Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
· f:20()5~2019 · ·
. .. . & ANSWERS o . . . .· CIVIL
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PROc!:DiJRE
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.. , QUESTIPNS [)ECIS10NS IN R~EDIAL LAW .·
SUPR6¥E q()URT
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. . Qu~tion No. XLII • . . ~ d Ulevidencec ~~l'CC!Uttcdis .,;_affnlaviiof,i;ccit
which states_the facts constt~ thcm~v~'s good and substantial ·
.. ··. · · · - A filed an acti~~ seekin~ *e ~Ctit · defense, .which he, may ·prov~-if.~e DlOtion is sranted (Uy ii-$'. Firn .
· · . On March JO, 1 999,
bi . and posses~1~n of lot agams_t B. On Metr(J Jnt,egrated Steel Corporatton, 5!-_,4 P.hiL 839 (ioo6J). .. -
of title, recovery of ownersan ~rgent Motion for Inte~en~on lind · .
March 14; 2000, T filedonditional sale was ex~c~te~ ~ his fayor.
alleged that a Deed of Ce RTC rendered a J?~1s10n m fa~~ of B.
On FcbruarY 28,201 l, ~eel the RTC Decision. ·. ~ Petitto11 for .
I The requisi~s /~r
the _itui"~on of newly d.iscovereq_
evidence are: (l). the evi~ce ~as discovered aftenrial; (2) such .
evidence could not ,have ~ discovered and produced at the trial ·
On appeal, the ~A ~~th the .Supreme Court, !.
mtrodu~ new even with the e~CISe o f ~ I e dilig~(3) jt i s ~ not
Review ori ~e~oran Affidavit of Merit of the Petition, alleging for merely c~ulative. con:oool"!ltive._ or ~~ and· ( ) the . .
4
evidence, which is th~. ·· .of the Agreei;nent that were allegedly evidence ~ of ~uch w ~ that It ·.would j,robably change the
the firs~ time ~e exi5t~~ and yin .February, 2001 y.'herein_B judgroent if admitted ~U!l'IUU V6. TIIIU!<Mlabaldon, 665 Phil.297
executed by X ~ June, _0 on with the sale at the pn~ earlier /2011/). Ifth~all<:gedevi~cou1dhavevery~~becnpresented ·
allegedly promised toAg ements qualify as newly discovered · during the tnal ~th the exerc1~ of ~ l e dihgence, t'1e same
stipulated. Can the gre · · could not be considered newly discovered evidence. ·
' evidence?
In this case, Ts alleged newly discovered evidence is
Answer:
highly suspiciOl.1$. T had all the opportunity to introduce th~ as
_ ·e . cements
cannot e'°:en qualify · as .newly · . evidence du,ring the. trial given her assertion that the Asreei;nents
No. 1?
AgrN ly discovered eVfdence may be i:aised as where executed in 2000 and 2001. 'It is inaedulous that she only
discov~ eviden~. fiewnew trial or reconsideration pursuant to remembered the Agreements when , she prepared her Petition
a ground m a motton or .d
Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules, which provt es:
. .
. . ., . a
so~et~e in 2014, or over decade when-they were executed The
said evidence, if indeed the Agreements were executedin 2000 and
SECTION 1. Grounds ofand period for fili~g motion f~r·new.
. .de tion. _ Within the per:1od for taking an
t 2001, as claimed by T, were av~able during the trial and could have
been presented during that time. Thcrefo~ the requisite that such
trial or [~cons,. ~pa- rty may move the trial court to .<:et atide. evidence could not have been ·discovered·and produced at the trial
appeal, tru: aggne . · • /fi• : · oe
thejudgmentorfinalorderandgranta~ew tr,a orone_or": rts . . even with th~ exercise of reasonable diligence is wanting. The
o)thefol/qwingcauses materially affecting the substaTJtial righ . ·e vidence that T seeks to introdu~ at this late .stage of . the
ofsaidparty. proceedings is not newly discovered evidence. (Mandin:.T,otin vs.
Bongo~ et.. al, G.R. .No. 212840, August 28, 2019)
xxxx
Note:
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n. 1 Newl!Y discovered evidence, - h h e cou Id not• with
w h ,c . h
. ,v., . ..
· reasonable diligence, have· discovered
and . od cetl at t e
pr u It Rule 3 7, Section 1 of the Rule$ of <;ourt states:
irial, and which ifprese~ted would p~obably alter the resu ·
Section J. Grounds of and period for filing motion f~r new
xxxx trial or reconsideration. - Within the period for taking ~
. . . e appeal, the aggrie~dparty may move the tri~ court to set_'!'~
Section 2_of .Rule 3 7 requires that a motion for the : ~ ,theJudgment orfinal ortkr (Yid grant a new tr,alfor one_ or or
m~~ed in p~ph (b) of the said Secti~n shall_be supp: to be ofthefollowing causes materially affe~ting the substantial rights
~davits of the Witnesses by ~hom such ev1d~ce is expectcd'to be ofsaid pqrty: . .
,-
given, or by duly authenticated documents which are propos ·
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: WfRSOF·m s-2019 ' . • CML: PROCIDURE .
~ESTIONS & A~ISIC)NS IN REMEDIAL ~W
SUPREME COURT DEC . . ·. . \.) .,
. .. . ~~ or .excusable neglig_ence Which ' ~f~ ~ew lawyer.Atty~ D. B f'J,l~ aMotjon·to.. Withdraw Notice of
(a} Fraud; acc"Je'-'t:'«i n(Jt Jli1ve guqrded agamst and by Appeal \and a Motion for -~nsideration ·before the RT9.
ordinary prudence cch ,m,,.;eved party has probably been Meanwhile, the appeal before the CAprocee.ded The CA dismissed
ason of which su .· abO- . . . ' ' B's appeal for failure ·t o file ·the_required appellant's brief. Entry of
re . . • · ,,.,.ts; or ·
impaired ,n his r,15,, . . ·. Judgment then followed after the dismissal became final.
. . . red evidence, which he could not, with . Aggrieved. B filed in the S8D;le case a "Petition for Relief fi;om
(b) Newly .d!scove haVe discovered and produced at the tria~ Resolution or J~gment in Case Entry was Already Ordered",
reasonable diligence,d ouldprobably alter the result. · alleging gross ne?1:1gence on th~ J)art ofAtzy. D . Treated as a petition
and which ifpresente w . . for relief, the petition was outngbtly denied by the CA Is the CA•s
. riod. the aggri~dparty may also movefor ·. outright denial of petition.proper?
With~n the ~epe the grounds th4t the damages awarded are
recons~rationth;';:dence is insufficient to jus(ify the decision ~ Answer:
excessive_:_~
-or final cx--r. or
thaJ the decisioh 'or final order is contrary to ·
.
Jaw. . . Yes. The nature of an action, as well as·which court or body
has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
~ gl~ed.
1
· · a motion f<;Jr .reconsideration may be . contained in .the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether
. ~ 0)the damag~ awarded are excessive, (2) the ev~~
~citnt to Justify the decision or f"mal: order, or(?~ t
or fmal order is contrarY.to Jaw. The judicial or, quasedt-JU ,. c
:c;:n
. y
,, .
.or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein (City of Dumaguete vs. Philippin~ Ports
Authorty, 671 Phil 610(2011/). Notably, thepetitionforreliefwas
concc:mcd may aim"e at any ~tthe ~ enumerat, cone1us1ons filed in the same case, which resolution had already become final.
even without requiring addibonal . ~den~. To .be sure, the A1;1 ex~mioation ofB's avermeots ~ relief sought. i.e.,·the setting
_introduction ofnewly discovered additional evtdence_ts a grotn1d ~or aside of a final and executory resolution denying an appeal, leads to
new trial or a de novo appreciation of the case, b~ not for the -fil~ no other CODflU:Sion than that it is the m9(fe provided under Rule 38
of a motion for reco~ideration ·Judicial proceedin~s ev~ Pl:<?lub!t i of the Rules of Court whether-or not that was what B intended. The
the practice ofintroducing new.evidence on ~cons1der~~m smce It CA cannot, thus, be faulted for treating the petition as one which
potentially deprives the opposing party of ~ or ~er nght to _due ~o~t the relief provided by Rule 38, and_consequently dismissu,g
process. While quasi-judicial bodies in administrative p r ~ ~ 1t. ~t 1s settled that a petition for relief from judgment is not an
may extend leniency in this regard ·and allow the adm1Ss1on of available remedy in the CA (Purcon, Jr. vs. MRMPhilippina Inc.
evidence offered on reconsideration or on appeal (Scisan vs. -~RC, 588 Phil 308 [2008/). , ,
G.}l. No. 176240, October 17, 2008), this is merely permissi~e and
doe_$ not ~late to a requirement of attaching additional ev1denc~ Citing _S pouses Mesina vs. Meer in its.assailed January 29,
to support motions for reconsideration (Philippine Deposit 20I 4 Resolunon, the CA reasoned that a petition for relief is not the
Insurana Corporation vs. Gidwani, G.R. No. 234616, .June 20, prol'C: r~edy from a CA Resc;,Iution dismissing an appeal. As
2018) . explamed m Mesina:-, .
B .was indicted for Bigamy. .Toe RTC found B guilty t,eyond 1he procedure in the Court ofAppeals and the Supreme C<)Url
reasonable do~t of the crime charged. B appealed his conviction to :;e goveme~ by separate provisions of the Rules of Court and
:e ~A. Athaccording to B, his then counsel ofrecord A~. C, broached ay, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules
· e 1 ea the might want to engage a new lawyer. Upon the advice , pr':"'ulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or
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· . QuesnoNS a..~ ~s It-I RfMEOIAL LAW CML PROCEC>URE
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suPRB'AE COURT . . . . . .
