Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 07/29/2020 11:12 AM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by A. Miro,Deputy Clerk

1
SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP
2 WILLIAM H. FORMAN (State Bar No. 150477)
wforman@scheperkim.com
3 DAVID C. SCHEPER (State Bar No. 120174)
dscheper@scheperkim.com
4 MARGARET E. DAYTON (State Bar No. 274353)
pdayton@scheperkim.com
5 800 West Sixth Street, 18th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90017-2701
6 Telephone: (213) 613-4655
Facsimile: (213) 613-4656
7
Attorneys for Defendant,
8 Church of Scientology International

9 JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP

ROBERT E. MANGELS (Bar No. 48291)
10 rmangels@jmbm.com
MATTHEW D. HINKS (Bar No. 200750)
11 mhinks@jmbm.com
1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor
12 Los Angeles, California 90067-4308
Telephone: (310) 203-8080
13 Facsimile: (310) 203-0567

14 Attorneys for Defendant,

Religious Technology Center
15
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
16
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
17
VALERIE HANEY, CASE NO. 19STCV21210
18 Assigned to Hon. Richard J. Burdge, Jr.
Plaintiff,
19 DEFENDANTS CHURCH OF
v. SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL AND
20 RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER’S
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S
21 INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
TECHNOLOGY CENTER, and DAVID
22 MISCAVIGE; and DOES 1-25, [Filed Concurrently with Supporting
Declarations of Deidre Assam, Lynn R. Farny,
23 Defendants. William H. Forman, Gary S. Soter, and
Michael Sutter; and Objections to the
24 Declarations of Robert W. Thompson, Michael
Rinder, and Hana Whitfield]
25
Date: August 11, 2020
26 Time: 1:30 p.m.
Dept: 37
27
Complaint Filed: June 18, 2019
28 Trial Date: Vacated

DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
2
I.  INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................5 
3
II.  ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................................6 
4
A.  Plaintiff Did Not Provide Notice of the Motion. ........................................................6 
5
B.  Plaintiff’s Inherent Authority Argument Is Improper and Meritless. ........................7 
6
C.  The Court Cannot Grant Reconsideration Under Section 1008(a).............................8 
7
1.  Reconsideration Is Improper Based on Plaintiff’s “New” Facts. ...................8 
8
(a)  “Facts” From the FBT Cannot Be A Basis For
9 Reconsideration ..................................................................................8 

10 (i)  The Arguments “Based on” the FBT Are Meritless. .............9 

11 (b)  “Facts” Regarding Scientology’s Arbitration Procedures

Cannot Be A Basis for Reconsideration. ..........................................10 
12
(i)  Plaintiff Already Possessed the “New” Information
13 or Could Have Obtained it with Diligence Before the
Hearing. ................................................................................11 
14
(ii)  Plaintiff Actually Possessed the Information She
15 Argues Is Material Before The Hearing. ..............................15 

16 (c)  Even if Considered, Plaintiff’s Arguments Regarding the

Procedures Are Meritless. ................................................................15 
17
2.  Reconsideration is Improper Based on Re-Asserted Arguments. ................17 
18
3.  Reconsideration is Improper Based on “New” Legal Arguments. ...............18 
19
(a)  Enforcing the Arbitration Agreements Does Not Violate
20 Plaintiff’s Right of Free Exercise. ....................................................18 

21 (b)  Plaintiff’s Claims Are Within the Scope of the Arbitration

Provision and Compelling Arbitration Is Not Against Public
22 Policy. ...............................................................................................19 

23 III.  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................19 

24

25

26

27

28

2
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
2
Federal Cases 
3
Braunfield v. Brown,
4 366 U.S. 599 (1961) .................................................................................................................... 19
5 Encore Prods., Inc. v. Promise Keepers,

6 53 F.Supp.2d 1101 (D. Col. 1999) ........................................................................................ 18, 19

7 Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc.,

No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2018 WL 3439638 (M.D. Fla. July 17, 2018)............. 12, 13, 14, 17
8
Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Srvc. Org., Inc.,
9 No. 8:13-cv-10844160, 2015 WL 10844160 n.11 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015) ........................... 16
10 Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips,
173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) ....................................................................................................... 17
11

12 In re Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc.,

847 F.Supp.2d 1253 (2012) ......................................................................................................... 19
13
Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
14 52 F.Supp.3d 1070 (E.D. Cal. 2014) ........................................................................................... 19
15 State Cases 

16 Crippen v. Cent. Valley RV Outlet,

17 124 Cal.App.4th 1159 (2004) ...................................................................................................... 17

18 Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman,

125 N.J. 404 (1991) ..................................................................................................................... 18
19
Garcia v. Hejmadi,
20 58 Cal.App.4th 674 (1997) .......................................................................................................... 11
21 Gilberd v. AC Transit,
32 Cal.App.4th 1494 (1995) ........................................................................................................ 17
22

23 In re Marriage of Herr,
174 Cal.App.4th 1463 (2009) .................................................................................................... 7, 8
24
Jones v. P.S. Dev. Co., Inc.,
25 166 Cal.App.4th 707 (2008) .................................................................................................... 7, 12
26 Kerns v. CSE Ins. Grp.,
106 Cal.App.4th 368 (2003) .......................................................................................................... 8
27
Le Francois v. Goel,
28
35 Cal.4th 1094 (2005).................................................................................................................. 7
3
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 Midwest Television, Inc. v. Scott, Lancaster, Mills & Atha, Inc.,
205 Cal.App.3d 442 (1988) ......................................................................................................... 18
2
New York Times Co. v. Superior Court,
3 135 Cal.App.4th 206 (2005) .............................................................................................. 8, 11, 12
4
Reid v. Google, Inc.,
5 50 Cal.4th 512 (2010).................................................................................................................. 12

6 Shiffer v. CBS Corp.,

240 Cal.App.4th 246 (2015) .......................................................................................................... 8
7
Spivey v. Teen Challenge of Florida, Inc.,
8 122 So.3d 986 (Fla. App. 2013) .................................................................................................. 18
9 State Statutes 

10
Civ. Proc. Code § 1005 ..................................................................................................................... 6
11
Civ. Proc. Code § 1008 ..................................................................................................................... 7
12
Civ. Proc. Code 1008(a) .................................................................................................................... 8
13
Civ. Proc. Code § 1010 ..................................................................................................................... 6
14

15 State Rules 

16 Cal. R. Ct. 3.1112(a) ......................................................................................................................... 6

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 I. INTRODUCTION

2 On January 30, 2020, this Court ordered this matter to arbitration, holding that “multiple

3 arbitration agreements” exist between her and Defendants and that she did “not dispute the meaning
and scope of these agreements as written or that her claims come within the scope of the arbitration
4
agreements.” The Court rejected her assertion that the agreements were unconscionable. The Court
5
noted that a transcript of a recording of her signing one of the agreements contradicted assertions of
6
duress and that “many” of her allegations of coercion were “substantive questions that go to the
7 merits of Plaintiff's claims that should be resolved by the arbitrator.” (Thompson Decl. Ex. 2 at

