THE AFGHAN REFUGEES AND

PAKISTAN'S INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS

PROFESSOR PERVAIZ IQBAL CHEEMA

Quaid-i- Azam University

Islamabad

Pap&r presented at the International Seminar on Refugees

and Internal Security in South Asia, organised by
Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Colombo
10 - 11 July 1994.

303820099Y
 s Interne.1 Security Problems
The Af ghan Refugees and Pakist an '

Pervaiz Icibai Cheema

comprehensive definition of national security must

relate to an elaborate defensive mechanism devised to cope with

*<

threats emanating either from external sources or internal

developments . To many , national security means nationsldefence

which they often tend to equate with military preparedness of a

nation . Dwelling heavily upon external threats emanating from

global or regional considerations , they believe that well

disciplined armed forces equipped with modern weaponry can provide

the requisite level of security and ensure national survival .

Admittedly this is perhaps one of the most important aspect?; of

national security but this does not necessarily imply that the

other aspects are less important and do not deserve any

significant consideration . What about internal security problems

like revolution , subversion , insurgency , coups etat ',

d' internal

disorder ranging from ordinary crime to full scale civil war ? It

has been often observed that many mini internal disturbances

snowballed into a conflict situation where it became

indistinguishable from internationa l conflict .

While many factors cause internal security problems

(
such as economic disparities , social inequalities , national
 building proce sses , ethnicity , political instabi lities etc .
), this

paper concentrates only on security problems that were and , in

some cases , still are the direct product of large concentration of

Afghan refugees on Pakistani soil . For analytical discussion of

various security problems emanating from the Afghan refugees '

presence , three categories with allowances for overlapping and

inadvertent link ages -are being employed ; political , economic and

I social .

Afghan Refugees

Throughout the decade long Afghan crisis the refugees

kept on pouring into Pakistan . By the time Geneva Accords were

signed in 19S8 , the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan has

already gone beyond 3.5 millions .Admittedly the migration of

Afghans into Pakistan is not an uncommon phenomenon as most of the

1500 miles Pak-Afghan border is inhabited by the Pakhtoons , who

are known to cross border at will . Pakhtoon traders and

businessmen regularly move between the two countries and the

Kutchis or Powindas (
the Afghan nomads ) were and still are

accustomed to move annually with their herds between summer

pastures in Afghanistan and winter pastures in Pakistan . However ,

the number of nomads and merchants rarely exceeded 100 ,000 in one

given year .
 Althou gh the initial influx of the Af ghan refugees

started almost immediately after Sardar Daud '

s coup in 1973 , the

large scale migration of the Afghan followed the Saur revolution

of April 1978 . The subsequent events like the introduction of

Hafizullah Amin " s hurriedly contrived reforms and the Soviet

in Dec . 1979 accelerated the flow of

invasion of Afghanistan

refugees at an alarming pace . Approximately 20 ,0

00 to 100 ,0
00

Afghan refugees walked into Pakistan almost every month soon to

touch the 4 million mark . By any yardstick this number of refugees

was too large for Pakistan to provide for even the basic needs and

requirements . Just as the figures were overwhelming , the nature

and extent of problems emanating from refugee concentrations in

bordering provinces of Pakistan were equal ly frightening . Although

feeding and housing three to four millions people presents

difficulties of alarming magnitude , the government of Pakistan was

able to cope with the problem rather admirably . Not only it paid

more than 50% of the expenses incurred in the relief work but it

also made arrangements for the schooling of the Afghan children

and provided medical facilities . Admittedly many UN agencies (

e.g.

UNHCR . MFP , UNICEF , MHO , FAO etc .

) along with many independent

relief agencies and groups helped Pakistani authorities in their

massive relief work , but the major burden was borne by the
Pakistanis .

Undoubtedly the most directly affected country by the

intensity of the Afghan crisis was Pakistan . The refu gees problem

itself was pregnant with many complexities which were perhaps less

obvious but quite disturbing . The refugees not only introduced

ethno -demographic imbalances within Pakistan but also

substantively contributed toward security problems .To comprehend

such contributions one needs to analy ze the impact of the presence

of Afghan refugees in political , economic and social terms .

