to return
with something substantial on agriculture, but EU negotiators said that they
could not make a proposal until after the WTO Ministerial in Cancún [in Sep-
tember 2003].”
The period following the Cancún Ministerial was one of the most dynamic for
EU–Mercosur negotiations. Events in Cancún may have contributed to this
development. Cancún was considered unsuccessful by many, as negotiations
deadlocked, collapsed and the meeting was prematurely adjourned. Suddenly, the
WTO Doha round did not look very promising at all. Two months later the EU
and Mercosur held a Ministerial-level meeting in Brussels where they created a
work program and a deadline to conclude EU–Mercosur negotiations. The parties
agreed to schedule five rounds and two Ministerial-level meetings over a twelve-
month period. Agreement was to be reached by 30 October 2004, the end of term
for the European Union Commission. EU–Mercosur rounds were actually held in
December 2003 and March, May, June and July 2004 with an EU–Mercosur
Ministerial meeting in Lisbon in October 2004. But the parties were unsuccessful
in achieving agreement and so these negotiations have since drifted away.
Near the end of this last sustained EU–Mercosur effort to reach an agreement,
WTO Doha round negotiators succeeded to break the deadlock first formed in
Cancún through intense negotiations in Geneva in July 2004, three months prior
to the established EU–Mercosur deadline. Known as the WTO “July Framework
Package” it addressed many issues that created conflict in Cancún. WTO nego-
tiations looked promising once again. A high-level EC negotiator observed:
“Although Cancún was seen as a setback in 2003, in July 2004 there was a WTO
Ministerial that appeared to achieve results. The WTO future looked brighter
briefly. In hindsight this perception was not warranted, but in July 2004 the
WTO looked like it might make progress. This perception did not help EU–
Mercosur break the October 2004 deadlock.”
Data indicate that failure to achieve an agreement by the October 2004 dead-
line terminated this linkage between the Doha round and EU–Mercosur negotia-
tions although six EC and eight Mercosur ambassadors, government officials and
trade negotiators separately told me that WTO Doha failure would breathe new
life into EU–Mercosur negotiations. Some officials even believe that Doha failure
is not the critical factor; rather, certainty is the critical factor as it is certainty that
will create opportunities for the resumption of EU–Mercosur negotiations. A
senior trade official from Uruguay observed that “the EC has a mandate to nego-
tiate a treaty with Mercosur. This is not an insignificant matter, as this negotiation
remains a formal EU goal.”
Data points within the WTO Doha & EU–Mercosur relationship indicate
that when one negotiation was achieving gains, the other negotiation was stalling.
Such dynamics could be conceptualized as a negative linkage. Perhaps the reason
for this relationship is that each negotiation served as a tangible alternative for the
other negotiation for parties involved in both negotiations. Not all linked nego-
tiations serve as an alternative. For example, US–Chile was not an alternative for
EU–Chile and vice versa; nor was EU–Chile considered an alternative for WTO
Doha by the EU. Nevertheless, it may be that linked negotiations that are per-
ceived as a viable alternative for each other have the potential to be “negatively
linked.” When this is the case, one negotiation can directly influence processes in
the other negotiation so that opportunity to achieve closure is reduced in one or
both negotiations.
It is not clear whether linked negotiations that are an alternative for each other
are the only factor determining negative linkage. Future research should seek to
identify other factors that produce negative linkage dynamics.
Data indicating a negative linkage suggests the possibility that positive linkages
may also exist. In interviewing US and EU negotiators, the observation that
appeared most often on each side of the Atlantic about the other is that each
perceives the other as a primary competitor in trade negotiations. For example,
EU negotiations with Mexico (producing the 2000 EU–Mexico Free Trade Agree-
ment) were a response to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA,
signed in 1992). A lead EU negotiator told me that:
the EU experienced a shock, as there was a significant decrease in EU–Mexico trade shortly after
NAFTA went into effect. Mexico was a turning point for the EU . . . The US and EU were essentially
competing for the South American market via the FTAA and Mercosur.
A Brazilian trade official observed that “EU–Mercosur negotiations were a reac-

tion by the EU to the FTAA negotiations.” Others that I interviewed expressed
similar observations. It may be that competition or perceived opportunity is a
primary force that contributes to positive linkage dynamics. When two negotia-
tions are positively linked, one negotiation can motivate or inspire another nego-
tiation to commence and, once begun, can directly influence negotiation process
in the other negotiation so that opportunity to achieve closure increases.
To summarize, positive linkages may occur through competitive or opportu-
nistic forces and negative linkages may occur when one negotiation is perceived
as an alternative for another, although other explanatory factors may exist.
Understanding the forces that create negotiation linkages and characterizing
such dynamics with concepts that form a theoretical paradigm is the first step in
gaining control over such dynamics.
Multilateral–Regional Structural Linkages: Case 2

