Crim 1 Digest POOL

CASE DIGESTS
IN
CRIMINAL LAW 1
Judge Fredrick Separa
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NOTE: For reference purposes only.
TITLE
GR No, Date, Ponente, (under what section in the syllabus)
Issue
1. Based on the syllabus and the concept in the book
2. question form (for easier browse)
Facts
1. a paragraph or less
Ruling and Basis

1. format: [issue] [short answer] [basis from book] [here in this case, … ]
2. can have more than 2 issues, but choose only the main issue yung nasa syllabus
3. verbatim or exactly the terms of books as much as possible
Doctrine or Any Crim Concepts mentioned in the syllabus

1. not more than a paragraph
[Digest made by]

(the online digest should ideally be at most 1 page only)

ARTICLE 14
AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES
(10 CASES)
#1 PEOPLE VS. PUNO

GR No. L-3321, June 29, 1981
Ponente: Aquino, J.
Title 1- Felonies (Disregard of Sex)
ISSUE: Is disregard of sex as aggravating circumstance manifested in the particular case?
FACTS: Ernesto Puno entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay) where he
said, “Mangkukulam ka, mambabarang, mayroon kang bubuyog” then slapped her and struck
her several times on the head with a hammer until she was dead. After the assault, he went to
the room of Lina Pajes and made confessions of killing Aling Kikay and threats not to report it to
the authorities. Puno's father surrendered him to the police and two Malabon policemen brought
him to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong on September 10, 1970 (p. 14, Record). On
October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal.
Alleged in the information as aggravating circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of
superiority and disregard of sex.
RULING AND BASIS:
No. In the case at bar, disregard of sex is not aggravating because there is no evidence that the
accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed manifest
disrespect to her womanhood (People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2,
January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 404, People vs, Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14
Phil. 190).
DOCTRINE OR ANY CRIM CONCEPTS MENTIONED IN THE SYLLABUS:
Article 14, Par. 3 of RPC says that insult or in disregard of the sex of the offended party refers to
the female sex, not to the male sex. Killing a woman is not attended by this aggravating
circumstance if the offended did not manifest any specific insult or disregard the sex of the
victim.
[Digest made by R.Acha]
#2 PEOPLE VS. SAPINOSO

GR No. 122540, March 22, 2000
Ponente: Per curiam
Title 1- Felonies (Disregard of dwelling)
ISSUE: Is the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party?
FACTS: Yolanda Partida, a 15-year old, was hired by Diosdado Castillo to work as a stay-in
laundress at his residence in Taguig. Castillo's residence, parenthetically, also housed a shop
for his stained glass business. Yolanda started working on December 11, 1993. At around 6
P.M. on January 28, 1994, while Yolanda was lying on a folding bed located near the door of the
shop, three men, later identified as Domingo Quila and accused-appellants Noel Sapinoso and
David Recreo, suddenly barged in. Yolanda stood up at the intrusion, only to be boxed by
Sapinoso, causing her to lose consciousness. When Yolanda came to, she found Sapinoso on
top of her. He was then inserting his penis inside her vagina, all the while poking a knife at her.
The two others took turns and then departed, leaving Yolanda lying on the bed, unable to move
because of the pain she felt coming from her private part.
RULING AND BASIS:
Yes. Although Yolanda was raped in a house belonging to her employer Castillo, the same
served as her residence, she being a stay-in laundress of Castillo. For all intents and purposes,
the same constituted a dwelling as the term is used in Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code,
it not being necessary, under the law, that the victim own the place. Be she a lessee, a boarder,
a bedspacer, or a maid, the place is her home, the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect
and uphold.
Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy

the law accords to human abode. According to one commentator, one's dwelling place is a
sanctuary worthy of respect and that one who slanders another in the latter's house is more
guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. Cuello Calon says the commission of the crime in
another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm (People
v. Monsayac, G.R. No.126787, May 24, 1999). With the presence of one aggravating
circumstance, i.e. dwelling, the law has made it inevitable that the greater penalty of death shall
be applied.
The basis of Article 14, Par. 3 of the RPC says that dwelling is considered an aggravating
circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of the privacy the law accords to human abode.
According to one commentator, one’s dwelling place is a “sanctuary worthy of respect” and that
one who slanders another in the latter’s house is more guilty than he who offends him
elsewhere. (People v. Balansi)
[Digest made by R. Acha]
#3 PEOPLE VS. VENTURA

GR No. 148145-46, July 5, 2004
Ponente: Per Curiam
Title 1- Felonies (Nighttime)
ISSUE: Is the crime committed with the aggravating circumstance of night time?
FACTS: Spouses Jaime and Aileen Bocateja were sleeping in their room. At around 2am, Jaime
was roused from his sleep by accused Felix Ventura (armed with a firearm) and Arante Flores
(with a bladed weapon) who were able to stealthily enter the house by cutting a hole in the
kitchen door. Ventura pointed the gun at Jaime’s face, announced a hold-up and hit Jaime on
the head. The two then struggled for the gun, and since Jaime was winning, Ventura called on
Flores to stab Jaime. Flores did stab him 3 times. When wife Aileen saw her husband in danger,
she cried for help and Flores stabbed her 4 times (she died eventually). The spouses’ niece who
was sleeping upstairs, ran downstairs and recognized Flores as a former employee of the
spouses’ butcher shop. She called on their neighbors for help. Ventura and Flores then fled.
RULING AND BASIS:
Yes. In determining nocturnity, two tests are employed in the alternative: (1) the objective test,
under which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness facilitated the commission of the
offense; and (2) the subjective test, under which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness
was purposely sought by the offender. Applying these tests to the established factual
circumstances, this Court concludes that nocturnity was correctly appreciated in connection with
both crimes.
While the bedroom where the crimes occurred was well-lit, the evidence shows that, in
furtherance of their murderous intent, appellants deliberately took advantage of nighttime, as
well as the fact that the household members were asleep, in order to gain entry into the
Bocateja residence. Indeed, their own testimony indicates that while they were already outside
the Bocateja house at around 11:00 p.m., they purposely waited until 2:00 a.m. before breaking
into the residence so as not to call the attention of the Bocatejas and/or their neighbors. It is
thus clear that appellants deliberately took advantage of the darkness of the night, not to
mention the fact that the Bocatejas were fast asleep, to conceal their actions and to facilitate
and insure that their entry into the victims' home would be undetected.
Same as above.
#4 PEOPLE VS. SANCHEZ

GR No. 131116 , August 27, 1999
Ponente: Pardo, J.
Title 1- Felonies (Use of Motor Vehicle)
ISSUE; Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle can be
appreciated in the case at bar?
FACTS: On April 13, 1991, Vivencio Malabanan went to the Bishop Compound in Calauan,
Laguna, as part of the security force of mayor Antonio L. Sanchez. After a while, accused Ding
Peradillas arrived and informed mayor Sanchez that there would be a birthday party that night at
Dr. Virvilio Velecina's house in Lanot, Calauan, Laguna. Peradillas assured mayor Sanchez of
Nelson Peñalosa's presence thereat, one of the political leaders of Dr. Velecina. Sanchez
replied, "Bahala na kayo mga anak. Ayusin lang ninyo ang trabaho," and left the premises. All
the accused, including Malabanan, understood it as an order to kill Nelson Peñalosa.
Afterwards, Peradillas, Corcolon and Averion made arrangements to acquire two-way radios
and a vehicle for the operation. Thereafter, using the two-way radio, Peradillas informed the
occupants of the car that Nelson Peñalosa's jeep was leaving the Velecina compound. As the
car overtook the jeep, Peradillas and Corcolon fired at Peñalosa's jeep, using M-16 and baby
armalite rifles, executed in automatic firing mode. There were three bursts of gunfire. Rickson
Peñalosa, son of Nelson Peñalosa, fell from the jeep. The jeep, however, continued running in a
zigzag position until it overturned in front of Irais Farm. After the shooting, the accused
proceeded to the house of mayor Sanchez in Bai, Laguna, and reported to mayor Sanchez that
Peñalosa was already dead.
RULING:
Yes. Accused specifically used a motor vehicle to execute the crime. Thus, the aggravating
circumstance of use of a motor vehicle must be appreciated. However, we cannot appreciate
the generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime; while the crime was committed at night, the
prosecution failed to show that the malefactors specifically sought this circumstance to facilitate
the criminal design.39 The fact that the crime happened at 7:00 in the evening does not indicate
that accused made use of the darkness to conceal the crime and their identities.
Use of motor vehicle is aggravating where the accused used the motor vehicle in going to the
place of the crime, in carrying away the effects thereof, and in facilitating their escape. Use of
motor vehicle will not be considered as an aggravating circumstance where there is no showing
that the motor vehicle was purposely facilitate the commission of the crime or where it is not
shown that without it, the offense charge could not have been committed.
#5 PEOPLE VS. TORRES

G.R. No. 134766, January 16, 2004
Ponente: Callejo, Sr. J.
Title 1- Felonies (Uninhabited place)
ISSUE: Is the crime committed with the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place?
FACTS: Lerma V. Briones attended a week-long seminar sponsored by the POEA for overseas
contract workers. After the seminar on November 17, 1997, she proceeded to the terminal back
to Kalibo. When the other passenger alighted at Altavas at 9:30 p.m., the appellant told Lerma
to transfer in front, to the seat beside him. However, Lerma noticed that the van traveled much
slower than when they were still in Iloilo on their way to Altavas. At about 11:00 p.m., as the van
was nearing a bridge in Feliciano, Balete, Aklan, it suddenly stopped. The appellant touched the
part of the engine under Lerma’s seat and told her that the engine had overheated. He also told
Lerma that they had to sleep in the van for a while. Lerma protested but the appellant switched
off the light of the van. Suddenly, the appellant pulled out a knife with his right hand and forced
Lerma to lean against the seat. He then pointed the knife at her breast, and removed her pants
and panties. The appellant himself removed his pants and briefs. He warned her not to resist,
otherwise, she would be killed. Petrified, Lerma could do nothing when the appellant ordered
her to spread her legs. The appellant then started the engine and drove on to Kalibo. Instead of
driving the van to its terminal, the appellant drove it towards Lerma’s house. Lerma then told her
mother Leny de Juan, that the appellant had raped her.
RULING:
No. The Court agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in sentencing him to suffer the
death penalty for raping the victim on its findings that the use of deadly weapon,nighttime and
uninhabited place were attendant in the commission of the crime. It was noted that the
prosecution proved beyond cavil that the appellant committed the crime at nighttime to facilitate
the commission of the crime and with the use of a knife, a deadly weapon, to intimidate the
victim. However, the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating circumstance of
uninhabited place (despoblado). In People v. Cabiles, this Court held that the more important
consideration is whether the place of the commission of the offense is a reasonable possibility
for the victim to receive some help. Before despoblado could be appreciated against the
accused, it must be established that solitude was purposely sought or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime. We find that the prosecution failed to prove such
circumstance in this case.
An uninhabited place is one where there are no houses at all, a place at a considerable
distance from town, or where the houses are scattered at a great distance from town, or where
the houses are scattered at a great distance from each other.
#6 PEOPLE VS. LOZANO

