Grazer Philosophische Studien

80 (2010), 65–77.

GROUNDS AND CONSEQUENCES

Roderick BATCHELOR
Universidade de São Paulo

Summary
We first introduce the intuitive idea of a relation of grounding between facts (§ 1).
Then we propose a definition of this idea, based on a certain theory of the
structure of facts (§ 2, with formalization in an appendix). Finally we consider
the idea of proofs of a special kind, namely proofs which follow the grounds of
what is proved (§ 3).

1. Introduction

It is natural to think that some facts are more fundamental than others;
and that more fundamental facts may be the grounds of which other, less
fundamental facts, are consequences.
We mean here an objective relation, a relation between the facts in
themselves; it is nothing to do with our knowledge of them.
So for instance if we consider a conjunctive fact p š q, it seems obvious
that the more fundamental separate facts p and q provide in some sense
the ground of the conjunctive fact p š q. It is because it is the case that p
and because it is the case that q, that it is the case that p š q. Of course p
and q may have further grounds of their own; but they are the immediate
grounds, of which p š q is an immediate consequence.
The idea of such a relation of ground and consequence is to be distin-
guished from the idea of a relation of cause and effect, although the two
have sometimes been mixed up. A relation of causation should no doubt
be an empirical relation, with application restricted to spatio-temporal
occurrences or the like. A relation of grounding, on the other hand,
should be a logical relation (in a broad sense of the term), and one which
can be applied to any facts whatsoever, even e.g. mathematical facts (if
there are such things). There may well be, however, some connexion
between grounding and causation: for instance, relations of causation
might perhaps be definable in terms of relations of grounding (as Bolzano
thought).
Nor can the relation of ground to consequence be identified with any
relation of mere implication. It is true that the grounds of a fact, at least
the total grounds, should always imply the fact: so in our example of con-
junctive facts, the grounds—the fact that p and the fact that q—, taken
together, imply the consequence—the fact that p š q. But it is equally
true, for instance, that p š q implies p (or q); but of course we don’t want
to say that p š q is a ground of which p is a consequence—it is rather
the other way round: it is p that is one of the grounds of the fact p š q.
It is a characteristic of all relations of mere implication that they some-
times hold in both directions (p implies q and q implies p); but it is essen-
tial to the relation of ground to consequence that it should never hold in
both directions, i.e. that it should be anti-symmetric (if p is a ground of q
then q is not a ground of p). In other words: mutual implication must be
possible, but not mutual grounding. From this it follows that grounding is
not to be identified with implication; and also that, between two mutually
implying facts, the grounding relation holds in at most one direction.
Here is an example given by Bolzano in this connexion. If it’s cold, then
the thermometer will be low; and the converse of this is no less true: if
the thermometer is low then it’s cold. But of course it is because it’s cold
that the thermometer is low and not because the thermometer is low that
it’s cold: the coldness of the weather is the ground (or part of the ground)
of the lowness of the thermometer. It may well happen that our reason for
thinking that it’s cold is that we can see that the thermometer is low; but
the reason—the objective reason, the ground—for the thermometer’s being
low is it’s being cold, and not the other way round.
Another excellent example of this point can be found in the following
remark of Aristotle: ‘The fact of the being of a man carries with it the
truth of the proposition that he is [i.e. the fact that the proposition that
he is is true], and the implication is reciprocal (for if a man is, the propo-
sition wherein we allege that he is is true, and conversely, if the proposi-
tion wherein we allege that he is is true, then he is). But the truth of the
proposition is in no way the reason of the being of the man, but the fact
of the man’s being does seem somehow to be the reason of the truth of
the proposition, for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the
fact of the man’s being or not being.’ (Categories, Ch. 12, ad fin. Cf. also
Metaphysics 1051b7: ‘It is not because we think truly that you are pale, that
you are pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth’.)

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 This idea of a relation of grounds and consequences, of an objective
‘order of reasons’, can be found in some form in the writings of various
philosophers, especially perhaps those of a more logical cast of mind, such
as Aristotle and Leibniz. But it was not until Bolzano that this relation
was made itself the object of a sustained and detailed investigation. (See
Bolzano 1837, esp. §§ 198–222. Tatzel 2002 may be consulted for further
references to Bolzano and to secondary literature.) Bolzano’s work contains
already many of the necessary distinctions and observations within this
area, and some of these we will be echoing in what follows.

