The Politics of Backwardness PDF

THE POLITICS OF BACKWARDNESS
Reservation PolicY in India

THE POLITICS OF
BACKWARDNESS
Reservation Policy in India
Edited by
V.A. PAI PANANDIKER
under the auspices of

CENTRE FOR POLICY RESEARCH
New Delhi
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Foreword
O social issue is perhaps as explosive in India, especially

Hindu India, as that of reservations. A mere decision to
extend the period of existing reservations to Lok Sabha seats
in January 1990, which should have been almost non-controversial,
started large-scale caste riots and anti-reservation demonStrations in
U.P. and Bihar and may well have spread to other parts of the country
but for some timely political action to bring home to people that the
govemment was not talking of any action on reservations for jobs.
The National Front in its Manifesto for the Lok Sabha election
1989, specifically stated that the "recommendations of the Mandal
Commission will be implemented expeditiously."
Reservation for jobs and in educational institutions is perhaps the
most explosive threat to the Indian polity today. A1l over the country,
the young are angry on both sides---one demanding more and more
reservations, the other against even the existing ones. Just a few years
ago, the issue blew up in the face of the then Chief Minister of
Kamataka, Ramakrishna Hegde, who had to use all his political skills
to avoid a major blood-bath in Kamataka.
In the early years of Independence, there was a great sense of guilt
in Indian society, especially Hindu society, about the injustice of the
caste system and the sufferings ofthe "outcastes" and the tribals, also
referred to as Harijans and Girijans. In the first two decades, when
reservations were sparingly andjudiciously used, there was no prob-
lem.
As the pressure for meeting the quotas and later the "roster"
system came into play in govemment jobs and even educational
institutions, political attitudes changed. What is more important is
that by the 1970s, the composition and size of the so-called upper
castes also changed. Indeed, the numbers game changed and so also
the political rhetoric and political action.
The Politics of Backwardness
As India stands in the 1990s, the reservation issue---cspecially in

government jobs and in the educational institutions, not only for the
OBCs but now even for the Scheduled Castes and ScheduledTribes-
has been a very sensitive issue.
Behind all this lies the changing nature of the Indian polity,
economy and society. The question is where will it lead to?
In order to discuss these issues and to look at the Indian experience
in the major States, the CPR commissioned a series of papers which
were discussed at length at the CPR in New Delhi. Based on these
papers and discussions thereon, the present book is being presented
to the larger academic and policy community in India.
It is quite clear that the reservation issue is the single most serious
threat in the 1990s to the intemal Indian polity. A mishandling of this
issue could engulf India from north to south and from east to west
into violence and turmoil. As one distinguished public official once
said, India could enter a phase of "civil war". All thinking Indians
and policy makers should, therefore, discuss and debate this issue and
find some consensus lest the country plunge into serious internal
strife. We hope this volume will help'in that direction of discussion
and debate and possibly a consensus.
V.A. PAI PANANDIKER

Centre for Polity Research Director
New Delhi
List of Conhibutors
V. A. Pai Panandiker has been Director of the Centre for Policy

Research, New Delhi since l9?3. He hadworked as Spial Officer
inthe
Ministry of Finance and was associated with the Gwernrnent of Irdia as
Chairman, Population Policy Committee, Plarming Commission and

as
Industry'
Chairman of the Expenditure Commission's Committee on
A mernber of seviral national and intematiorul aca&mic atrd cultual
Foundalron of lndia
inslitutions, he is Life Trustee of the Population
prolific ouput of publications
and the Iniernational Centre, Goa. His
and articles in
includes more than 20 books, several research reports
r.**, Enelish
Eabinet, the irrst
lenguge dulies. His lfie$ nublicatiu The Indrsn
comprehensive study on the subject was released
in early 1997.
Earlier
Pran Chopra is Visiting Professor, Centre for Policy Research'
He has been guest
he was Risident Editor, Statesman, New Delhi'
Editorial Director'
commentator tlN Radio and among other things
piess noundation of Asia. Widely travelled" he has written exensively
has also published
on politicat matters in Indian and foreignjounrals' He
several books.
the Academy of
Shri Prakash, Ph,D. (Contab), is Research Professor at
numerous
Third World Studies, Jamia Mllia University, New Delhi' His
India and Ctina with rderence to
fubtications include those conceming INLAKS
l"o**ic issues. He has been awarded fellowships by the
fo*attion, Churchill College, Cambridge and the Japan Foundation
for his research.
SumaChitniswasuntilrecentlyVice.ChancellorofSNDTUniversity'
;;;"y. She has prwiouslv been Professor { thlfP Institute of
ofNew
iocial iciences and a Visiting Professor at the Stare University
Vo* ui Suffulo and the Univirsity of Frankfurt. Her field of speciality
publications to her credit'
is Sociology ofEducation and she has several
at
G. Thimmaiah, Ph.D. (Bom.), did his post doctoral research Queens'
vt The politics of Bacluardness
lard Univenity, Australia and was later Visiting Scholar at Australian

University. He has also been Visiting Fellow at Brookings
ltlational
Institution, Washington. He was for some time Director ISEC, Bangalore
and has been on sweral official committees in Karnataka. He has more
than a dozen books and numerous research papers on economic issues
to his credit.
Cunently he is Member, Plarming Commission of India.
Sachchidananda, D. Lit., is a distinguished anthropologist who was

ducated at Patna University and SOAS, London Universi8. He has been
Director A N. Sinha Institute, patrn and Vice-Chancellor Ranchi
University. He has also taught at patna and New york Univenities. A
profilic writer he has published several books and research papers in
anthropology in India and abroad. Currently, he is Director, Sulabh
Institute of Dwelopment Studies, patna.
Mrhit Bhattacharya was earlier Chairman, West Bengal Municipal

Finance Commission and one time Vice-Chancellor, iur<twan
Uni_
versity. He has been Profesor of p'blic Administration at
calcutta
university and fte rndian Instime puDlrc
0f Aduunntrafion, New Delhi
His special areas of interest and experience lie in field and local
admin_
micro-level planning and dwelopmeng municipal and urban
lstration;
institutional issues.
Prof. D. L. Sheth is Senior Fellow at the Crntre for the study of

Dweloping Societies, Delhi and Editor of Alternatives. He is founder_
rnember of Lokayan and Member (Social Scientisb), National
Commi-
ssion for Backward Classes. Sheth has contributed articles
to tndian and
international journals and books in the areas of political sociolog5r,
cornparative politics and grassroots mwements.
Ghanshyam Shah is a professor at Lal Bahadur Shastri National

Academy of Administration, Mussoorie. He was a Senior Fellow
aad
the Director at the Centre for Social Studies, Surat. His area
of interest
are Social Movements aad Minorities.
B. G. Verghese was educated at Delhi and Cambridge Universities. He

has been Editor of The Hindustan Times md Tti Indfan
Express.
From 1966{8 he was information Adviser to the prime Minister.
An
?:tl\: colgmnis! he received the Magsaysay Award for Journatism in
1995. Author ofa number ofbooks he is currently
at the Centre for policy
Research.
List of Conlributors ix
Rqieev Dhavaru M.A. (Cantab), 8.A., LL. B. (Allahabad), Ph. D.

(London) of the Middle Temple, Senior Advocate, Sqrrerne Court of
India, is a practising lawyer. A former academic, he has published various
books and articles on constitutional and public law.
Contents
Foreword v
Li$ of Contibutors vii
Chapter I
Introduction I
V.A. Pai Panandiker
Chapter 2
An Overview 13
Pran Chopra
Chapter 3
Reservations Policy for Other Backward Classes: 29
Problems and PersPectives
Shri Prakash
Chapter 4
Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and 88
Scheduled Tribes: A Crisis of Ambivalence
Suma Chitnis
Chapter 5
Karnataka Government's Reservation Policies for 108
SCs/STs and OBCs
G. Thimmaiah
Chapter 6
Reservation and After: The Case of Bihar 16l
Sachchidananda
xii The politics of Backwardness
Chapter 7
Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Scene lg3
Mohit Bhattacharya
Chapter 8
The Reservation System in Gujarat 19g
Shri Prakash
Chapter 9
Reservations Policy Revisited ZZt
D.L. Sheth
Chapter I0
Consequences of Reservations 24O
Ghanshyam Shah
Epilogue 256
B.G. Verghese
Postscript
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: 262
The Mandal Controversy
Rajeev Dhavan
INDEX T3
Chapter I
Introduction
V.A. Pai Panandiker
OR the last few years especially since 1990, India has taken a
regressive turn in:o backwardness as a direction of the na-
tional polity. The issue of backward sections of the Indian
society had caused considerable agony to tlre founding fathers of the
Indian Constitution. Who could not be insensitive to idustice inher-
ent in an old civilizztion which while creating a social order also
created by design or default many social injustices? Indian civiliza-
tion had obviously many strengths. But it also had many weaknesses.
These weaknesses especially of the age old caste system have given
Indian society a deep sense of guilt and hence sorne of the transitional
provisions of the Constitution regarding reservation of seats in legis-
latures and in the civil service.
The dilemma before the founding fathers was whether to undo
history or to build a new India free from its historical evils and
frailties. A new India built on its greater concern of human values, of
inded the all-encompassing Dharma.
essential equality, tolerance aod
fie founding fathers including B.R. Ambedkar decided in favour of
building a new India where the evils of caste or community or even
religious divide would not fetter tbe nation. A new India had to be
built.
The Constitution which came into force on 26 January 1950 was
therefore a political and social manifesto of the nation. It enshrined
the best of political and social values of India along with the best of
other values available from other human experiences around the
world.
2 The politics of Backwardness
India was to be a casteless society. Freed from the chains of

history and moving towards a new political and social order where
the quintessential Dharma---or the principles which hold everything
together-was to be the guiding principle.
H.V. Kamath, a distinguished member of the Constituent Assem-
bly participating in the debates on 14 October 1949 while referring to
the reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes said,
"Men$en and even friends outside may dispute the wisdom of this
course" and went to add "Before I close I only wish to express the
hope that, beforc ten years have expired from the commencement of
the Constitution, in this country of ours which has had an ancient
history, this country of ours which is ancient, but ever young, there
will be not merely no backward classes, socially and educationally
backward classes left, but that all the classes will corne up to a decent
normal human level, and also that we shall do away with this stigma
of any caste being scheduled. This was a creation of the British
regime which happily has passed away. We have taken many strides
forward in rernoving or doing away with the numerous evils that
were associated with the British regime. This is one of the few that
still remain. I hope, sir, that ere long, this stigma too will disappear
from our body politic, and we shall all stand before the world as one
single community." I
Speaking on the Report of tlre Committee on Minorities Vallabhbhai
Parel on 25 May 194.9 had much the sarne in his mind. He said "When
we rnet this tinp, we found a considerable change in the attitude of
the minorities themselves. Dr Mookherjee moved a nrotion for the
drcpping of tlrc clause on rcservation of seats in the l-egislature on
pogrlation basis. When this proposal was moved, Mr Muniswami
Pillai, who was represcnting the Scheduled Castes, moved an arend-
ment to the effect that the provision for reservation, so far as the
Scheduled Castes are concemed, may be continued for a period of ten
years. The general opinion in the Advisory Committee-which was
alnrcst unanimous--was that this reservation so far as the Scheduled
Castes are concerned, should be continued for that period and that Mr
Muniswami Pillai's anrendnrent should be accepted." Vallabhbhai
Patel concluded by saying "But in the long run, it would be in the
interest of all to forget that there is anything like majority or minority
in this country and that in India therc is only one community."2
Introduction
Speaking on this very issue on 25 August 1949, DrB.R. Ambedkar

who was defending the ten years provision of reservation stated "For
the scheduled tribes I am prepared to give far longer time. But all
those who have spoken about the reservations to the Scheduled
Castes or to the scheduled tribes have been so meticulous that the
thing should end by ten years. All I want to say to them, in the words
of Edmund Burke, is "Large Empires and small minds go ill to-
gether."r
Alas after more than forty years of operating the Constitution,
some of the transitional provisions especially of reservations have
become the centrepiece of the Indian polity. Pernicious doctrine of
"compensatory discrimination" has begun to be evoked as the rem-
edy to the sins of the past. Whose sins? Of a social order which we
have deliberately sought to obliterate? Or a discarded social order
which we now want to revive.
In an attempt to achieving nanow political ends, the V.P. Singh
Government in l99O revived the old casteist social order. It was
given a new lease of life. In faimess the V.P. Singh Governnrent did
not invent the reservation theory. It has had a long history especially
in the old Madras Presidency and in Mysore State. But the fight of
nearly a century against the tyranny of the old social order was given
up. Caste was henceforth to become the basis of govemnrcnt and
governance in India. Reservations and more reservations in govem-
ment service, in educational institutions, and in legislatures were to
be the new directions of state policy.
The doctrine of compensatory discrimination for reservations is
pernicious for two rcasons. First there is no end to it. Secondly it does
not serve the purpose for which it is meant. After nearly fifty yean of
independence, India has the distinction of being one of the poorest
and most backward countries in the world. And India is now fighting
hard to become more backward. To go back to a social system which
we consider the main weakness of our civilization.
Who are the backwards? Is there any absolute criteria by which all
backward castes can be classified as entircly backward? Or for that
matter are all forward castes entirely forward? That India has many
poor and disadvantaged is well accepted. What is diflicult to prove is
that there are no poor and disadvantaged in almost any caste. Hence
the logic of compensatory discrimination is almost impossible to end.
*.
4 The Politics of Backwardness
Practically all castes, and perhaps even Brahmins in some cases, may
be entitled to the benefits of the doctrine of compensatory discrimi-
nation.
Caste has developed such a political appeal that religions like
Christianity and Islam which are not afflicted by the vice or sins of
the caste system, have suddenly discovered their dalits or scheduled
castes and are now demanding the benefits of reservations for their
adherents. It is an extraordinary phenomenon that in the twilight
years of the twentieth century, everyone is struggling to be backward.
Compensatory discrimination has emerged as India's new "mantra"
for practically each and every caste except perhaps the much villified
Brahmin.
This national competition for backwardness which the V.P. Singh
Govemment has bequeathed to the nation contrasts sharply with
global trends. The rest of the world is moving towards a more
advanced civilization, materially and morally. The global mega trends
are towards high technology, competence and competition. In India
technology is suspect, competence is at a discount and competition is
frowned upon as anti-smialistic. The world is moving towards greater
integration intemally and extemally. India is moving in the opposite
direction.
The nations of South East Asia and East Asia comnpnced on the
same joumey as India towards modernisation and economic develop
nrcnt around t 950. By 1970, they had begun to tum the comer and by
1990, these nations had become the world's economic power houses.
Even China which started late has now taken off as a major economic
giant. The ideological shibboleths which kept China backward were
replaced by a pragmatic emphasis on technology, compet€nce and
competitiveness. The countries of East and South East Asia are
rapidly integrating with the rest of the world.
India has been waiting long to tum the corner. Meanwhile hun-
dreds of millions of the Indian people wallow in poverty. Malnutri-
tion, hunger, ill health, illiteracy afflict almost all castes, some more,
some less. Compensatory discrimination and its ilk have brought
India to compensatory backwardness. Compensatory because, if we
do not go forward, the compensation is backwardness!
Much is said against Manu and the Manusmriti. However much
Manu may be reviled and abused, his laws ceased to operate centu-
Introduction
ries ago. There is no legal sanction behind any of the tenets of Manu
including the Varnashram Dharma. However Manu has now been
revived by the castes who see visions of political mileage in the
revival. This casteist rhetoric may have a political appeal in the short
run. But like every such epiphenomenon, it too is destined to fade
away.
The real challenge before India is to free itself from the clutches of
this nefarious history, if one wants to call il so, and to move towards
a new political and social order. The Indian Constitution guarantees
such .a movement. How else could Mulayarn Singh Yadav' Laloo
Prasad Yadav or Mayawati head the govemments of mega states like
Uttar Pradesh or Bihar? Their rise to the highest political office is the
very new political order that the Constitution envisaged.
The most important issue before India's new social order is to
make the transfer of power work. It can and must work essentially
through the political process. This is neither easy nor likely to happen
either by caste politics or reservations. V.P. Singh's theory that
reservations in the civil service are necessary to transfer power
bristles with problems. Despite all the attacks on efficiency, the rot in
the adminisration of the country coincides largely with the 1990s.
There is a great deal of evidence that comrption and its twin ineffi-
ciency have rcached untold heights since 1990. As norms of effi-
ciency and integrity have been thrown to the winds, scams of massive
magnitude have come to the fore.
It is by no means a coincidence that the large scale transfer of
political power in rccent years has been accompanied by a quantum
jump in public comrption. There is a new ethos in the working of the
government machinery. The rule of law, ethical standards and integ-
rity in administration are no more considered relevant. The cue now
comes from the top. And it cascades down in the form of grand
rapids. The state is for private benefit. Those in power rcserve the
right to grab whatever they can. This is where the transfer of power
in India threatens the vitals of Indian polity.
Power does not suddenly become good in the hands of the poor or
the deprived or the backward, no more than power does in the hands
of the rich or the forward. The greatest damage to India's political
institutions was done by an upper caste Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
The caste of political leaders is no guarantee of either.moral or ethical
The Politics of Bachuardness
or politically sound nonns. The theory that the poor or the backward
are somehbw virtuous is no more valid than that the rich or the upper
castes are somehow superior. Comrption and criminality do not
know caste boundaries. They never have. Nor does the economic or
political status of the powerful. India's history is replete with social
and political destruction by the wealthy and the powerful. Aurangzeb
is only one such example. On the other hand the two grehtest Indians
namely Buddha and Gandhi were not Brahmins and were accepted as
great despite whatever the Brahmins may have had to say.
No society has found a satisfactory means of identifying those
who can be trusted with power. Perhaps only saints might qualify.
But saints do not seek political power. It is therefore necessary for all
societies to find ways of ensuring that political power is not abused
or misused. The administrative system with its rules and regulations
is supposed to be an antidote to or a check against the blatant abuse
or misuse of power. To make the administrative system representa-
tive is neither easy nor workable. It has not worked anywhere in the
world.
The problem of recruitment to tle civil service, however, remains.
What is merit? Is it no more than performance in a written examina-
tion which is held to be good for all time until retirement? Despite the
antiquity of the civil service systems in the world, merit has remained
up to a point an elusive concept. However technical competence is
neither elusive nor difficult to measurc. The problem is more com-
plex when it comes to general services like the administration or the
police. .However, reservations deprive the selection by open compe-
tition of its relatively greater value and validity which it undoubtedly
has.
In a system where the aura of power politics is open for anyone,
the theory of compensatory discrimination bodes ill for the adminis-
tration or civil service. Representative democracy makes reasonable
sense. A repr€sentative bureaucracy which deals with the technical
aspects of administration does not. Putting up the state for grabs at
both ends bodes ill for democracy. And yet satisfactory means have
to be found to deal with the perception thar administration is biased
in favour of any group.
Bureaucratic systems have to be devised to make it as "good" as
possible. And to be "good' it will be necessary not only to have a
Introduction
better technology of administratiori but also "good" people. If this

does not happen, demands for all kinds of reservations will make the
bureaucracy an unworkable institution which it has virtually become
already.
To go back to the second key issue. Does compensatory discrimi-
nation work? The simple truth is that it has not worked anywhere in
the world. After more than four decades of reservation in India, the
problem of social justice remains exactly where it was. Studies in the
US also show that affirmative action in that country has not solved
any problems.
Why is it that reservations do not work? Perhaps the remedy is
flawed or inappropriate. The theory of compensatory discrimination
is built around compensation for past social inequities. What are
these? Generally low social status, low education and low income.
Why do they arise? Mostly because those suffering from these social
inequities have made the mistake of being born into the wrong
families. Children born of families with a higher social status, higher
educational levels and perhaps a higher income enjoy a distinct
advantage over those who are not.
ff this diagnosis is correct, then the remedy to social inequities lies
not in political or legal action but in changing the societal structure.
Societal structures are not amenable either to political or legal action,
unless the state thinks it can in some way nationalise the family itself.
People who seek political remedies for social injustices do so essen-
tially to derive some political mileage, and not to solve the problem.
Once their political objective is attained, it matters little what hap-
pens to the issue itself or for that matter, to the nation and the society
at large.
One of the groups which has suffered historic disabilities are the
tribal people who are growing towards ten per cent of India's total
population. The tribals have historically remained outside the preva-
lent socio-political structure of India. Unlike in many Western coun-
tries or those colonized by Western nations such as the United Stafes
of America or Australia where the tribal population has been deci-
mated, in India the tribal population has incredsed not only in abso-
lute numbers but also as a percentage of the national population.
However, the social and economic conditions of the tribals in India
remain dismal. Of all the have-nots of India- the tribals ar: the
T
bottom of the pile. But as the tribals do not offer the same political
mileage except in the north eastem region, the votaries of social
justice have never been,greatly attracted by the cause of the tribals.
If as the theorists of social justice argue, empowering the poor and
backwards will automatically solve the problem of social injustice,
then many States of the Indian Union and several African countries
would be shining examples of success. They are not. Obviously
power does not solve the problem. And reservations which are sup-
posed to be proxies for power, have not done so either.
It rs worth examining from global experience as well as national
experience as to what works since the state cannot dictate the quality
of families. The Soviet policies in Central Asia which consisted to a
substantial extent of nomadic tribes seem to have transformed the
Central Asian countries in fundamental ways. Large doses of social
action in terms of education, health and intensive economic develop-
ment including an excellent physical and social infrastructure seem to
have worked. Within India several communities which were consid-
ered relatively backward only a few.decades ago have since made
great strides. The Patels in Gujarat are a case in point' So are the non-
Kshatriya Marathas in Maharashtra or the Kurmis in Bihar. Unlike in
the Soviet Union case, these communities focussed on those issues
which helped them graduate from backward to forward status. This
process which sociologist M.N. Srinivas called the "Sanskritization"
process has had a considerable impact on many castes and communi-
ties in India. Quite obviously the Patels have gained by their own
societal action rather than by external political props. The Patels do
not need compensatory discrimination or reservation. They have
shown what is doable in India.
Intemationally the countries which have made dramatic impact on
social inequities are many of our neighbours in East and South East
Asia. They focussed on the few critical factors which dramatically
influence all inequities. They are investments and growth, technol-
ogy, health and education, and global competitiveness. These coun-
tries shared the same handicaps as lndia in the 1960s. Today they
have practically done away with social injustice. Their strategy has
worked and now they enjoy an economic and political status which
India will take a long while more to attain. Their focus was on
societal change: to adopt advanced technology, to ensure health in
Introduction 9
the broadest sense, education to everyone, and to enable every indi

vidual to enjoy the benefits of modem society.
India in contrast has worked very hard to have a slow growth rate
and perpetuate poverty. Its anti-poverty slogans have been the great-
est frauds on the poor of India. ln 1967, the percentage of poor in
South Korea was-33.7. In 1990, it was only about 5 per cent' In
contrast in India the percentage of the poor in 1970 was 43. In 1995
the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission had differing
estimates of poverty. Both estimates are high' But one is higher. The
Planning Commission in fact argues that India has larger numbers of
tie poor. That such figures reflect a severe indictment of itself does
not bother the Planning Commission. Do we need 40 years of plan-
ning to keep so many so poor? Is that the development strategy which
we have followed since 1950-51?
The votaries of reservation and compensatory discrimination do
not ask as to who is guilty for keeping so many Indians poor and
backward for so long, Nor do they ask how to rid India of its essential
backwardness. The hypocrisy is often so great that when it comes to
treating themselves for their heart ailments or cancer, these advocates
of social justice have no hesitation in going to the United States of
America often at the cost of the state. Nobody asks them that if
reservations do not.affect quality then why not insist on treatment by
medical practitioners who are products of the reservation quota. It is
not the inadequacy ofthe medical profession that is in question but of
the politicians who preach one thing and practice precisely the oppo-
site.
How does India resolve this issue? Not by political or legal means.
Political instruments by their very nature are designed for the benefit
of politicians, to get them into or keep them in power. Legal steps are
also inadequate. The hapless Supreme Court can work and decide
only within the provisions of the Constitution. Despite what has been
written in this Volume, the Supreme Court did not and does not solve
problems. It only defuses them. That by itself is no small achieve-
ment because time and again, the Parliament and the Cabinet have
failed to solve this as well as many other pressing problems of India.
It has left the baby in the hands of the Supreme Court which, luckily
for the nation, has defused many a crisis.
The way to solve the backwardness and poverty in India is by
l0 The politics of Bach,vardness
societal change. That is what has worked in all achieving countries

the world over. The challenge is therefore to the Indian society. The
Indian society has repeatedly shown strength, capacity, and stability
to face many a challenge. India has been govemed by three types of
stability. That of the government, that of the state and that of the
Indian society. The stability of the Indian society is indeed the
bedrock on which the entire edifice of the nation rests. Indian society
must therefore address itself to this challenge as well.
It has broadly two options, endogenous and exogenous. For endo-
genous solutions, India must look inwards which is what we have
done since 1950. This inward outlook has not worked. An isolated
India suffers from inherent handicaps. All societies which have suc-
cessfully made transitions to modern technologically and socially
advanced nations in recent decades are societies which have looked
outwards. But there is a massive challenge of intemal integration.
Successful nations have also had to integrate their societies into
cohesive ones. Many of India:s problems such as in Jammu and
Kashmir or tlre North Eastem States emanate from the nation's
inability to integrate them effectively into the larger national identity.
Such social integration would not imply destruction of tlreir local
identity. Indeed national integration and local identities are perfectly
compatible as evidenced in most oflndia. India's civilizational strength
has been unity in diversity-a larger Indian identity which subsurnes
all the smaller identities.
The most effective exogenous solution is integration with the
world. This is the most important challenge to Indian society. Ironi-
cally it is India which philosophically proclaimed that the world is
one family-Vasudhaiva Kutumbakarn. Perhaps long colonization
by the British has made India a more defensive society. Some,
therefore, see global integration as a threat to India. It need not be so.
While Japan has taken full advantage of integration with the world, it
has surrendered neither its sovereignty nor its socio-cultural identity.
But countries like Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand know
that without intemational trade and investments their economies and
societies cannot grow. And without growth there is no social future,
nor even basic national security. Global economic and over time
larger global social integration is a historic necessity perhaps an
inevitabiliw. This is a clear lesson of historv.
Introduction 1l
India must, therefore, in clear terms integrate with the rest of the
world. Such inregration will not prevent India from protecting its
essential sovereign or cultural interests. On the other hand integration
will bring greater exposure of the people of India to new technolo-
gies, new ideas, newer types of organisation and a variety of other
teans to bring about the desired societal change' It is by no accident
that little Mauritius, whose population is ?0 per cent of Indian
descent from those who went as indentured labour, has a per capita
income ten times that of India. Integration on acceptable tenns pays'
lndia must tierefore exercise that option in unambiguous terms'
The objective of this integration is not only for India's philosophi-
cal orientation but more practically to help India grow economically
and socially. As George Verghese has argued in this volume, the
answer to poverty and backwardness lies in increasing the size ofthe
cake. Thus far we have tried vainly to satisfy everybody by distribut-
ing limited jobs and economic opportunities through reservations' It
is now necessary for India to create far more jobs, far more educa-
tional opportunities, far more growth and far more income to over-
come social and economic backwardness. The politics of power or
legislating compensatory discrimination have not and will not solve
India's problems. They will create many many more. A well thought
out high growth str.ategy and societal development and change will
accomplish more. Unfortunately Indian politicians have not shown
the ability to understand lessons of global human history. Indian
society must do so and bypass the political class as much as possible'
The Government, as our experience of nearly fifty years shows, is not
sensitive to Knowledge. Its capacity to govern is in serious question'
The people of India will therefore have increasingly to look after
themselves.
What about reservations? They must go sooner than later' The
transitional provisions of reservation in legislatures for ten years even
for SC and ST have been extended to fifty. Further reservations for
new groups are being made. Even more will be demanded until India
is fractured and partitioned again. Message must go clearly from the
people of India. Enough is enough. By the year 2020 all reservations
must go. Seventy years of reservation is long enough time for those
whose power politics depends upon it. The people of India especially
the poor and the backward will gain far more by a r€surgent fast
growing and integrated India than by the divisive and

wholly miscon_
ceived politics of rcservations.
This volume is an attempt to look at the problems of reservations
from differing perspectives and viewpoints. Most of the chapters of
this volume were prepared around 1991. Much has happened since
then an! hence we requested Rajeev Dhavan to prepare a postscript.
The various authors have differing views on reservations in India. As
only to be expected, some sftongly support reservations. Others
strongly oppose reservations. The volume reflects the diversity of
views and dissent on this vexatious issue which is likely to dominate
debate in India for quite some time to come. It is our hope that India
will come out of this legacy and work towards an integrated and
casteless social structurc.
REFERENCES
l. Constituent Assetnbly Debates-efrcial Reporr, Vol. X, Lnk Sabha Sec_

retariat, New Delhi, pp. 24243.
2. B. Shiva Rao, The Fmming of India,s Constitarion, Vol. IV, New Delhi.
Indian Institute of Public Administration, 4, pp. 6O3-06.
3. Constituent Assembly Debates-Offcial Repon,yol.IX, New Delhi, Lok
Sabha Secretariat, p. 697.
Chapter 2
An Overview
Pran Ch:oPra
fIE practice of reserving or restricting jobs in govemment