II

Political

The presence of large number of Afghan refugees caused

many political problems in Pakistan . These included the growth of

terrorism , and sharp cleavage among the political parties

regarding the Afghan refugees and their eventual return . Until the

advent of the 8
0s . organi zed terrorism was virtually never

experienced by the Pakistanis . Acts of terrorism were varied and

many .The NwFP has been particularly at the receiving end of

terrorism . The Kabul regime had managed to penetrate into the

great reservoirs of resistance ; namely the refugee camps . In fact ,

it was commonly beli eved in Pakistan that many Afghan saboteurs

had come into Pakistan in the guise of refugees with the objec t of

spying and creating tensions between the refugees and the locals .

Two factors seemed to have contributed consider ab ly towards the

increased terrorism . First , the agents of Afghani intelligence

service had been extremely active in creating not only the

potential for riots in refugee villages and generating antagonism

between the refugees and the locals but had also been responsible

for periodic bomb blasts in areas of civilian concentrations as

well as attempted to destroy targets of tactical importance . Both

Pakistan Government and Mujahideen sources firmly placed the blame

on the Khad Agents for causing various successful acts of

terrorism . Perhaps that '

s why Khad was promoted for its good

performance and was elevated to Cabinet level as the Ministry of

4.
State Security . In fact , Khad had grown as large as the Afghan

army and worked in close collaboration with the KGB , Second , the

internal feuds between various resistance groups and factions had

also manifested in the forms of irresponsible terrorist acts .

Perhaps that was one of the major considerationsto influence the

Government '
s decision to order , in August 1984, ail Peshawar based

resistance groups to move out of Peshawar .

Acts of terrorism continued even after the stoning of

Geneva Accords and the subsequent establishment of Mujahideen 's

own government . Following -the fall of Na jib '
s government , the

Mujahideen formed their own government but were soon plunged into

fierce civil war with various groups of MuJahideen stru ggling to

gain power in Kabul . Pakistan , having actively supported the

Mujahideen throughout the Soviet occupation , was now confronted

with a dilemma as various groups of freedom fighters made their

violent bids for power . Apart from making periodic peace efforts

and sending food and other necessary supplies , Pakistan refrained

rather scrupulously from getting itse lf involved or taking sides ,

in the ongoing Afghan civil war . Yet Pakistan continued to

experience acts of terrorism . The most recent and the most

prQnounced act of terrorism was when a school Bus carrying 4.

7

school children was kidnapped from Peshawar on Feb. 2

0, 1
99 4..

Perhaps the most serious political problem arising from

the continuing presence of large number of refugees in Pakistan

was the impact on the domestic politics . Norma lly most external

crises tend to have unifying effect on domestic politics but in

case of Pakistan , the impact of Afghanistan crisis had sharply

divided politica l opinions about the refugees and the eventual

settlement of the crisis . It all started when one of the political

part ies gained access to the refugee camps mainly through the

Peshawar based Af ghan resistance groups . The humanitarian work of

 party created goodwill among the "cultivated
that particular

refugees 'which , in turn , senerated apprehensions among the other

political parties and they began to wonder what would happen if

the refugees did not leave and formed a large vote-bank for the

10
privileged political party . Besides , until recently it was not

al l that difficult to obtain National Identity Cards or Domicile

Certificates enabling the cultivated refugees to form a strong

po litical base for the involved party . This simmering fear

surfaced in 1986 when the Movement For Restoration of Democracy

MRD )passed
( a resolution alleging the growin g involvement of the

12
Afghan Refugees in the politics of Pakistan . In addition , it was

also alleged that the refugees were being made an instrument to

create dissension and disorder in academic institutions to serve

13
the political objectives of a particular section . Indeed those

were very serious charges . Some political parties also disagreed

s approach
with Government ' towards the Afghan crisis and insisted

14
that direct talks with the Kabul regime should be initiated .

Another sensitive political problem relates to the

augured ethnic imbalance in Baluchistan that could have had

generated dangerous results provided the Afghan crisis had

continued to persist and the flow of the refugees into Pakistan

did not stop . Had no change taken place in the then operative rate

of refugees influx and the conflict remained unreso lved for few

15
more years , the concentration of the refugees could have had

gravely disrupted the socio -economic life in provinces bordering

Afghanistan . Not only the refugees had increased the population of

those areas by 10 to 15% but in case of Baluchistan the inflow of

Pakhtoon refugees had begun to erode the Baluchi predominance .