This structural linkage examines separate negotiations involving the WTO and
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The linkage that constitutes this
single case also serves as a useful point of comparison for examining Cases 1 and 2
through cross-case analysis as the former demonstrated linkage patterns, while
the latter presents random linkage events without a pattern. The reason for this
observation is examined but first it is useful to identify the various linkages that
can be observed.
A Chilean trade negotiator told me that “initially nations were committed to
hemispheric integration, but nations did not know how to proceed with such a
complex endeavor.” A Brazilian trade negotiator recognized that the US was the
primary driver behind the FTAA process and observed that “the US noted increas-
ing EU integration and this contributed to US motives to integrate the Americas
but other factors were also present. The GATT Uruguay round had recently con-
cluded and the US did not gain everything it wanted on investment, services,
intellectual property, market access and the environment. The US thought that
the FTAA might be more effective for pursuing an expanded trade agenda than a
WTO negotiation and so the US shifted from a multilateral approach to a mul-
tilateral and regional strategy.” A senior US trade policy advisor observed that
“the US believed that the FTAA was the next logical step after NAFTA as the
Americas, as a hemisphere, should integrate economically.” Multiple events from
various relevant environments including EU integration, NAFTA and GATT/
WTO inspired FTAA negotiations.
FTAA was launched in Miami in December 1994; a couple of weeks before the
establishment of the WTO. The timing of these two events appears to be purely
coincidental. FTAA held five summit meetings and eight ministerial meetings
between 1994 and 2005. Although three of the five FTAA Summits occurred a
month prior to a significant WTO development (see Figure 1) generally, no
respondent identified substantive linkages between WTO developments and
FTAA progress; unlike the reasonable explanations reported for coincidental tim-
ing (i.e., negative linkage) in WTO & EU–Mercosur. A senior Argentinean trade
official compared FTAA and EU–Mercosur negotiations and observed that:
a significant difference between these two negotiations is structural. EU negotiations with Mercosur
were bilateral and FTAA negotiations were multilateral and much more complex as a result. Com-
plexity did not contribute to linkages; if anything, complexity within the FTAA negotiations worked
against any possibility that linkages would occur.
A Brazilian trade negotiator made similar observations in reference to FTAA

negotiation linkages. “There was too much background noise, there were too
many other things happening, and the situation was just too complex.”
WTO negotiations are also complex although a clear pattern emerged in rela-
tion to EU–Mercosur negotiations because key leaders within EU–Mercosur per-
ceived their negotiation as a viable alternative to the WTO Doha round. This
perception sustained the link until it was no longer useful. FTAA negotiations
could have been perceived as an alternative to WTO negotiations also – FTAA
negotiations certainly appear to be a viable alternative – but the complex nature
of the FTAA, including 34 parties, drove a process that did not react to WTO
successes and failures. A complex negotiation may contribute to the initiation of
a second negotiation and/or it may contribute to its conclusion, otherwise sus-
tained linkage patterns between two complex negotiations may only be possible
as an isolated incident.
One clear link could be found between FTAA and WTO Doha negotiations.
Many respondents reported that FTAA negotiations agreed to exclude agricul-
tural domestic support, as it could only be considered within the WTO. A senior
US agricultural trade negotiator observed that:
the US was prepared to address agricultural export subsidies in FTAA negotiations but the US was
not prepared to address domestic farm support, as it could only be addressed in the WTO. The
rational for this is that it is impossible to control US competitor domestic support activities in US
trade partner markets.
An Argentinean Ambassador made similar observations:
it became apparent that this issue [agricultural subsidies] could only be solved at the WTO because
the US and EU must compromise concurrently on this issue. The US is unwilling to reduce agricul-
tural subsidies without a similar move on the part of the EU and the EU will not reduce agricultural
subsidies without a similar move on the part of the US.
Some issues can only be addressed in that venue where key parties are present.
Agricultural domestic support provides an unfair advantage in international mar-
kets. If one party withdraws their unfair advantage but others do not then the
party that has withdrawn their advantage is hurt, while others benefit. This is the
reason why some issues can only be addressed in that venue where all key parties
are at the table – in this case a multilateral–global environment.
EU–Mercosur negotiation may come back to life after the WTO Doha round
achieves some kind of closure; however, no one I interviewed thinks that FTAA
negotiations will re-start under any circumstances. A Brazilian Minister told me
that “FTAA negotiations, although unsuccessful, inspired many other negotia-
tions within the region. Some negotiations involving Mercosur were a direct
result of FTAA negotiations.” A US trade negotiator made similar observations:
“Bilateral negotiations in the region did not cause the FTAA to fail, rather bilat-
eral trade negotiations occurred after it was clear that FTAA was failing.” The
emergence of bilateral negotiations following a failed regional negotiation has
global implications, which are addressed in the next case.
Multilateral–Bilateral Structural Linkages: Case 3