services for designated social groups goes back more than a
hundred years- As with any practice which has such a long
history, this one has also developed great complexity, deviations and
mutations. Some of its manifestations bear little resemblance to the
original. tn the process it has happened that what began as a specific
solution to a specifrc problem in a specific area has infiltrated the
whole of society and its institutions, and almost all over India'
Therefore whatever infection grows around these mutations will
soon break out of its pafticular location and infect the whole body
politic. Conversely, whatever problems are solved through "reserva-
tion" in one location will become more amenable to the same remedy
in other places.
The origins of "reservations" lie in whar is now Tamil Niidu' and
in the protest of the non-Brahmins-all non-Brahmins, whether Hindu,
Muslim, Christian or any other-against the overwhelming predomi-
nance of Brahmins in government services. Therefore the initial
purpose of "reservatibns" was to restrict the proportion ofjobs which
Brahmins may hold in governnent services, and leave all the rest
open to an undifferentiated category, "non-Brahmins"- From this
base. reservations infiltrated the educational system because, and
rightly, the "non" felt that the cause of the Brahmins' predominance
in govemment service was that they were virtually the only well
educated community, thanks to their traditional functions in Hindu
society and the high status thus achieved by them in the Hindu
t4 The Politics of Backwardness
hierarchy.
This causation distinguishes the Brahmins' predominance in
the
early decades of British rule in India from th" p.ido-inun.. which
a
community may gain from its religious or other affinity with the
rulers of the day; as for example, the job advantages Muslims
ac_
quired in the states ruled by Muslim princes in Indiu, o. to
some
extent acquired during the later decades of British rule. The Brah_
mins acquired their high representation in jobs, both in British and
'princely" India, because candidates with the requisite educational
qualifications were to be found more easily among the Brahmins than
among other communities.
But this limited and specific causation had seeds of other causa_
tions in it, and these, more complex and far-reaching, were soon to
flower, watered by four separate streams. The first stream was the
great importance which the Indian mind has always attached to
"government service." The only jobs to which the policy of reserva_
tions applied were those in government or semi-govemment offices,
and these always constituted only a very tiny proportion of tlre total
job market, especially if the market of the self-employed was in_
cluded in the total. This is as true today as it was when the policy of
reservations began. But polemics regarding this tiny proportion of
jobs have consumed an enornous amount of the energy of the oppo-
nents and supporters of the policy of reservations, and in recent years
have caused social earthquakes of considerable intensitv.
This is partly because of the belief, whetherjustified L not, that a
man who is in government service can benefit many more of his caste
and community and is a multiplier of benefits for them. But another
reason is the sense of status which a govemment job gives, in the eyes
of others, to the incumbent and also to the community to which the
incumbent belongs. That is why job opportunities, or the lack of
them, in other walks of life have attracted much less attention. Even
the issue of reservation of seats in legislatures has not raised so much
controversy despite the fact that legislatures are supposed to be the
forums where govemment policies, at times including those concern_
ing reservations, are made or marred.
From this seedbed of government jobs the policy of reservations
flowered into various fields of education in the course of a few
decades. Because education up to school leaving certificate level is a
An Overview 15
necessary qualification for applying for jobs' especially those

in
jobs for
gou"**ni service, the demand for a "reserved" quota of
Iertain ethnic communities also brought with it a demand from these
same communities for a "reserved" number of seats in education; the
reservationists felt that without reserved seats in education, they
would not be able to fulfil their reserved quotas in governrnent
service.
At one time the demand for reserved seats in educational institu-
tions was confined to institutions of general education, because only
certificates of qualification in general education were required in
applying for governmentjobs. But from here, the demand spread into
inslitutions of professional education as well, such as engineering
and medical colleges. This happened partly because certificates of
qualification from these institutions also began to count in the market
for govemment jobs, and partly because, as this market became
satuiated. reservationists started to demand quotas of seats in the
professional institutions as well for entering the market for profes-
iional jobs. Therefore the demand for reservation in institutions of
professional education has become at least as insistent as in institu-
iions of general education. In fact, some major agitations for and
against reservations in recent years began in institutions of profes-
sional education.
But more potent has been the assistance given by the second
stream to the further flowering of reservations. This stream origi-
nated in the growing, and growingly assertive, differentiation within
that huge segment of Indian society which was earlier treated as an
undifferentiated mass of "non-Brahmins"' So long as the oljective
was only to restrict Brahmins and to assist non-Brahmins, the battle
over reservations was only between two adversaries- That helped to
keep ia intensity under control and to moderate the social turbulence
caused by it. What helped even mone was that the Brahmins as a
group werc tiny in number compared with the non-Brahmins, and
they decided discretion would be wiser than resistance in an arena
where democracy was going to give great power to greater numbers'
They also showed, as expected, the subtlety of intellect and anticipa-
tion they required for realising that as India developed and the
economy expanded, there would be other pastures for them to move
into. Therefore, precisely in the region, that is southem India' in
which they least resisted their ouster from pre-eminence in govern_

ment service, they most significantly gained new positions in busi_
ness, commerce and industry.
But as the years passed the battle came to be ioined bv other
adversaries too, and among them were many who pieferred io stand
their ground and to fight for their rights (as seen by them). perhaps
they chose to do so for a variety of reasons, and lack of flexibility and
subtlety, such as the Brahmins showed, might well have been among
these. But two other major reasons also persuaded them to take the
stand they took. First, they lacked the education, the skills and other
assets which the Brahmins had accumulated during the decades of
their ascendancy and then used for making a strong bid in the newly
emerging areas of the economy. Hence the insistence of these non_
Brahmins on their share in govemment jobs. Second, they had the
numbers with which to fight out their battle in the newly emerging
areas of democratic decision-making, a battle which the Brahmins,
lacking numbers, could not wage.
As the battle developed, new fronts opened up within the ranks of
the non-Brahmins. The less favoured among the non-Brahmins fought
the more favourcd with the same slogan of ,Justice for the under-
privileged" with which the non-Brahmins as a whole had fought the
Brahmins as a whole, one of the celebrated warriors on behalf of the
non-Brahmins being called by that precise name, Justice party, in the
former Madras presidency, wher6 the overthrow of the Brahmins
from governr4ent and politics was soon to become more complete-
and to be accomplished more non-violently-than anywhere else in
the country.
However, on the whole the inner differentiations among the non-
Brahmins as rival claimants for govemment jobs did not grow very
rapidly. This is confirmed by Dr G. Thimmaiah in his paper on the
history of reservations in Kamataka, including the former princely
state of Mysore, which has the longest history of reservations along
with what is now the state of Tamil Nadu. Dr Thimmaiah says ... . .
from 1874 till 1947, the backward classes included all castes except
Brahmins, Anglo-Indians, and Europeans" with very little distinction
between them in terms of the reservations for them. But this began to
change very rapidly after 1947 because of a sequence of accentuating
causes. The first was that out of a variety of mixed motives, the
l7
An Overview
scheduled castes
Congress party decided to accord reservations to the
and icheiutei tribes in govemment services' Among
the motives'
one was certainly the purely humanitarian one, urged by
Mahatma
had so repressed
Gandhi and otheis, thai for centuries Hindu society
these castes and tribes that unless they were assisted for a time by
be able to
positive discrimination in their favour, they would never
with others' But there
iet their fair share of the cake in competition
ivas also, undoubtedly, a political motive of a lower order' tlat the
scheduled castes and tribes' forming around 20 per cent of the popu-
lation, could be persuaded to become a loyal vote bank of the
Con-
gress.
But whatever the motives, they were soon to catalyse a sharp
differentiation of interests within the "non-Brahmin" mass, sharper
and soon to be more violent than the differentiation between the
interests of the Brahmins and the "nc:-". The differentiators now had
two arguments to choose from. First, the argument which had been
used against the Brahmins, that they had cornered too much and
must
be divested of some' The differentiators now used the same argument
for demanding that those among the non-Brahmins who had comercd
too much at G expense of other non-Brahmins must also be divested
of some. And second, the argument which the Congress (and others
too) had used in favour of reservations for the scheduled castes and
tribes, that they had been so unjustly deprived of so much for so Iong
the
that now tiere must be some discrimination in their favour' Hence
demand of the differentiators that there must also be some discrimi-
nation in favour of those among the non-Brahmins who were not of
the scheduled castes and tribes but whom society had historically
treated with some injustice and who therefore now deserved some
discrimination in their favour. These twin arguments' one drawing
upon the precedent created by the restrictions placed upon the Brah-
;ins, the other drawing upon the precedent created by the positive
discrimination in favour of the scheduled castes and tribes became
the third stream which nurtured the flowering of reservations' The
result was that, as Thimmaiah points out in his chapter, the second
Backward Classes Commission in Karnataka, the Gowda Commis-
sion, "reserved jobs for specific groups constituting about 75 per cent
per cent
of the population. The jobs it thus reserved amounted to 68
of the total iobs."
l8 The politics of Backwardness
A fourth stream was soon added by the dynamics of the electoral

process. Just as the Congress tried to build up its vote
bank among the
scheduled casies and tribes by conferring the privilege of reserva-
unon thern, other parties, and later the Congresi too, tried
!o5
build altemative vote banks by demanding the privilege for the more
to
backward among the non-Brahmins---{hat is for occupation groups,

classes, castes and other social formations which collectively came
to
be known as the "backward castes". The proportion of the population
of Kamataka thus classified by segnrents has now risen to 90 per
cent. This term began to be used for cast€s which, although more
advanced than the scheduled castes and tribes, were more backward
than the higher castes, like the Brahmins and Thakurs. The Constitu_
tion allows "special provisions for the advancement of any socially
and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes."
Until about the late 1950s southern India was more familiar than
the northern with the phrase -backward castes." Since reservations of
jobs by caste quotas had started much earlier in southern India,
the
system of rcservations percolated through society and the social
consciousness more widely there and much earlier. But from the
early l!)60s onwards, northern India began to catch up and was soon
to exceed the South in the vigour of ..backward castes" politics. The
Socialist Party leader, Ram Manohar Lohia, set the pace by carving
out an electoral base for his party among the backward castes in
Bihar. The soil was very fertile for him, because under the antiquated
but deeprooted land tenure system in Bihar, most land was owned,
but not cultivated, by the higher castes, and cultivated but not owned
by the peasant castes. The latter had indeed been severely exploited
for generations by the former. Lohia used their vast numbers among
the peasantry, and their resentments, to mobilise their political powei
under the collective banner of the ..backward castes", who stood
somewhere on the middle and lower rungs of the caste ladder, in the
rural economy below the high land-owning castes and above the
scheduled castes, the latter being neither owners nor cultivators but at
best only casual laSour and most often both jobless and landless.
Lohia's very significant successes in the elections in Bihar in the
period between India's third general elections in 1962 and the fifth in
1972 brucarl'rc, atemptation which no political party could resist. As a
An Overview 19
result the backward castes became a major factor in Indian politics

and in all parts ofthe country from about the late 1960s onwards' For
a time they were even able to install their best known leader, the late
Chaudhary Charan Singh, as India's Prime Minister, in 1979. His
incumbency was quickly cut short by other factors in India's politics
at that time. But it signified the strength of the backward castes,
which has proved more durable than Charan Singh and has grown
further in recent years.
This has had the effect, in the first place, of giving the reservations
principle a more entrenched position, and in the second place has
made its impact on society as a whole deeper and wider. If the
scheduled castes and tribes had been its only beneficiaries the prac-
tice of reservations might by now havebeen quietly allowed to wither
away. Although no one objects in principle to positive discrimination
for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, reservation of govern-
ment jobs for them beyond the lO-year period originally allowed by
the Constitution would have come under gteat pressure from the non-
beneficiaries, who in that event would have included the vast num-
bers of the backward castes. But, being important beneficiaries them-
selves, the "backwards", as they are sometimes collectively called,
have not only prevented that; they have also used their political clout,
much greater now than that of the scheduled castes and tribes, for
making a stronger and on the whole a more successful bid for their
full share of the reservations cake than the "scheduleds", if one may
so call them, have been able to make, though it was primarily for their
benefit that the framers of India's Constitution wrote the principle of
positive discrimination into the Constitution itself. They are so at-
tached now to the label "backward" because of the benefits it brings
them that a leading caste among them, the Lingayats of Karnataka,
fought hard and successfully when the state government took away
the label from them on the plea, which was factually correct, that they
had benefited well enough and long enough to have attained a much
higher educational, social and economic status and therefore should
make way for other backward castes.
Being more differentiated now among themselves than they used
to be when they were all lumped together as, and with, "non-Brah-
mins", different segments of the backward castes have gravitated
towards different political formations. Conversely, different forma-
20 Thc potitics of Baclwardncss
tions have wooed different segments among them. Both aspects were
amply demonstrated in Karnataka in the early 1970s when the Con_
grcss party, fearing that it was losing its hold on certain backward
castes, worked out an altemative coalition for which it mobilised
certain other backward castes. This has given the backward caste an
issue, and with it the issue of caste-based reservations, a much deeper
and more divenified penetration into society and politics than they
might have attained otherwise. How deep and diverse was amply
demonstrated in the mid-1980s when two of India's states which are
among the most advanced politically, Gujarat and Karnataka, were
thoroughly shaken by inter-caste conflicts on the issue of reserva-
tions. Since the web of caste runs tlrough the whole of Indian
society-it is pervasive not only among Hindus but in varying de-
grees among other communities too-whatever inflames the threads
of this web inflames Indian society as a whole. Few things inflame
them as much as issues of social stahrs and livelihood which, rightly
or wrongly, have come to be identified withjob reservations, and seat
reservations in educational institutions as the route to jobs.
The use---or misuse----of the electoral prccess for the purpose of
consolidating the political clout of a caste in the interests of the caste
has often been criticised as undemocratic. But in its defence it is
argued that even the framers of the Constitution must have assumed
a nexus between social justice for a community, even if it be a caste
community, and the community's representation as a community in
the legislatures. That is why they provided that seats in prcportion to
their share in the population shall be reserved for the scheduled castes
and tribes in the Union Parliament and the state legislaturcs, for that
is where policies are supposed to be made (a supposition which has
been severely strained in rccent years, but that is a different matter).
This reservation in legislatures was initially provided for a period
of ten years from the cornrnencement of the Constitution, but was
made renewable for another ten years if the need for it was still felt
at the end of the first ten years. But it has been extended again and
again by ten-year periods since the Constinrtion commenced more
than forty years ago at the time of this writing, and its end is not in
sight as yet. This only implies the ironic fact that this particular
safeguard for the weak is not seen to have served its purpose. But let
that be. What is more relevant here is a basic inconsistencv which
An Ovemiew 2l
cannot be resolved without running into a more basic dilemma.

The inconsistency is that while in the case of the scheduled castes
and tribes reservations were seen to be necessary both in jobs and
legislatures, for the "backwards" they were provided only in jobs.
The logic which commanded the former dual reservations has not
been extended in the latter case. But how long can it be denied to the
"backwards", seeing the very great political clout they now com-
mand? A beginning has been made already in a few places. Legisla-
tion regarding local body elections, which under the Constitution are
within the competence of states to legislate upon, has attempted in
one state to provide for reservations for certain backward classes
also. It is only a matter of time before the attempt is repeated in more
states, succeeds in some, is then extended to more of them, and from
there ascends to the Union level as well and into Parliament. When it
does, we will no longer be voting as individuals on individual issues
of the day but as groups bound together by primordial loyalties. We
might then be no longer able to argue, as the Law Minister argued in
Parliament as recently as 24 March that reservations cannot be made
in the judiciary because they have not been provided for in the
Constitution. They have not been provided for the "backwards" in
local body elections and yet an attempt has been made to provide
them.
Thus the actual operations and consequences of reservations have
brought to the surface some very troublesome contradictions and
dilemmas. The foremost and most dangerous is illustrated by what
happened in Gujarat almost throughout the first half of the 1980s and
especially in 1985. A severe and sometimes violent clash developed
between the beneficiaries and opponents of reservations, and India's
most rapidly advancing state, in economic terms, suffered a serious
setback. The course and the rights and wrongs of the agitation have
been discussed in detail by Shri Prakash in his second paper in this
volume and need not be gone into here. But the point here is that this
clash created the worry which triggered the seminar which is the
subject of this volume. Because caste permeates Indian society as a
whole, controversies over caste-based reservations are also similarly
pervasive. Therefore, clashes similar to the one in Gujarat, unless
forestalled in time, can be safely expected to rip up India as a whole
much more than such clashes can as, say, between Hindus and
Muslims, which are generally localised by the location of the antago-

nists.
And yet every approach at resolving or even containing these
contradictions opens up more dilemmas than ii rqsolves. Take the
first approach, which was also the first seed of what was later to
become to-day's full-blown reservations problem. There was much
to justify the restriction placed over a hundred years ago upon the
preponderance of Brahmins in the services. But it opened up two
dilemmas, and both are with us a hundred years later. The first relates
to the efficiency of the services, the second to issues of social justice.
The Brahmins, who had no special affinities with the rulers of the
day, preponderated because they were the best available for the
services. How far could the services go, without loss ofefficiency, in
repl.lcing them with recruits from among those who in the circum-
ftances of the day were less well-equipped for the jobs? But if the
services had to take the first step in this direction in the name of social
justice, how could they refuse to take the second, or the twentieth?
How could reservation be restricted only to certain categories, and
only up to a certain percentage even for these categories, when by the
same logic other categories could also claim it, and in still higher
percentages? The same logic which justified positive discrimination
in favour of the first layer of claimants below the Brahmins justified
it also in favour of all other layers below them and up to their full
proportion in the population, with consequences for efficiency which
could not be brushed under the carpet for long.
The issue of efficiency was bound to arise sooner or later. The
framers of the Constitution recognised that it would. In a section of
the Constitution specifically intended for explaining "special provi-
sions relating to certain clauses" made in other articles, in this case in
Articles 15 and 16, Article 335 says: "The claims of the members of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into con-
sideration, consistently with the maintenance of the efieiency of
administration, in the.making of apPointment to services and posts
. . ." (emphasis added).
There is an inconsistency here in so far as this rider is not added to
the reservations made for the same reason under Article 16 for "any
backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not
adequately represented in the services of the State" (which means
An Overview 23
whether at the level of the Union or State govemments). The Su-

preme Court has tried to rectify this inconsistency. In applying the
Constitution to the laws, the Court has not only bent the knee to
efficiency, it has done so in respect of all reservations. It ruled that the
jobs reserved for any reason or class should not exceed half the total,
and one of the reasons behind its ruling, as Shri Prakash explains in
Chapter 3, was that it felt that otherwise efficiency would suffer. To
that extent it can be said that the Supreme Court has removed the
discrimination which the "scheduleds" would have suffered if the
quantum of reservations for them had been restricted by consider-
ations of efficiency but not the quantum of reservations for other
classes and groups. But other inconsistencies remain.
Why should reservations be restricted to half the total jobs when
those who qualify for reservations within the prescribed criteria form
upwards of 6O per cent of the total population of tlre country, or even
a higher proportion in certain states under the criteria prescribed by
them? And how can one place the demands of justice above the
demands of efficiency in respect of half the jobs and reverse the order
in respect of the other half? And can one afford half the services of
state being rendered ineffrcient- assuming (an assumption the present
writer does not accept at face value) that non-Brahmins are by
definition less efficient-for the sake of benefining the very tiny
proportion of the "backwards" and "scheduleds" who would be
benefircd intris way, or who would be benefited even if the 50 per
cent limit were removed altogether?
On the pages which follow, three contributors have attempted to
soften these worries in various ways. D.L. Sheth assures us that "for
jobs in governrnent services and seats in educational institutions,
only thosc who meet certain minimum prescribed standards qualify.
These standards are fixed with reference to the prevailing competi-
tive standards for all, except that in the case of the scheduled castes
and scheduled tribes candidates they are relaxed or lowered only to a
certain degree" (emphasis added). He also assures us that "the rate of
utilization by the SCs and STs" of the job quotas reserved for them
"rcmains considerably low compared to tle extent of allocations
made for them."
But two difficulties arise here. First, not everyone is convinced
that the prescribed standards are lowered only to a certain extent. The
contrary opinion, that they are substantially lowered, is much more

widespread, and it is not confined to the categories adversely affected
by the reservations for some other categories. Second, if the reserva-
tions policy is to be accepted only on the assumption that in fact it
does not deliver the benefits to the intended beneficiaries, then it is a
policy which will increasingly come under attack as it succeeds in
delivering the intended goods, a fact which Sheth also admits (and
regrets). Would it not be better then to eliminate the need for the
slight lowering of standards for the beneficiaries, assuming the low-
ering is slight, by improving their competitiveness by other means
before they are exposed to the competition, and then to expose them
to the competition without lowering any standards at all for them?
But of course this whole question of how to improve their competi-
tiveness bristles with its own inconsistencies and contradictions,
some of which have been discussed by Suma Chitnis.
Mohit Bhanacharya has suggested another way round the clash
between the demands of social justice and efficiency. He examines
the demands of efficiency at two levels, the policy-making level and
the level of policy implementation. He argues that there is only
negligible, if any, representation for the scheduled castes and tribes at
the higher rungs of the administration, where policies are made.
Therefore reservations cannot be blamed for any inefficiency at that
level. But at the implementation level efficiency may well improve
with the increased presence of those for whom the jobs are reserved.
They belong to and therefore better understand the needs and the
modes of thinking and working of those categories of society for
whom the reservations are made in the first place. This can make
reservations a useful tool for social justice. But there are two difficul-
ties here as well. First, there is an increasing demand, and one that is
fully justified in its own terms, that the under-representation of the
reserved categories at the higher rungs of the administration must
also be rectified. Second, those who hold reserved posts at the lower
rungs of the administrative services do not service only those social
categories for whom reservations are made. They attend to the whole
gamut of the services supposed to be rendered by the administration
to society as a whole. On the argument that they have a special
understanding of the needs of one section of society, could it not be
argued that their understanding of the needs of the other sections of
An Overview 25
society might be below average? I would much rather put my faith in

the view expressed by some very senior administrators present at the
seminar, that after a little acclimatisation officials belonging to the
beneficiary categories appear no different from the others in the level
of their general efficiency.
Sheth, Bhattacharya, Chitnis and others have also attempted to
build a larger by-pass around the whole problem that arises from the
practice of reservations for such large categories as castes, without
disaggregating a category in terms of its internal differentiations.
This practice ignores the fact that there are as many differences in the
levels of privilege and deprivation within a caste group as there are
between caste groups. From this practice arises the very distressing
anomaly that sometimes an abler and poorer candidate .of a higher
caste, for which there may be no reservation, is overlooked in favour
of a richer candidate of a lower caste for which there may be. These
three and other participants in the seminar therefore suggested that
for the purposes of reservations people should be classified by their
economic status and not by caste, and in this way reservations would
be for those who are really poor. Sheth also suggests that reservations
should be made for Xhe poorer households, not for castes as a whole,
because that would eliminate the complaint, widespread and very
justified, that the better off within a caste group monopolise all the
reservations intended for the group as a whole. But these remedies
invite an objection which is as comprehensive as the remedies them-
selves.
The whole rationale for reservations rests upon the premise that
the rigid.caste hierarchy of Indian society, especially Hindu society,
has subjected the lower castes, as castes, to serious disabilities, and
has done so for such long periods of time throughout history that the
members of these castes are no longer able to take their due place in
society through open competition. Therefore they must be assisted
for a sufficient period of time through sufficiently positive discrimi-
nation in their favour so that they may come up to the level from
which they can openly compete with others on an equal footing.
Reservations for the poorer households rather than for caste catego-
ries as such would not be consistent with this rationale. Even less
consistent with it would be the more general proposition that regard-
less of their caste the poor as a whole be given the benefit of
26 The politics of Baclcwarclness
reservations. The disabilities of the poor of the highest castes cannot

be put down to historic social discrimination; these arise from an
unjust economic order, and the remedies for them must be found in
the right kind of politico-economic policies for the polity as a whole,
not in reservations for some on economic grounds.
There is a morc legitimate case for so administering reservations
that the benefits cannot in future be disproportionately comered, as
they have been in the past, by a small segment of the entitled group.
A remedy often proposed is that those within an entitled caste group
who have already risen up to the average economic standard in the
country, or who have enjoyed the benefits of reservations for a
specified maximum period of time, should be debarred from a contin-
ued share in these benefits so that others. who have not benefited
from them, may have better access to them in future. But this too has
been opposed on the ground that this is an attempt to drive wedges
within the entitled groups and to deprive such groups of the leader-
ship of those among their kin who have risen to higher levels of
competence. This opposition often comes from those who in fact
have received disproportionate benefrtl within the entitled group. So
it did also at the seminar which is the subject of this book, and it was
argued with much cogency and force. However, being essentially an
unreasonable position, and contrary to the basic consideration of
social justice not only between but within social groups, it did not
rcceive much support from other participants.
Seeing how intricate are the contradictions and inconsistencies
between and within the theory and practice of reservations, it should
not surprise anyone that very diverse suggestions for resolving them
were thrown up in the course of the intense discussions of the
chapters. It is worth pointing out that despite diversity of opinion
regarding specific recommendations and remedies, there was a broad
agreement on a number of general approaches. In fact most of the
recommendations flow from one or another of these approaches.
It was generally agreed for example that in the given historical
circumstances it was not only desirable but necessary for public
policy to intervene in a big way to mitigate, even if it could not
entirely remove, the severe injustices and disabilities which large
sections of Indian society have had to endure through the centuries.
The emphasis was less on questioning the intervention than on mak-
An Overview 27
ing it more effective. Though opinions differed on the specific ways

of making it so, most participants emphasised that while legislation
providing for reservations was important, it was at least equally
important that this benefit should be made better known to the
intended beneficiaries and they should be intensively tutored, at
public cost if necessary, in the ways in which they could use the
benefit effectively.
There was also little disagreement about continuing the reserva-
tions for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and also for the
lowest among the other backward castes. The disagreement was
mostly about extending reservations to the relatively better off among
the OBCs. There was wide disagreement on the question whether the
target groups of beneficiaries should be considered qualified by their
castes or by their economic status. But it was generally agreed that
whatever the criterion chosen, be it social or economic, caution was
needed both in withdrawing reservations from those presently en-
titled to them and in extending them to groups not entitled to them
already. Similarly, there was general agreement that the higher aim of
social and economic justice for those most needing it should not be
allowed to be frustrated by the benefit being monopolised by small
sections within the larger entitled groups at the cost of the less
enterprising but more deserving sections among these groups.
But the clearest impression that the dimensions left on one's mind
was that the case for reservations as_ well as the case against it, are
transitory, and even more so are the specifics of the two cases. What
is of more durable relevanae to the whole issue of reservations is the
totality of the socio-economic process. Whatever the origins of the
caste system in times now relatively remote, the hardships it started
to inflict upon the lower castes in relatively recent times have
crystallised out of an environment of economic stagnation and scar-
city. The stagnation has congealed an association between certain
castes and certain occupations, and where the occupations are of a
demeaning kind in one way or another they have also demeaned
those who are engaged in these occupations, and demeaned them as
much in their own eyes as in the eyts of others. Stagnation has also
inhibited those processes of socio-technological progress through
which a society grows out of the more distasteful ways of meeting its
functional needs.
Scarcity has added to this its own problems. It has made upward
mobility more difficult even for the abler and more enterprising
among the lower castes. They are not only held back by the stigma of
caste but also by the sheer lack of economic space above and around
them; the only way they can go is down. Caste prejudice is organised
against them as a way in which the more privileged may protect their
own islands against any attempt at assault by the underprivileged
castes, which together constitute more than half the population. When
state policy intervenes on behalf of the low-caste-poor (though ad-
mittedly it intervenes as much with a view to picking up votes as to
giving some relief to the deserving) caste prejudice is mobilised as a
dyke against an economic threat.
From this it follows that just as the socio-economic disabilities of
caste for the low-caste-poor have crystallised out of economic stag-
nation and scarcity, similarly the best solvent for the disabilities is
also going to be social evolution and economic growth. This is not
some kind of a latter day "trickle down" theory. Nor is it a stratagem
against specific intervention by public policy for carrying specific
relief to particular groups by the most direct and the shortest route. It
is only an argument that if the confennent or withdrawal of specific
benefits is attempted in ways which lead us into socio-political
turmoil and then socio-economic dislocation, the worst sufferers are
going to be those very sections of society which are the least able to
afford any additional suffering. The controversy over reservations is
therefore also a controversy over much larger social and economic
processes.
Chapter 3
Reservations Policy for Other Backward

