Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT ................................................................................................................................. 2
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 4
II. Plaintiffs Lack Standing As To Their Claim (Count Two) That The ACA Constrains
Missouri’s Choices Of Health Insurance To Be Offered Its Constitutional Officers,
And The ACA Does Not Do So In Any Event ................................................................... 5
III. Plaintiffs Lack Standing As To Their Claim (Count Three) That Section 1302 Of The
ACA Imposes An Unconstitutional Tax On Missouri, And The Claim Is Unripe In Any
Event ................................................................................................................................... 7
IV. Plaintiffs Lack Standing To Assert Count Four, Which Speculates That The State Of
Missouri Might In The Future Violate Its Constitution ...................................................... 9
VI. Count Seven, Which Challenges A Repealed Section Of The ACA, Should Be
Dismissed .......................................................................................................................... 12
VII. Count Eight, Which Challenges Panels Authorized To Make Recommendations, Should
Be Dismissed .................................................................................................................... 14
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 15
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954) .............................................................................................................. 13
Florida ex rel McCollum v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Services,
716 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (N.D. Fla. 2010) ................................................................................... 4
Motor Vehicles Mfgs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983) ............................................................................................................... 12
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§ 1513 ........................................................................................................................... 6, 11
§ 1513(a) ............................................................................................................................. 6
§ 1513(b) ............................................................................................................................. 6
§ 1513(d) ............................................................................................................................. 5
§ 1003 .................................................................................................................................. 6
§ 1102 ................................................................................................................................ 13
§ 1102(b) ........................................................................................................................... 13
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INTRODUCTION
Counts One and Two challenge ACA provisions that are alleged to violate the sovereign-
ty interests of the State of Missouri. None of the plaintiffs is the State of Missouri (see Amended
Complaint (“Am. Comp.”) at page 2), and none has standing to assert any claims Missouri might
have against these provisions. See Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
Plaintiffs similarly lack standing to assert Counts Three and Four, both of which argue that the
ACA will impose expenses on Missouri and that, as taxpayers, plaintiffs share in that alleged
In counts Five, Six, and Nine plaintiff Samantha Hill alleges that the minimum coverage
provision of the ACA will, beginning in 2014, require her to buy more health insurance than the
catastrophic coverage insurance she has and desires to retain. However, Hill admits that she is
only 21 years old, Am. Comp. ¶ 18, and section 1302(e) of the ACA expressly provides that a
catastrophic coverage policy can satisfy the minimum coverage requirement for anyone under
30.
In Count Seven, plaintiffs Dale Morris, Robert Osborn, and Geraldine Osborn challenge
the ACA because (they argue) it extends special treatment with respect to Medicare Advantage
1
The ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, was amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (“HCERA”).
Unless otherwise stated, all citations in this memorandum to the ACA are to that Act as amended
by the HCERA.
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In Count Eight, plaintiffs challenge the ACA because (they argue) it establishes panels
that will prohibit them from receiving medical treatment that they and their physicians decide
upon unless the panels agree. Here too, the ACA does no such thing, and plaintiffs have
The defects in plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the ACA should not be overlooked merely
DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342. The plaintiffs here have not carried that burden.
STATEMENT
Plaintiffs are six Missouri residents. One plaintiff is the Lieutenant Governor of
Missouri, but he “is not bringing this case on behalf of Missouri as a state.” Am. Comp. at 2.
In Count One, plaintiffs argue that Missouri’s rights as a sovereign are violated because
Missouri’s officers are “commandeer[ed]” by the ACA to enforce a federal regulatory health-
care scheme. Am. Comp. ¶ 67. “[F]or example,” section 1341 of the ACA is alleged to require
In Count Two, plaintiffs argue that section 1513 of the ACA will “interfere[ ] with the
what health benefits to offer to Missouri’s constitutional officers. Am. Comp. ¶ 73.
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In Count Three, plaintiff Julie Keathley alleges that her son suffers from autism and
would benefit from behavioral therapy that she alleges is required under Missouri law. Id. ¶¶ 94-
95. The amended complaint assumes that behavioral therapy will not be included in the ACA’s
“mandated coverage.” Id. ¶¶ 97-98. If so, plaintiffs argue, the ACA will require that Missouri
pay for the additional premium costs occasioned by Missouri’s requiring such coverage. Id. ¶
97-98. This, plaintiffs argue, is an unconstitutional “direct tax upon Missouri.” Id. ¶ 99.