8 Attachment 1 (“1/30/2020 Order”).) The Memorandum1 for Reconsideration points to no error by

9 this Court, and presents facts and legal authority that could have been included in the original
briefing had Plaintiff and her counsel exercised even a modicum of diligence. Worse yet, the
10
Memorandum seeks to mislead the Court through demonstrable misrepresentations of fact and law.
11
 Plaintiff contends that one of the agreements to arbitrate (the Staff Departure
12
Agreement) is invalid due to a “newly-discovered” document, the Fitness Board Turndown
13 (“FBT”). But Plaintiff cited to and argued the import of this document at the hearing on the
14 motion to compel arbitration. Tellingly, there is no declaration from Plaintiff that she had not
15 seen this document before. That is because she reviewed the FBT in 2017, before she chose to

16 enter into the Staff Departure Agreement. The “FBT is new evidence” argument rests on lies.
 Plaintiff’s reliance on the FBT is illogical. She claims that the FBT stated that she
17
had been “declared” a “suppressive person” (it does not say that) and therefore she was under
18
duress to sign the Staff Departure Agreement. But if the FBT caused Plaintiff’s duress, then she
19
knew about it and it is not a new fact. And the entire argument is a non-issue because this Court
20 ruled that the question of duress is to be decided by the arbitrators.
21  Plaintiff relies on a declaration from Mike Rinder, a paid witness for anti-Scientology
22 lawyers, to assert that the arbitration procedure “actually” used by the Church is unconscionable.

23 But Rinder, as his declaration shows, has zero first-hand knowledge of Church arbitration.
 More importantly, the entire basis for Plaintiff introducing Rinder’s declaration is a
24
fraud. Plaintiff claims that Rinder’s statements about Church arbitration were “unknown and
25
unavailable” when the Motion to Compel arbitration was heard, but Rinder is a business partner
26

27 1
As explained below, Plaintiff filed only a Memorandum for Reconsideration; no noticed motion
28 was filed. Furthermore, Defendants have served and will file a motion for sanctions under Code of
Civil Procedure Sections 128.7 and 1008 if the “Memorandum” is not withdrawn.
5
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 of Plaintiff and her counsel. The “facts” in Rinder’s declaration are alleged in complaints drafted

2 and filed by Plaintiff’s counsel months ago, are contained in documents Plaintiff’s counsel
possessed before the hearing, are available on websites Plaintiff’s counsel visited months ago,
3
and are available on the docket of a case that Defendants Church of Scientology International
4
(“CSI”) and Religious Technology Center (“RTC”) cited to in their Motions to Compel
5
Arbitration. Mr. Rinder sits on a board of directors of a corporation with three of Plaintiff’s
6 counsel, and Plaintiff’s counsel Marci Hamilton is the CEO of that same corporation. Mr. Rinder
7 was the co-host of an anti-Scientology television show on which Plaintiff and her counsel
8 appeared. Plaintiff works as the personal assistant of Mr. Rinder’s co-host of that show.
Plaintiff’s assertion that she could not have discovered Rinder’s fallacious opinions previously
9
is a deliberate attempt to mislead this Court.
10
 Further, of the nine “new” documents Plaintiff claims warrant reconsideration, two
11
were filed by Defendants in this action prior to the hearing, one is cited by Plaintiff’s complaint,
12 one contains facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint, and four are available in the public record,
13 including on websites Plaintiff’s counsel has visited and on the docket of a case Defendants cited
14 as enforcing identical arbitration agreements to those at issue here. Plaintiff makes no argument

15 based on the remaining document.

 Finally, Plaintiff’s Memorandum impermissibly rehashes rejected arguments raised
16
in her original Opposition and asserts new arguments based on known facts and existing case
17
law with no explanation as to why these arguments were not raised sooner.
18
II. ARGUMENT
19
A. Plaintiff Did Not Provide Notice of the Motion.
20 A motion must be accompanied by a notice stating “when, and the grounds upon which it
21 will be made, and the papers, if any, upon which it is to be based.” Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1005, 1010.

22 Motions must include “[a] notice of hearing on the motion,” “the motion itself,” and “[a]
memorandum in support of the motion.” Cal. R. Ct. 3.1112(a). In connection with her “Motion for
23
Reconsideration,” Plaintiff filed only a memorandum, a declaration from her counsel with exhibits,
24
and a declaration of service. Plaintiff’s submission does not include a notice or a formal motion.
25 This omission matters. The relief sought by Plaintiff’s Memorandum is unclear. In the
26 Introduction, Plaintiff seeks reconsideration pursuant to the Court’s “inherent authority” and “[i]n

27 the alternative, Plaintiff requests the Court vacate its prior ruling.” (Pl.’s Mem. 1:2-3, 1:21-23.) Yet,

28 Plaintiff requests the Court consider evidence and arguments that cannot be considered when the

6
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 Court is acting pursuant to its inherent authority, see Section II.B. infra, and the word “vacate”

2 appears on no other page of the Memorandum. Next, Plaintiff requests she be allowed to conduct
discovery “prior to a final ruling,” (Pl.’s Mem. 14:19-20), but the Court has already issued a final
3
ruling on Defendants’ motion. (1/30/2020 Order.) The Court also previously denied Plaintiff’s ex
4
parte application to conduct discovery, and yet the Memorandum does not seek reconsideration of
5
the order denying discovery. (1/30/2020 Order at p. 1; Pl.’s Mem. at 1:1-2.) Finally, the Conclusion
6 “respectfully requests this Court deny Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, or it should stay

7 its final ruling on the motion and permit Plaintiff to conduct discovery,”2 (Pl.’s Mem. 15:20-24), yet

8 the Court granted Defendants’ motions months ago, (1/30/2020 Order at p. 2). Plaintiff’s non-
existent and unintelligible “motion” must be denied.
9
B. Plaintiff’s Inherent Authority Argument Is Improper and Meritless.
10
A Court may reconsider a prior ruling subject to jurisdictional prerequisites of Section 1008
11 or pursuant to its inherent authority. Regarding a court’s inherent authority, Le Francois v. Goel, 35

12 Cal.4th 1094 (2005) (cited by Pl.’s Mem. 1:2-3, 6:2-4, 7:2-4), holds that motions for reconsideration

13 attempting to invoke the Court’s inherent authority are per se improper:

14 [N]othing would prevent the losing party from asking the court at a status conference to
reconsider a ruling. [citation] But a party may not file a written motion to reconsider that
15 has procedural significance if it does not satisfy the requirements of section 437c,
subdivision (f)(2), or 1008. The court need not rule on any suggestions that it should reconsider
16 a previous ruling and, without more, another party would not be expected to respond . . . .