Classes: Problems and Perspectives
Shri Prakash
SECTION I
The Question of National Consensus
tIE call for evolving a national consensus on the issue of

reservations policy for the Other Backward Classes (OBCs)
has by now been made by many leaders of different political
paEs. e significant cross_section of active political leaders holding
guidelines
importunt official positions recognize the need for a set of
which can regulati the future evolution of OBC reservations policy'
A call for Uuitdlng a national consensus was fint made by the then
Prime Minister nillv CanOtrl on 20 luly, 1985 in the context of
quota
efforts by the govemment of Gujarat to increase the reservation
in educationJ institutions for the OBCs following the report of the
by at
Rane Commission. Subsequently' similar staternents were made
least three chief ministers-those of Kamataka, Andhra Pradesh and
Gujarat. This provides the context for the present paper'
it is obvioui that any attempt at evolving guidelines for a proposed
national consensus cannot be accomplished at one stroke' The
ideas
put forward in this essay are meant to act as an input in an ongoing
iiscussion which needs to be extended to include the academic
adminis-
experts, political leaders at the national and local levels and
proracted process of interaction between those who
t utott. Onty a
reservation policies can produce a
suggest, formulate and implement
30
common national understanding of this

issue.
At the outset of this analysis it is necessary to explain
why the
subject of reservations for the category widely
tno*n u, OBCs_
properly described in the constitution of
India as ..socially and
educationally backward classes" (Articles
15(4); 1614;_needs to be
treated separately from the issue of reservations
for irr" schedul"d
Castes (SC) and the Scheduled Tribes (ST).
In brief, the explanation
lies as much in the history, sociology and politics
of reservation
policy as it does in the objective ofeffiiient ani
egalirarian economic
development. However, it must first be clarified that
while discussing
the issue ofreservations for SC/ST and OBCs
it is not true to identify
them as being associates or followers of particular political
parties.
No one can doubt the fact, as will be shown in deta;t
below, that it
yas the Congress party and its leaders who won over Dr B.R.
Ambedkar, the leader of the Depressed Classes, from position
a of
relative hostility to one ofcooperation and leadership
of the Constitu_
ent Assembly. In the post-1947 period too the Congi"s.
govemments
were active in promoting various welfare and participatory
schemes
for the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and ihe backward
classes.
In the case of the ',socially and educationally backward,, classes
being included in the scheme of preferential poli"i"r,
the Congress
and its leaders again played a prominent role. The Objectives
Reso_
lution of the Constituent Assembly was moved by Jawaharlal
Nehru
on December 13, 1946 and itresolved to provid" id"quut"
safeguards
for "minorities, backward tribal areas, depressed and other
backward
classes." So also, the famous clause 4 of Article 15 in which
it is said
"that nothing in this article shall prevent the state from making
any
special provision for the advancement of any socially and
education_
ally backward classes ofcitizens or for the Schedulei castes
and the
Scheduled Tribes," was also moved for adoption by prime
Minister
Nehru. It was again the cabinet, led by Jiwaharial Nehru which
decided in August, 196l that since no agreement could be reached
on
the implementation of the report of the Kaka Kalelkar
Commission,
which had given prominence to caste and not to economic
criteria,
the states could frame their own OBC lists under Article l5(4)
and
t6@).
At the time of the framing of the Indian Constitution
.leaders were associated
mosr political
with the Congress party in one way or
Reservations Policy for Other Backward Classes 31
parted company with their

another. Later on when some of them
to project the schgdu]3d caste and the
;;;;;.;;it"tion, thev tried the
OBC issues in their own tashion' Dr B'R' Ambedkar founded
Party of India to represent tl" ilt"Tttt of
the Depressed
n"p"ur""" in a few
except
Ail;t, uut it did not do too well in the elections to outline his
Ji"i"" of Maharashtra. Ram Manohar Lohia set out make
ri"*, on m" position of backward castes in Indian society and Party' He
politics of the Socialist
that the basis of one aspect of the
into the dominant "twice
assumed that his division of Hindu society
political or potential
bom" and other castes actually conformed to
arena' A closer
oolitical groups in the all-India national or electoral
social structure
!*urninu,ion of the regional variations and changes in
the kind of expectations likely to
*lrtti" ,f," country would belie
Subsequent to the deci-
follow from Ram Manohar Lohia's analysis'
were free to formulate
sion of the central government that the states
political figures
their own lists of backward classes, several leading
took the
like Devraj Urs from the Congress party in Kamataka again
policy for the
ini iuriu" in fo.th".iog the evolution of a reservations
of the nineteen
backward classes- Indeed, starting from the latter half
Commissions re-
sixties, between 1965 to 1987 Backward Classes
po*O't*i"" in Kerala, Kamataka, and Gujarat and once in Tamil
^Nadu, National
Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, in addition to the second
in 1980'
Sackward Classes Commission or the Mandal Commission
It is interesting to note that these Commissions were appointed both
Uy Congr".. id non-Congress governments and
often as a result of
initiatiu"es coming from above or in pursuance of
a strategy for
promoting social justice towards the backward classes' However' on
govemment (as in the case
itri, puttiJut- issue often a non-Congress
the Mandal Com-
of the Venkataswamy Commission in Karnataka or
power' In
mission at the Centre) took up the issue after coming into
thecaseoftheMandalCommissionagain'theCommission'sreport
by the
is under consideration at present even though it was initiated
Janata government.
It ha's not only been the different govemments which have agreed
on this method of appointing a Public Cornmission
for drawing up
OBC lists. comprehensive survey of the opinions of political
A
leaders in 1978 in the Karimnagar district of Andhra
Pradesh re-
party lines'
vealed how opinions about reservation policy cut across
Of the leaders interviewed, 72 per c,entbelonged

to the Congress (I),
I I per cent to the Janata pafiy, another
I I per cent to the CpI and the
rest had no parry affiliations. of these,
z+ p..."ni-.uio thar reserva_
tions in general should be time_bound
and;;;;;;;;;;"bte afrer
the
expiry of the stipulated deadline and
18 per cent ,.iJin.v should be
time-barred and hence not renewable (Study
by N. Ramchander, in
Reservation policy in India, ed. ty e.e.V. "Sfra._u
und K. Madhu_
sudhan Reddy).
It is therefore clear that on the issue of reservations the
lines
between different political parties are Utuo"O
unj *i"n ir comes to
actual policy formulation and implementation
there is often consider-
able overlap between the policies followed
by diff.r*igou"rn_.ntr.
One fact which stands out. both in the evolution
oi poficy anA in
terms of agitational or protest politics intended
to shape reservation
lol:y, i, thar much greater controversy and differences surround
OBC reservations than those meant for the scheduled
castes and
tribes. This also means that there are several
aspects of the criteria
used for classifying OBCs which remain under
continuing discussion
as also the extent ofjobs/college seats reserved
for them. By contrast,
the quotas sanctioned for SC/ST as well as the
scheduled liits naming
the sc/sr enjoy greater acceprance among the different national
parties.
One reason for looking at the possible causes
explaining the
greater social consensus about SC/ST reservations
and the more
numerous differences relating to OBC reservations
is to see whether
at the policy lever the factors leading to the first
result cannot be
helpful in promoting a similar effort relating to the
oBC issue. In this
context, it might be observed that in recent years
the consensus
relating to SC/ST reservations has been under
some strain in a few
regions due to inter-caste conflicts. What possible
consequences such
conflicts may have, if at all, for the scheme of SC/sr
reservation
remains a subject of separate study. In this paper
the focus is strictly
on the backward classes. The issue of the consensus
about SC/ST
reservations is being raised primarily from a
comparative view_
point.
A vigorous intellectual and reformist opinion against the presence
oflntouchability within Hindu society was first viiced
by the social
reform movements which started in the nineteenth
century. Both the
Punjab believed in
Brahmo Samaj in Bengal and the Arya Samaj in
when it concemed the issue of
promoting a dual process of reform
the Shudhi move-
untouchability. As the Arya Samaj did through
either through
ment, the untouchables were to become caste Hindus
possible
formally adopting ritual ceremonies of the latter or through
The fact
inter-caste .irriug", as promoted by the Brahmo Samaj'
against untouchability required a change of perception
that a struggle
and practii! on ihe part of the upper castes was best brought out in the
philosophy and actions of Mahatma Gandhi' Temple entry move-
ments for Harijans were to be accorrpanied by an effort at changing
In retro-
the traditional dislike of manual labour by the upper castes'
spect, it was this kind of thinking which underpinned the policy of
reservations for the Depressed Classes. Job reservations would en-
sure that upper caste employees would accept to work with the
former untouchables. By this it was hoped to better the conditions
of
SC/ST who provided the most vlsible examples of social and regional
backwardness in conEmporary Indian society' Such a policy
was
justice and win the
intended to be an illustration of growth with social
consent and participation of other deprived sections for the demo-
cratic political system as a whole.
Facts too supported the view that untouchabllity in itself consti-
tuted a key element of enforcing hierarchy within the caste system
and that to undermine it, when successful would alter that
system.
"ifo.tt
Although the law of occupational specialization in regard to
untouchable castes had already been weakened considerably by the
time of the 1931 census, that of strict residential segregation and
marital exclusion in rural India was and is applicable' According to
the 1931 census, e.g. of the Bombay Presidency, many of the known
untouchable castes had moved away from their traditional occupa-
tions to others within the rural economy and society' Amongst the
bhangis or the scavengers almost 572 ottt of every 1000 persons had
stopp;d pursuing their traditional occupations' Similarly' 547 out of
every 1000 chamars/mochis or shoemakers were no longer engageo
in their traditional occupations' Among the mahars or the village
watchmen in the Bombay Presidency only 179 out of every 1000
were said to be foliowing their traditional occupation' If occupational
specialization or diversification is to be considered as a yardstick
for
modemization, then the above mentioned untouchable castes were
34 The politics of Backwardncss
clearly ahead of others. Among the sutars or carpenters,

for example,
776 outofevery 1000 persons were following
tireir traditional occu_
pations,in 193 l. Among the lohars or blacksi.f
ths in Bombay presi-
dency this ratio was 731 out of every lW (Census
of India, 1931,
vol. VIII, Part I, Statement No.l7).
In the pre- 1947 days, occupational diversification
however did not
remove the social disabilities associated with the
stigma of untouch_
ability, a fact which remains true today when the Ind]an
Constitution
has abolished and outlawed untouchab ity and social practices
based
o:l it. Discrimination on grounds of being an untouchable was
not
necessarily related to being more or less well_off or poor.
The mere
fact that one belonged to a caste locally considered;
untouchable
might exclude him/her from using tlie village well, temple,
or the
village chaupal and the right to use such facilities is a subject
of many
unknown informal personal struggles even today. G.S. Sharma
has
documented for us many situations in which barbers refused
to serve
chamars even when the latter were willing to pay for the former,s
(G.S. Sharma, teg islation and Cases on Untouchability
1"yi"_"1 and
Scheduled Castes in India.ICSSR, 1975). Such cases are known onlv
when a formal complaint is made or a commission of inquiry
appointed.
A commission of inquiry appointed by the Rajasthan High Court
to investigate reports on the continuing practice of untouchability
in
the town of Bari Sadri has found that not only does it prevail
there but
is sometimes seen in its crudest form. It has been lound that such
discrimination prevails in govemment offices, the municipal council
and in the lower munsif courts. Affidavis have been submitted
to the
commission by the scheduled caste employees in the primary health
centre testifuing that they are not allowed to drink thl stoi,ed water
nor is the night chowkidar of the municipal council allowed to
use the
office supplies; and the munsif court has denied minimum wages ro
its scheduled caste employees for thrce years (Economic and politi_
cal Weekly, August 30, 1986). More such facts are included in
Appendix I to this chapter. An all-India survey by a team of experts
discovered many regional variations in the extenf of participation
by
scheduled castes in the educational system. HowevJr, on" com-on
factor they found was the continuing belief in caste endogamy.
Another was the invisible rule that scheduled caste students iouid
Resemations Policy for Other Backward Classes 35
that they contin-

,make friends only among'the scheduled castes and
ued to have a poor image of their own status because of the treatment
they received from other caste students' Consequently'
they lacked
and were diffident
the confidence to compete openly for employment
about venturing into the private sector' (Suma Chitnis' A I'ong Way
to Go: Repoi on a Survey of Scheiluleil Caste High School and

College Sudents in Fifieen States of lndia,ICSSR, p' 16l')
Another
that many from urban and rural areas
.studyif college students found
were prejudiced against the Harijans. (R'N' Prasad, Caste Prejudice
Amoig bollege Studrntt, A Socio-Psychological S/ady' Varanasi:
Rupa Publishers, 1979.)
ihe need for protective discrimination or for job and political
reservations was first voiced by those among the untouchables who
had done well in relative economic terms. The mahars in the Bombay
Presidency, for example, had been among the first to move away
from theii traditional occupation as village watchmen and take up
jobs in the army and the railways' This headstart led to motivation for
ieform and the growth of political awareness among them' The
movement for political representation for the Depressed Classes was
led by a su""esifol mahar barrister, B'R. Ambedkar' Similarly in the
of th. chamars in the United Provinces, their consolidation into
"ur.
a recognizable constituency followed the growth amongst them of
a
fairly affluent section due to a sudden spurt in the demand for leather
goois during the Second World War. It is these better off sections
*ho huu" provided the leadership to the scheduled casteVtribes'
The untouchable castes found advocates and leaders not only from
among the ranks of their own better off section but also from among
the many illustrious thinkers and social activists produced by the
growth of Indian nationalism-Swami Vivekananda, Jyotiba Phule'
i{arain Guruswami, Ramaswami Naicker' Lokhitwadi, Gokhale'
Agarker, Munshi Premchand, B. Pantulu, R'Venkatraman, etc' By
the 1920s the country was dotted with movements for giving an equal
status to untouchables within Hindu society. By 1924 the mahars in
the Bombay Presidency had launched a "self respect" movement
under the leadership of Dr' Ambedkar. In Punjab the Adi-Dharm
movement was started in l926.In Bengal there was the Nama Sudra
Andolan, in the Madras Presidency the Adi-Dravida, and in Kerala
the Adi Karnataka Andolan. The Charuman' Palaya, etc' harijan
groups started movements against untouchability.

In Andhra there
was an Adi Andhra movement and in Kanpur an Adi Hindu
move_
ment. Later Mahatma Gandhi published the newspaper F1a rijan.
He
also renanrcd the Akhil Bharatiya Anti_Untouchability lrague,
started
by Amritlal V. Thakkar, the Servants of Untoucha6les Socie8 and
this subsequently became the now famous Harijan Sevak Sangh.
There was thus an all-India scope and dimension to the movement for
helping the scheduled castes to fight untouchability through eco_
nomic, political, cultural and educational means. It was easy to
achieve a consensus on this iss'le.
It is to be emphasized that whereas untouchability in its different
dimensions provided an easy all-India demarcating line within which
the scheduled castes could be identified and about the removal of
which many social and political leaders were in agreement with each
other, the same was not true of the factors which led to the rise of the
non-Brahmin movement, the progenitor of the social category later to
be described as the Other Backward Classes (OBCs). What the
following analysis will emphasize is that purely political factors and
rcsponses had a much greater role to play in shaping the OBCs as a
constitutional, legal and social beneficiary. Hence political action has
a'much greater relevance in determining the legai and political time
limits within which such a category can be socially beneficial, than is
the case with the SCTST groups, who constitute a collectivity in a
more fundamental cultural, economic and geographical sense.
The origins of the social category called the OBCs goes back to
the non-Brahmin movement and the decisions made by the ruler of
Mysore to give preference to the backward classes. In re-examining
this piece of history one has to ask a question which is of great
contemporary relevance for policymakers today. Was the classifica_
tion of the OBCs, which emerged during this period, a natural out-
come of a social movement or a policy decision of the existing
govemment? This distinction has a vital relevance because the de_
gree to which the state has fashioned its own criteria and imposed its
own interpretation on social events is more easily changeable than a
policy franework that is the direct outcome of social conditions not
acceptable to large groups of people. Thus untouchability creates a
deprived social constituency which is unique in its own right and for
whose abolition various special social devices are needed. Is this
equally true of the OBCs? [n order to answer this question one needs
to reconsider some history.
SECTION II
The Non-Brahmin Movement: Largely a Regional Phenomenon
One of the factors that distinguished the social structure in Tamil

Nadu from many other parts of India during the late nineteenth
century was the interlinkage between large landholding educational,
professional and political leadership within many Brahmin families,
which set them apart from families belonging to other castes and
gave the Brahmins as a whole a well-knit appearance as a social and
a political group. It is important to note that even at the start of the
twentieth century Tamil Nadu-then a part of the Madras Presi-
dency-was not a region dominated by extensive commercial agri-
culture. It could boast of few merchant princes and even fewer
captains of industry. Unlike the Permanent Settlement in Bengal, the
Ryotwari Settlement in the Madras Presidency did not lead to a large-
scale transfer of land, primarily because the extent of the revenue
burden imposed on agriculture had over the years been more closely
related to the costs of production. The large-scale "sunset" auctioning
of land in Bengal initiated certain changes in the social composition
of the landed elites. It created an avenue for upward mobility for
persons who had acquired wealth in trade as agents or carriers for the
East India Company, which had been active in that region of India for
more than three centuries. Such a social process also widened the
caste base of the Bengal landed and urban elites, a phenomenon that
led to the coining of a new phrase, the Bhadralok, to describe the
Bengal elite-a term which spanned families from at least three
castes, Brahmans, Vaidyas or Vaishyas and Kayasthas. This to a
certain extent foreclosed the attempts to mobilize sections of the
affluent upper castes to head a non-Brahmin movement. It is to be
noted that the caste associations formed in Bengal in the nineteenth
century have disappeared after independence. There has also not
been any real pressure from below for instituting OBC reservations
which do not exist in West Bengal. Such social mobility was typical
of areas where landed property showed a quick turnover as in Bengal,
or.where clan systems were more prevalent than sub-castes. Govern_

ment-sponsored new land settlements in westem Up, where peasants
' .of different origins predominate over older land settlements is an-
other example. In the Jat-based villages, as in Punjab, Haryana or in
regions of intensive commercial agriculture as in Gujarat, many
Kanbis could rise to become Patidars or Patels along with a relative
increase in their affluence during intervals ofprice rise, as during the
cotton boom in the 1860s or the First World War. Also, in Bengal,
western UP, Punjab, and Gujarat there was no attempt at mobilizing
a politi:al movement for demanding caste-based privileges, except
for the untouchables, who existed everywhere in Hindu society.
In contrast to other regions of India, in Tamil Nadu and Mysore,
both parts of the Madras Presidency at that time, many of the Brahmin
families wielded economic and social power quite out of proportion to
their numbers. In Madras Presidency as a whole the Brahmins consti-
fited 3.3Vo of the Hindu population. InTamil Nadu their share of the
total population ranged from I % in the Nilgiri s to 3.7Vo in Tinnevelli,
Chingleput and Trichinopoly. This contrasted for example with Gujarat
where Brahmins constituted 5% of the population in Baroda state, in
central Gujarat and north Gujarat, 47o in south Gfiarat and nearly 1Vo
in Kathiawad. (Census of India. 1931, Madras Presidency and Baroda
State.) In Tamil Nadu the Brahmins constituted a high proportion
among the larger landowners. In Gujarat this position was occupied
by Rajput or Patidar (Patel). In the Madras Presidency generally, the
Brahmins had long been the literati and hence occupied the position
of clerks, administrators and officials, whether tlre rulers were Tamil
kings, Vijaynagar viceroys or the East lndia Company. Once again,
the contrast with Gujarat or Bengal is interesting because in these two
regions the literati came not only from among the Brahmins but also
from the other castes like the Kayasthas or the Vaishyas, who as
traders in Gujarat looked after personal or public accounts, etc. One
hears of the famous Nagar Sheths of Gujarat who ran their businesses
on their own (Kenneth Gillion: Ahmedabad). In Tamil Nadu the
Brahmins invariably held the position of the village Karnam or the
village accountant and in appreciation of their religious and secular
services they had been awarded land ights as Mirasdars and lramdars.
In the case of the Tamil and to a certain extent Telugu Brahmins,
..- traditional status, access to landed wealth, generations ofinvolvement
Reservations Policy for Other Baclcward Clnsses 39
in the administration and aloofness from cultivation were responsible

for the Brahmin domination of the western-educated, professional '
middle class from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. This
was best illustrated by the male literacy rates in English which were
28.21o for theTamil Brahmins as against 17.4% far the Vellalas, the
leading non-Brahmin caste group in Tamil Nadu. Also, due to their
greater involvement with English education the Brahmins could not
be closely identified with the renaissance of the Tamil language and
literature, a task performed mostly by members of the non-Brahmin
intelligentsia. This again meant that the issue of developing a Tamil
culture could become an added element in the opposition to Brahmin
dominance as such.
One of the consequences of the explicit Brahmin dominance at the
regional level in many parts of the Madras Presidency was the attempt
by the educated and professional sections of other castes to mobilize
their caste associations. Between 1905 and 1930 a great number of
caste associations were set up with the aim of strengthening caste
identity, improving caste status and fostering mutual assistance. This
provided the backdrop to the formation of the Justice Party and the
demand for reserved seats for the non-Brahmins in the legislature.
The mere existence of caste associations or even a non-Brahmin
movement wzrs not sufficient to get the principle of political reserva-
tions for the non-Brahmins accepted. It was also a fact that at this
time the British govemment, sensing the growing support for the
nationalist movement, was looking for new allies who would support
it within the framework of a limited constitutional government. The
criteria for choosing such allies was that unlike the previous ones
(zamindars, for example) who were chosen mainly for their loyalty,
the new allies should enjoy proven mass support. The ability of the
non-Brahmin movement to institutionalize itself into the Justice Party
and win support from caste associations was a good reason why in
March 1920 the British-appointed arbitrator Lord Meston decided in
his judgement on the implementation of the Montague-Chelmsford
Reforms to neserve 28 of the 65 non-Muhammedan general seats. It
was clearly the political factor which weighed with the Justice Party
when they got the issue of reservations in the legislature settled in
their favour. For the British govemment this was an act of expedi-
ency but in the special social situation of Tamilnad it signified the
entry of a new social strata into political life and activity. It needed
the special sanction and support of the British state at that time to
convert the heterogenous social groupings constituting the non-Brah_
min movement into a reserved political constituency within Tamil
Nadu. Once the Congress-led Constituent Assembly had decided to
introduce adult suffrage in 1949 the need for continuing with the
political reservations for the backward classes disappeared. In this
context, it must be recognized that the principle of reservations in
employment or educational institutions fot the backward classes in
the Indian Constitution was based on the concept of according wel-
fare and equality to the backward sections of society and not on the
principle of political expediency. In this sense there was a difference
in the nature of the political principles that underlay the question of
reservation for backward classes in the pre-1947 period and the way
this issue was defined in the Indian Constitution.
This distinction in the case of political reservations for the back-
ward classes, which were discontinued after 1947, also extends to the
reservation of government jobs. In connection with this issue the
term "backward classes" first acquired a technical meaning in the
princely state of Mysore. In 1918, the Mysore govemment appointed
a committee to enquire into the question of encouraging members of
the "backward communities" in public service. Marc Galanter has
narrated the details of this process (Marc Galanter, Cornpeting Equali-
ties, 1984, Chapter 6). What he has not emphasized is that during rhe
British period the official committees, by and large, either included
the untouchafles and the tribes within the rubric of the "backward
classes" or when they excluded them they often went by the view
generated by the non-Brahmin movement that everyone except the
Brahmins were backward. Ai least in South India this view became
so widespread that the Miller Committee, appointed by the Mysore
govemment in 1918 under the chairmanship of Sir Lesley Miller, was
prepared to ignore the fact that a few castes had the same literacy rate
as the Brahmins. The Miller Committee classified the Mudaliars and
Pillais as backward when they had a ten per cent literacy rate, almost
the same as Brahmins. By this method the Mysore government hoped
to keep all the non-Brahmin castes as their own supporters because
they wrongly identified the leadership of the freedom movement with
the presence ofpower hungry Brahmin leaders. Thus, purely political
Reservations Policy for Other Backward Classes 4l
considerations were always crucial in the pre-1947 period in the

classification of the backward classes. The need to tum a policy of
granting concessions to the backward classes into an instrument for
securing some kind of broad support against the nationalist move-
ment meant that no strict criteria could be formulated for classifying
the OBCs. Different committees used wide definitions to net as large
a cross section as possible and there was no agreement on an all-India
basis on who constituted the backward classes.
After the issue of the Non-Brahmin Manifesto in 1916 and the
formation of the government in Madras by the Justice Party, the latter
gave a definitive push to job reservations for the non-Brahmins in the
govemment. The First Communal Govemment Order on September
16, l92l extended job reservations for non-Brahmins from revenue
to all departments. A staff selection board and then a public services
commission was formed to implement these reservation quotas. How-
ever, the attempt to raise the non-Brahmin movement to an all-India
level on a social plane was a failure. The first all-India non-Brahmin
congress was convened in Bombay by Ramaswamy Mudaliar. He
openly described the non-Brahmin movement as 'Jobocracy: the
securing of jobs to the men of our communities and I am not ashamed
of calling myself a job hunter." No other words could portray better
the fact that at root it was the educated section of the landed non-
Brahmin castes who were in the forefront of the demand for job-
reservations. The second and last attempt to convene an all-India
non-Brahmin congress was at Amaraoti in 1925. This occasion was
marked only by a speech from the Raja of Panagal who suggested
some constitutional reforms and inclusion of items like handspinning
from the programme of the Indian National Congress. It was not only
the case that the backward classes movement remained restricted to
the local and regional levels. Even when organizations like the
BAMCEF were formed during the 1970s, these were associations
mostly of persons already having government jobs and fighting for
better or faster promotions. In this sense the non-Brahmin movement
was the largest one of its kind and created the ground in South India
for the formation of many caste-based associations that continue to
sustain the demand for and practice of reservations there till today.
The special conditions which produced the non-Brahmin movement
in the South did not exist elsewhere in India to the same extent.
SECTION M
The Constituent Assembly and the Constitutional provisions
The perspective in terms of which the issue of reservations for the

scheduled castevtribeyother backward classes (SCVST/OBCs) was
to be viewed, was to change with the dawn of freedom. The British
administration had at best produced a series of ad hoc responses and
estimates of population of the Depressed Classes, with a view to
gaining their political support to oppose the Congress by granting a
few concessions. Neither the objective nor the criteria of an implicit
preferential policy were ever stated clearly. They could not be, be_
cause in the minds of the British rulers most of these concessions
were a short-term political device to try and split the nationalist
movement. The debates in the Constituent Assembly on the other
hand, and the measures or principles this distinguished gathering
embodied in the Indian Constitution, set out the approach towards a
reservations policy in terms of the goals of promoting nuional inte-
gration and providing social justice to the deprived soctions of the
population. The exact meaning of the ideas and formulations of the
Constituent Assembly need to be restated today, when opposite
arguments are being put forward either for entirely doing away with
a policy of reservations or for indiscriminately extending it on a
grand scale. The middle course proposed by the Constituent Assem-
bly, even if it was not written down in the Constitution explicitly,
needs to be elucidated in order to devise a practical programme of
action for attempting to build a national consensus on the reserva-
tions policy issue.
The first feature to note in relation to the principle of preferential
treatment in the Indian Constitution for SC/ST/OBCs is that the word
caste is used only in rclation to the Scheduled Castes. Both in Article
15(4) (which is a part of the broader article prohibiting discrimination
on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth) and in Article
16(4) which is included within Article 16 promising equality of
opportunity in matters of public employnrent, the refercnce to those
deserving special treatment is to "any socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens or the Scheduled Castes and the Sclred-
uled Tribes" and to "any backward class of citizens which in the
the services under

opinion of the state is not adequately represented in
the state." It is well known that both Article l5(4) and
Article 16(4)
wereintroducedbyPanditJawaharlalNehruaftertwojudgementsby
of 'commu-
the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the system
nal' reservations of government jobs for the non-Brahmins in the
Madras Presidency. In a significant intervention during the
debate'
"economically" had not
Jawaharlal Nehru explained why the word
Jawaharlal
been used separately in phrasing Anicle 15(4) ' According to
Nehru, this was becauie those who drafted Article 15(4) thought
of
backwardness as cumulaiive. The.word 'Socially' in the Article' he
said, covered many things and iertainly included 'economically''
(Parliamentary Debates, vol. XII-XIII (Part II)' col' 9830')
The many things that cumulatively would constitute backward-
ness were not spelt out by the Constituent Assembly nor listed in the
Constitution as such. It was assumed that this task would be per-
formed by the Commission which may, according to Article 340' be
appointed by the President "to investigate the conditions of the
r*iutty and educationally backward classes within the territory of
India and the difficulties under which they labour and to make
recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by the Union or
any state to remove such difficulties and to improve their condition'"
One fact however stood out. There were only very few persons either
from South India or Bihar who thought caste in itself to be a primary
indicator of backwardness. The view expressed by Shri Chandrika
Ram from Bihar was: "Our society is divided into three sections-the
highest consisting of that section known as Scheduled Castes and the
lowest as Harijans, while the third occupying a middle position
between these two and consisting of a larger portion of our people is
what may be termed as the Backward Class." Such an opinion was
far less common than that expressed by Dr Dharam Prakash who
said: "In fact there is no community which does not have a section of
people which is backward, whether economically or educationallyor
socialty." (C o nstitue nt As s embly D eb ate s : 3O | | | | 19 49' pp. 680-86')
We will examine below the extent to which the post-1947 commis-
sions on backward classes used caste as a primary factor in listing the
backward classes.
It is not only that the Constituent Assembly sought to de-empha-
size caste as a denotation of backwardness. Over time, it sought to
reduce and finally to abolish caste as

