Criminal Law 1 Outline Partial

CRIMINAL LAW I
Fundamentals of Criminal Law

REGINALD MATT SANTIAGO, ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY
COURSE OUTLINE
I. Fundamental Principles
II. Construction of Penal Laws
III. General Characteristics of Criminal Law
IV. Repeal and Amendment of Penal Laws
V. Limitations on the Power of Congress to Enact Penal Laws
VI. Felonies
VII. Elements of Criminal Liability
VIII. Stages in the Execution of a Felony
IX. Conspiracy/Proposal
X. Circumstances Affecting Criminal Liability
a. Justifying Circumstances
b. Exempting Circumstances
c. Mitigating Circumstances
d. Aggravating Circumstances
e. Alternative Circumstances
XI. Persons Criminally Liable
XII. Penalty
a. Duration and Effects
b. Complex Crime
c. Service of Sentence
XIII. Civil Liability
* Read with the Pre-Bar Notes and Review Lectures by Judge Rowena Apao-Adlawan
1
Criminal Law I: Fundamentals of Criminal Law COURSE OUTLINE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
Criminal Law, Defined

1. Defines Crimes
2. Treats of their Nature
3. Provides for their Punishment
Criminal Law from Criminal Procedure
Nullum Crimen Nulla Poena Sine Lege
Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita

1. Definition
2. Nature
3. Criminal Intent and Good Faith
4. Crimes Covered
5. Stages of Execution
6. Circumstances Attendant to the Commission of the Crime
Not All Offenses under Special Laws are Mala Prohibita
Use of RPC Penalties does not make crime Mala in Se
Not all Offenses under Revised Penal Code are Mala in Se
• Ysidoro v. People, November 14, 2012: Article 220: But criminal intent is not an
element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public
property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another
public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not
inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience. It is the
commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof,
that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or
criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS
Construed Against the Government

Liberally in Favor of the Accused
➢ Rationale: Right to Liberty
When Law is Clear and Unambiguous

• People v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil 664: Where the law is clear and unambiguous, there
is no room for the application of the rule.
When Law is Ambiguous

• Gidwani v. People, January 15, 2014: It is a basic principle in criminal law that any
ambiguity in the interpretation or application of the law must be made in favor of the
accused. Surely, our laws should not be interpreted in such a way that the
interpretation would result in the disobedience of a lawful order of an authority vested
by law with jurisdiction to issue the order.
Reginald Matt Santiago | Ateneo de Davao College of Law 2

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW
Generality, Territoriality and Prospectivity
1. GENERALITY
Generality Principle: Who are subject to criminal laws?

Exceptions
Doctrine of State Immunity

• Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713: State immunity from suit will not apply and may not
be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity
as an ordinary citizen.
Ambassadors, Diplomatic Staff and Charges D’affaires

• Schneckenburger v. Moran, July 31, 1936: [Consul of Uruguay charged for the
crime of falsification in the Philippines]. This case involves no question of diplomatic
immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities
of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country
to which he is accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for
violations of the laws of the country where he resides. The consul does not represent
the political interests of his country, but only the commercial interest.
New Civil Code, Article 14
2. TERRITORIALITY
Territoriality Principle: Where does criminal law apply?
General Rule: Intra-Territorial

➢ Within the Philippine Territory
➢ Archipelagic Rule [ABC-BD]
Exception: Extra-Territorial
➢ Article 2, Revised Penal Code: 1-5
➢ 6. Offense committed in Philippine Embassy, Consulate or Diplomatic Premises
➢ 7. Continuing offense by PH citizen and permanent resident against PH citizen
Rule on Merchant Vessels; French Rule vs. English Rule
Illustrative Cases
1. Piracy is a Crime against All Mankind
• People v. Lol-lo and Saraw, February 27, 1922: [Moro pirates in attacked two
boats containing Dutch nationals in the Dutch East Indies. Charged in the Court of First
Instance of Sulu] Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against
any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be
carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it
is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits,
though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.

2. Extramarital Affair Committed Abroad Still Covered under Psychological Violence

• AAA v. BBB, January 11, 2018: [RA 9262 case against BBB due to illicit relationship
with another woman in Singapore. Does Philippine Courts have jurisdiction?] Contrary
to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital
infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering
on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances
that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the
various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending
on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship
may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the
mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the
commission of the offense.
Acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or
continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and
requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur
in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material
acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood
that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person
charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality
or territory where the offense was in part committed.
3. PROSPECTIVITY
Prospectivity Principle: When can the law consider an act as a crime?
General Rule: Prospectivity, - Article 21, RPC

➢ Prohibition Against Ex Post Facto Laws; Definition of Ex-Post Facto Law
Exception: Retroactive Application if Beneficial - Article 22, RPC

• Dorado v. People, October 3, 2016: Since Dorado was only 16 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime in 2002. When RA 9344 came into law in 2006, since
it is favorable to the accused, it should be given retroactive effect. Penal laws which
hare favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.
Retroactive Application
• People v. Mejares, January 10, 2018: This Court affirms with modification the
conviction of accused- appellant Mejares for the crime of qualified theft. While this
Court finds no reversible error in the ruling that she was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, this Court finds it necessary to modify the penalty initially imposed upon her.
In light of the recently enacted Republic Act No. 10951,which adjusted the amounts of
property and damage on which penalties are based, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and considering the prosecution's failure to establish the precise values
of the stolen items, accused-appellant must be ordered released on time served.
Republic Act No. 10951 has since come into effect during the pendency of this case. It
likewise specifically stipulates that its provisions shall have retroactive effect. Section
100 adds that this retroactivity applies not only to persons accused of crimes but have
yet to be meted their final sentence, but also to those already "serving sentence by
final judgment." This is in keeping with Article 22.
When Beneficial Retroactive Application Not applicable

1. Express inapplicability to pending actions
2. Habitual Delinquent: Article 62(5), RPC

REPEAL AND AMENDMENT OF PENAL LAWS
New Law makes Penalty Lighter

➢ Apply Article 22 with Exceptions
New Law imposes Heavier Penalty

➢ No retroactive application
Repeal of an Existing Law Obliterating the Crime

➢ All existing actions are dismissed
➢ RA 10158 which decriminalizes Vagrancy
Absolute Repeal of a Penal Law

Effect: Deprives court of authority to punish a person charged with violation of the
old law prior to its repeal.
Exceptions:
1. Saving clause on inapplicability to pending actions
2. Reenactment involving the punishable act being tried
• Taken from Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, September 4, 2001: Despite repeal of

Circular 960, new Circular 1353 retained the same reportorial requirement for
residents receiving earning or profits from non-trade foreign exchange transactions
and Circulars 1318 and 1353 contain a saving clause expressly providing that the
repeal of Circular 960 shall have no effect of pending actions under Circular 960.
Implied Repeal or Repeals by Re-enactment
Revival of Repealed Laws

1. Express repeal – no revival
2. Implied repeal – revival unless the repealing law provides otherwise
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO ENACT PENAL LAWS
Limitations on Enactment of Penal Laws

Prohibition Against Ex Post Facto Laws
Ex-Post Facto Laws, Definition
Bill of Attainder
Due Process Clause
Administrative Decisions Not Binding

• Catacutan v. People, August 31, 2011: The findings in administrative cases are not
binding upon the court trying a criminal case, even if the criminal proceedings are
based on the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the administrative matter.
Doctrine of In Dubio Pro Reo
Equipoise Rule
• People v. Librias, September 14, 2016: When the evidence in a criminal case is
evenly balanced the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scale in favor of
the accused since evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty.

Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment – Article 5, RPC

• Corpuz v. People, April 29, 2014: [Decided prior to RA 10951, range of penalties
are imposed on amounts valued 80 years ago]. Where the act is already punishable
by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive, the remedy
is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive
the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with
the act committed.
FELONIES
Felonies, Defined – Article 3, RPC

Elements of Felony
Felony vs. Offense vs. Crime
Kinds of Felonies
1. Intentional Felonies (dolo)
a. Requisites: Criminal Intent, Freedom of Action, and Intelligence
2. Culpable Felonies (culpa)

a. Requisites: Criminal Negligence, Freedom of Action, and Intelligence
Criminal Intent, Defined
Motive, Defined
General Rule: Motive is immaterial
• People v. Buenafe, August 03, 2016: [Motive is imputed by accused to one of the
main witnesses] As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense
charged does now show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish
the innocence of the accused for the crime charged. Motive is irrelevant when the
accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness. Intent is not synonymous
with motive. Motive alone is not a proof and is hardly ever an essential element of a
crime.
When Motive is Material

[1] When Evidence is Purely Circumstantial
[2] When Identity of the Accused is Doubtful

• Fernando Fernandez v. People, December 11, 2019: [Shooting in a jeepney
hitting Garino’s buttocks.] It was not shown that Fernandez had any motive for
shooting Garino. While motive is generally immaterial when it comes to considering
intent in a criminal case, it can help facilitate the intrusion into the accused’s mind
especially when there is an issue as to the identity of the latter.
In the case at bar, there is no indication that Fernandez and Garino knew each other
beforehand, and as mentioned, it seems to be a matter of mere convenience that
Garino zeroed in on Fernandez as the culprit only after a conversation with Barcenas.
There was also no plausible reason for Fernandez to risk his safety and life in shooting
Garino, especially with a possible witness in tow. If Fernandez wanted to end Garino's
life, it would also be strange that he would not run after Garino and finish the job, as
Garino would certainly have been hobbled as a result of the wound. [Acquitted].\

Culpable Felonies
Reason for Penalizing Culpa
Mistake of Fact
Requisites [lawful if correct – lawful intent – no fault or carelessness]
• US v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488: When the Chinaman stuck the fatal blow in the firm
belief that the intruder who forced the door open to his room was a thief, from whose
assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstance, he acted in good faith,
without malice or criminal intent, in the fine belief that he was doing no more than
exercising a legitimate right to self-defense.
• People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257: Unlike in Ah Chong, the person in the room being
then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity
without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
Mistake of Fact does Not Apply to Culpable Felonies
Intent to Kill Negates the Defense of Mistake of Fact

• Yapyuco v. People, June 25, 2012: [Shooting of vehicle tagged as rebels but turned
out to be SMC employees]. The location of the shooting and the circumstances of the
shooting breed no other inference than that the firing was deliberate and not
attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill.
• Intent to Kill: Abello v. People, October 7, 2013: The use of a scythe against the
neck of Benigno’s neck was determinative of the accused’s homicidal intent when the
hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to figure out that a single
hacking blow to the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a
person and leave him dead.
Circumstances of the Killing Negate Mistake of Fact

• People v. Gervero, July 11, 2018: First, there was no reason for the accused not to
recognize the victims because they were traversing an open area which was
illuminated not only by moonlight, but also by a light bulb. In addition, the witnesses
testified that the victims were conversing and laughing loudly. It must be borne in
mind that it was not the first time that the accused had seen the victims as, in fact,
accused Bañes and Castigador met Hernando just a few hours before the shooting.
Moreover, they all reside in the same town and, certainly, the accused who were all
members of the CAFGU would know the residents of that town so as to easily
distinguish them from unknown intruders who might be alleged members of the NPA.
Second, when Jose fell down, Hernando identified himself and shouted, "This is
Hernando!" However, instead of verifying the identities of the victims, the accused
continued to fire at them. One of them even shouted, "Birahi na!" ("Shoot now!").
Third, when the victims fell down, the accused approached their bodies. At that point,
they could no longer claim that they didn't recognize the victims; and still not
contented, they sprayed them with bullets such that Jose suffered 14 gunshot wounds,
Hernando 16 gunshot wounds, and Benito 20 gunshot wounds.

Fourth, contrary to their testimonies during trial to the effect that the victims were the
first to fire their weapons, Brgy. Capt. Balinas testified that when he asked the accused
whether the victims had fired at them, the accused answered him in the negative.
Fifth, the accused would like the Court to believe that the victims knew the safe word
"Amoy" which must be uttered in response to "Simoy" in order to easily determine
whether they were members of the NPA. However, the victims could not have known
the safe words as accused Gervero himself stated in his testimony that only he and
his co-accused were present when their commanding officer briefed them about the
safe words to be used in their operation. All these circumstances negate accused-
appellants' claim of mistake of fact and point instead to a concerted action to eliminate
the victims.
ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Components of Article 4, RPC:

1. Extraordinary manner of incurring criminal liability; and
2. Impossible crimes
1. EXTRAORDINARY MANNER OF INCURRING CRIMINAL LIABILITY’

Proximate Case: Direct, Logical and Natural Consequence of his Act
➢ Requisites [D-I-U-W]
• People v. Cagoco, 58 Phil 124: Victim was punched by accused and head hit the
pavement which caused the victim’s death. El que es causa dela cause es causa del
mal causado.
• Garcia v. People, August 28, 2009: Victim was punched but was able to escape but
upon reaching home was found lying on the floor and died due to heart attack. The
accused is liable since the emotional strain form the beating led to his death.
• US v. Marasigan, 27 Phil. 504: Refusal to submit to medical treatment and the

infection of the victim’s injury became worse, the accused is still liable for serious
physical injuries as the victim was not obliged to submit to medical treatment.
Efficient Intervening Cause
a. Error in Personae
Mistake in the Identity
➢ Liability: Crime actually committed but penalty shall be that what is committed or that
is intended whichever is lower, but in its maximum period.
b. Aberratio Ictus
Mistake in the Blow
➢ Two Offenses: [1] That intended; [2] That actually committed

➢ If both are either less grave or grave felonies by single act there is a complex crime
o Penalty on the most serious crime in its maximum period.
c. Praeter Intentionem
Did Not Intend to Commit So Grave a Wrong
➢ Liability: Actual crime committed but entitled to mitigating circumstance

2. IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES
Requisites [PEIN]
Kinds of Impossibility
1. Physical or Factual Impossibility
2. Legal Impossibility
Crime of Last Resort
Cases
• People v. Domasian, March 1, 1993: The act cannot be considered an impossible
crime because there was no inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or the
employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after
the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty.
• People v. Intod, October 21, 1992: Shooting but the intended victim was not
present was deemed an impossible crime. To hold it as attempted murder would render
useless Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act which would have
been an offense against persons or property.
• Gemma Jacinto v. People, July 13, 2009: [Unlawfully took a postdated check but
the check had bounced] Performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified
theft but the check bounced, a fact unknown, and turned out to be useless.
STAGES IN THE EXECUTION OF A FELONY
Stages in the Execution – Article 6, RPC

Internal Acts
External Acts
1. Preparatory Acts
a. General Rule: Not Punishable
b. Exception: By Law (e.g. Possession of Picklocks)
2. Acts of Execution
Attempted Felonies
“Directly by overt acts”
• People v. Lamahong, 61 Phil. 707: In order to convict a person for attempt felony,
the overt acts must be directly related to the felony for which he is charged. The mere
act of entering without taking anything is not attempted felony.
Effect of Desistance
Kinds of Desistance
Frustrated Felonies
Attempted vs. Frustrated
1. As to acts of execution
2. As to causes of non-accomplishment
3. As to subjective or objective
When Would is Fatal or Not Fatal

• People v. Gutierrez, February 4, 2010: If the wound is not mortal it is attempted.
But if the would is mortal but death did not supervene due to medical intervention, it
is considered as frustrated [in crimes against persons with intent to kill].