· : . the · les O outt nor the . ev; ed :- -··.-' '.. . : . . .. . . . .· . . .
eithe -~ ~~ ly dep riv~ of her righ t ~ -present!i#
circ ula r~- =- h oudr o.. · cils allow the reme 0 negligence and .ignorance,:of ht:r fonner ·colllis ~ -due to the gross
InterTlfl. l R11tes o. ·t ine · the ·°"-. rt ·0 . als. 1ir,,...-.
v(KU,_:rs,co-.
nng. el who caused the
titio_n or relie . · · · dismissal of her com p~ for. annillm.ent of
· mortgag«? due to her.
supplied) failure to appear on the Fe b~ 23, 2010 hear
, , .. ing of tlie case· who
failed to ftle the motion for reconsideration on
· · . vides relief to htig an~ whe n gross
While the Co ur t~~ in such cases, pebn of the wrong temeciy by filing a second moti
time· and who a;ailed .
oners go to on-fa'.r reconsideration
negligenCC of co~ el lS ificallY provided by law which eventualJy le4.t o-~ finality of the Febr
and the Rules. In , uary 23, 2010 Order.
court tbroush modes spec C rt ofAppeals, Thus , she w!l5· prompted to_· file the .petit
and Legarda v. Court ion· for relief from .the
both APEXMining) Jnc. ·v. oucdy availed of February 23, 2010 · Order of the RTC with
before the CA was a in-60 days from · her
of.Appeals, cited by B, tbe ·~e ni t.mder Rule knowledge of its finality . .In its Mar di 18~
47 of the Rules of 2013 Order, the RTC
petition for annulment 0 ~ dismissed outright L's petition for relief. The
le of the Phillppines, 526 PhiL 239·' trial court explained
Court fu Cal~ ~an vs. ~ to a Rule 45 that a petition for relief from a final judgmen
petition on a pure t or order must be filed
(2006), the petrttoner res this Court, which within: _(a) 60 days aft.er the petitioner learn
s of the judgment, final
question of law ~f assailed the RTC's
tition questioning the MTC's denial of a
dismissal of a ~e . ~ case. we are, thus
order, or' other proceeding to be set_asi~ ; and
enl:I) ' of suchjudgment, order, or
(b) six-months from
other proc ccdi ng, It emphasized
, confounded by that these two periods inust concur and mus
motion for new ~ ih a_ . er is referring to in t be strictJy observed
his contention that since compliance with .the reglementary perio
~ mode 0 ~ r : : ~petition before it as one filed under Rule The} trial cow t ruled that contrary to L's belie
ds is jurisdictional.
tbeCAerre"dm f,...-urt. (Baoaporovs. People, f. the 60-day perio d bad
38 of the Rules O ~ G.R. No. 211829, com men ced when she, through her (orm
0 er coun sel, received a copy
JanJlarJ 30,-2019) _ . of the Apri l 29, 7010 Order deny ing· the
·reconsideration of the
dismissal of the case on February 23, 2010 ,_and
not from the time of
her belated know ledg e of the final ity aft.er
consultjng with a
Question No. XLIV . different lawyer. Thus, ~tr ial. court opin
ed that the petition for
relief was filed way bey ~d the two. perio
ds set by the Rules_of
L
On January 14, 2003, filed a Complaint for
· · · · t PNB The RTC issued an Ord er ~~ ~en tthof
Cou rt Is the RTC correct?
· 1
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QU · ,:, ·ISl()NS.IN REMEOIAl lAW · CIVIL ~B:lUR E- .
S~f'REME C<:>URT ~EC . .• . . . .
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· · · · .. ·_, uch, it is:incumbent upoi:ithe•petitio~~;t '1 ' ~. '
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and as expressly provided under the Rules of Court, the 6<Hiay . MRI filed a -case for unlawful detainer against P before
'od under S~ion 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court sliould be MeTC docketed as Civil Case-No.151271-CV. OnMarch31, 1998,
~ ed from the time the aggrieved party has knowledge of the the MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of MRI. Afk.r the decision
_:;f!l\t or order sought .to be set ~ide. In other words, for .
purposes of the 60-day period ~d~ Rule .38; _knowledge of
. became final and executory, _MRI filed a Motion for Execution. In
. an Order dated July 27, 1998, the MeTC granted the motion. On
the finality of the judgment or order 1S urelevant. · October 1, 1998, a writ of execution was issued. M~ e. P filed
before RTC Branch 47, a Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition Md
The records reveal that L's knowledge of the February ·23, lnjW1ction with prayer for issuance; of temporary restraining order
201 0 Order could be traced to at least two periods: on Feb~ 23,. seeking the nullification of the prOCA"Cdings in the unlawful detainer
2010, when the Court issued the subject Order and on which~ was case. The petition was later amended. On March 9, 1999, the RTC
admittediy in attendance; and on July 23, 2010, the date L s~gned an
Branch 47 issued Order directing the Sheriff ofMeTC to put on
the Verification and Certification for the Petition for Certioran filed hold any further action on the case without giving due course to P's
with the CA It must be underlined that the very subject of the prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order. On April 20,
aforementioned petition forterli orariw as the February 23, 2010 1999, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement which was
Order itself. On the other hand, while there was an attempt to argue approved by the MeTC. · However, P violated the terms and
the compliance with·the 60-day period in the petition for relief, there
conditions thereof. Thus, MRI moved for the execution ofthe MeTC
was no effort to show that the six-month peij.od - which is equallY
Decision dated July 15, 1999. On May 4, 2001, the MeTC granted
r MRI's motion, and ordered the issuance of a writ
relevant for a petition for relief - was complied with. It ~a~ ~ ~ of execution for
the enforcement of the July 15, 1999, Decision. On July 6, 2004, the
this was consciously adopted to conceal-the fact that the petition fo
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QuESTIO~ & ANSWERS bF 2005-2019 CML PROCIDURE-
· ,. RT DECISIONS IN.REMEDIAL ½W
SUPR™ECOU .
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· ' erved a copy ~f the _Writ of Ex~~on·and ~ ' IJowd~er. there arethinstanlces_fwfihere thj.s-C<>urt·all()~ed execution by
Sheriff of the Me~~;. The.Sheriff reported that ~e.~t was not trtotion even after e apse O: ve years_upon mentorious grounds.
Notice to Vacate ~ receipt of a written commumcation fro!Jl P's
implemented due to . hin;i. under pain of contempt of COUrt, to ·. In the case of Lancita, et al.· v. Magbanua et al., the C()urt
counsel stro~y urgingacti~n against p u,. view of the case lodged pronounced:
desist from taking anyh 47 which was then pending rcsolutiq~ The
bef~ the RTC :~;C Branch 47 was dism~s~ on~~>: 10, 2004.
petrtton before ~ ~ to the CA, but 1t was dismissed in a
In computing the time limited for suing.out of an eucutiQn,
although iMre is authority to the contrary, the ge_neral rule is
P a~aled: M~ 23, 2007. Still ~tis_fied, P assail~ the that there should not be inclutk4 the time when execution is
Dec1S1on da ugh a tition for ceitloran before the Supreme stayed, either by agreement ofthe partiesfor a definite time, by
ruling of the CAthr: a RJ:lution dated July 2, 2008, the Court injunction, by the taking ofan appeal or writ oferror so a,s to
~ !;"ertition a In subsequent Resolution dated November
operate as a supersedeas, by the death ofa party or otherwise_.
Any interruption or delay occasioned by _the debtor will extend
dismis008 ~ Court denied with ~ty. P's . motion for the time within which the writ may be issued without scirefacias.
. :on~id~on. After the finality_of the d1~1ssal, MRI ~I~ a
Motion to Enforce Writ of Execution _?D April 2~, 2010. P moved The foregoing principle had been applied by this, Court iµ
1"deration·setting aside the wnt of execution On March 15, several cases. As ~sed in Francisco Moton_Corp. vs. Court of
. for reconsthM TC on1~ted p•s motion for reconsideration. It held that" Appeals, 535 Phil 736 (2006): .
2011 e e o-- · th uh' f hi h _. . .
MJU's Motion to Enforce Writ of Execution, . es ~~ o_ w c
be' th July 15 1999 Dec~ion, was filed only on April 28, 2010. In Blouse Poienciano v. Mariano, we held that the motion/or
Th~Me;C found that' this mo~on was filed beyond ili:e 10-ycar examination of the judgment debtor, which is a proceeding
· period for the enforcement .o f a Judgment through a motion Is the supplementary to execution, and the action for mandamus
;wing of the MeTC correct? · amounted to a stay ofexecution which effectively interrupted or
suspended the five (5)-year periodfor enforcing~judgn:,ent by
Answer: motion. In Catr,acho v. Court ofAppeals, el al., where after a
) final judgment, "the petitioner (ol;,ligor) moved ·to defer the
No. Section 6, Rule 39_ of the 1997 Rules ~f Civil Procedure, execution, elevated the matter to the C.A and the Supreme Court,
as amended provides: · transje"ed the property to her.doughier, in addition to the fssues
regarding counsel and subsequent vacancies in the courts, we
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by fndeperu;lent action..-Afi~al ruled that:
and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
within/ive (5) years from the date ofits entry. After_th~·/"!'se 0{ Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case where
such time, ar,d before it is barred by the statute of l,m1tahons, the delays were occasioned by petitioner's own initiaJives and
judgment may be enforced by action. The revivedjudgment may for her advantage as well as beyond the respondents' control,
also be enforced by motion within five (5) yearsfrom the date 01 we hold that the five · [5)-year period allowed for the
its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute · enforcement ofthe judgment by motion wds deemed to Have been
of limitations. effectively interrupted or suspended. Ona again we rely upon
basic notions ofe~ity andjustice in so ruling.
According to the above rule, a judgment may be executed on
motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the ~ · 1he purpose of the law in prescribing time limitatipn.s for
it becomes final and ·executory. After· that, a judgm~t ~ar enforcing judgment or actions "is to prevent oblig'!"s !°"'
enforced by action before it is barred by the statute of bm1tabons, sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on the,_r r i ~
respondents persistently pursued their rights of action. It is
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CML PROCEDURE
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS OF 2005-2019
RT OECISJONS IN REMEDIAL LAW
SUPREME ~OU · , . . .
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: ~ conscien~ t~ allow petitioner to fariher avert . ~~ded the five,year period to enforce the.~is_ion through a
revol~f);0 t'. e · 01 her obiigation because of sheer literal . motion.
the ;,u,..,iaction 11. . .• . . . .
adherence to technicality;. .