Many Baluch leaders had already expressed fears that the

continuous inflow of the refugees could have caused a major u.pset

in the existing delicate balance bet ween the Baluchis and the

Pakhtoons , and could have even caused a situation in which the

Baluchis would have found themselves in minority in their own

Province .

Politically the Baluchistan situation could have been

quite easily exploited by the Soviets if they had so decided Not

only Baluchsitan had remained a troub led province specially during

the Z.A . Bhutto regime which resulted in the flight of many

dissidents who took refuge in Afghanistan , but the Baluch minority

problem was viewed as extremely sensitive and prone to

exploitation . The Soviets had many compelling reasons to play the

Baluch card in order to coerce , if not undermine , the Pakistani

Government . Among the reasons that seemed to have annoyed the

s linkage with the US and China , the use of

Soviets were Islamabad '

territory for sanctuary purposes by the Afghan

Pakistani

groups , the supply of men and material for the

resistance

forces from and via Pakistan , Pakistan 's repeated

resistance

refusal to talk directly to Kabul regime , and its unenthusiastic

to Gorbachev initiative . In fact , according to an

response

carefully and actively

American writer the Soviets have already

cultivated support among the Baluchis to increase their leverage

18
asainst t h e reg i m e in Islamabad .

Finally among the political circles many questions were

repeatedly debated whether or not all the refugees would so back

if the Geneva process was able to produce a settlement ? What would

be the status of those refugees who opt not to go back to

Afghanistan ? Mould they be allowed to become Pakistani citizens ?

If no settlement was agreed upon in the near future , would the aid

be stopped ? What would happen if the refugees refused to accept

the settlement ? Would Pakistan force them out? Would there be a

war within the bordering provinces between the refugees and the

Pakistanis ? Such questions not only reflected the apprehensions of

those who were directly affected by the presence of the refugees

but also at national level , indirectly , communicated fears for

future harmony , stability and peace of Pakistani Society .

Ill
Economic

While Pakistan had to bear enormous economic cost and

experienced innumerable economic problems , not all of them save

birth to security problems . However most of problems listed under

this section eventually contributed substantively towards the

enlargement of existing reservoir of internal security problems .

By the mid 80s , accordin g to various sources , the average cost of

maintaining the registered refugees was little^ over a million

19
dollars a day . This , of course , was the minimum version of the

cost entailed as this did not take into account the new comers and

the unregistered refugees . The cost , of course , increased

enormously with the advent of another million registered refugees .

The number of un-registered refugees varied from 3

00 ,0
00 to

500 ,000 . However , most sources agreed that almost half of the cost

involved in the maintenance of Afghan refugees was borne by

Pakistan and the other half was met by many donor states , agencies

2
0
and international organizations . While it may be true that

almost 50% of the cost was borne by the donors but when invisible

expenditure were added it appeared somewhat reasonable to assume

2
1
that Pakistan was sharing the major burden of the cost involved .
 Another dimension of the economic problem was the issue

cattle , goats ,
of providing fodder to the animals ( sheep , camels

etc .) that came along with their masters . The Afghan refugees were

accompanied by more than 3 million heads of livestock '

whose

indiscriminate and uncontrolled grazing ruined the sparse grazing

grounds and caused extensive damage to the ecology of the

22
surrounding areas . The provision of grazing grounds and water

livestock caused consistent headaches for the

for the Afghani

Pakistani officials . In both provinces of NMFP and Baluchistan ,

lands are somewhat limited . In NMFP most of it

the grazing

be longs to private land owners but in Baluchistan part of the

green pasture land be longs to the Government . Obviously the

private owners guarded their land with all the care they could

muster while the Government land was not sufficient enough to

cater for all the Afghani animals . The persistent grazing of

Afghani livestock on private grazing grounds caused innumerable

clashes and created law and order situation , most of which were

not even reported as it has became a daily event in some areas .

Consequent ly the pressure on land compelled the Pakistani

authorities to disperse them to other provinces ; a necessity which

was not particular ly favoured by the Government because such types

of dispersement often make their eventual repatriation of refugees

rather difficult .