GR No. 137370-71, September 29, 2003
Ponente: Puno, J.
Art. 14 Par. 6 (Band)
FACTS
Raul Oco (Appellant), PO2 Armandzo Lozano, Dave Samson, and Eustaquio Pacaa, Jr. were
charged with the two informations of Murder and Frustrated murder before Branch 7 RTC of
Cebu City. During the trial, the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses while the defense
presented thirty-one (31) witnesses.Surviving victim Herminigildo Damuag testified that at
around 9:30 p.m. of November 24, 1997, he was driving his motorcycle along V. Rama Avenue,
Cebu City with the late Alden Abiabi riding with him at the back when upon reaching the vicinity
of Pica Lumber, a white Tamaraw FX AUV overtook their motorcycle (first motorcycle) and
blocked their path. Another motorcycle (second motorcycle), with two (2) riders on it, appeared
behind the first motorcycle. From a distance of about two (2) to three (3) meters, one of the
riders of the second motorcycle suddenly fired two (2) shots in close succession. Damuag
noticed another motorcycle (third motorcycle) passed by from behind him. His motorcycle
zigzagged towards the gutter. Damuag was thrown off and hit the ground. He saw the third
motorcycle at about two (2) to three (3) meters that was on a stop. Appellant was at the back of
the third motorcycle, holding a short firearm in his right hand and tried to fired his gun at him but
missed. Although wounded, Damuag was able to run. The appellant and his co-accused denied
any participation in the shooting incident.The trial court found that the appellant is guilty of
murder and frustrated murder. The trial court disregarded Salem Tenebrosos Affidavit of
Recantation and gave full credence to his previous Affidavit identifying the appellant as one of
the gunmen. Further, the court doubted the credibility of eyewitnesses Gamboa and Ybanez, Jr.
who claimed to have seen not only the face of the appellant but of his three (3) co-accused as
well. Thus, the appellants co-accused were acquitted.
ISSUE
Whether or not the crime is committed by a band?
RULING
No, the crime is not committed by a band. The SC found that the offenses were not committed
by a band. A crime is deemed to have been committed by a band or en cuadrilla when more
than three armed malefactors take part in its commission. The four armed persons
contemplated in this circumstance must all be principals by direct participation who acted
together in the execution of the acts constituting the crime. In the case at bar, the prosecution
alleged that the accused and his three other co-conspirators used unlicensed firearms in the
perpetration of the offenses. However, the evidence on record shows that only two of them
carried firearms. En cuadrilla, as an aggravating circumstance, cannot therefore be appreciated.
DOCTRINE OR ANY CRIM CONCEPTS MENTIONED IN THE SYLLABUS
A crime is deemed to have been committed by a band or en cuadrilla when more than three
armed malefactors take part in its commission. Also, armed men must act together in the
commission of the crime.
[Digest made by D. Agan]
#7 PEOPLE VS. FELICIANO

G.R. No. 196735; May 5, 2014
Ponente: Leonen, Marvic.
Art 14 Par. 14 (Disguise)
FACTS
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the
Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of
the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men
carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity and
separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted and frustrated murder of
Sigma Rho fraternity members.
RTC found Alvir, Feliciano Jr., Soliva, Medalla and Zingapan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and attempted murder. Others were acquitted. The case against Guerrero was ordered
archived by the court until his apprehension. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused-appellants have employed disguise in the commission of the crime?
RULING
The Court found no merit on the appellants’ arguments that the prosecution should not have
included the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information since
they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that
their masks fell off. It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged
must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly
proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution
to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the
information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial
court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes. The introduction
of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but
the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating
circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that
there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information
was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense
they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.

The fact that the defendant had his face blackened in order that he should not be recognized at
the time he committed a crime constitutes the aggravating circumstance of disguise.
#8 PEOPLE VS. VARONA

G.R. No. 119417; October 9, 1996
Ponente: VITUG, J.
Art 14 Par. 16 (Treachery)
FACTS
Omar Cleto Varona, Jr. has appealed the decision of the Malabon RTC convicting him of
murder, along with his brother Tom Barona (Varona), in an amended information that read:
"That on or about the 8th day of February, 1993, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping with one another, with intent to kill, and with treachery
and evident premeditation, while armed with a knife and bolo, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab and hack one EDUARDO M. ALBERTO, hitting the latter on the
different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.”
The accused-appellant raises in this appeal a single assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court
has erred in not considering favorably the claim of self-defense. The defense admits that
appellant has caused the death of Alberto, and it does not question the established
jurisprudence that where, the accused has admitted to having inflicted the wounds on the
murdered victim, it becomes incumbent upon him (the accused) to convincingly prove any
justifying circumstance that is conjured in order to negate his liability. Appellants contention of a
supposed encounter between him and the victim with the latter being the unlawful aggressor, as
already so adverted to, simply has not been established.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused-appellants committed treachery?
RULING
The decision of the RTC is affirmed. In the case at bar, witness Mario Soliman testified that after
the accused hit the victim in the cheek with a dustpan, the latter ran away but was still pursued
by the former. Upon meeting his brother, he got hold of the bolo which accused Tom Barona
handed to him and in the ensuing segment, accused Omar Cleto was seen by the witness
hacking the deceased while he was kneeling and pleading to the accused even up to the time
the body of the deceased was already lying motionless on the ground. Obviously, the stand
taken by the victim posed no risk to the accused as he was unarmed, begging for his life and
utterly defenseless. Accused Omar Cleto deliberately executed the act of killing Eduardo by
taking advantage of the situation. Treachery then was manifested in that manner of assault
because it insured the killing without any risk to the assailant.

Treachery means that the offended party was not given opportunity to make a defense.
Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
#9 PEOPLE VS. SABANGAN

G.R. No. 191722; December 11, 2013
Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Art 14 Par. 13 (Evident Premeditation)
FACTS
On appeal is the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 20, 2009 which affirmed with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, City of Davao dated
November 25, 2004 the appellate court sustained the conviction of accused-appellant Gerry
Sabangan (Sabangan) for the murder of Barangay Captain Abe Felonia (Felonia), and acquitted
the other accused, Noli Bomasal (Bomasal), of the same crime.
In this case, Felonia was at a store, chatting with Allado. He was unarmed with his guard down.
Sabangan went in and out of the store, around three times, apparently waiting for the perfect
opportunity to commit the crime. When he saw his chance, Sabangan positioned himself behind
the unsuspecting Felonia, suddenly brought out his gun, and without the slightest provocation
on Felonia’s part, shot the latter once in the head and twice in the back. Sabangan clearly
employed treachery in killing Felonia.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of five (5) witnesses and documentary evidence
which consisted sworn statements and sketches. The totality of the evidence for the prosecution
against Sabangan establishes with moral certainty all the essential elements of the crime of
murder qualified by treachery. Sabangan’s attack on Felonia was sudden and unexpected, the
manner of which was deliberately adopted to give Felonia little or no chance at all to defend
himself or retaliate.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is evident premeditation in the commission of the crime?
RULING
The Decision dated November 20, 2009 of the Court of Appeals if affirmed with modification.
The Court though does not find convincing proof of evident premeditation. To warrant a finding
of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following
requisites: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly
indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. Evident premeditation, like other circumstances that would qualify a
killing as murder, must be established by clear and positive evidence showing the planning and
the preparation stages prior to the killing. Without such evidence, mere presumptions and
inferences, no matter how logical and probable, will not suffice.
The prosecution’s evidence herein pertained merely to the actual commission by Sabangan of
the crime. It did not submit any proof that Sabangan, at some prior time, determined to kill
Felonia; that Sabangan performed an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination
to kill Felonia; and that there was sufficient interval of time between his determination and
execution which allowed Sabangan to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

In the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the basis has reference to the ways of
committing the crime because evident premeditation implies a deliberate planning of the act
before executing it. [Digest made by D. Agan]
#10 PEOPLE VS. SALIBAD

G.R. No. 210616; November 25, 2015
Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Art 14 Par. 13 (Evident Premeditation)
FACTS
On appeal is the Decision dated June 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals convicting accused-
appellant Eddie Salibad y Dilo of the crime of murder. Appellant was indicted for Murder in an
Amended Information dated October 3, 2008, the accusatory portion of which reads: "That on or
about the 1st day of June 2008, at Lepanto, Municipality of Mankayan, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill, using an unlicensed caliber
.45 firearm, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one RAYMUNDO
DACUYAN Y CABANNAG thereby inflicting a gunshot wound on his abdomen that caused his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of RAYMUNDO DACUYAN Y CABANNAG.”
Accused-appellant asserts that the lower courts erred in admitting the unlicensed firearm as
evidence because the warrantless search was illegal. The prosecution, on the other hand,
argues that accused-appellant was lawfully arrested on the basis of a text message forwarded
by the Chief of Police about a man holding a gun28 running down the UCCP Compound and the
identification of the accused-appellant by Myrick as the man who stole his gun. Consequently,
the search which yielded the gun was lawful. The prosecution added that even assuming that
the gun found in the possession of accused-appellant is found to be inadmissible, accused-
appellant may still be convicted of murder aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm, as
the felony was proved by evidence independent of the firearm itself.
Accused-appellant filed an appeal before the CA which affirmed the RTC Decision convicting
accused-appellant and giving credence to the testimonies of Manuel Bin wag (Manuel) and
Diego Aclibon (Diego) who saw the killing of Raymundo.
ISSUE
Whether or not the qualifying aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm is
present in the case?
RULING
The appeal is dismissed by the SC. The decision dated June 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
convicting accused-appellant Eddie Salibad y Dilo of murder is affirmed with modification.
The SC finds the issue of the firearm's admissibility inconsequential as the use of the
unlicensed firearm in committing the crime, and even the crime itself, were proved by evidence
independent of the firearm seized from accused-appellant. The Court has clarified that there is
no need to present the firearm itself to prove the existence of an unlicensed firearm. In this
case, the court finds that the testimony of Manuel and Diego as to the existence of the firearm
and its use in the crime of murder coupled with the Certification from the Philippine National
Police Firearms and Explosives Division to the effect that accused-appellant was not a licensed
firearm holder of any kind and caliber sufficient to consider the special aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance; there are two (2)
requisites to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and
(b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding
license or permit to carry it outside his residence. (Ramos vs. People, G.R. No. 218466, Jan.
23, 2017)

ARTICLE 15
ALTERNATIVE
CIRCUMSTANCES
(7 CASES)
#1 PEOPLE VS. ORILLA
G.R. No. 148939-40, February 13, 2004

Ponente: Carpio, J.
Article 15 – Alternative Circumstances

Issue
Whether or not alternative circumstance of relationship between the offender and the victim may
be appreciated to increase the penalty of rape to death, even if relationship is not alleged in the
information?
Facts
Joseph Orilla is charged for two counts of rape filed against him by Remilyn Orilla. Joseph and
Remilyn are siblings. Remilyn is the youngest in a brood of nine. Their parents are already
dead. Remilyn was then staying in the house commonly owned by the siblings. Adjacent to
Remilyn’s house is the house of the accused where he and his own family lived. The RTC held
that accused Joseph is guilty of qualified rape and since Remilyn is under 18 years of age and
the offender is brother of the victim, the death penalty must be imposed. Accused-Appellant
Joseph Orilla sought to impugn the decision of the lower court. One of the allegations posited by
accused is that, trial court gravely erred in imposing death penalty, despite the fact that the
information never alleged the qualifying circumstance of age and relationship. The Office of the
Solicitor General concedes that RTC erred in imposing death penalty based on twin
circumstance of age and relationship. According to OSG, what justifies the penalty is that the
appellant used a knife in committing the rape which was perpetrated against his own sister. The
OSG points out that relationship in the case at bar is an aggravating circumstance based on
article 15 of the RPC.
Ruling and Basis