17 Id. at 1108 (italics original, bold added). Plaintiff’s written memorandum requesting reconsideration
pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority is improper, and the Court must disregard it.
18
Even if the Court entertains Plaintiff’s request, the Memorandum misstates the matters the
19
Court can reconsider under its inherent authority. Plaintiff impermissibly requests the Court
20
reconsider its ruling based on “new evidence” and arguments not presented in the original briefing.
21 (Pl.’s Mem. 1:1-23.) But a court has inherent authority “on its own motion, to reconsider its prior

22 interim orders so it may correct its own errors.” Le Francois, 35 Cal.4th at 1107 (emphasis added).

23 “In order to grant reconsideration on its own motion, the trial court must conclude that its earlier
ruling was wrong, and change that ruling based on the evidence originally submitted.” In re
24
Marriage of Herr, 174 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1470 (2009) (emphasis original). The Court cannot
25

26
2
The request for undefined “discovery” also contradicts the thrust of the Memorandum. Plaintiff
27 asserts that the Court should vacate its Order, or enter an order denying the motions to compel

28 arbitration (again, the relief sought is not clear) based on her supposedly new evidence. This means
there is no need for discovery.
7
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 exercise inherent authority to grant a motion for reconsideration on evidence and arguments not

2 previously submitted. Id. Here, Plaintiff never argues that the Court’s prior ruling was “wrong”
based on the evidence and authority before the Court at the time it granted the Motion to Compel
3
Arbitration, and thus there is no “error” to point to.
4
C. The Court Cannot Grant Reconsideration Under Section 1008(a).
5 A motion for reconsideration under Section 1008(a) must: (1) present “new or different facts,
6 circumstances, or law”; and (2) provide a satisfactory explanation for the party’s failure to present

7 the new or different facts, circumstances, or law prior to the challenged order. Civ. Proc. Code §

8 1008(a); New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-13 (2005). The
Memorandum does not satisfy either of these requirements – much less both of them. Therefore, it
9
must be denied. Kerns v. CSE Ins. Grp., 106 Cal.App.4th 368, 391 (2003).
10
1. Reconsideration Is Improper Based on Plaintiff’s “New” Facts.
11 The Memorandum relies upon three “new” facts that Plaintiff falsely claims she “did not
12 know, and could not know (without discovery)”: (1) that Plaintiff had been declared a “suppressive

13 person” before she signed the Staff Departure Agreement, (Pl.’s Mem. 3:5-7); (2) that she had been
terminated by Defendants before she signed the Staff Departure Agreement, (id. 3:2-5); and (3) “that
14
Defendants misrepresented to this Court that the ‘so-called’ arbitration is an avenue for Plaintiff to
15
seek justice when they knew it was not, but really a ‘Committee of Evidence,’” (id. 6:22-27).
16
Plaintiff claims she learned the first two facts from a document filed by RTC on January 22, 2020,
17 the FBT. (Id. 2:5-16.) She claims she learned the third fact from former Scientologists who contacted

18 her counsel following the January 30 hearing. (Thompson Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff’s bogus “new” facts

19 fall into two categories: (A) facts Plaintiff did know before the January 30, 2020 hearing or (B) facts
Plaintiff could have discovered with reasonable diligence before the January 30, 2020 hearing.
20
(a) “Facts” From the FBT Cannot Be A Basis For Reconsideration
21
The Memorandum claims that the FBT, served on her counsel on January 22, 2020, is a
22 “newly discovered document[]” sufficient to warrant reconsideration. (Pl.’s Mem. 7:23-26, 8:4-7,

23 2:5-9.) It is neither new under Section 1008 nor material. Evidence known to a party prior to the

24 hearing on the motion and issuance of the challenged order is not new evidence under Section

25 1008. See Shiffer v. CBS Corp., 240 Cal.App.4th 246, 254-55 (2015) (testimony from deposition
conducted days before summary judgment hearing was not new evidence for reconsideration
26
motion); New York Times Co., 135 Cal.App.4th at 208, 212-15 (same).
27
Here, Plaintiff received the FBT on January 22, 2020, before the January 30, 2020 hearing
28 and Order. At the January 30 hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel made the exact same arguments based

8
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 on the FBT that Plaintiff’s Memorandum argues here. (Concurrently-filed Declaration of William

2 H. Forman (“Forman Decl.”) Ex. A at 3:12-4:10 (arguing he discovered Plaintiff had been declared
a suppressive person before she signed the Departure Agreement from the “fitness board turndown”
3
filed by RTC in connection with its anti-SLAPP motion).) Because Plaintiff had the FBT and
4
expressly made arguments based on it at the hearing, it is not a “new” fact under Section 1008. In
5
addition, there is no declaration from Plaintiff stating that she was not aware of the FBT. The truth
6 is Plaintiff was presented with, and reviewed, the FBT when she departed from the Sea Org in 2017.

7 (Declarations of Michael Sutter and Deirdre Assam at ¶ 5.)

8 Furthermore, Plaintiff misrepresents the meaning of the FBT. Her Memorandum falsely
states “Plaintiff was declared an enemy of Scientology (“Suppressive Person”) approximately a
9
week before she signed the ‘Staff Departure Agreement.’” (Pl.’s Mem. 3:5-6.) However, the FBT
10
does not declare Plaintiff a Suppressive Person – it states that if she takes certain actions “she is
11
subject to declare.” (Rinder Decl. Ex. G (emphasis added).)
12 Finally, the FAC’s allegations show that Plaintiff assumed she had been declared. The FAC
13 alleges “Defendants declare anyone who flees or speaks out against Scientology a suppressive

14 person.” (Forman Decl. Ex. B at ¶ 33.) While Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s allegation, it is a binding

15 judicial admission upon her. She alleges that she “escaped” Scientology (id. ¶ 60), and thus by her
allegations assumed she would have been “declared” long before her counsel desperately seized on
16
that false assumption as somehow significant. Nor can Plaintiff claim that the Memorandum’s false
17
allegations regarding the so-called “Fair Game” policy were unknown to her earlier. While her
18 Memorandum “cites” to the Declarations of Mr. Thompson, Mr. Rinder, and Ms. Whitfield, the

19 content is copied nearly verbatim from the Complaint in the case Bixler, et al. v. Church of

20 Scientology, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. 19STCV29458 (“Bixler Case”) – drafted

21 by her counsel and filed on August 22, 2019. The Memorandum includes the original footnotes
from the Bixler Complaint, despite not attaching these materials to her Memorandum. (Compare
22
Pl.’s Mem. 3:6-21 with Forman Decl. Ex. K at ¶¶ 37-40, 47.) The complaints in this case also raised
23
the “Fair Game” policy. (Forman Decl. Ex. B ¶¶ 32-42, ns. 6-7; id., Ex. C ¶¶ 69-76.)
24
(i) The Arguments “Based on” the FBT Are Meritless.
25 The above “evidence,” even if considered, amounts to nothing. First, the entirety of the
26 argument concerns only the Staff Departure Agreement. None of Plaintiff’s arguments concerning
the FBT affect the several other religious arbitration agreements Plaintiff signed. The Court ordered
27
arbitration based on those agreements. (1/30/2020 Order at 4-6 (citing Plaintiff’s agreements to
28