This structural linkage examines two separate negotiations involving the WTO &
US–Chile negotiations. All bilateral and regional trade negotiations conducted
by WTO members exist within a conceptual and regulatory framework deter-
mined by WTO policy and practices that began with GATT. It is also clear that
WTO negotiations can have more or less directional control over another nego-
tiation, as illustrated through a comparison of Case 1 and Case 2. In this context,
case data identified little directional control from WTO Doha to US–Chile nego-
tiations although data was gathered that indicates that bilateral negotiations may
be used to influence multilateral processes.
The US has been committed to multilateral solutions for most of the last 60
years. US commitment to the development of global trade was fundamental to
the successful negotiation of eight GATT rounds, resulting in the establishment
of the WTO. The US has been equally concerned about regional trade negotia-
tions such as NAFTA, APEC, and the failed FTAA negotiations. However, in the
final days of the Clinton administration, in December 2000, the US began pur-
suing bilateral or free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore. This decision is
a fundamental shift in the US approach to trade policy (US trade agreements
reached with Israel in 1985 and Jordan in 2000 primarily exist for political rather
than economic reasons). No single factor contributed to this shift, but the WTO
Seattle Ministerial failure twelve months earlier did motivate political leaders to
seek alternate trade policy development approaches (Crump 2006b).
A bilateral approach to trade was consistent with the new US administration’s
views when George W. Bush took office in January 2001. The Bush administra-
tion successfully concluded trade agreements with Chile and Singapore, and went
on to conclude agreements with Australia, Bahrain, Colombia, the Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, South Korea, Morocco, Nicaragua,
Oman, Panama and Peru (USTR 2008) – fifteen countries in total. A Deputy US
Trade Representative told me that:
The US has begun to realize that they can conduct certain activities in a smaller arena that might
later produce benefits within the WTO Doha round. For example, every US free trade agreement
includes language prohibiting states from engaging in export trade. In so doing, this process is build-
ing a coalition that may be useful in WTO negotiations.
A US telecommunications negotiator made similar observations about eCom-

merce, “a trade issue included in every single trade treaty since Chile and Singa-
pore.” An intellectual property (IP) trade negotiator in Chile observed that: “The
US has objections to some provisions in TRIPS [Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights] and so it is using free trade agreements to remediate these
provisions.” The Deputy Chief of IP negotiations in Brazil told me:
The US found it difficult to push its IP agenda multilaterally and they now pursue this agenda
bilaterally. Once the US has achieved a sufficient number of bilateral IP agreements it is possible that
they will return to a multilateral setting to consolidate these bilateral gains.
Coalition-building is not purely a numbers game. A Deputy Assistant US Trade

Representative for WTO Affairs told me that: “Chile and Singapore both hit
above their weight in WTO negotiations. To have a shared agenda between the
US, Chile and Singapore is valuable, as it creates synergies. US negotiations with
Australia, Morocco and the CAFTA [Central America Free Trade Agreement]
nations continue to build this shared agenda that became a coalition. This coali-
tion was critical in keeping trade facilitation in the WTO July [2004] Framework
Package.”
The US has developed a bilateral–multilateral trade strategy – a strategy grounded
in bilateral coalition-building that was initiated in the Clinton administration via
Chile and Singapore but fully implemented during the Bush administration.
Coalition analysis is the most common approached for understanding multi-
lateral negotiations, while the predominant view sees a group of parties as an
issue-focused coalition that brings in parties behind a package of trade-offs (Zart-
man 2002). Coalition theory primarily addresses formation, stability or durability,
and impact or outcome (Dupont 1994). A large body of literature recognizes
the unstable nature of issue-focused coalitions. Such coalitions form around
issues, cooperate to achieve goals, and then disband once an outcome is achieved
(Stevenson et al. 1985; Murnighan and Brass 1991). But emerging literature
argues that coalitions or alliances based on member similarity (Russett 1968;
Sened 1996; Werner and Lemke 1997) and relationships (Cullen et al. 2000;
Polzer et al. 1998) tend to operate across issues and over time, and are more stable
as a result. A coalition built through the US bilateral–multilateral strategy, as
presented in this study, is more than an issue-focused coalition, though it is not
clear whether it is a relationship-focused coalition. Nevertheless, a coalition built
through intensive government-to-government interaction that is part of a bilat-
eral trade agreement may not have the same fundamental characteristics as a
coalition that forms in response to a package of issues during multilateral nego-
tiations. How a coalition forms may have implications for coalition stability,
durability, and impact or effectiveness.
US–Chile negotiations are symbolic – actually the first step – in a multilateral
strategic experiment that can provide understanding about the stability, durability
and impact of coalitions in multilateral settings. Such understanding could con-
tribute to our knowledge of coalition effectiveness. Critical to this analysis is an
understanding of the relationship between how a coalition forms and coalition
performance. Future research could gather data via the WTO or other relevant
forums to support or to refute this proposition. Greater understanding of the
nature of bilateral–multilateral linkage dynamics could emerge as a result. This
US bilateral coalition-building strategy could have geopolitical implications for

future multilateral negotiations, as bilateral environments may explain events in
future multilateral environments.
Bilateral–Bilateral Structural Linkages: Case 4