.In ~e ·case under coiisideiati~ ~e judgm~t sought to be
· btractedfrom u,ejive (5)-year period the time whh, execute4 IS the July 15, )999, ~ion of the· MeTC which
W~ also su Id not be enforced due to.the restraining order approved by the Compromise Agreeme,nt of the parties. The writ of
'!'eJudr~t~rt andwhen the records ofthe case were /~st execution was iss~_ on May 4, 2011 : However, it could not .be
,ssue1 ra:; through no fault of the petitioner. In Provincial
or m':::mentoJSorsogon v. Vila. Vill~oya. we li~ise excluded .
enforced by the sheriff because P filed an amended P~tition for
· certiorari and prohibition with pray~ !or issuapce of a restraining
· ~lays caused the .auditor's requirements which were not the order before R!C ~~h _47. The pcl:Ition was assailing the validity
; ;1, of the parties who sought exe_cution, _and ruled that "in the of the proceedings m Civil Case No. 151271-CV before the MeTC
ei years that elapsedfrom the ~~e the1.u~gment became final , on the ground of lack ofjurisdiction. Thus, in bis Return dated July
u'::f the filing of .the restrammg .motion by the private 19, 2004, ~e sheriff I'CJ?Oited that ori July 6, 2004, he served a copy
espontknts the judgment never became dormant. Section 6, of the Wnt of Executton on P. Indeed, through an Order dated
~le 39 ofthe RevisedRules ofCou~t does not apply. "In Jacinto March 9, 1999, . the RTC Branch 47. requested the sheriff of the
v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
. .
this Couf'! further h~ld:
. . MeTC to hold m l!l?eyarice any action on the case. such as the
implementation of a wri~ of ~on. As stated earlier, on May to,_
Granti~gfor the sake oJargument that the motion for an alias 2004, RTC Branch 47 dismissed P's petition. Qn appeal to the CA.
writ ofexecuJion was beyond the five [5]-year limitation within the latter affmned the RTC in a Decision dated March 23 2007.
which a judgment may be executed by mere motion, still under
Then, in a Resolution ~ · July 2, 2008, the Suprem~ Court
the circumstances prevailing wherein all the delay in the
execution ofthe judgment /.astingfor more than eight [8]-years dismissed P's petition-for ceniorari. On November 17 2008 the
was beneficial to private respondents, this Court, for reasons of Court denied with finality P's motion fOl" reconsi~on. p is
equity, is constrained to. treat the motionf~r execu~on as having attacking •the RTC and CA's ruling of granting MRl's motion for
been filed within .the reglementa,y period required by law. execution. Because of P's acts. there has been a long delay in the
(F,,nphasis omitted; citation omitted) · enforc~ent of the July 15, 1999, MeTC.Decision. The enforcement
of the M~TC's Decision.by motion has been ~ t e d by the acts
ofP, the Judgment debtor. · · · .
Also, in Yau vs. Silverio, Sr., 567 Phil 493 (2008), the writ
of execution could:not be.enforced for the full satisfaction of the trial
court's judgment within the five-year period by reason of the • Under the circumstances of the case at bar where the delays
petitions challenging thel trial court's judgment and the writ of · were caused by P for her ad.vantag~ as well as outside of MRI' s
execution. The Cowtheld that the petitions suspended or interrupted con~o~ the Court holds that the fiveeyear ,period allowed for
the further coforcement of the writ. · enforcement of the judgment by motion was deemed to have been
~ec~vely intenupted or suspended. The Court reiterates the
1n·Rizlzl Commercial Banking Corp. (RCBC) vs. Serra,713 pnnc1ple that the.purpose of the law in prescribing tiJ;ne limi~ons
Phil 712 (2013), RCBC sought to enforce against Serra a decision f?r c;nforcing judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping on their
Iha~~ already become final and executory. However, to evade his ?~· The Court firids in this case that MR/, far from sleeping on
obligation, ~erra transf~ the property to ·his mother who then ~ts rights, was diligent in seeking the execution of the judgmr.nt in
transferred 1t to another perspn This prompted RCBC to file an its favor. (Perez vs. /t(anotolc Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 2161S7,
October U, 2019) ·
~ent case. This Court held therein that the delay in the
execution of the decision was caused by Sena for his own ·
advantage. Thus, the pendency of the annulment case effectively
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Qu~tio li No. XI.VI '• ·~ ~ui¢.b y·moti~n. W~ ~ Order issued beyoruj the reglcmentacy
· period for executms a;dec1$tori by motio~? _.
,
27' 199 ' CMDC
3 and PFRC-entered into a J.oint .
On October )inprep· aratton
· fi_o~ the fiorma_ti'
ent(NA onof _ajoint Answ~r:. . J •
53~hectare ar;~dwnaoan
venture to ~~ Benguet (G Project). On November
awar4ed the MPSA to CMDC On A ~ s,
ti t 996, thee and PFRC ~ecute d a Letter-Agreement amending
· · . Yes. I_t is ~OJllat\c· that ~ a judgment has been folly .
satisfied, the case is_ deem,ed temunated once an4 for all. It is when -
the judgment bas been satisfied that the same passesbeyond review,
1997, CMD der tneir new arrangement, PFRC acquired a 40% stake · for satisfaction thereofts the kz:t
act and end of the proceedings. In.
~JVA.Uno·ect. On January 11, 2000~ DDCP, PFRC's drilling Vda. de Paman v'. Judg~ Sene'!3., theJ!ourtheld thatac;ase·i,n which
m the G PrJ d a Complaint for collection of sum of money with an execµtion bas been,1 ~ is regarded_as still pending so that all
CO?tracto~ ettachment againstPFRCbefore the RTC. In an Order pro ~s on the ~ n m:e proce-Mi_ngs in the suit There is no
::e;a n~ 28, 2011, the RTC gran~ed the preliminary question that the court ~ch rendered _the judgment has a generai
attachment PFRCs 40% share in the G Pt/LevyroJect washichattached and supervisory control over its process ·of execution, and this power
levied n through a Notice of Attachm:m _ cai:nes with it the right to determine every question of fact and law
w w~ ~ed
~ ffice of the MGB of the Cordillera ,Autonomous Regions which may be inv9lved in the· execution...The Court, therefore,
~ ) , e \:re the 40¾ share is officially recorded. On April 23, - allowed the enforcement of the employee's subsidiary liability in the
· crim,ina1 proceeding for reckless imprudence t~ting in homicide
2001, th:_trial court rendered a Decision holding PFl!,-C_li.a~le_to because at that point--the judgment had not yet bet.n fully satisfied_ ·
DDCP. On October--19, 2001, En~ of Judgm ~t was ~ss~ed m th~
=:urt.
· ·· d, atDDCP's instance a wntof execution was issued by the
By virtue thereo{the 40% interest of PFRC ~ the G
Project was levi~ Thereafter, a Notice of Levy on Executtdedon o~th,er
Likewise, in Seavan Carrier v. GT/ Sportswear, where execution
had already commenced but the certificate of sale issue4 by the
deputy sheriff in favor of the prevailing parties did not cover the full
the said 40% interest was served on, and cause_d to b_e recor . WI amount of the judgment. the Court o ~ the trial court to conduct
the MGB-CAR. On Decem.ber 31, 2001, PFRC's mterest m the .G a hearing to determine the exact m;noµot still owing to the judgment
fu>ject was publicly auctioned whereupon DDCP ~e out as the creditors, on the ground that the trial court continued to exercise the
highest bidder. Thereafter, a Certificate of Sale was issued ~y _tbe power to control the execution of its decwori, since the judgment
Sheriff of the RTC in favor of DDCP. The sale was duly regt~ered had not yet been fully satisfied.
with the MGB-CAR. Hence, DDCP gecanie the 4~/o e~tabb: .
owner. hi 2008, DDCP requested the MGB to rc:cord ~ts 40¾ Also, Rule 39,.Section 6 of the Rules of Court limits the time
interest in the G Project The request was denied on th~ gr_ ound ~~
within which a writ of execution may
be issued; but it does not
prescribe.a period when the sale at public auction shall take place
DDCP bas not acquired any interest ,in.the MPSA sm~ the 581 e _
Agreement is between the govepmient and CMDC. In ~ew of th after the issuance of such writ and a valid levy made pursuant
dtnial, DD'P filed a M~tion dated Jwie ·2, ·2011 praytnB that byan
thereto. The execution ~e simply ·carries out the execution writ and
the levy which, when issued, were valid Accordingly, the Co\lrt has
order be issued directing the DENR Secretary to amend M;PSA
!°al ~u:.
held that a valid execution issued and levy made dtuing the lifetime
incorporating the 40% o\Vllership of DDCP thereirL The of the writ of execution may be enforced by a sale thereafter, i.e.,_a
then issued the Order on August 31, 2011 granting DDCP s ~otto n
sale made even beyond the lifetime of the writ of cxccution,
On petition for certio ~ by CMDC, the CA -~~d_ the pe~tton:e ~ovided such sale is made within ten (lO)years fron;i the entry of
the ground that the tmil court no longer had Junsdiction to issue .
Order, as f!DCP's moti~n.to amend ~SA is essenti~ly a
for cxecutlon of the Dects1on dated April 23, 2011 which was · be
ro:: JUdgm~t This rule rests ·upon the principle that the levy is the
ess~ act·by which the property is set apart for the satisfactioo of
the Judgment and taken
into custody of the law,
beyond the five-year J>Cri;od within which a decision maY
l62. 163
QUES110NS&A~ ~OF~2Q19 _. ciyit PROCB;>URE
SUPREME COURT OECISlONS iN REMEDIAL l,AY!
' :;_1,. . . ..
· · In this case, the judgntent in·favor of D_DCP, should be !lhe.t?~ es~ mo~e; and later, it·~~gccl ~ the highest bidder ·
full satisfied at the -time it fil~ ~e ~o~on to am.end ~ at the ~~lie auction such that a_certifit:atc Q.f sale was eventually
~:theTh; trial court.bad already lost J~~~on _by.~e tune i~-
issued assailed ordet, for~ the acqw~1tton by Judicial sale of
. iss~ 1Il its fa~or. On July ~9, 201~, th!'·RTC ·snmte<l the petition
· and -issued the . corresponding wnt of possession. Meanwhile
DDCP of PFRC's 40% interest m the G ProJ~ DDCP had already Spouses A and ~ ~ed an Omnibus Motion with Prayrr·foc ~
acquired property of its judgment de~tor which stan~ as payment Issuance of a Prelmmwy ~ Injunction. They claimed that
for the judgment debt._DDCP'. s ~Cltlon that ~e ~sailed o~~er'is a they were the owners of the subject JX'operty which was previously
mere continuation of the execution ~oceedings ~ unavailing, It covered by .TCT tmder ~ir name. They sbltes
that.in 2003, they
must be noted that PFRC was a foreign corporation whose only ' mortgaged it to _ UB, but m ~eptembc- 2007, through a certain D. c,
attachable property in this jurisdiction was its 40% share in the G · and E, they decided 1? sell it to M, subject to the condition that M
Project Under the NA between CMDC and PFRC, the 40% share would secure fmancmg from one V. who, in ium, would pay
in the G Project pertained to the ..Assets" of the Project, defmed as Spouses A and B's balance with l:lB andMwould then secure a loan
· "the •-Claims, Mineral Production Agreement, Other Tenements; from PSB using the 5am:e property as_coUatcraI. SJ'Ofl:SO A arid B
Facilities, Mineral Products and Supplies and all other assets added that they were third ~ s claiming rights adverse to M;
acquired or held by the parties with respect thereto or pursuant to· thus, .they ~uld no! be deprived of the pcmession of the subject
this Agreement as the same may exist from time to time. In tmn, the · ~cperty without ~ heard of their claim first: Spo,ua A. and B
Letter-Agreement dated-August 5, 1997 referred to the "execution ms1St that the RTC nnpropedy issued a writ of poss~ion in favor
ofthe necessary and recordable transfer documents to evidence the of 1:SB on the contention that they were third parties holding the
ownership of PFRC of Forty Per Cent (40%) interest in the G subject property pdverse to the judgment debtoc, M. Rule on the
Project and the 1996 Mineml Production Sharing Agreement. ·By contention of Spouses A and B.