an indicator of backwardness.
Ttris aim is to be seen nor only in the legal
abolition oi untoucnaUlity.
It is also to be seen in the Directive priicipf",
of Stut" folicy. Article
38 clearly affirms that..the state shall
strive to promote the welfare of
the. people by securing and protecting
as effectively as ir may a social
order in which justice-social, economic and poliiical_shall
inform
all the instirurions of the national life, and ir
s;all
in
farticular strive
to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour
to eliminate
inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities
no1 only among
individuals but also amongst g.oup, oip"ople residing
in different
areas or engaged in different vocations." Article
46 also states that
"the state shall promote with special care the
educational and eco-
nomic interests of the weaker sections of the people
and in particular
of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled iribes and shall protect
them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.,, (Cinstitu-
tion of India, Central Law Agency, Allahabad, 19g 1.) As
opposed ro
the interpretation proposed by Marc Galanter that no specific
goal
was set to be achieved through the policy of reservations,
the goal
was clearly stated to be the increased werfare of the weaker
sections
through a reduction of inequalities in income, education and
other
status facilities. The clear import of reading together the constitu_
tional provisions relating directly or indirectly to reservations is
that
as a device they were expected to be used for a long period of
time,
or as long as the majority view was that goals likl reduction in
inequalities and status had not been fully achieved.
At the same time, reservations were seen by the constitution
makers as a policy which also had some negative aspects and there_
fore needed to be worked carefully within well-defined li.its ro a, to
carry the support of those who would not be able to benefit from it.
In the case of reservations of seats in the legislature this consensus
was sought to be achieved by limiting such reservations only to
scheduled castes/tribes and then restrictrng the period of such reser_
vations initially to ten years (Article 334). The really educative part
of the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly was that the leaders
of the scheduled castes sought actively to build a consensus on the
issue of reservations by accepting and even proposing restrictions on
the concessions being granted. It is remarkable that the clause re_
stricting the reservation of seats for the SC/STs in the legislature to
Reservations Policy for Othzr Baclcward Classes 45
ten years only was introduced by Dr B.R. Ambedkar who was the
prima donna among the Harijan leaders. When some of the sched-
uled caste members spoke against the time limit Dr Ambedkar re-
minded them that 'they have rcally no cause for complaint because
the decision to limit the thing to ten years was rcally a decision which
has been arrived at with their consent. If at the end of the ten years,
the Scheduled Castes find that their position has not improved or that
they want further extension of this period it will not be beyond their
capacity to invent new ways of getting the same protection which
they are promised here." (Constiuent Assembly Debates:291811949,
pp. 696-7) Such a strategy had a definite impact on those from
among the upper castes who might not have agreed with the policy of
reservations for the scheduled casteytribes. As Jagat Narain Lal from
Bihar put it: "If we have accepted this principle of reservation in the
case of the scheduled castes and the aboriginals, it is because we have
seen speaker after speaker rising from among the scheduled castes to
support a time limit on reservations." (Ibid.,251811949, p. 691.) The
moral of this illustration is that a conscious strategy of accepting a
limit within which a policy of reservations is to be worked, provides
a viable mechanism for promoting a consensus in rclation to such a
policy and hence minimizes the social conflict likely to arise from
having to accord preferential treatment to given sections of society,
sometimes at the cost of others. In the context of a policy of backward
class reservations, we need to rcnew the search for limits acceptable
to the majority social opinion in different parts of tle country. Such
a framework does not exist within the Constitution nor has one
.
evolved subsequently at the national or local levels, giving rise to

situations of inter-caste social and political conflicts on more than
one occasion.
The l0-year time limit was not the only compromise accepted by
the scheduled caste leaders in order to promote a political consensus.
In Article 335, which specifically promised that in the making of
appointmens to services and posts in the Union or a state the claims
of the members ofthe scheduled castes and tribes would be taken into
consideration, a tough qualification was introduced which said that
this would be done "consistently with the maintenance of efficiency
of administration." This part of Article 335 clearly states that unless
the criterion of merit is combined with reservation of posts, effi-
ciency would be the likely cisualty. In purely formal terms, no

such
qualification was introduced in Article l5(4) and 16(4) menrioned
above, which refer to reservation of jobs for the backward classes
although in practice a minimum level of competence, as seen in a
specific percentage of marks, is required of any candidate who is
entitled to avail ofa reserved quota. This defect needs to be removed
since there is no reason why the qualification about efficiency should
not apply to both SOST and the OBCs. Further, Dr Ambedkar fully
expected that in order not to contravene the more fundamental rule
about all citizens having an equality of opportunity, the number of
jobs or college seats reserved for SCyST/OBCs should .,be confined
to a minority of seats." In fact, in his final summing up of the debate
on Articles l5(4) and 16(4) he specifically said that the word .,back-
ward" had been brought in to limit the number of reservations to a
minority of the available seats. In answer to a question by T.T.
Krishnamachari whether his observation about reservations applying
to only a minority of the seats was justiiiable, Dr Ambedkar said: .,If
the local government included in this category of rcservations such a
large number of seats, one could very well go to the Supreme Court
and say that the reservation is of such a magnitude that the rule
regarding equality of opportunity has been destroyed." (Cowtituent
Assembly Debates; 3Ol | | | 1949, pp. 7 Ol-2.)
It is pertinent to emphasize that Dr Ambedkar regarded the rule
about equality of opportunity as being more fundamental and one
which an excessive degree of reservations would tend to undermine.
The need to be able to restrict reservations to a limit which does not
encroach too greatly upon the principle of providing equality of
opportunity needs to be re-emphasized today, when sbme political
leaders visualize a rapid expansion of a system of reservations as a
viable welfarc strategy through which they can mobilize quick politi-
cal support. Whether this is at all a realistic expectation will be
discussed in the last section of this paper. The point to be emphasized
is that even if a strategy of expanding rcservations were to be politi-
cally rewarding, it would still conrradict the admirable principle laid
down by the founders of the Indian Constitution, that reservations
can be instituted only if ample safeguards are provided to ensure that
equality of opportunity is available to the majority of the population.
Reservations Poticy for Other Backward Classes 47
SECTION ry
Problems Regarding Classification of Backward

Ctasses since 1947
The question ofbeing able to clearly demarcate the Scheduled Castes/

Tribes and the Other Backward Classes was left to be decided either
by the President himself or by a commission appointed by him' lble'
scheduled castes and tribes can be referred to only briefly because the
main issue is the criteria used for classifying the OBCs and estiryat-
ing their population. ., ' '
fne tggi had estimated the total of the Depressed Cl4ss€s
""nsusin British India and Ll.l million in the States and
to be 39.1 million
Agencies. The criteria used to identify these castes were not those of
theoretical untouchability i.e., whether a caste, due to its varnd status,
was considered susceptible to touch afid distance pollution. Each
Provincial Superintendent involved with the 1931 census was told to
"reckon as depressed only those castes who definitely suffer from
serious social and political handicap on account of their degraded
position in the Hindu social scheme." The list of llepressed Classes
put together by the l93l census was to be the basis for the special
electoral representation given to the Depressed Classes in the 1935
Government of India AcL Then the Scheduled Castes order promul-
gated by the President in 1950 basically re-enacted the 1936 list. It is
significant to note this fact because it takes away the edge from the
criticism that the scheduled castes list, as it stand$+eduF, is based on
narrow political considerations favourable to the Indian National
Congress then and the Congress(I) now'
The 1941 census enunrerabd 12.6% of the total population of
i'pdi:l*edlndia as the Depressed Classes. The l95l census updated
thi( istimate to 14.5% of the population and according to the 1971
census the scheduled castes comprisd 14.6% of the population.
After the additions and the deletions made by the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes Lists (Modification) Order 1956, there have
been no further changes in that list on an all-India basis apart from a
few small changes being made for Jammu and Kashmir (1956),.-'
Andaman and Nicobarlslands (1959), Dadra and NagarHaveli (1962)'
Pondicherry (1964), Uttar Pradesh (1967), Goa' Daman and Diu
(1968), Nagaland (1970) and Sikkim (1978). This again demon-

strates a vital aspect of the scheduled caste list often not
emphasized
enough. There has been little or no attempt by the parties
in power to
alter or add on to the scheduled castes liat in any significani
*uy .o
as to confer concessions on various new castes o. gaup,
in the hope
of creating a political alliance with them. One of the criticisms
levelled, by the leaders of the Bahujan Samaj party for example,
has
been that too few from the Dalits (SC/ST/OBCs) fin<t a place in
govemment jobs or education and politics, and that very linle
has
actually been done for these deprived groups. This policy of relative
neutrality in the matter of defining those groups to be included within
the scheduled caste list contrasts with the frequent changes made by
the British government in granting privileges to new groups so as ro
broaden the narow social basis of its political support. On this point
there is also a contrast between the list of scheduted castes and those
of the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) both nationally (which has
-
not been accepted by the government so far) and in those states where
reservations exist for the OBCS. There has been a tendency to appoint
successive commissions, often by govemments of different political
parties, which have either increased or revised the number of social
groups (usually castes) in the OBC lisrs and the proportion ofjobs or
places in educational institutions reserved for them.
An interesting example of how the OBC lists tend to be prone to
sudden expansion or suggestions for expansion is to be found in the
comparison between the reports of the First National (Kaka Kalelkar)
Commission and the Second (Mandal) Commission on backward
classes. According to the Kaka Kalelkar Commission (which re_
ported in 1955), 2399 castes were classified as backward. The Mandal
Commission proposed to increase the number of OBCs to 3743
castes. The rationale behind this enhanced list was nowhere clearly
explained and as the Mandal Commission chose not to publish data
it had collected through its field surveys, no basis exists for a public
debate on this subject. It will always remain a trenchant mysrery as ro
why the Mandal Commission dara was hidden away from the public
eye. In the absence of data with which one can cross-check the
classification of OBCs, the Mandal Commission Report irltimately
portrays the same problems which had stalked the Kaka Kalelkar
Commission Report-the unavailability of a firm data base.
Reservations Poticy for Other Backward Classes 49
The two principal difficulties in classifying backward classes are

concemed *ittt th" determination of the population of the OBCs and
the use of various indices for listing the OBCs' It is necessary to look
at these issues in some detail, both at the national and the state levels.
It is a paradox that the commissions appointed and the critics who
have examined their reports have not tumed their attention to the
complex problem of estimating the population of the OBCs when
they are listed caste-wise, as they have been so far. On the face of it,
the figures of populations suggested to date scarcely bear comparison
and indicate that a more systematic examination of the reports of the
backward classes commissions should be undertaken as a sequel to
this paper. The Kaka Kalelkar Commission Report estimated the
OBC population at I 16 million or abotrt 32Vo of the total population
io 1952. The Mandal Commission in 1978 estimated the OBC popu-
lation at 527o of total population. This included the Hindu OBC
castes (43.7To of total population) and the OBCs from among the
non-Hindu communities (8.4Vo of the total population). Incidentally'
the Mandal Commission failed to furnish the absolute figures of the
population involved and it escaped this responsibility in the main
body of the report by merely referring to a Table in the Appendices
which was not then published! (Report of the Backward Classes
Commission, vols. I & II, 1980, p. 56.)
In effect, the Mandal Commission, like the Kaka Kalelkar Com-
mission, made two separate calculations: one was a qualitative sample
survey to collect its own data for designating the backward classes
and tle second was a projection of census data from the 1931 census
(which was the last census to give a complete breakdown of caste-
wise population figures) in order to generate aggregate caste-wise
population figures on an all-India basis. It is quite clear that the data
collected through the sample survey could not give a clue to overall
caste-wise population figures. Even the Mandal Commission, which
conducted the largest exercise so far attempted at a socio-educational
survey, could cover only two villages and one urban block in each
district of India. In addition, it collected information through inter-
views and from the list of OBCs published by different states. Ac-
cording to the schedule of indices constructed by the commission it
then finalized a state-wise list of OBCs. There was no certainty, first
of all, that the method followed by the Mandal Commission had been
able to cover all the castes which claim to exist within the
country.
Then, given the small size of the sample, the great variations
in the
mix of castes from one area to another, and differences in fertility
patterns within the same caste group and between states and
regioni,
there was little possibility of extrapolating aggregate, all_India,
caste_
wise figures from the breakdown given by the sample survey. yet
without the aggregate population figures no suggestion could be,
made as to the overall share ofjobs or college seats that should be
reserved because since the days of the .,Communal G.O.', of 1927 in
Madras and subsequently the recommendations made by the Kaka
Kalelkar Commission, the share of reservations for each group has
been, in one way or another, proportional to its overall size.
In order to calculate the overall proportion of different castes or
clusters, the Mandal Commission undertook a different exercise. It
assumed "that the inter se rate of growth of population of various
castes, cornmunities and religious groups over the last half a century
has remained more or less the same." (Mandat Commission Report,
vol. I, p. 56.) Then on rhe strength of its socio-educational survey it
culled out from the l93l census caste/community-wise population
figures for those it classified as forward and backward groups. Thereby
it obtained the following classification:
A Scheduled Castes and Tribes of population

-
A-l Scheduled Castes (SCs)
Vo
15.05
A-2 Scheduled Tribes (STs) 7.51
Total of A 22.56
B_ Non-Hindu Communities, Religious Groups, etc-

B-l Muslims (other than STs) I l.l9
B-2 Christians (other than STs) 2.16
B-3 Sikhs (other than SCs and STs) t.67
B-4 Buddhists (other than STs) 0.67
B-5 Jains 0.47
Total of B 16.16
C Forward. Hindu Castes antl Communities cLt of total popu-

- Iation of India
C-l Brahmins (includingBhumihars) 5.52
C-2 Rajputs 3-90
C-3 Marathas 2.2r
Resenations Policy for Other Backward Classes 5l
C-4 Jats 1.00

C-5 Vaishyas, Bania, etc. 1.88
C-6 Kayasthas 1.07
C-7 Other forward Hindu casteVgroups 2.OO
Total of C 1?58
TOTAI A/B/C 56.30
D OBCs
-
D-l Backward Hindu casteVgrouPs 43.7
within OBC
D-2 529o of religious groups under 8.4
section B
D-3 Approximate derived pop. of OBCs 52.O
rounded off to a unit
There are several objections to the piocedure used and the results
arrived at by the Mandal Commission. Its estimate of backward
castes and groups from among the Hindus came to 43.7% of the
population. This represents an increase of almost ll%: over the
estimate of OBC population by the Kaka Kalelkar Commission which
only considered the Hindu sections of the population. How is one to
explain this increase, especially when the base year for both esti-
mates is the 1931 census and when despite the slowness of the
modemization process, the growth of primary, secondary and higher
education has more than kept pace with the growth of population in
India? It is difficult to argue from any given set of statistics that
taking the urban and the rural sector together, socio-economic back-
wardness now covers proportionately a greater section of the popula-
tion than it did in 1951. Either the Kaka Kalelkar estimate should be
shown to be a gross underestimation or the data on which the Mandal
Commission has based its calculations be made available before the
estimate of OBCs at 52Eo of rhe population can be accepted.
Looking at the methodology followed by the Mandal Commission
one can conjecture that its estimates of population could not be right,
even as an approximation. The Mandal Commission assumed that
different castes have enjoyed, over the last 50 years, the same rate of
growth as the all-India population. This is an impossible assumption
for several reasons. Between 1931 and 1981 the annual rate of
52 The Politics of Baclcwardness
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population growth has shown an increase. However, this increase has

been distributed unevenly between the states and a single national
Frcentage for the OBCs would not be applicable to rh; unless ir
was an average of the actual sizes of the OBC popul.ation in separate
states . Table I has been culled from part II-A of the General popula_
tion Tables published by the 1981 census. The lggl census pur
together this special Table by taking the area of stales and union
territories as found in 1981 and calculating the variation in each ten-
year period since 1901. For our purposes it is sufficient to collate the
data since 1931.
Table I contains highly significant data. Since the Mandal Corn-
mission nowhere explained the exact method used by it to calculate
the population, one has to assume that it used the average rate of
population growth since l93l as a uniform standard applicable to all
the castevcommunities. This average rate works out to 1.98% per
annum between l93l and 1981, this being the average of a rate which
varied from l.42Vo btween 1931 and l94l to 25% between l97l
and 1981. A comparison will reveal how much of a gap there is
between an average all-India rate of population growth and the rates
of growth applicable to different states in different decades.
Table II shows clearly that if the all-India rate of population
growth is applied to the states there would be an underestimation and
overestimation in different cases. Taking the overall, average, all-
India rate alone, it would be seen that in 8 states the rate will be below
and in the rest above the all-India rate. Often. the difference is
substantial. For example, Gujarat had an average rate of growth of
2.43Vo per annum between l93l and 1981. If the all-India rate of
1.98% is applied, the population in Gujarat would be.underestimated
approximately by 23%.In Tamil Nadu a similar procedure will yield
an overestimation of 2lvo. Since the base figures vary greatly accord-
ing to the size and population density of a state, the percentage
differences, which too will increase or decrease from decade to
decade, also conceal immensely different magnitudes. It is incon-
ceivable that a simple application of the all-India average rate of
population growth would yield an accurate figure over 50 years,
especially as it is being applied to different castes and social groups.
The second major shortcoming in the Mandal Commission Report
is that it entirely ignores differentials within the caste in the matter of
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population growth, income levels and educational attainments and

facilities. An interesting World Bank study of fertility decline in
India argues that it is associated with factors that operate much more
at the level of regions, states and individual families than at the level
of social groups. A fall in mortality rates and better educational
attainment enabled parents both to make rational choices through
family planning and also persuaded them to limit the number of
children since education became a necessity for economic survival.
The increase in wages of agricultural labour diminished the income
of landowners forcing ihem to adopt fertility control. Wage increases
boosted the cash income of female daily-wage earners, raising the
opportunity cost of their time spent in bringing up children (K.C.
Zachariah and Sulekha Patel, Determinants of Fertility Decline in
India: An Analysis, World Bank Staff Paper, No. 699). The obverse
corollary of this hypothesis is that given sufficiently high farmer
income levels and labourer's wage levels, the need for family labour
to undertake intensive cash cropping could lead to higher fertility
rates among owner-cultivator groups.
The first scenario of improved literacy producing a decline in
fertility is true of Kerala, whereas the second scenario of an enhanced
need for f4mily labour to undertake remunerative farming leading to
a slightly'higher population growth inspite of improving standards of
education is to be seen in Gujarat. In either case, however, an in-
crease in population would, at the same time, be accompanied by a
decrease in social and educational backwardness. It is clear that the
Mandal Commission's figures of OBCs constituting 52% of the
population cannot be accepted and needs to be re-examined by a
committee which will have to design a survey method that will take
into account the complexities affecting calculation of population
growth in different states.
The additional questions which the report oI the Mandal Commis-
sion will have to answer when analyzed in detail, are best illustrated
from a close reading of several backward classes commission reports
from the states of Kamataka and Gujarat. It should be remembered
that when after prolonged debate and consideration it was decided by
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's govemment not to accept the Kaka Kalelkar
Commission Report (primarily because of its self-confessed weak
and unverified data base and unexplained adherence to caste as the
principal index of classifying the OBCs), the Cabinet also decided in

iuty t-lOt that the state governments should be free to appoint their
own commissions to make reservations for the backward classes'
both under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution' A more
systematic discussion of these reports will be attempted in a later
publication. Here one can pinpoint only typical problems which
show the need for a detailed and thoroughgoing enquiry'
One of the major paradoxes a researcher is bound to note when
reading successive reports of the backward classes commissions is
the abience of any effort by the later reports to delineate and explain
the differences from the earlier ones. In as much as the backward
classes commissions claim to base their decisions to grant privileged
concessions to certain groups on authentic sociological research and
not on any arbitrary dispensation, the contradictions between two
reports pertaining to the same area need to be explained and ac-
counted for, especially when they refer to key aspects of the issues
under consideration. The Backward Classes Commission in Kamataka
headed by L.G. Havanur took approximately five years to complete
its work (1972-77). Subsequently, due to objections raised by several
groups before the Supreme Court, the Karnataka government
appointed a Second Backward Classes Commission headed by
T. Venkataswamy in 1983. This commission submitted its report in
1986. Both the commissions conducted their own surveys and com-
puted their separate lists of OBCs. The determination of caste-wise
population by the Havanur Commission was made on the basis of a
sample survey i n 1972-73 selecting at least one village in each taluka,
one division or ward in each town municipality, two divisions in each
city municipality and four or five divisions in the city municipal
corporations throughout the state. Every individual in the selected
200 villages and 204 blocks was covered under the survey' The
Venkataswamy Commission undertook an even more comprehen-
sive door-to-door survey to enumerate the population of the state by
religion, caste, and subcaste and to study the existing socio-economic
and educational status of the communities. (Govemment of Kamataka,
Report of the Second Backward Classes Commission, vol. I, 1986'
pp.141-42.) A comparison with the earlier report was however not
made and when this exercise was undertaken it showed imponant
unexolained differences, some of which will be mentioned in this
paper.
^ Quile clearly, despite its declared intention, the Venkataswamy

Commission did not undertake a comprehensive state_wide,
door_to_
door survey. According to its own estimate published in
Annexure
9.2 of_vol. III of the Report, whereas the Karnataka State population
according to the 1981 census was 37,135,j14 at the 1971_ l gg
l rate
of growtlr, by 1984 it should have been 3g,920,gg3. The acrual
population according to the caste-wise socio-educational survev
con_
ducted by the Commission in 1984 was only 36,124,594 o, 232Eo
less than the figure reported by the 19gl census and 9.l57o less
than
the figure projected on the basis of the lggl census for 19g4. This
difference is neither acknowledged nor explained in the text of the
report. A comparison with the Havanur Commission Report shows
that one possible reason, when compared to the lgTZ survey, is that
8 castes with a scheduled caste component, had been included in the
OBC list and were later transferred from it. The population of these
8 castes was 6,42,533. But when tle two OBC lists were compared
in detail it was found that the Venkataswamy Commission had alto_
gether omitted another 39 castes which. had no scheduled caste com_
ponent and whose populati on in 19'12 was g,42,221. Among these
were substantially numerous castes like the yadavas (4,46,993),
Hanbar (34,001), Kodaga (82,271), Kolayam (ZO,97g) and Koracha
(20,164). Again, no mention of this fact was found in the
Venkataswamy Commission's report, much less an explanation of it.
Considering that the population figure produced by the l9g4 socio_
educational survey (36,124,594) was the basis for its recommenda_
tions, any future report cannot be considered complete unless and
until the following conditions are met: (a) a rigorous comparison is
made with the previous reports on the Other Backward Classes
commissions to explain differences in assumptions, survey methods
and actual data collected; and (D) the data itself are sent to all the
relevant experts, those interviewed by the commission and other
associated persons for their comments, and those comments are then
considered and acted upon before finalizing the report. By implica-
tion those reports, e.g., the Mandal Commission and the Venkata_
swamy Commission reports against which major objections can be
raised should not be accepted unless new commissions have re_
examined their data.
In continuation of the general criticism of the methodology adopted

by several commissions, it might also be pointed out that there has as
yet not emerged any standard means of setting up a scale of indices
to measure social and educational backwardness. In its judgement in
the famous Balaji case, the Supreme Court had held that if a particu-
lar community is to be treated as educationally backward, the diver-
gence between its educational level and that of the state average
should not be marginal but substantial. The court considered 50%
divergence to be acceptable. It cited the example of Bihar, where
according to the l97l census, the percentage of illiteracy was 807o.
If only those whose social group has a 50% divergence from tle state
average were to be considered educationally backward then no one in
Bihar could be said to be educationally backward since in order to be
so, l2OVo members of a caste/class would have to be illiterate.
The Mandal Commission decided first of all to select about a
dozen castes well known for their social and educational backward-
ness from among its own survey in a state and use the average oftheir
level of achievement as the minimum divergence from the state
average. For instance, one of the indicators for social backwardness
is the rate of student dropouts in the age group 5-15 yeius tls com-
pared to the state average. As a result of the above tests it was seen
that in educationally backward castes this rate is atleast 25 per cent
above the state average. Further, it was also noticed that this devia-
tion of 25Va from the state average in the case of most of the
'indicators' gave satisfactory results. In view of this, wherever an
indicator was based on deviation from the state average, it was fixed
at 25Vo, because a deviation of 50% was seen to give wholly unsat-
isfactory results and at times to create anomalous situations. This
should perhaps be considered one of the more enduring contributions
made by the Mandal Commission to the OBC survey methodology.
The one fuli-scale report on backward classes after the publication
of the Mandal Commission Report was the Venkataswamy Commis-
sion Report in Karnataka. It was a bit of a regression in this case
because instead of adopting the principle of divergence from the state
average, the Venkataswamy Commission constructed a schedule of
indices in terms of which any deviation above the state average was
considered a sufficient qualification for backwardness. For instance,
the state average for those not owning any house in Kamataka was
l3.llVo and for those owning only kuchha houses was 36.52Vo. Any
caste/recognised social group, which registered a percentage higher
than this scored one point on the scale of backwardness. Out of 17
such indices, ifa group scored 9 or more it was considered backward
and 8 or less it was considered forward. Quite clearly, the practice of
taking a single given figure as the average means that the marginal
cases on either side of this limit have to be, in a sense, arbitrarily
classified. Out of the thirty-nine Hindu castes. and five non-Hindu
communities listed by the Venkataswamy Commission, six had an
exact score of 9, three had a score of 10. six had a score of I I and
seven had a score of 12. Among those listed as forward, four had a
score of 8, six had a score of 7 and nine had a score of 6. Another
thirteen castes were assessed on a scale of 18-20 points, an exception
which raised doubts about the reason for the special treatment awarded
to them. A small exercise was done taking the absolute percentages
against each caste and in the case of the castes listed as backward
subtracting 3Vo and in the case of the castes listed as forward adding
3Vo, to see if this range made a differe4ce to their classification. Out
of a sample of nine castes it was seen that four castes classified as
forward would revert to the backward category if the 3Eo range were
applied to them and one caste with a score of 9 would move over to
the forward category. Clearly, the principle propounded by the Su-
preme Court and upheld by the Mandal Commission that a diver-
gence of 5OVo or 25Vo fromthe state average should be the criteria for
determining backwardness is more definitive and ought to be used in
place of a single average figure. The same principle is to be applied
in the case of a yardstick like the number of students passing the
SSLC or High School exam in a given year being used as a measure
for assessing the educational backwardness of a caste. A one-year
average is not a decisive index to the cumulative stock of SSLC pass
within a caste-group and it is this latter ratio or proportion which
ought to be estimated in the course of a socio-educational survey.
The general trend has been to use caste as one among many
indices to assess backwardness. There are several difficulties in
concretizing the use of caste as a criterion of backwardness to which
attention needs to be drawn. One of the most basic difficulties, which
was mentioned as early as the 1931 census in great detail, is the
growing dissociation between traditional occupation and caste. As
census of
Table shows, based on the Imperial Tables of the 1931
III
on|y 33% on
the 23 castes for whom all-India data is given in 1931'
on their traditional occupa-
an average continued to depend mainly
tion. In ih" of Bhats and Chamars only 7 '77o were wholly
"ur"
dependant on their traditional occupation whereas for the
Jat cultiva-
potters 37%'
tors this figure was 657o' for the weavers 337o, fot the
This table ieveals the great need for a fresh enquiry into the relation-
in order
ship between caste and occupation in today's circumstances
to understand how the process of the growth of a modern economy
has affected vital aspects of the caste system'
It is surprising tLat most of the surveys commissioned by the
various baciward classes commissions have not undertaken to exam-
ine the existing relationship between caste and occupation' The Mandal
Commission Report assumed a more or less static and unchanging
relationship between caste and social structure but the data it sought
to collect did not even seek to answer the questions contained in its
definition of caste' On page 16 it produced its definition of caste'
According to the Mandal Commission Report, "When dealing with
the living social reality what counts is not the fine metaphysical
concepts embodied in great religious works of a people but the
homeipun ideas that have percolated into the consciousness of the
masses and become a part of their world view." One of the homespun
ideas it propounded was: "In this sense the caste system hirs meant a
divisionof Hindu society into numerous isolated castes and jatis who
marry among themselves, dine among themselves and broadly pur-
sue iraditional occupations." (Mandal Commission Report, vols' I
and II, 1980 p.16.) Yet neither the data collected, nor the indicators
used under the heading for social and educational backwardness,
touched on any of these points. The eleven indicators used were
classified as follows:
A. Social
I . CasteVclasses considered as socially backward by others'
2. Castes/classes which mainly depend on manual labour for their
livelihood.
3. Castes/classes where at least 25'% females and l07o males
above the state average get manied at an age below 17 years in rural
areas and at least lOVo females and 5Vo males do so in urban areas'
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4. Castes/classes where participation of females in work is at least

25Vo above the state average.
B. Educational
5. CasteVclasses where the number of children in the age group
of5-15 years who never attended school is at least 25Vo above the
state average.
6. Castes/classes where the rate of student dropout in the age
group of 5-15 years is at least 25Vo above the state average.
7. Castes/classes amongst whom the proportion of matriculates is
aI least 25Vo below the state averase.
C. Economic
8. Castes/classes where the average value of family assets is at
least 25Vo below the state average.
9. CasteVclasses where the number of families living in kuchha
houses is at least 25Va above the state average.
10. CasteVclasses where the source of drinking water is beyond
half a kilometre for more than 50Vo of the households.
I l. CasteVclasses where the number of households having taken
consumption loan is at least 25Vo above the state average.
Subsequently all the social indicators were given a weightage of
three points each; educational indicators a weightage of two points
each and economic indicators a weightage of one point each.
What is noteworthy is the fact that none of the indicators touched
upon the three features earlier said to be the defining characteristics
of the caste system namely marriage within the jati, inter-caste din-
ing, and traditional occupations. Instead within the criterion 'social'
the indicators used were such that they could not easily tell us much
abcut backwardness. The first criterion,-Castes/classes considered
as socially backward by others-is so relative that it could apply to
most castes. In local terms sub-castes are arranged in an hierarchical
order and in terms of formal language such usage characterizing a
caste as being below your own persists long after economic and
social practice has destroyed any real hierarchy. Every sub-caste
would be considered backward by the one theoretically occupying a
position above it. The second ofthe social indices pertains to "Castes/
classes which mainly depend on manual labour for their livelihood".
Now with the decrease in the phenomenon of landlordism and a slow

rise in the wages of agricultural labourers since 1947 two tendencies
have grown stronger--owner-cultivation with a greater'involvement
of family labour and the opportunity for agricultural labourers to
work. Hence the incidence of manual labour in agriculture has gone
up. Such manual labour unlike that of the Bhangis or bonded labour
is economically rewarding and hence enables one to live a better life'
even to educaie one's children. It cannot be counted as a factor of
backwardness. The third criterion is even less related to caste al-
though it does provide a measure for indicating backwardness' This
is concerning casteVclasses where at least 25Vo females and 1O%
males above the state average get married at an age below 17 years
in rural areas and at least 107o females and 57o males do so in urban
areas. Now clearly there is very little evidence to show that marriage
at an early age is determined by caste. It is much more determined by
education, the need for children to participate in family work or
income mobilization, and one's individual belief in ritual and reli-
gion. These factors are not in all cases determined by caste' The
iemaining eight criteria are either educational or economic and once
again, not related to caste.
The contradiction between the desire to use caste as a means oI
assessing backwardness and the inability to use it in any concrete
manner is to be seen in the survey design of the Venkataswamy
Commission Report which is the latest among the backward classes
commission reports. A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court has recently proposed the use of a caste-cum-means criteria for
assessing backwardness. According to the authors, "we laud and
appreciate it (caste-cum-means criteria) as a vital landmark in the
march of the Other Backward Classes towards social justice and
social equality." (Report of the Karnataka Second Backward Classes
Commiision,vol. I, 1986.) Admirable as this desire might seem, it is
a revelation to compare the questions actually asked during its survey
by the Venkataswamy Commission Report. One then discovers that
out ofthe 17 criteria that were applied to collect data, not one refered
to the three characteristics considered fundamental by the Mandal
Commission in defining the caste system : inter-caste marriage, inter-
caste dining and traditional occupation. The indices were divided into
negative and positive aspects. In the case of the negative aspects, if a
group scored above the state average it was an indication of

back_
wardness and in the case of the positive aspects this happened when
it scored a percentage below the state average. The two indices. each
under the rubric of negative and positive social aspects respectively,
were whether families belonging to specific castes were houselesV
siteless, resided in kuchha houses and those residing in pa*&a houses
and the share of the caste living in urban areas. The rest ofthe indices
once again, were concerning economic assets, educational achieve_
ments, and facilities and share in government employment. (Govem_
ment of Kamataka, Report of thz Second Backward Classes Commis-
sion, vol. II, Annexure 9.6.)
This great ambiguity between the use of the word caste and the
total absence of empirical criteria for making use of it according to its
acceptable sociological definition raises an important question about
how to interpret the word 'socially' in the Constitution, which refers
to "socially and educationally backward classes." Clearly, the ques_
tion is not whether a list of OBCs is written down and published in
the form of a list of castes to whom an income criterion is then
applied, as happens now. The issue is whether in concrete empirical
terms, one can measure or specifu backwardness caused by caste in
the case of the OBCs and what weight is given to such indices.
Clearly, if we try and use the three criteria suggested by the Mandal
Commission, namely inter-caste marriage, inter-caste dining and tra_
ditional occupation, these would not be able to provide an empirical
measurre of comparative social backwardness. Either ways are sug_
gested of using these criteria empirically or alternative ways of
assessing social backwardness caused by caste are thought of and
data collected by future surveys of Other Backward Classes. Alterna_
if
tively, a likely option is that no merhods are found ro relate
backwardness to caste, the OBC lists are entirely drawn up in future
according to occupation, where social backwardness is seen in terms
of indices referring to education, income, assets, languages spoken,
travel, share of female employment outside of the home, age of
marriage, access to entertainment, etc. Some of these indices have
not been used by the OBC commissions in the past but will be
relevant, especially in regions where rural development has or will
provide many villagers with facilities now mainly available to urban
dwellers.
The inability to really make use of the caste criterion led the
Karnataka government, after it had rejected the recommendations of
the Venkataswamy Commission Report, to give priority to the in-
come criterion. The Government Order specifying the groups of
OBCs separately under Article l5(4) and under Article 16(4) listed
Groups A to E as shown in Table IV below:
Table IV
List of OBCs according to Kamataka Government Order in force
since 13 October, 1986
Backward Under Under Income limit under

Class Article Artick both Articles
Is (4) 16 (4)
Group A 5% 5% No income limit
Group B l57o l39o Rs 10,000
Group C t6% 16% Rs 10,000
Group D 9% 1r% Rs 10,000
Group E 5% 5% Rs 8,000
(Backward Special)
TonI 50% 5OVo
iV.B.: 1. GroupA refers to Backward Tribes.