In Count Four, plaintiffs predict that the ACA will impose “massive additional cost[s]”
on the State of Missouri; that the legislature will in turn “impose[ ] extraordinary tax increases”;
that the legislature will do so without complying with the Missouri Constitution; and that plain-
tiffs as taxpayers and citizens of Missouri will be injured by that predicted future failure of the
In Counts Five, Six, and Nine, plaintiff Samantha Hill alleges that she is 21 years old and
that she wants to buy “high deductible ‘major medical’ or ‘catastrophic health care insurance.’”
Am. Comp. ¶ 138; see id. ¶¶ 19-20. She alleges that section 1302(e) of the ACA “allows citizens
to maintain catastrophic plans only if an individual is under 30 years of age and certifies that his
or her premium payment is more than eight percent of his or her household income.” Id. ¶ 140.
She also alleges that she wants to pay for “routine” medical expenses herself. Id. ¶ 20.
In Count Seven, plaintiffs Dale Morris, Robert Osborn, and Geraldine Osborn allege that
they are enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans and that subsidies for such plans are being
reduced in Missouri (and elsewhere) but not in parts of Florida in alleged violation of equal
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In Count Eight, plaintiffs allege that the ACA establishes panels, that patients and doctors
are “compelled to discuss and resolve questions of medical care only within the bounds that the
federal panels have established,” Am. Comp. ¶ 189, and that doctors and patients may not decide
upon a course of medical care unless the panel agrees, id. ¶ 194.
ARGUMENT
In Count One, plaintiffs argue that the ACA “commandeers Missouri’s” officials into
enforcing federal law. Am. Comp. ¶ 67. This claim would lack merit even if brought by the
State of Missouri itself.2 But none of the plaintiffs is the State of Missouri, and these different
plaintiffs lack standing to assert any claim Missouri might have against its officials being com-
mandeered. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939) (private parties "ha[d]
no standing to raise any question . . . under the [Tenth A]mendment" "absent the states or their
officers" as parties to the litigation); United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir.) (“We
now join the majority of circuits and hold that a private party does not have standing to assert
that the federal government is encroaching on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth
2
One of two “example[s]” of this alleged commandeering given in paragraph 68 of the
amended complaint is a supposed requirement to implement and maintain a “reinsurance” pro-
gram under section 1341 of the ACA. However, this provision applies only to States that choose
to establish an Exchange. Under section 1321(b), States may “elect[ ]” to establish an Exchange
or not. 124 Stat. at 186. Only if they do so elect are they required to comply with the standards
in section 1341(b). The second example plaintiffs give is that the States will have to pay a
penalty if their employees are not offered qualified health benefit plans. Am. Comp. ¶ 68. A
challenge to the ACA by twenty other States on this very ground has already been correctly
dismissed by another district court. Florida ex rel McCollum v. United States Dep’t of Health &
Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1151-54 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
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Amendment absent the involvement of a state or its instrumentalities”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
302 (2009).
motion to intervene by Missouri’s Attorney General – who, unlike Kinder, is authorized to assert
claims on behalf of Missouri in court, MO. REV. STAT. § 27.060 – led to amendment of the
complaint to make it clear that Kinder “is not bringing this case on behalf of the State of
II. Plaintiffs Lack Standing As To Their Claim (Count Two) That The ACA
Constrains Missouri’s Choices Of Health Insurance To Be Offered Its
Constitutional Officers, And The ACA Does Not Do So In Any Event
In Count Two, plaintiffs assert that the ACA violates “the unique prerogatives of state
sovereignty” by penalizing Missouri if it does not offer qualified health care coverage to its
constitutional officers (such as its Lieutenant Governor). Am. Comp. ¶ 73. The short and
sufficient response is again that plaintiffs, who are not the State, lack standing to assert that
It again makes no difference that one of the plaintiffs is the current Lieutenant Governor.
It is doubtful that any Lieutenant Governor would be adversely affected by a federal requirement
encouraging his employer to offer him health care benefits. But, even assuming that some
Lieutenant Governor could claim some personal injury that would confer standing, Kinder is not
the right Lieutenant Governor to be making such a claim. The challenged provision of the ACA
does not go into effect until January 1, 2014. ACA § 1513(d), 124 Stat. at 258. Kinder’s term as
Lieutenant Governor ends in January 2013. See Am. Comp. ¶ 2; MO. REV. STAT. § 26.015.