the execution sale,.DDCP became subrogated to all the rights of
PFRC mder the NA and the Letter-Agreement dated August 5, Answer:
1997. The right to demand the amendment of the MPSA to reflect
the 40% interest therein is only one among the btmdle of righ~ that The contention of Spouses A. andB is untenable. Section 33,
DDCP had acquired in the execution sale: These rights constitute Rule 39· of the Rules of €ourt, whicli extends to extrajudicial
property which may stand as payment for the judgment debt As foreclosure sales (Spouses Galle:nt vs:. Vdasque:., 781 Phil 44
regards the share in the MPSA, at this point, the remedy of DDCP /2016]), explicitly provides that when no redemption.is made within
no longer lays with the trial court but with the DENR Secretary, one (I) year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale,
because the approval of an amendment to an MPSA to reflect a the purchased is already entitled to the possession of the subject
transfer or assignment of rights therein is a power and function of property unless a third party is holding it adversely to the judgment
· the.?~ Secretary. •(Diamond Drllling Corporation of the a
debtor. It . bears stressing that purchaser in an extrajudicial
Philipp,nes vs. Crescent Mining and Development Corporation, foreclosw-e becomes the absolute owner of the subject property in
G.R. No. 201785, April JO, 2019) case no redemption is made within one (I) year from the registration
of ~e certificate 9f sale. As the absolute owner, the purchaser is
entitled to all the rights of ownership, including the right to possess
th~ property. -It, th~. follows that upon proper application
Question No. XLVIl and
evi~ce ~f ownership, the issuance of a writ ofpossession becomes
am On Octo~ ~6, .20C)7, M obtained a loan from PSB in the a IIllIUsterial duty of the court except where a third party is holding
ount of P5. 7 Million. As security thereof, M executed a real estate ~e property adversely to the judgment debtor. In the latter case. the
: ~ over a_~l of land-~ failed to-pay the loan when it fell :uance of a writ of possession is no longer ministerial and may not
' • PSB mstituted a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of done ex parte and hearing for ·the purpose of detamining
164 165
. · :,.....-::of 2()05-20 19 : . CML PROCEDURE
E$TIONS & Al'Q"~ . ·
QU ·[)ECISlbNS IN REMEDIAL 1:AW
-suP.R!J>4E_couRT . . D
. . .. ust be held :(Chi~a-B~nkin g Corp. v.s. . - i ~c -;endered a Decisio~ in R's favor. A~eve d.:~ aweaied_the
f
entitleinent to p0sses~1~ 54 [2008». Let it b:e_stressed that by third ~~-to the f:?_
A._ Ute CA granted the appeal;_·On ~ n for ~eview
certiora n _with the ·Supreme Co~ R ~ntend s that S violated
SpollSS·l o:""'• 579 PhiL by ad~ title or !lght. the ~ref ~ ..
partY boldin8. t· h e ~ . of the disputed property_in hrs or her ru1~ 44 of ~e ~es of Court wh~ the·latter's ~ppell~ t• s ~rief, .
to one who 1s.lll possessi on
-_.uer 8 tenant or a u sufructuary. · · .
which was submitted to the CA, f~~ to contain a ·subJt;_Ct mde_x
own right sue h M800 ~~•'
•· . . · with page of rceference and comphant statement .of facts. This
. ·
. . ses A and B sold the subject_p r ~ to M omission. according to-R, sho~d be enough to warrant ~revers al of
· In this cMC. S~te saie. By doiri.g so, they rehnqmshed their the_CA decision_ Is the contentl.on ofR tenable? .
fur<>u8h a_~of ai:rthe latter- This also means that from the time
title over 1t JI1 favo~.ect propertY, Spouses A ~d-B no _long<:t had _ Answer:
that they sold l?e •/cannot be considered as third parties wtthan
9tI'f rigb~ ~er: ~ thejudgment deb~or. '?te sale'wa s an_absoh
No. Section 13~Rule 44 of the Rules of Court.provides the
~e requisite contents of an appellant's brief that. is to be submitted
advefSe ~ without any reservatlon of ownership by its
one;-_thereby~ r t ~ ouses A and R). In fact, the interest of the before the courts. It states t,hat: . .
previ_ous ownbers...!,..,ed from Spouses A and B themselves which
:..-i;,.,,ent de tor.,..........
· SECTIO N 13. _Contents of appellant's brief. The appellant's
J- · claimo fSpouse sAandB of auu.iere
..J: =. ·· ~
n_tmterestu';'ll1 briefshall conJain, in the order.herein indicated,. the following:
th
refutes e vConsery ·denng· that the sale of real property 1s an e~ective ·
that of M 1
. ode of ~ferrin g ownership, it follows that th ·
. ere _1s suffic~e_nt
· . (a) .A subject index of the matter in the brief-with a digest of
m lud that S,-nuses A and B have no mdependent nght the arguments . and page l references, ar,d a table of cases
reason to· cone e
..-kt Thus s,,ouse s A andB cannot bedeemed
-r-
overthes ubject
.
pr0.r,..r • -r alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with
as third parties who were not pri~ to the debtor. To . ey are not references to the pages where they are cited;
•tied to protection and may be removed from the subJect property
:!out violating •their · right to: ~u~ · proce~s of law. (Spouses (b) An assignm ent ofe"ors inJended to be urged, which e"ors
Batolino vs. y_ap-Rosas and Philippine Saving s _Bank, G.R. No. shall be separately, distinctly and concisely stated without
206598, September 4, 2019) repetition and number ed consecutively;
167
166
,' .
report at~~~~ th~ case ~gms andthe page rof the report on .
which the atatton is fowid; , . . •In~ ,~nsisten_t witli the ~ ~ De Leon, the
guiding ·
principle m th~ r~lution of the _foregoing issues is that if·the
(g) Under the heading "Relief," a ~cification ofthe order or . citations found m -~~ appellants bri~f could sufflciently enable the
judgment which the.appellant seeks. and • · CA to lo~ expediti~y the ~ons of the records referred to,
then there _IS substantial comp~ with the· requirements of
(h)· In coses not brough! up by · record . on appeal, the section.13. Rule 44 of the Rules.of Court;
appellant's brief shall contain, as an appendix, a copy of th_e
judgment or final order qppealedfrom. (16a. R46) In this case, the CA did not exercise the discreti~ to dismiss
the appeal based on.the absence of "a subject index wi~ page of
ArrJ deviation from the required contents as provided reference and com:phant statement of facts" in·the appellant's brief.
thereunder is dealt with by Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. For the Clearl~, the CA did no~ find_~ the tenets of justice and fair play
purpose of this case; R, actually ~chors his plea on Sec~on l(t) of were disregarded by this omission. Rathec, the CA chose to decide
Rule 50, which particularly menbons the absence of page references the case on the merits, which' impliedly fom,,d the appellant's brief
in the subject iridex and statement offacts in the appellant's brief. It to ·~ substanti~y sufficient insof~ _as ·the guiding principle
provides that · mentioned above IS concerned. More, rt IS proper to empbasi:ze that
this di$cretion is particularly vested unto the CA and not unto the
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal ofappeal. - An am,eal mqy Court. Thus, absent any grave abuse o.f disaetion in~ applicati~n
be dismissed by the Court o[Appeals. on its own motion or on of the rules, the .Court could not, and would not, interfere with the
that ofthe appellee; on the following grounds: CA ·findings. Considering too that R ·merely (1) quoted the
provisions of the rules that the appellant's brief "violated" and (2)
xxxx . showed the insufficiencies in the appellant's bri~ but did not
present any proof of any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
(f) Absence ofsped.fie assignment ofen-ors in the appellant's CA, the Court would not now dismantle a.ruling that was reached
brief. or ofpagt references to the record as required in Section based ori a discretion which was not improperly exercised. (Rich vs.
13. paragraphs (a), (c). (d) and (I) ofRule 44;. · Paloma Ill, et. al, G.R. No. 2105~8, March 7, 2018)
xx xx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
. .
Question No. XLIX .
In De Leon vs. Court ofAppeals, the Court has already ruled
that the gromids for dismissal of m appeal under Section l of Rule On May 5, 1997, D filed an action for recovety of ownership
50 of the Rules of Court are discretionary upon the CA. It said that:
before the RTC. D maintained that Chad been squatting on the
parcel of land owned by D, and that despit~ repeated demands, C
;:,.x Rule 50, Section 1 whichp;O'Vides specific grounds for
refused to vacate the ~d lot During the hearing, D'.s counsel
. issaJ ofappe~l manifestly "confers a er and 'does not
impose a duty " "What . . •
p· ow.
168 169,
· .· · .•~o'f2 00S-2 019 · • · CIVIL PRoci:ou~e
NS & Aru,....w .. .
auesno oectsK>Ns IN REMEDIAL LAw ·
SUPREME COURT ; . . . .
· · , all ed that hi~ :collllSCl's nesliBerice in · t' . J the issue . of extrinsic ,fraud with the trial 'court. . he is .
, Judglllent wherein be_ ed~ from piµ'tic,i pa~ th~ci n and from ':Sectively barred from .raising the. same iss~ via his _pct,ition
bandlins bis case prevent , the same _was demed by the RTC for for '
ulment of judgment Howe:ver, the sa.me _ capnot be said for the
·filing bis appeal. H~WC".er~. On October 1s,:2011, D filed ar:und of lack of }w:isd:iqtion. ·~~ that -D. immediately
. bavin& been filed out of 1:t·or with the .
judgmentbn -~e ground of e~i c
. CA a petition for ~~ct i~n. Will the pennon for annulm
:Sorted to court action - 1.e, a ~no n for relicf-from ~~t
the petition for ~ulm ent of Judgment - upon l ~ g of
and
fraud and lack of JUil ent of the
.. unfavorable Decisi:o~ dated_May 18, 2010 ~f 1he ~ court,
judgment prosper? · ~
· cannot be deemed guilty o f ~ nor p ~ m estoppcl. Thus,
ifD.
is able · to .prove that the trial court_indeed went beyon
Ans,ver: d its
, jurisdiction in issuing its Decision, nothing prevents him
. 1 Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that asking for its annulment (Tu Hein_ of 'Cul/ado, d. aLfrom vs.