2. Income refers to family income of the citizens and hiVher parens/legal
guardians.
3. Limit of reservations for OBCs at 50% in addition to the quota for SCJ
STs.
What determines the individual's qualification for being able to

use the reservation is not caste-determined criteria in this case but an
income-determined criteria, virtually applicable to the entire popula-
tion subject to a means test. This is especially so because Group E
refers to the Backward Special Group which according to the
Karnataka govemment order "shall consist of the following citizens:
(i) an actual cultivator;
(ii) an artisan;
(iii) a petty businessman;
(iv) one holding an appointment either in Govemment service or
corresponding services under private employment including casual
labour; and
any person self-employed or engaged in any occupation in_

_(u)
volving manual labour." (Karnataka Government Order No. SWL 66
BCA 86, Bangalore, l3rh October, 1986.)
There is no caste qualification as far as the Backward Special
Group is concerned. It is to be considered why then there was still a
need to list the castes separately in the OBC list. perhaps in Kamataka
there is a tradition of having caste associations. As the analysis in the
following section would show, the reach of these caste associations is
often limited to the economically well-off sections of the castes. In
this sense it is difficult to make caste into a mass issue and as an
identity, its mobilizing power evokes a greatly diminishing response
at the popular level (when one is talking of millions of people) than
it does when one is talking of the elite groups, especially at the local
levels and in the rural areas (when one is referring to hundreds or
thousands of persons). The existence of the Congress and other
parties as all-India organisations has already struck hard at the use of
caste identities and groups. The emergence of regional political par-
ties in India and their substantial success in mobilizing voter support,
cutting across caste and other ethnic groups reveals the growing
strength of identities other than caste. The region as a developmental
unit within the nation is gaining a more extensive place in popular
consciousness above that of tbe more localized identities like caste.
This consciousness is quite different from that of the region in
itself, which was more typical of the princely states of nineteenth
century India. This is a factor that should be taken into account by
those political leaders who might be tempted to see the issue of
expanding reservations for the OBCs as a means of winning the
political support of "the backward castes". It must after all be remem-
bered that many caste associations have been set up at the initiative
of political leaders. It was during the tenure of Devraj Urs as chief
minister of Karnataka that economic and administrative facilities
were extended for the organisation of associations ofbackward castes
and more than thirty such new organisations sprang up. If Devraj Urs
had hoped to create a long-term base of social or political support
then he was to be sadly disillusioned. Once again, the issue raised by
the electoral dimension of political behaviour of people leads us back
to the relevance of caste, either as an indicator of backwardness or as
a powerful lever of mass identification which must continually be
forced upon issues like that of defining the 'socially and education-
ally backward classes'. The question of caste needs to be examined
separately before deciding on whether or not to dispense with it
entirely in the context of classifying the Other Backward Classes.
Another aspect of social reality which weakens the argument
about listing entire caste groups as backward entities is the intemal
economic and educational differentiation within the caste groups.
The difference in economic conditions, assets and educational stan-
dards between castes would be evident when one examines the socio-
economic data put together by any of the backward classes commis-
sions. Take the example of the tables published in the Report of the
Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Commission in Gujarat.
The difference between the average figures shown for various castes
reveals how those classified as backward castes themselves have
widely differing standards. Each household belonging to the Ghanchi
caste spent Rs 4615 per household, while for the Rajputs this figure
was Rs 3393, for the Bhois Rs 2871 and for the Bajania Rs 1318,
even while all these cirstes were classified as backward.
The range of expenditure within the caste group wds further
indicative of internal economic differentiation, as the following Table
of selected castes shows:
Table V
Average, Minimum and. Maximwn Annual Expenditure
per Household belonging to Select Castes in Gujarat
Narne of Annual Ann rul Exp e nditure Ran g e

Caste TonI
Expenditure Minimum Maximum
Per HH in Rs
Brahmin (F) 4,070 120 18,500
Darji (B) 3,830 7to 15,750
Kanabiheva (F) 4,224 I,100 13,21O
Rajput (B) 3,393 120 13,900
Bajania (B) 1,318 350 4,150
Bhoi (B) 2,87r 250 2,850
Ghanchi (B) 4,615 1,330 10,750
N.B.: (F) Forward, (B) Backward.
Such intemal differentiation marked all tle castes, including the

scheduled castes and tribes. For these two categories the income
range was as follows:
Caste/Group Annual Eryenditure Minimum Maximum
Scheduled Castes 3,191 230 36,2m

Scheduled Tribes t923 zto 7,350
Source: Repon of the Socially and E&rcationally Bactcward Classes Com-
tnissiion, Gujarat, 1976, vol. tr, Appendix XXIX.
These data show that without an income crit€ria, merely including

the entire caste group as backward hides severe income inequalities.
In the case of the scheduled castes and tribes where a collective social
identity is morc developed because of the cultural deprivations like
untouchability, non-inclusion within Hinduism etc., the bener-off
might still suffer from psychological and social stigma and com-
plexes. They would then need the support of their ethnic grcrups and
would act to give them real leadership on the assumption that without
a substantial number of their group achieving a higher status, their
own social isolation would not be easily overcome. It is this distinct
status of visible group deprivation of a social and culnrral type which
distinguishes the scheduled casteytribs from the other backward
castes. As one had argued earlier in the case of the OBCs, the
commission rcports so far have failed to establish qmte-governed
deprivation as being applicable to "socially and educationally back-
ward classes", and this is especially true of the surveys conducted by
the Mandal Commission and the Venkataswamy Commission. If
caste is not shown to be the cause of backwardness, the case for
applying only cultural, economic and educational criterion to identify
the backward classes is greatly strengthened.
A quick survey of the kind of criteria prevailing in the states that
have sanctioned rcservations for the OBCs shows that most of them
alrcady specify an economic criterion. Only, it is applied to specified
castes who are not represented within the educational set-up and the
government services, in proportion to their population. The applica-
tion of the income criterion in most states has been chosen without an
explanation being given about it and has been made to change again
without a proper justification on a number of occasions. The Mandal
'11
Classes
criteria' Instead' it estimated
Commission did not specify any income
the value of family u""t' und the proportion of families taking
t}te
t *r"ttofO loans' Clearln the first criterion' namely
of
urr"t, is a difficuit rule to apply in
"onrumition
r"*'y the case
greater
""f""-"f
i""r*"ra goois and the chances of wrongIt reporting are far
income' is also not legitimale to
il;;;;";;t" of current familv
loans' since the value
iisi all famities taking household consumption Hence'
;il;;";"t varieJgreatly from one household to another'
an income criterion should be used'
in different states has
A summary of income criteria being applied
Equali'
U*" p.""ia"i Uy Marc Galanter (Marc Galanter ' Competing 20)' It is neces-
India' Table
,irtt to* and the Backward Classes in analysis of the
this data as a starting point for-an
,urv to
"onriO"r
inc'ome criteria to be used in classifying the
OBCs'
Table VI
Income Criteria for the Other Bachttard
Classes: A ProfiIe
Estimate of OBC
State Year Name of
GrouP Population as
share of Total
1. Andhra r97s (, BC 92 listed 56w
Pradesh (ii) Econom- castes/

icallY communities
BC All with income
under Rs 1500
2. Bihar 1979 BC Member of list Sovo
of128 castes/
communities whose
annual income rs
less than Rs l200oi-
1978 82 listed communities N'A'

3. Gujarat BC
19'12 F-cono- All with income

micallY under Rs 4800
BC annually
72
4. Jammu & 1973 Socially l. Occupations

Kashrnir N.A.
and Edu- 2. 19 communities N.A.
cationally 3. Border and 8%
BC poor areas
5. Kamataka 1986 BC Group 42 Backward N.A.

A Tribes: No income
limit
Group B 95 castes: N.A.

Within them those
having an annual
income of Rs 10000
Group C 5 communities: N.A,

Within them those
having an annual
income of Rs 10000
Group D I castes: N.A.

Within them those
having an annual
income of
Rs 10000
Group E 5 occupations: N.A.

Within them those
having an annual
income of Rs 8000
1979 0) Bc List of 16 communi- 45go

ties, 129 castes
and 62 tribes
(ll) Economi- All with annual

cally BC income under
Rs 4800
6. Kerala 1977 Socially Members of N,A.

and Edu- listed communi-
cationally ties with income
BC less than Rs 10000
Classes IJ
1972 Socially Members of listed N.A.

and Edu- communities with
cationally income less than
BC Rs 6000
19',10 BC Members of 560 N.A.

listed communi-
ties with income
less than Rs 8000
1. Maharashtra 1966 oBc list of communities N.A.
Tamil Nadu 1972 BC list of 105 51%

communities
9. Uttar 1978 BC list of 58 N.A.

Pradesh communities
Based on Marc Galanter, op. cit., Table 20, and Kamataka Govemment
Order of 13 October, 1986.
Although Marc Galanter has provided the data on the income

criteria actually being used in states, he has said nothing on why tlese
are so different or why they have been changed over time. The
discrepancies in the known statistics for wages show that often the
figures are far higher than those prevailing for jobs categorized as
badly paid. Recently, the Labour Ministers' Conference in Delhi
recommended a minimum wage of Rs 11 per day for agricultural
workers. With this as the base ii can be seen that in a state like Bihar
the annual income of an agricultural labourer would be Rs 3960. In
actual practice, as one knows, the wages paid are often much less
than this and so the limit of Rs 12,000 per annum which has been put
as a maximum criteria for the backward classes contains several other
income levels above that of the agricultural labourers. According to
exhaustive data compiled by the Ministry of Labour, the wage rates
of unskilled labour provides a good basis for assessing the income
criterion set up for the backward classes in different states. There is
a need to review these income criteria and justify a new one on the
ground that it actually covers the educationally backward.
In Kamataka the wage rate mentioned by the Ministry of Labour
on 30.1.1985 was Rs 9.50 to Rs 14.00 per day, acgording to class of
work and type of land. This gives us an annual income range

of Rs
342O to Rs 5040. By comparison, the cutoffpoints for
mosr groups of
backward classes under the latest scheme of the Karnataka Govem_
ment is Rs 10,000. This is three times the lower figure for unskilled
labour and twice the highest salary given to artisans, handicraftsmen,
etc. In many of the states there are no income criteria applicable, for
example, Andhra Pradesh in lg1.1 and Gujarat. Exact istimates of
OBC population are also not available in Gujarat, Jammu and Kash_
mir, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and several other states. At the verv
least an enquiry is . alled for to determine the OBC population in
those states wherc a reservation system already exists. Such a de_
mand is likely to arise in the future as this is one of the questions
which groups excluded from the OBC list or individuals unable to
make use of the reservation system could well ask. It also needs to be
answered purely from the view of estimating the actual extent of
social and educational backwardness and the economic poverty which
is related to it.
SECTION V
Policy Perspec-tives for the Future
The question of policy about reservations, as far as the backward

classes are concemed, is whether one should argue for an expansion
of the reservation system, for cutting down its size, for freezing it at
certain levels, for its abolition or for other reforms within it to make
it more effective as a means of promoting social equality, without
provoking a breakdown of social consensus. It is important to ask this
question now because conflicts over the reservation issue add to other
conflicts like terrorism and communalism, which already threaten to
fracture the Indian polity. Besides, the system of reservations had at
one time, especially in the latter half of the 1960s and the whole of
1970s, appeared to many political leaders and policy makers as an
important means of providing an escalator for representatives of
deprived social groups or of those with nascent economic wealth but
without a significant presence in the administration or in the educa-
tional world. If political leaders had taken the lead in establishing or
extending the reservation system for the OBCs expecting to build a
Reservatiorc Pohcy for Other Backward Classes '15
stable politicat base, their calculations have proved to be wrong' In

every national election and major state election, those who have been
ctasiitieO as OnCs have shown the calmcity and the will to take their
own decisions. They have often been influenced by other identities
and other issues. In so far as reservations provide jobs only to a few
persons among a particular social group, their usefulness as an av-
inue of patronage or reward is very limited. This is especially so
because the cohesion of social groups like sub'castes-a cohesion
assumed by certain schools of sociology-never really existed' and if
it did it has now been greatly loosened by a variety of factors like
language, region, occupation and income, which tend to influence
different members of these groups differently.
One kind of political opinion advocates eschewing any discussion
or research on the subject of the reservation system in the hope that
this will prcvent notice being taken of its shorrcomings. This is
shortsighted for it overlooks the real social factors which will con-
tinue to force a discussion about the manner in which the system of
reservations is working and the limits that should be imposed on it so
as to prevent it fKrm disrupting the social consensus that has charac-
terized its operation for a long time. It is only when these factors are
highlighted that it becomes obvious why the reservations issue is
likely to be of political relevance for sonrc time to come.
The four states where, in the last year, there has been a vigorous
discussion about the future course of the OBC reservation system (as
well as protests against attempts at expanding it or excluding groups
already included in the OBC list) are Gujarat' Kamataka, Andhra
Pradesh and Kerala. In addition, during the last several years' the two
states where there have been protests against the expansion of the
OBC rcservation system and the operation of a reserved seat system
for the scheduled castes are Bihar and Maharashtra. One common
observable feature in all these six states is that although they have a
varying rate of literacy, the nunSer of colleges and the students
enrolled within them are far above the all-India average.
The key ratios to look at are those concerning the total number of
students. In Kerala, the number of students in colleges is l27o less
than the all-India average. In Andhra Pradesh it\s'llVo higher, in
Bihar it is 43% higher, in Gujarat it is 28% higher, in Karnataka62%o
and in Maharashtra 148% higher than the all-India average. In Kerala'
Table VII
Rates of Uterocy and Pattem of Higher
Education in Several States
State/ %lite- %lite- %lite- Nunber Total
An- rote rare rate of Colleges Nwnber
India Total Urban RuraI Arts, Science of
t98I 1981 r981 & Commerce College
students
1961 Total 1983/
19$n4 84
All-India 57.2 29.6 3652 5246 3359323
Aveiage
per state
174 zso 159968
Andhra 29.7 5l.l 23.2 287 420 273176

hadesh
Bihar 26.1 51.9 22.3 331 473 22844r
Gujarat 43.8 60.3 36.3 l9l 28s 204697
Kamataka 38.4 56.4 3 t.l 314 498 259804
Kerala 69.2 75.0 67.8 128 184 140226
Maharashtra 47.O 63.8 38.0 472 693 397280

Source: l- Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, Census of
India, 1981, Series l, India, paper 3, provisional population Totals, Workers
and Non-Workers, 1981.
2. University Grants Commission Report, l9t3l84
although the number of students enrolled in colleges is less than the

alllndia average, the rclatively greater numbers in the schools make
up for this deficiency. It stands to reason that in these states the
number of educated job seekers will tend to be higher than in other
states or the all-India average. This fact is confirmed by a look at the
statistics compiled by the Economic Monitoring Service of the Com_
merce Research Bureau in Bombay. These are reproduced in the
Table VIII:
Resertatioru Policy for Other Backward Classes 7'1
Table VIII
Job Seekers Registered with Employment Exchanges
(as on June 30, 1980 except where speciJied otherwise)
(In thousands)
States/ Matic Grad.uates Toml Unskilled Toml Job

AU ann including manual all
of seekers
India above post- labourers Job u; on
but Sraduates and others Seelcers May 3 I,
below 1985
All-India 5882 1415 7297 78'73 1517 Ul19

Average
per srate 196 47 243 262 5l 806
Andhra
Pradesh &
uP 487.6 ll4 601.6 714.4 1316 2218
Bihar 594.6 ll7 711.6 1504.4 22t6 2650
Gujarat 217 42.3 259.2 118.8 448 652
Kamatata 287.2 76.1 363.3 206.7 570 8ll

Kerala 639 71.8 7ll 657 1368 2461
Maharashtra 493.2 l0l 594 539 tt34 2102

Source: Commerce Research Bureau, Borlll,zy, October, 1986-
Basic Statistics on State Economies of India

The number ofjob seekers shows the great pressure that exists on
the economy to provide jobs or some form of self-employment- For
those who consider themselves unemployed the sight of more jobs
being reserved for specific categories is much less acceptable tlan
the feeling that they have won or lost through a system of open
competition. Indeed, our system of education has not been closely
geared to the specific manpower needs of the economy and is there-
fore likely to produce a surplus of the wrong kind of degree holders.
The psychology of the unemployed is not to demand reservations, but
to resist its expansion or demand the application of cultural,

educa_
tional and economic criteria that are not limited by caste. A good
example of such a reaction is the loss in popularity suffered
by the
Congress-led government in Kerala when ii did not implement its
initial promise to provide a 15% reservation in schools, on the basis
of only economic criteria. It would be an interesting exercise to carry
out an opinion survey among the job seekers on their view of thl
function and the future of the reservations system. No such surveys
have been made so far. One of the elementary facts such u .u*"y
may be expected to discover is the spread of educated job seekers
over all the different social, religious and linguistic groups.
Another important reason why the reservation issue is going to
remain in focus politically is related to the question of how the
population of the backward classes has been estimated so far. Ac-
cording to the information supplied by the central govemrnent rnin-
istries and departments to the Mandal Commission, the latter esti-
mated that the OBCs constitute 1255% of the toral number of gov-
emment employees, whercas tbeir aggegate population is 52%. Their
representation in Class I jobs is only 4.69%,i.e., less than l/lfth of
their proportion to the country's total population. (Mandal Commis-
sion Report, vols. I and II, 1980, page 63.) As has been shown at
length in this paper, the estimates of OBC population, both ar the
national and state levels, are subject to varying but definite and often
significant margins of error. Clearly, if the estimates of OBC popu-
Iation themselves are questionable, then to say that only 12% of
OBCs are govemment employees and compare them against an
erroneous population estimate is equally mistaken. Until and unless a
reliable estimate of OBC population is provided, other calculations
based on such an estimate too will be suspect. The same observation
may be made about the more detailed estimates which are often
prcsented by Members of Parliament during the course of various
debates. For example, during the discussion on the Mandal Commis-
sion Report in the Rajya Sabha in October 1982 one Member of
Parliament prcsented a set of staristics Clable IX) which clairned to
show the relative position of differcnt categories in various classified
services.
Classes 79
Table IX
Relative position of various categories in Central
Govemment Senices as presented by an honourable MP
to the RajYa Sabha in October 1982
Scheduled Castes Other Baclcward Classes

Class I 7 .187o 2.59%
Class II 13.569o 3.98%
Class III & IV 30.9SVo 8.4t%
Total Services 16.837o 4.83Vo
Source: Parliamenary Proceedings, Parliament Library, vol XXIV, 11-15

october 1982, pp. 249-50.
The claim made in the above table cannot be a credible one so long
as the actual basis for classifying the backward classes is unavailable.
Whereas the MP had claimed that only 4.837o of all Central Govern-
ment employees belong to the OBCs, the Mandal Commission had
estimated this to be 12.55Vo. Clearly, such discrepancies arise be-
cause in order to strengthen the claims of the backward classes many
political leaders are often prepared to use statistics that underestimate
the actual extent of representation of the backward groups.
There is a great need, if the future of the reservation system is to
be properly assessed, for a more exdct estimate of the population of
the backward classes. A committee of social scientists based at the
Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, capable of taking dn objec-
tive view and working in tandem with the official machinery of the
l99l census n€eds to be set up by the central government, to define
the national criteria for determining the exact population of the
backward classes, as per the intent of Articles l5(4) and l6(4) and re-
examine the Mandal Commission Report, since it is still under con-
sideration by the government. The scope of the committee need not
be to set up reservation quotas but simply to clarify and settle, among
other issues, the controversy regarding the population estimates of
OBCs nationally. This should be done at the national level and in
states where they are already recognized by the govemment and
should cover central govemment services, as well as different levels
of the educational system. The report of such a committee will

be a
useful source of information for discussing welfare schemes of
schol-
arships, loans and reservations meant for the backward classes.
The
committee itself may function in liaison with the Ministry of Welfare
or that of Human Resource Development, who could provide the
required facilities and information.
Another area of reservation policy where guidelines issued by the
central government or by Parliament in the form of an amendment to
Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is needed is to specify rhe maximum limit
for rescrvation quotas, with a provision for enforcing it by a certain
date. While the state govemments will be free as before to determine
the composition of the backward classes, this general limit should
provide a barrier after which selection may only take place on the
basis of merit. The reason why such a limit was not prescribed by the
Indian Constitution makers is unclear. The intention to do so was
clear enough in the summing up of Dr B.R. Ambedkar, as was
mentioned in Section II of this paper. Dr Ambedkar had said that in
all cases reservations should refer to a minority of posts, or else they
would clash with the constitutional provision to provide equality of
opportunity to all citizens.
Some time after the Constitution was enacted, the Supreme Court,
in the famous Balaji case, ruled that reservations for scheduled castes/
tribes and the Other Backward Classes together should not be more
than fifty per cent of the total available seats. Since it was a ruling of
the Supreme Court and not enforceable by law, for some time it was
observed by all the states. Soon enough, the 5OVo barrier was crossed
and today Karnataka reserves 68Vo of seats and jobs for SC/ST/
OBCs, Kerala 54%,'tamil Nadu also 687o, Andhra hades.h approxi-
mately 43Vo, Jammu and Kashmir almost 507o, and Bihar close to
5l%. The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court has tried to
rationalize this situation by advising, through a majority decision,
that each state can fix its own quotas according to its specific condi-
tions. This is an important revision and from the standpoint of the
letter and spirit of the relevant constitutional provisions an unfortu-
nate one, since it encourages pressures for the further expansion of
the reservation system. The govemment can help to remedy the
situation by introducing the 50Vo limit as a part of the constitutional
provisions themselves, emphasizing that a system of reservation must
Resemations Policy for Other Backward Classes 8l
function alongside that based solely on merit and not swallow the
latter altogether. The share of reservations allocated to the scheduled
castes and tribes in this rule should come first and the difference
up
to 5OVo be proportionately divided according to the criteria used for
classifying the. backward classes. The case for such a constitutional
amend-ment is strengthened by the fact that despite estimating the
OBC populatio n at 52Vo the Mandal Commission recommended that
onty CTVI of the central government jobs be reserved for the OBCs'
This figure of 27Va was arrived at by deducting the 23Vo aheady
allocated to the SC/ST from the 507o limit prescribed by the Supreme
Court in its ruling in the Balaji case. A conference of different
political parties is needed to discuss and forge a consensus on the
issue of the 507o limit on reservations in all spheres as a whole' With
this 507o as the maximum limit, states can feel free to adjust the level
of reservations at the minimum possible, as per the existing social
consensus and demand. Such an arrangement will both be flexible
and have the additional merit of conforming to the known intentions
of the Indian Constitution makers to restrict the reservations system
to a minority share of available places.
Finally, a major policy issue regarding the system of reservations
as a whole is one of time limit, which may be a renewable one. Such
a time limit exists in the case of Article 340 where reservations of
political seats in the legislatures for scheduled castes and tribes is
done every ten years. Many of the members of the Constituent
Assembly suggested a similar time limit for reservations as a whole.
According to them, a time limit, say of twenty years, would provide
an occasion for a comprehensive review of progress in the implemen-
tation of the reservation quotas and the extent to which they have
achieved the goal of social justice and equality. A strict enforcement
of the education and income criteria will automatically provide an
entry and exit point for members of a family entitled to use the
reservation system. Thought may be given to another kind of entry
and exit system. The Venkataswamy Commission had suggested that
those families who have used the reservation system for three genera-
tions may be disallowed the future use of reservation quotas for some
jobs and for college education. Such exclusion may be accepted if it
is also provided that the right to avail of reservations can be restored
to families which have not used the reservation system for three
generatlons.
The provision and enforcement of an entry/exit/re_enrry sysrem
would require a proper monitoring machinery as a part of thi regular
administration. The Ministries of Education or Human Resource
Development may be entrusted with this task once it is agreed that
there is need for an entry/exit system for individual families, and not
groups as a whole, since this allows the small numbers of reserved
seatvjobs to b€ accessible to a growing number of families within the
same social group. With the growth in the numbers of the educated
job seekers such an entry/exit system will prove popular. It would
probably face resistance from within those groupVfamilies who have
so far been able to use the system of reservations on a more continu-
ous basis. In order that such resistance is not excessive and eventually
gives way to a social consensus, two steps could be advocated. As
earlier suggested, the direct descendants of those ;rho left the reser-
vation system after having used it for a specified time could use it
again after a period of time, if they satisfy the income and orher
criteria for the users. Secondly, such provisions for entry/exit may be
introduced as a part of a package scheme for the welfare of the
backward classes, either in the form of an increase in the number of
scholarships or through schemes for giving loans, etc.
In tie present situation of a growing number of educated job
seekers, an expansion ofthe reservation quotas is not at all desirable.
The present levels of reservation should either be reduced to at least
the 5O% maximum limit earlier suggested or frozen at the existing
level, thereby giving full scope to a system based on merit. The
introduction of the reservation system into new areas should also be
resisted since it offers a solution, if at all, to a tiny minority. If such
an extension becomes necessary as a concession it should be accom-
panied by an entry/exit system from the outset. In today's circum-
stances and those of the foreseeable future, programmes of increased
growth, increasing output and mass welfare rather than reservations
for small numbers will meet the demands of the people. The adoption
of a statutory maximum limit of 5OVo for all reservations on an all-
India'basis, an entry/exit system, a more rational criteria of classifi-
cation and estimate of OBC population and a renewable time limit
can provide, as suggested above, a meaningful basis for attempting to
build a political consensus on the reservations issue during the com-
ing decade.
Appendix I
A Report from the Times of India, Delhi'