This structural linkage examines two separate negotiations involving EU–Chile
and US–Chile. Within the methods section it was noted that linked negotiations
that are bilateral and/or regional in nature can be explained through role theory
(link-pin party and linked parties). Fig. 2, presented previously, provides a visual
image of Case 4 through the application of role theory. The amount of coopera-
tion between linked parties (the EU and the US) is of particular interest.
A Chilean lead negotiator observed: “Negotiations over financial services and
investment were discussed by the US and EU. Clearly, communication moved
across the Atlantic, as the same explanation with significant detail was presented
separately by the US and EU.” This official’s EU counterpart confirmed the over-
all approach: “There was an exchange of views between the EU and US on nego-
tiations with Chile...On agricultural issues, for example, the EU and US held two
or three conference calls.” A US lead negotiator said: “The US really did not pay
attention to what Europe was doing with Chile until around the latter half of
these negotiations.”
A preponderance of data indicates that direct contact between the EU and the
US occurred irregularly and at upper levels of government, although communica-
tion between linked parties was not the only linkage form that influenced nego-
tiation process. The EUCAA (EU–Chile) treaty was published and available via
the Internet a month before USCFTA (US–Chile) negotiations concluded in
December 2002. This development caused unintended consequences, as it gave
the US an advantage in negotiating with Chile.
US negotiators told me they were pleased to gain access to the EUCAA treaty
right before concluding USCFTA negotiations. After reviewing the services por-
tion of the EUCAA treaty, the US demanded the same or more on an item-by-
item basis (compare EUCAA Title III to USCFTA Chapters 11 and 12) and then
attached the EUCAA services list as an annex to the USCFTA services list to add
clarity to Chile’s services obligations (see annex attached to USCFTA, Chapter 11).
However, Chile was not at the complete mercy of the US. One US negotiator
told me that after reviewing EUCAA he realized that Chile was more generous
with the EU than with the US on tariff reductions for chemicals, petroleum and
fuels. The two sides argued about this at length without resolution (see EUCAA
Title II; USCFTA Chapter 3).
In this case the US, as a linked party is using benchmarks established by EU–
Chile to strategic advantage. A “benchmarking strategy” involves using goals,
issues, agendas, arguments, positions, and concessions as a reference point in a
linked negotiation. Benchmarking appeared several times in bilateral–bilateral

linkages. The EU gained strategic advantage by monitoring US–Chile negotia-
tions, as it allowed EU negotiators to form educated guesses of US goals and
positions on a range of issues relevant to EU–Chile negotiations. In EU–Chile
financial services negotiations, for example, a lead EU negotiator advised his
Chilean counterpart that EU financial services goals were more reasonable than
US financial services goals, and argued: “Cut a deal on our more moderate finan-
cial services goals now and then you can use this agreement as a precedent in
negotiating with the US.” A Chilean financial services negotiator confirmed this
EU approach and explained how Chile used this EUCAA outcome in US–Chile
negotiations: “Chile achieved financial services policies with Europe that were
much closer to our goals, as compared to US demands. Without this precedent,
Chile would have had no argument with the US.” Chile was forced to accept
many US financial services demands, but this same negotiator told me that Chile
successfully rejected a US proposal to accept foreign banks setting up in Chile
without committing capital (known as branching) because of the precedent
achieved through its EU agreement (see EUCAA, Title 3; USCFTA, Chapter 12).
The EU succeeded in achieving some financial services goals it sought by using a
benchmarking strategy. Perhaps a linked party is more likely to achieve its goals
by assisting a link-pin party in crafting a precedent relevant to a linked negotiation.
Benchmarking is not the only strategy that emerges when negotiations are
linked in bilateral–bilateral negotiations. Chile gained strategic advantage, as a
link-pin party in US–Chile–EU, by establishing the same outcome for each
linked negotiation on its luxury tax on cars. Essentially, Chilean officials
concluded that they could gain more by compromising with the US rather than
with the EU on their “85% tax of the custom value of cars above the threshold of
$ 15,740” (European Commission 2003: 2). However, EU negotiations con-
cluded eight months before US negotiations and the EU was pushing to finalize
this issue. An EC trade negotiator said: “Chile and the EU were deadlocked on
the luxury car tax and finally Chile told us that they would offer us [EU] whatever
arrangement they offered the US. The EU did not like this understanding but
accepted Chile’s offer, which allowed negotiations to conclude.” A leading nego-
tiator for Chile observed:
If Chile had compromised with Europe on the luxury car tax first, then Chile would not be in a
strong position to gain something from the US, as Chile believed it could gain much more from the
US than from the EU on this issue. In the final stage of US–Chile negotiations we agreed to phase
out this tax and in return Chile gained advantages for small and medium companies in the US
market. But the big gain was that the US agreed to eliminate copper tariffs. A lot of money is
involved in this US tariff because this is by far Chile’s largest export.
A link-pin party can minimize loss and/or gain benefits by protecting critical
information through an “outcome bundling” strategy.
A third strategy that emerges through bilateral–bilateral linkage dynamics is