9
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 arbitrate other than the Staff Departure Agreement, 12/20/19 Farny Decl. Exs. 7-10, 11); id. at 10

2 (Plaintiff’s argument concerning her entry into the Staff Departure Agreement “does nothing to
show that the earlier agreements were entered into due to duress or coercion” and the Staff Departure
3
Agreement “does not contain language indicating that it was to supersede any of the prior
4
agreements”).) Further, the “facts” are immaterial to enforcement of the Staff Departure Agreement.
5
The Memorandum argues that Plaintiff being terminated from the Sea Org before she signed the
6 Staff Departure Agreement “mak[es] said agreement a nullity since she was no longer staff and not

7 subject to the requirements of Defendants, including, but not limited to, ‘religious arbitration’

8 requirements.” (Pl.’s Mem. 7:23-26.) The Memorandum cites no authority in support of the claim
that the Staff Departure Agreement is now a “nullity.” Moreover, Plaintiff contractually agreed to
9
religious arbitration in exchange for consideration recited in the Staff Departure Agreement – which
10
consideration (including a payment of $4500) was not part of the FBT. Next, Plaintiff argues that
11
the threat of being declared a Suppressive Person, as embodied in the FBT, contributed to her duress
12 in signing the Staff Departure Agreement. (Pl.’s Mem. 7:16-8:7.) Again, the argument does not

13 make sense. In her original opposition, Plaintiff already argued that the threat of being declared a

14 Suppressive Person caused her to sign the Staff Departure Agreement under undue influence and

15 duress. (Forman Decl. Ex. G at 10:1-11:2, 12:3-5.) The Court rejected her arguments. (1/30/2020
Order at 7, 8, 10.) Indeed, Plaintiff’s argument that the FBT created the duress that caused her to
16
sign the Staff Departure Agreement, (Pl.’s Mem. 4:1-10), requires that she knew about the FBT
17
when she signed the Agreement in 2017– in which case, the FBT again is not new “evidence.”3
18 (b) “Facts” Regarding Scientology’s Arbitration Procedures Cannot
19 Be A Basis for Reconsideration.
Next, Plaintiff argues that reconsideration is warranted because “Defendants have materially
20
misrepresented to this Court what the ‘so-called’ arbitration entails.” (Pl.’s Mem. 9:28-10:1 (initial
21
capitalizations omitted).) Plaintiff has some gall making this allegation considering that her
22
Memorandum rests on a bedrock of falsehoods and that her principal “new” documents were
23 previously filed and cited to in this action. Not surprisingly, the Memorandum does not cite to a

24 single statement by Defendants or their counsel – much less demonstrate its falsity. (See generally

25 id. at 9:28-12:4.) Setting aside Plaintiff’s desperate accusations, facts regarding Scientology’s

26 arbitration procedures are not a basis for reconsideration because Plaintiff could have presented

27
3
28 Conversely, if Plaintiff did not know of the FBT when she signed the Staff Departure Agreement,
it could not have acted as “duress” upon her and is of no logical relevance whatsoever.
10
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 these facts sooner, and even if considered, the arguments are irrelevant, meritless, and untrue.

2 (i) Plaintiff Already Possessed the “New” Information or Could

Have Obtained it with Diligence Before the Hearing.
3
Plaintiff’s Memorandum misleadingly understates the standard for “new or different facts.”
4 The Memorandum states “[a] party seeking reconsideration need only provide a satisfactory

5 explanation for why the evidence was not presented at an earlier time . . .” (Pl.’s Mem. 6:20-21

6 (citing Garcia v. Hejmadi, 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 689 (1997) (“Hejmadi”)). Yet the very case Plaintiff

7 cites demonstrates this is a stringent standard, which Plaintiff cannot meet. Plaintiff’s cited
authority, Hejmadi, explains: “This does not mean, however, that all facts not previously presented
8
to a court now suffice.” Hejmadi, 58 Cal.App.4th at 690. Instead, Hejmadi requires that a party
9
moving for reconsideration based on new facts “show a satisfactory explanation for failing to
10 provide the evidence earlier, which can only be described as a strict requirement of diligence.” Id.

11 (emphasis added).4 Indeed, “the burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking

12 a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the

13 moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial.” New
York Times Co., 135 Cal.App.4th at 212-13. The Memorandum and the accompanying declaration
14
of counsel do not demonstrate any diligence. Rather, Mr. Thompson simply recites the conclusion
15
that he could not have discovered the “new” facts with the exercise of reasonable diligence without
16
stating a single act he took to exercise such diligence prior to the Court’s ruling. (Thompson Decl.
17 ¶ 5.) As an excuse for failing to present this “evidence” sooner, Mr. Thompson states:

18 After the hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, I and/or other members of
Plaintiff’s legal team were contacted by several former Scientologist [sic] including, but [sic]
19 Michael Rinder and Hana Whitfield, who all provided Plaintiff’s legal team with new
documents and information that was unknown and unavailable prior to Plaintiff’s opposition to
20 Defendant’s motion on January 16, 2020. All of this information and documents could not be
discovered with reasonable diligence because it was unknown to Plaintiff’s legal team, and
21 was in the possession, custody and control of Defendants. Due to the stay of discovery. [sic]
There was mechanism [sic] for Plaintiff to obtain it prior to the Plaintiff’s opposition to
22 Defendant’s motion on January 16, 2020. After reading about this Court’s ruling on
Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration in the Press, Michael Rinder and Hana Whitfield
23 reached out and provide [sic] this new information and documents.
24 (Id.)5 Plaintiff and her counsel could have discovered this information from known witnesses and

25
4
26 To conceal the true standard, Plaintiff’s Memorandum misleadingly omits this language from her
Memorandum, despite quoting the sentence that immediately precedes it. (Pl.’s Mem. 6:11-15.)
27 5
The lack of diligence is noteworthy given the time and resources available. There were 41 days
28 between the filing of the motions to compel and the hearing. Ten attorneys from four different law
firms and one law school appear on the caption of Plaintiff’s opposition to the motions to compel.
11
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 public records long before the due date for her Opposition and the hearing. Plaintiff’s counsel’s

2 declaration essentially claims that he did not know the information earlier because the witnesses did
not contact him until after the hearing. However, that is not the applicable standard for diligence.
3
An attorney’s decision not to collect evidence is not a basis to consider that evidence on a motion
4
for reconsideration, where the movant “undoubtedly possessed the means to” contact potential
5
witnesses and obtain testimony from them previously. New York Times Co., 135 Cal.App.4th at 214;
6 Jones v. P.S. Dev. Co., Inc., 166 Cal.App.4th 707, 725 (2008), disapproved on other grounds by

7 Reid v. Google, Inc., 50 Cal.4th 512, 532 n.7 (2010). Plaintiff’s counsel claims the information was

8 “unavailable” and in Defendants’ possession, and therefore, he could not obtain this information
due the discovery stay. Despite his claims, Plaintiff’s counsel obtained the information from third
9
parties without using any discovery procedures. Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel states that Mr. Rinder
10
and Ms. Whitfield affirmatively reached out to Plaintiff’s counsel to voluntarily provide the
11
information. (Thompson Dec. ¶ 5.) They would have provided it had Plaintiff’s counsel contacted
12 them prior to the hearing; discovery was not necessary to obtain this information.