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Even if the merits were to be reached, Count Two would not state a claim. Plaintiffs mis-
understand what the ACA requires and so end up challenging federal limitations on Missouri’s
options that do not exist. Plaintiffs argue that section 1513 of ACA, the large employer shared
responsibility provision, may result in penalizing Missouri if the State does not offer qualified
health care coverage to its constitutional officers. But Missouri has in fact chosen to offer health
coverage to its officers, Am. Comp. ¶¶ 78-79, and plaintiffs do not even speculate that it will
choose otherwise in the future. Plaintiffs argue instead that the ACA nevertheless constrains
Missouri by “defin[ing] a minimum set of benefits” that the health plan must include that may be
different from the menu of benefits that Missouri has chosen. Am. Comp. ¶¶ 80-84.
Plaintiffs are mistaken. Granted, aspects of the application of section 1513 of the ACA
do vary depending on whether the employer does or does not offer a plan that provides
“minimum essential coverage.” Compare § 1513(a) with § 1513(b). But, where the employer is
a State government, any plan “established or maintained for its employees . . . by the govern-
ment of any State” qualifies as minimum essential coverage.3 Thus, contrary to plaintiffs’ mis-
reading of the ACA, Missouri is free to choose the contours of the coverage it offers employees.4
3
The provision cited by plaintiffs, ACA section 1513 (adding 26 U.S.C. § 4980H), refers
to 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(2) (added by ACA section 1501) for its definition of “minimum
essential coverage.” 124 Stat. at 253, as renumbered by HCERA § 1003, 124 Stat. at 1033.
Section 5000A(f)(2) (read in conjunction with § 5000A(f)(1)(B)) says that the minimum
essential coverage requirement is satisfied by “a governmental plan (within the meaning of
section 2791(d)(8) of the Public Health Service Act).” In turn, section 2791(d)(8) of the Public
Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(8), says that “‘governmental plan’ has the meaning
given such term under section 3(32) of” ERISA. Section 3(32) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32),
defines “government plan” to “mean[ ],” inter alia, “a plan established or maintained for its
employees. . . by the government of any State.”
4
Plaintiffs’ argument assumes that the “employees” referred to in the ACA include cons-
titutional officers of the State. It is unnecessary for present purposes for defendants to take any
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III. Plaintiffs Lack Standing As To Their Claim (Count Three) That Section 1302
Of The ACA Imposes An Unconstitutional Tax On Missouri, And The Claim
Is Unripe In Any Event
Like Counts One and Two, Count Three alleges that the ACA will violate alleged rights
of Missouri, in this instance by imposing an allegedly unconstitutional “tax” on the State via
ACA section 1311(d)(3)(B)(ii). Am. Comp. ¶¶ 85-101. Again, plaintiffs are not the State of
Missouri and have no standing to assert the State’s potential claims.5 The Amended Complaint
might be read as alleging that, as individual taxpayers, plaintiffs will be affected by any financial
consequences visited upon Missouri and will thus sustain injury as taxpayers. But any such
alleged injury is one they will share with all the State’s taxpayers and is not the kind of personal
injury that can create a case or controversy. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332
(2006); Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-87
(1923) (rejecting taxpayer standing to challenge federal act protecting health of mothers and
Plaintiff Julie Keathley pleads personal circumstances related to Count Three, but not
ones that could give her standing. Keathley has a child affected by autism. Am. Comp. ¶ 95.
Keathley believes that he would benefit from “behavioral therapy.” Id. Missouri law allegedly
will require health insurers to cover such behavioral therapy. Id. ¶¶ 94-95. The Amended
Complaint assumes (whether rightly so we address in the next paragraph) that the ACA will not
position on whether that assumption is correct. Defendants accordingly assume arguendo that
plaintiffs are correct in assuming that constitutional officers are “employees.”