The large concentration of refugees in certain areas

also caused ecological problems . Many forests suffered because most

2
3
refugees used the wood for cooking and heating purposes . Most of

these refugees were poor and not familiar with the use of modern

cooking and heating gadgets that were provided to them and

inconsequence they not only opted but preferred the traditional

methods of using wood . In some areas , the deforestation assumed

alarming proportion s and areas particularly nearer to refugee

villages saw gradual disappearance of trees and shrubs .

Recognizing the inadvertent damage being done to environmental and

ecological resources particularly in NWFP and Baluchistan , the

Government took many remedial measures including portable water

supplies , digging of tube wells and open surface wells , mono pump

2
4
and hand pump, etc . in order to alleviate the situation .

More affluent and wealthier Afghan refugees , after their

arrival , began to invest their wealth in varied types of

commercial pursuits including the real estate and transport

business . The purchase of immovable property caused a boom in real

estate business especially in and around the areas of refugee

concentrations .Realising the dangerous implications of such a

trend the government expressed its determination to curb this

25
deve lopments . Although the Afghan refugees were not allowed to

purchase the immovable properties , the shrewd Afghans continued to

manage to evade the operative rules and regulations either through

capitalising over the incumbent loop-holes within the system or

2
6
through employment of unfair means . They found ways to get

around the law restricting their right to purchase of property by

obtaining National Identity Cards I.D.Card )

( , Domicile

Certificates , and at times even Passports through agents who

27
charged handsome fees for such procurements . Those developments

not only raised the property prices but also encouraged

corruption . In addition , the house -rents had also soared in cities

mainly because rich city dweller Afghans were willing to pay

higher rent which , in turn , pushed the rent ceiling beyond the

28
capacity of the local lower middle and lower classes . In order

to check the refugees unauthorised pursuits in various urban

centres of Pakistan and to make things difficult for the Khsd

agents operating in the guise of refugees , the Government of

Pakist an eventually decided to recheck all the I.D. Cards issued

since 1979 . In addition , the procedure to issue passport had been

made little lengthy enabling the issuing authorities to satisfy

themselves with thorough investigations of the applicants .

small number of refugees also started to participate

in transportation system of NWFP and gradually took over part of

the transport business . The Afghan transporters not only offered

relative ly less rates in order to secure a portion of this

business but also operated without immunity . Many of Afghan

transporters did not bother to pay toll tax at appropriate

checkpoints which , in turn , resulted in many clashes creating

innumerable law and or<Ler situations . It is also alleged that

since the Pakistanis treated them more like guests and were given

faciliti es that were not available to the local transporters , the

29
Afghanis were able to soon establish foothold in this business .

This also caused discontentment among the local transporter .

Periodic clashes between the Afghan and local transporter had

taken place . Among such clashes the Thakot and Quetta clashes

created complex law and order situations . The presence of large

30
number of refugees also increased the unemployment problems . Not

only the refugee concentration areas had already their own

unemployment problems , the arrival of many young refugees looking

for jobs and willing to work for lesser payment escalated the

local unemployment problem . Many Afghanis managed to secure

employmen t in agriculture and construction industry which implied

that those opportunities could have been available to the locals

in the absence of the refugees . In addition , the Afghanis had also

secured reasonable positions of odd Jobs in urban centres . Since

the Af ghanis were and still are willing to work for lower wages

and inconsequence many local employers opted for the Af ghanis over

the locals , the friction became somewhat inevitable .

IV

Social

Many economic issues were , in many ways , linked with the

social prob lems and had contributed enormously towards the

existing tension . For example transport , grazing land , property

purchase , deforestation , and unemployment had all contributed

considerably towards the initial birth and later increasin g

tension between the natives and the foreigners . In urban centres

not only the increased rents ceiling caused frictions but also the

"privileged position * of the refugees for whom the refugee

administration systematically provided all sorts of facilities

31
raised many questions among the local population . Since many

poor Pakistanis did not and still do not enjoy most of the

facilities that had been extended to the Afghan refugees and

government was and still is unable to provide similar facilities

to all the Paki stanis , tension became somewhat a natural outcome

of such situations . In some areas the refu gees settlement had

upset the existing ba lance amongst tribes and sects . The refugees

settlements in Kurram Agency not only altered the existing

sectarian balance and increased tensions between the two sects but

32
it also totally altered the existing demographic structure . It

was also alleged that the refugees fully participated in periodic

sectarian and tribal clashes which caused many deaths , though the

involvement of the refugees in local clashes was strongly

33
condemned by the leaders of the region .