Monday, August 3l,l9E7
Ending Untouchability: A Far Cry
The Commission on Scheduled Castes and Tribes in its sixth report plac€d
before Parliament has pointed out that the home ministry objective of July l97E
to remove untouchability in five years has remained "illusive".
The report for 1983-84 points out that the term 'tntouchability" has not been
defined in the Constitution or the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 under
which cases of this kind are investigated. Though several crses are registercd
most of them remain infructuous because of doubts about the exact meaning of
the term'tntouchability".
The commission is equally concemed about the large number of cases
regislered as well as acquitted. The cases are discharged because of failure to
relat€ insults or attempts to insult on grounds of untouchability.
Because of the mandatory provision of imprisonment of at least one month
if the offence is established, even the rrial courts appear to hesitate in pronounc-
ing anyone guilty. The courts, the rcport says, have no choice in choosing the
mode or the minimum duration of punishment.
lte report says caiegorically thatjustice is denied to the aggrieved-most of
them belonging to the lowest socio-economic strata- No case goes beyond the
trial coun. Out of the 9249 cases with the trial courts in 1983, only l95O were
considercd by the courts and of these 1707 acquitted.
The commission wfote to seven states, where the number of cases acquitted
is the highest, to ascertain the reasons for the high acquittal rate. Only Tamil
Nadu and Kamataka responded. They said because of the delay in investigation
by the police as well as delay in disposal ofcases by the court, the witnesses were
won over by the more powerful offenders. The commission has also b€en critical
of the calibre of the investigating police oflicials. Because of poverty, th€
victims were unable to pursue their cases in the higher cours.
Only five states, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh
and Bihar have set up special courts to deal with these cases. The commission
84 The potitics of Backwardness
has said unless such hearings are arranged within a week ofthe submission ofthe
chargesheet, the acquittal rate will continue to be high.
Though there is only a marginal increase in the total number of cases
registered under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, the rise has been alarming in
A.P., Kerala, M.P-, Delhi and Pondicherry. In Delhi the number of cases regis-
tered has risen by 266 per cent. The cases registered in Bihar, Gujarat, Kamataka,
Maharashtra, Orissa, U.P., Goa, Daman and Diu have decreased.
The cases pending in the couts have risen from 4,545 i^ 1982 to 7,299 il
1983. The number of cases acquitted is on a disturbingly high side. In 1980, 69
per cent of the cases wete dismissed and in 1983 acquittal rate rose to 87 per
cent.
State govemments are said to be providing legal aid so that victims can seek
justice. Unfortunately, though legal aid has been announced by some states the
numbers receiving assistance is not known. Under the PCR Act almost every
state has set up a police cell to handle cases ofuntouchability but the commission
has doubts as to \ hether such cells are really initiating cases.
The commission has asked the home ministry to review the FCR Act. It has
also called for a close look at the functioning of the special courts and police
cells.
REFERENCES
A. Reports of ollicial Commissiolls on the Backward Classcs:
l. Report o! the First National Baclcward Class Convnission: Chairman"

Kaka Kalelkar. 3 vols, 1983, New Delhi.
2. Report of the Second Bacl<ward Classes Commhsion: Chairman' B'P'
Mandal. Vols I to VII, 1980, New Delhi.
3. Report of the First Kanataka Backward Chsses Comtnission: Chairman'
L.G. Havanur. 4 vols, 1975, Bangalore.
4. Report of the Second Karnataka Baclowrd Classes Convnission" Chair-
man, T. Venkataswamy. 2 vols, 1986, Bangalore'
5. Repon of the Socially aad E&tcationally Bacl<ward Classes Commission,
Gujarat State, 2 vols, 1976.
6. Report of the Sociatty and Educationally Bacl<ward Classes (Second\
Commission, Gujarat State, 2 vols, 1983.
B. Parliamenlary PaPers:
l. Constituent AssemblY Debates:
(t 30-l l-1948 - Article 16 (4)

(ii) 24-8-1949 - Article 330
(iii) 14-10-1949 - Article 335
2. Lok Sabha Debates:
(i) 6-8-1977 Discussion Regarding Employment of Scheduled Castes and

Tribes.
(ii) 2O-12-1977: Statement by Minister of Railways on Public Sector Em-
ployment of SgsT/oBC.
(iii) 11-2-1982'. Debates on the Report of the Second Backward Classes
Commission under Rule 193.
(iv) 13-10-1982: Vol. XXIV. Further Discussion on Second Backward Classes
Commission Report.
3. Rajya Sabha Debates:
(D 9-12-19'17: Half-an-hour discussion on points arising out of the answer

given to question regarding reservation of quota in Central Services for Back-
ward Classes and Minoritv Communities.
4. (tr) ll-10-1982 to 15-10-1982: Discussion on the need to imDlemenr the

Mandal Commission Report, vot. CXXIV.
C. Reports of the C.ensus Commissioner, Government of India:
(i) Cmsus of India, I93I Paill, vol. I, India Report, vol. VlI, India Report,
vol. XIX, Baroda Report, Part I.
(ii) Census of India, 1961, vol. V, Gujarat, Part V-A.
(iii) Census of India, 1971, Series 5, Part IA.
(iv) Census of India, 1981, Series -1, India, Pan II-A (i), Table A-2, pp. 573
to 5E4.
(v) Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, Census oJ India,
1981, Series l, India Papers of 1981, Provisional population Totals, Workers
and Non-Workers. 1981.
D. Other Government reports and publications:
(t Statement of Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers as fixed by the

Central Govemment and Reported by the State Govemments as on lst January,
1987, Ministry of Labour Library, New Delhi.
(ii) Univenity Grants Commission, Report for the Year 1983-84.
(iid) Development Programme, l9E7-88, Planning Division, General Admin-
istration Depaiment, Govemment of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, February. 1982.
E. Non-Governnrent sources of statistical data:
li) Statistbal Outline of India, 19U, Tat^ Services Limited, Department of

Economics and Statistics, Bombay.
(ii) Statistical Outline of Gujarat, 1963 Bureau of Economics and Statistics,
Govemment of Gujarat, Gandhinagar.
(iii) Basic Statistics on State Economies of India, Economic Monitoring
Service, Commerce Research Bureau, Bombay, October 1986.
F, Unpublished dissertations, survey reports and papers:
(t) C.P. Barthwal, Safeguards for Scheduled Castes in the Indian Constitu-
tion, and their Working, Ph.D. dissertation, Lucknow University, 1980, Social
Sciences Documentation Centre, ICSSR, New Delhi.
(r;) Suma Chitnis, A Long way to Go . . . (Report on a Sumey of Scheduled
Caste High School and College Students in Fifieen Sntes of India). Social
Sciences Documentary Centre, ICSSR, New Delhi.
(,rr) Victor S. D'Souza, Structural Constraints on Development: Thz Case of
Scheduled Castes in India, XlWorLd Congress of Sociology, New Delhi, l8-22
August 1986, Symposium II, Session-4.
(iv) Morton Weinfi eld, Counting Racial Minoities and Afirmative Action in
Reservations Policy for Other Backward Clnsses 87
Canada. Xl World Congress of Sociology, New Delhi, 18-22 August, 1986,

section on Ethnic, Race and Minority Relations.
G. Books:
l. B.A.V. Sharma/K. Madhusudhan Reddy, eds., Reservation Policy in

Indra. Hyderabad: 1980.
2. B. Shiva Rao, ed., The Fmming of India's Constiturton, vol.lY.
3. Constiturion of India-1981 (Allahabad Publication).
4. Craig Baxter, District Voting Trends in lzdia. New Delhi, 1980.
5. David J. Elkins, Electoral Participation in a South Indian Context.
Califomia: University Press, 1980.
6. David Amold, Iftz Congress in Tatnil Nadu, 1919-1932 Manohar, 1978.
7. Dilip K. Basu/Richard Sisson, eds ., Social and Economic Development in
India: A Reassessrn€nt New Delhi, 1986.
8. Eugene F. Iraschick, Politics and Social Conflict in South India. New
Delhi. OUP. 1976.
9. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (vols I and II).
10. Iqbal Narain, ed., St4te Politics in India.
I 1 . Iswari Prasad, Rese rvation: Action for Social Equality. New Delhi : I 986.
12. Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Iaw and the Baclcward Classes in
India. Delhi: OUP, 1984.
13. Myron Weiner, ed., State Politics in India. New Delhi, 1968.
14. Vimal P. Shat/Binod C. Aggarwal , eds., Reservation, Policy Programmes
and Issues. New Delhi, 1986.
15. A.K. Vakil, Resenation Policy and Scheduled Castes in India. New
Delhi, 19E5.
H. Articles:
l. Marc Galanter, "Who are the other Backward Classes? An Introduction to

a Constitutional Pu z-zle;' Economk and Politicat lleeHy, vol.13, pp. 18l2-28.
2. Marc Galanter, 'Compensatory Discrimination in Political Representa-
tion: A Preliminary Assessment of India's Thirty-Year Experience with Re-
served Seats in Legislatwes." Economic and Political WeeHy, vol. 14, pp. 437-
54.
3. M.V. Subbarao, "Pro-Reservationists vs. Anti-Reservationists." Social
Change, vol.l2, no. 2, June 1982.
Chapter 4
Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes: A Crisis of Ambivalence
Suma Chitnis
An Outstanding Provision
HEN the nationalist struggle for self-ruIe, conducted
with courage, tenacity and forbearance for almost three
quarters of a century, eventually resulted in political
freedom for India in 1947, it was only the first step in independence
that had been won. The right to self-rule had been established, but the
dreams and ideals that had fired the struggle had next to be translated
into reality. This was a large and complex task.
Looking back, one is impressed by the eclecticism of the leaders
responsible for designing and planning the country's future as an
independent nation. They drew freely from the several social philoso-
phies, ideologies, and political systems current at the time. As a
result, the Constitution that they gave the country, anil the plans and
the policies they made to define its future as a nation, combine sorne
of the finest ideals of the twentieth century. However, although the
combination thus forged was bold and full of promise, it was untested
and untried. Inevitably it contained several flaws, ranging from con-
tradictions in the conception of ideals, blind spots with reference to
how these ideals could clash with established practices and vested
interests, to inadequacies in the definition of programmes and strate-
gies for their implementation. These flaws have now started to sur-
face.
This paper discusses one of the inadequacies in the formulation of
Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and Tribes 89
what, in spite of its many inadequacies, is one of the most outstanding

provisioni of the Constitution of independent Indial i'e', the provi-
sion for preferential facilities for the advancement of the historically
disadvantaged scheduled castes and scheduled tribes' The particular
inadequacy discussed in this paper is the failure to define the rcrms
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Denotation without Connotation

The Constitution names the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and
"other" (socially and economicalll') "backward classes" as weaker
sections of society eligible for special protection and care. It does not
define the terms scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, or other backward
classes. Nor does it provide detailed criteria by which these groups
may be identified. It only prescribes that in the first instance these
groups shall be designated for each state by a Presidential order' in
ionsultation with the governor of each state with subsequent modifi-
cation by an Act of Parliament.:
Bold Provisions
The Constitution do€s not specify the special provisions to be
made either. But the Government has been innovative in designing
them. The provisions for the scheduled castes and the scheduled
tribes are particularly bold. They range from facilitios for education,
health, housing, etc., routinely provided by a welfare state to a unique
policy of "reserved" seats in Parliament, in the legislatures and in
other representative political bodies, "reserved" admissions in higher
education and reserved jobs in several categories of govemment
employment.
The rationale on which preferential provisions are based is that
when a highly hierarchical society chooses to be egalitarian and
decides simultaneously to be free and open, equality is not likely to
be achieved unless groups that rank low in the traditional system of
stratification are purposively assisted to leap across the gap that
separates them from the others: The underlying assumption is that
traditional disadvantage must inevitably operate as a handicap and
traditional advantage as a head start, even if competition is in prin-
ciple free and open.
Inherent Problems
Humane though it is, this rationale is inconsistent with the
conven_
tional concept of equal citizenship. If all citizens are equal then
none
have a right to preferential provisions, however extenuating
the cir_
cumstances. As may be expected, therefore, the preferential provi_
sions provided in the Constitution were openly opiosed at the
outset.
It was only with the aid of a Constitutional amendment emphasising
the spirit of equality and reiterating the commitment to go beyond
thi
literal interpretation of the ideal that the reservations ior the sched-
uled castes and the scheduled tribes could be retained.4
Quite apart from this problem with the established concept of
equality, problems arise from the fact that reservations in education
clash with some of the basic norms and practices by which educa_
tional institutions have functioned. For instance, the principles of
qualification by tested performance, ranking on the basis of graded
competence, reward for best performance and disqualification for
poor performance. Similarly, in employment, reservations negate the
principle of selection by qualification and promotion by seniority or
by proven competence. Under the policy of reservations, barely
qualified scheduled caste and scheduled tribe candidates have been
admitted to institutions for higher education and in employment into
slots where the qualifications required of those who seek to come in
through open competition are high. In fact, in several instances tle
performance level of those who are rejected in open competition is
significantly higher than that of those who are admitted through
reservations. This compromise has had to be pushed even further as
criteria for "passing" in education and conespondingly for..promo-
tion" in employment have been scaled down to facilitate the progres_
sion of those who are accepted on the basis of reservations.
Initial Acceptance
Initially, all these compromises were accepted with relative equa_
nimity, largely because the castes and tribal communities, listed in
the Presidential Schedule, were, at the time of their listing, clearly at
the bottom of the social scale. Regardless of whethei p.,
income, literacy or any such secular criteria were used to assess"upitu
their
situation, they were backward. In addition, the scheduled castes
suffered the disability of a low caste status, including the traditional
Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and Tribes 9l
from
practice of untouchability and the scheduled tribes suffered
groups they were truly the most
if,isicut and cultural isolation. As of individuals
iisadvantaged in Indian society. Exceptions in terms
who had riade good were rare enough to leave the listing of the
groups in the Presidential Schedule valid's Under the circumstances'
ii.,i"i uv denotation had a distinct advantage. It eliminared tedious
groups would
burea:uciatic procedures through which individuals and
otlerwise have had to prove their "backwardness" and claim
eligibil-
ity for special Protection.
The Changing Parameters of Backwardness

Howevelr. after about two-and-a-half to three decades of the opera-
tion of the policy of protective discrimination, the parameters of
the
The scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes
situation
were no
"ttungio.
longei as uniformly backward as they had been when the
constitutional provisions for preferential facilities for them were
made. Individuals from several of the casteVtribes included in
tie
Schedule had moved up-in terms of education, employment' occu-
pational and economic status-to belong to the lower middle or
'middle
classes. In instances where they belonged to the all-India
services such as the I.A.S., or were in high political office' they had
moved up to be part of the upper class elite' As individuals they had
reached a polnt at which they seemed to be much less deserving
of
preferential provisions than the mass of the population, particularly
the mass that stood below the poverty line'6
In some instances entire casteytribes had advanced to a point
where they were clearly less disadvantaged than some castes/tribes
not includ;d in the Schedule. We do not have adequate data on this
issue yet, but even on the basis of the limited data available one may
hazardthestatementthatthereisapossibilitythatcommunitieslike
the Mahars of Maharashtra or the Chamars of U'P' and Gujarat are
today better-off than some ofthe castes that were not considered to be
baciward enough to be included in the Schedule' Yet, as castes/tribes
listed in the Prisidential Schedule, they continue to be eligible for
these provisions. What is even more significant is that they continue
to use the provisions freely. As may be expected this causes strong
resentment. Caste riots on the issue of reservations have grown to be
a common phenomenon of Indian life since the mid-seventies'7
While this reversal of status between the scheduled

casteVtribes
and the others creates one set of problems, other problem,
of the fact that the advance of the different scheAuf"O
ari; ;;,
if". f,u,
been extremely uneven.,Carefully documented studies "u.t"Vt
reveal that in
each state some casteVtribes have used, and continue
to use, most of
the facilities to the exclusion of the other casteVtribes
in the Sched_
ule. usually the casteytribes that have failed to use the
facilities are
backward because they are not even in a position to reach
out to the
support offered.
The Need to Deschedule those who have Advanced

The obvious solution in the face of these anomalies would
be to
"deschedule" the individuals, castes/tribes that have ,.advanced,,.
In
fact, Article 342 of the Constitution anticipates a process of
dcscheduling, inasmuch as it clearly specifies a parliamentary proce_ ,
dure for the purpose and in 1955 the Government did appoint
the
Lokur Committee to advise it on the revision of the existing lists of
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. This committee noted
the
creation of "vested interests" in the listing and categorically
stated
that "the time has come when the question of deschiduling of rela_
tively advanced communities should receive serious and urgent con_
sideration." It further went on to point out that in view of the consti_
tutional abolition of untouchability ..it would indeed be inappropriate
to apply the sole test of untouchability in preparing the list of the
scheduled castes . . . Nevertheless, having regard to the historical.
background we have, in revising the list, adopted the list of extreme
social, educational and economic backwardness of castes arising out
of the traditional custom of untouchability." In fact, it went so far as
to admit that "the line of demarcation between high castes and low
castes, which was fairly clear in the past has tended to become
blurred," implying thercby that the problems of the scheduled castes
could be bracketed with those of the rural and the uftan poor. More
immediately, the committee recommended descheduling of fourteen
tribes and twenty-eight castes. The Chamars of Bihir, U.p. and
Punjab and the Mahars of Maharashtra refened to above were amonqsr
those recommended for descheduling.8
However, it is significant that the committee made these recom_
mendations exclusively on the basis of the suggestions they solicited
from "several persons who appeared before us, including eminent

social workers." They did not go through a systematic process of
using the 1961 census and other data available at the time. In any case
the scheduled caste leadership was extrcmely hostile to the report and
the recommendations it had made faded away. In subsequent efforts
to review and revise the lists made in 1969 and in 1976, controversial
issues such as whether or not to include converts to Islam and
Christianity and non-scheduled caste persons married to scheduled
caste individuals in the lists, or how rigidly to adhere to area rcstric-
tions, etc. have surfaced, but they have never been squarely con-
fronted. They have been accommodated almost ad hoc into the
administration of preferential provisions. Meanwhile, in response to
political pressure from the scheduled casle/scheduled tribe leader-
ship, the ten-year term initially set by the Constitution for the opera-
tion of reservations in political bodies for the scheduled castes and
the scheduled tribes has been successively extended, three times
over, to further ten-year periods, stretching this particular provision,
now scheduled to terminate in 1991 to forty years instead of the ten
initially planned for. The evasion of controversial issues and submis-
sion to political pressures suggests that in the very first instance, the
Government of India swept some explosive problems relating to the
issue of preferential provisions under the carpet by adopting the
denotative method for the selection of castes and tribes to be included
in the Presidential Schedule. These are now beginning to fester. In
order to handle them it is useful to look at the evolution of the terms,
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and to identify the political
overtones that they have acquired through the process of their evolu-
tion. The rest of this paper concentrates on this task.
The Politics of the Evolution of the Terms

The terms scheduled caste and scheduled tribe are the most recent
of a long series of labels that have been used to denote a particular
sector of the socially and economically disadvantaged population in
Indian society. The scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes,
together with some other disadvantaged sectors, have often been
collectively referred to as the "depressed classes" and the "backward
classes".In addition, each ofthe several groups have been referred to
by some specific terms. For instance, the scheduled casbs have been
referred to as untouchables, ex-untouchables, outcastes, and Harijans.

The scheduled tribes have been refened to as the Aboriginees and
Girijans.
First used in 1935, the terms scheduled castes and scheduled tribes
have evolved through a variety of philanthropic, administrative and
political compromises and considerations. They cover a cluster of
separate deprivations such as poverty, illiteracy, poor access to edu-
cation, health care, employment and other opportunities. In addition,
the term'scheduled caste' connotes a low position in the caste
hierarchy, generally implying subjection to the social stigma of un-
touchability and all the other oppressions that go with low caste
status in Indian society. The term 'scheduled tribes' denotes an
aboriginee population that practices animistic religion and is physi-
cally and culturally isolated from the mainstream. These two sets of
characteristics have historically been considered to be significant
enough to mark the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes as
distinctively different and more disadvantaged than the mass of the
rural and the urban poor.
Depressed Classes and Backward Classes

Early, upon their arrival in India, Christian missionaries identified
low caste Hindus, particularly the untouchables, and the tribals as an.
oppressed people to whom the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood
of man and of a loving and a compassionate God, would hold special
relevance and appeal. Accordingly they paid special attention to
these 'depressed classes' in their welfare and proselytizing activi-
ties.e By the second half of the nineteenth century, Hindu reformers
inspired, and perhaps embanassed by the initiative taken by the
missionaries, were also actively engaged in the cause of the 'back-
ward classes'. Already, in the 1860s Jyotiba Phule of Maharashtra
had drawn the attention of the British govemment to the plight of
those who suffered from caste disabilities. He made a bold and
passionate appeal for some action on their behalf.t0
All this had a cumulative impact. During the second half of the
nineteenth century the British govemment took a decision to take
special measures for the welfare of the"depressed classes"J I Inspired
by British benevolence, some native rulers, such as the Princes of
Baroda, Kolhapur and Travancore were also stimulated to act on
behalf of the depressed classes. Towards the end of the century, the
issue derived an added meaning as reports about the discriminations
suffered by Indians in South Africa began to trickle in. The parallels
wer€ too sharp to disregard and consciences that had hitherto re-
mained insensitive on the issue were awakened.
By the 1880s, special schools, scholarships and other assistance
for the depressed classes had been established, both by the British
govemment and by the native rulers. Activity on their behalf was
particularly marked in Madras, Baroda, Kolhapur and Travancore,
but all over the country reformers had awakened to a new sense of
responsibility towards these hitherto neglected sections of the soci-
ety. Typically, in 1895 Justice M.G. Ranade shonglv underlined the
"claims of the aboriginals and untouchables on Hindu society."l2
This many-sided support was effective. Members of the depressed
classes, who for centuries had either consciously (the untouchable
castes) or through circumstances (the tribes) been excluded from
leaming, now had opportunities for education. The rigidity of caste-
defined division of labour and occupation was broken. Untouchables
as well as other lower castes gained access to occupations that they
had earlier been denied. Both the untouchables and ihe tribals gained
a new confidence and a sense of worth.
The Birth of the Term "Untouchable"

Inevitably, tlte attention and exposure that they gained and the
opportunities they experienced gave some of the several groups from
among those lumped together as the 'depressed classes' a new sense
of identity. It forced them, as well as the other Hindus who had been
party to their subjugation to question their situation. It was in the
course of this process that in 1909 the problem of the lowest castes
was first conceptualised under the rubric of'untouchability'. Shridhar
Ketkar used the term in a study of the caste system published in
September 1909.13 Soon afterwards, in October 1909, the Maharaja
of Baroda used the term 'untouchable' in the course of an address that
he delivered to the 'depressed classes' mission in Bombay.ra Mean-
while, the tribals were already being referred to as aboriginees.
The Politics of Philanthropy

It would be unfair to claim that charity or philanthropy played no
part in Christian missionary, British or the reformers' action on

behalf of the "depressed classes". On the other hand, it would be
naive to believe that their intentions were purely philanthropic. The
missionaries were zealously committed to proselytization and both
the untouchables and the tribals were vulnerable to conversion. As
regards the intentions of the British government, it may not be too
far-ferched to suggest that the strategy of 'divide and rule' is likely to
have influenced the British decision. Official action on behalf of
these two severely neglected sections of the population, particularly
the untouchables was bound to embarrass the Hindu elite and create
for them an awkwardness that had immense political value to the
British in the context of the nationalist demand for self-ruIe. The
actions of the Hindu reformers must in tum, to some extent at least,
have been a political response to Christian missionary and British
government overtures.
The Politics of Numbers

Regardless of whether, and if so to what extent, the support for the
'depressed' classes was consciously conceived of as a political strat-
egy, the fact remains that it had far-reaching political implications.
Towards the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the national-
ists had been pushing for greater participation in government. How-
ever, as this movement gathered momentum towards the end of the
century, the Muslims started to fear that the Hindu majority would
dominate them, if and when the British acceded to the nationalist
demand. To safeguard their interests they petitioned the Viceroy to
provide them with reserved seats as representatives to be elected by
a Muslim electorate. The British agreed. The petition, presented in
1906, brought the Muslims separate electorates in the Morley-Minto
Reforms of 1909. The visible success of the Muslims brought the
idea of communal electorates to the minds of other communities like
the Sikhs, who similarly feared domination by a Hindu majority.
Since communal representation was to be proportionate to the size of
a community in the population, the politics of numbers was born.15
Political Leverage from "Untouchability"

One of the first expressions of this politics was that the Muslims
sought to chisel down the size of the Hindu representation with the
pale of
claim that "properly speaking the outcastes are beyond the
Hinduism, and therefore, their strength should not go to swell
the
heard'
numerical force of the Hindus." Their voice must have been
for the census commissioner for 1911 seriously raised a question as
to whether the 'depressed classes', who numbered between a fifth to

sixth of the total population, should not be enumerated separately'
While the Muslim League as well as orthodox Hindus promptly
supported the suggestion, the Indian National Congress, eager to
prevent the fragmentation of the Indian force took the opposite stand'
it is significant that this claim on the part of the Congress was
u".o.p*i"d by a new inlerest in the welfare of the untouchables' At
the second meeting of the Indian National Congress in I 886, Dadabhai
Naroji, its President, had categorically declared: "A National Con-
gress must confine itself to questions in which the entire natioir has a
iirect participation, and it must leave the adjustment of social re-
forms and other class (caste) questions to class (caste) congresses"'
But by l9l7 the Congress stand had changed so far as to prompt an
"anti-disabilities" resolution on behalf of the untouchables'
In retrospect, this resolution app€ars feeble and lukewarm' It
reflects the fact that the Hindu leadership of the Congress, which
earlier was extremely slow to respond to Ranade's call for action on
behalf of the untouchables, did begin to recognize the political need
to hold the untouchables in the Hindu fold. But they had not really
warmed up to the idea. There was an absence of fervour and sympa-
thetic conviction in the framing of the resolution' Later' when the
administrative reforms of 1919 provided a few nominated seats for
the Depressed Classes, and the 'untouchables' began to form their
own political base to organise themselves separately under the lead-
ership of Ambedkar, it became even more imperative for the Con-
gress to retain them as Hindus. Alert to the situation, Mahatma
Gandhi, who was just emerging as the new leader of the Congress,
made their welfare a plank of the Congress policy' But with due
deference to Gandhi's personal commitment to the removal of un-
touchability and the uplift of the untouchables, a review of the
functioning of the Congress at that point clearly indicates vested
political interests. The politicization of the issue of tle untouchables
was further accentuated by the fact that the British government
responded by stepping up its own welfare activities for the depressed
Thz Politics of Bacl<wardncss
classes-aossibly as a foil to the Congress. It announced fresh schemes

for land, housing, schooling and government jobs for them and
declared illegal, age-old practices by which the untouchables were
denied access to schools, wells, roads, etc.r6
Polarization of Pmitions and New Labels

Meanwhile, Ambedkar, who was himself an untouchable. and
Gandhi continued at loggerheads with each other. Ambedkar, a staunch
democrat, strongly influenced by his experiences as a student in the
USA and comnftted to a secular, political resolution of the conflict
was firmly convinced that the untouchables were unlikely to advance
unless they were allowed separate political representation and power.
He was determined to gain such representation for them and to
organise them politically for further advance. Gandhi as a spirirualist,
was al3ogether opposed to the solution that Ambedkar proposed. He
coined the term Harijan (people of God) for the untouchables and
claimed that it was possible to remove untouchability and its accom-
panying evils by a change of upper<aste Hindu hearts. He fondly
referred to the tribals as "Girijans" who could be easily assimilated.
While the term "deprcssed classes', had thus differentiated be_
tween thi terms "untouchables", "Harijans" and ..Girijans', in the
political dialogue with the Ambedkarites and Gandhians, the British
continued to use the original term. This had significant implications
as will be evident from the following.
The Communal Award and the Containment of the Conllict

In 1928 when the Simon Commission visited India, Ambedkar
demanded reserved seats for the untouchables in legislative bodies,
special educational concessions, and recruitnrcnt to govemnlent posts.
These werc accepted in the Commission's report. As expected, Gandhi
finnly opposed separate electorates for the untouchables though he
conceded them to Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and Anglo-Indians. In
spite of Gandhi's objections the Communal Award granted by the
British in 1932 gave the untouchables regular votes in the general
eleclorate and granted their demand for separate electorates in areas
in which they were concentrated. Gandhi protested with his epoch-
making fast and finally Ambedkar was forced to compromise in the
Poona Pact, which provided 148 reserved seats instead of the Zg
Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and Tribes
separately elected members provided in the Communal Award. It

also provided a system of primary elections for those seats; a panel of
four candidates was to be chosen by electors from what was signifi-
cantly refened to as the "Depressed Classes". In this terminology and
in the Poona Pact, the opposition between Ambedkar and Gandhi
was contained without resolution of the qpnflict that lay at the root
namely, that Gandhi denied untouchability while Ambedkar made it
the core issue. Regardless of this, untouchability scored a new height
as an issue of social and political concem. Shortly after the signing of
the pact a conference of Hindu leaders met at various places and
adopted a resolution declaring their commitment to assimilate the
Harijans.tT
The G.O.I. Act of 1935 and the Birth of the Schedule