Yes. Secbo~ent by the CA ofjudgments or final orders and Gutierrez, G.R. No._212938, July 30, 2019) .
i
the ~edy ?f ~ actions of the Regional Trial Courts can only
be
res~lubOJIS; ci the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
avail~ of ereoth appropriate remedies are no longer available
for relief or er · · · fi annuim t f Annulment of-judgment is a remed
no fault of the petitioner. Thus, a peb.bo 1
y in law independer;lt of
~ough under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only under except~ the case where the judgment sought to be annull
n or o
ional ed was rendeied. It
J~gment __.,__ party without fault on 11,is part, had failed to is a recourse that presupposes the filing of a _separate and original
1 8
circumS tanCCS
, of th ordinary-Or other' appropriate remedies proVI'ded by 1aw;
Wlll, " action for the purpose ofannulling or avoiding a decision in anothe
:f such ~on is never resorted to as a su?stitute for a party's ~
neglect , not promptly avail,ipg of the ordinary or other approp
. case. It is not a continuation or progression of the same ~
fact the case it seeks to minul is already final and exccutory,
as in
but
r
. ' '
. the victim's ·cadaver. In its Co~pliance and Manifestaii · ,
the
fOl.lllNBdm.l l..;.,,ed that semen specmen was ·no longer m · °!1,
\ W~ll-sedled i~ die prl~ipie _tho!, a deciiio,, .~ ,-has acquired .
the c _.. , . . . hadbe -•'--= ·- finality beconiu immuiable.'and~ tera~le 'tmd.'!f'iY no longer
an-~ tbatthe spec1D1Cll lts
~ "UVlllltted 8S e-,;i~....: . , be modified in any respect even if the IJl<idj.fication is meant t() .
custody._It lll!S""The trial court denied this claim. Howev ~e
to the trial court . correct e,:roneous.conclusions offact or-law and wliether it will
Certification. Dr. B of the ~I s ~ co-Legal ·n· . . er, 111 a .
, M. di
. 1~s1on conrlllncd -. be made by the COU(t that rendered it or by the highest court of
the slides containin8 the specmen ~ere still m the Bureau• the land .
~Y- Due to"the missing ~menspecmen, -Wfiledthe,Pctiti~ - ··
for Indirect Contem.Pt W cl~ that A and ~ qf the NBI made a 'Jhe reason for this is that litiga#on must end and terminate
fal report to the Court when 1t stated that 1t had submitted the • sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to~ effective and
re
· seim.en to the trial court Two (2) weeks after the filing of Petition
Indirect Contempt, the Court.ruled on the case_~f Leano \IS.
People, the aiminal case. In finding that -the prosecub.~ failed to
efficient administration of justice that, Ql1Ce a judgment lias ·
become final, the winning party be not deprived ofthe fruits of
the verdict Courts must guard against any scheme calculaJed to
bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to
e bis guilt beyond reasonable doubt, W was acqwtted .of the
prolong the controversies. · -
:::e charged. The Office of the Solicitor Genera) argues that the
Petition of Indirect Contempt is rendered m~t -~ promulgation . The doctrine rests upon the principle that "parties ought not
of Lejano ~ --Is the action barre9 by the dec1s1on m Leano case? . to be permitted to litigate the same issue inore than once." It "exists
as an obvious rule of reason, justice, fairness. expediency, practical
Answer: · necessity, and public tranquility."
No. Resjudicata literally means "a matter adjudged". It is an Precluding re-litigation of the same dispute is made in
oft-repeated doctrine which bars _the re-litigation of the same claim recognition that judicial resources are finite and the number of cases
between the parties en: the same issue on a different claim between that can be heard by the court is limited. Tlius. the principle of res
the same parties (People vs. Escobar, 814 Phil 840 /2017}). Res · · judicata seeks to conserve scarce judicial resources an4 to promote
judicata is founded on the principle of estoppel, and is based on the efficiency. Moreover, it precludes the risk of inconsistent results and
public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of ·suits (Ligtas vs. prevents the embarrassing problem _o f two (2) conflicting judicial
Peopk, 766Phil 750 /2015}). lnLtgtas v. People: . . decisions • when there is ~litigation. Hence. res . judicata
"encourages reliance on judicial'. decision, bars vexatious litigation,·
like the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in and frees the_courts to resolve other disputes."·
pursuance of such policy. Matters settled by a Court's final
judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Res Judicata embraces two (2) concepts: (1) bar by prior
Relitigation ofissues already settled merely burdens the Courts judgment; and (2) conclusiveness ofjudgmen. t.
and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, cmd wastes .
valuable time and energy that could be devoted to worthier · · Resjudicata by bar by prior judgment, enunciated in-Rule 39,
cases. , · Section47(b) of the Rules of Court. is ·in effect when, "between the
~II'St case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that
. ~ res judicata, primacy is given to . the first cas~-.
1bc 1s sought to be barred, there is identity ofparties, subject matter, and
Ulldcrlymg reason for this rule is the doctrine of immutability.of
causes of action" (Social Securil;y Commission vs. Rita!. Poultry
final judgments, which is essential for the effective and efficient ~nd Livestock Association, Inc., 66S Phil. 198 /2011}). Thus, the
adminis~tion of justice (Pryce Corporation ~s. China BanJclng Judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second
Corp";"fion, 717 Phil 1 /2014}). In Siy vs. Natioltlll L,b(lr action. l
Rdations Commission, SOS Phil 26S (200S) : . . . ·
,..
172 'J 173
. -t-is&ANSWERSOF2005-2019 .
QUc.,11v , . Ctv,11- P.ROCIDURE
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS t-1 REMEpl~L lA~
• I.~
. - d ~ncept,. pertaining to conclusiveness· of · , ., j~~essafy lo:sris~n a judgment in the second actior, would
have
The_ s;coodin.Rule39, Section47{c) of~Rules.ofCo .. · . • ">authm-izedajud~ent for •° 'f same party in thefir~ actum
judgln~~~=iveness of judgm~ .when ~ 1s identity~-· .
~ .in the first and ~ d cases, ?ut no td~tity_of causes of . 1n:essence; res'judicata by bar ·by prior judgment proh.tbits .,
~es,, Moreover·''the firstJudgm~t is conclusive only as to.th<>sc·, · the filing of a second case wh~ it lias the ~ej,arties, subj_ect. ~
acbQll. _......:, y ~d directly
matterS -~UA& 1 controverted and determined and ..~ '.
ed th . ,, .Th h
cause of action, or when the liti~ prays for the same rehcf as.lJl
the first case. Meanwhil~- rr judicata ~ concJilsiveness of
""I
att:crs merely involv . ~em. us, w ~ a court of
':i!,o :Ot jurisdictjon judicially ~ed and ~ed ~ right _or fac~ or .
an 0~ t y for a trial bss_been given, _the court's Judgment should .
judgment precludes the_re-libgatiqn ofi,. fact·or 1SSUe that has ~eady
been judicially settled m the first case between the same J)$"b.es. If,
be conclusive upon the parties. In Nabus v. Court ofAppeals: between the first and second case, the causes 9f action are different .
and only the parties and issues arc the same, res judicata is still
The doctrine of conclusiveness ofjudgment states that a fa~t · present by conclusiveness of judgment (Presulential Decree No.
or question which was in issue in _a former suit, and was there • 1271 Committee•vs. De Guzman:, 801 Phil 731 /2016)).
judicially passed on~ determined by-a_court of competent
jurisdiction, is concl1LS1~ly settled by_the Judgment therein, as To properly invoke resjudicata, _the following elements must
far as concerns the parties to that action arid persoru,in privity concur:
with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action . . \
between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any ! {I) the judgmerit sought to bar the. new action must be fUIQl;
other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or'a (2) the decisiQll must have been renckre4 by a court having .
different cause·o faction, while the judgment remains unre_versed jurisdiction over the subject matter qnd the Flies; (3) ,the
or unvacated by proper authority. The only identities .thus disposition ofthe case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
required for the operation of the judgment as an estoppe~ irr there must be as between the first and second action, 'identity of .
contrast to the-judgment as a bar, are identity ofpar~es and parties, subject matter, and causes ofaction.
. identiiy of issues. , .
In this case, the Court'S-IUling in Lejano cannot preclude W's
It has been held that in order that a judgment in .one action filing of the contempt action.
can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another ·action
between the :same parties or their privies, it is essential that the '. The principle of res judicata, a civil la.;_., principle, is not
issues be identical Ifa particular poiTJt or question is in issue in applicable ip criminal cases, as explained in Trinidad v.r. Off.a of
the second action, and the judgment will ckpend on the the Ombudsman, 564 Phil 382 (2007). As further held in .People
determination of that particular point or question, a former . vs. Escob°!, _814 Phil 840 (2017), while certain provisions of the
judgment between the same parties will be final and conclusive Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases ·Rule 39
in the second if that same point or question was in issue and •. of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the en~cration
adjudicated in the first suit; but the adjudication of{111 issue'iil · · under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. ·
thefirst case is not conclusive ofan entirely different and distinct
issue arising in the second. In order that this rule may be · . 1:lesi~es._even if the, principle of res judicata were applied,
applied, it must clearly~ positively appear, either 'Jroin the ~s ~ction is still not precluded by the·fmality of the decision in the
record itself or by.the aid of competent extrjnsic evidence that crurunaI case. ·
the precise point or question in issue in the second suit was
involved and decided in the first. And in determining whether a
· Between Lejano and this contempt ~e, only the first three
given question was an issue in the prior action, it is proper 10 ~is3)final
elements of resjudicata are nno-..t (1) theJ"udgment · 7 :.. ·
look behind the judgment to ascertain whether the evidence (2) · · · r - llluJano
; it was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; and
j 175
174
. . .
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS OF 2005-2019 . CML PROCID URE
. .-· COURT DECISIONS IN REMEDI.Al IAW.
SUPREME · . ·
·\.
.
.
, ,
· ,:i,..,,en ·-. e merits. The last eiem.ent is
th·.
(3) 1t was a_J U~ .. t•on issllCS, and · . · • .
~ent· ,.\n:s ~er: .
cause of action m the · 2':c) .
t
. hcr
is no identity of parties, . . . . .·
two ·c
·. . No The petitio n f'or declar atory relief initiated by Fis not the
cases. . ro r~ed y to challe nge the :validity of Municipal Ordinance
No.
. · A . dB in this contem pt action are not parties in th ~ifo r th~ Ordinance has ~~ been e_nforced and ~~ ~
ear1:., the
. . c1 M:1eover, issue and the C8;USe of action_ here
~ cas th riminal case. Here, the action seeks to c1tc...t and
a; fi ·ts violat ion impos ed asa:mst F. Aquin o. vs. Mumc,paliJ
· :ft,Jay,
Aklan , eJ. al, 744 Phil 497 (2014 ) decree d: ·
t y
y of
~eren t from. e ~e in the criminal case, the accus ed sought
to
- B m COQ~pt,:Ction. ·l'o be cl~. contem pt of court simply
reverse bis::; asks
B willfully defied the Court's order. Their reasoning
Resolv (ngfirs t the proced ural aspect ofthe case: We find merit
in petitio ner's contention that the specia l with ofcertiorari, and
·
.~=us
wheth er! to weaken the authority of the Court. They present·a
argum ~ that ~• people_ can choos e to defy the Court's
orders as long as it fits their percepnon.
not declaratory relief, is the prope r remed yfor assail ing EO JO.