• Esqueda v. People, June 18, 2009: [Stabbed at the back, stabbed again upon falling
to the ground.] If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the
crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no
intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or murder if the
offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill was present.
Crimes without Frustrated Stage [Rape, Arson, Corruption, Adultery, Physical Injury, Theft].
No Frustrated Theft
• Jovito Canceran v. People, July 1, 2015: [Hid the Ponds White Beauty Cream in a
box of Magic Flakes, but was discovered and left it in the store – guilty of theft]. There
is no such crime as ‘frustrated theft.’ The element of unlawful taking which produces
theft in its consummated stage, is deemed complete from the moment the offender
gained possession of the thing, even if he had no opportunity to dispose the same. But
since the information charged him of frustrated theft, thus he may be charged of the
lesser crime of attempted theft since an accused cannot be convicted of a crime even
if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the information.
• Valenzuela v. People, June 21, 2007: [Stealing of "Tide” detergent, intercepted by
the security in the taxi and left items in parking space.] Theft is already produced upon
the taking of personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
Rape Has No Frustrated Stage

• People v. Orande, November 12, 2003: The lower court convicted Orande of the
crime of Frustrated Rape because there was no penetration. But the Court sustains
that there is no such crime of frustrated rape. For the consummation of rape, perfect
penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is
sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the of the female organ, without rupture of the
hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
• People v. Salinas, May 6, 1994: In a manner of speaking, bombardment of the

drawbridge is an invasion enough even if the troops do not succeed in entering the
castle. In rape cases, there are no half measures or even quarter nor is their gravity
graduated by the inches of entry. Partial penile penetration is as serious as full
penetration; the rape is deemed consummated in their case.
• People v. Padit, February 1, 2016: The slightest penetration of the female genitals
consummates the crime. In the present case, AAA testified that she felt pain when
accused rubbed his penis against her vagina. Severe pain could not have been felt of
mere superficial rubbing of the sex organ = such pain could be nothing but the result
of penile penetration sufficient to constitute rape.
Consummated Felonies
If not all elements – civil obligation can be established\
Cases that are consummated or nothing (felony by omission, false testimony, slander)
Indeterminate Offense
➢ Purpose is uncertain and nature in relation to objective is ambiguous.
Felonies According to Gravity (Article 9)

1. Grave felonies – capital punishment (death) and afflictive penalties (PM, RT, RP)
2. Less grave felonies – correctional (D, S, AM, PC)
3. Light felonies – (Am, Not exceeding P40,000)
a. Only punishable when consummated except persons or property (Art. 7)

CONSPIRACY OR PROPOSAL TO COMMIT FELONY
Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Felony – Article 8, RPC

When Punishable
When is there a Conspiracy
When is there Proposal to Commit Felony
Kinds of Conspiracy
1. Conspiracy as a Crime
2. Conspiracy as a Manner of Incurring Criminal Liability
Conspiracy as a Crime
➢ General Rule: Preparatory Acts are not Punished
➢ Exception: When the law provides for a penalty
Conspiracy [Treason, rebellion, insurrection, coup d’etat, sedition]
Proposal [Treason, rebellion or insurrection, coup d’etat]
Special Law [Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism – Anti-Terror Law]
Conspiracy as a Manner of Incurring Criminal Liability

➢ Requires an overt act before co-conspirators become criminally liable
Burden of Proof
• Franco v. People, February 6, 2011: Conspiracy must be proven on the same
quantum of evidence as the evidence of the felony subject of the agreement of the
parties. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words,
or conduct of the alleged conspirators, prior to, during or after the commission of the
felony to achieve a common design. Petitioner’s actions were in relation to the
attainment of a common objective. They had vital roles in the nefarious scheme to sell
a vehicle that they knew would never be delivered, but for which they obtained a
substantial sum of money. Conspiracy may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators, prior to,
during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose.
Necessity of Overt Act

1. As a Crime [What if the crime was indeed committed?
2. As a Manner of Incurring Criminal Liability
Effect of Conspiracy: Co-responsibility and becomes liable as principal for crime

➢ Act of one is act of all
• People v. Charlie Orosco, March 25, 2015: [X held the hands of victim while Y
placed arm around neck and stabbed victim at the center of the chest and took the
money]. Having acted in conspiracy with the other, Orosco is equally liable for the
killing of Yap. When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide whether they actually participate in the killing, unless there is proof that
there was an endeavor to prevent the killing.
➢ Except when one commit crime out of intended crime

• People v. Valdez: As an exception to the co-responsibility in conspiracy, when one
or some of the conspirators commit a crime out of the intended crime, it will be treated
as a separate offense, unless they have knowledge then they will be liable. But, if they
tried to prevent such, they will not be liable [During robbery, one accused rape and
killed a child.]

Degree of Participation
➢ General Rule: Direct participation = Conspirator
➢ Exceptions: [1] mastermind; [2] overt act in relation to the conspiracy (e.g. lookout)
• People v. Hua and Lee, September 29, 2004: [Tourist friends visited and stayed
in a friend’s condo who turned out to be a shabu haven]. Conspiracy cannot be
presumed it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The bare fact that the two were
found with the other suspects does not constitute proof of conspiracy. Hua: Mere
association with the principals or mere knowledge of the conspiracy and without more
does not suffice. Lee: conspirator, was found to have control and possession of the
bedroom where the shabu and paraphernalia are found.
• People v. Valdez, January 18, 2012: One did have to participate in every detail of
the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-
conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts. Both accused shown to have acted in
concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting the unarmed victims with their
guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only from their going together aboard
a single motorcycle, but also in joint attack.
Conspiracy Need Not Rest on Direct Evidence

• People v. Gambao, October 1, 2013: [Ransom money of P400K to be delivered in
a Chowking restaurant] Conspiracy may be inferred from the collective conduct of the
parties, before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. Their
testimonies reveal the common purpose and how they were all united in its execution
from the beginning until the end [kept coming back, shifts in guarding victim].
Mere Acquiescence or Approval, Not Necessarily a Conspirator

• GMA v. People, July 19, 2016: Aguas of the PCSO wrote a letter addressed to PGMA
requesting for additional release of Intelligence Fund. PGMA wrote on the side of the
letter the letters “OK.” She cannot be considered as a conspirator as the treatment of
the unqualified “OK” as an overt act of plunder was absolutely unwarranted considering
such act was a common legal and valid practice of signifying approval of a fund release
by the President.
• Rimando v. People, November 29, 2017: [Husband involved in fake US dollars, in

a test buy, husband placed the money in the bag of his wife – wife not conspirator.]
The mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without
proof of cooperation or agreement to cooperation is not enough to constitute one a
party to a conspiracy. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, approval of the act without the
cooperation or agreement to cooperation is not enough to constitute one a party to
the conspiracy. The fact that the wife accompanied her husband and money was placed
inside her bag would not be sufficient, in addition there is no overt act.
• People v. Salga and Namalata, June 23, 2018: [Accused was shown driving green
motorcycle allegedly leaving the locus criminis] To be held guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed overt act in
pursuance to the conspiracy. Joan, although present at the scene of the crime, never
identified the accused as one of the group of robbers, and his sighting was after the
robbery when he was driving the green motorcycle. This was not the overt act to make
Ruel part of the conspiracy – the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary
relation to the offense. The act of mere driving the motorcycle did not amount to an
overt act indicating his having conspired in the robbery with homicide.

Two Ways in Committing Conspiracy

1. Express conspiracy
2. Implied conspiracy
• People v. Zabala, November 23, 2015: [Friends walking home, one was mauled by
two people, R boxed victim while E held victim’s hands from behind]. Proof of the
actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be
implied or inferred from their acts. It was convincingly shown that both appellants had
acted in concert to achieve a common purpose in assaulting and killing Joseph as the
accused where together when they walked the road and Romeo boxed Joseph while
Edgardo held Joseph’s hands from behind.
• People v. Niegas, November 27, 2013: [From Jollibee, driver did not deliver them
home but picked up unknown men and was held hostage.] Conspiracy may be deduced
from the mode and methods. The acts of Niegas show that he was complicit in the
joint purpose and design of kidnapping the victims. It was himself who drove them to
the place and personally took them to the house and even caught the victim in her
attempt to escape and threatened to kill victim in her attempt to shout.
Overlapping conspiracy
• People v. Sandiganbayan, August 10, 2007: It depicts a picture of a conspirator
in the first level of conspiracy performing acts which implement, or in furtherance
thereof, another conspiracy in the next level of which the actor is not an active party.
Wheel Conspiracy
• Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, February 26, 2002: Wheel or circle conspiracy in which
there is a single person or group (the “hub”) dealing individually with two or more
persons or groups (the “spokes”) and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common
goal in the overall conspiracy. The hub is the former president Estrada while the spokes
are all of the accused and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal which
is amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
Chain Conspiracy
• Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (supra): The chain conspiracy, usually involving here the
distribution of narcotics or other contraband in which there is a successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and
the retailer and consumer.
Legal Effects of Implied Conspiracy

➢ Not all present are conspirators
➢ Only those who participated are considered
➢ Mere acquiescence or approval does not make one criminally liable.
Head of Office Not Conspirator on Basis of Command Responsibility Alone

• Arias v. Sandiganbayan, December 19, 1989: [Land overpricing issue] All heads
of office have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good
faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. It would
be a bad precedent if a head of office is plagued by all too common problems – such
as dishonest or negligent subordinates, overworks, multiple assignments – and is then
suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not examine every
single detail and painstakingly trace every step from inception.

Conspiracy by Silence and Inaction (Under RA 3019)

• Jaca v. People, March 19, 1990: [grant of cash advances without liquidation, the
accused cites long-standing practice or prevailing practice, claims of good faith.] Here,
petitioners are all heads of their respective offices that perform interdependent
functions in the processing of cash advances. The petitioner’s attitude of buck-passing
in the face of irregularities in the vouchers and absence of supporting documents, and
their indifference to their individual and collective duties to ensure that the laws and
regulations are observed in the disbursement can only lead to a finding of conspiracy
by silence or inaction.
Death of Alleged Co-conspirator

• People v. Henry Go, March 25, 2014: [X, public officer and Y, private person were
charged with RA 3019, but X died prior to filing of information.] Private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable
for the pertinent offenses. The death of the public officer does not mean that the
allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The death of one of two or more conspirators does
not prevent the conviction of the survivor/s.
***
Offenses Not Subject to the Provisions of this Code – Article 10, RPC

CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES (ARTICLE 11)
Justifying Circumstances, Concept

Presence of Crime
Civil Liability [Exception: State of Necessity]
1. SELF-DEFENSE
Rationale why Self-Defense is Allowed

Rights included in Self-Defense
➢ Right to Honor: Rugas v. People, January 14, 2004: slap on the face is considered
as unlawful aggression since the face represents a person’s dignity -a serious attack.
➢ Defense of Property Rights: People v. Narvaez, April 20, 1983: The doctrine of self-
help may be invoked when there is unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of one’s
own property, one may use necessary force to repel or prevent such even if the attack
is not coupled with attack against the person.
o But not reason enough to kill a person (life > property)
Requisites of Self-Defense [U-R-L]

➢ Effect of Incomplete: Privileged Mitigating Circumstance (SEE: Article 13[1])
Burden of Evidence is Shifted to the Accused [Admission of Killing]
• People v. Fontanilla, January 25, 2012: It is basic that once an accused admitted
his infliction of fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would
avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the
victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving such. [Hitting stone leading to
fatal injury was not reasonable against the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.]
a. Unlawful Aggression
Elements of Unlawful Aggression [A-A-U]

Two Kinds of Unlawful Aggression
1. Actual Unlawful Aggression
2. Imminent Unlawful Aggression
Kind of Threat to Amount to Unlawful Aggression
Aberratio Ictus and Self-Defense

• Matic v. People, November 23, 2011: [While they struggled for control of the
revolver, it accidentally fired and hit Ernesto – No self-defense]. The fact that target
of the assault was not the victim, it did not excuse him killing Ernesto. The fatal hitting
of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of Talampas’ felonious deadly
assault against Eduardo. Talampas’ poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus or mistake
in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal liability nor
mitigated his criminal liability. It was shown that the victim Ernesto was only present
at the scene of the attack but he did not commit any unlawful aggression to the
accused, rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.

Aggression Must be Continuous – Retaliation is Not the Same as Self-Defense

• People v. Gamez, October 23, 2013: [Hacked by father, accused reached for the
bolo and hacked back, but chased fleeing father for 20 meters and hacked unarmed
father and slashing his neck with the scythe.] Unlawful aggression is a condition sine
qua non, without it there is no self-defense. The aggression initially staged by victim
was not of the continuous kind as it was no longer present when the accused injured
the victim. He was able to grab the bolo, and from the point on, the aggression that
was initially staged by the victim ceased to exist and the perceived threat to his life
was no longer attendant – thus he was no longer acting in self-defense, as he was able
to pull out a scythe, a weapon different from the victim’s bolo.
Unlawful Aggression Should Not be a Mere Threatening Attitude

• Raytos v. People, June 7, 2017: [Victim approached table of Raytos and asked who
was brave enough while drawing a knife tucked in the waistband of his pants. Raytos
tried to escape and while doing so, he twisted the victim’s arm, got hold of the knife
and delivered three stabbing blows on the chest of the victim – No self defense.] It is
difficult to imagine how Raytos, while attempting to escape, was suddenly able to grab
hold of victim’s hand, relieving knife and stabbed him multiple times. And even if the
Court were to believe such, it is evident that no unlawful aggression can be deduced
as there was no imminent danger on the person of Raytos to justify the killing. Here,
the mere drawing of the knife by the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression,
as the peril sought to be avoided was both premature and speculative.
• People v. Patotoy, August 26, 1996: No veritable physical force on the part of
Manuel has been shown that could have really endangered accused’s life. Manuel’s
alleged act of drawing something from his waist certainly is not the unlawful aggression
meant in the law that would justify a fatal strike on the victim with such lightning
speed as accused has delivered. In fact, no weapon, supposedly in the person of
Manuel is shown to have been found.
Well-Grounded Belief as to Danger of Life Justifies Self-Defense

• People v. Cristina Samson, September 02, 2015: [Drunk husband scolded Cristina
who was not able to cook food as she had no money to buy food and led to the
altercation.] It must be noted that after she was able to take hold of the knife from
her husband, he did not stand down but instead, continued to move towards her
despite her plea that he should not come nearer. He grabbed her by the arm which
could have precipitated her well-grounded belief that her life was still in danger if he
would be able to wrest the weapon from her. It was not farfetched to presume that,
being stronger, he could have easily overpowered her and eventually killed her.
b. Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed to Prevent or Repel
Reasonable Necessity – Cannot be Measured by Mathematical Equation

Factors in Determining Reasonableness of Means (nature of weapon, physical condition, place)
➢ Instinctive use of the first available means available
➢ Not expected to think coolly to choose what kind of weapon
Doctrine of Rational Equivalence

• Espinosa v. People, March 15, 2010: [M threw a stone to X, X took down M. But X
continued to hack M with the bolo scabbard even if M was motionless]. It is settled
that reasonable necessity of means does not imply material commensurability between
the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the
consideration of which will enter the principal factors the emergency, imminent danger
to which the person attack is exposed, and the instinct more than the reason, that

moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend on
the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. The doctrine of
rational equivalence presupposes the consideration not only of the nature and
quality of weapons, but the totality of circumstances. Notwithstanding the fact that
petitioner merely used a scabbard in fending off the unlawful aggression – the totality
of the circumstances shows that after the aggressor was taken to the ground,
“continuous hacking” showed he had intent to harm.
c. Lack of Sufficient Provocation on the Part of Person Defending Himself

Sufficiency of Provocation
• Castanares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567: The provocation that was given is such that it is
normal and natural for a person to react by becoming an unlawful aggressor.
Confrontational Stance
• People v. Almojuela, June 2, 2014: The prosecution proved that it was Almojuela
who first challenged Paz and his group to a fight. Almojuela came prepared to fight
and was in fact armed with a bladed weapon.
Self Defense Negated by Number of Wounds

• People v. Gallego, 406 SCRA 6: [Six deep stab wounds] The number, locations and
depth of the wounds sustained by the victim belie the accused’s pretention that he
killed the victim in self-defense.
Flight, When it Negates Self Defense (NOTE: Case to case basis)

• People v. Geneblazo, 361 SCRA 572: Accused’s taking flight and going into hiding
instead of surrendering on the spot was highly evidentiary of guilt, and incompatible
with the claim of self-defense.
• People v. Abrazaldo, February 7, 2003: [Y assisted X, but for unknown reason they
shouted at each other, X stabbed Y]. The justifying circumstance of self-defense cannot
be appreciated considering accused’s flight from the crime scene and his failure to
inform the authorities of the incident. Furthermore, that he did not surrender the knife
to the authorities is inconsistent with a clean conscience.
• People v. Roxas, February 10, 2016: [Stabbed victim while back turned]. The
number of stab wounds sustained by the victim belies the claim of self-defense. The
accused’s flight negates his plea of self-defense and indicates his guilt.
Imputation to Another of Killing the Victim Negates Self-Defense

• People v. Macaraig, June 7, 2017: [Accused stabbed Joven and ran to the rice
field.] When the accused admits killing the victim it is incumbent upon him to prove
any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the
accused stated that it was not him who stabbed the victim, but the victim’s companion
or somebody else. From this observation alone, the trial court correctly struck down
plea of self-defense, this assertion negates accused’s defense.
Voluntary Surrender and Extreme Danger

• People v. Olarbe, July 23, 2018: [Arca, with a rifle, disturbed Olarbe’s home and
later wrestled with a gun and bolo, Olarbe shot Arca, but surrendered and narrated his
participation therein with the authorities]. Arca committed continuous and persistent
unlawful aggression against Olarbe and his common-law spouse that lasted from the
moment he forcibly barged and brandished his gun until he assaulted Olarbe’s
common-law spouse with the bolo. Such armed assault was not a mere threatening
act. The courts should not demand that the accused conduct himself with the poise of
a person not under imminent threat of fatal harm.