With the principle of separate representation thus firmly estab-
lished, the administrative task of listing the relevant castes had to be
accomplished. Accordingly, they were listed (i.e., scheduled) in 1936
in order to give effect to the provisions for special electoral reprcsen-
tation as per the Government of India Act of 1935. But the listing
presented several problems.
From 1908 onwards there were several estimates of the size of the
depressed classes in the country. In 1908 Risely counted 50.6 mil-
lion. In 191 I Holdemess placed the figure at 50 or 60 million. So did
several others, including the census of 1911. However, Baines in
l9l2 placed it at a low 34.8 million. In 1917 Sir Henry Sharp, who
was Educational Commissioner placed it even lower at 3l .5 million.
The Franchise Committee appointed to implement the 1919 Reforms
fornd 42.2 million in British India. A quarter or a third as many were
estimated in the princely states. The census of l92l and the Mudaliar
Committee of 1924 conformed to the rough figure of 50 million.
However, in 1928, official figures quoted a much lower 28.5 to 29
million. The Hartog Committee of 1929 set the figure at 29.76
million. But at about the same time the Nair Committee placed the
figure at 214.5 million, whereas the Simon Commission itself placed
the figure at 43.6 million. In 1931 Hutton as Census Commissioner
estimated the figure as 31.2 million, excluding Bengal but while
doing so, he had encount€red serious problems. This is significant. It
indicated that the task of defining who was to be given separate
representation was already diffi cult.
From Disability to Untouchability

During the nineteenth century, the British had been able to roughly
ideltify the 'depressed classes' for administrative purposes. They do
not seem to have been specifically concerned with identifying vic-
tims of untouchability in this context. But as the issue of untouchabil-
ity came to be politicized, British administrators grew to be increas-
ingly aware of the need to take note of the 'untouchability' factor in
the process of their identification of the depressed classes.
It seems that initially the definitibn of untouchability did not pose
any problems. Conceptually, untouchability appeared to be stark
enough to be identified in terms of a practice of ritual and social
exclusion. In fact, political bargaining on behalf of the untouchables
had proceeded on the assumption that untouchables throughout India
wene set off by some uniform and identifiable usages. Thus the
Governnpnt of India's Fifth Despatch in Constitutional Reform (1919)
mentions that "though they are defined in varying terms (they) are
broadly speaking all the same kind of people. Except for the differ-
ences in the rigidity of their exclusion they are all more or less in the
position of the Madras Panchamas, definitely outside that part of the
Hindu community which is allowed access to their temples." But as
enumerations were made, sharp differences were evident in the North
and the South. In fact, it was apparent that untouchability, as prac-
tised in the South, for instance in the Bombay and Madras regions,
did not exist in U.P. Yet Hindus in U.P. were divided into high and
low castes and the consequent marginalisation, deprivation and op-
pression werc as acute as they were due to the practice of untouch-
ability in the provinces of Bombay and Madras.
In order to resolve this problem, Hutton as Census Commissioner
in l93l developed a series of criteria to gauge the incidence of
disabilities. These were as follows:18
I . Whether the caste or class in question can be served by Brah-
mans or not;
2. Whether the caste or class in question can be served by the
barbers, water-carriers, tailors, etc., who serve caste Hindus;
3. Whether the caste in question pollutes a high-caste Hindu by
contact or proximity;
DeJinition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and Tribes 101
4. Whether the caste or class in question is one from whose hands

a caste Hindu can take water;
5. Whether the caste or class in question is debarred from using
public conveniences such as roads, ferries, wells or schools;
6. Whether the caste or class in question is debaned from the use
of Hindu temples;
7. Whether in ordinary social intercourse a well-educated member
of the caste or class in question will be treated as an equal by the
high-caste men of the same educational qualifications;
8. Whether the caste or class in question is merely depressed on
account of its own ignorance, illiteracy or poverty and but for that
would be subject to no social disability; and
9. Whether it is depressed on account of the occupation followed
and whether but for that occupation it would be subject to no social
disability.
The Entanglement of Ritual and Secular Disability

With the bracketing of caste and class in sevon out of the nine
indicators listed above we notice the unresolved tangle of ritual and
secular disability. This entanglement has caused serious problems.
The remarks of subsequent cornmentators are significant. Galanter
remarks that "the tests clearly point to the incidence of disabilities as
the crucial test." reLelah Dushkin.anothereminentscholar on the issue
remarks that "it is at least clear that occupation, ignorance, illiteracy
or poverty or any such forms of backwardness were not intended to
enter into the definition process." Hutton himself had made it clear:
"From the point of view of the state, the important test is the right to
use public ssnvsnignss5-1eads, wells and schools-and if this be
taken as the primary test, religious disabilities and the social disabili-
ties involved by them may be regarded as contributory only." Some
importance must be attached to them, since obviously if the general
public regards the persons of certain groups as so distasteful that
concerted action is resorted to in order to keep t}tem away, persons of
those groups do suffer a serious disability.
Are they disabilities per se or are the religious, ritual discrimina-
tions (leading to disability) the crux of the problem? Galanter
emphasises the disabilities without reference to their source, which,
on the other hand, is exemplified. Dushkin points out that backward-
lO2 The Politics of Backwardness
ness in terms ofoccupation, education, etc. was not intended to be the

basis of the definition, implying that caste is the core issue. Hutton
clearly emphasises the absence of the right to use public conve-
niences-thus stressing again the ritual factor. Does it mean that
preferential provisions are primarily to take care of this factor?
Free Scope for Administrative Discretion

Meanwhile, the existence of multiple criteria left census superin-
tendents ample scope to use their own discretion in the compilation
of provisional lise. Thus, there is considerable variation in the basis
on which people have been classified as untouchables in the different
provinces. Moreover, even the application of a criterion could not
guarantee uniformity for the simple reason that the exact form that
the debarment or exclusion took, could vary substantially from prov-
ince to province. For instance, in some cases debarment from a
temple meant that the paxticular caste was forbidden to approach tle
temple. In other cases it merely meant exclusion from the inner
sanctuary. In some cases debarment from water entailed the require-
ment that they use a separate water supply. But in others it meant
denial to any decent water supply, or dependence on the upper castes
to serve water to the lower castes. One of the most serious conse-
quences of these two factors is that castes that were included in the
Schedule in one province were omitted in another. hoblems also
arose out of the fact that census superintendents and commissioners
did not adhere strictly to Hutton's criteria. Often they excluded castes
that were ritually untouchable, but had advanced educationally or
economically. Correspondingly, they included castes that were not
untouchables but were visibly at the bottom of the social strata.
As may be expected, these anomalies left the Franchise Commit-
tee with serious doubts. However, testifying before the Franchise
Committee in defence of the listing as it stood, Dr Ambedkar, the
spokesman for the untouchables emphasised that "it is a fatal mistake
to suppose that differences in tests of untouchability indicate differ-
ences in the conditions of the untouchables." The crucial element he
emphasised was "the odium of avoidance" by the upper castes. Once
this element is present, he claimed "the whole ofthe class ofuntouch-
ables so ascertained must be taken into account for the purpose of
representation, without any funher distinction between rich and poor,
advanced and backward. educated and uneducated . . ." Others testi-

fying before the Committee, particularly Tambe, Chintamani and
Bakhale rejected Ambedkar's position. They pointed out that outside
of Madras, Bombay and the Central Provinces the untouchables do
not constitute a distinct section of the population. They claimed that
in the other provinces, "untouchability is the adjunct not of the person
but of the occupation he occupies." The majority of the Committee
felt that denial of access to temples and causing pollution by touch
should be accepted as tests of untouchability and that those who are
only economically poor and in other ways backward should not be
included in the Schedule.2o
The Committee finally decided, with considerable hesitation, the
list of untouchables in the North and the East. But on the whole,
commentators agree that the castes included in the list were socially
the lowest Hindu castes in their particular provinces and they were
listed, partly at least, on that basis. It contained over 40 million
people. By the census of 1941, the figure, roughly proportionate to
the total increase of the population of the country, had risen to 48.8
million, constituting l9percentof the Hindu population and 12.6 per
cent of the total population of undivided India.
The Presidential Schedule

When the President of newly independent India promulgated the
Scheduled Castes Order in 1950, he basically conformed to rhe lisr of
1936 with two major additions: some Sikh castes, and castes from
areas that had not till then been included in the Schedule. In 195 I and
1956 a few changes were again made, but these were mainly in the
nature of correcting errors. The only major change was the inclusion
in 1956 of all Sikh untouchables in the list. There were no other
policy changes
Tribals
The identification of tribals was less difficult. Upto the early
twentieth century they were included within the depressed classes.
But in the wake of the Communal Award, they were clearly identi-
fied as aboriginals who pracrised animistic religions. The general
notion since then has been that this category should include groups
distinguished by their "tribal characteristics" and by their sparial and
cultural isolation from the population. The problem here is that the
tribals mix animism with Hinduism and that except for a few excep-
tions, their spatial and cultural isolation is not absolute enough for
them to be marked without overlap with the rest of the population.
The other important point is that there is an underlying current of
concern towards insulating them from exploitation by sophisticated
outsiders and towards protecting them from domination by the main-
stream culture. The British protected the tribals by placing them
outside of ordinary administration and by treating their habitations as
separate reserves.2rThe Government of India Act ofl935 provided for
sepzfate representation for the "Backward Tribes" just as it did for
untouchable castes. Accordingly, a list of backward tribes was pro-
mulgated for the purpose.
Complications in Listing Scheduled Tribes

The post-independence scheduling of tribes was much less com-
plicated. In 1950 when the President promulgated the list of Sched-
uled Areas and Scheduled Tribes, he only made some additions to the
1935 list of Backward Tribes. Further, there were some transfers
from the earlier scheduled caste list (e.g., in Bengal) to the tribes' list
and vice versa. However, it would be mistaken to infer from the ease
with which the listing was done that the matter was simple and
uncomplicated. Rather, the complications were glossed over.
The scheduled tribes were defined partly by habitat and geo-
graphic isolation but mainly on the basis of their social, religious,
linguistic and cultural distinctiveness and "their tribal characteris-
tics." Just where the line between tribals and non-tribals should be
drawn has never been clear. The issue is intricately intertwined with
controversy over the extent to which tribals are Hindus. Ghurye
describes them as "backward Hindus". Others like Haimendorf de-
scribe them as animists.22 A great deal has been written on the
theoretical complexity of the caste+ribe distinction, but ttre bound-
aries remain hazy and unresolved.
Willingness to Accept Ambivalence

Moreover, as with the scheduled castes, not all who could qualify
for listing have been listed. No religious test was specified. The
underlying assumption is that tribals practise animist religions. Yet'
converts are included. Attempts to exclude them have failed. In 1951

the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes had
remarked that no uniform test for distinguishing the scheduled tribes
was available. He requested the state govemments for their views.
After considering the points suggested by each state, he settled upon
some common elements: tribal origin, primitive way of life, remote
habitation and general backwardness in all respects. In the context of
what has been said so far these criteria should appear nebulous and
difficult to apply precisely. Nevertheless only a few years later they
were declared to be fully satisfactory. In 1956, the Horr.e Minister
referred to the "well-defined and easily ascertained" criteria. In 1961
the Dhebar Commission felt no need to solve the problem of identi-
fying the tribals.23
An ldeal that has Soured

One wonders at such statements. The foregoing discussion indi-
cates that the terms scheduled castes and scheduled tribes have not
yet been precisely defined. Indicators listed from time to time provide
broad outlines in terms of which casteVtribes may be included in the
Schedule, but boundaries between those to be included and the others
are often hazy. Worse yet, the weightage to be accorded to poverty,
rural residence, gerierations of illiteracy and other secular aspects of
their marginalization has not yet been determined. By way of sum-
ming up it may be useful to look at some of the bold implications of
this.
The Lokur Committee's statement that the line between the disad-
vantages of class and caste is already quite blurred, may not be as
valid for rural India as it is for urban India. Nevertheless the fact
remains that it has become invisible in many quarters. Under these
circumstances, the failure of the government, to deschedule those
who have advanced, amounts to a failure to accept this reality and
forces those who are affected to question the govemment's intent. In
this context, it is difficult to forget the vesred political inrerests rhat
had initially prompted the Congress to pay attention to the untouch-
ables. Correspondingly, it is difficult not to suspect that vested inter-
ests continue to influence the Congress govemment, particularly
from descheduling the castes which have advanced. In a sense, the
fact that the terms scheduled caste and scheduled tribe are not clearlv
I
i
:
defined aggravates the matter as efforts to deschedule distintegrate at

the point at which policy must define the basis for descheduling. As
all this happens, the magnificent ideal of equality for the scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes sours. It degenerates into a political game,
creating a crisis of credibility, and fouls up the ethos of democracy in
India.
At another level, with respect to the more immediate challenge of
advancing the quality of life of the scheduled castes and the sched-
uled tribes, the failure to define the terms has other far-reaching
implications. Because cf the 'denotative' approach there is a ten-
dency to lump the various castes or tribes together as an
undifferentiated mass of 'backward' and disadvantaged people. Very
little is done to focus action on the exact inadequacies suffered. This
is unfortunate. Studies into the substance of the disadvantages suf-
fered by the scheduled casteytribes, and their impact, as also the
steps taken to help them remove these disadvantages are as yet very
meagrc. But the few that are available clearly suggest that there are
several different disadvantages that constrain the advance of the
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and that it is necessary to
understand each of these carefully to direct appropriate ameliorative
or remedial action. The continued reluctance to define the elements
tiat constitute the 'backwardness' of the scheduled castes and the
scheduled tribes results in a failure to recognise and to anend to the
specificities of their situation. It reduces to mechanical, administra-
tive measures, what should be carefully designed strategies for the
advance of a historically disadvantaged section of the Indian society.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
l. Ref. Constitution of India, Article l5(b) of Part Ill-Fundamental Rights'

Articlb 46 of Part lV-Directive Principles of State Policy, and Articles 330' 332
and 334 of Part XVl-Special Provisions Relating to Certain Clauses.
2. Ref. Anicle 366 (Definitions) of Part XIX Miscellaneous (24) "Scheduled
Castes" means such castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such
castes, races or tfibes as are deemed under article 341 to be Scheduled castes for
the purposes of this Constitution. (25) "Scheduled Tribes" means such tribes or
tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or tribal communities
as are deemed under article 342 to be Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of this
Constitution.
3. Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities, University of Berkeley and Los
Delinition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and Tribes 107
Angeles: Califomia Press, 1984, pp. 4l-83

4. Ref . State of Madras v. Champakatt Dorairaian, A.I.R. 1951 S.C- 226,
l95i S.C.J. 313. Venlcataramana v. State of Madras, A.l.R. l95l S-C. 229.
Jagwant Kaur v. State of Bombay, A.I'R. 1952 Bom. 461. The Constitution
(First Amendment) Act, para 2 (1951) and Artiple 15(4), which articulates the
amendment.
5. Marc Galanter, op. cit., ChaP. l.
6. Suma Chitnis, A lnng Way to Go. New Delhi: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd.,
1981, pp. 154-56.
7. A. Yagnik, "Spectre of Caste War", Economic and Political Weekly, vol.
xvi, no. 13., 1981, pp.553-55.
8. Department of Social Security: Report of the Advisory Committee on the
Revision of the Lists of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Lokur Com-
mittee). Delhi: 1965, pp. 6-10.
9. Charles H. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, pp.53-54.
10. Dhananjay Keer, Mahatma Jotirao Phooley: Father of our Social Revo'
lution, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1964.
11. D.N. Sadanshiv, Resenations for Social Justice. Bombay: Current Law
Publishers, 1986, pp. 2-3.
12. Marc Galanter, op. cit., p. 24.
13. Shridhar Ketkar, The History of Caste in India. Ithaca: Taylor and
Carpenter, 1909, pp. 86.
14. Sayaji Rao III, Maharaja of Baroda. Speeches and Addresses, I'ondon:
Macmillan Co., 1912, pp.'44-45.
15. (i) Eleanor Znl7iot, "Dr Ambedkar and the Mahar Movement", Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, p. 141.
(ii) The Hindu population was already dropping steadily. According to the
Census of 1881 Hindus constituted 74.3 per cent of the total population of
British India. By 1911 the figure had dropped to 69.3 per cent.
16. Eleanor Zelliot, op. cit., p. 166.
17. Marc Galanter, op. cit.,pp. 122-26.
18. J.H. Hutton, Caste in India: Its Nature, Function and Oigins.3rd e.d.
Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 194.
19. Marc Galanter, op. cit., pp. 128-29.
20. Report ofthe Indian Franchise Committe€, 1932. vol. l, p. 203. Calcutta:
Govt. of India, Central Publication Branch.
21. Muc Galanter, op. cit., Chap.5.
22. G.S. Ghurye, The Scheduled Tibes, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1963,
p. 19,
23. Scheduled Areas and Tribes Commission (U.N. Dhebar) Report 1960-61,
2 vols. Delhi: Manaser of Publications.
Chapter 5
Karnataka Government's Reservation

Policies for SCs/STs and OBCs
G. Thimmaiah
1. Socio-Political Background of Reservation Policy

I'if ARNATAKA has a long history of protective discrimination
f( nolicf for uplifting the socially and educationally backward
I \sections of the population of the state. In order to understand
and appreciate the significance ofthe role played by the state govern-
ment in improving the socio-economic and educational conditions of
SCVSTs, Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and minorities in the
state, it is necessary to review the history ofthe reservation policy in
Kamataka.
The present Kamataka was crcated in 1956 by integrating Kannada-
speaking areas of the former Hyderabad state and of former Bombay
and Madras provinces with the then princely state of Mysore. Though
the reservation policy of the government of Mysore was influenced
by the reform movement in the former Madras province, particularly
the social revolt sponsored by the Justice Party, Mysore had devel-
oped its own rudimentary policy of reservation as far back as 1874.t
During the period between 1874 and 1885 the government of Mysore
reserved 20 per cent of middle and lower-level jobs in the police
department for Brahmins and 80 per cent for Muslims, Hindus and
Indian Christians. Again from 1914, the govemment of Mysore
introduced a system of nomination of qualihed backward class can-
didates to the posts of Assistant Commissioners. Even so, it was
realised that the backward classes (including SCs and STs) could not
Kamatakn Government's Reserttation Policies 109
break the monopoly of the Brahmins in the state government servrce'

It may be interesting to know that between 1881 and l9l0 the
demand for jobs for locals inspired by a sort of "sons of the soit'
theory was going on among the Brahmins. At that time, the Mysore
Maharaja was advised to appoint Diwans (Chief Ministers) from
outside the state who came mostly from former Madras Province'
These Diwans used to help their kith and kin belonging to their own
sub-castes to get employment in the state govemment. This was
resented by the local Brahmins who raised a hue and cry against the
Tamil Brairmins' domination of govemment jobs in the Princely state
of Mysore. It would appear as though the Mysore Brahmins them-
selves behaved like backward classes, asking for reservation of state
govemment jobs for Mysore Brahmins only. However, this contro-
versy came to an end with the appointrnent of Sir M. Visveswaraya
as Diwan of the then Mysore state in 1910. But Visveswaraya him-
self resigned in l9l 8 on the issue of reservation for backward classes
in government service. This needs some elaboration.
The social reform movement, the resultant communal order in the
Madras Province and the monopoly of the Brahmins in Mysore
government jobs created a lot of discontent among the backward
classes. No govemment, not even the princely government, could
ignore the demands of a vast majority of the people for a sha-re in the
govemment service. As a positive response to this demand, the First
Backward Classes Committee was appointed under the Chairman-
ship of the Chief Judge of Mysore Chief Court, Sir Irslie C. Miller.
This committee which submitted its report within a record time of
about ll months, laid the foundation for the reservation policy for
backward classes in the state of Kamataka. In fact, the thirty-one-
page report has many original ideas about the criteria to be adopted
for identifying backward classes, measures needed for promoting
their education and the reasons for compromising on merit for ad-
equate representation of the backward classes in government service.
The Miller Committee was the result of the political awakening of
the backward classes in the princely state of Mysore. The two nu-
merically dominant communities, the Vokkaligas and Lingayats'
while strong economically, were educationally backward. Therefore,
they could not compete with the Brahmins for govemment service,
who constituted only 3.4 per cent of the population. They, thereforc,
took the lead in demanding reservations in state govemment jobs. .
They were supported by other backward castes, Muslims, Indian

Christians, SCs and STs. They got a semi-democratic political forum
to articulate their demands. In 1882, immediately after the rendition
of the princely state back to the Mysore royal family, a Representa_
tive Assembly was constituted as a forum for consulting different
sections of tle society on state govemment matters. Most of these
members were nominated on the basis of thefu economic and social
background. This Representative Assembly gave rise to a political
awakening among the backward classes, though the economically
better-off among them took the lead.
There was also another historic factor which paved the way for the
early emergence of the backward classes movement in Karnataka.
During the reign of Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan which extended over
80 years, the population of Muslims increased in the state and a large
number of them came to hold important positions. After the fall of
Tipu many of them suddenly found themselves powerless. British
rule had reduced substantially the influence of the Muslims in soci-
ety. The next generation of Muslims started asking for a larger share
in the govemment service, which provided a complementary support
to the Vokkaligas and Lingayats in their political ambitions. Simul-
taneously, the Christians also started growing in numbers after the
establishment of the British rule. Thus the local dominant castes, i.e.,
Vokkaligas and Lingayats, longing for power, got an opportunity to
articulate their demands through the Representative Assembly and
made common cause with Muslims and Christians. All of them, put
together, constituted a major portion of population, who came to be
known as the non-Brahmins. Though SCs and STs were numerically
significant even in the former Mysore state, the awarenels among
them was not sufficiently strong until Independence and the introduc-
tion of the Constitution.
It was this coalition of self-interest groups which compelled the
Maharaja of Mysore to break the monopoly of Brahmins in govern-
ment service and throw it open through reservation to non-Brahmins.
Although the fortunes of the backward classes fluctuated, dependent
as they were upon the social-political whims and fancies of the
Diwans who succeeded Sir M. Visveswaraya, the Maharaja could not
reverse the policy of reservation as it was demanded by an influential
Karnataka Government's Resemation P olicies lll
and large section of the people of Mysore.
After Independence and up to the time of the reorganisation of the
state 094't-1956), the Miller Committee recommendations were
implemented. By the time Mysore was integrated into. independent
India, the Brahmins had accepted willy-nilly the growing power of
the backward castes. Because of their minority position, the new
political system came to depend significantly upon the numerical
strength of these castes. During this period, the dominant communi-
ties, along with SCVSTs and the Muslims' resorted to yet another
interesting strategy of driving the Brahmins out of the rural areas'
The dominant communities which controlled the elected government
after Independence, introduced tenancy abolition legislation, under
which the Brahmins lost their izam land to the tenants.2 In the South,
particularly in Mysore, Brahmins never cultivated the vast lands they
owned under th e inamdari system. Their tenants belonged mostly to
the dominant communities though in some places there were SCs
also. This political strength was effectively and intelligently used by
the dominant communities to weaken the economic base of the
Brahmins in the rural areas. As a result, after losing their lands, the
Brahmins moved to urban areas in search of white-collar jobs. Though
they suffered during that transition period, through their resourceful-
ness and ingenuity they rehabilitated themselves comfortably in the
urban areas.
After the integration of the state in 1956, it became necessary to go
through the exercises of reservation once again, in view of the merger
of the areas from other states which did not have any consistent
reservation policies. The attempts of the government of Karnataka to
prepare a uniform list applicable to the people of all the integrated
areas were frustrated by the High Court.3 Therefore' the Second
Backward Classes Commission was appointed under the chairman-
ship of a backward class political leader, Dr. Nagana Gowda in 1960,
to determine the backward classes and to recommend the extent of
reservations. This Commission identifred the backward classes basi-
cally on the basis of caste, though it used educational levels and
proportion of people of each caste in govemment service as addi
tional criteria. By using all the three criteria, the Commission de-
clared one of the dominant communities, the Lingayats as forward.
This led to a legal banle which ended in the Supreme Court striking
ll2 The politics of Backwardness
down the state govemment order on reservations in 1963. Conse_

quently, the state government implemented a modified reservation
policy between 1963 and 1977, under which the income of rhe
parents and their occupation were taken into account for determining
the backwardness of the people.
This period (1956-1972) was also marked by the rule of Lingayars
in Kamataka under the chief ministerships of S. Nijalingappa and
Veerendra Patil, who did not want their own community to be ex-
cluded from the list of backward classes and lose tle benefits of
reservation. At the same time, it was alleged that the two dominant
communities cornered all the benefits under the earlier as well as
modified reservation policies and that a new set of guidelines was
required for determining the backward classes. At this juncture, the
backward classes movement took a different turn under the political
leadership of Devraj Urs. Until that time , all the non-Brahmin castes
and communities were considered as backward classes. But a general
feeling that Lingayats and Vokkaligas dominated the political, eco-
nomic, educational and even administrative spheres was exploited by
Urs to divide the backward classes. He devised a new political
strategy after the 1969 split in the Congress party to wrest political
power from the two dominant communities in the state, by uniting the
non-dominant minority backward castes, the Muslims and SCVSTs.
Though he was successful in this attempt to begin with, the arithmetic
of backward classes compelled him not to ignore Vokkaligas torally.
He wanted to formulate a new reservation policy consistent with his
new political strategy. For this purpose, he found in L.G. Havanur, an
active proponent of the new backward classes ideology, an able
policy adviser. While the status of the earlier backward qlasses in-
quiry bodies was only those of committees, Urs elevated it to that of
a commission and appointed the First Backward Classes Commis-
sion in 1972 under the chairmanship of L.G. Havanur.
This Commission submitted its report after prolonged delibera-
tions in November 1975. However, it also left out certain sections of
the Lingayat community. When the partially modified governmenr
order on reservation was implemented, the national emergency had
already been declared. The Lingayats could not take to the streets
against the recommendations of the Havanur Commission and had to
wait for a more appropriate time. After the emergency, they decided
Karnatakn Govemment's Reservation Policies 113
to seek judicial remedy' The Karnataka High Court upheld the rec-
ommendations of the Havanur Commission but partially struck down
the modifications introduced in the govemment order' Even then the
Lingayats went on to appeal to the Supreme Court which directed
both the governments of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu to review the list
of backward classes in the light of fresh data.
This judicial decision forced the government of Karnataka to
appoint the Second Backward Classes Commission in 1983' which
suUmitteO its report in 1986, excluding not only the Lingayats and
Vokkaligas, but also 13 other communities which were still etiuca-
tionally backward and were also numerically in a minority position'
This sparked off a state-wide agitation and ultimately forced the
Janata govemment to reject the recommendations of the Commis-
sion. The fresh govemment order, issued in 1986' brought back most
of the communities (the former non-Brahmins) to the backward
classes list for the purpose of reservation' This, in brief is the story
of the backward classes movement in Kamataka'
It is necessary at this stage to mention the diversity of the back-
ward classes movement in Karnataka after the reorganisation of the
state. We have noted earlier that from 1874 lill 194"1, the backward
classes included all castes except Brahmins, Anglo-Indians and Eu-
ropeans. The pre-independent backward classes movement in Mysore
state is known as the non-Brahmin movement, as it included all the
non-Brahmin communities of Hindus, Muslims and Christians. The
SCs and STs were part of the backward classes in the princely state
of Mysore, but were followers rather than leaders in the backward
classes movement. But after 1947, particularly after the introduction
of the Constitution which guaranteed proportional reservation for
SCs/STs, they started emerging as a separate backward group in
Karnataka. This group became very powerful during Urs's rule.
Consequently, Ambedkarism took deep roots in Karnataka in the late
1970s and early 1980s. They not only started fighting for their
constitutional share, both in admissions to educational institutions
and govemment jobs, but also introduced a roster system in appoint-
ments to governmentjobs and reservations in promotions for SCs and
STs in government service. Over and above these, they even started
asking for a share in the reservation meant for other backward classes.
An interestine feature of the backward classes movement in Karnataka,
ll4 The politics of Backwardness
particularly in the 1980s, has been an unprecedented unigr among the

SC and ST leaders for the purpose of claiming their legitimate share.
Cutting across party lines and ideological overtones, they have be_
come a powerful vocal minority in all the state public platforms,
including the Legislative Assembly and the Council. Today they are
a force to rcckon with by political parties and other sections of the
society.
Another interesting development in the backward classes move-
ment in Kamataka has been the subtle move of L.G. Havanur to
organise the Bedas and Nayaks under one group: backward tribe.
This tag, given to Nayaks in Maharashtra, was used by him to further
upgrade the status of the Bedas for the purpose of rcservation as a
backward tribe. It may be mentioned in this context that the Havanur
Commission classified the OBCs into backward tribes, backward
castes and backward communities and recommended their sharcs in
the reservation in ascending order. Furtheq by using the constitu-
tional provision given to SCs and STs, he manoeuvrcd to see that the
income ceiling was not fixed for the castes included under backward
tribe. Then he started lobbying in Delhi for getting ST status to
backward tribes and this has been challenged by the Second Back-
ward Classes Commission and others. But the fight is still going on.
The third recent development in the backward class movement in
tle state of Kamataka is the fight which has been going on between
the Lingayats and Vokkaligas for the backward class status. When
the Lingayats were declared as forward by the Havanur Commission
they were furious, not merely for conferring on them the unprofitable
forward status but also for isolating them from the Vokkaligas. They
would have accepted the forward status if the Vokkaligas were also
made forward. This intention was explicitly made known to the
Supreme Court. Sensing the true intention of the appeal preferrcd by
Lingayats before the Supreme Court, the Second Backward Classes
Commission made Vokkaligas also forward. Though initially it sat-
isfied the Lingayats, the ugly turn that the recommendations of the
Second Backward Classes Commission took made the Lingayats also
to retrace their steps and fight for the backward tag. The final conse-
quence of this development has been that the Vokkaligas have emerged
as champions of the neglected minority backward castes in Kamataka.
This is because it was the Vokkaligas who took the lead in organising
Karnataka G ov e rnment' s Resemat ion P olic ie s 115
the l3 other minority castes which were made forward and organised
the joint agitation against the recommendations of the Second Back-
ward Classes Commission.
Finally, the Muslims have emerged as an identifiable group, jeal-
ously guarding their own backward tag rather than supporting the
broader backward classes movement. In other words, there is a clear
evidence of every single group of former backward classes trying to
protect its own group interests without bothering about the loss or
gain to other sections of the OBCs. The unity of all OBCs, SCs/STs
and minorities is becoming shaky and their split is becoming open.
This is evident even within each major community. For instance, the
fight for supremacy, both in political leadership and for controlling
the money-spinning educational institutions, has been going on be-
tween different sub-castes within the Vokkaliga community. There is
a possibility of an anti-reservation movement erupting as it did in
Gujarat. Furthermore, if Vokkaligas and Lingayats unite for political
reasons, it may manifest itself in the form of a second anti-Brahmin
movement in Karnataka.
2. Share of OBCs, SCs and STs in the State's Population