As provid ed under Section I, Rule 63 ofthe Rules ofCou rt:
published in a newspaper of general circul ation in violation of tbe In the case at bar. the petition for declaratory relief bec~me
due process clause of the Constitution and the Local Government unavailable by EO 10 's enforcement and implementation. The
·
Code. Will the petition for declaratory relief prosper? · clo~r~ and demolition ofthe·hotel render edfutile any possible
KUide_lmes_ that may be issued by the trial court for carryi ng out
the directives in the chqllenged EX) JO. Indubitably, the CA e"ed
177
176
.,; & ANSWERS OF 2005-2019 CIVIL.PROCIDURE
QUESTIO,....,
OURT DECISIONS IN REMEDIAL LAW
SUPREME C
.. ·. d 'hat declaratory relief is the proper remedy o; . . ·· Nevertheless,. the g ~ ~e.that an appeal and a certiorari
.when ,t rule t. . . o• lien
such a situation. are not interchangeable admits exceptions. In /)q,artment of
Education vs. .cu~nan, 594 P~ii: _451 (2008), the Court exercised
· ·ate remedy· in the ~r~ises is certiorari and liberality and considered the .p etition for certiorari filed therein as 811
. ?te a ~ , ef Transportation,~et. aL vs. Philippk,e appeal :.
.
.. -
\
. . .
prohtb1bon Transport Association, et. al, G.R. No. 230107.
Pmoleuttt ::enunciated that the power-of judicial ~ew includ~ The re"!edy ofan aKK:_ieve<f.partyfrom a resolution issued by
July 24_, ~o whether there ~d been ~ave abuse of discreti_on on the I.he CSC IS to file a peti~o~ for review thereofunder &le 43 of
detennuun8 b.....,ch or. instrumentality of the · Go:vemnient, which . the lw!es of Court w1t.hm fifteen days ·from notice of the
part of any ._. · f I,.;. __ , . ··
. th legislative. assembly o a vwu government unit reso~ution. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
(MuniCIJlll•,!,
mclud~ ..J o·'Turpi
~
vs. ·Faumno,
.
G.R. No. 231896, August 20
. . ,
renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy.
Nonet.heless, there ar.e exceptions t.o this rule, to wit: (a) when
2019)
' 'public welfare and ~ advanc.ement ofpublic policy dictates;
(b) when the broader interest cifjustice so requires; (c) when the
writs issued are_null and void; or (d),w}ien I.he questioned order
Question No. LIi
amounts to an oppressive ~rcise ofjudicial authority. As will
be show.nforthwith, exception (c) applies to the pruent case.
What is the difference between appeal and certior~? /
A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari · At any rate, Cuarian's petition for certiorari before the CA.
· _under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. could be treated as a petitionfor review, the petition having been
The existence and availability of the right of appeal are filed on November 2_2, 2004, or thirteen (J 3) days from receipt
antitheticatto· the availability of the special civil action of o~ N_ovember 9, 2004 of CSC Resolution No. (UJ U7, clearly
certiorari: Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) w,thm I.he l 5-day reglementary periodfor the filing ofa petition
and certiorari :are mutually . exclusive, not alternative or for review. Such move would be in ~ordance with the liberal
successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a ·substitute spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
for an. appeal, especially if one's own negligence .or error in substantialjustice. ·
one's-choice ofremedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One ofthe · (Punong~ayan-V-isitacion vs. Peonle, G.R.
10,2018) '
No.
194214 JanuLm,
requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal o,: . r · ' _-.,
any_plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an. appeal °is.
available, certiorari will notprosper, even ifthe ground therefor
is grave abuse ofdiscretion.
178 179
QUESTIONS g, ANSWERS OF 2005-2019 CM. PROCEDURE
181
180
.t
: . ·c o
· URT DECISIONS IN ·REMEDIAL LAw
,SUPREME · . . .
/' -'.,' .-: ' . . . . -
f ()rd~t(1) November 8, 2014 ~ - RTC, Branch 141 Order; and ·
Answer: . .' · (8) BSP's petition for certiora~ filed m_ the C~. The C:<>Uit finds the .
. n Rule 45 of the Rtiles o~ Court enumerates the · above attachments as substantialcomphance with Section 4(d), Ri,de
No. Seen~ . 4' ew on certioran: · · · · 45 of the Rules of CoUit as it supports BFs position. BF attached
contents of a pe~non for revt . . . . copies of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution, as well as the
· SF£. .f. Contents ofpetition. - '1!'~petition ~hall be filed in. RTCs orders and pleadings that are pertinent to its position A
petitioner is · not required to attach all pleadings, coUit
ei een (18) copies, .with the original C?f!Y intended for the _
· · 'g#rtc bein indicated as.such by the petitioner, and shall (a) orders/processes, exhibits, ordocwnents of the.case, but only those
court rg name of u,e
: · thejull ..i.
appea· 1·mg party as the petihoner
· <ind which are material .and relevant to the issue/s presented in the
state "th
. _..J.-rse nnrtv as respoTILl£nt, w1 ou zmp e mg the lower
-"- t . l ad" . . petition (BF Citiland . Corporation vs. BSP, G.R. No. 1)4912,
the au.., r- -✓ th .ti __,
as:
courts orjudges thereofei er petl oners ~r res/Jf),"".ents; (b) October 16, 1019) · . . . . . .
indicate the material dates show mg.when notice ofthe Judgment
-or final order or resolution subj~ct th~reoJ_was received, when
a motion for new trial or reconsider,ation, if':ny, was filed and Question No. LV
·. . . . .
when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c). set forth ;
183
182
QUESTIONS & ANS·W~S OF 2005-201 .9 CML PRocEDURE
PDI. Thus, D filed a case for Ann~ ent of Contra~~ with Damages ' .' . ~ Supreme ·Court by petition for review : o~ certiorari in
•against PDI. The RTC rendered Judgment against• .PDJ. 'Pb{ · · accordanee wiih Rule 45. . . • _
interposed an appeal with the ~A. It ~~ ~t it is the HLlJRB
and not the RTG which bas prunary Jun~dic~on over the subject Since,what PDI raised in their appeal was a pure question of
matter of the -case .filed by D. '.The CA dis~ussed the appeal, and w their proper,recours~ w~ to file before the "Supreme Court a _
ruled that sincePDI's appeal raised no.ques~1on other than the issue
of-jurisdiction; PDr.~o uld ha~~ taken the~ appeal ~ Y to the
S,upreme Comt by ftlmg Ii. I)Cttbon for revt~ on Certiorari und~
pet=
la .'. for review.on certioran under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
the CA's dismissal of fDI's appeal was the only proper and
~voida ble outcome as Section 2, Rule .50 of the Rules of Court
Rule 45 of the Rules of Comt and not an ordinary appeal with the provides:
CA under Rule 41 of the same Rules. PDI argues that the CA erred
in dismissing _their appeal for raising a pure question of law without Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Couri ofAppeals.
first passing ju4gment. on whether the HLURB · has primary -An appeal under Rule 41 takenfrom.the Regional Trial Court
jurisdiction over-the subject matter of the case. Is the argument of to the Court of Appeals raising·only questions of law shall .be
PDl tenable? . dismissed. issues purely of law not being reviewable by said
court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by
Answer: petition for review from the appellate judgment of a,Regional
Trial Court shall be dismissed.
'. No. Under the .Rules of Court, there are two modes of appeal
from a decision or ·final order of the trial court in the exercise -of its An appeal e"oneouslv taken to the Court o(AJ,.peals shall not
original jurisdiction: (1) by writ of err-0r W1der Section 2(a), Rule 41 be transfe"ed 'io the qpJJrogriate court but shall be dismissed
if questions of fact or questions of fact and_· law are raised or outriw,t · ·
involved; or(2) appeal by certiorari under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in .· (Park D'evelopers, Incorporated, et. aL vs. ~ G.R. No.
· 211301, November 27, 2019)
relation to Rule 45, where only questions of law are raised or .
involved (Cando·vs. Spouses Olar.o, 547 Phil 630 [2007)). This is
glaringly clear from tlie·provisiops of Section 2, Rule 41, viz: • ••
Sec. 2. Modes ofappeal. -
· .184 185
QUESTIONS&. At:ISWERS Of2005-~19 PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
SUPREME~OURT OECIS10NS IN REMEDIAL LAW
.· . . . , . or·bis agent. on demand of the sheriff. ~ '.. :partj and execution issue thereon, the sheriff may cause the
~J
.unless the attaclri1l8
1
by the comt to indemnify the ~d-P&fy
shall file ~ bon~ approess than the value of the p ~ levied \ipon.
. Jydgment to be satiefied out of the property attqched if it be
5J!ilicient for that purpose in the following manner: (Fmphasis .
~ant ma~:•filed by X and Y. Moreoyer~Junsprude~~ has supplied) ·
No such_affi~ f liJninarY attachment 1s o~y ~ provisioQa).
held ~ a_wnt O ~ of the·comt where 3:11 action 1s pending; it ·· (a) By paying to the judgment obligee the proceeds ofall sales
remedy~ upon Attachment is only adnmct to the main suit. ofperishable or other property sold in pursuance ofthe order.of
is an anc~ ~~ri-;;inde · ndent existence a art from a suit im
the d,urt, or so much as shall be necessary to satisfy. the
judgment; ·
~ore rt cm:,taintiff against" the defendant In other words, art
a claun of tbegamisbment is generally ancillary to, and dependent ·(b) If any balance remain due, by selling so much of the
atta~5!', proceedin&;either at law or in equity, which has for property, real or personal, as may be necessary !o satisfy the
~ a J!U.""-:-detmnination of the justice ?fa creditor's d~mand. &Jy_ balance, ifenough for thaJ purpose remain in the sheri.ffs hands,
ItsP~ ·such ~ent could be disposed of onl~ m that case. or in those ofthe clerk ofthe court; ·
relief_~ the cessation of Civil Case N~. B-8623, with the RTC's
H~, having attained the status of finality, the attac~ent sought . (c) By collecting from all persons having in their pruse.ssion
· I)ccisJOO 'oned by X and y has legally ceased to exist (Yu vs; credits belonging to the judgment obligor, or owing debts to the
:-!t:·aL, G_.R.No. 225752, March 27, 2019) · latter at the time ofthe a(!achment ofsuch credits or debts, the
amount of such credits and debts as determined by the court in
the action, and-stated in the judgment, and paying the proceeds
Question No. LVIII ofsuch collection over to the judgment obligee.