The supreme court said, No. The circumstance pertinent to relationship must be alleged in the
information and be duly proven in the trial. In the present case, such circumstance was not
alleged, and the prosecution did not prove the same during trial. Alternative circumstance of
relationship shall be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the
nature and effects of the crime and other conditions attending its commission. The revised penal
code is silent as to when relationship is mitigating and when it is aggravating. The determination
whether an alternative circumstance is aggravating or not to warrant the imposition of death
penalty cannot be left on a case-by-case basis. The law must declare it unequivocally.
According to the supreme court, the aggravating circumstance sufficient to justify the imposition
of the death penalty must not only be alleged and proven, it must be one of those enumerated in
Article 14 of RPC or those specified by law. In all other cases where the maximum penalty is not
death, the term aggravating circumstance must be interpreted in its broad or generic sense to
include the alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the revised penal code.
Doctrine or any crim concepts mentioned in the syllabus

Same as above.
[Digest made by: A. Alvarez, Jr.]
#2 PEOPLE VS. CURATCHIA
G.R. No. L-31771, May 16, 1980

Ponente: De Castro, J.
Article 15 – Alternative Circumstances (Relationship)

Issue
Whether or not the imposition of death penalty be justified by disregard of age and relationship?
Facts
Severo Curatchia, herein accused and appellant, was charged for the crime of robbery with
homicide. This is in relation to the killing incident happened in Bario Bantad, Gumaca, Quezon.
The victim was an old man and grandfather of the accused. According to the testimony of
Faustino Laurista, eyewitness to the crime, the accused and the victim were drinking liquor at
around 5:00PM in the house of the former and upon invitation, Faustino joined them.
Afterwards, since an inky darkness was already setting, accused invited the victim to sleep in
his house and pass the night away, which the victim readily agreed. The deceased curled
himself comfortably on the mat and was well on the way to slumber Ville. The accused got an
ugly garrote and slid down to the deceased then sleeping sidewise, grabbed him by the hair,
and beat him with the garrote on the left side of the neck. The attack was followed by three or
more garrote blows at the back of the head of the deceased. The deceased died. Thereafter,
the accused took the deceased’s money bag and then thrown the cadaver in the river. The
lower court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt with attendance treachery and
imposed death penalty due to disregard of age and relationship.
Ruling
The supreme court said Yes. The highest court is convinced that the accused killed the old man
with intention of robbing him of his money. As correctly found by the lower court, treachery
attended the killing, and fraud was employed when accused induced the old man to sleep in his
house because of the lateness of the night. The crime is committed also in disregard of respect
due to the victim on account of age and relationship, being a grandson of the deceased,
justifying the imposition of the death penalty for the crime charge that of robbery with homicide.
However, for lack of necessary votes, the death penalty may not be imposed.

1. Same as above.
#3 PEOPLE VS. FONTILLAS
G.R. No. 184177, December 15, 2010

Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Article 15 – Alternative Circumstance (Intoxication)

Issue
Whether or not intoxication should mitigate the offender’s liability in the case at bar?
Facts
Andres C. Fontillas, herein accused, was charged for the crime of rape qualified by his
relationship and the minority of AAA, the victim. In an information filed with the RTC, the incident
happened on the evening of December 8, 2001 at Bamban, Masinloc, Zambales, when said
accused arrived at their house drunk. Afterwards, accused slept beside the victim, then forcibly
had a sexual intercourse and carnal knowledge of his own daughter, 13 years of age, without
the latter’s consent and against her will. After the incident and when accused left the house,
AAA reported the matter to her aunt. After hearing the story, AAA was not allowed to go back to
their house. AAA also informed his uncle about the incident, who then brought her to the police
station where she executed a sworn statement. Based on the evidence presented, the RTC
rendered its decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for incestuous rape
and was sentence to the supreme penalty of death. The court of appeals thereafter affirmed the
decision of RTC. Accused appealed to the highest court questioning the decision of the lower
courts. One of his arguments is that, his liability should be mitigated by intoxication as an
alternative circumstance provided under article 15 of the revised penal code.
Ruling
The supreme court said, No. The lower courts correctly rejected the accused-appellant’s
assertion that his extreme intoxication from alcohol on night of the rape should be appreciated
as mitigating circumstance. The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as
a mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if
the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the
intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as aggravating circumstance. In the
case at bar, accused- appellant did not present any evidence that his intoxication was not
habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the rape. The person pleading intoxication must
likewise prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the
crime, as would blur his reason. Accused- appellant failed to present clear and convincing proof
the extent of his intoxication on the night of December 8, 2001 and that the amount of liquor he
had taken was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. Hence, the conviction of the
accused- appellant of qualified rape without any mitigating circumstance should be affirmed.

1.The person pleading intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage,
prior to commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. (People vs. Bernal)
#4 PEOPLE VS. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. L-18368, March 31, 1966

Ponente: Makalintal, J.
Article 15 – Alternative Circumstances (Education)

Issue
Whether or not circumstances which attended the commission of the crime are correctly
appreciated by the lower court?
Facts
On July 13, 1966, while they were on their way home from their farm in Iglonoy, Bugasong,
Antique, spouses Benito and Emilie Labauan were suddenly attacked by several offenders, who
are alleged to be herein appellants and other persons accused. Benito was killed while Emilie
suffered fatal injury who managed to crawl and hide. The killing of Benito was the aftermath of a
land controversy where he sued some residents of Barrio Iglonoy for the recovery of land on
which they had their houses. Benito won that case, but defendants refused to vacate the
premises even after a writ of execution had been issued against them. Appellants are among
the residents of the barrio affected by the case, whose houses were demolished by an order
issued by the court. The court of first instance found appellants guilty for the crime of murder
with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender, lack of instruction and extreme poverty, and the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength before the regional trial court.
Ruling and Basis

With regard the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, lack of instruction and extreme
poverty, the Supreme court said, NO. The condition of lack of instruction cannot be taken as a
mitigating circumstance, because it has not been established that illiteracy was coupled with
such a low degree of intelligence that the malefactors did not fully realize the consequences of
their criminal acts. Neither may poverty and voluntary surrender be appreciated. Extreme
poverty may mitigate a crime against property but not a crime of violence, such as murder.
On the other hand, the circumstance of treachery- which qualifies the killing to murder- must be
taken, considering the suddenness of the attack launched by them from a hidden position. This
circumstance absorbs that of abuse of superior strength while evident premeditation has not
been clearly established. The crime was, however, committed by a band of armed men and in
an uninhabited place, which purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime.

1.To be mitigating, lack of education must be coupled with such low degree of intelligence that
the malefactors did not fully realize the consequences of their criminal act. (People vs. Ripas)
#5 INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-181409, February 11, 2010

Ponente: Corona, J.
Article 15 – Alternative Circumstances (Absolutory causes – relationship)

Issue
Whether or not relationship by affinity is an absolutory cause in the case at bar?
Facts
On November 24, 1992, accused William Sato, a Japanese national, induced Manolita
Gonzales (Deceased), who was already blind and 79 years of age, to sign and thumbmark a
special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Mendy Mitsuko C. Sato,
daughter of accuse, who was then a minor, making the deceased believe that said document
involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully that said documents authorizes his daughter to
sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of deceased’s properties
located in Tagaytay. Once in possession of the said special power of attorney, said accused
made his daughter sign three deeds of absolute sale involving properties of the deceased and
once in possession of the proceeds of the sale, accused misapplied, misappropriated and
converted the same to his own personal use and benefit. Subsequently, Mediatrix G.
Carungcong, in her capacity as administrator of intestate estate of her deceased mother
Manolita Gonzales, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against the accused. Accused moved to
quash the information claiming that his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, who was
his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance. The prosecutor disputed accused’s
opposition contending that the death of Zenaida, wife of accused and daughter of deceased,
extinguished their marriage and so the relationship by affinity of the accused with the deceased.
Therefore, according to prosecution, the protection provided to the accused by relationship is no
longer present. The regional trial court and court of appeals ruled in favor of the accused
dismissing the case at bar stating that, the death of accused’s wife did not extinguish his
relationship by affinity with the deceased.
Ruling and Basis

The Supreme court said, NO. A reading of the facts alleged in the information reveals that Sato
is being charged not with simple estafa, but with complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents. Article 332 of the revised penal code provides for an absolutory cause in the
crimes of theft, estafa and malicious mischief. The supreme court agrees with the contention
that relationship by affinity is not extinguished by death of the offender’s spouse, nonetheless,
the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 cannot be appreciated. The plain language of
said provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It does not apply where the crimes mentioned in Article 332 is complexed
with another crime. The purpose of article 332 of the RPC is to preserve family harmony and
obviate scandal. Thus, the actions provided under such provision, simply concerns the private
relations of the parties as family members and is limited to civil aspect. Effectively, when
offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as a
means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective
mantle of absolutory cause under article 332 of RPC.

1. Death of one’s spouse does not severe his relationship by affinity and may avail
absolutory cause of relationship for crimes involving estafa, theft and malicious mischief.
2. Absolutory cause of relationship does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned in
article 332 of RPC is complexed with another crime. (Regalado, Florenz, supra note 16, p. 736)

#6 PEOPLE V PUEDAN
GR No. 139756, September 2, 2002
Ponente: Panganiban, J.

Article 15 (Death/Physical Injuries under Exceptional Circumstances)
ISSUE: Can the adultery committed by the victim and the accused spouse may be used to
establish exceptional circumstances?
FACTS: The accused Rogelio Puedan stabbed the victim Florencio Ilar on February 21, 1995
five times after he saw his wife Leah Puedan having sexual intercourse. Right after the incident,
he immediately fled from the crime scene. The victim’s body was found in a fully clothed shirt
and pair of pants with all buttons intact while the accused hid for about three years until he was
arrested by the authorities on March 16, 1998.
RULING AND BASIS:
Yes. However in the case at bar, it requires burden of proof that the victim actually surprised his
wife and Florencio in flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man during or immediately
thereafter. However, all that appellant established was Florencio’s promiscuity, which was
inconsequential to the killing. What is important is that his version of the stabbing incident is
diametrically opposed to the convincing accounts of the witnesses.
Besides if victim had been caught by surprise while engaged in the sex act, he would not have
had the opportunity to put on his pants, parry the forthcoming bolo thrusts, and then grapple
with accused. The court ruled to deny the appeal.

ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. – Any legally
married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or
shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
ARTICLE 15. Their Concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and
the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the
degree of instruction and education of the offender.
[Digest made by R. Bobis]

#7 PEOPLE V BARTOLOME
GR No. 191726, February 6, 2013

Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Article 15 (Entrapment)
ISSUE: Does the transaction resulting to the arrest of Bartolome be considered as an

entrapment?
FACTS: A buy bust operation was conducted on August 10, 2003 to which the suspect Noel
Bartolome was caught having 0.06 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride. The suspect
claimed that the arresting officers had framed him up because they wanted to extort a
substantial amount from him in exchange for his release as he claim that on August 9, 2003,
policemen suddenly entered the suspect’s house, frisked the suspect and detained him and
demanded 20,000 pesos in exchange of freedom. The suspect insist that he was instigated by
the police into participating in selling illegal drugs.
RULING AND BASIS:
Yes. A buy-bust operation, considered as a form of entrapment, is a valid means of arresting

violators of Republic Act No. 9165. It is an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the
act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from
the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. The accused was
not arrested following an instigation for him to commit the crime. Instead, he was caught in
flagrante delicto during an entrapment through buy-bust. Here, Paras asked the accused if he
could buy shabu, and the latter, in turn, quickly transacted with the former, receiving the marked
bill from Paras and turning over the sachet of shabu he took from his pocket. The accused was
shown to have been ready to sell the shabu without much prodding from Paras. There is no
question that the idea to commit the crime originated from the mind of the accused. The court
ruled against the accused.