Battered Woman Syndrome (RA 9262)

Battered Woman, Defined
• People v. Genosa: In order to be considered as a battered woman, the couple must
go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the
situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
Marriage, Not Necessary

Phases of Cycle of Violence
1. Tension building phase
2. Actual battering incident
3. Tranquil, loving, at least non-violent, phase
Effect of Battery on the Woman

Battered Woman Syndrome, Valid Justifying Circumstance
➢ Exception; [1] influence of alcohol; [2] illicit drug; [3] other mind altering substance
2. DEFENSE OF RELATIVES
Requisites of Defense of Relatives

Relatives Covered
Medina v. People, January 15, 2014: [Lino was injured in a fight during a basketball
game, he went to the house of the Medinas, he grabbed Randolf and altercation ensued.
Ricardo, the brother of Randolf saw his brother in distress and was able to stab Lino leading
to his death.] In invoking defense of a relative, Ricardo states that his immediate impulse
upon seeing Randolf being attacked by Lino with a knife was to get his own weapon and to
aid in the defense of Randolf. But that theory was inconsistent with his declaration at the trial
that Lino’s fatal wound had been self-inflicted, as it presupposes direct responsibility for
inflicting the mortal wound. Thus, his defense was unworthy of belief due to its incongruity
with human experience.
3. DEFENSE OF STRANGER
Requisites
Defense of Relatives vs. Defense of Strangers
4. AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL OR INJURY

Requisites of State of Necessity (EIPC)
Presence of Civil Liability [Those who benefited]
5. FULFILLMENT OF DUTY OR EXERCISE OF LAWFUL RIGHT OR OFFICE

Requisites
Necessary Consequence of Duty, Right or Office
6. OBEDIENCE TO AN ORDER ISSUED FOR LAWFUL PURPOSE

Requisites (S-O-M)
Order Must Not be Patently Illegal, Even if there is Good Faith

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES (ARTICLE 12)
Presence of a Crime
Nature of Exempting Circumstances
Difference between Justifying and Exempting Circumstances
1. Legality of the Act
2. Presence of a Crime
3. Civil Liability
4. Emphasis of the Law
1. INSANITY OR IMBECILITY
Insanity or Imbecility, Defined

• People v. Danao, November 19, 1992: Imbecility is the condition of the mind where
the offender might be advance in age but the mental development is comparable to
that of a child between two to seven years old. Insanity exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act where the accused is deprived of
reason or the freedom of the will.
Presumption of Sanity (Article 800, New Civil Code); Mere abnormality not sufficient
Quantum of Proof Required
• People v. Salvador, June 27, 2018

o There must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. He
who invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence; thus,
for accused-appellant's defense of insanity to prosper, two (2) elements must
concur: (1) that defendant's insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of
intelligence, reason, or discernment; and (2) that such insanity existed at the
time of, or immediately preceding, the commission of the crime.
Cognition Test and Volition Test
In the Nature of a Defense of Confession and Avoidance
Effects of Insanity of the Accused

1. At the time or immediately preceding the commission of the crime
2. During the trial
3. After judgment or while serving sentence
Illustrative Jurisprudence
1. Temporary insanity and state of confusion
o People v. Dagsil, December 13, 2017: [Accused lurking outside the house
and stabbed victim. Accused argued that he was confused and he did not know
what he was doing at that time.] The testimony of the accused of his awareness
as to what happened before and after the stabbing is not an indication of
someone who was insane. His answers to the questions were intelligent,
responsive, and straightforward.
2. Schizophrenia Relapse
o Verdadero v. People, March 02, 2016: [Stabbing; In and out of hospital
from Psychiatric Department; suffered relapse on the day. – Exempted]. It is
true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero’s mental state at the
exact moment the crime was committed. This however is not fatal and may still

be shown by the circumstances immediately before and after the incident and
was even found to have suffered a relapse at the time of the stabbing. Thus, it
is reasonable to conclude on the basis of the testimony of the expert witness
that Verdadero was of unsound mind at the time of the commission of crime.
3. Manifesting Psychotic Symptoms but Could Not Establish Psychosis in Commission

o People v. Umawid, June 09, 2014: [Accused suddenly appeared in terrace
hacking victims killing 2 year old baby and proceeded to another house
attacking Jeffrey.] The doctor evaluated Umawid and found that Umawid was
manifesting psychotic symptoms. However, he could not tell with certainty
whether Umawid was psychotic at the time of commission of the crime.
4. Reputation as “Crazy” in the Community Not Sufficient

o People v. Roa, March 22, 2017: May the history of mental illness prove that
the accused is insane at the commission of the crime? [Killed victim from behind
using a jungle bolo.] While accused was confined in a mental institution prior,
he was discharged therefrom and indicates improvement in his conditions.
Absent any contrary evidence, the presumption of sanity must prevail. The
popular conception of the word “crazy” is to describe a person or act that is
unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may, therefore, behave in a crazy
manner but it does not necessarily or conclusively prove that he is legally so.
The legal standard requires that the accused must be so insane as to be
incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.
5. Mental Retardation – IQ Below 50

o People v. Bulagao, October 05, 2011: [RTC noted that the examination was
conducted more than a couple of years after the dates of complained incidents.]
There was no proof that the mental condition was already present at the time
of the rape incidents. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity bears the burden of proving it = otherwise presumed sane.
6. Feeling of Remorse
o People v. Villanueva, September 25, 2007: [Killing of niece; venting after
because no dinner was cooked because mother has no money to buy food.]
Villanueva’s recollection of the events prior to the crimes and his emotions
afterwards indicate that he was sane before, during and after commission and
was even apprehensive being in jail for a longer time. A feeling of remorse is
inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication that he was conscious of his
acts, that he acknowledges his guilt and that he was sorry for his acts.
7. Medical History of Psychosis for Eight (8) Years

o People v. Puno, June 29, 1981: [Puno entered bedroom of old widow and
accused as “mambabarang” hitting her head with hammer until she died.] Puno
was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and helpless victim. The facts
and findings of psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion he was no
completely deprived of reason and freedom of will.
2 & 3. MINORITY
Republic Act No. 9344 (as amended by RA 10630)
Juvenile Justice Welfare Justice System
➢ Is a system that deals with child at risk and children in conflict with the law which
provides child-appropriate proceedings and services for prevention, diversion,
rehabilitation, reintegration, and after-care to ensure normal growth and development.

Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility (Section 6, RA 9344)

➢ Who are Exempt from Criminal Liability
Civil Liability Not Included in Exemption
Determination of Age of Minor (Section 7, RA 9344)

• Presumption of Minority
• Proof Required [1] Birth certificate; [2] Baptismal Certificate; [3] Similar documents
• Testimonial Evidence
1. Information from the child
2. Testimony of relatives and other persons
3. Physical appearance
4. Other relevant sources (e.g. dental records)
Age Bracket and their Corresponding Criminal Liability and Treatment

1. 15 years old below
2. 15 years old above but below 18, who acted without discernment
3. 15 years old above but below 18, who acted with discernment
Status Offenses (Section 57, RA 9344)

• Ordinance imposing curfew against minors
o Samahan Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon, August 8, 2017:
On the matter of curfew ordinances, when the curfew ordinance already gives
sanctions to a minor and the sanction is limited only to community service and
admonitions, these so-called “sanctions” are not considered penalties under
Section 57-A. What is prohibited under Section 57-A when the children are
punished by status offenses. With regard to status offenses, when the local
government imposes penalty on status offenses such as curfew, that portion of
ordinance imposing reprimand (several/ formal reproof), fines/ imprisonment
would be in violation of Section 57-A. But insofar as ordinance states only the
giving of sanctions community service and admonition (gentle or friendly
reproof or warning against fault) these are not considered as penalties.
Chronological Age vs. Mental Age

• Is the mental age of the defendant considered over chronological age?
o People v. Milan Roxas, June 4, 2014: Accused was suffering from a mild
mental retardation, he has mental age of 9 years old, he must be exempt from
criminal liability even though his age at the time of commission was already
that of legal age. In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal
liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the age as determined by the anniversary of
one’s birth date, and not the mental age as argued by accused-appellant Roxas.
When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room
for construction or interpretation.
Discernment, Defined [fully appreciate consequences of unlawful act]
Intent from Discernment

• People v. Almodovar, January 26, 1989: From the foregoing, it is clear that the
terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are
products of the mental processes within a person, the [intent] refers to the desire of
one's act while the [discernment] relates to the moral significance that person ascribes
to the said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of
the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in

negligently handling an air rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner

does, that since a minor above [fifteen] years of age but below [eighteen] acted with
discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his
friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the
undesirable result of his negligence.
Determination of Discernment
Child in Conflict with the Law (CICL) (Section 1, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC)
- Presumption of Minority
Automatic Suspension of Sentence (Section 38, RA 9344)

- Ascertainment of civil liability
- Effectivity of suspension of sentence despite reaching 18 years of age
• Limitation on Suspended Sentence: Maximum Age of 21
o People v. Mantalaba, July 20, 2011: However, this Court has already ruled
in People v. Sarcia that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension
of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until
the child reaches the maximum age of 21. xxx
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can
no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his
suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. xxx The
records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19
(2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years
old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have
suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the
provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of
sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the
provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.Nevertheless, the appellant shall be
entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which
provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows (SEC. 51.
Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training
Facilities).
o Hubilla v. People, November 26, 2014: Lastly, following Section 51 of

Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence,
may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in
coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a
manner consistent with the offender child’s best interest. Such service of
sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.
Determination of the Age of the Child (Section 7, RA 9344)

• When Testimonial Evidence Satisfactory
o People v. Henry Arpon, December 14, 2011: The Court deemed sufficient
the testimonial evidence regarding minority and age of accused provided the
following conditions concur, namely: "(1) the absence of any other satisfactory
evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar

documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence
of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of the
accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection on the
part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the
accused's and/or his relatives' testimonies are untrue."
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on

February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the first incident of
rape allegedly happened in 1995. Other than his testimony, no other evidence
was presented to prove the date of his birth. However, the records of this case
show neither any objection to the said testimony on the part of the prosecution,
nor any contrary evidence to dispute the same. Thus, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals should have appreciated accused-appellant’s minority in ascertaining
the appropriate penalty.
Offenses Not Applicable to Children (Section 59)

• Section 202 of the RPC: Prostitution (vagrancy is now decriminalized)
• Sniffing of Rugby under PD 1619
• Anti-Mendicancy Law
Exemption from Death Penalty (Section 58, RA 9344)
Liability of Accused under 18 but more than 15 Years of Age with Discernment
o Jerwin Dorado v. People, October 3, 2016
4. ACCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR INTENTION OF CAUSING IT
Elements (L-D-A-F)
• When Reckless Imprudence
• When Simple Imprudence
Concept of Accident: Lack of Intention

• People v. Lanuza, August 27, 2011: Due care is belied by conduct of the accused.
Illustrative Case
• Pushing door open hitting shotgun causing killing wife in forehead– no credence
o People v. Roy San Gaspar, April 2, 2014: Contrary to what appellant wants
this Court to believe, a .12 gauge shotgun will not go off unless it is loaded,
cocked, and its trigger squeezed. We thus entertain no reasonable doubt as to
appellant’s culpability. The location of the gunshot wound with gunpowder
burns clearly shows that the shooting was not accidental, but rather indicative
of an intentional killing.
5 & 6. COMPULSION OF IRRESISTIBLE OR UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR

Actus me invito factus non est meus actus
Irresistible Force
Elements (P-I-T)
Uncontrollable Fear
Requisites [1] threat is greater; [2] evil of such gravity to succumb to it
Elements (F-R-G)
Mere threat is not enough

Irresistible Force vs. Uncontrollable Fear

1. Compelling force
2. Directed against
3. Gravity of imminent injury
Nature of Irresistible Force or Uncontrollable Fear

• People v. Licayan, July 29, 2015: A person invoking the exempting circumstance
of compulsion due to irresistible force admits in effect the commission of a punishable
act, and must therefore prove the exempting circumstance by clear and convincing
evidence. Specifically: He must show that the irresistible force reduced him to a mere
instrument that acted not only without will but also against his will. The compulsion
must be of such character as to leave accused no opportunity to defend himself or to
escape. The duress, force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent, and
impending; and it must be of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension
of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not
enough. A speculative, fanciful, or remote fear, even fear of future injury is insufficient.
The Court finds it hard to believe that a person who accidentally discovers the kidnap
victims would be held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to guard said victims; or that a
mastermind would invite another to the place where he is holding prisoners; or that
Delos Reyes did not find it unusual to see a woman with her hands tied.
Illustrative Cases:
1. Forced to participate crime because he and family where threatened to be killed
o People v. Anticamara, June 8, 2011: For such defense to prosper, the
duress, force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent, and impending,
and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough.
There is nothing in the records to substantiate xxx that he was under duress
from his co-accused while participating in the crime that would suffice to
exempt him from incurring criminal liability. The evidence shows that Al was
tasked to act as a lookout xxx. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. of the
following day, while the rest of the group was waiting in the landing field. Thus,
while all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer
subjected to a real, imminent, or reasonable fear.
2. Forced at gunpoint by companion otherwise harm would befall to him or his family
People v. Labuguen and Zuñiga, February 24, 2020: The malefactors had
a well-hatched plan to commit the crime of robbery with homicide and that
Zuñiga was not only well-aware of every detail thereof but likewise actively
participated in its commission. He had every opportunity to escape while they
were passing through the corn fields on their way to the Padre’s house.
However, he did not avail of the said chance. He did not perform any overt act
to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and
prevent the commission thereof. While he refused to kill Rachel, he nonetheless
delivered the fatal blow to Manuel's head and stabbed Nenita at her back using
a chopping knife without any prodding or compulsion from his companions.
3. “Mitigating Circumstance” of Uncontrollable Fear of Losing Her Job

o Manansala v. People, December 09, 2015: To begin with, "acting under an
impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not among the mitigating circumstances
enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided
under Article 12 (6) of the same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to

be appreciated in favor of an accused, the following elements must concur: (a)

the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear must be real and
imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that
committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done.
A threat of future injury is not enough.
In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was apprehensive
in committing a falsity in the preparation of the subject report as she did not
know the repercussions of her actions, nothing would show that Lacanilao, or
any of her superiors at UMC for that matter, threatened her with loss of
employment should she fail to do so. As there was an absence of any real and
imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion would have compelled Manansala to
do what she did, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in her favor.
7. PREVENTED BY SOME LAWFUL OR INSUPERABLE CAUSE
Elements (D-F-L)
Exempting Circumstance on Felonies by Omission
Absolutory Causes
1. Spontaneous Desistance (Article 6)
2. Attempted or Frustrated Light Felonies (Article 7)
3. Accessory is Relative of the Principal (Article 20)
4. Legal Grounds for Arbitrary Detention (Article 124)
5. Physical Injuries Inflicted Upon Surprise of Illicit Carnal Knowledge (Article 247)
6. Legal Grounds on Trespass to Dwelling (Article 280)
7. Swindling or Malicious Mischief on Relatives (Article 332)
8. Marriage Extinguishing Criminal Action (Article 344[4], Article 266-C)
9. Mistake of Fact
10. Instigation (US v. Phelps) (May fall under irresistible force)

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES (ARTICLE 13)
Concept of Mitigating Circumstance [Extenuating Circumstances if Not under Article 13]

When Circumstance Must be Present
Classes of Mitigating Circumstances
Ordinary Mitigating Circumstance vs. Privileged Mitigating Circumstance

1. Offset
2. Effect on Penalty
3. Presence of Two or More Mitigating Circumstances
4. Applicability to Felonies
Examples of Privileged Mitigating under the Revised Penal Code
1. INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING AND EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE
Principles to Remember
1. Some of the conditions required to justify the deed or to exempt are lacking
2. Majority of such conditions are nonetheless present
3. Indispensable element must be present (e.g. unlawful aggression)
Effect on Criminal Liability

1. Less than majority – Ordinary mitigating circumstance
2. At least majority – Privileged mitigating circumstance
➢ What if there are only two requisites? Presence of one is majority.
Incomplete Self-Defense, Defense of Relatives or Strangers

➢ Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element
Not applicable to the exempting circumstance of accident (Article 12[4], RPC)

➢ If there is no due care or there be fault – Article 365 on negligence
➢ If there is intention – it is considered an intentional felony
2. MINORITY OR SENILITY
Mitigating Circumstance of Senility

• Accused must be over 70 years at the of commission of offense
o Reyes v. People, August 04, 2010: Accused was 63 years old at the time of
the commission of the offense. The mitigating circumstance does not apply.
Legal Effects of Various Age Brackets

1. 15 and Under – Exempting Circumstance
2. Over 15 but under 18 – Exempting Circumstance if no discernment; Privileged
Mitigating Circumstance if with discernment;
3. 18 to 70 – Full Criminal Responsibility
4. Over 70 years – Mitigating Circumstance; No Death Penalty – Suspended &
Commuted
Senility Approximating Insanity

• Will be considered as exempting circumstance instead

3. PRAETER INTENTIONEM
Not Available if Resulting Felony Could be Expected (There must be evident disproportion)
Not Applicable to Felonies by Negligence
Not Applicable if Offender used Brute Force
Lack of intent to Commit so Grave a Wrong – Not Appreciated
4. SUFFICIENT THREAT OR PROVOCATION
Elements (S-O-I)
Threat Need Not be Offensive and Positively Strong (Otherwise, it is unlawful aggression)
Provocation, Defined [Only Against the Origin of Threat or Provocation]
“Sufficient provocation” in self-defense
Rationale of the Immediacy Requirement (Diminished Self Control)
5. VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
Elements [C-D-P]
Concerns “Honor”, “good names and reputation”
“Offense”, How Understood
“Grave” How Determined
Lapse of Time and Proximate Cause
o Gregorio Pelonia v. People, April 13, 2007: [Uninvited guest (victim) in the
accused’s house announced that he did not come to eat but to kill the accused,
fired first a warning shot and warned the victim but the victim instead attacked
accused and the accused shot the victim.] Mitigating circumstance of having
acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was, likewise, properly
appreciated. Petitioner was humiliated in front of his guests and kin in his own
house. It is settled, however, that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of
a grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident
so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance.
Sufficient Threat or Provocation vis-à-vis Vindication of a Grave Offense