r filed a case for Collection of Sum of Money and The sheriffshallforthwith make return in writing to the court
ofhis proceedings under this section andfurnish the parties with
Att!cinnent against Bl before the RTC. The·compl~ t alleg~ ~ copies thereof
Bl entered into acontract of1~ with T for a space m Ts building
to be used for Brs boQkstore business-: Alleging unpaid rental~, T
The use of the word may clearly makes the procedure
filed the said complaint Ts application for the issuance of a wnt_of . directory, in which case, the sheriff may disregard the properties
attacliment was granted by the RTC. Thus, BI' s pe~onal properties attached and proceed against other properties of the· judgment
in the bookstore were attached and its ftmds in. RCBC were . debtor, .if necessary. (Booklight, Inc. vs. Tw, G.R. No. 213650,
gamislied 'Ibd-eafter, the RTC rendered a decision in favo~ of T.. June 17, 2019)
On appeal, the CA affirmed the Rl'C's decisiori. Execution . of
. jodgment ensued. According to Bl, the proceeds of the sale. of the
.· attached properties shall be considered by the · sheriff m the
satisfaction ofjudgment Is the position of BI tenable? · While deposit may not be included in the provisional
remedies·stated in Rules 57 to 61 of the Rules of Court. this does not
Answer: · me&\ however, _that its concept as a provisional remedy is
nonexistent. Rule f35 . gives courts wide . latitude in CD)ploying ·
. . No. The satisfaction of jµdgment otit of property attac~ed i~ means to carry their jurisdiction into effect. Thus," the Court has
not mandatory. Section 15, Rule57 of the Rules of Court provides. ~Id deposit orders issued by trial courts in cases involving
actions for partition (Go vs. Go, 616 Phil. 740 /2009]), recovery of
SEC. / 5. Satisfaction ofjudgment out ofproperty attach~d; Possession (Bustamante vs. Court ofAppeals, 430 l'hil. 797), and
return of officer. - Ifjudgment be recovered by the attaching
189
188
QUESTIONS g. -A ~ Of 2005-2019 PRO~ION~~ REMEDIES ..
,
DECISIONS IN REMEDIAL LAW
SUPR~E COURT
"
' The Province of Bataan vs. Ho" :,'. ~ '. i · sit the installm~_~ ipents ~th the trial ~W:- In Reyes, the
·
even annulm
. 1n
cot of contract. . ·~
·C urt sustained an escrow order over the lease
Villafaerte, Jr., ~e O perti~ therein pending the resolution of the
,to:' upheld a provisional deposit J..order covenpg the down_
~';,ment for a ~eel of ~and pending Ute resoluti~n of the. for' case
rentals o!tbe subJOCt i-oentof sale and reconveyance~ while in Reyes . anmwnent of contract, VIZ.:
main acbon for an::ld an order to deposit the down payment for .•.
v. Lim. Jhe Co~ f a parcel of land after the buyer sought the Since Reyes is demanding to rescind 'the Contract to·Se/~ lie
the purchase pnce o . i cannot refuse to deposit the PIO million down payment in. court.
rescission of the con~t to sell. . • ' Such deposit will ensure re_stitution of the PJO mi/lion to its ·
· · · · •_...:.:....•.tence,
a deposit order is an extraordinary rightful owner. Um, on the other hand, has nothing to refund, as
Based on J1.11u,.111..... th . l . . he has not received anything under the Contract to Sell. .
. . · remedy whereby money or o . er property i~ p aced m
p-oVISt~ . ensure
to restitution to whi~hever p~ is declared
In both Eternal Gardens and Reyes, the nature of the relief
a,s~od,a~ o after court proceedings. It is extraordmary because .
~~ · not found in Rules 57 to 61 of the Rules of Court on sought precluded the depositor-party · from · co~tirig the
rts ~~ Rem~ies but rather, under S~tions 5(g) and 6 ofRule-
demandability of the amounts sought· to be deposited. Stated
differently. · the depositor-parties effc;,ctively resigned their
ProV15 f the same Rules pertaining to the inherent power of every
13 8 respective interests ov~ the ~OWlts ~sited. The most equi~le
coort "ta Qend and con~l · •
its ?1'~~. and. orders so ~ to m..ake solution to prevent WljUSt ennchment m su<;h cases, therefore, is a
them conformable to law and JUSbce; as well as ~o .~sue ~ .·
BJJitiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to cany its provisional deposit order; so that the amo~ deposited may ~ily
be turned over .to .whoever would be adjudged properly mtitled ·
jllrisdiction into effect. thereto. ·
. .
To elucidate further, provisional deposit orders can be seen •,
as falling .~er two general categories. In the first ca~gory, the the second categocy of cases involve provisional deposit
orders covering sums regularly received from non-parties to tpe case
dcmandahility of the money or other property to be deposited is not,
or cannot - because of the nature of the relief sought - be contes_ted by _the depositor-party during the pendency of the proceedings.
by the party-ocpositor. In the second category, the party-deposi~r
These are. turned over to.. the custody . of the court since the
regularly receives money or other property from a non-party dunng entitlement of the depositor-party thereto remains disputed. and to
the pcndcncy of the case, and the court deems it proper to ~lace such
· ensure the timely transfer of such ·sums to whoever would be
money or ($.er property in custodia legis pending final adjudged properly entitled thereto. In Go v. Go, Bustamante v. CA,
determination of the party truly entitled to the same. and Province of Bataan, the Cow:t upheld the trial court's ·-order
·directing the depositor~parties therein. wlio regularly received rental
The cases ofEtemal Gardens Memorial Parks Corp. v. First payments from the lessees of the disputed properties, to depos~ such
Special Cases Division, Intermediate Appellate Court and Reyes v. rental_payments with the court pending th,e resolution of the issue of
. Lim fall under the first category. Eternal Gardens involved an ownership of the disputed properties.
interpleader case where the plaintiff-buyer (Eternal), who was
seeking to compel the litigation of the.two conflicting claims to_~e A common ~ nmning · through these cases is the
property in question, refused to comply with an order to deposit ID existence of an agreement or a juridical' tie, which either binds the
custodia legis the installment payments for the disputed property· In depositor-party and the,party to be benefited by the deposit; or forms .
uphol~ ~e provisional deposit ·order, the Court ruled that .the basis for the regular receipt of payments by the depositor-party.
E ~ s disavowal of interest in the disputed property, and fhe
In Eternal Gardens, .Eternal had a contract of sale with one of the
depos~t of such disputed money or property with the court. are ', in~leading parties; while in Reyes, Reyes had a contact to sell
with Lim; and in Go, JJustamante, and Province of Bataan, the
essential elements of an interpleader suit Thus, Eternal \V8S ordered
190 191
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS OF 2005-2019 PROWIONA L REMEDIES
, ,
RT DECISIONS IN REMEDIAL LAW
SUPREMECOU
..
·;l-
eceived by the deposit<_>r-parties are based on
regular paym:: (Lorerl%0 Shipping Corporation vs. Jiularin, et.
lease agreem J7.'S.727 and 178713, March 6, 2019)
,AiJ~er:
No. Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules ofCourt enumerates the
al., G.R. Nos. . · jnstanCCS where a writ of prelim ~ injW1ction is proper, viz.:
193
192
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
NS & A~OF20 05-2019
QUESTIO ~ DECISIONS IN REMEDIAL LAW
SUPREME C0U . .
verwhebnin8 evidence has not been necessary to .~& of the injunctive relief was improper. IJ;ijunction is the'
Although_ 0
. f the right to be protected, jurisprudence
~ng· ~ of equity. This transcendeQt or extraordinary remedy
establish the ~ ~e evidence of the right to be prescntM Or should not be lightly in~ged in but should_be used sparingly and
~m
. . ere pnma
. . thJae,•udgnlent of the law, 1s
· ~suffiicientto
· ""' onlY in a clear and plain ~ - The ?OWer of the courts to issue
establish
~ evtdenCC as, : . eJ or chain of facts constituting the Party's injunctions.sho~d be ~ised . spanngly, ~~ \Jbn~ care, an~·.
a ~ven fact. or than~cb . if not rebutted or conndicted, will . with great caution and delibei:ation. The obJective o( preliminary
claim or defer_ise m:,.,J ·Medical Center vs. Botor, G.R. No. injunction is to pres~e ~ s~atus 'I!'° until the merits of the case
remain sufficient
'Ol,er ,~· rding to •\".,pouses nuce can be fully heard ~ mJunctto_n. bemg a preliminary remedy, must
4 2017). Acco
/:Cr Bank,
JI.T•
v.s. not resolvethe ments of the mam case pending the trial, for it is not
214~73, G.il No. 167434, Febru~ry 19, _2007, the
~iJlll,1
the function of preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a
ented must show clearly that the apph~t' s nght exists
evtdc:ncepresdoubt·l;,;0 ers as to the existence of such nght, thus- case. or to decide C9ntroverted facts._(Lerias ~ Court Appeals, el.
~~~ ~ . . . · aL, G.R. No. 193548,April 8, 2019)_
'Jhe iaint{ffpraytngfor a writ ofpreliminary injunctipn must
j,Jrll,e pestablish that he or she has a present and unmistakable
'ghJ; be protecled; that the facts againsf which injunch·on is Question No. LX
~rected violate such right; and there is a special andparamount
cusityfor the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence · Sometime in · 20<p, E filed a Complaint for Replevin ·
ef proofofa legal right and the injury sus_ta~ned b?' ~he p~aintif(, docketed as Civil Case No. I 0846 against A before the RTC for the
recovery of' her Toyota Hi-Ace van valued at P300,000.00. A
tin orderfor the issuance ofa writ ofprehmmary m;uncllon will
be Tl1'lli.fted Thus, where the plaintiff's right is doubtful or all~gedly refused to return hervan, claiming that it was given by Es
disputed, a' preliminary iniunction is not pr.oper. The _po_ssib~lity son as a consequence of a gambling deal. E applied for a repl~
of i"eparable damage with~t P7'!°(of~n actual existing right bond from MIC. On February 24, 2003, MIC issued Bond No. 138
is not a groundfor a prelimmary m;unclion. for P600,000.00 which bad a period of 1 year. E also executed an
indemnity agreement with MIC, where she agreed to indemnify the
In this case. SL's right to be protected by injunction was not latter for all damages, payments and expenses of whatever kind and
established, or was not shown ·to exist SL' s claim to have o~ed. · ·nature that it would incur as surety ofthereplevin bond OnMay 24,
the poperty since 1918 was supported only by the taxdeclarat1on. 2004, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the Complaint without
In contrast.L's ownership was registered under the Torrens system prejudice due to E's continued failure to present evidence. The RTC
(fCT No. T-9542). The latter should be preferred because her then declar~ Bond No. 138 forfeited On July 12, 2004, the RTC
Torrem certificate was.evidence of her indefeasible title to property · held a heanng on the final forfeiture of the bond where it was found
as the person whose name appeared thereon. Indeed, the registration that MIC failed to produce the V3Jl, and that Bond No. 138 bad
of title under the Torrens system was a quieting of the title to the alJ:eady _expired. Due to E~s failure to remit the amowit, MICpaid
. land in question:Her ownership was consequently neither doubtful Am compliance will\ the RTC Order. It was also constrained to file
nor disputable, but certain and settled. At any rate, the law expressly a ~~ection suit against E with the RTC. In its July. 23, 2010 ·
. ~ her certificate of .title, being indefeasible, not subject to Dec1Sion. the RTC ruled in favor of MIC. It found that non-payment
coll~ attack, but only to a direct attack. It is worthy to note ~t of the ~re~l.llllS did not cause the replevin bond to expire.·Thus, E
SL itself admitted L's ownership of the property in the-compromise was still liable for.the reimbursement made by the·surety oo the ·
asrecmcnt as ·well as in San"ggunian Pan/alawigan Resolution No. , bond. E ap~ed with the CA, arguing that the replevin bond bad
070, Series of2003. The admission precluded SL from asserting the ~expired; therefore, she c_ould not hav~ been liable under the
~ . including disputing the right of L to the enforcemen~ of tbe issued . ty agreement The. CA held that· the lifetime of 'BllY bond
J~~ by ~prom ise~ the writ of _executi~n. SL's right t~ 10 ~ court
proceeding shall~ from court approval until the ·
remain mpossession was either doubtful or non-existent; hence, th
. 194 195
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS OF 2005-2019 PROVislONAL REMEDIES
..., DECISIONS IN REMEDIAL LAW
SUPREMECou"' .