13 And, Plaintiff’s “legal team” knew of Mr. Rinder long before he “contacted” Plaintiff’s
6
14 counsel after the January 30 hearing. (Thompson Dec. ¶ 5.) Mr. Rinder provided two publicly-

15 available declarations in the case Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc., M.D.
Fla., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM (“Garcia Case”) concerning the procedures of Scientology
16
arbitration. (Forman Decl. ¶¶ 13, 17, Exs. L, P.)7 CSI cited to the Garcia Case in its moving papers.
17
(Id., Ex. D at 17:9-14 & 23:2-9.) Plaintiff and her counsel are associates of Mr. Rinder. They
18 appeared on an anti-Scientology television series of which Mr. Rinder was the co-host, Leah Remini:

19 Scientology and the Aftermath (the “Aftermath”). (Concurrently filed Declaration of Lynn R. Farny

20 ("Farny Decl.") ¶¶ 5-6; Forman Decl. Ex. B ¶ 69.) Over the past two years Plaintiff appeared on

21 three episodes of the Aftermath with Mr. Rinder; Plaintiff’s counsel, Marci Hamilton, appeared on
an August 2019 episode of the Aftermath with Mr. Rinder. (Farny Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) When introducing
22
Ms. Hamilton on that show, Mr. Rinder stated in front of Ms. Hamilton, “We [referring to Ms.
23

24
6
Mr. Thompson’s declaration is purposefully vague. While the declaration states that “several
25 former Scientologist [sic], including, but [sic] Michael Rinder and Hana Whitfield” contacted

26 Plaintiff’s legal team after the January 30, 2020 hearing, it does not state whether Plaintiff’s counsel
previously had spoken to these individuals or already knew of these individuals or their role as
27 potential witnesses. As shown, Mr. Rinder and the “legal team” knew each other well.
7
28 Mr. Rinder was a paid witness for the plaintiffs in the Garcia Case, charging $175 per hour for his
testimony attacking the Church. (Concurrently-filed Declaration of Gary S. Soter ¶ 6.)
12
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 Remini and Mr. Rinder] know the Scientology answer for everything.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Mr. Rinder also

2 sits on the Board of Directors of CHILD USA, the non-profit lobbying organization of which Ms.
Hamilton, Plaintiff’s counsel, is the CEO and a member of the Board, and of which two additional
3
Plaintiff’s counsel are Board members. (Forman Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. R.) Plaintiff is the personal
4
assistant to Ms. Remini, Mr. Rinder’s co-host on the Aftermath. (Farny Decl. ¶ 5.) In short, Mr.
5
Rinder and Plaintiff and her lawyers are thick as thieves, and have been for quite some time. Because
6 Plaintiff and her counsel could have presented a declaration from Mr. Rinder in her original

7 opposition, it cannot be the basis for a motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff’s counsel also knew the

8 identity of Ms. Whitfield prior to the hearing on Defendants’ motions to compel arbitration, having
spoken at the same anti-religious conference. (Forman Decl. Ex. S.) Ms. Whitfield was also a known
9
anti-Scientologist, as she had appeared on the Aftermath show in 2017. (Farny Decl. ¶ 9.) In any
10
event, the information contained in Ms. Whitfield’s declaration is publicly-available, known to
11
Plaintiff, and duplicative of Mr. Rinder’s declaration. (Compare Rinder Decl. ¶¶ 5-8, 12-13 & 16-
12 19 with Whitfield Decl. ¶¶ 5-6 & 7-9.)

13 Even without contacting Mr. Rinder or Ms. Whitfield, Plaintiff could have presented the
14 information she claims is “new” in her original opposition: Nearly all of the information was either

15 submitted by Defendants as part of their motions to compel arbitration, or is publicly available in

the Garcia Case and on websites Plaintiff’s counsel has visited. Indeed, Plaintiff’s argument again
16
principally relies on documents she already possessed. Mr. Rinder and Ms. Whitfield assert that
17
the applicable procedures (to which Plaintiff objects) are contained in Introduction to Scientology
18 Ethics, Rinder Exhibit C, and HCO Policy Letter of 7 September 1963, Rinder Exhibit D. (Rinder

19 Decl. ¶¶ 16-17, 19, 21; Whitfield Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s counsel quoted Introduction to Scientology

20 Ethics in the Complaint in the Bixler Case. (Forman Decl. Ex. K at ¶ 27, p. 7, n.5.) CSI submitted

21 the HCO Policy Letter of 7 Sept. 1963 as an exhibit to CSI’s Motion to Compel Arbitration. (Id.,
Ex. E at Ex. 6.) Plaintiff’s counsel already possessed these documents.
22
Furthermore, Mr. Rinder’s declarations in the Garcia Case contain the same information (at
23
times, verbatim), as Mr. Rinder’s declaration here. (Compare Thompson Decl. Ex. 5 (Rinder Decl.)
24
¶¶ 2, 9, 11, 13, 16.a., 16.b., 16.c., 16.d., 18 with Forman Decl. Ex. P ¶¶ 1, 4, 3, 5, 6.a., 6.b., 6.c., 6.g.,
25 11 & id., Ex. L ¶¶ 8.a., 8.b., 8.c.) And, all but one of Plaintiff’s “new” documents was available in

26 filings in this case and the public record.8

27
8
28 Plaintiff submits only one document that she supposedly did not already possess or that was not in

13
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 “New” Reconsideration Documents Location Available to Plaintiff
2 Thompson Decl. Ex. 3/Rinder Decl. Ex. G RTC Anti-SLAPP Mot. in this case Farny
(Plaintiff filed the same document twice, as Decl. Ex. 4 (Forman Decl. Ex. I); also shown
3 two separate exhibits) to Plaintiff in 2017 (Sutter Decl. ¶ 5, Assam
Decl. ¶ 5)
4 Thompson Decl. Ex. 4 (Excerpts from M. Ellis Garcia Case, Dkt. # 166-1 (Forman Decl. Ex.
Deposition in Garcia Case) M)
5 Whitfield Decl. Ex. A. Garcia Case, Dkt. # 32-1 pp. 6-20 (Forman
Decl. Ex. N)
6 Rinder Decl. Ex. A Garcia Case, Dkt. # 32-1 at p. 48 (Forman
Decl. Ex. N)
7 Rinder Decl. Ex. B “Fact” contained in this document alleged in
Plaintiff’s original complaint in this case
8 (Forman Decl. Ex. C at ¶ 67)
Rinder Decl. Ex. C Garcia Case, Dkt. # 95-1 through 95-5
9 (Forman Decl. Ex. L)
Rinder Decl. Ex. D CSI Mot. to Compel, in this case (Forman
10 Decl. Ex. E at Ex. 6); Garcia Case, Dkt. #
127-2 (Forman Decl. Ex. O)
11 Rinder Decl. Ex. E Publicly available website:
https://www.scientologynews.org/faq/what-
12 does-the-term-fair-game-refer-to.html
This information is not buried in the public record. Not only does CSI’s Motion to Compel
13
Arbitration cite to the Garcia Case, it explains its relevance: It explains that the Garcia court rejected
14
the Garcia plaintiffs’ unconscionability challenge “to arbitration provisions which were the same
15 and/or very similar to which Plaintiff agreed” and the Garcia plaintiffs’ “objections to Scientology