2. A definition of grounding

Bolzano was inclined to thinking that this relation of ground and conse-
quence was a basic, indefinable relation; and it is indeed hard to think of
any plausible general definition. (Bolzano’s unfortunate tentative sugges-
tion in his note to § 221 is best forgotten.) On the other hand, one ought
always to be suspicious when a philosopher says that a certain notion is
indefinable: in almost all cases he has reached not the real end of analysis
but rather the end of his wits. A deeper investigation would almost always
result in analysis being carried further and a definition being given.
It is also true that sometimes one ought neither to give a definition
nor to think that a fundamental, indefinable notion has been reached:
sometimes one ought to conclude that there is no legitimate notion cor-
responding to our preliminary, intuitive idea that was up for some sort of
precisification. And perhaps many philosophers might be inclined to think
this in the present case of this intuitive idea of ground and consequence.
But it is no doubt the most satisfying state of affairs when we can give a
proper definition of a notion.
Now, however this may be, it will be argued in what follows that we can
give a definition of this notion of a relation of ground and consequence,
if we proceed case by case: we do not give a definition in general terms for
arbitrary facts, but rather first give a classification of facts according to their
form, and then a clause-of-definition for each of these forms. We already
saw before in effect the suitable clause for the case of conjunctive facts: the
immediate grounds of a conjunctive fact are its conjuncts. Similar clauses
may then be given for facts of all other forms.
It may be granted that a definition in general terms (had it been pos-
sible) would have been better than a case-by-case definition; but surely a

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case-by-case definition is better than no definition at all. Also, even if one
found the case-by-case procedure inadequate as a definition of the relation
of grounding, one might still allow it the interest of a correct specification
of the extension of the relation.
An obvious drawback of such a procedure is that it requires one first
to provide a suitable exhaustive classification of forms of facts, which is
of course no easy task and some might even think is not a feasible task
at all.
In any case, here we will illustrate the procedure on the basis of a
especially simple theory of the forms of facts, namely an atomistic theory
similar to that of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. (It is merely similar to the theory
of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and we will not be pausing to indicate all the
differences.) To philosophers who think that there are facts of other forms,
we may recommend the task of extending the definition of grounds by
providing suitable clauses for those other forms.
Our theory can be described as follows:—
There are situations (also known as ‘states of affairs’), of which some are
factual (obtain, are the case), and others are counterfactual (do not obtain,
are not the case). Factual situations we may also call facts; and counter-
factual situations we may also call counterfacts. By the factuality-value of a
situation we mean factuality or counterfactuality according as the situation
is factual or counterfactual. (This is of course by analogy with the term
truth-value, factuality and counterfactuality being what corresponds, for
situations, to truth and falsehood for propositions.)
By an atomic situation we mean a situation which consists of a simple
Property applied to a simple substance, or a simple Relation applied to some
simple substances (simple in the sense of not having any proper parts or
constituents). (We give this standard definition only for the sake of definite-
ness: in fact the exact nature of the inner constitution of atomic situations
will be irrelevant for our main purposes here.) The atomic situations are
modally independent, i.e. all combinations of factuality-values for atomic
situations are possible. We assume that all situations are truth-functions (or
more correctly speaking factuality-functions) of atomic situations. More
specifically, we assume that every situation is built up out of some atomic
situations by successive applications of negation and conjunction.
We use the term elementary situations for both atomic situations and
negations thereof.
We assume, contrary to what Wittgenstein thought, that the truth-func-
tions (or better factuality-functions) give a definite contribution to the

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identity of the situations in which they figure: negation and conjunction
are taken here as specific entities, which appear as constituents of situations.
Thus for instance the situation aap is for us distinct from the situation p
(although of course the two are strictly equivalent).
We assume also that conjunction can apply to any finite or infinite
number (t 1) of situations to give another situation.
Now, in this theory, the elementary facts, i.e. the factual elementary
situations, determine all other facts (i.e. which other situations are fac-
tual). Moreover the elementary facts should be the ultimate grounds of
which all other facts are consequences. They are the most fundamental
facts, which have no grounds of their own but serve as the grounds for
all other, less fundamental facts; they are the starting-points of the chain
of groundings.
Coming now to non-elementary facts, we may distinguish in the first
instance two cases: conjunctive facts, and (non-elementary) negative
facts.
As we saw before, the immediate grounds of a conjunctive fact are to
be its conjuncts.
The case of non-elementary negative facts can be sub-divided into two
cases, according as the negated situation is negative or conjunctive. (It
must be one of the two, or else the negation would be elementary.) That
is to say, there is the case of facts which are negations of negations, and the
case of facts which are negations of conjunctions: facts of the form aap and
facts of the form aš(p, q, …).
The immediate ground of a fact aap must be of course the fact p.
And the immediate grounds of a fact aš(p, q, …) we will take to be the
facts ar, as, etc. where r, s, etc. are the counterfacts among p, q, …—and
there must of course be at least one such counterfact or else it would not
be a fact that aš(p, q, …).
The definition of immediate grounding (I) is then as follows:

1. If the fact p is elementary, then it has no immediate grounds.

2. If p = š(q, r, …), then s I p iff s = q or s = r or …
3. If p = aaq, then r I p iff r = q.
4. If p = aš(q, r, …), then s I p iff s = au or s = av or …, where u, v,
… are the counterfacts among q, r, …

(If one thought that disjunction was basic rather than conjunction, one
should replace 2 and 4 above by the obviously similar clauses for disjunctive

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and negative-disjunctive facts: the immediate grounds of a disjunction are
the disjuncts which are facts, and the immediate grounds of the negation
of a disjunction are the negations of the disjuncts.)
One might prefer to count an elementary fact not as having no immedi-
ate grounds but as being its own only immediate ground. But this would
be less adequate: nothing can properly be said to be a reason for itself.
Some impatient mothers like to answer, when a child asks ‘Why?’, with
‘Because—just because’—or ‘Why so and so?’, ‘So and so because so and
so’. In any such case the child is no doubt justified in thinking that the
question has been evaded and no reason has been really given.
Now the grounds of a fact can be defined as its immediate grounds
plus the immediate grounds of those immediate grounds and so on. More
exactly:

p G1 q = p I q.
p Gn + 1 q = r (p I r š r Gn q).
p G q = n t 1 (p Gn q).

That is to say, the relation of grounding is the ancestral of the relation of

immediate grounding.
Mediate grounds should not be defined as non-immediate grounds: for
we sometimes wish to count a fact as both a mediate and an immediate
ground of another, as e.g. p in p š (p š q). Rather we should define ‘p is
a mediate ground of q’ as n ≥ 2 (p Gn q).
The ultimate grounds of a fact are then defined as its grounds which have
no further grounds of their own—i.e. which are elementary facts.
Complete (or total) grounds and sufficient grounds may also be defined
in the obvious way: the complete grounds of a fact p are simply the facts
q such that q G p; and sufficient grounds for a fact p are any facts each of
which is a ground of p and whose conjunction strictly implies p.
Both complete and sufficient grounding are relations which hold
between one grounded fact p (‘on the right’) and, typically, a plurality of
more than one grounding facts q, r, s, … (‘on the left’). But it should be
observed that here these relations are being defined in terms of our more
basic relation G which relates always a single fact p to a single fact q (as
does the relation I in terms of which we have defined G).
Now, all these notions of grounding concern, as we may say, not the
grounds of the being of facts, but rather the grounds of their factuality.
By the grounds of the being of a fact, or indeed of any other entity, we

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mean the simpler entities which figure in the composition of the given
entity; i.e. what may be called its constituents. But ontic grounding in this
sense can be said to be related to grounding in our sense of grounds of
factuality or factive grounding, in so far as the factive grounds of a fact are,
generally, also ontic grounds of it. (The only slight exceptions to this stem
from the fact that the negation of a conjunction may have as immediate
factive ground something that is not quite one of its ontic grounds but
only the negation of one.) We see thus that the more fundamental facts
(i.e. the facts which are closer to the base of the chain of groundings) are
in general the simpler facts, a principle which is also borne out by mere
common sense.
In fact, within the theory sketched above, ontic grounding or constitu-
ency can be given a case-by-case definition rather similar to the definition
of factive grounding. Let us assume that there are no entities beyond the
simple substances and simple Properties and Relations which make up
atomic situations, negation and conjunction (which we take to be simple
entities), and the various situations. Then we can define the immediate
constituents of an atomic situation to be its Property or its Relation and
the substance or substances to which it is applied in the situation; of a
conjunctive situation to be conjunction and its conjuncts; and of a negative
situation to be negation and its negatum; and entities other than situa-
tions have no immediate constituents. Constituency is then the ancestral
of immediate constituency; and the ultimate constituents of an entity are
its simple constituents. Just as the elementary facts are the starting-points
of the chain of factive groundings, so the simple entities are the starting-
points of the chain of ontic groundings.
Now going back to factive grounding, in the theory described above
it is easy to see that every non-elementary fact, even if it is itself a neces-
sary fact, must be grounded on some contingent facts. But in some other
metaphysical theories this will not be so, and it may then be interesting
to consider the notion of a pure necessity, which can be defined as: a fact
which is itself necessary and which, necessarily, has only necessary facts as
grounds. Thus mathematical facts might be examples of pure necessities
in this sense, but not say p › ap for p contingent, since this ‘touches con-
tingency’ at some point in the chain of grounding. This definition of pure
necessity would provide an explication, within the theory of grounding, of
the idea of a ‘transcendental’ fact adumbrated in Fine 2005. (It is perhaps
surprising that Fine himself does not make this connexion, since he is quite
concerned with grounding, as can be seen from Fine 2001 § 5 and other,