1. To whom directed
2. Necessity of being a “grave” offense
3. Time interval
6. PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
Basis: Loss of Reasoning and Self-Control

Passion and Obfuscation, Defined
Must Arise from Lawful Sentiments (Not Revenge or Lawlessness)
Requisites (acted on impulse | so powerful to act on passion or obfuscation)
Article 12(4), (5) and (6) cannot coexist and pleaded all the same time
➢ Except if they arise from different set of facts
Vindication of a Grave Offense vs. Passion or Obfuscation

➢ Incompatible
Sufficient Threat or Provocation vs. Passion or Obfuscation

➢ Only one mitigating circumstance

1. As to origin
2. As to time period
3. Effects
Passion or Obfuscation, Incompatible with:

1. Treachery
2. Evident Premeditation
7. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OR CONFESSION OF GUILT
Voluntary Surrender
Elements (A-A-V)
Surrender Must be Spontaneous: [1] save them trouble or expenses; [2] show remorse
• People v. Rebamontan, April 13, 1999: It is clear from the above circumstances
that it was the police officer who went looking for the accused appellant immediately
after obtaining information from eyewitnesses as to who had perpetrated the crime.
The mere fact that he did not resist his arrest or deny his criminal act cannot be
equated with voluntary surrender. His arrest was already imminent. Surrender must
be spontaneous.
Surrender due to Self-preservation

• People v. Dela Cruz, November 18, 2003: In the case at bar, the appellant’s alleged
surrender to the barangay chairman was not voluntary. On the contrary, it was solely
motivated by self-preservation from what he feared was an imminent retaliation from
the immediate relatives of Alfredo. Consequently, the same cannot be appreciated in
his favor.
Offender Surrender Immediately After Having Committed the Crime

• People v. Curaraton, July 13, 1993: The mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender should have been considered by the trial court in the determination of the
penalty. The evidence shows that immediately after slaying Cabagte, accused-
appellant walked all the way straight to the Calinan Patrol Station in Calinan, Davao
City to surrender.
To Whom Voluntary Surrender Should be Made

1. Person in Authority (Vested with jurisdiction, power to govern and execute laws)
2. Agent of Persons in Authority (Charged with maintenance of public order, protection)
o People v. Sion, August 11, 1997: Thus, in addition to the Punong Barangay,
the members of the Sangguniang Barangay, or Kagawads, and members of the
Lupong Tagapayapa are now considered not merely as agents of, but as
persons, in authority.
o Del Castillo v. People, January 30, 2012: By virtue [Section 388 of LGC],
the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a
person in authority during the conduct of the search.
Plea of Guilty and then Voluntary Surrender

o De Vera v. De Vera, April 6, 2009: The mere filing of an information under
the issuance of warrant of arrest will not make the surrender involuntary.
Not Applicable to Culpable Felnoies

Confession of Guilt or Plea of Guilty
Elements (O-S-E)
Rationale
Plea of Guilt and Voluntary Surrender, Different
Not Applicable to Culpable Felonies and Crime under Special Laws
Conditional Plea of Guilty Not Considered
8. PHYSICAL DEFECT
Basis: Diminution of Voluntariness

Relation to the Commission of the Crime
Requisites; [1] deaf-dumb-blind-physical defect; [2] such restricts communication
9. ILLNESS OF THE OFFENDER
Basis
Requisites [1] diminish willpower; [2] should not deprive consciousness of acts
Feeblemindedness
10. ANALOGOUS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Significance
Circumstances similar to Article 12 (1) to (9)
• Man 60 years of age and of failing sight
• Outraged feeling of owner of animal taken for ransom
• Outraged feeling of creditor versus debtor
• Impulse of jealous feeling
• Esprit de corps
• Voluntary restitution of the property
• Extreme poverty
• Abandonment of wife convicted of bigamy
• Acting out of embarrassment
• Testifying in favor of prosecution despite but not being discharged from information

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES (ARTICLE 14)
General Concepts
Definition of Aggravating Circumstances
Basis
Kinds of Aggravating Circumstances

1. Generic
2. Specific
3. Qualifying
4. Inherent
Special Aggravating Circumstances
Generic vs. Qualifying Aggravating Circumstance

1. Effect as to the Penalty
2. Offsetting
Requirement to be Alleged in the Information and Proven in Trial
Aggravating Circumstances that Do Not Increase Penalty

1. Crime in themselves
2. Inherent to the crime
Aggravating Circumstances Personal to the Offenders
1. Advantage of Public Position

Elements [1] public officer; [2] took advantage of position to commit crime
Inherent in Certain Crimes (Bribery, Malversation, etc.)
2. Contempt or Insult to Public Authorities

Elements [1] exercise of functions; [2] public authority not the victim; [3] offender knows
him to be public authority; [4] presence not prevented him
3. Disregard of Rank, Age, Sex or Dwelling

Four Aggravating Circumstance
Applicability as to Rank, Age and Sex is to Crimes against Persons and Honor Only
Two Main Requisites
Rank, Age, Sex

1. In case of passion or obfuscation – not considered
2. In case of relationship-based felonies – inherent (if based on sex) (e.g. seduction)
3. In case of felonies or offenses where being a female is indispensable
Dwelling
Defined (Need Not be Domicile or Permanent)

o People v. Daniel, November 20, 1978: Although Margarita was merely
renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents
and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal
Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the place where
he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his
home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.

Dwelling, When Not Aggravating
Illustrative Cases
1. Shooting from Outside
o People v. Terso Sibbu, March 29, 2017: Although the triggerman fired the
shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be
considered it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered
the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim
was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised
means to perpetrate the assault from [the outside.]
2. Dragging Outside from the Dwelling

o People v. Dela Torre, January 15, 2002: Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a
bedspacer, the place is his home, the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect.
The fact that the crime was consummated in the nearby house is also
immaterial. Marita was forcibly taken by appellant from her dwelling house
(kitchen) and then raped her. Dwelling is aggravating if the victim was taken
from his house although the offense was not completed therein.
3. Victim is a Guest who was Invited to a House

o People v. Balansi, July 19, 1990: However, one does not lose his right of
privacy where he is offended in the house of another because as his invited
guest, he, the stranger, is sheltered by the same roof and protected by the
same intimacy of life it affords. It may not be his house, but it is, even for a
brief moment, "home" to him. He is entitled to respect even for that short
moment.
4. Abuse of Confidence or Obvious Ungratefulness
Abuse of Confidence
Elements (T-A-F)
Personal Relation
Inherent in Qualified Seduction, Qualified Theft, Estafa by Conversion and Malversation
Obvious Ungratefulness
Elements (T-A-O)
Obvious and Manifest Ingratitude
5. Place of the Commission of the Crime

Four Circumstances [should not be merely incidental]
1. Palace of the Chief Executive
2. Presence of the Chief Execute
3. Place Where Authorities are in the Discharge of Duties
4. Place Dedicated to Religious Worship
6. Nighttime, Uninhabited Place or by a Band

Main Elements (facilitated the commission | sought to ensure crime | advantage for impunity)
“Especially Sought” and “Impunity”
Nighttime (Nocturnidad)
Period Covered; Commenced and Completed
Illumination (Moonlight, Road Lights)
Rationale; Absorbed in Treachery; Exception

Uninhabited Place (Despoblado)

Possibility from Receiving Help
Factors Considered
Band (Quadrilla)
Four Armed Malefactors
Intrinsic Nature of Armed Weapons
Applicable Only in Crimes against Property and Persons Not in Chastity
7. On the Occasion of Calamity or Misfortune

Instead of lending aid, takes advantage of the misfortune
1. Conflagration
2. Shipwreck
3. Earthquake
4. Epidemic; or
5. Other Calamity or Misfortune
8. Aid of Armed Men

Instances when Not Aggravating
Absorbed by Quadrilla
Armed Men Should Only be Accomplices, Otherwise Conspiracy
• People v. Enojas, March 10, 2014: In “aid of armed men,” the men act as
accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the
same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-
principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a
special aggravating circumstance that is not among the circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to murder.
9. Recidivism
Kinds of Criminal Repetition

1. Recidivism (Article 14 [9])
2. Reiteracion (Article 14[10])
3. Habitual Delinquency (Article 62, par. 5)
4. Quasi-recidivism (Article 160)
Elements of Recidivism (T-C-T-C)

“At the Time of his Trial for One Crime” – in its general sense
“Previously Convicted by an Offense”
Effect of Pardon to Recidivism
Effect of Amnesty to Recidivism
Evidence Required:
o People v. Compendio: Recidivism is an affirmative allegation, thus it cannot
be appreciated without the certified true copies of the judgment of conviction.
10. Reiteracion
Elements (T-P-C)
“Previously Punished”
“The Penalty the Law Attaches”
Effect of Pardon – no reiteracion
Recidivism vs. Reiteracion ([1] as to antecedent; [2] as to offenses)

Quasi-Recidivism (Article 160)
Definition [after conviction but before service of sentence or during service of sentence]
Special Aggravating Circumstance
Period Covered
First Offense can either be a Felony or a Special Law Offense

Second Offense must be a Felony
Quasi-recidivism is not a crime in itself

• People v. Alicia, January 22, 1980: The accused were prisoners in the New Bilibid
Prisons serving sentence by virtue of final judgment. The existence of quasi-recidivism
renders moot the argument of appellants' counsel that the trial court failed to consider
certain mitigating circumstances which should have entitled the appellants to a lower
penalty (voluntary surrender and plea of guilty).
Burden of Proof in quasi-recidivism: Excerpts

• People v. Baldogo, January 24, 2003: Accused-appellant is alleged to have
committed murder and kidnapping while serving sentence in the penal colony by final
judgment for the crime of homicide. In the present case, to prove quasi-recidivism,
the prosecution was burdened to adduce in evidence a certified copy of the judgment
convicting accused-appellant of homicide and to prove that the said judgment had
become final and executory. In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely
the excerpt of the prison record showing that he was convicted of homicide. The
excerpt of the prison record of accused-appellant is not the best evidence to prove the
judgment that had become final and executory. Said excerpt is merely secondary or
substitutionary evidence which is inadmissible absent proof that the original of the
judgment had been lost or destroyed or that the same cannot be produced without the
fault of the prosecution. The barefaced fact that accused-appellant was detained in the
penal colony does not prove the fact that final judgment for homicide has been
rendered against him.
Habitual Delinquency (Article 62, paragraph 5)

Requisites [1] 10 years from release/conviction; [2] FRETSeL; [3] Found guilty 3x or oftener
FRETSeL – Falsification, Robbery, Estafa, Theft, Serious or Less Serious Physical Injuries
• People v. Dalawis, October 5, 2016: It is clear, therefore, that habitual delinquency

is considered only with respect to the crimes specified in the aforequoted Article. In
the instant case, appellant was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law,
the same crime adjudged in his two (2) prior convictions, and not of crimes of serious
or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, as required by the
RPC. Hence, the law on habitual delinquency is simply inapplicable to appellant.
Conviction for a Third Time or Oftener [Requires a Third Conviction]

Special Aggravating Circumstance
Recidivism vs. Habitual Delinquency

1. Convictions
2. Crimes covered
3. Prescription
4. Nature
5. Information

11. In Consideration of Price, Reward or Promise

Two Requisites (Two Principals; Consideration for the Offense)
➢ Two Kinds of Principals
o Principal by Inducement (Offeror)
o Principal by Direct Participation (Offerree)
Need Not Be Material
Affects both Offeror and Offeree
12. By Inundation or Great Waste or Ruin

Fire, Explosion, Derailment of Locomotive, Poison
Rules as to Fire
1. Intent was to burn but somebody died - arson
2. Fire as a means to kill - murder
3. Intention kill and fire was used to conceal – arson and murder
Use of Poison
1. In murder cases – considered as inherent
2. In parricide – appreciated as aggravating circumstance
13. Evident Premeditation
Essence of Evident Premeditation

➢ Preceded by cool thought and reflection
Elements (Determination-Preparation-Time)
Appreciation of Evident Premeditation in Error in Personae and Aberratio Ictus

➢ General Rule: Not Appreciated
➢ Exception: [1] No particular victim; or [2] Belongs to the same class
Evident Premeditation and Conspiracy

• People v. Olazo, October 3, 2016: Persistent attempts sufficiently demonstrates
how determined they were to adhere to their agreement despite sufficient lapse of
time. Moreover, that Charito and his cohorts went to great lengths to hire Joseph to
ferry them back and forth to the scene of the crime shows sobriety and circumspection
surrounding their decision. Such circumstances therefore show that the crime
committed was a product of intent and coordination among the accused. Hence, the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is present. [Rule it is inherent in
Robbery and it is aggravating in Robbery with Homicide.]
14. Craft, Fraud or Disguise
Craft, Defined [Intellectual trickery and cunning to deceive the victim]

Fraud, Defined [Insidious words or machinations to enable offender]
Craft and Fraud may be absorbed by Treachery
Disguise, Defined
Test of Disguise – intended to make identification difficult.
Not Necessary to Hide Identity Throughout All Commission

• People v. Feliciano, May 5, 2014: [Fraternity wars were one group from a rival
fraternity attacked the members of the other fraternity. The attackers wore masks and

face coverings, some of which fell off.] The introduction of the prosecution of
testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but the masks
fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance.
What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there
was the concealment of the identity of the accused.
15. Abuse of Superior Strength or Means Employed to Weaken the Defense
Abuse of Superior Strength

Meaning: Notorious Inequality of Forces in the Commission
Absorbs Band but Absorbed by Treachery
Test: [1] Relative Strength; [2] Took Advantage
Superiority in Number Per Se, Not Sufficient
• People v. Cañaveras, November 27, 2013: [Striking of beer bottle, victim in search
of “Judas”]. Superiority in number does not necessarily amount to the qualifying
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength. It must be shown that the
aggressors combined forces in order to secure advantage from their superiority in
strength. When appreciating this qualifying circumstance, it must be proven that the
accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased. Indeed, when assailants attack a
victim alternately, they cannot be said to have taken advantage of their superior
strength.
In this case, the unidentified companions of appellant punched Claro first. He was
already about to escape when he was struck by appellant on the head with a beer
bottle. Thus, the attack mounted by the unidentified persons had already ceased when
appellant took over. Also, the fact that Claro would have been able to escape showed
that the initial attack was not that overwhelming, considering that there were three of
them attacking. Clearly, there was no blatant disparity in strength between Claro, on
the one hand, and appellant and his companions on the other.
Illustrative Cases
1. Superiority in Number and Arms
o People v. Melanio Del Castillo, January 18, 2012: A gross disparity of
forces existed between the accused and the victims. Not only did the six
accused outnumber the three victims but the former was armed with bolos
while the latter were unarmed. The accused clearly used their superiority in
number and arms to ensure the killing of the victims. Abuse of superior strength
is attendant if the accused took advantage of their superiority in number and
their being armed with bolos. Accordingly, the crimes committed were three
counts of murder.
o People v. Tamayo, March 12, 2014: Since about 15 men, including Erwin,
pounced on their one helpless victim, relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head,
and stabbed him on the stomach until he was dead, there is no question that
the accused took advantage of their superior strength. Thus, it qualifies that
killing into murder.
2. Superiority in Number against a Frail Man

o People v. Pigar, February 17, 2020: [Throwing stones and used bangkaw
against the frail Feliciano, Sr.] The inequality of forces in this case is beyond
doubt. Feliciano, Sr. was a thin 52-year-old man who was slow moving

according to his daughter. Nonetheless, appellants attacked Feliciano, Sr. with

nine (9) persons. The number alone shows the inequality of strength between
the victim and the aggressors. This coupled with the fact that Feliciano, Sr. was
already a frail man, supports the finding of abuse of superior strength. This
circumstance qualifies the killing of Feliciano, Sr. into murder.
Means to Weaken the Defense
Materially Weakened
Absorbed in Treachery
16. Treachery
Treachery (Alevosia), defined
Nature of Treachery
Elements of Treachery
Crimes Against Persons Only
Cannot Exist with Passion or Obfuscation
Appreciation in Error in Personae and Aberratio Ictus
Evident Premeditation can exist with Treachery
Instances Absorbed by Treachery

➢ Abuse of Superior Strength
➢ Aid or Armed Men
➢ Band
➢ Means to Weaken Defense
➢ Craft
➢ Nighttime
Time When Treachery be Present