16 procedures.” (Forman Decl. Ex. D at 17:10-14 & 23:2-9.) Accordingly, CSI’s Motion alerted

17 Plaintiff and her counsel that the Garcia Case considered – and rejected – the exact arguments
concerning the exact topics that Plaintiff seeks to make on reconsideration.9 Had Plaintiff’s counsel
18
bothered to review the publicly-available filings in Garcia, Plaintiff’s counsel would have
19
“discovered” the documents and testimony that he claims was “unknown and unavailable” to
20
Plaintiff. Similarly, with regard to Rinder Declaration Exhibit E, Plaintiff’s counsel visited the same
21 main webpage, Scientologynews.org, on August 13, 2019 to access a different “frequently asked

22 question.” (Forman Decl. Ex. K at p. 12, n.20.)

23

24
the public record prior to the hearing, Rinder Decl. Ex. F. Because she could have obtained this
25 document from Mr. Rinder prior to the hearing, it is not “new.” Furthermore, Plaintiff never cites to

26 and makes no substantive argument based on the content of this document (or any other). (Pl.’s
Mem. generally (not citing to any specific exhibit).)
27 9 Plaintiff’s legal team was aware of the Garcia Case long before CSI filed its Motion to Compel

28 Arbitration. On July 5, 2019, Plaintiff’s lawyer, Ms. Hamilton, appeared on a podcast during which
the host of the podcast described the Garcia Case to Ms. Hamilton. (Forman Decl. ¶ 21, Ex. T.)
14
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 (ii)
Plaintiff Actually Possessed the Information She Argues Is
Material Before The Hearing.
2
Despite her “kitchen sink” approach to presenting “newly-discovered information,”
3
Plaintiff’s Memorandum only asserts arguments based on three “new facts” regarding the arbitration
4 procedures: (1) the purported “Fair Game” policy and the Church’s alleged treatment of Suppressive

5 Persons, (Pl.’s Mem. at 3:2-4:11); (2) that Scientology arbitration “is a proceeding known as a

6 ‘Committee of Evidence’ which is outlined in the official Scientology publication Introduction

7 to Scientology Ethics,” (id. at 4:13-15 (bold added); id. generally at 4:13-5:15); and (3) that the
procedures require the arbitrators to be Scientologists in good standing, making the process unfair
8
to Plaintiff, (id. at 10:23-11:2, 11:22-25).
9
Plaintiff already possessed this information. First, as to her claims about “Fair Game” and
10 the treatment of Suppressive Persons, Plaintiff’s Complaint and the Complaint in the Bixler Case

11 make the same allegations as her Memorandum – often verbatim. (Compare Pl.’s Mem. 3:6-21 with

12 Forman Decl. Ex. K at ¶¶ 37-40, 47 & id., Ex. B at ¶¶ 32-42 & id., Ex. C at ¶¶ 69-76.) The

13 Memorandum admits that Plaintiff knew these “facts”: “Plaintiff knew what it meant to be declared
a ‘suppressive person’ and that she would be subjected to ‘Fair Gaming.’” (Pl.’s Mem. 4:8-10.)
14
Second, as to her claims about the Committee of Evidence procedures, Plaintiff’s counsel already
15
possessed the publication Introduction to Scientology Ethics and HCO Policy Letter of 7 September
16
1963, which describe the procedures for a Committee of Evidence (which is not even the procedure
17 at issue), (Forman Decl. Ex. K at p. 7, n.5; id. Ex. E at Ex. 6); information concerning the procedures

18 for Scientology religious arbitration was also available on the Garcia docket, (id., Ex. Q). Third, as

19 to her claims about the arbitrators being Scientologists in good standing, Plaintiff argued this fact in
her original Opposition. Indeed, it is a provision plainly disclosed in the arbitration agreements that
20
Defendants moved to compel upon. (Id., Ex. G at 4:3-12; see also id. at 6:17-19.)
21
(c) Even if Considered, Plaintiff’s Arguments Regarding the
22 Procedures Are Meritless.
23 Even if considered, Plaintiff’s arguments do not warrant reconsideration. First, Plaintiff’s

24 “new” factual argument – that, as a supposedly "Suppressive Person" she cannot participate in
Scientology arbitration – is simply false. Suppressive Persons can – and have – participated in
25
Scientology arbitration. (Farny Decl. ¶3. .)
26
Second, Plaintiff’s claim that Scientology arbitration is a proceeding known as a Committee
27
of Evidence is nothing but a cynical attempt to mislead the Court. As previously explained to this
28 Court, and the Garcia court, Scientology has developed its own “internal justice and dispute

15
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 resolution structure.” (Forman Decl. Ex. E at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff’s Agreements refer specifically to

2 dispute resolution through “Scientology’s internal Ethics, Justice, and binding arbitration
procedures.” (Id., Ex. E at Ex. 7 ¶ 6.d.) CSI informed this Court of the Scientology justice system
3
through specific reference to Introduction to Scientology Ethics and “a fact finding body called a
4
Committee of Evidence.” (Id., Ex. E. at ¶¶ 18 & 20.) CSI also submitted to the Court the Scientology
5
document setting forth the procedures for a Committee of Evidence (Id., Ex. E at Ex. 6.) The
6 arbitration provisions of the Agreements that Plaintiff executed spell out the specifics of how the

7 arbitration is to be conducted (such as method of selection of arbitrators, who may serve as an

8 arbitrator, and the scope of arbitration), while “the Scientology system of Ethics and Justice”
supplement the arbitration provisions as necessary. Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Srvc. Org.,
9
Inc., No. 8:13-cv-10844160, 2015 WL 10844160, at *6-*8, *9 n.11 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015)
10
(holding procedures for arbitration were adequately stated in arbitration agreements identical to ones
11
here, which invoke Scientology internal ethics and justice procedures).
12 Plaintiff now points to Introduction to Scientology Ethics and Rinder Declaration Exhibit D,
13 “Committees of Evidence,” to argue that Scientology arbitration charges certain offenses against an

14 “interested party” and that the body adjudicating the dispute is selected by a “Convening Authority”

15 and can be dissolved by the Convening Authority, which in turn is “ultimately subject to the
International Justice Chief.” (Pl.’s Mem. 4:13-25.) Plaintiff could have made these objections
16
before, as they are based on “Committees of Evidence,” submitted with Defendants’ motions to
17
compel arbitration. (Forman Decl. Ex. E at Ex. 6.) If Plaintiff had raised the argument before,
18 Defendants would have responded as they do now: the argument is 100% nonsense. Scientology