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as yet unpublished works.) There is also an approximate correlate of this
notion for ontic grounding or constituency: we may say that a situation p
is hyper-rigid if p is rigid (i.e. non-contingent) and all situations which are
constituents of p are also rigid. Presumably in any reasonable metaphysic
all hyper-rigid facts will be pure necessities; but the converse may fail: e.g.
identities or modal facts may provide counterexamples.—In the present
theory, however, obviously no situation is hyper-rigid.

3. Canonical proofs

Now, in the present theory we can say that every non-elementary fact has
a single proof in a certain canonical sense: namely, a proof which follows
the grounds of the fact proved, from the most proximate to the most dis-
tant—from the immediate grounds to the ultimate grounds.
(The idea of such canonical proofs can be found in Bolzano (op. cit.,
esp. § 525). He used for them the term Begründungen, which he opposed
to Gewissmachungen, i.e. proofs of any other kind. It should be mentioned
here also that the term ‘canonical proof ’ has been used in a somewhat
related sense by Dummett and Prawitz. See Dummett 1991, Chs. 11 and
12, where can also be found references to Prawitz’s writings.)
The three clauses of our definition of immediate grounding for non-
elementary facts correspond in an obvious way to three rules of inference
which are the only rules in accordance with which all canonical proofs
must proceed. These we will call (not very imaginatively) the Rule for
Conjunctions, the Rule for Negations of Negations, and the Rule for
Negations of Conjunctions:

p q … p ar as …
(RC)  (RNN)  (RNC) 
š(p, q, …) aap aš(p, q, …)

(r, s, ... being the counterfacts among p, q, …).

It should be emphasized here that canonical proofs in the present sense
have nothing to do with language (or thought). They are certain tree-
structures (in the sense of set theory) with facts as nodes.
Naturally we do not speak of the proof of a situation if the situation is
not a fact. But if a non-elementary situation which as it happens is not a
fact had been a fact, then it would have had its unique canonical proof.

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It is not only actually the case but also necessarily the case that every non-
elementary fact has a unique canonical proof.
But what the canonical proof of a fact is is not in general necessarily
determined—it is often a contingent matter. Speaking in terms of possible
worlds, we can say that a situation may have different canonical proofs in
different possible worlds.
This is due to a certain peculiarity of the Rule for Negations of Con-
junctions as compared to the other two rules—namely: If š(p, q, …) is a
fact then its immediate grounds must be p, q, …; and if aap is a fact then
its immediate ground must be p; but if aš(p, q, …) is a fact, it is not in
general necessarily determined what are its immediate grounds.
For instance, let p and q be atomic situations such that, as it happens, p
is a fact but q a counterfact—although, given the independence of atomic
situations, the three other combinations of factuality-value are also pos-
sible. The canonical proof of the fact p › q, i.e. aš(ap, aq), is then, as it
happens, this:

p
RNN 
aap
RNC 
aš(ap, aq)

But if p and q had both been facts the canonical proof would be rather
this:

p q
RNN   RNN
aap aaq
RNC 
aš(ap, aq)

And if q had been a fact and p a counterfact:

q
RNN 
aaq
RNC 
aš(ap, aq)

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If both p and q had been counterfacts then p › q would also have been a
counterfact and so would have no proof at all.
The tautologies are the only situations which would have had proofs no
matter what factuality-values their atomic situations had. But again what
the proof is will vary from possible world to possible world: e.g. the proof
of p › ap (where p is atomic) will now start from p, now from ap.
We may add here that, just as factive grounding gives rise to this notion
of canonical proof, so also ontic grounding gives rise to a notion of canoni-
cal definition: that is to say, a definition which follows the ontic grounds
of what is defined, from the most proximate to the most distant—from
the immediate constituents to the ultimate constituents. (This is what is
called an H-tree in Batchelor (forthcoming), where a more precise account
can be found.) One important difference is that, unlike canonical proofs,
canonical definitions are always the same in all possible worlds.
The three rules given above may be useful also in the construction of
postulate-systems. Suppose for instance that we have a language where
all formulae are built up out of some ‘atomic formulae’ by negation and
(possibly infinitary) conjunction. If the axioms of a system consist of one
out of each pair a, aa for a atomic, and the rules of inference correspond
to our three rules above, it is easy to show (by induction on the complexity
of formulae) that the system is negation-complete in the sense that for each
formula D, either D or aD is a theorem. If we take the usual propositional
variables p, q, etc. as the atomic formulae, we obtain 20 negation-complete
systems; the classical propositional calculus can then be characterized as
their intersection.