“free-riding.” In US–Chile–EU negotiations, some EU financial services goals in
Chile were actually achieved for the EU by the US. Members of Chile’s negotia-
tion team explained: “The EU was clever in how it managed policies related to
the movement of capital out of Chile, as the EU probably concluded that the
US would get a better deal from Chile than the EU could achieve. As a result,
the EU proposed and Chile eventually accepted a condition that Chile would
not discriminate against the EU in relation to any third country regarding move-
ment of capital. In this context, the US is by definition a third county and so any
agreement the US achieved on movement of capital in USCFTA would auto-
matically transfers to the EU via EUCAA” (See EUCAA, Annex XIV). A second
example involves intellectual property (IP). The EU pursued a narrow set of IP
goals in EUCAA compared with USCFTA (see EUCAA, Title 6; USCFTA,
Chapter 17). A high-level Chilean official explained: “The EU understood that
the US would establish a strong intellectual property regime in Chile. The EU
strategy was: why make compromises with Chile to achieve something that the
US will achieve for them?” In this case, the EU need only insist that Chile apply
the most favored nation (MFN) clause found in the WTO TRIPS agreement to
their bilateral treaty so that the IP regime negotiated by the US would be applicable
to the EU.
In these two examples it is the linked party that is gaining something of value
from the link-pin party via free-riding, but this value is primarily gained based on
work conducted by the other linked party. In addition, it does not appear that the
linked party that conducts the work lost anything through this process (i.e. it cost
nothing). Here is a linkage strategy that provides one linked party with a benefit
at little or no cost to either linked party, although additional data should be gath-
ered on this final point before it is confirmed. Nevertheless, it is important to
note that such opportunity is only realized if one linked party is aware that they
can free-ride on the work of another. Understanding the dynamics of free-riding
is valuable knowledge in a world of scarce resources.
It is useful to note that Chile organized two teams in negotiating with the US
and the EU but with substantial overlap in team membership (i.e. selected Chil-
ean officials negotiated with both the US and the EU). A link-pin party may gain
some advantage by organizing one team to conduct two separate negotiations,
but such advantage is not certain. A Chilean trade official observed: “It was real
busy during these two negotiations. One week you are negotiating with the US
and the next week with the EU. There was no time to think.”
What are the advantages and disadvantages for a link-pin party in organizing
and managing two teams that include the same members (e.g. one team essen-
tially) or two teams that do not include the same members (e.g. an A team and a
B team)? In answer to this question it would be useful to compare free trade
agreements negotiated between 2000 and 2003 by (1) US–Chile and EU–Chile;
and (2) US–Singapore and US–Australia. Chile essentially managed a single team
against the US and EU but Singapore managed two separate teams (an A team
and a B team) against the US and Australia (Crump 2006a; Crump 2010). Such
analysis could be the subject of another study but it is noted here that linkage
dynamics are primarily a function of linked party communication rather than the
organizational decisions of a link-pin party (Crump 2010); observations that are
generally consistent with conclusions of the present study.
Bilateral–Regional Structural Linkages: Case 5

This final structural linkage examines two separate negotiations involving EU–
Mercosur and EU–Chile. As a case, Mercosur–EU–Chile would not exist if the
Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not recognized an opportunity to apply
a free-riding strategy to an emerging negotiation being planned by EU–Mercosur
(see example presented in the introduction to this article). Role theory is also
relevant to bilateral–regional structural linkages (see Fig. 2) but once negotiations
began link-pin party management of benchmarking dynamics is the most inter-
esting aspect of this case.
Unlike US–Chile–EU linkage dynamics, which occurred primarily through
linked party opportunistic behavior conducted informally, the EU as link-pin
party formally linked negotiations with Mercosur and Chile when the European
Council established separate but identical mandates to conduct an Association
Agreement with each entity. The EU treated Mercosur and Chile as two separate
projects, but each was part of the same package because, “it was thought that these
two negotiations would eventually merge” (several EC officials) as “the EU hoped
Chile would join Mercosur” (EC diplomat; Argentinean Ambassador; Chilean
diplomat posted in the EU). By formally linking Mercosur and Chile negotia-
tions, EU leaders hoped to contribute to the unification of South America –
perhaps as a way of reaffirming their own geopolitical model.
Initially, chief negotiators for Chile and Mercosur met regularly as the EU wanted such collabora-
tion. Mercosur and Chile stopped exchanging information when it became clear that the two nego-
tiations would not merge, although occasional telephone calls between chief negotiators continue
(Chilean diplomat posted in the EU).
Officials representing Mercosur confirm this observation. After eighteen months,