5
If section 1311(d)(3)(B)(ii) actually were a tax (as plaintiffs argue), then a pre-
enforcement claim brought even by Missouri itself would be barred by the Anti-Injunction Act,
26 U.S.C. § 7421, and the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
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include such behavioral therapy in its definition of what are the “essential health benefits” that,
beginning in 2014, must be offered in the individual health insurance market in which Keathley
apparently seeks to buy coverage. Id. ¶¶ 95, 97, 98.6 Plaintiffs argue that, if they are right both
that Missouri law will require such coverage and that federal law will not require it as part of the
“essential health benefits” package, then section 1311(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the ACA, 124 Stat. at 900,
will require that Missouri pay for the coverage Missouri would be requiring in excess of what the
ACA would be requiring. Am. Comp. ¶ 96. Even if one were to follow that chain of reasoning
to its end, it would not provide Keathley with standing because, if the ACA requires Missouri,
rather than Keathley, to pay for this coverage, that would be a benefit in fact to Keathley, not the
In any event, the claim raised by Count Three is not ripe for judicial consideration. One
necessary premise of plaintiffs’ argument is that behavioral therapy for autism is not part of what
must be covered as “essential health benefits” under the ACA beginning in 2014 for new plans in
the individual and small group markets. Am. Comp. ¶¶ 95, 97, 98. Neither plaintiffs nor defen-
dants can know that at this time. Section 1302(b)(1) of the ACA does not itself define what are
“essential health benefits,” but directs “the Secretary [to] define the essential health benefits”
that new plans in the individual and small group markets must cover beginning in 2014. 124
Stat. at 163. The ACA also provides that the Secretary’s definition "shall include at least the
following general categories and the items and services covered within the categories" Id.
These ten general categories include ambulatory patient services; emergency services; hospital-
6
Starting in 2014, new plans sold in the individual and small group markets must cover
"essential health benefits" pursuant to ACA sections 1201 and 1302. Grandfathered plans and
self-insured plans are not subject to this requirement.
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ization; mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment;
prescription drugs; and rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices. Section 1302(b)(1),
124 Stat. at 164. The Secretary has not yet issued proposed regulations, let alone final regula-
tions, defining what is or is not included in the definition of “essential health benefits.” Whether
behavioral therapy for autism in particular will or will not be included in the Secretary’s defini-
tion of “essential health benefits” is thus not known at this time. Plaintiffs’ contention that the
ACA is unconstitutional because beginning in 2014 it will not require coverage of such
behavioral therapy is not ripe unless and until it becomes known whether the ACA, as
implemented by regulation, will require such coverage. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985) (claim not ripe if it rests upon “contingent future events
that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
IV. Plaintiffs Lack Standing To Assert Count Four, Which Speculates That The
State Of Missouri Might In The Future Violate Its Constitution
In Count Four, plaintiffs speculate that the ACA will on balance cost Missouri more than
it would already have been destined to spend on the rising costs of health care without reform,
that Missouri will eventually raise taxes to pay for that spending, that in doing so Missouri will
violate its own constitution, and that such a violation of the Missouri Constitution by Missouri
will harm plaintiffs as Missouri taxpayers. Such speculation that Missouri might violate its con-
stitution in the future does not give plaintiffs standing as taxpayers to sue the federal government
today. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 343-44 (rejecting claim to taxpayer standing based on
“speculat[ion] that elected officials will increase a taxpayer-plaintiff's tax bill to make up a
deficit”); Nolles v. State Comm. for Reorg. of School Dists., 524 F.3d 892, 901 (8th Cir. 2008)
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(no standing where “claimed injury” was “the potential for increased property taxes without a
hearing”).
Counts Five, Six, and Nine assert different legal theories for why plaintiff Samantha
Hill’s rights are violated by a requirement of the ACA that beginning in 2014 she purchase an
insurance policy she does not want to buy.7 Hill misunderstands what the ACA requires.
Hill does not assert that she does not want to buy any health insurance. Instead, she
alleges that she is 21 years old, Am. Comp. ¶ 18, and that she “has (and desires to retain) the
ability to purchase . . . health care plans offering ‘major medical’ insurance coverage, defined as
coverage with a high deductible,” id. ¶ 19, also known as “‘catastrophic’ health insurance
coverage,” id. ¶ 138. This, she assumes, will not satisfy her general obligation, beginning in
2014, to have a minimum level of coverage. She recognizes that, under section 1302(e) of the
ACA, buying a catastrophic plan can satisfy this requirement. Am. Comp. ¶ 140. But she
misreads that provision as applying “only if an individual is under 30 years of age and certifies
that his or her premium payment is more than eight percent his or her household income.” Id.
(emphasis supplied). That is not what the statute says. The ACA instead provides that purchase
7
The Amended Complaint does not appear to assert these claims on behalf of any plain-
tiffs other than plaintiff Hill. The other plaintiffs would lack standing in any event. These
counts challenge the general requirement of 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (added by ACA § 1501) that
non-exempt individuals maintain minimum essential coverage. Plaintiffs Dale Morris, Robert
Osborn, and Geraldine Osborn are all entitled to Medicare, Am. Comp. ¶¶ 10, 15, which satisfies
the requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(1)(A)(I).