ARTICLE 15. Their Concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and
the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the
degree of instruction and education of the offender.
TITLE TWO
PERSONS
CRIMINALLY
LIABLE FOR
FELONIES
ARTICLE 16-20
(10 CASES)
#1 PEOPLE V AGUDEZ
GR No. 138386-87, May 20, 2004
Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
Title 2 (Conspiracy)


ISSUE: Does the circumstances involving the accused suspects involve conspiracy?
FACTS:
On June 27, 1998, the accused Eufricino Agudez Y Asiong alias "Opring", Ronilo Agudez Y
Cocoy alias "Danilo", Ricardo Agudez Y Cocoy alias "Olong",Fernando Agudez Y Cocoy and
Paquito Katimpo Y Inggo alias "Kitoy, was found conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, while armed with long shotguns, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation,
treachery and use of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot Dominador Castro and Mamerto C. Nalangan which lead to their
death.
On Adoracion Castro, together with her husband Dominador Castro, left their house to hear
mass at the Seventh Day Adventist Church. As they were crossing the river, one after the other,
Adoracion suddenly heard a gunshot. She immediately turned around as she was walking
ahead of Dominador and Mamerto. Immediately thereafter, she heard two shots and saw
Dominador and Mamerto fall into the water. While holding her husband, Adoracion looked up
and saw the five accused with their bodies, from the waist up, protruding from fox holes dug in
the ground. They were about ten armslength away from Adoracion and Dominador and they
were all armed with shotguns locally known as "pugakhang". They immediately ran and
scampered to different directions. She noticed that Dominador and Mameto were no longer
breathing. Adoracion was asked to identify a person who was earlier apprehended by the police
and identified the accused among those who killed her husband and nephew.
RULING AND BASIS:
Yes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proved with the same
quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the following circumstances prove the existence of conspiracy among the
appellant and the other two accused: (1) the presence of all the accused at the same time in an
where the killing took place; (2) the existence of five holes from each of which each of the five
accused emerged; (3) all five of the accused were armed with shotguns or "pugakhang"; (4)
after the victims fell when fired upon by all of them, all the accused simultaneously came out of
hiding and scampered to the thickets. In conspiracy, "where conspiracy is directly established,
with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time and means of
executing the crime, the existence of evident premeditation can be appreciated". The court ruled
against the accused.
ARTICLE 8. Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Felony. — Conspiracy and proposal to commit
felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution
to some other person or persons.


#2 PEOPLE V SALVADOR
GR No. 201443, April 10, 2013
Ponente: Reyes, J.


FACTS:
On or about April 7, 2002 Betty Salvador y Tabios (Betty), Monico Salvador (Monico), Marcelo
Llanora, Jr. y Baylon (Marcelo), Robert Gonzales y Manzano (Robert), Ricky Peña y Borres @
Rick (Ricky), Roger Pesado y Pesado @ Ger (Roger), Jose Adelantar y Caurte (Jose), Lowhen
Almonte y Pacete (Lowhen), Jubert Banatao y Aggulin @ Kobet (Jubert), and Morey Dadaan
(Morey) were accused of conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with the
use of firearms, threats and intimidation did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap and take away Albert Yam and Pinky Gonzales Tabora by forcing to board a Toyota Hi-
Ace van which transported then until finally they were brought to an undisclosed location in
Caloocan City where they were kept for six (6) days; That ransom for Albert was in the amount
of $1,000,000.00 was demanded in exchange for his safe release until both were finally rescued
on April 12, 2002 by police operatives from the Philippine National Police. All accused
presented their alibis, which all stated that they were not present nor participated during the
kidnapping. However, evidence showed the contrary.
RULING AND BASIS:

Yes. Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof of prior agreement by the parties to
commit a crime but that it may be inferred from the acts of the accused-appellants before,
during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to a joint purpose,
concerted action and community of interest. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and the
conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime. Here, the accused-appellants all denied
being personally acquainted with Albert or having knowledge of any grudge which the latter may
harbour against them. The RTC and the CA found Albert’s testimony on the participation of the
accused-appellants as conspirators in the kidnapping incident, and the manner by which he had
subsequently identified them, as clear and categorical. The court ruled against the accused.

#3 PEOPLE V CASTRO
GR No. 132726, July 23, 2002
Ponente: Vitug, J.


FACTS: On or about 17 January 1997 the suspects Jesse B. Castro, a.k.a. George Castro,
Jesus L. de los Angeles and Edgardo E. Reyes, a.k.a. Ompong, were indicted for the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom as they were accused of conspiring
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kidnap and detain Alfonso Saez Y Antonio for the purpose of exhorting ransom
from the latter or his family and that during the victim's detention for more than 5 hours, serious
physical injuries were inflicted upon and threats to kill him were made. It was alleged that
accused Jesse George Castro summoned the victim to his residence. When Saez arrived,
Castro opened the gate. At once, Castro fired his 9 mm. gun at Saez with its bullet whizzing by
his right ear. The latter was thrown against a concrete wall. It was after the gunfire was heard
when de los Angeles and Reyes rushed into the compound. Saez was then taken inside the
house of Castro where he was mauled. Castro later ordered the victim to call his house to ask
for ransom money. The suspects Angeles Reyes stated their alibi that they heard noises in the
nearby house which though was an intruder.
RULING AND BASIS:
No. Conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, with each of its elements being
shown by the same quantum of proof required for proving the crime itself. The state is required
to establish by competent evidence that there has been an agreement to commit the underlying
substantive offense by the accused and at least one other person. The evidence, given the tests
for proving conspiracy, would appear to be rather tenuous. The participation of appellants,
standing alone, without conspiracy being established, neither could be described as constitutive
of the crime of kidnapping for ransom nor as being indispensable to its commission. However,
the absence of conspiracy does not absolve them of criminal liability. Article 18 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, penalizes as being accomplices persons who cooperate in the
execution of the crime by previous or simultaneous acts, by means of which they aid, facilitate
or protect the execution of the crime. The court ruled that Jesus de los Angeles and Edgardo
Reyes, are found guilty as being accomplices in the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

ARTICLE 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in article
17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
#4 People V. Tampis
G.R. No. 148725, July 31, 2003

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
TITLE 2: Persons criminally liable for felonies (Principal by Direct Participation)
Issue: Does absence of allegation of conspiracy in the information affect the individual’s direct
participation in a crime?

Facts: Luis Tampis and Daisy Napiliw Tampis were charged with violation of Article II, Section 4
of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, before
the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. 1198.
That in the morning thereof on August 7, 1997 at Sabangan, Mountain Province, Luis and Daisy
Tampis, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
transport and dispatch in transit from Bontoc, Mountain Province to Baguio City, via the Red
Eagle Bus with Plate No. 2008, dried marijuana leaves, buds and stems weighing approximately
seven kilograms and four grams (7.4 kilograms) contained in a brown bag with full knowledge
that said marijuana is a prohibited drug or from which prohibited drug may be manufactured.
Ruling and Basis: Yes. Absence of a particular statement in the accusatory portion of the
charge sheet concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy renders the indictment
insufficient to hold one accused liable for the individual acts of his co-accused. Thus, each of
them would be held accountable only for their respective participation in the commission of the
offense. Here, while it is true that conspiracy was not alleged in the information, the individual
acts of the appellants constituted the offense of delivery and transportation of prohibited drugs.
Both of them packed the marijuana leaves into a brown bag. They also left the house together
carrying the said brown bag. Finally, they both boarded a Ford Fiera and a Red Eagle Bus with
the same brown bag, which was later found to contain marijuana. Hence, even in the absence
of an allegation of conspiracy in the information, appellants are still culpable for the crime
charged inasmuch as their individual participation satisfied the elements thereof.
Doctrine or Any Crim Concepts mentioned in the syllabus:
Two or more persons who took part in the commission of the crime are principals by direct
participation when: they participated in the criminal resolution; and that they carried out their
plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end.
[Digest made by Jessica Caranay]
#5 People V. Madali
G.R. No. 67803-04, July 30, 1990

FERNAN, C.J.
TITLE 2: Persons criminally liable for felonies (Principal by Inducement)
Issue: Whether Annie Madali can be found guilty as principal by inducement for using words of
command

Facts: Spouses Ricarte Madali and Annie Mortel Madali were charged for the murder of Felix
Gasang Cipriano Gasang, and for the frustrated murder of Agustin Reloj on October 31, 1979.
The said crimes stemmed from an altercation between the son of the Madali spouses, Ramon,
and Felix in a fist-fight. One of Felix’s companions then was Agustin Reloj. Annie Madali helped
her husband, the prinicipal of the crime, by beaming her flashlight at them and warning her
husband of the presence of other persons in the vicinity.
Ruling and Basis: No. Annie’s assistance merely facilitated the commission of the felonious
act of shooting. Ricarte Madali could have nevertheless accomplished his criminal acts without
Annie’s cooperation and assistance since “it was not so dark and not too bright” during that
night. There is no proof that shouting “here comes, here comes another, shoot” had great
dominance and influence over Ricarte as to become the determining cause of the crimes. The
rapidity with which Madali admittedly fired the shots eliminated the necessity of encouraging
words such as those uttered by Annie. Hence, the court ruled that the liability of Annie Mortal
Madali with respect to the crimes committed herein, is only that of an accomplice.
Inciting words/using words of command must have great dominance or influence to the
executor for the act to be considered as an inducement. That the inducement be made directly
with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and such inducement be the
determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor.
#6 People V. Abina
G.R. No. 129891, October 27, 1998

VITUG, J.
TITLE 2: Persons criminally liable for felonies (Principal by Cooperation)
Issue: Can absence of unity of purpose and lack of knowledge on the intention of the executor
a defense against accusation as principals by indispensable cooperation?
Facts: Two accused brothers, Alejandro and Romeo Abina both appealed to the Court of

Appeals to reverse the trial court’s decision on the murder of Eulalio Pelino. Where appellants
contended that no one of the prosecution witnesses was aware of what really happened. Still
professing their innocence, appellants bewailed the finding by the trial court of conspiracy
between appellant and Rodrigo Caruso, who, concededly, was the only person who actually
stabbed the victim.
Ruling and Basis: Yes. In People v. Jorge, Supreme Court ruled that to be a principal by
indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity
in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act
without which it would not have been accomplished. Here, the strong likelihood that Abina
brothers were not impelled by a criminal intent to kill Eulalio could be shown by the fact they
themselves did not inflict any harm on the victim. Hence, the absence of unity of purpose
between appellants and Caroso as well as the utter lack of proof that appellant have been
aware of the intention of Caroso to kill Eulalio, neither may appellants be considered principals
by indispensable cooperation or accomplices.
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered,
which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is
therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation, or as
an accomplice, that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation.
#7 People V. Gamboa
G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013
Perez, J.
TITLE 2: Persons criminally liable for felonies (Accomplice)
Issue: Whether Perpetian is a co-principal

Facts: Halil Gambao Esmail, along with ten others, was found guilty of beyond reasonable doubt
of kidnapping for ransom. Esmail and his group kidnapped Lucia Chan Lee, a businesswoman,
for the purpose of extorting ransom amounting to Php 400,000.00. Some of the members kept
coming back to the victim’s house and were changing shifts in guarding her. A woman, later
identified as Thian Perpenian, who was 17 years old at that time, was also present at the resort
along with the accused. The group unlawfully barged inside the house of the victim armed with
high-powered firearms and took her away on board a Tamaraw FX van. The victim’s son
reported the incident to the police, which immediately conducted an investigation and rescue
operation.
Ruling and Basis: No. Perpetian is not a principal but only an accomplice. In People v
Clemente, it was ruled that being present and giving moral support when a crime is being
committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed. The
prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as principal. She
can no longer also benefit from RA 9344 because she was 31 during the trial. Her presence and
company were not indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping with
ransom. Hence, she is only liable as an accomplice.
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code
#8 People V. Eusebio
G.R. No. 182152, February 25, 2013

Abad, J.
TITLE 2: Persons criminally liable for felonies (in case of doubt, favor the accused)
Issue: Whether benefit of the doubt can lessen a penalty of the accused
Is doubt be considered as to whether the accused acted as principal or just a mere
accomplice?