EU–Mercosur negotiations stalled and EU–Chile negotiations surged ahead.
Linkage dynamics were less apparent after EU–Mercosur negotiations stalled.
In US–Chile–EU, the link-pin party was challenged by US and EU use of
benchmarking strategies, even applying an outcome-bundling strategy as a defen-
sive measure against anticipated linked party benchmarking strategies. How did
the EU manage Mercosur or Chilean opportunities to exploit benchmarking
strategies? The EU adopted a conscious strategy that produced no divergent
benchmarks between its separate negotiations with Mercosur and Chile, as it lit-
erally ran these two negotiations in parallel. For example, the EU presented Mer-
cosur and Chile with the very same review of the EU regulatory environment in
the second and third rounds ( June and November 2000), and very similar frame-
work and regulatory proposals in the fourth round (March 2001). More detailed
proposals and rules were presented in the fifth round (July 2001), including a
comprehensive tariff liberalization proposal covering 90 percent of traditional
trade tariff lines, but again the EU presented very similar proposals to Mercosur
and Chile with minor adjustments only for economic differences (e.g. Chile does
not have an aluminum industry but some Mercosur countries do). After the sixth
round (October 2001), EU–Mercosur negotiations paused and did not resume
until the EU and Chile were about to sign EUCAA in April 2002 (many inter-
views and archival data confirm these observations). Such actions inadvertently
avoided the benchmarking challenges observed in US–Chile–EU.
Basically, the EU demonstrates that it is possible for the link-pin party to gain
some control over benchmarking dynamics by conducting similar activities in
separate but linked negotiations – at least until proposals are presented – through
a “parallel-linkage” strategy. However, relative power relations between the link-
pin party and the linked parties are a necessary condition in conducting a paral-
lel-linkage strategy; Chile as link-pin party would not be able to run parallel
negotiations with the EU and the US.
Parallel-linkage and outcome bundling may be useful strategies for a link-pin
party, free-riding is a useful strategy for a linked party, and either party may find
benchmarking a useful linkage strategy. Such theory is relevant in any setting
where role theory can explain linkage dynamics. Bilateral–regional linkage struc-
ture and bilateral–bilateral linkage structure appear to have many similarities;
however, important qualifications must be presented. These issues are considered
in the conclusion, where linkage structure and linkage dynamics are examined.
Conclusion
This conclusion has four goals. It develops a theoretical framework of linkage

dynamics by using the present study to build on the extant literature. It clarifies
the distinct structural nature of multilateral, regional and bilateral environments.
It examines the different ways that a multilateral negotiation controls regional
and bilateral linkages, and it investigates the use of bilateral–multilateral linkages
to pursue geopolitical ends. In so doing, this article demonstrates that a negotia-
tion’s relevant environment or context can, under certain circumstances, halt,
suspend, support or advance a negotiation we seek to explain.
The study of linkage dynamics is complicated but not incomprehensible. It is
possible to integrate the extant literature on issue linkage and two level games (see
review of literature in the background section) with data from the present study
to establish comprehensive understanding. Complexity provides a useful context
for theorizing about negotiation. It is reasonable to assume that a theoretical
framework of linkage dynamics that is grounded in complexity will be built on
the following variables: number of parties, number of separate but linked nego-
tiations, and the number of linkage levels – within a single level or between levels
(e.g. US–Chile–EU exists at a single or bilateral level; Mercosur–EU–Chile
includes both bilateral and regional negotiations). It is assumed that complexity
increases with an increase in the number of parties, number of linked negotia-
tions and/or number of levels.
Issue linkage is the least complex form based on these assumptions, as it involves
(1) two parties engaged in a single negotiation that trade among diverse issues
(e.g., Chile agrees to phase out its luxury tax on car imports and the US agrees to
eliminate its copper tariffs) or (2) the same two parties engaged in separate but
linked negotiations (e.g., the US uses its control over US–Chile trade negotiations
in seeking Chile’s support to initiate war against Iraq through the UN Security
Council). The latter form is more complex than the former, as it includes two
rather than one discrete negotiation.
A slightly more complex linkage form includes two negotiations and three
rather than two parties, such as US–Chile–EU. In this case, both bilateral nego-
tiations exist at the same structural level (i.e., bilateral-international) so initial
analysis indicates that it is more complex than issue linkage. This form is also less
complex than two-level games that, by their very nature, operate at both domestic
and international levels.
It is interesting to note that linkage-role theory cannot explain simple negotia-
tions such as issue linkage, and cannot explain complex negotiations that are
multilateral in structure; however, this theory is useful in explaining linkages with
moderate degrees of complexity. For example, linkage-role theory can explain
linked negotiations involving three parties at a single level or linked negotiations
that involve three parties at two levels, such as two-level games.
In two-level games, a national government functions as a link-pin party and its
international partner and its domestic lobbies function as linked parties. Curi-
ously, no prior research investigates the importance of benchmarking in this set-
ting or asks whether governments engage in outcome bundling. Nor has prior
research investigated whether domestic lobbies or linked international parties are
able to employ a free-riding strategy. This article argues that these linkage strate-
gies are relevant and useful in two-level games. Future research should examine
these conclusions.
The complexity of bilateral–regional linkages and multilateral–regional link-
ages are examined shortly when the fundamental nature of structural type is con-
sidered. The extant literature and data from this article suggest the following
framework grounded in complexity (from least to most complex):
• issue linkage within a single negotiation;