1. If aggression is continuous
2. If aggression was not continuous
Illustrative Cases
1. Victims were Unaware that they will be Hailed by Bullets
• People v. Yolando Libre, August 1, 2016: In this case, the records show that the
attack was well-planned and the series of events that transpired clearly established
conspiracy among them. First, the perpetrators undoubtedly acted in concert as they
went to the house of Ruben together, each with his own firearms; Second, the
perpetrators used Lucy Sabando and her child to trick Ruben and ensure that he will
come out of the house clueless to their presence; Third, after a moment of struggling,
Caman immediately shot Ruben Barte at the back; Fourth, perpetrators simultaneously
strafed Barte's house for a long period to ensure that those inside the house are
likewise killed; Fifth, despite Juanita Barte's plea to stop shooting as there were
children with them, the shooting continued thus manifesting clear intent to kill; and
Sixth, when they ceased firing, they rested at the same time and fled together.
The suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault deprived the victims of an

opportunity to resist it or offer any defense of their persons. The victims were unaware
that they would be attacked by accused with a hail of bullets from their firearms. In
fact, they were already in bed when Lucy Sabando called for help which prompted

Ruben Barte to come out of the house. Hence, the subsequent shooting was deliberate,
unexpected, swift and sudden which foreclosed any escape, resistance or defense
coming from the victims.
Likewise, the prosecution sufficiently established the attending circumstance of evident

premeditation. The fact that they asked Lucy Sabando to lead them to Barte's house,
and on a 2-kilometer walk, showed their determination to commit the crime and clung
to it all the time they were on the way to Barte's house. Thus, treachery and evident
premeditation attended the commission of the crime, qualifying the killing of Barte's
children as murder.
2. Stabbed while Lying Face Down

• People v. Dela Peña February 12, 2020: In this case, Ernie categorically stated
that his father was sleeping inside the nipa hut when accused-appellant stabbed him
using a "pinuti." Olipio was lying on his stomach, with his face down, and it was in that
position that he was killed by accused-appellant. Under such circumstance, there is no
doubt that he was not in a position to put up any form of defense against his assailant.
Treachery attends the killing where the accused attacks the victim while the latter is
asleep and unable to defend himself. Absolutely, a sleeping victim is not in a position
to defend himself, take flight or otherwise avoid the assault, thus ensuring that the
crime is successfully executed without any risk to the attacker.
3. Frontal Attack and Existence of Treachery

• People v. Pelis, February 21, 2011: Although frontal, if the attack was unexpected,
and unarmed victim in no position to repel attack, treachery can still be appreciated.
• People v. Celino Nabong, April 04, 2007: [Stabbing of the young female
accountant by construction workers.] Thus, this Court has ruled that even frontal
attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is
unarmed. Treachery can still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of
the danger to his/her person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself/herself or to retaliate. In the present
case, the victim did not even have sufficient warning of the danger that was looming,
since the attack against her came from behind and was so sudden and unexpected,
thus giving the victim no time to flee or to prepare her defense or enable her to offer
the least resistance to the sudden assault.
4. Treachery and Intent to Kill

• Roel C. Casilac v. People, February 17, 2020: [Three armed men waiting at the
road shooting at victims in motorcycle] First, at the time of the attack Ryn Loui and
Ramil were not in the position to defend themselves. On board their motorcycle, they
were not aware of any kind of risk or threat to their lives until they reached the curved
portion of the road when they saw the petitioner, They were rendered defenseless at
the time when the petitioner surprisingly fired successive shots at them while they
were driving and traversing the road. Second, the petitioner consciously adopted an
attack that was deliberate, swift, and sudden. To be exact, the petitioner did an
"ambush" when he made a surprise attack upon Ryn Loui and Ramil from a concealed
position, which is the curved portion of the road.
In the present case, the prosecution has established petitioner's intent to kill Ryn Loui.
The Court also finds such intent to be present with respect to Ramil. In this regard, it
is hard to reconcile that there is an intent to kill Ryn Loui while there is none when it
comes to Ramil considering that petitioner commenced the commission of the felony

directly through overt acts by treacherously shooting both the victims while they were
on board the same motorcycle.
In particular, with respect to Ramil, after he was shot by petitioner in the arm, the
latter's intent to consummate the crime was shown by the fact that he continued to
chase Ramil and fire at him. However, the petitioner was not able to perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the crime of murder as the wound inflicted
upon Ramil was not fatal and the latter was able to run away from the petitioner. From
the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner also intended to kill Ramil and that all the
elements of attempted murder are present.
5. Kicking by Victim after Stabbing Does Not Negate Treachery
• People v. Moreno, March 2, 2020: Despite being stabbed multiple, the person was
able to kick the accused, so much so the accused fled the scene of the crime – is there
treachery? Yes. Appellant's sudden attack on Mijares while asleep in his own home
amply demonstrates treachery in the commission of the crime. Mijares had no inkling
of the impending attack that night; or any peril to his person as he felt secured in his
home. Mijares was not able to put up an effective defense. Although he kicked and
pushed the appellant out of their room, this did not negate the presence of treachery.
In People v. Baltazar, We ruled that treachery must still be appreciated even if the
victim was able to retaliate as a result of his reflexes, so long as he did not have the
opportunity to repel the initial assault.
6. Suddenly Shot by Firearms while in the Course of Questioning People

• People v. Manuel Prado, August 10, 2016: There were many people at the site
when the team reached the place. As the team was about to ask questions, four (4)
men equipped with short and long firearms suddenly appeared and fired upon them,
instantly killing PO1 Arato and hitting SPO1 Saludes. The prosecution established the
presence of the element of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The shooting of the
unsuspecting victims was sudden and unexpected which effectively deprived them of
the chance to defend themselves or to repel the aggression, insuring the commission
of crime without risk to aggressor and without any provocation on part of the victim.
7. Intent to Harm Should Not Come About Spontaneously

• People v. Cañaveras, November 27, 2013: In this case, there was no time for
appellant and his companions to plan and agree to deliberately adopt a particular
means to kill Claro. The first query of Claro was regarded as innocent enough and was
given no attention. It was the second query that was considered impertinent, and
witnesses testified that appellant and his companions went after Claro immediately
after it was uttered. Even the choice of weapon, a beer bottle readily available and
within grabbing range at the table as appellant followed outside, shows that the intent
to harm came about spontaneously. [“Judas” case.]
8. Attempt to Hack Informed Victim of Intent to Harm

• People v. Pigar, February 17, 2020: In any event, we find that treachery, indeed,
did not attend the victim's killing. Records show that before Feliciano, Sr. got killed,
Roy visited his house first and already tried to hack him but missed. Thereafter, Roy
sped off on board his motorcycle. At that time, Feliciano, Sr. was already deemed to
have known of Roy's intention to harm him and it was not remote at all that Roy would
intend to return soon to finish his business with the victim. For this reason, Feliciano,
Sr. could have already prepared to defend himself should Roy indeed return to harm
him anew.

9. Treachery Present Even When Victims were Armed Jail Guards

• People v. Charlie Fieldad, October 1, 2014: [Shooting of jail guards in a nipa hut
and escaped prison but arrest in a cane field.] In the instant case, despite being armed,
the jail officers were not afforded any chance of defending themselves. Without
warning, Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan held
the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with
Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad
took JO2 Gamboa's gun and shot JO1 Bacolor.
10. Treachery Absorbs Abuse of Superior Strength

• People v. Joel Aquino, January 15, 2014: [Post shabu session stabbing incident].
Victim was stabbed by the group on the lateral part of his body was he was under the
impression that they were simply leaving the place where they had a shabu session.
Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle,
his head is usually higher or at the level of the roof of the side car which leaves his
torso exposed to the passengers seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way for
Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his body both from the people
seated the side car and those seated beside him. But, we cannot consider abuse of
superior strength as an aggravating circumstance in this case. As per jurisprudence,
when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the
former is absorbed in the latter.
17. Ignominy
Ignominy, Defined [moral order which adds disgrace to material injury]
Crimes Applicable; Ignominy v. Cruelty
18. Unlawful Entry

Rationale
Inherent in Trespass to Dwelling and Robbery with Force Upon Things
Aggravating in Robbery with Violence or Intimidation Against Persons
19. Forcible Entry

Requisites
Instances when Breaking is Lawful
20. Aid of Minors or Use of Motor Vehicles

Minors Must be Under 15 Years of Age
➢ Rationale
Use of Motor Vehicles
➢ Only in the commission, not applicable in escape
21. Cruelty
Definition
Requisites [increase injury + unnecessary]
The Victim Must Still be Alive
Not Inherent in Crimes Against Persons
Number of Wounds Per Se Not Proof of Cruelty
• Simangan v. People, July 8, 2004: Moreover, the crime is not aggravated by cruelty
simply because the victim sustained ten stab wounds, three of which were fatal. For
cruelty to be considered aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that, in
inflicting several stab wounds on the victim, the perpetrator intended to exacerbate
the pain and suffering of the victim. The number of wounds inflicted on the victim is
not proof of cruelty.

Other Aggravating Circumstances
A. Crime Committed by a Syndicate

1. Theft
2. Estafa
3. Robbery
4. Illegal Recruitment (Special Law)
B. Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions

Section 29, RA 10591, Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act
Loose Firearm, Defined (Section 3[v])

➢ Refers to an unregistered firearm, an obliterated or altered firearm, firearm which has
been lost or stolen, illegally manufactured firearms, registered firearms in the
possession of an individual other than the licensee and those with revoked licenses.
In Homicide or Murder ✓
➢ Not a separate offense in such case (People v. Avecilla, February 15, 2001)
Rebellion, Insurrection, Attempted Coup – Absorbed as element
Not Necessary to Present the Firearm itself to Consider as Aggravating

• People v. Agcanas, October 11, 2011: Actual firearm itself need not be presented
if its existence can be proved by the testimonies of witnesses or by other evidence
that was presented.
Good Faith is Not a Valid Defense – Malum Prohibitum

• Sayco v. People, March 3, 2008: Although the accused had a Memorandum Receipt
and Mission Order issued by ISG, whereby he was entrusted with such firearm and
ammunitions which he was authorized to carry around, he was nevertheless convicted
for the subject violation as the documents cannot take the place of a duly issued
firearm license. The accused cannot invoke good faith as a defense against prosecution
for illegal possession of firearm, as this is a malum prohibitum.
Distinct Offense When Not Used
C. Under the Influence of Dangerous Drugs
Section 25, RA 9165: A positive of finding of the finding use of dangerous drugs shall be a
qualifying aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime by an offender, and the
application of the penalty provided for in the RPC shall be applicable.
➢ Loses its effectivity already
➢ Jaime Dela Cruz v. People, July 23, 2014, Sereno, J.: [Accused was arrested in
the alleged act of extortion, but his urine sample was subjected to testing and yielded
a positive result.] The drug test under RA 9165 does not cover every person who is
apprehended or arrest for any unlawful act, it only covers those under Article II of RA
9165. Note that accused was arrested in the alleged act of extortion. Making the phrase
“a person apprehended or arrested” in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for all other crimes is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing. Here
the urine sample is not material to the charge of extortion [N.B. Meaning, other than
RA 9165 offenses, there is no way to apply a positive finding of such use to make it as
a qualifying aggravating circumstance alluded to by Section 25.]

ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES (ARTICLE 15)
Definition
1. Relationship
Covered Relationships
Under Revised Penal Code
Under Jurisprudence
• People v. Tan, 264 SCRA 425: Step-daughter and step-father included.
• People v. Cabresos, 244 SCRA 362, Uncle and niece is not included.
Relationship if Inherent in the Crime (Parricide, Adultery, Concubinage)
Rules as to Relationship
1. In Crimes involving Property – relationship is generally aggravating
a. Mitigating: Robbery, Usurpation, Fraudulent Insolvency, Arson
b. Exempting: Theft, Estafa, and Malicious Mischief if Living Together
2. In Crimes Against Persons

a. In General – aggravating if by a higher or equal degree
b. In Murder or Homicide – aggravating even if lower degree
3. In Crimes Against Chastity – relationship is always aggravating
Allegation of the Information
Step-father and Common Spouse are Not the Same

• People v. XXX, December 4, 2019: [Is the phrase step-father and common-law
spouse are the same? No.] In a criminal case where the life and liberty of the accused
is at stake, every qualifying circumstance alleged in the information must be proved
as much as the crime itself. Thus, in the crime of rape and lascivious conduct under
RA 7610, an allegation that the accused is the “common-law” spouse of the victim’s
mother must be sufficiently established. Equally noteworthy, the terms “common-law
spouse” and “step-parent” are distinct terms bearing different legal meanings which
may not be used interchangeably. [Stepfather is legally defined as the husband of
one’s mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken
is the offspring.]
Proof of Marriage Required to Establish one as “Stepfather”

• People v. Romeo De Guzman, November 27, 2019: Proof of marriage must be
established, when the information alleged when the offender is the stepfather of the
victim. It was alleged in the information that De Guzman was AAA’s “stepfather” which
presupposes a legitimate relationship to AAA’s mother. But no proof of marriage was
then presented thus De Guzman cannot be considered stepfather as alleged.
2. Intoxication
When Mitigating and When Aggravating (Habituality)

• People v. Celino Nabong, April 4, 2007: It must be shown that it impaired the
willpower of the accused that he did not know what he was doing or comprehend
wrongfulness of his act.

The person pleading intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic
beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. his, the
appellants failed to do. The records are bereft of any evidence that the quantity of
liquor they had taken was of such quantity as to affect their mental faculties. On the
contrary, the fact that appellants could recall details of what had transpired after their
drinking session is the best proof that they knew what they were doing during that
occasion. The deception, the device, the place and manner of perpetrating the crime
all point to the fact that appellants had complete control of their minds.
3. Degree of Instruction and Education of the Offender
Does illiteracy automatically warrant a mitigating circumstance?

• People v. Celino Nabong (supra): Illiteracy alone will not constitute such
circumstance; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge
of the full significance of one's act.26 Besides, one does not have to be educated or
intelligent to be able to know that it is unlawful to take the life of another person
Effect of Aggravating Circumstance is Proven but Not Alleged in the Information

• People v. Baldogo, January 24, 2003: The same will not serve to aggravate the
penalty. But it will be used as basis to prove as basis for exemplary damages. But it
will not have effect at all as to the penalty concerned.
General Rule
Exception
1. Crimes against property
2. Crimes against chastity
3. Murder or homicide
4. Rape
5. Treason
o People v. Lansanas: Love of country should be a natural feeling of every
citizen however unlettered or uncultured he may be.
Test of Lack of Instruction: Lack of Sufficient Intelligence

Degree of Instruction of the Offender =/= Education of the Offender
Consideration of Alternative Circumstances
➢ When it is relevant to the crime committed
➢ Intoxication, if not mitigating, is automatically aggravating
***
Republic Act 10586: An Act Penalizing Persons Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol,
Dangerous Drugs and Similar Substances (2012)
Section 5. Punishable Act. – It shall be unlawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs, and/or other similar substances.
➢ This is independent from criminal liability under Article 365, RPC
Section 12. Penalties. – A driver found to have been driving a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or other similar substances, as provided for under
Section 5 of this Act, shall be penalized as follows:

(a) If the violation of Section 5 did not result in physical injuries or homicide, the penalty of
three (3) months imprisonment, and a fine ranging from Twenty thousand pesos
(Php20,000.00) to Eighty thousand pesos (Php80,000.00) shall be imposed;
(b) If the violation of Section 5 resulted in physical injuries, the penalty provided in Article
263 of the Revised Penal Code or the penalty provided in the next preceding subparagraph,
whichever is higher, and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00)
to Two hundred thousand pesos (Php200,000.00) shall be imposed;
(c) If the violation of Section 5 resulted in homicide, the penalty provided in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00)
to Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) shall be imposed; and
(d) The nonprofessional driver’s license of any person found to have violated Section 5 of this
Act shall also be confiscated and suspended for a period of twelve (12) months for the first
conviction and perpetually revoked for the second conviction. The professional driver’s license
of any person found to have violated Section 5 of this Act shall also be confiscated and
perpetually revoked for the first conviction. The perpetual revocation of a driver’s license shall
disqualify the person from being granted any kind of driver’s license thereafter.
The prosecution for any violation of this Act shall be without prejudice to criminal prosecution
for violation of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 9165 and other special laws and
existing local ordinances, whenever applicable.
NOTE: X was driving and bumps Y, resulting to the latter’s death. What is X’s liability? The
policemen or the prosecution may opt to file
1. Reckless imprudence resulting to homicide under Article 365, RPC
2. Under RA 10586, since prosecution under such law shall be without prejudice
Important Definitions
➢ (b) Breath analyzer refers to the equipment which can determine the blood alcohol
concentration level of a person through testing of his breath.
➢ (c) Chemical tests refer to breath, saliva, urine, or blood tests to determine the blood
alcohol concentration level and/or positive indication of dangerous drugs and similar
substances in a person’s body.
➢ (e) Driving under the influence of alcohol refers to the act of operating a motor vehicle
while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a
breath analyzer test, reached the level of intoxication, as established jointly by the
Department of Health (DOH), the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
➢ (f) Driving under the influence of dangerous drugs and other similar substances refers
to the act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver, after being subjected to a
confirmatory test as mandated under Republic Act No. 9165, is found to be positive
for use of any dangerous drug.
***
Instigation vs. Entrapment

Instigation, Defined
Instigation Absolves Offender from Criminal Liability (No Criminal Intent)
Persons Who May Commit Instigation
If Done by a Private Person without Public Function

Entrapment
Not an Absolutory Cause
In Flagrante Delicto
Instigation vs. Entrapment

1. Origin of the Criminal Design/Intent
2. Means and Ways
3. Criminal Liability
PROBLEM: PDEA had intelligence of drug pushing activities of R, but could not arrest him for
lack of concrete evidence. PDEA Agent approached E approaching him to act as poseur-buyer
to buy from R, E refused citing that he has been rehabilitated and did not want anything to
do with drugs anymore. But he was prevailed to help, when the PDEA agent told him that he
is the only one who can get to R, since E was his former customer. Agent gave E the marked
money, the operation proceeded, after handing the marked money to R. After getting the
signal from E, PDEA team barged in and arrest R & E, who were both charged by RA 9165.
[1] What defense, if any, may E invoke to free himself of criminal liability?
He is immune from prosecution and punishment because of his role as poseur-buyer

in the entrapment operation. There was virtually an instigation, so he is exempted from the
prosecution and punishment because the information obtained from him of the PDEA agent,
who had no direct and concrete evidence of R’s drug pushing activities, led to whereabouts,
identity ,and arrest of R. So long as the information and the testimony given are pleaded and
proven, E cannot be prosecuted.
[2] May R adopt as his own E’s defense?
No. First, an entrapment operation is a valid means of catching perpetrators under RA

9165. It is an effective way of apprehending violators in the act of committing the crime. In
the buy-bust operation the idea to commit the crime originates from the offender without
anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Second, the immunity does not
extend to violators of Section 5 of RA 9165 (selling). Lastly, he was the offender the crime
and apparently the most guilty of the offense.

PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
Persons Criminally Liable – Article 16, RPC

For grave and less grave felonies – principals, accomplices, and accessories
For light felonies – principals and accomplices only
Classification Applies only under Revised Penal Code

➢ Under the Special Law provides for graduated penalties same under RPC
Rule on Light Felonies

1. Liability arises only when consummated
2. Accessories are exempt from consummated light felonies [Rationale?]
PRINCIPALS
Kinds of Principals – Article 17, RPC

1. Principal by Direct Participation
2. Principal by Induction
3. Principal by Indispensable Cooperation
Different Classifications of Criminal Responsibility

1. Individual Criminal Responsibility – each is liable for his personal act
2. Quasi-Collective Criminal Responsibility – some are principals others are accomplices
3. Collective Criminal Responsibility - conspiracy is present and act of one is act of all
Principal by Direct Participation

Requisites
Non-appearance of Conspirator
➢ Deemed a desistance, unless he is a mastermind
“Personally, took part in the commission of the crime”
Crime Not Intended to be Committed in the Conspiracy
➢ General Rule: Only liable for the crime contemplated in the conspiracy. Conspirators
are not liable for the acts of another conspirator not contemplated in the conspiracy.
➢ Exception:
➢ [1] there is a particular provision of law that says so (Robbery by Band); or
➢ [2] acts done outside the contemplation are necessary and logical consequences of
the intended act.
In Case of Doubt whether or Principal or Accomplice

• People v. Eusebio, February 25, 2013: [Jaime went to Jesus’s house but shot Jaime
and five others shot and turned him over, Jesus was indicted as principal and the
others were deemed accomplices, RTC found conspiracy, however. CA cannot increase
to principal observing double jeopardy] The line that separates a conspirator by
concerted action from an accomplice by previous or simultaneous acts is indeed slight.
Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; but they assent
to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. The solution in case of doubt is that,
as the RTC said with ample jurisprudential support, such doubt should be resolved in
favor of the accused. It was held that when there is doubt as to whether a guilty
participant in a homicide performed the role of principal or accomplice, the Court
should favor the “milder form of responsibility.” He should be given the benefit of the
doubt and can be regarded only as an accomplice.

Principal by Induction
Requisites
1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of bring about the commission
of the crime; and
2. The inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the one
induced. [NOTE: The crime must have been committed]
Inducement Should Precede Commission
Ways of Becoming Principal Induction
1. Direct Force [irresistible force and uncontrollable fear]
2. Direct Inducement [price, reward or promise and words of command]
• Guillergan v. People, February 2, 2011: In this case, the Sandiganbayan found
that Guillergan ordered Butcon to sign the "receive" portion of the payrolls as payee
to make it appear that persons whose names appeared on the same had signed the
document when they in fact did not. [Anti-Graft case against AFP Lieutenant].
PROBLEM: A asked B to kill C because of a grave injustice done to A by C. A promised B a

reward. B was willing to kill c, not so much because of the reward promised to him but because
he also had his own long-standing grudge against C, who had wronged him in the past. If C
is killed by B, would A be liable as a principal by inducement?
No. A would not be liable as a principal by inducement because the reward he promised
B is not the sole impelling reason which made B to kill C. To bring about criminal liability of a
co-principal, the inducement made by the inducer must be the sole consideration which
caused the person induced to commit the crime and without which the crime would not have
been committed. The facts of the case indicate that B, the killer supposedly induced by A, had
his own reason to kill C out of a long standing grudge.
Inducement Must be Strong Enough

➢ Thoughtless Express is Not an Inducement to Kill
People v. Yanson-Dumancas, December 13, 1999: [Swindling via fake gold bar
transaction against Dumancas family, the swindlers were abducted, interrogated and later on
killed.] Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas was indicted as principal by induction, but the Court found
nothing to conclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused uncontrollable fear upon
the accused since the plan to abduct was hatched without Jeanette’s involvement or
participation. The only basis relied upon by the trial court is the supposed “commands” or
order given by her but no stretch of imagination such command is considered. The remark of
Jeanette to "take care of the two" does not constitute the command required by law to
justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by inducement. Furthermore, the utterance
which was supposedly the act of inducement, should precede the commission of the crime
itself. In the case at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element of the crime charged
(kidnapping for ransom with murder) has already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told
accused-appellant Geroche to "take care of the two." Said utterance could, therefore, not
have been the inducement to commit the crime charged in this case.
People v. Janjalani, January 10, 2011: [Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo]
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on
"principal by inducement." The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make
bombs - coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas
in Metro Manila and Rohmat's confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as
part of their mission - prove the finding that Rohmat's co-inducement was the determining
cause of the commission of the crime. Such "command or advice [was] of such nature that,
without it, the crime would not have materialized."

When Criminal Liability of Principal by Inducement Arise

Effect of Acquittal of Principal by Direct Participation on Principal by Inducement
➢ In case Principal by Direct Participation is Entitled to Exempting Circumstance
Principal by Inducement vs. Proposal to Commit a Felony

1. Presence of Inducement
2. When Criminal Liability Arises
3. Crimes Covered
Principal by Indispensable Cooperation

Requisites
Cooperates Upon Knowing the Criminal Intent
Considered as Conspirator in Implied Conspiracy
• People v. Simba, 117 SCRA 243: An accused may be a principal by direct
participation and principal by indispensable cooperation at the same time. When Sergio
had sexual intercourse against the complainant against her will with force and with
intimidation, the crime committed is rape through direct participation. But, when he
aided Berto and made it possible for Berto to have carnal knowledge with the victim
against her – Sergio committed another crime of rape as principal by indispensable
cooperation. Liable for rape for two counts.
Principal by Indispensable Cooperation vs. Accomplice

➢ Importance of participation in committing the crime
People v. Dulay, September 24, 2012: [Dina brought AAA at the back of the fish port, a
certain “Speed” handed money to Dina, and AAA was raped by Speed.] She is not considered
as a principal by indispensable cooperation. Nothing in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the
commission of the crime of rape. From the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until
appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in
the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in
exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her
own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this
disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be
remembered that in the Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered
and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by “Speed.” [But Dina Dulay is
still made guilty for violation Child Abuse Act].
PROBLEM: Despite the massive advertising campaign in media against firecrackers and gun-
firing during the New Year's celebrations, Jonas and Jaja bought ten boxes of super lolo and
pla-pla in Bocaue, Bulacan. Before midnight of December 31, 1999, Jonas and Jaja started
their celebration by having a drinking spree at Jona's place by exploding their high-powered
firecrackers in their neighborhood. In the course of their conversation, Jonas confided to Jaja
that he has been keeping a long-time grudge against his neighbor Jepoy in view of the latter's
refusal to lend him some money. While under the influence of liquor, Jonas started throwing
lighted super lolos inside Jepoy's fence to irritate him and the same exploded inside the latter's
yard. Upon knowing that the throwing of the super lolo was deliberate, Jepoy became furious
and sternly warned Jonas to stop his malicious act or he would get what he wanted. A heated
argument between Jonas and Jepoy ensued but Jaja tried to calm down his friend. At
midnight, Jonas convinced Jaja to lend him his .45 caliber pistol so that he could use it to
knock down Jepoy and to end his arrogance. Jonas thought that after all, explosions were
everywhere and nobody would know who shot Jepoy.

After Jaja lent his firearm to Jonas, the latter again started started throwing lighted super
lolos and pla-plas at Jepoy's yard in order to provoke him so that he would come out of his
house. When Jepoy came out, Jonas immediately shot him with Jaja's .45 caliber gun but
missed his target. Instead, the bullet hit Jepoy's five year old son who was following behind
him, killing the boy instantaneously, If you were the Judge, how would you decide the case?
Answer: I would convict Jonas as principal by direct participation and Jaja as co-
principal by Indispensable cooperation for the complex crime of murder with homicide. Jaja
should be held liable as co-principal and not only as an accomplice because he knew of Jonas'
criminal design even before he lent his firearm to Jonas and still he concurred in that criminal
design by providing the firearm.
ACCOMPLICES
Who are Accomplices – Article 18

Requisites
Accomplice vs. Conspirator
1. Criminal Responsibility (Individual / Collective)
2. Criminal Design (Concurrence / Origin)
3. Penalty (One degree lower / Penalty of a Principal)
PROBLEM: Ponciano borrowed Ruben’s gun, saying that he would use it to kill Freddie. Because
Ruben also resented Freddie, he readily lent his gun, but told Ponciano: "O, pagkabarilmo kay
Freddie, isauli mo kaagad, ha." Later, Ponciano killed Freddie, but used a knife because he
did not want Freddie’s neighbors to hear the gunshot. What, if any, is the liability of Ruben?
Answer: Ruben’s liability is that of an accomplice only because he merely cooperated

in Ponciano‟s determination to kill Freddie. Such cooperation is not indispensable to the
killing, as in fact the killing was carried out without the use of Ruben’s gun. Neither way Ruben
may be regarded as a co-conspirator since he was not a participant in the decision-making of
Ponciono to kill Freddie; he merely cooperated in carrying out plan which was already in place.
Would your answer be the same if, instead of Freddie, it was Manuel, a relative of Ruben, who
was killed by Ponciano using Ruben’s gun?
Answer: No, the answer would not be the same because Ruben lent his gun purposely
for the killing of Freddie only, not for any other killing. Ponciano’s using Ruben’s gun in killing
a person other than Freddie is beyond Ruben’s criminal intent and willing involvement. Only
Ponciano will answer for the crime against Manuel. It has been ruled that when the owner of
the gun knew it would be used to kill a particular person, but the offender used it to kill
another person, the owner of the gun is not an accomplice as to the killing of the other person.
While there was community of design to kill Freddie between Ponciano and Ruben, there was
none with respect to the killing of Manuel.
In Homicide or Murder, Accomplice Must Not Have Inflicted Mortal Wound

Accomplice is Not a Part of the Plan or Conspiracy
Accomplice’s Act Should Not be Equal or Greater than of the Principal
Manners How Accomplice Acquires Knowledge of Criminal Design
Rustia v. People, October 5, 2016: The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance
knowingly or intentionally rendered that cannot exist without previous cognizance of the
criminal act intended to be executed. But it cannot be said that Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino

knew that Benjamin, Jr. would shoot the victim. As earlier observed, the fatal shooting was
done in the heat of the moment, not premeditated or preconceived. Their group was making
its way out of the barangay hall when Benjamin, Jr. suddenly grabbed Ambrocio around the
waist, and the two of them started to wrestle with each other. Up to that point, nothing
indicated that Benjamin, Jr. intended to grab Ambrocio's gun and use it against him. From
their point of view, Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino were witnessing their closest of kin suddenly
engaged in the physical struggle with Ambrocio whom they knew was armed with a gun.
Going to the aid of Benjamin, Jr. was but their most natural reaction. That their going to the
latter's aid might have enhanced the changes of Benjamin, Jr. in gaining control of the victim's
firearm, but such did not unavoidably mean that they had themselves intended such outcome.
Nor did they contemplate such outcome in the absence of any clear showing that they
deliberately went to his aid to ensure his seizure of the firearm from Ambrocio. As things
stood, their acts could also mean that they were only trying to stop the grappling from
escalating into violence. Until the time when Benjamin, Jr.'s intention became known to them
that is, when he finally had full control of the gun, he cocked it and pointed it at the victim
nothing in the records established that Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino continued to provide
material and moral aid to Benjamin, Jr.
PROBLEM: Nel learned that Elgar, the owner of the biggest house in the place, would be out
of town for three days with no one left to watch the house. He called his friends Ben, Ardo
and Gorio and they planned to take the valuables in the house while Elgar was away. Nel and
Ben would go inside the house, Ardo would serve as the lookout, while Gorio would stay in
the getaway car. When Elgar left, they carried out their plan to the letter. Nel and Ben went
inside the house through the backdoor which was left unlocked. None of the rooms and
drawers inside were locked. They took the money, jewelry and other valuables therefrom and
immediately left using the getaway car.
After driving for about one kilometer, Nel realized he left his bag and wallet with IDs in the
house and so he instructed Gorio to drive back to the house. Nel just went in thinking that
the house was still empty. But to his surprise, Nel found Fermin seated on a bench with Nel's
bag and wallet beside him and appeared to be texting using his smart phone. Nel took a golf
club near him and hit Fermin with it. Fermin shouted for help, but Nel kept hitting him until
he stopped making noise. The noise alerted the neighbor who called the police. Nel, Ben, Ardo
and Gorio were caught. Fermin died. What is the criminal liability of Nel, Ben, Ardo and Gorio?
Explain. (5%)
Answer: Nel, Ben, Ardo and Gorio are criminally liable as principals for the crime of
theft. They conspired to take Elgar’s personal properties without his knowledge, with intent
to gain, and without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things (Article
308, RPC). Nel and Ben entered the house through an unlocked back door and took the
valuables from the rooms that were likewise left unlocked. Nel and Ben or liable as principals
by direct participation, while Ardo and Gorio are principals by indispensable cooperation
because they have concurred in the criminal resolution and cooperated by performing another
act look out and driver of a getaway car, respectively, which were indispensable for the
commission of the crime (Article 17, RPC). Nel, however, is also liable for the separate crime
of homicide for the death of Fermin. The killing of Fermin was a separate act and was not
necessary means for committing theft (Article 48, RPC), because the latter crime was already
consummated. Nel killed Fermin for a different reason, perhaps because of his anger that
Fermin was in possession of his bag and wallet, and appeared to be using his smartphone to
contact the police.

PROBLEM: Mr. Red was drinking with his buddies, Mr. White and Mr. Blue when he saw Mr.
Green with his former girlfriend, Ms. Yellow. Already drunk, Mr. Red declared in a loud voice
that if he could not have Ms. Yellow, no one can. He then proceeded to the men’s room but
told Mr. White and Mr. Blue to take care of Mr. Green. Mr. Blue and Mr. White asked Mr. Red
what he meant but Mr. Red simply said, "You already know what I want," and then left. Mr.
Blue and Mr. White proceeded to kill Mr. Green and hurt Ms. Yellow. (4%)
(A) What, if any, are the respective liabilities of Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr. Blue for the death
of Mr. Green?
(A) Mr. White and Mr. Blue are liable for the death of Mr. Green as principals by direct
participation. They were the ones who directly took part in the killing of the victim. Mr.
Red is not liable as a principal by inducement because his statement that Mr. White
and Mr. Blue were “to take care of Mr. Green” was not made directly with the intent of
procuring the commission of the crime. The words he uttered to Mr. White and Mr.
Blue: “You already know what I want,” may not be considered as powerful and
threatening so as to amount to physical or moral coercion. Likewise, there is no
showing that Mr. Red exercised moral ascendency or influence over them.
(B) What, if any, are the respective liabilities of Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr. Blue for the
injuries of Ms. Yellow?
(B) Mr. White and Mr. Blue are liable as principals by direct participation for the crime
of physical injuries for hurting Ms. Yellow. Their liability would depend on the extent
of the physical injuries inflicted – either serious, less serious, or slight physical injuries.
Mr. Red has no criminal liability because he did not participate in the act of hurting Ms.
Yellow.
People v. Gambao, October 1, 2013: As reflected in the records, the prosecution was not
able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as a principal. Seeing that the only
evidence the prosecution had was the testimony of Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998
Perpenian entered the room where the victim was detained and conversed with Evad and
Ronas regarding stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court opines that Perpenian should
not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an accomplice to the crime. A rational
person would have suspected something was wrong and would have reported such incident
to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to that, she even spent
the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present and giving moral support
when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime
committed.It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s presence and company were not
indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is
only liable as an accomplice.
People v. Bayabos, February 18, 2015: [Indoctrination and Orientation Period for PMMA
students, where Balidoy died. The school authorities was charged as accomplices, the case of
the principals was dismissed, thus authorities argue that the case against accomplice should
also be dismissed]. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to
hazing can proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal
accused. “The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are
distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in
evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently of that of the principal.” Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime
can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal
liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged principal.