Facts: On August 7, 1999, Jaime Magsino received a phone call at home, prompting him to
leave on board his motorcycle. He proceeded to the store of accused PO3 Jesus Bongon on a
street in Pasay City, stopping his motorcycle near where Bongon stood. At this point, accused
PO1 Ricardo Eusebio, SPO2 Romeo Isidro, and Jojit Contreras, as well as accused Robert Sy
and Boyet Parilla appeared from a nearby alley and took positions near Magsino. As Magsino
alighted from his motorcycle, Bongon shot him three times, causing him to fall. Eusebio and
Isidro, together with Contrares, Sy and Parilla drew their guns and they too, fired at the fallen
victim. All six shooters, said Rogelio Amihan—a witness, approached Magsino, turned his body
over, and kicked him as ther laughed. Bongon was found as the principal of the murder.
However, the court cannot decide whether or not the discharge from the firearms of Eusebio,
Isidro and Contrares actually hit Magsino.
Ruling and Basis: It was held that when there is doubt as to whether a guilty participant in
homicide performed the role of principal or accomplice, the Court should favor the “milder form
of responsibility”. In People v. Tamayo, the Supreme Court ruled that accused should be given
the benefit of the doubt and can be regarded only as accomplice. Hence, accused Eusebio,
Isidro, and Contrares should be granted the benefit of the doubt and should be considered as
merely accomplices and should be meted a penalty one degree lower than that to be imposed
on accused Jesus Bongon who is unequivocally the principal.
Mere presence at the scene of the incident, knowledge of the plan and acquiescence thereto
are not sufficient grounds to hold a person as conspirator. Lacking sufficient evidence sufficient
evidence of conspiracy and there being doubt as to whether appellant acted as principal or just
a mere accomplice, the doubt should be resolved in his favor and is thus held liable only as
accomplice.
#9 Vino vs. People, G.R. No. 84163, October 18, 1989 (Accessory)

Issue: Is the apprehension and conviction of the principal necessary for the accessory to be held
criminally liable?

Facts: Lito Vino and Sgt Jesus Salazar were charged with murder . A decision was rendered
by the trial court finding Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder. Vino, during the
pendency of his appeal in the Court of Appeals, came to know that Salazar, who was charged as the
principal of the crime of murder, was thereafter acquitted by the trial court in a decision that was
rendered on August 29, 1988. Therefore, appeals were filed in the appellate courts.

Ruling and Basis: No. When the alleged principal was acquitted based on the failure of the
prosecution to adduce the quantum of evidence to generate a conviction, the accessory
cannot be likewise acquitted as the commission of the crime of murder and his responsibility as
an accessory was clearly established by evidence. The corresponding responsibilities of the
principal and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can
be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accessory can proceed
independently of that of the principal.

Similar to the case of US v. Villaluz, a case involving theft, when the principal was acquitted due to
the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity, the accessory may still be convicted if the crime
was in fact established.

Doctrine: Same as above.

[Digest made by Catherine Dumalaog]
#10 Francisco vs. people, G.R. No. 146584, July 12, 2004 (Anti- Fencing Law)

Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient quantum of evidence for the accused to be held liable in violating
P.D. 1612 also known as Anti-Fencing Law?

Facts: The petitioner Francisco was charged of violating PD 1612, which alleged with intent to gain for
himself, bought, received, possessed and acquired from Pacita Linghon, not the owner, several pieces of
jewelry with the total value of P655,000.00, belonging to Jovita Rodriguez, which he knows, or should be
known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Ruling and Basis: Petition of the accused was granted. The decision of CA affirming the decision of RTC

is reversed. The petitioner was acquitted for the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Fencing is prohibitum malum, and PD 1612 provides a prima facie presumption of fencing by the
accused from evidence of possession of any good, document, item, object or something of value that has
been the target of robbery or theft, and prescribes a higher penalty depending on the value of the
property. The stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing.
It is merely a corroboration of the testimony and other evidence supported by the prosecution to prove the
fencing crime. Testimonial evidence against the petitioners failed to prove the malicious intent and are
deemed inadmissible by the court. It bears stressing that Francisco was not a party (accused) in Case 1
and he had no opportunity to cross-examine Pacita. The prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence
and to prove one of the essential elements of the crime under Anti Fencing Law which is that the accused
knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Doctrine: The essential elements of the crime of fencing under PD 1612 are as follows: (1) A crime of
robbery or theft has been committed; (2) The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft , buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals,
sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; (3) The accused knows or should
have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.
TITLE THREE
PENALTIES
ARTICLES 21-88
(13 CASES)
#1 Risos-Vidal vs. COMELEC and Estrada G.R. 206666, January 21, 2015 (Pardon)
Issue: Whether or not former Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the
pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

Facts: In September 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of
plunder. October 2007, however, former President Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of
pardon, to Estrada.Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a COC, this time vying
for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila. Petitioner Atty. Risos-Vidal, filed a Petition
for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC,stating that former President

Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder by the Sandiganbayan
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification.

Ruling and Basis: Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon by former President Arroyo, the
following provisions of the law states that:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.A pardon shall in
no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

This was expressly stated in the pardon: “In view hereof and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me
by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to Joseph Ejercito Estrada. He is hereby restored
to his civil and political
rights.”
Estrada is, beyond doubt, qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon
granted to him by PGMA. It is well-entrenched that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
Doctrine: Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure. It
was the Court’s firm view that the phrase in the presidential pardon issued which declares that former
President Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and political rights" substantially complies with the
requirement of express restoration.
#2 PDEA vs. Brodett, G.R. No. 196390, September 28, 2011 (Forfeiture and
Confiscation)

Issue: Whether or not the confiscated car or property be returned to the third party - owner
who has no participation in the unlawful act during the pendency of the case?

Facts: The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) charged Richard Brodett and Joseph Jorge
for violating section 5, in relation to section 26 (b) of RA 9165 after being caught selling and
trading methamphetamine. Brodett filed a motion to return non drug evidence. He contested

that during his arrest, PDEA seized several personal non-drug effects including a 2004
Honda Accord car which is registered in the name of Myra Brodett. PDEA refused to return
as it was believed to be used in the commission of crime which was supported by OCP.
When the criminal proceeding was ongoing, RTC ordered the return of the car to its owner.
PDEA filed a motion for reconsideration, such being denied. PDEA filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA, which was also denied, citing Section 20 of RA 9165.

Ruling and Basis: No. Pursuant to Section 20 of RA 9165, confiscation and forfeiture of
the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to Article 45 of the Revised Penal
Code. To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments belonging to a third person either as
a principal, accessory or accomplice. Less than that will not suffice to prevent the return of
the tools and instruments to the third person, for a mere suspicion of that person’s
participation is not sufficient ground for the court to order the forfeiture of the goods seized.
The order of the RTC to return the car was premature. Indeed, forfeiture if warranted
pursuant to either Article 45 of the RPC and Section 20 of RA No. 9165, would be a part of
the penalty prescribed. The determination of whether or not the car would be subject to
forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings

Doctrine: Same as above.

#3 Legrama v.s Sandiganbayan. G.R. No. 178626, June 13, 2012 (Special Mitigating
Circumstance)

Issue: Will the voluntary surrender and restitution of the petitioner be able to reduce or
mitigate the penalty prescribed for a crime of malversation of public funds exceeding
Php22,000?

Facts: An audit team from the Office of the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit
(COA) was ordered to examine the cash and account of the Municipal Treasurer Cecilio

Legrama of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales. COA found out that there is a
shortage in the amount equivalent to P1,152,900.75. Consequently, Mayor Romeo D.
Lonzanida was charged in the information with the malversation of public funds. Both of
them voluntarily surrendered and posted their respective cash bonds. From the total amount
of the shortage, petitioner Legrama was able to restitute the initial amount of P60,000.00.
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision acquitting the mayor for lack of proof conspiring with
the treasurer and at the same time found the accused treasurer alone guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds.

Ruling and Basis: Yes. While it is true that pursuant to the provisions of Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, if the amount involved is more than Php22,000.00 the penalty to be
imposed is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. However, in this
case, the court took into consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and
the presence of two mitigating circumstance, i.e., petitioner's voluntary surrender and partial
restitution of the amount malversed. The prescribed penalty is reduced to prision mayor in
its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period. In accordance with
paragraph 1, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code and considering that there are no other
mitigating circumstance present, the maximum term should now be the medium period of
prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium, which is reclusion temporal
minimum and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term should be
anywhere within the period of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium.
Hence, the penalty imposed needs modification.