Plaintiff Kinder has coverage provided by the State to its employees, Am. Comp. ¶ 4, which
satisfies the requirement, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(f)(1)(B), (f)(2)(A). Whether plaintiff Keathley
has health insurance today is unclear, but what is clear is that she wants coverage that provides
more than what she fears will be the minimum required by federal law. Am. Comp. ¶ 95.
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of a qualifying catastrophic care plan will meet the essential health benefits package require-
ments if an individual is under 30 years of age or meets the tests of 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e) with
respect to affordable coverage or financial hardship. ACA § 1302(e)(2), 124 Stat. at 168.
Because Hill will be under 30 when the requirement takes effect in 2014 and for several years
thereafter, she will thus be under no obligation to have any insurance policy other than a major
Hill also alleges that she does want to pay out of pocket for “routine medical expenses
that would not be covered by a major medical health-insurance plan.” Am. Comp. ¶ 21. The
ACA will require, however, that major medical plans sold on a health insurance Exchange cover
at least three primary care visits beginning in 2014. ACA § 1302(e)(1)(B)(ii), 124 Stat. at 168.
It is hard to see how Hill sustains any injury in fact as a result of this change in whether she pays
directly for these visits herself or does so through insurance. But, assuming that Hill does have
standing to challenge this regulation of what major medical plans must cover, such regulation of
the health insurance market is constitutional. Congress may regulate the insurance marketplace.
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). “Mandated-benefit
laws, that require an insurer to provide a certain kind of benefit to cover a specified illness or
procedure whenever someone purchases a certain kind of insurance” are a commonplace of any
such regulation. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 728 (1985). Indeed,
8
The amended complaint does not even allege that Hill’s income in 2014 will not be low
enough that she could not also meet the affordable coverage/hardship prong of the disjunctive
test in section 1302(e). Predicting what income someone will be making in three years at the age
of 24 is notoriously difficult, so the silence of the amended complaint on this point may reflect
Hill’s genuine uncertainty about what her financial circumstances will be in three years. This
uncertainty about Hill’s future circumstances provides all the more reason why there is no case
or controversy today over whether the ACA will unconstitutionally limit Hill’s choices in 2014.
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by 1985, every State had imposed some coverage requirements on health insurance policies, id.
at 729, and Congress has done so as well long before the ACA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1185-1185c. There
is nothing constitutionally novel or suspect about this further modest regulation of what
VI. Count Seven, Which Challenges A Repealed Section Of The ACA, Should Be
Dismissed
In Count Seven, the three plaintiffs (Geraldine Osborn, Dale Morris, and Robert Osborn)
who participate in Medicare Part C (also known as Medicare Advantage) argue that their rights
to equal protection and under the privileges and immunities clause are violated by a provision
they call “Gator-Aid,” Am. Comp. ¶ 174. According to the Amended Complaint, the ACA
singles out a few counties in Florida for more favorable treatment under the Medicare Advantage
The ACA does no such thing. Plaintiffs identify the “Gator-Aid” provision as part of
section 3201 of the ACA. Am. Comp. ¶ 172-73. But that section as originally enacted was
repealed in its entirety by section 1102 of the HCERA without ever having taken effect. 124
Stat. at 1040. Section 1102 does not contain a provision, dubbed “Gator-Aid” (Am. Comp.
¶ 174) or otherwise, that singles out Florida counties for special treatment.
9
Such requirements that products sold in interstate commerce meet minimum
requirements are commonplace. For example, it is within the authority of Congress under the
Commerce Clause to require that automobiles be sold only with seatbelts, see Motor Vehicles
Mfgs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), or that milk offered for sale
must contain certain nutrients, see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938),
even though some consumers might prefer the option to buy less expensive products without
those mandated features. Congress may similarly require that health insurance policies meet
minimum requirements.