Despite the periodic clashes what seems intriguing is the

fact that the anticipated increase in regional separatism did not

take place . It was expected that the large influx of Pakhtoon

refugees into NwFP would cause increase in regional 1st movement

especially because in NMFP Pakhtoonistan movement had frequently

taken a heavy toll of its stability . But it did not happen . The

initial influx of Afghan refugees consisted of Pakhtoons only but

later the ethnic composition of the Afghan refugees was diversified

through the influx of Tajiks , Uzbeks and Turkmen flowing into

34
Pakistan from the provinces of Kunduz, Beghlan and Jowzjan .
 Another significant social problem that was hitherto

non-existent in Pakistan , is the drugs problem . The drug menace is

direct fallout of the Afghan crisis . Until the advent of the 80s

the drug addiction was relatively unknown to most Pakistanis .

Although poppy was never cultivated on a very high scale in

Pakistan and General Zia '

s concerted efforts further "reduced

Pakistan '
s opium harvest from a 1979 high of 8
00 tons to a low of

45 tons in 1984 , in Afghanistan even after the advent of

35
civil war , poppy remained the most attractive cash crop . Before

the Khomani revolution in Iran , most of the poppy crop was

exported to Iran but with the advent of new regime export to Iran

altogether stopped - W ith the virtual vanishing of Iranian market ,

the growers began to set up labs in both Afghanistan and Pakistan

with the objective of making more profitable heroin for export to

36
the western countries . With Pakistan welcoming the Afghan

refugees and Iran depriving the poppy growers of its market , the

obvious route to west became through Pakistan . One dangerous

byproduct of heroin smuggling through Pakistan was that a massive

increase of heroin consumption among the Pakistanis was noticed

within a short span of time. In 1982 it was reported that out of

1.3 million addicts in Pakistan , roughly about 100 ,0

00 were heroin

hooked and in 1986 the number of heroin addicts exceeded

4 3
7 In 1987
.50 ,0
00. 1 ,2
the official count of addicts rose to 19,0 25

38
which included 6,57,8
42 heroin addicts . Since the advent of the

Afghan crisis , the number has been steadily on the rise despite

government '
s earnest efforts to curb its consumption and to

retrieve the hooked per sons. However , it must be asserted here

that addiction to such a dangerous drug cannot be solely assigned

to the Afghans . Perhaps the increased consumption could also be

attributed to the shiftin g centres of heroin activities and its

easy availability in local markets .

Another social problem confronting the Pakistanis is the

enormously increased crime rate during the last decade and half .

The Afghan imbroglio introduced KaLashnikov culture to Pakistan

with more than 3.5 million people who did not know what to do with

themselves , the Pakistanis had no panacea available to dampen

their irrepressible martial tradition on one hand and to provide

some sort of modes of occupation on the other . It is alleged that

the easy availability of smuggled and unauthorised large

quantities of weapons and ammunitions had contributed and stil l

continues to add substantively towards the increased rate of

39
crimes .
 During the decade from 1981 to 1991 , the crime rate

rapid ly increased throughout the country . However the province of

NMFP which was playing host to a very large number of Afghan

refugees saw a massive rise in the crime rate . It was reported

that the NWFP saw 75% rise in the crime rate . It was reported that

during the last decade 481 ,948 crimes were committed , out of which

361 ,461 were reported to have been committed by the Afghan

40
refugees . Death attempts were made on 6,189 citizens by

Pakistanis and for 18,5

65 death attempts Afghanis were named and

as far as the Kidnapping was concerned the locals kidnapped 1,287

»^er& 1
persons whereas the Afghanis .found guilty for 5,8
59 kidnapping .^.

Similarly in dacoities and robberies , the involvements of the

42
Afghanis was much more than the Pakistanis . The presence of &.

large number of Afghan refugees and the persistence of Afghan

crisis directly affected the law and order situation in Pakistan .

The provinces of Nl^FP suffered the maximum . What is interesting is

to note that prior to the advent of Afghan crisis , sophisticated

weapons like Kalashinkov s or rocket launchers were never used in

any crime in Pakistan but now these weapons are viewed as ordinary

weapons . In addition , the die hard criminals began to use the

Afghan refugees camps as a safe hide out and the local police

refrained from strict application of local laws to these camps.