Doctrine: Same as above
#4 ZAFRA VS. PEOPLE

GR No. 176317, July 23, 2014
(Complex Crime Penalty)
Issue
Is the complex crime penalty is applicable in this case?
Facts

Accused-appellant Manolito Gil Z. Zafra, a Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), was charged with 18 counts of malversation of public fund throuhh
falsification of documents. However, he denied that he committed the crimes charged herein as
he never accepted any payments from taxpayers nor issued the revenue official receipts
(RORs) and said that it was his subordinates who collected the tax issued by the said RORs.
Both the RTC and the CA found the accused guilty as charged.
Ruling and Basis

Yes. Accused was duly convicted of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents, all complex crimes. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty for each count is that prescribed on the more serious offense, to be imposed
in its maximum period. Falsification of a public document by a public officer is penalized with
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed ₱5,000.00. Prision mayor has a duration of six years and
one day to 12 years of imprisonment. In contrast, the penalty for malversation ranges from
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods to reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua depending on the amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to the
amount of the funds malversed or to the total value of the property embezzled.
To determine the maximum periods of the penalties to be imposed on the petitioner,

therefore, we must be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the penalties provided under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees; and (2) considering that the penalties
provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are not composed of three periods, the
time included in the penalty prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which each
portion forming one period, pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code.
[Digest made by Via Imperial]
#5 MARIANO VS. PEOPLE

GR No. 178145, July 7, 2014
(Special Rule for imprudence or negligence)
Issue
Whether or not the crime resulted from imprudence?
Facts
Petitioner Reynaldo Mariano was convicted by the lower courts of the felony of frustrated

homicide to reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. This happened when the
Toyota pick-up of Mariano overtook the jeep of the victim Ferdinand de Leon and almost
bumped it making Ferdinand to alight from his owner type jeep to approach Reynaldo. This lead
to the altercation between the two and was tried to be pacified by Urbanita (Ferdinand’s wife)
and Luis de Leon(uncle of Ferdinand) and went to their separate ways. However, Ferdinand
was then bumped by a car while picking up some items in Norzagay and identified it as the
same pick-up driven by Reynaldo. This allegations was denied by Reynaldo and argued that
Ferndinand’s injuries were the result of a mere accident, that he lacked criminal intent and that
he was not negligent in driving his pick-up truck.
Ruling and Basis

Yes. The Supreme Court affirm the judgment of the lower court and convicted Reynaldo of
the crime reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. Only a vehicle that is
moving beyond the normal rate of speed and within the control of the driver’s hands could have
caused Ferdinand’s injuries. Had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking
the jeep of Ferdinand, he could have easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left
side of the road,as there was no oncoming vehicle, when he saw that Ferdinand alighted from
his jeep and lost his balance, in order to avoid hitting the latter or, at least, minimizing his
injuries. The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based on the gravity of the
resulting injuries had his act been intentional.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code stipulates that had the act been intentional, and
would constitute a grave felony, the offender shall suffer arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; and if it would have constituted a
light felony, arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
#6 GUINHAWA VS. PEOPLE
GR No. 162822, August 25, 2005
Callejo, Sr.,J.
(Two options in imposing the penalty prision correccional minimum)
Issue
Did the petitioner employed fraud or deceit as defined under Article 318 of the Revised Penal

Code?
Facts
Spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo bought a van from petitioner Jaime Guinhawa who was
engaged in the business of selling brand new motor vehicles. However, without their knowledge,
the van was recently repaired due to an accident when delivering the van to the office off
Guinhawa. But after sometime, while on their way to Manila, Josephine Silo and Glenda Pingol
heard a squeaking sound but faded after sometime. However, when they went back to Naga,
the squeaking sound became worse and have it checked at a gasoline station. The mechanic
discovered that some parts under the van were wielded. This discovery prompted Pingol to
complain to Guinhawa and demanded that the van be change to two Charade-Daihatsu
vehicles. Josephine then filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and refund of their
money before the DTI but withdraw it. Afterwards, Josephine filed a criminal complaint for
violation of paragraph 1, Article 318 of the RPC. MTC of Naga and RTC of Naga convicted
Guinhawa.CA affirmed decision of the lower courts with modification of the moral damages and
deleted the exemplary damages.
Ruling and Basis
Yes. The false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he offers for sale is brand
new is one of those deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1 of Article 318 of the RPC. For one
to be liable for “other deceits” under the law, it is required that the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the
preceding articles;(b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended
party suffered damage or prejudice. It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent
representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant to part
with her property.

Art. 318. Other deceits. – The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the
amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon
any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the
preceding articles of this chapter.
Principle of Ejusdem Generis
Where a statement ascribes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of
a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with
those particularly enumerated unless there be something in the context to the contrary
#7 PEOPLE VS. MARTINADA
GR Nos. 66401-66403, February 13, 1991

Paras,J. (under what section in the syllabus)
(Complex Crime)
Issue
1. Is the aggravating circumstance recidivism to be considered in the case even though it was
not alleged in the information?

2. Is shooting of Alejandro Naboya attended by treachery and must be treated as a separate
charge?
Facts
Appellants Francisco Martinada and Bonifacio Mesias, together with one Bondoy Maroto
and two John Does were all charged with (a) qualified theft of large cattle or cattle rustling; (b)
illegal possession of firearms and (c) frustrated murder. This happened one midnight, when
Segundina Naboya was awakened by the barking og their dog and her husband Alejandro
(victim) descended from their house after beeing awakened by a gun report. At the same time,
Pascual Naboya, brother of Alejandro was awakened by the bark of the dog and therefore
checked why the dog was barking and saw then Alejandro lying on the ground because he was
hit at his neck. Segundina and Pascual recognized the assailants as Mesias and Martinada.
After shooting Alejandro, they untied the carabao and took the carabao away. The trial court
found the appellants guilty as charged of the crime Qualified Theft of Large Cattle with the
aggravating circumstance of Recidivism and by a band and as provided under P.D. No. 533,
otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
Ruling and Basis
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that recidivism must be considered even though It was not
alleged in the information. While it is true that to prove recividism, it is necessary to allege the
same in the information and to attach thereto certified copies of the sentences rendered against
the accused, such aggravating circumstance may still be given credence by the trial court if the
accused does not object to the presentation of evidence on the fact of recidivism.
No. With regard to the shooting of Alejandro Naboya, this incident should have been
considered by the trial court as a qualifying aggravating circumstance to the crime of cattle
rustling. Since the information did not allege the fact of Alejandro's injury, the same can no
longer be appreciated in the case of cattle rustling. The appellants therefore can be held guilty
under Criminal Case No. 1886 only of simple cattle rustling, with the aggravating circumstance
of recidivism. The circumstances of "committed with violence against or intimidation of persons
or force upon things and a person was seriously injured or killed as a result or on the occasion
of the commission of cattling rustling" are no doubt qualifying aggravating circumstances as they
"not only give the clime committed its proper and exclusive name but also place the author
thereof in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that especially prescribed for
said crime.Thus, the trial court could no longer convict separately accused Martinada and
Mesias of the crime of Frustrated Murder, otherwise there would be double jeopardy.

*same with ruling and basis*
#8 PEOPLE VS. MEDINA
GR No. 38417, December 16, 1933

Vickers, J.
(Successive Service)
Issue
Is it right for the Court to impose successive service for the crime committed by the accused
Facts
The accussed-appellant was charged with the crime of trespass to dwelling, with
frustrated homicide, and physical injuries. The crime happend at night time when the accused

appellant Marciano Media entered the dwelling of Captain J.H. Davidson, forcing his way
through a window protected by wire screens. He was caught by the people who live in that place
and tried to put him under arrest. However, Marciano resisted and tried to escape and assaulted
Joseph Davidson (son of Capt. Davidson) with a knife inflicting a mortal wound on him. In
pursuance of his escape, he also inflicted wounds to Capt. Davidson, his wife and daughter with
an open knife.
Ruling and Basis
Yes. In pursuant to article 70 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the culprit
has to serve two or more penalties, he should serve them simultaneously if the nature of the
penalties will so permit; otherwise, said penalties shall be executed successively, following the
order of their respective severity. Although the unlawful entry, that is, the passing of the accused
through a window, and the breaking of the window could not properly be regarded as
aggravating circumstances in the crime of trespass to dwelling, nevertheless the other
aggravating circumstances were sufficient to justify the imposition of the maximum degree of the
corresponding penalties. The decision of the lower court sentencing the defendant to suffer four
months and one day of arresto mayor for lesiones menos graves is affirmed.

*same with ruling and basis*
#9 PEOPLE VS. ESCARES
GR No L-11128-33, December 23, 1957

Ponente: Bautista Angelo, J.,
(Title 3 RPC- Penalties- Three-fold Rule)
Issue
When is the threefold rule applicable?
Facts
Salvador Poblador, Armando Gustillo and Rene Escares were charged with six cases of

robbery last September 1950. During the hearing for these cases Escares was still at large and
was arraigned only after four years, on April 21, 1954. He pleaded not guilty but withdrew his
plea to be able to appeal. He contended that the guilty plea should set no aggravating
circumstance and should afford him only the minimum penalty. He said that the three fold rule
should apply to his case in the imposition of the minimum penalty. The trial court was in conflict
whether to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law or the threefold rule provided in paragraph 4
of Article 70 of the RPC.
Ruling and Basis

The three-fold rule provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code is
applicable not in the imposition of the penalty, but in connection with the service of the sentence
imposed. Here, the penalty imposed upon Escares by the trial court should not be the
indeterminate penalty of not less than four months but the penalties mentioned in the limitation
prescribed in paragraph 4 article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 70, par. 4 of the RPC: Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding,
the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of
time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to
which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same
maximum period.
[Digest made by L. Landayan]

# 10 PEOPLE VS. DACUYCUY
GR No. L-45127, May 5, 1989

Ponente: Regalado J.
(Title 3- Penalties- Subsidiary Imprisonment)
Issue
Do the lower courts have the power to ascertain the period of subsidiary imprisonment
with their own discretion on the basis of Section 32 of RA 4670?
May a fine be converted to a prison term?
Facts
Celestino Matondo, Segundino Caval, and Cirilo Zanoria were public school officials of
Leyte and were charged for violating section 32 of RA 4670, or Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers. During the arraignment, the accused persons pleaded not guilty and challenged the
constitutionality of Section 32 for imposing a cruel and unusual punishment and for constituting
an undue delegation of legislative power1. The respondent of this case, Judge Dacuycuy held
that Section 32 of RA 4670 was valid and constitutional. The two penalties imposed were either
a fine ranging from 100php-1,000 php or a period of imprisonment. The imprisonment has
neither prescribed period nor was there a provision showing the equivalent of the fine to the
penalty of imprisonment as seen in “in the discretion of the court” phrase.
Ruling and Basis

No, it is not for the courts to impose subsidiary imprisonment or to arbitrarily fix the term
of imprisonment when there is no point of reference provided by the law. The length of service
and the term of imprisonment must be encompassed in the limits specified in the statute,
without such would be undue delegation of legislative power. Here, section 32 of RA 4670
provided for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither minimum or maximum
duration, contrary to the constitutionality Section 32 of RA 4670.
No, Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a fine whether imposed as a
single or as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be reduced or converted into a prison
term. Here, there was no rule for conversion between the amount of a fine to an imprisonment
period.Matondo, Caval, and Zanoria were asked to for a fine of not more than 3,000 php as the
pertinent law was RA 296 amended by RA 3828.