19 arbitration is an arbitration, and not the internal disciplinary proceeding Plaintiff describes. As

20 explained in the deposition testimony of International Justice Chief (“IJC”) Michael Ellis, which is

21 selectively quoted in excerpts Plaintiff presents at Thompson Declaration Exhibit 4, sources such as
Introduction to Scientology Ethics and “Committees of Evidence” are used to supplement the
22
agreed-upon arbitration provisions with procedural rules, such as “the system of getting evidence,
23
the system of interviewing witnesses.” (Thompson Decl. Ex. 4 at 115:2-4.) But the rules for selecting
24
the arbitrators and for vesting authority in the panel of arbitrators (and not in the IJC) to make a
25 final, binding decision are as set forth in Plaintiff's agreements with the Church. These arbitration

26 rules are “different procedure[s]” than for addressing a matter of internal discipline through a

27 Committee of Evidence. (Id. at 114:10-23.) Plaintiff does not cite to a single instance of a
Scientology arbitration being conducted as she describes. It is not how the Garcia arbitration was
28

16
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 conducted. In Garcia, the Church did not chose arbitrators, the arbitrators made a binding decision

2 that was contrary to the Church’s position, and the final decision was confirmed by a court. Garcia
v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2018 WL 3439638
3
(M.D. Fla. July 17, 2018) (appeal pending)).10
4
2. Reconsideration is Improper Based on Re-Asserted Arguments.
5 Plaintiff reasserts several of the arguments she made in opposition to Defendants’ motions
6 to compel arbitration: (1) that she signed the Staff Departure Agreement under duress, (Pl.’s Mem.

7 7:5-9:27); (2) that she should be entitled to discovery, (Pl.’s Mem. 14:19-15:15); and (3) that the

8 arbitration procedures are unconscionable because the arbitrators are Scientologists in good
standing, (Pl.’s Mem. 11:2-12:4). Plaintiff’s original opposition already presented these arguments,
9
and the Court already rejected them. (Forman Decl. Ex. G at 9:12-12:5; id. at 15:4-26; id. at 4:3-12,
10
6:17-19.) The Memorandum cites the same cases and quotes verbatim from Plaintiff’s original
11 opposition.11 (Compare, e.g., Pl.’s Mem. 7:11-22 with Forman Decl. Ex. G at 9:19-23 & 10:11-18.)

12 A motion for reconsideration under Section 1008 is not a proper vehicle for rehashing arguments

13 and facts. Gilberd v. AC Transit, 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500 (1995); Jones, 166 Cal.App.4th at 899.

14 Moreover, the Court properly rejected Plaintiff’s arguments in granting Defendants’ motions
to compel. The Court correctly ruled that: (1) Plaintiff failed to submit evidence of duress or
15
coercion, (1/30/2020 Order at 10; Forman Decl. Ex. A at 7:6-13), and alternatively, the question of
16
duress is for the arbitrator, not the Court, (Forman Decl. Ex. A at 8:8-13); and (2) Plaintiff made no
17
showing that discovery is necessary, (1/30/2020 Order at 1). And the argument that the procedures
18 are unconscionable is irrelevant. Because the Court found Plaintiff did not show any procedural

19 unconscionability, (id. at 10), it did not need to reach Plaintiff’s arguments regarding substantive

20 unconscionability, see Crippen v. Cent. Valley RV Outlet, 124 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 (2004) (both
procedural and substantive unconscionability are required to invalidate an arbitration agreement).
21

22 10
If, at the arbitration, the procedures described at page 4 of the Memorandum were used, such as
23 vesting final authority over any decision with the IJC and not the arbitrators, Plaintiff could object
to the conformation of any award as violating the express terms of the arbitration provisions in her
24 Agreements. See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 1999) (cited by
Pl.’s Mem. 10:13-17, 11:11-20, 13:27-28).
25
11
Plaintiff cites to some “new” case law claiming an “arbitration panel be made entirely of
26 Scientologists in good standing, who are required by their religious doctrine to be biased against
Plaintiffs [sic], is patently unfair in direct violation of both the Federal and State arbitration acts and
27 subsequent case law.” (Pl.’s Mem. 11:2-10.) Plaintiff’s cases do not support her claim. Instead they

28 held multiple, substantive provisions of the agreements at issue concerning varied topics supported
a finding of substantive unconscionability.
17
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 3. Reconsideration is Improper Based on “New” Legal Arguments.
Plaintiff’s Memorandum includes legal arguments based on known facts and existing law
2
that could have been asserted in Plaintiff’s original opposition, but were not. Specifically, Plaintiff
3
argues for the first time on reconsideration that enforcement of her agreements to arbitrate violates:
4
(1) the free exercise of religion clauses of the Federal and California Constitutions, (Pl.’s Mem.
5 12:4-13:24); and (2) public policy, (id. at 13:25-14:18). The most recent cases Plaintiff cites in

6 support of these arguments are from 2012. Legal arguments that could have been raised in the

7 original briefing, cannot be raised for the first time on a motion for reconsideration. Midwest

8 Television, Inc. v. Scott, Lancaster, Mills & Atha, Inc., 205 Cal.App.3d 442, 454 (1988).
(a) Enforcing the Arbitration Agreements Does Not Violate Plaintiff’s
9
Right of Free Exercise.
10 Even if considered, Plaintiff’s free exercise clause argument should be rejected. Plaintiff
11 argues that compelling arbitration would violate her right of free exercise of religion by “forc[ing]

12 a nonbeliever to be subjected to a religious ritual conducted by a religious organization.” (Pl.’s Mem.

12:4-8; id. at 12:4-13:24.) Plaintiff identifies nothing in the arbitration procedures that requires her
13
to do anything other than state her case before the arbitrators. For instance, Plaintiff is not required
14
to make a profession of faith, undergo Scientology auditing, or participate in any religious ceremony
15
or service as part of presenting a dispute to the arbitrators. (Farny Decl. ¶ 4.) Further, Plaintiff bases
16 the argument on the false premise that a Scientology arbitration is subject to rules and procedures

17 different from what the agreements unambiguously provide for. See Section II.C.1.(c), supra.