ACCESSORIES
Who are Accessories? – Article 19, RPC

Requisites
Crime Already Consummated

Knowledge of the Crime Committed
Crime Should Not be a Light Felony
Instances when the Accessory Not Criminally Liable
By Profiting or Assisting Offender to Profit from Effects of the Crime

Must Receive the Property from the Principal
Accessory in a Crime Liable as Principal in Another Crime
Fencing (PD 1612)

What is fencing?
Elements of Fencing
Accessory vs. Fencing

1. Extent of Knowledge (must know / should know)
2. Penalty (accessory / principal)
3. Presence of Criminal Intent (mala in se / mala prohibita)
4. Kind of Person (natural persons only / may include juridical persons)
No Double Jeopardy in Being Held Liable in Article 19, RPC, and PD 1612
A Crime of Moral Turpitude
Presumption of Fencing
o Tan v. People, 313 SCRA 254: [Missing spare pants and employee admitted
selling things to Tan, Tan was prosecuted for fencing, but employee who stole
was not charged, but did not report robbery nor thievery in the establishment].
Since there was no proof of unlawful taking as owner did not report the robbery
or theft, thus the first element of fencing is absent. Tan cannot be charged.
o Mel Dimat v. People, January 25, 2012: [Should know] Dimat knew that
the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said that
Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But
this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped,
Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good
on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that
the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia
Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her
purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since
she did not stand accused in the case.
By Concealing or Destroying the Body of the Crime or Effects or Instruments
Body of the Crime – Corpus Delicti

➢ Definition
Elements of Corpus Delicti
Corpus Delicti in Homicide or Murder – Is the Corpse Necessary?

• People v. Valdez [victim jumped out of the vessel due to threat and drowned and
the body was never recovered.] The body of the crime refers to the scolding made by
Valdez; the chasing with the knife, the jumping into the water within the full view of
other laborers. If the witnesses where hid to prevent discovery, whoever brought them
to the far place is an accessory for concealing the corpus delicti.
In Relation to PD 1829 on Obstruction of Justice [Charged as Principal]

• Padiernos v. People, August 17, 2015: Under [Article 19] the punished acts should
have been committed for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime. In this
case, the crime – the illegal possession of lumber – had already been discovered at
the time accused took the truck, the accused took the truck after its confiscation. Thus,
they are no accessories to the crime under PD 705. But are liable under PD 1829 for
obstruction of justice. P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which
obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders. The factual allegations in the Information clearly
charge the accused of taking and carrying away the truck so that it could not be used
as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as
a tool or instrument of the crime. Specifically, the petitioners intentionally suppressed
the truck as evidence, with the intent to impair its availability and prevent its use as
evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding for violation of P.D. 705.
PROBLEM: Modesto and Abelardo are brothers. Sometime in August 1998 while Abelardo was
in his office, Modesto, together with two other men in police uniform, came with two heavy
bags. Modesto asked Abelardo to keep the two bags in his vault until he comes back to get
them. When Abelardo later examined the two bags, he saw bundles of money that, in his
rough count, could not be less than P5 Million. He kept the money inside the vault and soon
he heard the news that a gang that included Modesto had been engaged in bank robberies.
Abelardo, unsure of what to do under the circumstances, kept quiet about the two bags in his
vault. Soon after, the police captured, and secured a confession from, Modesto who admitted
that their loot had been deposited with Abelardo. What is Abelardo’s liability? (7%)
Answer: Abelardo is not criminally liable. He is not liable as an accessory because he

has no knowledge of the commission of the crime of robbery. Knowledge under the law is not
the same as suspicion. Mere presumption will not suffice. Moreover, granting for the sake of
argument that his act would amount to that of an accessory, he is exempted from criminal
liability being the brother of Modesto. He is also not liable as a fence under PD 1612, the Anti
Fencing Law. The element of intent to gain is absent. Abelardo kept quiet about the two (2)
bags of money in the vault because he was unsure of what to do under the circumstances.
By Harboring, Concealing or Assisting in the Escape of the Principal
1. Accessory Acts with Abuse of Public Functions
Any Kind of Crime Except Light Felony
2. Principal is Guilty of Treason, Parricide, Murder or Attempt Against the Life of Chief
Executive or Habitually Guilty of Some Other Crime
Limited Kind of Crimes

Accessory who Harbors Principal Committing Crimes Not Enumerated
➢ Guilty as Principal under PD 1829 or Obstruction of Justice

PROBLEM: Immediately after murdering Bob, Jake went to his mother to seek refuge. His
mother told him to hide in the maid’s quarters until she finds a better place for him to hide.
After two days, Jake transferred to his aunt’s house. A week later, Jake was apprehended by
the police. Can Jake’s mother and aunt be made criminally liable as accessories to the crime
of murder? Explain.
Answer: Obviously, Jake’s mother was aware of her son’s having committed a felony,
such that her act of harboring and concealing him renders her liable as an accessory. But
being an ascendant to Jake, she is exempt from criminal liability by express provision of Article
20 of the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the criminal liability of Jake’s aunt depends
on her knowledge of his commission of the felony, her act of harboring and concealing Jake
would render her criminally liable as accessory to the crime of murder; otherwise without
knowledge of Jake’s commission of the felony, she would not be liable.
PROBLEM: Manolo revealed to his friend Domeng his desire to kill Cece. He likewise confided
to Domeng his desire to borrow his revolver. Domeng lent it. Manolo shot Cece in Manila with
Domeng's revolver. As his gun was used in the killing, Domeng asked Mayor Tan to help him
escape. The mayor gave Domeng P5,000.00 and told him to proceed to Mindanao to hide.
Domeng went to Mindanao. The mayor was later charged as an accessory to Cece's murder.
Can he be held liable for the charge? Explain.
If Domeng is not the principal to the crime of murder, the Mayor may not be held liable as
accessory since he merely assisted in the escape of an accomplice. Par. 3 of Art. 19, RPC
speaks of harboring or assisting in the escape of a principal. The mayor, however, can be held
liable as principal in the crime of maliciously refraining from instituting or prosecuting an
offender under Art. 208 of the RPC. He may also be held liable for obstruction of justice under
PD 1829. PD 1829 makes no qualification as to the offender, whether he be principal,
accomplice, or accessory.
Accessories Who Are Exempt From Criminal Liability – Article 20, RPC
Basis
Relationships Covered
➢ Nephews and Nieces Not Included
➢ Uncles and Aunts Not Included
Exception to the Exemption: Profit or Assisted Principal to Profit
• Intestate Estate of Carungcong v. People, February 11, 2010: [Accused had

defrauded mother in law, but accused’s wife predeceased the mother-in-law, is the
exemption still applicable?] The relationship by affinity created between AAA and the
blood relatives of his wife is dissolved by the death of his wife and the absolutory cause
of relationship by affinity is therefore no longer available to the accused.

PENALTIES
Penalty, Defined
Purpose of Punishment
Theories Justifying Penalty (Justice, Exemplarity, Reformation, Prevention, Self-Defense)
Three-Fold Purpose of Penalties in the RPC (Retribution, Correction and Social Defense)
Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws (Article 22, RPC)

General Rule on Penal Laws
Exception: When it is favorable to the accused
RA 9344
RA 9344: Is without discernment equivalent to lack of premeditation?
Cortezano v. Cortezano, September 23, 2003: The discernment that constitutes
an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of
age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known
and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
afforded by he records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission
of the act, but also after and even during trial. [Rape was attended by discernment as
they wetted the vagina, one was a look out, there was threat to kill among others.]
Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Minor Found Guilty of Heinous Crime

1. Yes, suspension is applicable regardless of the crime.
People v. Sarcia, September 10, 2009: The above-quoted provision makes no
distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with
the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 (in Declarador v. Judge Gubaton, 2006). and A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC.48 The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the
benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if,
among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344,
the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not
distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and
another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not
distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in
conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
2. But suspension only lasts until 21 years of age

People v. Jacinto, March 16, 2011: These developments notwithstanding, we
find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant.
The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches
the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. Unfortunately, appellant is now
twenty-five (25) years old. Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative
intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law
should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21)
years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The
offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and
reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance
to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community.

The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. Thus, appellant may
be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with
Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344 [Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural
Camps and Other Training Facilities].
People v. AAA, February 25, 2015: [Post graduation drinking spree rape]
However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A.
No. 9344, which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-
one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child. Hence,
in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision
should be taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in
conflict with the law, who have already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age,
the proper treatment envisioned by law.
Procedural Can be Given Retroactive Application

• People v. Gano, February 28, 2001: Be it procedural, substantive, or remedial for
as long as the law is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, the law
must be given retroactive application. [Requirement of Allegation of Circumstances in
the Information under 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.]
Exception to the Beneficial Retroactivity (Habitual Delinquency, Express Inapplicability)
Benefit May Apply to Recidivist
Effect of Pardon by Offended Party (Article 23, RPC)
➢ General Rule: Only civil liability extinguished not criminal liability

➢ Exception: Article 344(3), abduction, seduction, acts of lasciviousness, adultery and of
concubinage (Crimes cannot be prosecuted de oficio).
➢ It is only a bar to criminal prosecution. When must pardon be given? Before institution
of action? (People v. Lim)
Classification of Penalties (Article 25, RPC)

1. Principal Penalties
a. Capital Punishment: Death
b. Afflictive Penalties: PM, PAD, PSD, TAD, TSD, RT, RP
c. Correctional Penalties D, S, AM, PC
d. Light Penalties: Am, Pc
e. Fine and Bond to Keep the Peace (for [b] [c] [d])
2. Accessory Penalties
a. PAD, PSD, TAD, TSD
b. Suspension from public office, right to vote and be voted, profession or calling
c. Civil interdiction
d. Indemnification
e. Forfeiture or confiscation
f. Payment of cost
Factors in Determining Property Penalty

1. Determine the crime committed
2. Stage of execution and degree of participation
3. Determine the penalty
4. Consider the modifying circumstances
5. Determine whether the ISL is applicable or not

Penalties that May be Served Simultaneously

1. Imprisonment and destierro
2. Perpetual absolute disqualification (PAD), perpetual special disqualification (PSD),
Temporary absolute disqualification (TAD), temporary special disqualification (TSD),
suspension from public office, right to vote and be vote for and to follow of profession
or calling and fine
3. Principal and accessory penalties
Life Imprisonment and Reclusion Perpetua

1. Different Concepts
2. Presence of Accessory Penalties
3. Law Imposing Penalty
4. Duration
Duration of Penalties (Article 27, RPC)
___________Duration Prescription of Crime Prescription of Penalty

Death - - -
RP 20y1d – 40y 20y 20y

RT 12y1d – 20y 20y 15y
PAD,PSD 6y1d – 12y 15y 15y
TAD,TSD 6y1d – 12y 15y 15y
PM 6y1d – 12y 15y 15y
PC 6m1d – 6y 10y 10y

S 6m1d – 6y 10y 10y
D 6m1d – 6y 10y 10y
AM 1m1d – 6m 5y 5y
Am 1d-30d 2m 1y
Pc - 2m 1y
Reclusion Perpetua, Still an Indivisible Penalty (People v. Lucas, 1995)

• People v. Villanueva: The penalty shall be imposed regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime.
Death Penalty
When Not Imposable: [1] minor at the commission of the crime; [2] more than 70 years of
age; [3] automatic review by SC majority is not obtained; [4] insanity before execution; [5]
a woman while pregnant and 1 year after delivery.
• RA 9346 prohibits imposition of death penalty.
Preventive Imprisonment (Article 29)

Purpose of preventive imprisonment
When not bailable ([1] RP or Death; and [2] Evidence of guilt is strong)
Correlation of Article 24 with Article 29 (Deductible from Term of Offense)

1. Effect of signing undertaking on rules and regulation as convict = full credit
Unless: [1] recidivists or convicted twice or more times of any crime
[2] failure to voluntarily surrender upon summon of execution of sentence
2. Effect of not signing subject to rules on detention prisoners = 4/5 or 80% credit
3. If under destierro, release after 30 days of preventive imprisonment

Deduction from Destierro (People v. Bastasa, 1979)

If Penalty is Reclusion Perpetua2
• People v. Corpuz, March 1994: Article 29 does not make any distinction between
temporal and perpetual penalties. Moreso, since reclusion perpetua now has a fixed
period although still indivisible. [Deducted from 30 years]
Effects: Preventive Imprisonment Equal to or More than Possible Maximum Imprisonment

➢ Release without prejudice to the continuation of the trial
➢ Absence in any stage of trial, court may order rearrest of the accused
Penalty Imposed is Less Than the Full Time or 4/5 Imprisonment
➢ Released immediately
Credit Cannot be Given if the Court Imposes Fine Only
Amendments by RA 10592
1. Article 29 on Preventive Imprisonment
2. Article 94 now allows good conduct time allowances in preventive imprisonment
3. Article 97 (GCTA) which reduces the actual time the prisoner serves system and it
automatically accrues when person exemplifies good conduct, studying and it now
includes detention prisoners.
Preventive Imprisonment and GCTA to Special Laws (e.g. RA 9165)

➢ RA 9165 states that there is a limited applicability of RPC to RA 9165, Section 98.
Who Grants GCTA (Article 99). Once granted they cannot be revoked.
4. Article 98 (Special Time Allowance for Loyalty). – 1/5 period deduction if prisoner gives
himself up within 48 hours from passing away of the calamity; and 2/5 if he chose to
stay, The article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive
imprisonment of service of sentence.
Fine (Article 26)

Single or Alternative
Afflictive (over P1.2M); Correctional (P40,000 to 1.2M); and Light (less than P40,000)
Fine is Exactly P40,000 (Light felony but correctional fine, how treated)
Considerations in Imposing Fine
Imposition of Fine “Jointly and Severally” is Not Proper
May Not Validly Impose Alternative Penalty of “Imprisonment or Fine”
Civil Interdiction (Article 34, RPC)

Article 38, Civil Code
Accessory Penalty in RT, RP, and Death
Effects: [1] parental authority; [2] guardianship [3] marital authority; [4] manage property
and [5] disposition or conveyance of property inter vivos
➢ Cannot appoint an agent to manage property
➢ Can execute wills (donations mortis causa)
Effects of Pardon (Article 36, RPC)

Does Not Restore Right to Public Office or Suffrage Unless Expressly Stated
Pardon Does Not Excuse Civil Indemnity
Limitations [1] after conviction by final judgment; [2] not extend to impeachment
Pardon by Offended Party vs. Pardon by Chief Executive
1. Crimes (Crimes Against Chastity and Rape | Any Crime)
2. Benefit to Criminals (All Except Adultery and Concubinage | Only one or All)
3. Condition (Not Subject to Condition | May be Conditional)

General Rule: Pardon in General Does not include Accessory Penalties

Exception: [1] If pardon is after term of conviction unless LI after 30 years PAD subsists
[2] President precisely restore rights (pardoning a mayor-elect after election)
Pardon must be Accept, If Cancelled before Acceptance – No effect
Kinds of Pardon
1. Conditional Pardon (effect of violation: Crime = evasion of service of sentence)
2. Absolute pardon
Accessory Penalties (Article 40-44, RPC)

Inherent Even if Not Expressly Stated in Conviction
Continuously Suffered Even if Principal Penalty has been Pardoned
➢ Unless expressly remitted in the pardon
Death: PAD, Civil Interdiction 30 years from sentence

RP/RT PAD, Civil Interdiction for Life (RP) or During Sentence (RT)
PM TAD, PSD from Suffrage
PC Suspension: Public Office, Profession, PSD from Suffrage if exceed 18m
AM/Am Suspension: Office, Suffrage During Sentence
Destierro No accessory penalty
Effects of Penalties (Article 30-33, RPC)

Perpetual or Temporary Absolute Disqualification (4)
➢ Perpetual vs. Temporary Disqualification
➢ Exceptions: [1] deprivation of office or employment; [2] retirement pay and pension
Perpetual or Temporary Special Disqualification
Perpetual or Temporary Special Disqualification for Suffrage (cannot vote or be voted, hold)
Suspension from Public Office, Profession or Calling or Right of Suffrage
Nature of Disqualification
• People v. Coral, January 31, 1936: The presumption is that one rendered infamous
by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to
exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason
be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment,
the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right.
Office of the President v. Cataquiz, September 14, 2011: Based on the foregoing, it
is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment in public service
and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can still be imposed on the respondent,
notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the principal penalty of dismissal because of his
removal from office. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions – that of separation
from service – may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which
may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against
her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Bond to Keep the Peace (Article 35)