Delegata potestas non potest delegari- when the courts are said to exercise a discretion,
it must be a mere legal discretion which is exercised in discerning the law and not beyond it
1 Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall wilfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the
exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat
any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred
pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. People vs.
Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90, G.R. No. 45127 May 5, 1989

# 11 BUDLONG VS. APALISOK
GR No 60151, Date June 24, 1983, Ponente, (Probation)
Issue
Does probation affect both the civil aspect of the case?
Facts
Budlong, the Acting Third Assistant City Fiscal of Tagbilaran, had an action against a
private respondent for the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence on the
court of Judge Apalisok. During the arraignment on February 4, 1982, the private accused
Galagar pleaded guilty to the crime charged and the respondent judge sentenced him to thirty
(30) days of imprisonment and to pay the costs. No civil liability was imposed. Galagar also
asked for applicability of the Probation Law (PD 968) to his case. The court gave Galagar’s
counsel five days to file the petition for probation. A week after, the respondent court denied the
motion for probation because Fiscal Prosecutor Budlong has not filed on time. They further
alleged that prosecution should have asked leave to prove the civil liability of the defendant right
before it rendered its judgment not after for by doing so, would in effect nullify the Order of
suspension of the sentence and would defeat the very purpose of the Probation Law.
Ruling and Basis

No, the intent to apply for probation does not affect the civil aspect of the case.
Probation is effective after conviction and sentence. The “conviction and sentence” clause of the
statutory definition clearly signifies that probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case.
Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code states that Galagar shall remain civilly liable resulting
from the crime committed by him even upon fulfillment of the terms and conditions of the
probation. Here, Apalisok therefore had no right to rule that an application for probation should
have an opposite effect insofar as determination of civil liability.
Doctrine
Probation is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is
released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation
officer.2 It affects only criminal liability and precludes civil liability. Civil Liability established in
articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code shall be extinguished in the same manner as other
obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law.3
Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding article,
the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime
committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of
amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence, or any other reason.4
2 Section 3, PD 968, the Probation Law, as mentioned in Budlong vs Apalisok, 122 SCRA 935
3 Article 112, RPC, Extinction of civil liability
4 Article 113, RPC, Obligation to satisfy civil liability

# 12 COLINARES VS. PEOPLE
GR No 182748, December 13, 2011, Ponente: Abad, J.

(Probation under appeal)
Issue
May a person avail of probation after appealing?
When a person is guilty only of attempted homicide, is he qualified to apply for probation
on remand of the case to the trial court?
Facts
Arnel Colinares was charged with frustrated homicide after he struck Rufino twice on the head
with a huge stone. He also struck the person who tried helping Rufino. During the defense,
Colinares claimed self-defense and alleged that on his way home Rufino shoved him after he
asked where the mayor was before attempting to stab him. He was sentenced to frustrated
homicide and sentenced to to imprisonment prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and
one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under
the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. He appealed this to the
Supreme Court.
Ruling and Basis

No, a person may not avail of probation anymore after appealing his case according to
Section 4 of the Probation Law (PD 968)5. The application for probation is merely a privilege.
However here, Colinares was guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide which
imposed only imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four
months of prision correccional, as maximum. Here, Colinares has the right to apply for the
privilege for probation, but it does not necessarily mean that he has the right to probation, even
if it was remanded to the lower court. The intent of the makers of the Probation law is liberality
towards the accused. If the RTC gave the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty
of two years and four months maximum, it would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for
probation. The Court intends to correct the mistake of the lower courts, following the intent of
the makers of the Probation Law.
Doctrine
The Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused
only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter. The Probation Law should be applied in
favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.6
5 “Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal.” Sec. 4 of PD 968 or Probation law as cited in Colinares vs. People, 662
SCRA 266, G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011
6 Opinion of Justice Mendoza cited by Justice Abad in Colinares vs. People, 662 SCRA 266.

# 13 HERNAN VS. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No 217874, December 5, 2017, Ponente: Peralta J.

(Probation and RA 10707)
Issue
Given the lack of disqualification based on RA10707, may the accused apply for
probation?
Facts
Ophelia Hernan, a supervising fiscal clerk of DOTC CAR, had the job of receiving from
customers and clients telegraphic transfers of money which she was supposed to put in the
Landbank account of DOTC in the Baguio City branch. Upon inspection of the Commission on
Audit (COA) of the cash accounts handled by Hernan, they found out that she was not
depositing the money and the missing amount was around 81,000 (eighty-one thousand pesos).
COA therefore charged the petitioner of malversation of public funds. Upon arraignment on July
31, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The RTC found Hernan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she was to suffer
imprisonment of 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prisión mayor medium period, as minimum, to
11 years, 6 months and 21 days of prisión mayor as maximum period to reclusion temporal
maximum period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P11,300.00.
Ruling and Basis

No, the accused Ophelia Hernan is barred from applying for probation under RA10707.
Doctrine

TITLE FOUR
EXTINCTION OF
CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
(5 CASES)
#1 MORALES VS. CA AND BINAY

GR No. 127126-27 November 10, 2015 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Issue: Does reelection condones previous misconduct for the crimes charged?
Facts: On July 22,2014 a complaint was filed before the Ombudsman against Binay Jr. and
other public employees in the Makati City Hall accusing them of Plunder and violation of RA
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the building of the Makati
City Hall Bldg. 2. The Ombudsman conducted an investigation and found that on several
transactions the project in its phases were awarded without required publication and lack of
architectural design. Due to this the Ombudsman recommended and ordered preventive
suspension of the Mayor. Subsequently, Binay Jr filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
seeking to restrain his suspension, the CA granted the TRO. However the Ombudsman
contested the TRO, stating that the preventive suspension order had already been served and
implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain. The accused however posits that his re-
election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from
anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013 (first
term).
Ruling and Basis: No, the court held on basis of several jurisprudence regarding this case, cited
in Rice v State “Offenses committed, or acts done, during the previous term are generally held
not to furnish cause for removal”. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other
terms. An elective official’s re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby
cutting the right to remove him therefor; and that the reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove
him therefor. However, this only applies to administrative cases. It was explained that a criminal
case is different from an administrative case in that the former involves the People of the
Philippines as a community, and is a public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter,
only the populace of the constituency he serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is
only the President who may pardon a criminal offense.(Ingco v Sanchez et. al.)
Doctrine:
Condonation Doctrine
It is a principle that the administrative offenses of an elected official are already deemed
forgiven when the public decides to re-elect him or her for another term, but the condonation
doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. In this case the condonation doctrine is now
abandoned by courts because of the politicians abusing it. However, an acceptance of a
new doctrine and an abandonment of old ones out of touch to the current society must
be applied prospectively, thus Binay Jr.’s plea was granted provided that a case related
to this on the future will abandon such ruling.
[Digest made by Mark Thomas Nuguid]
#2 PEOPLE VS. BAYOTAS

G. R. No. 102007 , September 2, 1994
ROMERO, J
(Death before Finality of Judgment)
Issue: Is criminal liability extinguished by the death of the accused?

Is civil liability extinguished by the death of the accused?
Facts: On June 19 1991, the accused Bayotas was charged and eventually convicted of rape.
Bayotas died with pending appeal on February 4, 1992 at National Bilibid Hospital due to
cardiac and respiratory failure. Due to this the SC dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal,
and required SolGen to comment on the civil liability of the case. SolGen expressed his view
that the death of the accused did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of
the offense charged, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal
should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which
the civil liability is based.
Ruling and Basis:
Yes, pursuant to Article 89 Par.1 of the Revised Penal Code, by the death of the convict, as to
the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.Death extinguishes criminal liability.
Thus, a criminal case filed against an accused who dies while the case is still pending resolution
shall be terminated.The law is clear and unequivocal.
Yes, it was held in People v Castillo that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the
accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge Kapunan further stated that civil liability is
extinguished because there will be “no party defendant” in the case. There will be no civil liability
if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court stated “it is, thus, evident that… the rule
established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be
predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict.
Doctrine:
Definition of Final Judgment
The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall.
Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him
#3 PEOPLE VS. REYES

G.R. Nos. 74226-27 ,July 27, 1989
CORTES,J
(Prescription)
Issue: Was the crime already prescribed?
Facts:Spouses Rizare and Pampo owned a parcel of land in Lipa City, having died, they were
survived by the accused Reyes and the complainants Masikat, Vergara and de Ebueza. In June
1983 the complainants found in the Registry of Deeds in Lipa that the lands were transferred to
the accused. The complainants examined the deed of sale of their parents and the accused,
they found that the signatures of the spouses were allegedly falsified and the accused made an
untruthful statement about her civil status. The document was referred to the NBI and reported
that Pampo’s signature was forged. Upon complaint, the fiscal filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Lipa City on two information falsification of public documents. The accused filed a motion to
quash contending that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription of the
crime. The RTC granted the motion due to the lapse of more than twenty (20) years before the
two informations were filed, the crimes for which the charge have already been prescribed.
Petitioners filed for an appeal to the Court of Appeals, but it affirmed the Trial Court’s decision,
relying upon the jurisprudence of Cabral v. Puno, G.R. No. L-41692, where the Supreme Court
made a statement to the effect that in the crime of falsification of a public document, the
prescriptive period commences from the time the offended party had constructive notice of the
alleged forgery after the document was registered with the Register of Deeds. However,
petitioner contends that this particular statement is not doctrine but merely an obiter dictum.
Ruling: Yes, the crime has already been prescribed, in this case, the crime has been deemed to
be discovered when the lands were registered in the Registry of Deeds pursuant to the Art 91 of
the Revised Penal Code. The trial court decision stated that the title, once registered, is a notice
to the world, that all persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of registration, the
essence of registration is to serve notice to the whole world of the legal status and the dealing
therewith. If registration is a notice to the whole world, then registration is in itself a notice and
therefore, the prescriptive period of registered document must start to run from the date the
same was annotated in the Register of Deeds.The heirs who were not included in the deed of
partition are deemed to have notice of its existence from the time it was registered with the
Register of Deeds.
Doctrine:
Prescription of Crime and Prescription of Civil Action
The Court does not subscribe to the conclusion that the rules of interpretation used in the law on
prescription of civil suits can be applied in criminal actions. Laws in the Prescription of Civil
Action are only a statute of repose, a statute that cuts off certain legal rights if they are not
acted on by a specified deadline.
However, the law on Prescription of Crimes rests on a more fundamental principle. Being more
than a statute of repose, it is an act of grace whereby the state, after the lapse of a
certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the criminal act. The
law on prescription of civil suits is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between
two contending parties, the law on prescription of crimes is an act of amnesty and liberality on
the part of the state in favor of the offender (People v Moran)

#4 PEOPLE VS. ESTIBAL

G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014
REYES,J.
(Pardon by the Offended Party)
Issue: Can the accused be pardoned by the offended party?
Facts: On February 6, 2009, the accused Estibal was charged for raping his 13 year old
daughter, on which the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignmend. His wife during pre-trial
disclaimed any further interest to pursue the case because she took pity on her husband and
the minor victim had forgiven him, However the court refused their desistance. At the trial, four
witnesses were presented, the medico legal officer, the arresting barangay tanods, and the
police officer of the women’s desk PO3 Cobrado. Cobrado took down the statement of the minor
victim (AAA) on the night of the affidavit complaint was filed. PO3 Cobrado narrated that during
her investigation of AAA and the wife were both crying, that without being coached by her
mother revealed in detail the years of abuse of the accused and how he raped her. The accused
defended mainly on denial, he testified that the brothers of his wife were the one influencing
AAA to file against him. On the pendency of this case, AAA and the wife did not attend in trial,
their subpoenas were unserved because they move out to their address. The trial court relied on
PO3 Cobrado’s statements even without AAA’s statement in court, thus an appeal to CA. The
accused appealed that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt his crime. The
OSG counter argued that PO3 Cobrado’s investigation is part of res getae (start to end period of
felony). CA affirmed and agreed with OSG thus the accused filed the instant petition.
Ruling and Basis:
No, in People v Bonagua it is stated that rape is no longer considered a crime against chastity,
in line with the Anti-Rape Act of 1997. It was reclassified as a crime against persons which
cannot be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Thus,pardon by the
offended party of the offender will not extinguish his criminal liability.
Doctrine:
Presumption of Innocence
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees.Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This
reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which
protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in
his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of
course, mean such degree of proof as excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the
offense charged.
#5 MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012