• issue linkage between two negotiations;
• bilateral linkage within a single level;
• bilateral linkage between two levels;
• bilateral–regional linkages;
• multilateral–regional linkages;
• linkages involving multilateral negotiations.
There is utility in defining the universe of linkage dynamics and then placing such
dynamics in a theoretical framework grounded in degrees of complexity.
A second aim seeks to clarify the fundamental nature of structural type in
international relations. Based on this study, I conclude that multilateral and bilat-
eral negotiations are each clearly a structural type, although the significance of a
“regional” negotiation, as a structural type, is less certain. It appears that a regional
negotiation may assume one of two forms: bilateral–regional or multilateral–
regional. For example, when the European region negotiates, EU members are
engaged in a multilateral negotiation. When Mercosur members negotiate with
each other, they are engaged in a smaller negotiation that is still multilateral in
structure. But when the EU and Mercosur sit across the table from each other
they are engaged in a bilateral negotiation – although it is a bilateral negotiation
between two regions. The bilateral linkage structure of EU–Mercosur and EU–
Chile is the independent variable that supports an explanation of linkage dynam-
ics through the use of linkage-role theory. If a regional negotiation is multilateral,
such as FTAA negotiations, then linkage-role theory is not useful. “Regional” has
structural characteristics (e.g., geographic) but these characteristics are of second-
ary order not primary order for understanding the relationship between structure
as an independent variable and negotiation process and outcome as a dependent
variable. This article concludes that there are two fundamental regional types:
bilateral–regional and multilateral–regional with the former less complex than
the latter.
A third aim recognizes that multilateral negotiations with global implications,
such as the WTO Doha round, are super-ordinate to negotiations conducted at
other levels. All trade negotiations conducted by WTO members exist within a
conceptual and regulatory framework determined by WTO policy and practice
that began with GATT. An EU trade negotiator observed that, “WTO negotia-
tions have a cascading impact on regional and bilateral negotiations.” Keeping
this qualification in mind, it is also clear that WTO negotiations can have more
or less directional control over a regional or bilateral negotiation. Case 1 involv-
ing EU–Mercosur and Case 2 involving FTAA negotiations demonstrate the dif-
ferent impact that a super-ordinate environment can have on negotiations.
FTAA negotiations were conducted within a WTO context but the only iden-
tifiable linkage between these two negotiations concerned the elimination of
agricultural domestic subsidies. This linkage emerged because the FTAA did not
include all relevant parties – in this case, all national governments engaged in
providing domestic support to their agricultural sector – and the only venue
where all parties meet is the WTO. This set of dynamics shifted this issue from
FTAA to WTO Doha negotiations. Please note that export subsidies are also a
form of agricultural domestic support but FTAA negotiators found methods to
control this issue at the regional level. When an issue can be monitored and/or
controlled it may be addressed within a specific environment but if this is not
possible then it is likely that the issue will be shifted to that environment that is
most effective in controlling it.
As for WTO & EU–Mercosur, driven initially by opportunity, data indicates
that these negotiations were making progress but then stalled after the successful
WTO Doha Ministerial in 2001. A renewed push to conclude EU–Mercosur
negotiations followed the Cancún Ministerial collapse in 2003. The WTO
July (2004) Package, a brief moment of WTO success, did not create the current
EU–Mercosur stalemate but neither did it help bring closure. These data points
indicate that EU–Mercosur was negatively linked to WTO developments from
2000 to 2004. Not all regional negotiations are perceived as a viable alternative
for a multilateral negotiation (e.g. FTAA) but sometimes they are and then nega-
tive linkage dynamics can emerge as a result.
On the other hand, positive linkage dynamics may emerge through competi-
tive or opportunistic forces. The impact of NAFTA on EU–Mexico commercial
relations and then the development of FTAA negotiations inspired the EU to
begin negotiations with Mercosur. This is an example of competitive forces, while
EU–Chile linkage to EU–Mercosur is an example of opportunistic forces. In the
latter case, EU–Chile was positively linked to EU–Mercosur negotiations ini-
tially. Positive linkage exists when one negotiation initiates another or pushes
another towards conclusion. Positive linkage was observed at conception, as
FTAA negotiations inspired EU–Mercosur negotiations and then EU–Mercosur
essentially instigated EU–Chile negotiations. It is interesting to note that EU–
Chile is the only negotiation that achieved agreement (thanks in part to the 2nd
EU–Latin America and Caribbean Summit – an action forcing event in a multi-
lateral environment that produced a deadline for these bilateral negotiations).
Positive and negative linkage is a framework. Identifying the forces that create
such linkages and distinguishing such dynamics with concepts establishes a theo-
retical paradigm. Such knowledge is the first step in gaining control over linkage
dynamics.
Just as Putnam (1988) advised national and world leaders to understand the
nature and fundamental dynamics of two-level games, the present study recom-
mends that national and world leaders carefully investigate the potential for posi-
tive and negative linkages within and between levels. National and political
leaders should move with great caution if negotiations that are economically and
politically costly appear to be negatively linked. Political science, international