 1.6
Sometimes, when the loc^l authorities felt that law had to applied

and pursued the criminals in the refugee camps, invariably such

actions were resented by party leadership . Apart from other

factors , the easy availability of weapons on cheap rates was

indeed the major factor that caused the undesired increase in the

crime rate .

Three factors seemed to have caused tremendous increase

in weapons inside the country .First , the Afghan rulers had

continuously supplied arms to certain tribes in Pakistani

territory with a view to establish a sympathetic tribal m ilitia

that wou ld act as a restraint on resistance activities in and

43
around the tribal belt .- Second , since both Pakistani territory

and the Afghan political leaders were serving as conduit for

weapon supplies to resistance field commanders , it was alleged

that both involved Pakistani officials as well as Afghan political

44
leaders were peddling weapons for personal profit , while

accusing the CIA (

Central Intelligence Agency ) of gross

mismanagement of the arms pipeline to MuJahideens , the US

Congressmen emphasised that 4

0% of the total arms aid were

syphoned off along the way by corrupt officials , Afghan leaders

45
and MuJahideens . Third , in a crisis situation , it is somewhat
inevitable that local arms manufacturers would inevitably increase

its production in order to generate sufficient profit . Conscious

of increased smuggling of arms that flooded the market , the

indigenous producer was left with limited options ; either to

employ the economy of scales princip les or to indulge in

smuggling . A combination of these factors had not only increased

the availability of weapons but had also reduced the prices . Thus

the cheap weapons were and still are now easily attainable which ,

in turn . seemed to have contributed its share towards increased

., 4 6
crime rate .

Concluding remarks

Even today , the situation in Afghanistan is far from

being satisfactory ,it is positively enhancing the agony of the

friendly neighbours , more specifically that of Pakistan . In recent

times no other crisis had so profoundly affected Pakistan as had

the continuing Afghan crisis done so far . The forcible takeover of

Kashmir by India and the separation of East Pakistan were the

great tragedies of the past that had befallen on Pakistan . The

effects of Afghanistan crisis and the consequent presence of large

number of Afghan refugees were far reachin g. Whi le some of the

refugees have gone back to Afghanistan , a large bulk of them is

still in Pakistan . In fact , with the increase in the intensity of

ongoing civil war many Af ghan refugees who had already been

repatriated to their respective provinces began to once again

leave their home and entered into Pakistan . While 17,57402 Afghan

refugees had been repatriated during the last four years , the

47
fresh arrival of refugees between 1992 -94 were about 1
260
26 .

Among the host of problems that were the direct product

of large number of Afghan refugees presence on Pakistani soil ,

ethnic imbalances , terrorism , drug trafficking , smuggling and

alarmingly increased crime rate caused dangerous internal security

situations periodically . Added to these factors was the active

role of Khad which consistently attempted to initially create and

later exploit all situations of internal security . Some of these

problems existed even before the advent of the Afghan crisis . For

instance both smuggling and ethnicity don '

t owe their origin to

the Afghan crisis . Ethnic divisions have been a significant

impediment to the desired stabi lity since the creation of

Pakistan . Smuggling phenomenon is also too well known to almost

all developing societies. The Afghan crisis had not only pushed

these problems to alarmingly dangerous levels but periodically

produced serious internal security situations . Similarly the rapid

increase in crime rate was too high to be brushed aside . Terrorism

and drug trafficking were the new entrants to Pakistan '

s long list
of complex internal security problems . Each of the above mentioned

problems contributed their share towards the gradual weakening of

Pakistan '
s unity , stability and security . The internal security

situation was further exacerbated with the active role of external

agencies seared to quickly destablise Pakistan . Until and unless

vast majority of Af ghan refugees are repatriated , many of the

above discussed problems are likely to persist and continue

confronting the Pakistani authorities . Many of the Afghan refugees

are somewhat reluctant to go back because of the ongoing fierce

power struggle inside Afghanistan and many refugees are still

waiting in Pakistan for the return of normalcy in Afghanistan . In

consequence the Pakistani authorities continue to experience

undesired level of tension generated mostly by internal security

situations , which in turn , are the direct product of the Afghan

refugees presence on Pakistani soil ,

 NOTES

1. For details see Beverly Male'

s article entitled "A tiger ~by
the Tai l : Pakistan and the Afghan Refugees 'in Milton Osborne
et al. . Refug ee's? Four Political case studies . (
Camberra : The
Australian National University , 1981 ), p .39.