SERENO,J
(Amnesty)
Issue: Does the COMELEC resolution violate the presumption of innocence of MAGDALO’s
founders?
Facts: On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed a Petition for
Registration with the COMELEC, as a regional political party based in the National Capital
Region (NCR) for participation in the 2010 Elections. MAGDALO was represented by its
Chairperson, Senator Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General,. Acedillo. MAGDALO complied
with all COMELEC’s requirements for its registration, however COMELEC denied their petition
due to the events that happened on June 27,2003, the Oakwood Mutiny. It renders that the
party employs violence and uses unlawful means to achieve their purpose, being violative to the
Art IX-C Sec 2 of the Constitution. The petitioners filed for Manifestation of Intent to Participate
in the Party-List System of Representation and subsequently filed for Motion for Early
Resolution, in which it clarified its intention to participate in the May 2010 Elections, the
COMELEC denied it, thus, the instant petition. MAGDALO argues that the COMELEC resolution
was not based on the record or evidence, it is mere conjecture and pure baseless
presuppositions. The resolutions also preempted the current pendency of the trial of the criminal
case and violates the presumption of innocence in favor of founders of the Magdalo for being
forgiven from the mutiny through amnesty.
Ruling: Yes, pursuant to the amnesty given by the Legislative Department on their concurring
resolution to the Proclamation No.75 of the President, it stated on its provisions that
“Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members
shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.
No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity,
except to vote.”. The founders who are not members of the military are now entitled to
participate in any partisan political activity in accordance with the law. The court held that in
view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that
transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the
context of the disqualifications from party registration.
Doctrine:
Concept of Amnesty
Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released
by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
(People v. Patriarca)
Amnesty and Pardon on Judicial Review (not in the book)

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;
while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a
public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. (People vs. Casido)
TITLE FIVE
CIVIL LIABILITY
(5 CASES)
#1 AGLIBOT v. SANTIA
GR NO. 185945, DECEMBER 5, 2012
REYES, J
ISSUE:

Did the RTC erred when it dismissed the civil aspect of the case? Is Aglibot personally liable on
the checks?
FACTS:
Engr. Ingersol L. Santia (Santia) loaned the amount of P2,500,000.00 to Pacific Lending &
Capital Corporation (PLCC), through its Manager, petitioner Fideliza J. Aglibot (Aglibot). The
loan was evidenced by a promissory note. Allegedly as a guaranty for the payment of the note,
Aglibot issued and delivered to Santia eleven (11) post-dated personal checks drawn from her
own account maintained at Metrobank. Upon presentment of the checks for payment, they were
dishonored by the bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds or closed account.
Santia thus demanded payment from PLCC and Aglibot of the face value of the checks, but
neither of them heeded his demand. Consequently, eleven Informations for violation of B.P. 22
were filed before the MTCC.
MTCC acquitted Aglibot. On appeal, the RTC rendered a decision absolving Aglibot and
dismissing the civil aspect of the case on the ground of "failure to fulfill a condition precedent of
exhausting all means to collect from the principal debtor." Hence the filing on this instant
petition for certiorari.
RULING: Yes. Appellate Court ruled that the RTC erred when it dismissed the civil aspect
of the case. Hence, the CA ruled that Aglibot is personally liable for the loan. Aglibot is an
accommodation party and liable to Santia. The appellate court ruled that by issuing her own
post-dated checks, Aglibot thereby bound herself personally and solidarily to pay Santia, and
dismissed her claim that she issued her said checks in her official capacity as PLCC’s manager
merely to guarantee the investment of Santia. The facts present a clear situation where Aglibot,
as the manager of PLCC, agreed to accommodate its loan to Santia by issuing her own post-
dated checks in payment thereof. She is what the Negotiable Instruments Law calls an
accommodation party and therefore the civil liability is immediate and direct.
[Digest made by Mike Torio]
#2 Bunag, Jr. v. CA
GR NO. 101749, July 10, 1992
Regalado, J
ISSUE:

Did the trial court erred in awarding damages.
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, he invited her to take their
merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila, to which plaintiff obliged. But instead to
Aristocrat he brought plaintiff to a motel or hotel where he raped her. Later that evening,
defendant brought plaintiff to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days. Defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage
license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. October 1, 1973
Defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage
license. However, Defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff and
compelled her to go back to her parents. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could
not sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by defendants-appellants.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. The trial court
ruled in favor of the plaintiff and against petitioner, but absolved his father.
RULING:
Yes. Generally, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the
plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation
to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the
statutes. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly
abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and
thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege
on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts
contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible
transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and
exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and
Articles 2229 and 2234 of the Civil Code. In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for
forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation
stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might
arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein
private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary
dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
#3 Lacanilao v. CA
G.R. No. L-34940. June 27, 1988

SARMIENTO, J.

ISSUE:
Did CA erred in appreciating the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty
as mere generic circumstance.
FACTS:
The CFI of Manila found the petitioner, a policeman, guilty of homicide for the death of
one Ceferino Erese. CA lowered the penalty merely by one period applying Article 64,
paragraph 2, of RPC, appreciating as it did incomplete justification as a mere generic or specific
mitigating circumstance lowering the penalty to the minimum period. Accordingly, the penalty
originally imposed by the CFI of Manila was modified and lowered by the CA to 6 years and 1
day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 12 and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum.
RULING:
YES. The respondent Court erred. Incomplete justification is a special or privileged
mitigating circumstance, which, not only cannot be offset by aggravating circumstances but also
reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. Consequently, Article 69
is applicable, where it provides that: “ PENALTY TO BE IMPOSED WHEN THE CRIME
COMMITTED IS NOT WHOLLY EXCUSABLE. A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of
some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the
several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be
present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view
of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.” The above legal
provision, articulating the basis of the special or privileged mitigating circumstances of
incomplete justification, expressly provides for its applicability to the instances enumerated in
Article 12. on Exempting Circumstances, of the Revised Penal Code, when not all of the
conditions required to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability are present. Wherefore,
the petition was GRANTED insofar as it seeks the modification of the penalty pursuant to
Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code and court ruling in Oanis. The petitioner is hereby
SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of from two years, four months, and one day of
prision correccional, to eight years and one day ofprision mayor. The questioned judgment is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
#4 INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES INC. v. ARGOS and PINEDA
G.R. No. 130362 , September 10, 2001

QUISUMBING, J.

ISSUE:
Could private respondents sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal
libel cases against petitioner's employee?
FACTS:
Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial director
respectively of the International Flavors and Fragrances Incorporated (IFFI) filed a libel case
against Hernan H. Costa, the managing director of IFFI after being described by the latter as
pesona non grata in his Personal Announcement after termination of their services. They later
filed a separate civil case for damages against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as
employer with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig wherein IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint.
The Regional Trial Court granted IFFI’s motion to dismiss for respondent’s failure to reserve its
right to institute a separate civil action. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial
Court granted Argos and Pineda’s petition which was later affirmed by the appellate court.
RULING:
No. IFFI, petitioner contends that respondents did not allege that IFFI was primarily
liable for damages and on the contrary, the complaint was replate with references that IFFI was
being sued for its subsidiary capacity. Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in cases of
defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. As ruled in Joaquin vs. Aniceto however, article 33
contemplates an action against the employee in his primary capacity. It does not apply to an
action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability as such liability arises only
after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee adjudged guilty of
the wrongful act. Thus, the Supreme Court granted IFFI’s petition for dismissal.
#5 Pangonorom v. People
G.R. NO. 143380. April 11, 2005
CARPIO, J.
ISSUE: Is petitioner MMTC subsidiarily liable with Pangonorom considering its

due diligence in the selection and supervision upon its employees
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City finds accused Olimpio
Pangonorom guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple slight physical
injuries and sentenced him to suffer an imprisonment of 30 days of arresto mayor, to indemnify
the offended parties of the damages incurred by their motor vehicle and reimbursement of
medical expenses. An appeal was made before the CA to which subject decision was affirmed
by the latter. CA held that MMTC was already estopped in assailing the RTC’s decision. Hence
another petition by petitioner MMTC noting in their defense that procedure of the company in
hiring applicant driver and the requirements to be submitted by appellant Pangonorm is under
internal control in due diligence and proper supervision.
RULING:
YES. Due diligence under selection and supervision of its employees is not a valid
defense at the present case. Such was held under the provision of Article 103 of the RPC, in
relation to Articles 100 and 102 of the same code which states that: “The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.”
Pursuant to Article 103, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil
liability in a criminal action when there is adequate evidence establishing that he is indeed the
employer of the convicted employee; that he is engaged in some kind of industry; that the
employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and that the execution against
the employee has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on subsidiary liability - Articles 102 and 103 - are deemed written into the judgments in
cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court
need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. The subsidiary liability of
the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. In the present
case, there exists an employer-employee relationship between petitioners, the MMTC is
engaged in the transportation industry, and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a wrongful act
and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. However, there is no
proof here of Olimpio's insolvency. The judgment of conviction against Olimpio has not attained
finality. This being so, no writ of execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only
after proof of the accused-employee's insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer be
enforced.


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CASE DIGESTS

Judge Fredrick Separa

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

GR No, Date, Ponente, (under what section in the syllabus)

Ruling and Basis

Doctrine or Any Crim Concepts mentioned in the syllabus

[Digest made by]

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

#1 PEOPLE VS. PUNO

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

ISSUE: Is disregard of sex as aggravating circumstance manifested in the particular case?

RULING AND BASIS:

DOCTRINE OR ANY CRIM CONCEPTS MENTIONED IN THE SYLLABUS:

[Digest made by R.Acha]

#2 PEOPLE VS. SAPINOSO

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

ISSUE: Is the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party?

RULING AND BASIS:

Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy

DOCTRINE OR ANY CRIM CONCEPTS MENTIONED IN THE SYLLABUS:

[Digest made by R. Acha]

#3 PEOPLE VS. VENTURA

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

RULING AND BASIS:

DOCTRINE OR ANY CRIM CONCEPTS MENTIONED IN THE SYLLABUS:

[Digest made by R. Acha]

#4 PEOPLE VS. SANCHEZ

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

DOCTRINE OR ANY CRIM CONCEPTS MENTIONED IN THE SYLLABUS:

[Digest made by R. Acha]

#5 PEOPLE VS. TORRES

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

DOCTRINE OR ANY CRIM CONCEPTS MENTIONED IN THE SYLLABUS:

[Digest made by R. Acha]

#6 PEOPLE VS. LOZANO

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

Whether or not the crime is committed by a band?

DOCTRINE OR ANY CRIM CONCEPTS MENTIONED IN THE SYLLABUS

[Digest made by D. Agan]

#7 PEOPLE VS. FELICIANO

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

DOCTRINE OR ANY CRIM CONCEPTS MENTIONED IN THE SYLLABUS

[Digest made by D. Agan]

#8 PEOPLE VS. VARONA

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

DOCTRINE OR ANY CRIM CONCEPTS MENTIONED IN THE SYLLABUS

[Digest made by D. Agan]

#9 PEOPLE VS. SABANGAN

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

Whether or not there is evident premeditation in the commission of the crime?

DOCTRINE OR ANY CRIM CONCEPTS MENTIONED IN THE SYLLABUS

#10 PEOPLE VS. SALIBAD

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

DOCTRINE OR ANY CRIM CONCEPTS MENTIONED IN THE SYLLABUS

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

#1 PEOPLE VS. ORILLA

G.R. No. 148939-40, February 13, 2004

| Acha | Agan | Alvarez | Bobis | Caranay | Dumalaog | Imperial | Landayan

Ruling and Basis

Doctrine or any crim concepts mentioned in the syllabus

[Digest made by: A. Alvarez, Jr.]

#2 PEOPLE VS. CURATCHIA

G.R. No. L-31771, May 16, 1980