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There remain geographic differences in the federal payments for Medicare Advantage
plans, but Minnesota Senior Federation v. United States, 273 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 2001), makes it
clear that any challenge to those differences as a denial of equal protection is without merit. As
Minnesota Senior explained, 273 F.3d at 807, prior to the reforms introduced by the HCERA, the
government subsidies of a Medicare Part C plan in a given locality depended in part on what
traditional Medicare (Medicare Parts A and B) spent on average in that locality, so that a Medi-
care Advantage plan in a high-Medicare-expense locality would receive more money than a
similar plan in an area where Medicare spent less. Minnesota Senior squarely rejected an equal
protection challenge to that geographic disparity similar to the challenge raised by plaintiffs
here.10 The passage of the HCERA gives no reason to resurrect such claims because the HCERA
reduces the kind of geographic disparity at issue in Minnesota Senior, evening out to some extent
the rate of payment for Medicare Part C plans among areas of high and low traditional Medicare
expenditures. See HCERA § 1102, 124 Stat. at 1040-47.11 If there was no basis for an equal
10
The Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” adds
nothing to plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments. The privileges and immunities clause
addresses actions by States, not by the federal government. United States v. Lebman, 464 F.2d
68, 73-74 n.13 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom, J.). Plaintiffs recognize that the “Fourteenth Amend-
ment by its terms applies to the States,” but argue that “Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 490-99
(1954), has held the federal government to essentially the same standard under the Fifth Amend-
ment.” Am. Comp. ¶ 161. However, Bolling addressed only the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, not the privileges and immunities clause. Banner v. United States, 303
F. Supp. 2d 1, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 428 F.3d 303 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Even as against the
States, the privileges and immunities clause protects only a narrow set of rights – e.g., to transact
business with the federal government or establish a residence in a different state – and thus is not
implicated by the kinds of concerns raised by plaintiffs. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130
S. Ct. 3020, 3028-31 (2010).
11
Subject to various transition rules, one geographical variable element of the payment to
Medicare Part C plans will still be “benchmark[ed]” on underlying Medicare expenditures, but
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protection or similar claim before the HCERA – and Minnesota Senior establishes that there was
The Amended Complaint alleges that section 4003 of the ACA “establishes certain
‘panels,’” Am. Comp. ¶ 187; that these panels “interfere with the doctor-patient relationship, in
that they direct and require treatment – or non-treatment – in a mandated manner without regard
for the patient or the patient’s doctor,” id. ¶ 188; and that “[d]octors and patients are not allowed
to make decisions free from intervention, but are instead compelled to discuss and resolve
questions of medical care only within the bounds that the federal panels have established,” id. ¶
189. These are distorted characterizations of the provision plaintiffs purport to discuss.
Section 4003 does indeed discuss “certain ‘panels,’” viz., the Preventive Services Task
Force and the Community Preventive Services Task Force. The ACA did not "establish" these
"panels;"; the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force was first convened in 1984, and the
Community Preventive Service Task Force was established in 1996.12 The duties of the U.S.
Preventive Services Task Force include reviewing "the scientific evidence related to the
purpose of developing recommendations for the health care community." Section 4003. The
the benchmark will then be adjusted by varying percentages, with the areas of higher expendi-
tures being multiplied by lower percentage rates, which will have the effect of reducing that
source of geographic variation in payments to Medicare Part C plans. 42 U.S.C.
1395w–23(n)(2)(B), as added by HCERA § 1102(b).
12
See http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/intro.htm and
http://www.thecommunityguide.org/about/history.html.
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duties of the Community Preventive Services Task Force involve include developing, updating,
and disseminating "recommendations," and providing assistance "to those health care pro-
recommendations. Id.
amended complaint. There is no provision that would, in the words of amended complaint ¶ 194,
mandate that “even when a patient and physician determine the best medical treatment, and even
if the patient is willing to pay for the cost of treatment herself, she is not allowed to receive the
medical treatment her physician deems appropriate unless it is also agreed to by the government
panel.” That patient and physician are free to ignore any panel recommendation in that
circumstance.
Nor does the task forces’ authority to make recommendations shut down any one’s free
speech right to disagree or to make her own recommendations. Indeed, like most processes that
involve recommendations, the ACA relies upon a vigorous interchange of ideas. Far from giving
the task forces authority to prohibit doctors from reaching and acting on their own conclusions
and offering their own advice, section 4003 expressly directs the task forces to seek
recommendations and opinions from doctors and patients in a process that anticipates that the
recommendations will be reviewed and updated in an ongoing process. 124 Stat. at 542, 543.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
TONY WEST
Assistant Attorney General
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Case 1:10-cv-00101-RWS Document 31 Filed 01/18/11 Page 21 of 22
RICHARD G. CALLAHAN
United States Attorney
SHEILA M. LIEBER
Deputy Branch Director
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Case 1:10-cv-00101-RWS Document 31 Filed 01/18/11 Page 22 of 22
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 18, 2011, the foregoing was filed
Robert C. O’Brien
Steven A. Haskins
555 West Fifth Street, 48th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90013
obrien.robert@arentfox.com
haskins.steven@arentfox.com
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