Appendix

The definitions of notions of grounding given in § 2 above were somewhat

informal: they were formulated in a mixture of English and a few logical
symbols. The question therefore arises of what is the weakest (reasonable)
completely formal language in which those definitions can be formulated.
And the answer to this question seems to be: the language of third-order
propositional modal logic: i.e. a language which contains not only variables for
situations (‘propositional’ or better situational variables), but also variables
for classes of situations, both quantifiable—besides truth-functors, modal
operators and the membership-sign.—We proceed then to indicate the
(quite straightforward) formalization of our definitions in this language.

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 We take the basic symbols of the language to be: a, š, , , , the
situational variables p, q, …, and the class-variables *, ', … (and brackets).
The definition of formula is the obvious one: we should only mention that
š may also (besides connecting two formulae) be prefixed to a class-vari-
able to give a formula. We assume the usual definitions of ›, Š, {, . We
may define D = E (where D and E are formulae) as * (D  * { E  *);
or if one doesn’t like that, one should then add = as a further primitive
symbol. Fact-variables f, g, … and fact-quantification are introduced in
the obvious way: f Mf =df p (p Š Mp).
The notation š(*) is supposed to indicate here the conjunction of
certain situations, viz. the situations in *: so the class * itself is no part of
the situation described. We assume that the class-variables range over non-
empty classes of situations, so that š(*) is always a situation. It is not to
be supposed, of course, that any situations form a class—indeed the unre-
stricted principle of comprehension * p (p  * { Mp) would quickly
lead to contradiction when we put a' (p = š(') š p  ') for Mp. This is
of course like Russell 1903, Appendix B. (It is perhaps worth noting that
the derivation must use some such principle as š(*) = š(') Š p (p 
* { p  '), which is inevitable here, but not correct for intensional situa-
tions (identical if strictly equivalent), for which the unrestricted principle
of comprehension is acceptable and leads to no Russellian problems.)
Now the definitions of immediate grounding and of grounding can be
formulated as follows:

f I g =df g = aaf › * (g = š(*) š f  *) ›

* (g = aš(*) šp  * (f = ap)).
f G g =df * ((g  * š h, k ((h  * š k I h) Š k  *)) Š f  *).

(From this of course we can define D G E as f, g (D = f š E = g š f G g),

and similarly in other such cases.)
Levels of grounding are also straightforwardly defined:

f G1 g = f I g
f Gn + 1 g = h (f I h š h Gn g).

Also mediate, ultimate, complete, and sufficient grounds:

f mG g =df h (f G h š h G g).
f uG g =df f G g š ah (h G f ).

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 * cG f =df p (p G f { p  *).
* sG f =df p  * (p G f ) š (š(*) Š f ).

It should be clear that, given a notion of immediate grounding, the

adequacy of all these other definitions is independent of our atomistic
metaphysics.
We can also formulate our definition of Finean ‘transcendentality’ or
pure necessity:
pure D =df D š p (p G D Š p).

Even our definitions of ontic grounding or constituency can be formu-

lated in this language, in the case where the constituent is a situation. Thus
immediate constituency can be defined as:

D H E =df E = aD › * (E = š(*) š D  *).

(Indeed even a H E [sic] can be defined here as p (E = ap); and š H E

[sic] as * (E = š(*)).)
There are then the definitions, exactly similar to the ones above for
factive grounding, of constituency, levels of constituency, mediate con-
stituent, ultimate (situational) constituent, and complete (situational)
constituents. Sufficient factive grounding has no perfect correlate for ontic
grounding.
Finally hyper-rigidity can be defined as:

!'D =df 'D š p (p C D Š 'p),

where 'D =df D › aD, and C means constituency.

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Batchelor, Roderick (forthcoming): “Complexes and their Constituents”.

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Dummett, Michael 1991: The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. London: Duckworth.
Fine, Kit 2001: “The Question of Realism”. Philosophers’ Imprint 1, 130.
— 2005: “Necessity and Non-existence”. In his Modality and Tense: Philosophical
Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 32154.
Russell, Bertrand 1903: The Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge
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Tatzel, Armin 2002: “Bolzano’s Theory of Ground and Consequence”. Notre Dame
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