. finall . terminated. E argues that when MIC paid A on :. property may·be obtained by the plaintiff and retained durin
· agreementwas no 1onger in· force the pendency of the action. In this jurisdiction, the • . ig
tcmber 3, Y
caseis 2004, the ind~ty remedy Is identified in Rule 60 ofthe Rules ofC prOVISlonaJ
: effect since the bond expired<>?- February 24, 2004. E contends for delivery ofpe_rsonal property. ourt as an order
that even assuming that the m~ty agreement could be enforced,
she should not have been held hable ~01: the full ~ount of the bond.
Similarly, in BA Finance Corporation v. Court ofAppeals:
She argues that i judgment on ~plevm is ~y either for the delivery
of the property or fot: its-value m case delivery ~ot be made and Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form if ·. .
for such damages as eithe~party ~ay prove, with cos~. Is E liable remedy and of a provisional relief.1t may re'er o.thepnncipal'he
for the full amount of the bond paid by MIC as surety, m relation to . . /f. . . :1• e1 r to t
action I1se , 1.e., to regain the possession ofpersona/ ha/tels
a .previous case for replevin file4 by El · . c the
being wrongfully detainedfrom the p/ainJiiffby Qll(}the
..i·naJ dytha . r,orJo
pr~v,SlO . reme t would allow ~ plaintijf to retain the
Answer: t~mg durmg_ the_ pe~n?' of the acliori and hold itf)Pldente
l,te. 11,~ acllonh~ pnmanly ~ in nalllre and generally
· Yes. Replevin is· an action for the recovery of personal de_temunes not mg ~re than the righJ ofpossesswn. Rep/evin
property:Itis bothaprincipalrem~ an~ a ~visional relief._When is so usually ~scnbed as a mixed action, bein portly in
utili7.ed as·a principal remedy, the obJ~bve is to recover possession rem '!114 partly m !"rsonam-in rem insofar as the !cove,y of
of personal property that may have been wrongfully_detained by specific p~operty 1s ~rned, and in persona,,, as regards to
another. When sought as a provisional relie( it allows a plaintiff to ·damages mvolved As an "action in rem," the gist ofthe eplevi
retain the contested property during the pendency of the action. action is the right ofthe plainJiffto obtainJ)OS.SUSion ofspeci.fi:
In Tillson v. Court ofAppeals: . per~ona/ pro~rty. by reason of his being _the owner or of his
havmg ~ special mterest therein. Consequently, the person in
11,e term replevin is popularly understood as "the return -to _or possesszon of the property soughJ to be r~plevied is ordinarily
recovery by a person of goods or chattels claimed to b_e . the proper and only necessaryparty defendant, and the plainJi.lf
wrongfully taken or detained upon the person's giving security is ~ot required to so join as defendants other persons ~ing
to try the matter in court and return the goods ifdefeated in the a nght on the property but not in possession thereof. Rule 60 of
action;" "the writ by or the common-law action in which goods the Rules of Court allows an application for the inrmediaJe
and chattels are rep]evied, "i.e., taken or gotten back bj, a writ possession ofthe property but the plaintiffmust show that he has
for nplevin;" and to replevy, means to recover possession by an a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for seeking such
action ofreplevin; to take possession ofgoods or chattels under interim possession.
a replevin order. Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines rep/evin as
"a form ofaction which lies to regain the possession ofpersonal ~s a provisional remedy, a party may apply for an order for
chattels which have been taken from the plaintiffunlawfully . . ., the delivery of the property before the commenccmenrof the action
(or as) the writ by virtue ofwhich the sheriffproceeds at once to or at any time before an answer is filed. Rule 60 of the Rules of
take possession ofthe property therein described and transfer ii Court outlines the procedure for the application of a writ ofrcplevin.
to the plaintiffupon his.givingpledges which are satisfac(ory to R~e 60, Section 2 requires that the party seeking the issuance of the
the sheriffto prove his title, or return the chattels taken ifhe fail wnt must first file the required affidavit and a bond in an &m.O\Dlt
so to do;" the same authority states that the term, "to replevy• that is double the valu~ of the property: ·
means "to re-deliver goods which have been distrained to the
original possessor ofthem, on his giving pledges in an action of Section 2. Affidavit and bond - 1he applicant must show by
replevin. "The term therefore may refer either to the.action itself. his own affidavit or that ofsome other person who personally
l
for the recovery of personality, or the provisional remedy . ) knows the facts: ·
traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the
197
196
& At-lSWfRS OF 2()()5-2019 PROVISIONAL.REMEOIES ·
QUESTIOt-15 . ISl()NS IN REMEDIAL lAW
SUPREME COURI' DEC . p ..-.
,I
' ,
· . is the owner of the property•claimed, ·xnereir ancillary to the m1a.i,n acti~~ becomesfunctus o.ft9io. Toe
(a) 11,at the_apP_l•~·t1 ot is entitled to the possession parties returned t9 the !itatus quo ~ -if no case for reple
thereof: vin had been
ticularlydescnbmK' • ~ filed. 'fh4s, upon th~ dism issal of the case,
it was imperative for E
par is wrongfully detained by the adverse to return the van to_A. Jn.AdvouCapital and Fina
(b). That the property of detention there of accor nce Corporation
ding to the vs. Young, 670 Phil. .538 r/011 ):
' party. al~eging :_:u:eformation, and belie f; . .
best ofhiS k,1(1141 6 - ' We ag,:ee with the Court ofAppeals in dire cting ~
. . rty has ~ot been distrained or taken for a tax
·
to return the seized ~ to. Young_since this is ·the
trial court
(c) That the P;jn e pursuant io Jaw, or seized under necessary
a consequence of the dismissal of the replev.in case for
assessment or l' ;nary attachment, or otherwise writ of prosecute without prejudice. Upon the dismissal of
failure to
execution or_Pre ~mor ,ifso seized. that it is exempt fromplaced the replevin
case for failur_e to prosecute, the writ ofseizure, which
under custodia 1egrf, such· is merely
.ancillary in nature, b.ecame funct us officio and shoul
seizure or custody; and d have been
lifted There was no adjudication on the meriJs, which
means
. (d) 11,~ actual market valu~ ofthe property. that there was no determination ofthe issue who has
the better
right to possess the subject car. Advent ca mot there
fore retain
. r t ust also give a bond. executed tq the adverse possession of the subject car considering that
it was not
The ;':f'S:uc::'e;;mlu~ ofthe.property as stated in the'affidavit adjudged as the prevailing party entitled to the
.'remedy of
f!!'~entioned, for the return of the property to the adver.h rep/evin. · · .
~,.,. · i such return be adjudged, and for the paym :se ·
party if
ent t~ t .e
~r ch sum as he may recover from the applic
ant Contrary to ll.dvent's ViN, Olympia lnkm alion al Inc.
adverse party <!,-GU v. Court
in the action. · of Appeals applies to this case. The dismis.sa! of
the replevin
--case for failure to prosecute results in the restor
ation of the
Once the affidavit.is filed and the bond i_s approve~ parties' status prior to litigaJion, as ifno oomplainJ
_by the .- all. To let the writ of seizure stand after the dismi
wasfiled at
co the court issues an order and a writ of sel.Zllfe ssal of the
requlrtll~ the_ complaint would be adjudging Advent as t1,e· preva
sh~ · take the property into his or her custody. iling party,
If there 1s no when precisely no decision on the merits had been
further :b'ection to the bond filed within ~ve _(5) days rendered.
fro~ the _Accordingly, the parti es must be reverted to their
taking of ie property, the sheriff shall de~ver 1t status quo
to the apph_cant. ante. Since Young possessed the subject car befor
Toe contested property remains in the applicant custo1
e the filing of
coort detennines, after.a trial on the Issues, whichsamon dy until ~e
g the parties
the replevin case, the same must be returned to
him, as if no
complaint was filed at all.
has the right of possession.
. In Civil Case No. 10846, E filed a replevin case · . · D_e Guia v. Alto Surety & lnsuranc~ Co. requi
·the recovery of the Toyota Hi-Ace van valued _at P3?0
applied for a bond in the amount of P600,000.00 with_
··favor. TheR TC approved the bond and ordered the sheri
,000.~ -
MIC 1Il A
s~:
against A for ap~hcation on the bond be made after hearing but
of Judgment Otherwise', the surety can no longer
under the bond:
res that any
before the entry_
be made -liable
ffto r~cover
the van from A and to deliver it to E. While the van
was _111 Es Construing and applying tlu!se provisions of the
custody, the RTC dismissed the case without preju Rules, we
dice for failure to , have held in a {ong line of cases that .said provi
prosecute. Thus, it ordered the sheriff to restore the van si'ons are
to A ..When · mandatory and require the application upon the
E failed to produce the van, the.RTC directed MIC to pay bond against
A -d_!e · the .surety or bondsmen and the award there of to
amount of the bond. There was no trial on the merit
s. The RT~ 5 be made ajt(r
dismissal for failure to prosecute was a dismissal witho ~n g and before the enJry offinal judgment in
tM case; that
ut_preju~ce if the judgment under execution contains no directive
to re-filing. In .this particular instance, any writ of for the
seizure, belD8 surety to pay, and the prop er party fails lo make
any claim j()T
198 199