2- See '
The Af ghanistan Crisis and Pakistan '
s Security Dilemma *
by Pevaiz Iqbal Cheema in Asian Survey , Vol . XXIII , No . 3,
March 1983 , pp . 234 -37.

3. See "Along Afghanistan '

s war Torn Frontier * by Debra Denker in
National Geographic June 1985 , p . 7
85 . Also see The tluslim,
9 and August 4, 1987 .
0 , 1986 . July , 2
July 2

4. See "The MAr in Afghanistan ' by Craig M . Karp in Foreign

Af fairs, Summer 1986 , pp . 102 7.
6 -2

5. Ibid.

6. Denker , Of>. c-it., p . 7

85 .

7.- Ibid.

8. The highjackers demanded 2

000 truckloads of food and 5 million
dollars as ransom to free the children . In addition , the
highjackers demanded a helecopter .After the passage of 3
9
hours of long unsuccessful negotiations with the kidnappers ,
the Pakistani authorities decided to undertake commando action
and rescued the hostages unharmed but during the action all
the highjackers were killed . The incident invoked strong
reacion both among the Paksitanis as well as the Afghanis .
Angry Afghani mob attacked and burned Pakistani embassy in
Kabul . Consequently Pakistani mission in Kabu l was temporarily
closed . Por detailed analysis see Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema '
s
article entitled "What was behind the bus hijacking " in The
News, March 7, 1994 . Also see The News.Feb . 21 , 2 ,2
2 3. 2
4.
5. The Frontier
2 Post FEb. 25, 1994 . Jang , Nawa -e-Ua
at (
Urdu
Newspapers )Feb. 2 3, 1
2 .2 994 .

9. See Afghan Refugees in Pakistan ; Influx , Humanitarian

Assistance and Implications 'by Hasan Askari Rizvi in Pakisan
Horizon Vol . XXXVII . No - 1. 1st Quarter 1984 , pp . 4
0-61
10. Ibid.It was reported at the time that large number o-f
refugees had already managed to enlist themselves as regular
'
voters on Pakistan s electoral roll . See Jang (Urdu Daily )
,
8 , 1986 .
June 2

11. The Government of Paksitan announced that all Identity Card

(ID)issued since 1979 would have to be again reverified and
reissued .This measure was introduced to check the fake ID
Cards . See The Nation, July 31, 1987 .

12. The tluslim, Feb. 4, 1986 .

13. Ibid.

16.. Both Wal l Khan (

Leader of ANP ) and Asghar Khan (
Leader of
Tehrik -e-Istiqlal ) supported this view . See T hettuslim, may 7,
1985 .

0 , 1987 .
15. The- Nstion, July 2

16. See , South , Oct . 1982 , p . 2

4.

17. See ~ In Afghanistan '

s Shadow 'by Arthur Ross in The Uashins iton
Quar terly, Autumn 1982 . Also see Soviet Ambassador Smirnov 's
speech to the Press Club in Karachi on 18th Nov . 1984 , in The
liuslim Nov . 19 , 1984 . Also see the Times of Indie, Ap . 13,
1984 .

18. Ibid, Ross .

19. The Administrative cost of 2.4 million registered refugees was

put around a mi llion dollar a day in 1985 . Neither the flow of
refugees had stopped nor the unregistered refugees had been
taken into considerations when the above mentioned figures
were quotred .It is quite safe to assume taht the cost of
maintaining those refugees was more than a mil lion dollars a
day . Later this cost touched almost two million dollars (
For
sometimes )a day when the nmerbers drastically increased . See
Denker , O p. cit., p. 7 88 . Also see "Afghan refugees in
Paksitan ; The Paksitani view by Said Azhar in The Cultural
Bssis of Afghan N ationalism edited by Ewan M. Anderson and
Nancy H . Dupree New York : Pinter Publishers , 1990 )
( , p . 108 .
Also see '
The Politics of Afghan Resettlement and
Rehabili tation ' by harvin 6. Meinbaum in Asian Survey, Vol .
XXIX . No . 3, March 1989 .
0 . Ibid.
2

21 . The actual financial cost was almost equally shared . Pakistan

and the donor agencies but if you add invisible cost like
deforestation or free fodder from Pakistani grazing grounds ,
the the cost certainly appear much more than 5
0% of the total
cost involved . During the year 1987 -8
8 the financia l
requirement for the upkeep of 3 million refugees was as
follows ; Tota l amount spent 362 million dollars . Pakistan '
s
share 177 million dollars Externa l Sources 185 million
UNHCR + other donors.
dollars . ( )
Source :Chief Commissioner of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan .

2-
2 Said Azhar . Op. oil., p . 105 -

3 . See '
2 New Measure to save the forests 'by Ekber Menemencioglu
and Yvan Concur in Refu gees , No . 11, nov . 1984 . pp . 2
0 -21 .
also see '
the Afghan REfugees : The Human Aspect * by Zafar
Samdani in Pakistan and Gulf Economist Oct . 9-15, 1
982 , pp .
24--2
5.

4 . See
2 "The Afghan Crisis and its impact on Pakistan ' by Hafee z
Malik in Journa l of South Asian and diddle Easte rn Studies
Vol . 3.Sprin g 1982 , p . 4
6-

5 . The fluslim Dec . 8, 1981 .

2

6 . The South , Oct . 1982 . p . 2

2 4.

7 .Rizvi . Op. oit.

2 , p. 5
4.

2 , Also See
8 . Ibid. The Nation , June 2, 1987 .

2
9- Ibid.

30 . Male , Of>. oil., p . 39 .

31 . Malik , <?/z wt.. p . 46.

32. Every sixth or seventh person in IWFP and Baluchist an was an
Afghan refugee . In tribal areas and the Quetta division of
Baluchistan every third or fourth person was an Af ghan
refugee. The local population of Kurram was 289 , 0
00 where as

the refugee population was around 3 47 ,14.6. The areas of large

concentrations of Afghan refueees included Kurram , chaghi ,

North Uaziristan , Bajaur , Kohat , Pishin etc. For details see

Said Ashar , op. cit., p . 108 . Also see Rizvi , O p. cit., p. 5
3.
The- nuslim July29 , 1987 . The Nation, July 29 , 1 987 .

9 , 1987 .
t tuslim July 2
33. The

34. See 'Repatriation of Afghan Refugees : A UNHCR Perspective ' by

Rene Van Rooyen in the Seminar report entit led Afghanitsn :
Loo king to the Future (Islamabad : The Institute of STrstesic
, pp . 5
Studies , 1990 ) 4-66.

35. Denker , £3p . cit ., p . 7

88 .

6 . Ibid., Also see the Newesweek, Oct . 6, 1

3 986 .

37. The fiu s l i m March 1982 . Also see The M uslim Aug . 14, 1986 .

38. The ttuslim, July 2, 198

7.

9 . See Inspector
3 General Police '
s (
Punjab Police ) Statement in
Jang Urdu daily )Nov . 7, 1
( 986 . Also see The Nations , July
31 , 1987 .

40. The News, Mrch 8, 1992 .

41 . Ibid.

42. Pakistanis involved in dacoities 9 whereas

were 5 175 dacorties
were committed by the Afghanis . 154 robbery cases were
registered against Pakistanis whereas 45,975 robberies were
committed by the Afghanis . Ibid.

43. See 'Afghanistan : Winds of Change ' by colonel Edgar O'

Ballance '
in the Asian Defence Jour '
n8l , Sept . 1986 ., p . 8
0.

4 . Time, Dec . 9, 1985 .

4

5 . The Nation, J uly 31 , 1

4 987 .
4.6.In 1987 a Chinese Kaloshnikov was available in the arms marke t
of tribal areas for Rs. 15,0
00 where as the Russian version
was costing little bit more . Locally manufactured exact copy
were sold for rupees 7000 . Even anti-tank rocket launchers
were available for Rupees 5 ,0
2 00 . the shopkeepers would
readily deliver all those weapons anywhere in Pakistan
provided the buyers was willing to pay the delivery charges.
The stiatuion was not at all changed even today though the
nature of crisis in Afghanistan has radically changed . Se Tfw
nation , July 31 , 1987 .

4.7. See the latest ;report of Chief Coordinator R & R ) and

( Chief
Commissioner for Afghan REfugees , Islamabad , 199 4.