relations and international negotiation scholars should further develop theory
that will help protect national and world leaders from making or repeating these
costly mistakes.
The more complex a relevant environment or context the less likely it will
impact on a linked negotiation. However, one complex negotiation may initiate
another negotiation and/or contribute to its conclusion, but it is unlikely to find
two complex negotiations engaged in sustained linkage dynamics. Bilateral nego-
tiations may be influenced by multilateral environments, and we may even find
bilateral environments influencing multilateral environments, but it is unlikely that
one multilateral negotiation will directly influence a second multilateral negotia-
tion in a sustained manner, as observed through WTO and FTAA negotiations.
A fourth aim involves the use of linkage dynamics in seeking geopolitical goals.
In this study we found negotiations in bilateral environments used strategically to
influence future multilateral negotiations. The US use of intensive-bilateral coalition-
building today to secure potential multilateral gains tomorrow is an interesting
development and represents a strategic move that has not been observed in the
60-year GATT/WTO regime. The full impact of this strategy has not yet been
realized but it could have geopolitical implications. Coalition-building in a mul-
tilateral forum is often issue-based with a short-term focus. The US, on the other
hand, appears to be aligning the national trade policies of like-minded nations
through an intensive-bilateral negotiation strategy that, for example, prohibits
states from engaging in export trade, or liberalizes multinational investment in
national markets, or adopts US eCommerce trade policies, or pursues a pro-
industry intellectual property regime. These actions have practical and theoretical
implications. Alignment through an intensive-bilateral strategy could have signif-
icant implications in future multilateral forums. What effect will this more labor-
intensive bilateral-multilateral approach have on the fundamental questions of
coalition theory: those concerning coalition stability, maintenance and effective-
ness? This bilateral coalition-building model is worthy of study as results could
enhance understanding of coalition performance in multilateral settings. These
questions may also be of interest to political science, international relations and
international negotiation scholars.
The relationship between a negotiation and its context can be understood
through linkage theory. Negotiation context has the power to halt, suspend, sup-
port or advance the interests of a national government (or any party) engaged in
negotiation. As indicated at the outset of this article, linkage dynamics are par-
ticularly potent at the initiating and concluding stages of negotiation process,
where real opportunity is often gained or lost. But linkage dynamics can operate
throughout negotiation process, as demonstrated through this study, although
such dynamics appear less potent in multilateral–multilateral linkage environ-
ments because the degree of complexity is too great.
Understanding of linkage dynamics through linkage theory can do more than

explain interaction between a negotiation and its context or relevant environ-
ment, as it allows for the management of opportunity and risk in complex set-
tings. Ultimately, power is derived from the ability to effectively manage
negotiation complexity.
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International Negotiation 16 (2011) 197–227 brill.

Negotiation Process and Negotiation Context

The outcome of a single negotiation can have multiple explanations depending

circumstances that surround a negotiation. What is the relationship between a

agreement. Reaching an agreement with a party as complex as the EU is not easy,

constitutes “negotiation linkage” (Crump 2006a), while one negotiation is the

sponsored by the World Trade Organization (WTO) have on regional negotia-

US–Chile (USCFTA) 12/00 12/02 6/03 1/04

EU–Chile (EUCAA) 4/00 4/02 11/02 2/03

EU–Mercosur (EUMIA) 4/00 10/04

Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)

12/1994 4/1998 4/2001 1/2004 11/2005

FTAA Launch Santiago Quebec Monterrey Mar del Plata

World Trade Organization (WTO) Developments

Table 1. Structural Type and Case Study Construction*

* Four structural types and ﬁve linkage case studies.

bilateral negotiations; bilateral–bilateral negotiations; and bilateral–regional

Chile (Linked EU (Linked

Table 2. Field Research Interviews

empirical interest. Negotiation ﬁeld research was conducted by indirect methods –

Multilateral–Regional Structural Linkages: Case 1

Table 3. Fundamental Negotiation Characteristics:

Parties About 150 members during study (153 members currently)

Table 4. Fundamental Negotiation Characteristics:

Table 5. Fundamental Negotiation Characteristics: Bilateral–Regional Negotiation

Table 6. Fundamental Negotiation Characteristics: Bilateral Negotiations

A Brazilian trade oﬃcial observed that “EU–Mercosur negotiations were a reac-

Multilateral–Regional Structural Linkages: Case 2

A Brazilian trade negotiator made similar observations in reference to FTAA

An Argentinean Ambassador made similar observations:

Multilateral–Bilateral Structural Linkages: Case 3

A US telecommunications negotiator made similar observations about eCom-

Coalition-building is not purely a numbers game. A Deputy Assistant US Trade

US bilateral coalition-building strategy could have geopolitical implications for

Bilateral–Bilateral Structural Linkages: Case 4

linked negotiation. Benchmarking appeared several times in bilateral–bilateral

A third strategy that emerges through bilateral–bilateral linkage dynamics is

Bilateral–Regional Structural Linkages: Case 5

Oﬃcials representing Mercosur conﬁrm this observation. After eighteen months,

This conclusion has four goals. It develops a theoretical framework of linkage

• issue linkage within a single negotiation;

politically costly appear to be negatively linked. Political science, international

Understanding of linkage dynamics through linkage theory can do more than

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