18 Moreover, courts have rejected Plaintiff’s argument that enforcing contractually-agreed

19 upon religious arbitration violates the free exercise clause. Instead, courts hold that the parties’
express consent to religious arbitration precludes such a challenge and constitutes “a knowing and
20
voluntary waiver of their rights to pursue litigation in a secular court.” Encore Prods., Inc. v.
21
Promise Keepers, 53 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1112-13 (D. Col. 1999) (holding where “the parties agree” to
22 refer disputes to a “religious tribunal” it “is proper for a district court to enforce their contract”); see

23 also Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 125 N.J. 404, 416-17 (1991) (declining to reach free

24 exercise challenge to religious tribunal because the party’s consent to the tribunal precludes such a

25 challenge); Spivey v. Teen Challenge of Florida, Inc., 122 So.3d 986, 991-92, 994-95 (Fla. App.
2013) (rejecting representative of contracting party’s challenge to religious arbitration involving
26
Christian prayer because representative “stands in the shoes” of the party who expressly consented
27
to the procedures). Indeed, it is Plaintiff’s request to invalidate the agreements to arbitrate that
28 violates the free exercise clause: to determine that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable solely

18
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 due to its alleged religious nature could constitute “impedance of the practice of religion or creation

2 of an unjust bias against religion, thereby depriving [the enforcing party] of its free exercise rights.”
Encore Prods., 53 F.Supp.2d at 1113 (citing Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)
3
(plurality opinion)). Thus, courts apply the same presumption in favor of arbitration to requests to
4
compel either secular or religious arbitration. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 52
5
F.Supp.3d 1070, 1075-76 (E.D. Cal. 2014).
6 (b) Plaintiff’s Claims Are Within the Scope of the Arbitration Provision
7 and Compelling Arbitration Is Not Against Public Policy.
Plaintiff again relies on false statements to bolster a meritless, and previously-rejected
8
argument. The Memorandum falsely states that “the scope of the agreement is limited to ‘religious
9
services,’” (Pl.’s Mem. 14:14), and “[a]t oral arguments [sic], this Court already recognized some
10 of Plaintiff’s claims fell outside the scope of the ‘Staff Departure Agreement,’” (id. at 10:9-11).

11 Neither statement is true. The Staff Departure Agreement’s arbitration clause encompasses “any

12 problem or other dispute . . . concerning my experiences as a member of the Sea Org or as a voluntary

13 religious worker for the Church or any Scientology Entity, or concerning my participation in
Scientology’s religious services, or concerning any matter of church governance, organization,
14
practices, policies or discipline.” (1/30/2020 Order at 6-7.) And, at the hearing in this matter, the
15
Court did not recognize some of Plaintiff’s claims fell outside the scope of the agreements. Instead,
16
the Court stated that if the arbitrator decided some claims were outside the scope of the agreements
17 to arbitrate, then Plaintiff could “come back.” (Forman Decl. Ex. A at 9:17-22.)

18 Plaintiff argues that intentional tort claims are not within the “purview of an agreement to
19 arbitrate.” (Pl.’s Mem. 14:2-4.) This very issue was in the CSI Motion to Compel Arbitration
(Forman Decl. Ex. D at 15:22-28) addressed by Plaintiff’s Opposition, (id., Ex. G at 12:5-13:7 –
20
arbitration could not apply to “outrageous tortious conduct”), and rejected by the Court, when it
21
held that the scope of the arbitration is a question for the arbitrator,12 (1/30/2020 Order at 8; Forman
22
Decl. Ex. A at 9:17-22; see also Forman Decl. Ex. J at 8:2-9:21.) Plaintiff presents no basis for the
23 Court to reconsider this issue.

24 III. CONCLUSION
25 For the foregoing reasons, CSI and RTC respectfully request the Court deny Plaintiff’s
26 procedurally improper and substantively deficient motion for reconsideration.

27
12
28 Plaintiff cites In re Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 847 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1262-63 (2012), a case that the
Court distinguished and expressly “decline[d] to adopt the reasoning of.” (1/30/2020 Order at 8.)
19
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1

2 DATED: June 25, 2020 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

WILLIAM H. FORMAN
3 DAVID C. SCHEPER
4 MARGARET E. DAYTON

6 By:
William H. Forman
7
Attorneys for Defendant, Church of Scientology
8 International

9
DATED: June 25, 2020 JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP
10 ROBERT E. MANGELS
MATTHEW D. HINKS
11

12

13 By:
Matthew D. Hinks
14 Attorneys for Defendant Religious Technology
Center
15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

3 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am
employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 1900 Avenue
4 of the Stars, 7th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90067-4308.

5 On June 25, 2020, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as

6 DEFENDANTS CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL AND

RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
7 FOR RECONSIDERATION

8 as follows:

9 SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

10 BY PERSONAL SERVICE VIA FIRSTLEGAL: I personally arranged for a FirstLegal
messenger to deliver the document(s) to the person at the addresses listed in the Service List.
11 Delivery was made to the attorney or at the attorney's office by leaving the documents in an
envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being served with a receptionist or an
12 individual in charge of the office.

13 BY MAIL: I enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope or package addressed to the

persons at the addresses listed in the Service List and placed the envelope for collection and
14 mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with the practice of
Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing.
15 On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the
ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with
16 postage fully prepaid. I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The
envelope was placed in the mail at Los Angeles, California.
17
BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused the document(s) to be
18 sent from e-mail address vr1@jmbm.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the
Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic
19 message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.

20 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.
21
Executed on June 25, 2020, at Los Angeles, California.
22

23

24 Victoria Robles
25

26
27

28

67676487v1
 1 SERVICE LIST
2

3 SERVED VIA PERSONAL SERVICE AND Attorneys for Plaintiff Valerie Haney
E-MAIL
4 Robert W. Thompson
Kristen A. Vierhaus
5 THOMPSON LAW OFFICES, P.C.
700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160
6 Burlingame, CA 94010

8
ATTORNEY NOT ADMITTED TO THE
9 CALIFORNIA BAR – SERVED VIA MAIL
AS A COURTESY
10
Ricardo M. Martinez-Cid Attorneys for Plaintiff Valerie Haney
11 Lea P. Bucciero
PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.
12 One S.E. 3rd Avenue, Suite 2300

13 Miami, FL 33131
rmartinez-cid@podhurst.com
14 lbucciero@podhurst.com

15
Brian D. Kent Attorneys for Plaintiff Valerie Haney
16 Guy D’Andrea
M. Stewart Ryan
17 Lauren E. Stram
LAFFEY, BUCCI & KENT, LLP
18 1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19102
19 bkent@lbk-law.com

20 Jeffrey P. Fritz Attorneys for Plaintiff Valerie Haney

Lauren Goodfellow
21 SOLOFF & ZERVANOS, P.C.
1525 Locust Street, 8th Floor
22 Philadelphia, PA 19102
jfritz@lawsz.com
23
Marci Hamilton Attorneys for Plaintiff Valerie Haney
24 University of Pennsylvania
Fox-Fels Building
25 3814 Walnut Street

26 Philadelphia, PA 19104
hamilton.marci@gmail.com
27

28

67676487v1
 1 SERVED VIA E-MAIL AND U.S. MAIL Attorneys for Defendant Church of Scientology
International
2 William H. Forman
David C. Scheper
3 Margaret E. Dayton
SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP
4 800 West Sixth Street, 18th Floor

5 Los Angeles, CA 90017

wforman@scheperkim.com
6 dscheper@scheperkim.com
pdayton@scheperkim.com
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8 SERVED VIA E-MAIL AND U.S. MAIL Attorneys for Specially-Appearing Defendant
David Miscavige
9 Jeffrey K. Riffer
ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN
10 GARTSIDE LLP
10345 W. Olympic Blvd
11 Los Angeles, CA 90064
jriffer@elkinskalt.com
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