Duties of a Person to Give Bond to Keep the Peace
Bond to Keep the Peace vs. Bail Bond
Bond to Keep the Peace vs. Bond for Good Behavior under Article 284
1. Effect of Failure to Post Bond (Imprisonment of 30d or 6m | Only Destierro)
2. Particularity (Not particular | Grave threats and light threats only)

Confiscation and Forfeiture (Article 45)

General Rule as to Proceeds of the Crime and instrument or Tools
In Case it Belongs to Third Person Not Liable to the Offense
➢ Unless Not Subject to Lawful Commerce
Third Person Recovery in Relation to RA 9165, Section 20

• PDEA v. Brodett, September 28, 2011: [Brodett filed a Motion to Return Non-Drug
Evidence which is a car belonging to Myra who was not charged of the crime] The
status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) for
the duration of the trial in the RTC as being in custodia legis is primarily intended to
preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as such. To release it before the
judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as
evidence. Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was
not enough, for mere photographs might not fill in fully the evidentiary need of the
Prosecution. Indeed, forfeiture, if warranted pursuant to either Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the penalty
to be prescribed. The determination of whether or not the car (or any other article
confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could be made
only when the judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings.
Subsidiary Penalty (Article 39)

Substitute penalty for fine only
When served
Must be expressly stated by the court
One Day for Each Amount Equivalent to the Highest Minimum Wage Rate
➢ Prevailing at the time of the rendition of judgment
Proper Only If Accused Has No Property
➢ This is not a choice of the convict.
It Must be Expressly Imposed by the Court

➢ Not an accessory penalty and it is a principal penalty
Formula: Subsidiary Civil Liability / Highest Minimum Wage at Time of Conviction = Number
Days of Subsidiary Imprisonment
Rules as to Applicability
PC, AM, Am and Fine: Not exceeding 1/3 term of sentence and not more than 1 year
Fine only: Not exceeding 6 months for grave/less grave felony; not exceeding 15 days if light
PM above: No subsidiary liability
Not by Confinement with Fixed Duration (Destierro): Same penalty and same rules
Improvement of financial conditions: Payment of fine
Yolanda Luy v. People, October 12, 2016: If the penalty imposed is higher than
prision correccional thus subsidiary liability is not imposable. [Here, 12 years and 1 day and
to pay P300,000 fine, already, reclusion temporal.]
People Thru Britchford v. Alapan, January 10, 2018: [BP 22, MTC imposed fine
instead of imprisonment and acquitted the wife. Writ of execution was unsatisfied. Britchford
file a Motion to Impose Subsidiary Penalty] The penalty of fine and the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof pertain to the criminal aspect of the case. On
the other hand, the indemnification for the face value of the dishonored checks refers to the
civil aspect of the case. Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly
stated in the judgment of conviction. The facts show that there is no judgment sentencing

the accused to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvent to pay the fine imposed
upon him, because the said subsidiary imprisonment is not stated in the judgment finding
him guilty, it is clear that the court could not legally compel him to serve said subsidiary
imprisonment. A contrary holding would be a violation of the laws aforementioned.
When No Subsidiary Penalty

1. Penalty imposed is higher than PC (e.g. PM, RT, RP)
2. Failure to damages and pay costs of proceedings
3. Penalty without Confinement But No Fixed Duration (e.g. Public Censure)
4. When Subsidiary Imprisonment is Not Stated in the Decision
Accessory vs. Subsidiary Penalty
Death Penalty, When Not Imposed (Article 47)

[1] below 18 years of age at commission; [2] more than 70 years; [3] Upon automatic review
to the SC the vote of eight members is not obtained, [4] while pregnant and a year after her
delivery; [5] who becomes insane.
When Death Penalty Suspended or Commuted

RA 7659, December 31, 1993: “Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence.
– The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one
(1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the
death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided in Article 40.
***
COMPLEX CRIMES
Different Kinds of Crimes:

1. Simple Crimes
2. Plurality of Crimes
3. Special Complex Crimes (e.g. Rape with Homicide, Robbery with Homicide)
4. Complex Crimes
Types of Plurality of Crimes:

1. Real or material plurality: distinct criminal impulses = many crimes as many acts
2. Ideal plurality: single criminal impulse, series of acts = continuing crime
Two Kinds of Plurality of Crimes

1. Compound Crime (Delito compuesto) = 1 act, 2 or more grave or less grave felonies
2. Complex Crime Proper (Delito complejo) = Offense as necessary means of another
1. Compound Crime (Delito Compuesto)

Requisites
Both or All the Offenses Must be Punished Under the RPC

➢ No complex crime of Estafa with violation of BP 22
Single Act Must Constitute Two Grave or Less Grave Felonies

➢ Or 2 grave felonies or 2 less grave felonies
Light Felony Cannot be Complexed with a Grave or Less Grave Felony

Less Grave and Light Felony [1] absorbed by less grave (e.g. direct assault and slight physical
injuries) or [2] prosecuted separately
2. Complex Crime Proper (Delito Complejo)

One Offense is a Necessary Means for Committing Another Offense
If Indispensable for Other Crime – Doctrine of Absorption = Second Crime is the Offense
• People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515: [Rebellion with Murder] Murder, arson, and
robbery are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion, as a means necessary for the
perpetration of the offense. Such common offenses are absorbed or inherent in the
crime of rebellion. But if a rebel who for some persona motive commits murder is liable
for murder or other common offenses.
If Concealment for Other Crime – No Complex Crime
If by Direct Means to Commit the Other Crime

➢ Trespass to dwelling was committed in order to kill victim. The crime is murder is for
the aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling.
Condition Precedent for Sentencing Complex Crime

• People v. De Vera, June 1999: It is a condition precedent that there is one
information charging a complex felony. Although a single act resulted to two deaths,
one murder and one homicide, giving a rise to a complex crime under Article 48 of the
RPC, the accused cannot be validly sentenced for a complex crime with one penalty
where two separate informations were filed for said killings. This is true even though
a joint trial of the two criminal cases were held and consolidated. Accordingly, the
accused should be meted a separate penalty for each of the crime charged.
Penalty for Complex Crime (Article 48)

➢ Most serious crime in its maximum period; beneficial to the accused
➢ Basis: Singularity of the act
Other plurality of Crimes

1. Composite Crimes or special complex crimes
2. Continued Crime or delito continuado
3. Continuing crimes or transitory crimes
Composite Crimes
Definition (The law treats as single crime)
Ordinary Complex Crimes vs. Special Complex Crime
1. Number of crimes and acts
2. Penalty imposable
Continued Crime
Definition (Series of acts in same time and same place for same offense)
Reason: single criminal impulse
Single Larceny Doctrine

➢ In theft or robbery, the taking of property from different persons by a series of acts
arising from a single criminal intent constitutes only one crime.
• Santiago v. Garchitorena 228 SCRA 214: Charge against Defensor Santiago upon
signing 32 release orders of overstaying aliens on belief that detention is without legal
basis (alleged violation of RA 3019).

Exception to the Single Larceny Doctrine: Use of Submachine Gun

➢ People v. Sanchez, August 29, 1999: It is not the act of pressing the trigger which
should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets actually produced them.
Hence, where the accused pressed the trigger of the submachine gun and the gun fired
continually and several persons were killed and injured, there are as many crimes as
are persons killed or injured.
Complex Crime vs. Continued Crime

1. Governing Articles and Penalty
2. Number of Acts Performed
3. If there are two acts
Continuing Crime
Define (elements committed in different localities)
Not a Complex Crime
Illustrative Cases in Complex Crimes
No Complex Crime of Arson with Multiple Murder
People v. Reynaldo Abayon, September 14, 2016: [The house (containing the
units where Abayon and his neighbors live) started to catch fire. As a result, the house was
completely burned down along with the personal effects of the residents. Three (3) persons
also died because of the fire. Charged with Arson with Multiple Murder. Is there a complex
crime of arson with multiple homicide?] There is no complex crime of arson with homicide
because the crime of arson absorbs the resultant death or is a separate crime altogether.
Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what
crime/crimes was/were perpetrated - whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder,
it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is
the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson,
the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand,
the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire
is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only;
lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has
already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two
separate and distinct crimes committed — homicide/murder and arson.
From the body of the information filed, Abayon is charged with the crime of arson because
his intent was merely to destroy his family's apartment through the use of fire. The resulting
deaths that occurred, therefore, should be absorbed by the crime of arson and only increases
the imposable penalty to reclusion perpetua to death, pursuant to Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613.
Attempted Kidnapping with Murder
People v. Villanueva, Norada and Seva, December 13, 2017: [Regie tied by trio
hoping for Rey Truck for intimate partner, but Regie woke up and was hit in the head and was
later dumped in a sugar field. RTC – Attempted Kidnapping with Murder] The essence of the
crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with the intent of
the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. There was lack of
motive to resort in kidnapping the victim for they were bent to kidnap his friend Truck.

The fact alone of waiting for the victim to fall asleep and then and there tying his hands and
feet, based on Norada's account, was not determinant of intent to actually detain the victim
or deprive his liberty. As such, the trial court was indulging in speculation when it held that
the victim "will either be taken away or simply be kept in the hotel and thereafter ransom will
be demanded from the Canadian Ray Truck for his release." Courts should not indulge in
speculation no matter how strong the guilt of the accused. Hence since the offense of
kidnapping was not sufficiently established, the trial court erred in holding appellant liable for
attempted kidnapping. [Victim voluntarily went with the trio.]
“Double Murder and Multiple Attempted Murder”
People v. Jugueta, April 5, 2016: [Charged in one information for Double Murder
for the death of two minors and another information for Multiple Attempted Murder for three
other minors. In one criminal information, the judge sentenced the accused for two Reclusion
Perpetua despite the fact that only one information. For the other information, accused was
sentenced to PC-PM for each of the offended parties despite one information. Whether or not
the accused was properly charged in the Information.] However, the Court must make a
clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the crimes for which
appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the terms
"Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing
penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2)
separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.
The facts, as alleged in the Information, and as proven during trial, show that appellant is
guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims
was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same
vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple
Attempted Murder.
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two
others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their
respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several
gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows
their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What
appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held
"each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each
particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot
give rise to a complex crime."
Applicability of Article 48 to Article 365 (Criminal Negligence)
Jason Ivler v. Judge Modesto-San Pedro, November 17, 2010: [Ivler was
charged for (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Slight Physical Injuries and another (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide and Damage to Property resulting from vehicular
collision. Ivler pleaded guilty to the first information and was sentenced to public censure.
Ivler sought to quash information for second information would place him in double jeopardy.]
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses. Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. A becoming regard of this Court's place in our scheme of government
denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction
between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent
to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365.

It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two
or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for
committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor
General's argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not
be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that
the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with
the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies.
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges

under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant
occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention
that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use. Hence, we hold that
prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number
or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply
the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall
be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the
same first level court. [Thus, what should have been filed is a single information is Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Slight Physical Injuries and Damage to Property.]
Successive Penile Insertions in Rape Cases
People v. Aaron, September 24, 2002: [Accused inserted his penis to the vagina
but withdrew, ordered victim to lie down. For second time, he inserted. He stood again, he
commanded victim to move and for the third time inserted and made pumping motions. How
many charges of rape should you file against him?] Only one count of rape, despite the three
successive insertions, and he was motivated by a single criminal intent. There is no indication
in the records, from which it can be inferred that the appellant decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change positions
inside the room where the crime was committed.
People v. Lucena, February 26, 2014: [Victim was arrested by accused of violating
curfew on minors. Accused brought victim to a grassy area, ordered AAA to undress on the
point of a gun and inserted his penis on the vagina despite plea not to rape her. After a short
while, about five minutes, once again inserted penis. Thereafter he stopped, he inserted again
his penis, he finally stopped and ordered AAA to dress up with threat of killing her. Charged
with three (3) counts for the three insertions] The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be
convicted of three counts of rape. The intervening period of five (5) minutes between each
penetration does not necessarily prove that he decided to commit three separate acts of rape.
He maintains that what is of prime importance is that he was motivated by a single criminal
intent. Court: It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his
penis into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other
at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust
upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it
can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single
impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of
rape is indubitable. This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the
three insertions into AAA were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality.
Therefore, the appellant’s conviction for three counts of rape is proper.

When No Complex Crime: [1] continuing crimes; [2] in concealment; [3] indispensable; [4]
one of the offenses is penalized under special law; [5] special complex crimes; and [6] the
law provides for a two-tiered penalty.
Two-tiered Penalty
➢ Definition – “in addition”
➢ Maltreatment of Prisoners; Direct Bribery; Usurpation of real rights
One Offense Not Proven, May be Convicted of Other Offense

➢ Robbery with Homicide but during trial only Homicide was proved
ISL is Applicable in Complex Crime

➢ In fixing maximum penalty shall be applied despite of mitigating circumstances.
***
SERVICE OF SENTENCE
Rules as to Service of Sentence (Article 70)

1. Service of penalties simultaneously if nature of penalty permits
o PA/SD, TA/SD, Suspension, Destierro, Public Censure, Fine, etc.
o (E.g. imprisonment and fine)
2. If not, service of penalties successively in the order of severity
Order of Severity
Death – RP – RT – PM – PC – AM -Am – D – S – PAD – TAD – S - Pc
Note: AM is more severe than Destierro
Three-Fold Rule
➢ Not more than 3 times the length of time of most severe penalty
➢ Applies Only if Convict to Suffer At Least 4 Penalties
➢ Not applicable if simultaneously served
Maximum Duration of Sentence

1. Three (3) times the most severe penalty
2. Not exceeding 40 years
3. Subsidiary imprisonment included
Even Perpetual Penalties Taken into Account

Applies to the Penalty Imposed by the Court not that Prescribed
The Court is Not at Liberty to Apply the Three-Fold Rule – Prison Authorities
How Penalty Executed (Article 78)

➢ By virtue of final judgment
Effects of Insanity (Article 79)

1. During commission of the crime – exempt from criminal liability
2. During trial – suspension of proceedings
3. After final sentence is pronounced – suspended personal liability not pecuniary liability
4. Recovery of reason – sentence executed except if penalty has prescribed
***

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CRIMINAL LAW I

Fundamentals of Criminal Law

Criminal Law, Defined

Criminal Law from Criminal Procedure

Nullum Crimen Nulla Poena Sine Lege

Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita

Not All Offenses under Special Laws are Mala Prohibita

Use of RPC Penalties does not make crime Mala in Se

Not all Offenses under Revised Penal Code are Mala in Se

CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS

Construed Against the Government

When Law is Clear and Unambiguous

When Law is Ambiguous

Reginald Matt Santiago | Ateneo de Davao College of Law 2

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW

Generality, Territoriality and Prospectivity

Generality Principle: Who are subject to criminal laws?

Doctrine of State Immunity

Ambassadors, Diplomatic Staff and Charges D’affaires

New Civil Code, Article 14

Territoriality Principle: Where does criminal law apply?

General Rule: Intra-Territorial

Rule on Merchant Vessels; French Rule vs. English Rule

Reginald Matt Santiago | Ateneo de Davao College of Law 3

2. Extramarital Affair Committed Abroad Still Covered under Psychological Violence

General Rule: Prospectivity, - Article 21, RPC

Exception: Retroactive Application if Beneficial - Article 22, RPC

When Beneficial Retroactive Application Not applicable

Reginald Matt Santiago | Ateneo de Davao College of Law 4

REPEAL AND AMENDMENT OF PENAL LAWS

New Law makes Penalty Lighter

New Law imposes Heavier Penalty

Repeal of an Existing Law Obliterating the Crime

Absolute Repeal of a Penal Law

• Taken from Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, September 4, 2001: Despite repeal of

Implied Repeal or Repeals by Re-enactment

Revival of Repealed Laws

LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO ENACT PENAL LAWS

Limitations on Enactment of Penal Laws

Administrative Decisions Not Binding

Doctrine of In Dubio Pro Reo

Reginald Matt Santiago | Ateneo de Davao College of Law 5

Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment – Article 5, RPC

Felonies, Defined – Article 3, RPC

2. Culpable Felonies (culpa)

Criminal Intent, Defined

When Motive is Material

[2] When Identity of the Accused is Doubtful

Reginald Matt Santiago | Ateneo de Davao College of Law 6

Mistake of Fact does Not Apply to Culpable Felonies

Intent to Kill Negates the Defense of Mistake of Fact

Circumstances of the Killing Negate Mistake of Fact

Reginald Matt Santiago | Ateneo de Davao College of Law 7

ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Components of Article 4, RPC:

1. EXTRAORDINARY MANNER OF INCURRING CRIMINAL LIABILITY’

• US v. Marasigan, 27 Phil. 504: Refusal to submit to medical treatment and the

➢ Two Offenses: [1] That intended; [2] That actually committed

Reginald Matt Santiago | Ateneo de Davao College of Law 8

STAGES IN THE EXECUTION OF A FELONY

Stages in the Execution – Article 6, RPC

When Would is Fatal or Not Fatal