The formulation of any reservation policy depends upon reliable
data on the backward classes population of a state. In Kamataka, as
elsewhere in the country, caste-wise population data are not avail-
able. This forced the Second Backward Classes Committee (1960)
and the First Backward Classes Commission (1972) to estimate and
even 'guestimate' the caste-wise population. This has created a lot of
controversy relating to the numerical strength of each caste and
community in the total population. Perhaps the only committee which
had the benefit of reliable data on caste-wise composition of popula-
tion was the Miller Committee (1918). This committee which was
appointed in 1918 used the 1911 census data, which provided caste-
wise demographic information, for formulating its recommendations.
Table I gives the Caste-wise population of Hindus, Muslims,
Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians in the princely state of Mysore
according to the 1911 census. It may be observed that the depressed
caste population constituted a major proportion and next came the
Vokkaligas. This was how powerful the Vokkaligas were in the
former princely state of Mysore until after Independence. Subse-
ll6 The Politics of Baclcwardne ss
Table I
Share of SCs/STs and OBCs in the Total Population of Princely
State of Mysore
Sr. Castel Popul- Per cenl Ijterate Per cent Literate Vo of total
No.Comna- ation to total popul- to total in literate
nin Hindus ation literate English Hindus
Hindu in Enplish
populatian
l. Brahrnin 193137 3.59 80409 27.35 15455 75.14
(3.39),r (23.S9)+ (52.95)+
Kshatriya 36894 0.69 6031 2.05 638 3.10
(0.0s)+ (r.71)+ (2.r9)+
J. Vokkaliga 1328237 24.72 42206 14.35 717 3.58
Q3.ZA1* (12.36)1, (2.52\*
4. Lingayat 728571 13.56 66665 22.67 804 3.92
(12.77)* (19.55)* (2.75)+
f. Mudaliar ll87l O.22 3217 1.09 799 3.88
(0.2t)* (0.x1* Q.lq+
Other Hindus
not specially
backward 527891 11.68 64059 21.79 1499 7.29
(11.01)* (l8.zg)* (5.r+;*
Specially
backward or
Depressed
Classes ?447636 45.54 31467 10.70 636 3.O9
(42.9O)+ (9.23)* (2.18)'r'
Total Hindus 5374237 100.00 29N54 100.00 20568 100.00

8. Mohamme- 291708 5.11+ 34831 10.22* 1307 4.48+
dans
9. Indian 34ml 0.60* 7820 2.29+ U3t 8.33*
Christians
10. European
Anglo-
Indians 5213 0.09* 4199 t.23* 3987 13.66+
Total 5705359 100.00+ 3,!0940 t00.00+ 29190 100.00
Note: * These figures are with reference to total population of the state.
Source: Govemment of Mysore: Report of the Committee Appointed to
Consider Steps Necessary for the Adequate Representation of Communities in
the Public Semice, 1919, p. 24.
Kamataka Government's Reservation Policies tt7
Table II
Estimated Population of Various Castes and Communities and
their Relative Shares in the Total Population of Kamataka in 1960
Caste/Community Estinated Percentage Percentage to the

PoPulation total
to the total population
Hindus of thc state
l. Ahasa 248800 1.35 1.18

2. Banajiga 332400 1.80 1.58
3. Beda 1002100 5.44 4.74
4. Brahmin 905700 4.92 4.28
5. Darzi 65000 0.35 0.31
6. Devanga 221000 1.20 1.05
7. Gangakula 460800 2.50 2.18
8. Ganiga 90700 o.49 0.43
9. Idiga 528600 2.87 2.40
10. Kshatriya 78200 0.42 0.37
11. Kumbara 109100 0.59 o.52
12. Kuruba 14558C0 7.90 6.88
13. Lingayat 32930001C 17.88 t:.f /
14. Mahratta 861700 4.68 4.08
15. Meda
' 28300 0.15 0.13
16. Mudali 112200 0.61 0.53
17. Nayinda 120800 0.66 0.57
18. Neyagi 142000 o.77 0.67
19. Rajput 43800 0.24 0.21
20. Satani 36600 0.20 0.17
21. Thigala l527OO 0.83 0.72
22. Uppata 220700 1.20 1.04
23. Vokkaliga 27M3OO 14.90 12.98
24. Yaisya 1214800 0.79 0.68
25. Viswakarma 4824OO 2.62 2.28
26. Yadava 310700 1.69 1.47
27. LamarLi 178400 0.9"1 0.84
28. Waddar 359800 1.95 |.70
29. Nayar 24600 0.13 0.12
30. Kodaga 56200 0.31 o.z7
31. Other non- 703600 3.82 3.30
Scheduled Hindu
Castes
ll8 The Politics of Backwardne ss
Total non- 15514800 84.24 73.37

Scheduled Hindus
Scheduled Tribes 87600 0.48 0.41

Total Hindus 18418{nO 100.00 87.09
TotalPopulation 211473c0 100.00

of the state
Sorrce: Govemment of Mysore, Mysore Backward Clnsses Committee:
Final Report,1961, p. 41.
quently, the Nagana Gowda Committee (1960) did not have rhe
benefit of reliable caste-wise population data, as it was not available
from 1951 onwards. Therefore, the committee projected the popula-
tion of all the castes by using the rate of growth of population
between l93l and 1941. According to this estimation, as shown in
Table II, Lingayats constituted the highest proportion of state popu-
lation, the next highest being the Vokkaligas. Thus the Vokkaligas,
who were a nunrerically dominant backward community in the princely
state of Mysore, were reduced to second position after the first
position. The SCs and STs, though constituting about 14 per cent of
the population, came to be separately trcated under the special provi-
sions of the Constitution and became a separale entity after Indepen-
dence. However, the Christians and Muslims continued to be a part of
the backward classes though they enjoyed minority status under the
Constitution.
The hrst Backward Classes Commission (1972) which is popu-
larly known as Havanur Commission also faced the sime problem of
lack of data on caste-wise population. However, the Havanur Com-
mission used, wherever necessary, the 1911, l93l and 1941 caste-
wise census data as the base-year data for projecting the population
of different castes, depending upon their availability from these
various censuses. The Commission projected the population of dif-
ferent castes by using the growth rate of total population. The pro-
jected population of different castes for 1972 is shown in Table III.
It may be observed that the relative position of the two dominant
communities-Lingayats and Vokkaligas-remained the same be-
cause of the use of constant growth rate for projecting the caste-wise
Kamataka Government's Reservation Policies ll9
Table III
Estimated Population of Various Castes and Communities and
their Relative Shares in the Total Population of
Karnanka in 1972
Sl.. Castd Estimated Per cent Estimated Percentage

No.Communiry population to total popubrton n the.
of 1971 Hindus of 1972 state.
population
l. Agasa 346463 1.37 355246 l.l8

2. Ambalavasi 2059 0.01 2108 0.01
3. Arasu 19595 0.08 2t245 0.07
4. Balija 460505 1.82 4724109 1.57
5. Bandi t4459 0.06 14793 0.00
6. Banjara 345487 L36 353882 1.18
(Lamani)
7. Beda 1484168 5.86 15196 5.06
8. Bhaat 8059 0.03 8277 0.03
9. Bhunt 2002100 0;19 205r93 0.68
10. Bogad 2553 0.01 '2622 0.01
11. Brahmin t23E42l 4.89 12694s5 4.23
12. Chakkan 4930 0.02 5048 0.o2
13. Chaliyan 2524 0.01 2584 0.01
14. Chapparabanda 2943 0.01 3001 0.01
15. Chaptegara 2609 0.01 2670 0.01
16. Charodi 1815 0.01 1858 0.01
17. Chunchar 57t4 o.o2 58n o.o2
18. Darzi to84'24 0.43 I11567 o.37
19. Devadiga 6s375 0.?5 67440 o.22
20. Devanga 273692 1.08 280546 0.93
21. Dombam 10346 0.04 105E2 o.(X
22. Gambit 6630 0.03 6733 0.02
22. Gangakula 695888 2.75 712922 2.38
24. Ganiga 152983 0.60 156898 0.58
25. Garudi JA'I I -0.01 2693 0.01
26. Gatti 2535 0.01 2596 0.01
27 . Gavli 10099 0.04 10344 0.03
28. Ghadi 2852 0.01 29r8 0.01
29. Giddidki 44118 0.1? 45137 0.15
30. Ganiga 2822 0.01 2902 0.01
31. Gosavi 7784 0.03 7968 0.03
32. Gujarathi 2398 0.01 z.59 0.01
r2a The Politics of Backwardness
33. Gurav 17867 0.07 18279 0.06

34. Halwaki Wakkal 44706 0.18 45832 0.15
35. Hambar 33270 0.13 34001 0.11
36. Hoovadiga 13078 0.05 11392 0.04
37. ldiga 659383 2.60 657654 2.25
38. Jogi 43955 0.17 45072 0.15
39. Kanbi 20f.23 0.08 21091 0.07
40. Kanisan 2320 0.01 2375 0.01
41. Kasai 10485 0.04 10733 0.04
42. Kasar 9975 0.04 10237 0.03
43. Kodaga 84812 0.33 86271 0.29
44. Kolayan 20488 0.08 20979 0.07
45. Komarpallic 16965 0.07 17357 0.06
46. Koracha 16965 0.0E 20164 0.07
47. Koraga 9066 0.04 9283 0.03
48. Korarna 95758 0.38 98055 0.33
49. Kotari 2456 0.01 2515 0.01
50. Kotegar 12412 0.05 12707 0.04
51. Kshatriya 7J391 o.29 75301 0.25
52. Kudihi 17002 0.07 17410 0.06
53. Kumbara 213006 0.84 218399 0.73
54. Kurma 10147 0.04 10408 0.03
55. Kuruba 1984697 7.83 2032032 6.77
56. Ladar 699'l 0.03 7153 0.02
57. Lingayat 4292392 16.93 439299 14.9
58. Mahraua 1012648 3.99 1036377 3.45
59. Mala 21883 0.09 2402 0.07
60. Malava 8974 0.04 9188 0.03
61. Malavali 3125 0.01 3190 0.01
62. Marata 3191 0.01 3246 0.01
63. Meda 30981 1.t2 3t742 0.1I
64. Moger 18163 0.07 18591 0.06
65. Mudali 102010 0.40 rM979 0.35
66. Mukkavan 5229 o.o2 5354 0.02
67. Nadar 11194 0.04 11453 0.(X
68. Natuva 4178 0.02 4280 0.01
69. Nayar 33958 0.13 34696 0.12
70. Nayinda 186958 0.74 191.502 4.64
71. Neygi 216378 0.85 221725 o.74
72. Pandit 6543 0.03 6694 0.02
73. Pandarem 1619 0.01 1656 0.01
74. Patramela 1975 0.01 2022 0.01
75. Patwe Keri 11563 0.05 t1796 0.04
Karnataka Government's Reservation Policies t2r
76. Rajapuri 18604 0.07 19050 0.06

77. Rajput 78069 0.31 80052 0.27
78. Sanyasi 35tJ 0.01 3447 0.01
79. Satani 52125 o.2l 53459 0.18
80. Shikalagar 27U 0.01 2787 0.01
81. Sillekyatha 18132 0.07 18153 0.06
82. Satanike 27t5 0.01 2778 0.01
83. Sudir 3375 0.01 3453 0.01
84. Udugadusidda 3052 0.01 )L/,J 0.01
85. Tigala 217128 0.86 2232'19 0.74
86. Uppara 377487 1.49 386573 t.29
87. Vaisya 174247 0.69 178580 0.59
88. Viswakarma 674698 2.66 690689 2.30
89. Vodda 447695 1.77 458560 1.53
90. Vokkaliga 3455699 13.67 3546171 11.82
91. Yadava 435686 r.72 446893 1.49
92. Other non- 966118 3.79 982702 3.28
Scheduled
Hindu Caste
Total 21251086 83.89 2176s362 72.53
Scheduled Tribes 231268 0.01 236865 0.79

Total Hindu 25332388 100.00 25945432 86.46
population
of the state
Nate: The district-wise base year population of different castes was projected
to 1971 by using the district growth rate between the base year population and
the 1971 population.
The projected district-wise population of various castes estimated for 1971
and adjusted for the changes in the area and population as per reorganisation of
the state is further projected to 1972 using the district-wise growth rate of
population between 196l and 1971.
Sorrca: Govemment of Kamataka, Report of the First Backward Classes
Commission. 1975. Vol. L
population. It may also be noted that though both the Second Back-
ward Classes Committee headed by Nagana Gowda and the First
Backward Classes Commission headed by Havanur projected the
rate of growth of population by using caste-wise census data from the
pre-Independence censuses, they did not use the same method. The
difference in the relative shares of population of various castes pro_
jected by them is partly on account of different methods used for
projections.
The Second Backward Classes Commission (19g3) headed by T.
Venkataswamy realised the weaknesses of the caste-wise population
projected by the earlier Backward Classes Comminee and Cornmis-
sion and decided to conduct household census in Kamataka to esti-
mate for the first time after Independence the caste-wise population.
The Commission also collected other relevant socio-economic infor-
mation through household survey for determining the relative back-
wardness of different castes. For this purpose, the Commission can-
vassed two schedules, one for the caste and community associations
and another for households. The Commission however admifted that
the data collected by it were an underestimate to the extent of Z per
cent. But actually the total population of Hindus, including SCs and
STs, as estimated by the commission for 1984 was less than tle total
population of Hindus as estimated according to the l98l census. The
difference was to the extent of l0 pbr cent. What is more, in the
controversy which followed the release of the Second Backward
Classes Commission Report, it was pointed out that one of the
members, after examining the household data collected, circulated a
note among the members of the Commission contending that the total
population covered by the Commission was about 70 per cent only.
This would mean the caste-wise population was underestimated by
the CommisSion to the extent of 30 per cent. This has also been
confirmed by several caste associations in the state.
We have projected the caste-wise population of the major caste
among Hindus by using the rate of growth of different castes between
191 I and 193 1 , and also by using the proportions of different castes
of the 1931 census. These caste-wise population projections are
presented in Tables VII, Vm and D( in Annex 4. It may be observed
that the population, according to our estimate, is slightly more than
the Hindu population as revealed by the 1981 census. But the Hindu
population as estimated by the Second Backward Classes Commis-
sion (Table IV) is an underestimate to the extent of l0 per cent on
paper. However, the relative positions of major casteVcommunities
do not change. The Lingayats rop rhe rank, followed by Vokkaligas
Karnataka Government's Reservation Policies 123
Table IV
Population of Castes/Communities and their Relative Shares in the
Total Population of Karnataka in 1984
Population % to total
population
Agasa 306-141 1.00

Ambalavasi 179 0.00
Ambalakaran 188 0.00
Baandhi 6435 o.02
BalUa 479905 1.33
Bevaji 11707 0.03
Beda 994196 2.75
Bestha 1013028 2.80
Brahmin 1377550 3.81
Budubuduki 9661 0.03
Bunt 298952 0.83
Darzi 117872 0.33
Dasaru 42733 o.L2
Deshabandari 2325 0.01
Devadiga 104310 0.29
Devanga 268146 0.74
Gatti 3270 0.01
Golla 529222 1.46
Gondali 17587 0.05
Goniga 123t4 0.03
Gudigara 2941 0.01
Halwaki Wakkal 69295 0.19
Helava 24441 0.07
Hindu Sikkaligara 2963 0.01
Hindu Hugar l0(X9 0.03
Idiga 917953 2.54
Jetti 4766 0.01
Jogi 21122 0.06
Kamma 89065 0.25
Kaniyan 1ll5 0.00
Kanjirabat 200 Negli
Katik 60586 o.17
Kodagaru 84f/.3 0.23
Kote Kshatriya 28578 0.08
Kottari 6927 0.02
Kshatriya 158523 0.44

Kudubi 24483 0.07
Kumbara 252439 0.70
Kuruba 2501465 6.92
Ladara 4459 0.01
Lingayat/Veerashaiva 6ttM66 16.92
Maratha 1t57547 5.ZV
Medara 37824 0.10
Mudaliyar 172547 0.48
Nagadha:u 10642 0.03
Nayar 57163 0.16
Nayinda 215272 0.60
Neygr 234884 0.65
Pategar 15472 0.04
Rajput 55851 0.15
Raju Kshatriya 5299 0.01
Rayaravat 426 Negli
Hindu Sadaru 21160 0.01
Satani 20934 0.06
sc 573t027 0.06
ST 1015601 15.86
siddi 4848 2.82
Somavamsha Kshatriya 24727 0.01
Tewar 4971 0.07
Tigala 211107 0.01
Uppara 472968 0.60
Urs 28865 l.3l
Vaisya 277495 0.08
Viswakarma/ 708836 0.7'l
Panchala 1.96
Vokkaliga 4219520 11.68
C,N.K. 2445N 0.68
Other Religions
Buddhist r3269 0.04
Christian 682634 1.89
Gurka 670 0.00
Jain 304013 0.84
Muslim 3963071 10.97
Parsi 3251 0.01
sikh 6643 o.o2
Total population J6r24594 100.00
of the state
Karnaaka Govemment's Reservation P olicies r25
Notes'. 1. SC = Scheduled Caste

2. ST = Scheduled Tribe
3. CNK = Caste not known
4. These caste-wise population data were estimated by the Second
Baclcward
Classes Commission (1983) based on its household survey'
Source: Report of the Second Bacl<ward Classes Commission,
VoI III' 1986'
pp. 28-30.
and among other backward classes which are in minority' Kurubas,

Marathas, Idigas, Viswakarmas and Upparas come in that order' The
relative positions of artisans are insignificant. Thus the general obser-
vation that the numerically two dominant communities are also eco-
nomically and politically dominant is supported by their relative
demographic position in the state.
As far as the SC and ST population is concerned, we have got
fairly reliable data from successive censuses. However, the data on
ST population, as revealed by the 1981 census are not reliable be-
cauie all the Bedas have reported as Nayaks with a view to getting
the ST status.4 Hence, we find a sudden rise in the ST population of
Kamataka in 1981.
3. Recommendations of Different Commissions
3.1. Miller Committee's Recommendations

We have already mentioned in the first section that the Miller
Committee provided the rationale for the reservation policy in the
princely state of Mysore as far back as 1919. The Committee also
iuggested two basic criteria for determining the backwardness of
different castes and other social groups. These criteria continued to
be followed by successive committees and commissions' with suit-
able modifications.
The Miller Committee used the criterion of educational backward-
ness with reference to the percentage of literates in English in each of
the castes and communities. Since knowledge of English was consid-
ered a necessary qualification for government service' the literacy
rate in English of the different castes and communities was used as an
important criterion for determining their educational backwardness'
This broad criterion was fair enough. However, some degree of
arbitrariness was injected while applying this criterion by treating
126 The politics of Bachrtardness
those castes and communities as backward whose English_knowing

literates were less than 5 per cent of their population. The Commir
tees did not elaborate the reasons for using 5 per cent as the cut-off
point.
The second criterion used by the Miller Committee was the pro_
portion of people of different castes and communities in the state
govemment service. Even here, the Comminee excluded the menial
and inferior jobs, which according to the Committee were not rel_
evant as in any case the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes would
predominate in these jobs. The Colnmittee classified those castes and
communities whose population had less than 5 per cent of literacy
rate in English and also those whose members were not adequately
represented in the government service as backward classes. The
Committee did not bother about limiting the representation in gov-
ernment service to the proportion of population of each caste, be-
cause the number of non-Brahmins in government service was abys-
mally low.
The Committee countered the argument of merit, which was ad-
vanced against reservation, in the following way: ..Efficiency, how-
ever, is not to be measured solely or even mainly by academic
qualifications and it will not be denied that there are many important
branches of the adrninistration in which other qualities such as sym-
pathy, honesty of purpose, energy and common sense go as far to
make an efficient officer as literary superiority."s Further, the Com-
mittee maintained that ". . . under the present system of Govemment,
the officers of the Government in the higher grades of the service
have necessarily much influence in shaping the policy of the admin-
istration, and the efficiency of the services viewed as machines for
securing the even and uniform progress of the State, is likely to be
increased by the presence in their ranks, of officers of different
communities . . . For the fact cannot be ignored that an officer in the
exercise of his duty making appointments and promotions finds it
easier to see the virtues of his own community than those of others."6
The Comminee observed, with reference to the field-level jobs in
government service: "It is these officers who come most frequently in
contact in their official capacity with all the classes of people of the
State, and from the point of view of general administration it seems
desirable that in these grades a full representation of all important
Kamataka Goverrnent's Resemation Policies 127
communities should be found.-7 These argunrents were used for

recommending reservation in government jobs for the non-Brahmins.
After so justifying the policy of reservation, the Committee found
that all non-Brahmins, except Mudaliars, Anglolndians and Europe-
ans, were educationally backward. However, the Committee recom-
rnended that the Mudaliar and Pillai communities should also be
included in the backward category though the Committee did not
justify or elaborate the reasons for this violation of its own criteria-
Accordingly, all the non-Brahmins were classified as backward classes
by the Miller Commiuee. This is the reason why the backward
classes came to be known as non-Brahmins ia the former princely
state of Mysore.
It was realised that a separate rcservation for each caste-group was
not possible at that tfune and therefore, the Comminee classified all
castes into: ( I ) Brahmins, (2) other caste Hindus, Mohammedans and
Indian Christians, and (3) the depressed classes (SCs and STs). The
Committee recomrnended that while applying the reservation policy
to governnentjobs, first preference should be given to SCs. This was
so that the dominant backward castes and communities would not
monopolise and corner the benefits. Thus the extent of rcservation
was supposed to be implernented in reverse order, first to the de-
pressed classes and then for other classes such as Hindus, Muslims
and Indian Christians and finally open to the Brahmins. The Commir
tee recommended: "within a period of not more than 7 years, not less
than one-half of the higher and two'thirds of the lower appointments
in each grades of the service and so far as possible in each office are
to be held by the members of the communities other than the Brahmin
community, preference being given to duly qualified candidates of
the depressed classes when such are available."s
The Committee suggested grant of exemptions from qualifying
educational tests, preferential treafinent in the case of equal or nearly
equal qualifications, relaxation of severity of prescribed tests and
prescribed the selection of a minimum proportion of backward classes
in making appointrnents. Though the Committee examined the need
for a roster system in promotion, it found this very difficult to apply
at that time.
The two Brahmin members gave dissenting notes to the
Committee's report. One of them recommended proportional repre-
sentation for each caste in order it prevent the dominant among the
backward communities cornering the benefits of reservation. But the
other member, M.C. Ranga Iyengar, simply rejected most of the
recommendations on the ground that any reservation would harm
efficiency of administration by preventing persons with merit from
joining the service.
The government in its order dated 16 May l92l accepted the
recommendations of the Committee in regard to reservation but not
on promotions. The govemment order did not specify the percentage
of reservation but only indicated that the proportion of backward
classes in government service would be gradually raised to 50 per
cent of the total strength within seven years from 1921. The maxi-
mum age for entering government service was also increased from 25
to 28 years and spme relaxation was made in regard to the qualifying
tests and examinations for appointments in some departments of the
government.
3.2. Nagana Gowda Committee's Recommendations

The Nagana Committee used three criteria for the purpose gf
classifying backwardness:
I . Social backwardness of a community judged by the status of the
community in society in general, apart from individuals. Thus the
first criterion used was the caste if the people were in the Hindu caste
hierarchy.
2. General educational backwardness, based on certain fixed stan-
dards. The Committee used the state average of students of different
communities studying in High School in 1959-60. For this purpose,
those below the state average were classified as educationally back-
ward.
3. Representation of Communities in govemment seryice.
The Committee submitted an interim report in which it recom-
mended the p€rcentage of literacy of several communities as one of
the criteria. In addition to this the number of students of each commu-
nity studying for the last three high-school classes during 1959-60
was also used and those communities whose proportion was equal to
and below the state average were classified as educationally back-
ward and eligible for reservation.
In its final report, the Committee further classified backward
Kantataka Government's Reservation Policies r29
classes into 'backward class' (Group-A) and 'more backward class'

(Group-B). The more backward classes were those whose standard of
education was less than 50 per cent of the state average, and those
whose standard of education was above this limit and up to state
average were grouped under backward class. The Cofirmittee recom-
mended that 50 per cent of the seats in the technical institutions and
45 per cent of the jobs in govemment service should be reserved for
the backward classes. The Committee distributed these percentage
reservations between more backward and backward classes in the
following ways: For admission to technical institutions, 28 per cent
for backward classes and 22 pet cent for more backward classes' In
regard to appointment in govemment service, for the purpose of
Article 16(4), the Committee determined that only 45 per cent of the
backward classes was under-represented; of this 2l per cent consti-
tuted backward classes and 24 pet cent constituted more backward
classes. These proportions were determined on the basis of their
relative shares of the population. The Committee estimated that the
total population of backward classes in the state was about 57 per
cent, comprising 33 per cent backward classes and 24 per cent more
backward classes.
The Committee recommended for the first time that all the stu-
dents from families whose income was less than Rs. 1,200 per annum
should be given free hostel and educational facilities' But the Com-
mittee did not use this income criterion for the purpose of reservation
in admission to technical institutions and for jobs in government
service.
The Committee also recommended that these reservations should
be reviewed after l0 years (i.e., by l98l), and the communities which
show improvement in their educational status and representation in
govemment service be removed from the list after such a review. One
rnajor recommendation of this Committee was that the entire commu-
nity of Lingayats was made forward. There was a note of dissent
against this recommendation by a member, M.S. Patil' who was a
Lingayat. He alleged that the Committee deliberately got the origi-
nally estimated percentage of Lingayat students studying in High
Schools revised by the Director of Public Instruction (DPI) so as to
make it more than the state average (6.6 per cent) with a view to
removing Lingayats from the backward classes list. This recommen-
130 Thc politics of Baclcwardness
dation sparked off a political conftoversy and in the legal banle

which followed the Mysore High Court struck down the govemment
order implernenting the recomnpndations of this Committee.
3.3. Havanur Conmission's Reconunendations

The Havanur Commission had leamt the lessons from the past
developments in reservation policy, both for the purpose of develop-
ing the methodology and appropriate criteria for determining the
educational backwardness of different castes and communities. as
also for forrnulating the recomrnendations in such a way as to satisfy
judicial scnrtiny. The Havanur Commission got a selective sample
survey otr households done in order to obtain information on the
socio-economic status of differcnt castes and communities in the.
state. This infonnation was used rnainly for the purpose of determin-
ing the eronomic staus as also for examining the nexus between the
economic and social staars of different sections of the people. But the
Commission used the 1972 datzrc,lating to the percentage of students
of different castes who passed the SSI-C examination, for determin-
ing educational backwardness. Those castes and communities whose
percentage of SSlC-passed students was equal to or below the state
average werc classified as educationally backward and those above
the state avefirge were classified as forward. Knowing the judicial
opinion against using caste as a criterion for determining the back-
wardness of the people, the Havanur Commission avoided the ex-
plicit use of caste but used the educational criterion in such a way as
to obtain the sarne result. For reservations in govemment jobs under
Article 16(4), the Commission used the proportion of people from
each caste and community represented in governrrent service.
The Havanur Commission Report classified the backward classes
into three grcups: (l) backward tribes, (2) backward castes, and (3)
backward communities. The backward tribes were similar to sched-
uled tribes. Backward castes were rnostly the artisans and such other
backward castes, other that the dominang majority backward com-
munities. The backward communities includcd all other dominant
casteVcommunities, except Lingayas who should be treated as for-
ward. In other words, the Havanur Commission confirmed tle rec-
omrnendation of the Nagana Gowda Committee but with more logic
and empirical justification. The Commission fixed the proportion of
Kamataka Government's Reservation Policies 131
reservation according to the poPulation of these categories in the total

population.
The government of Karnataka, while implementing the recom-
mendations of the Commission, added seven more castes to the
backward castes list and also prescribed a family income criterion of
Rs. 10,000, both to filter the better-off among even the backward
castes and communities as also to satisfyjudicial opinion. Even then,
the Lingayats questioned the govemment order in the court of law.
The High Court used the principle of severability and upheld the
major recommendations of the Havanur Commission, but deleted
those castes which were added by the government. The Court also
upheld the fourth category, 'Backward Special Group', which the
govemment order had created, under which all those candidates
whose parents were engaged in traditional occupations and had very
low incomes were made eligible for 5 per cent reservation.
The Lingayats went in appeal against the judgement. The Supreme
Court allowed the state govemment to constitute a new Commission
to collect fresh data and determine the backwardness of the people.
Accordingly, the Second Backward Classes Commission was ap-
pointed in 1983.
3.4. Venkataswamy Commission's Recommendations

The Second Backward.Classes Commission used multiple criteria
to determine the socially and educationally backward sections of the
people for the purpose of reservations in admission to educational
institutions and in government service. The Commission used 17
indicators of which 9 were negative and 8 positive indicators. The 17
indicators included percentages for the following: illiteracy in each
caste, students studying in each caste, households livingin pucca and
/<utclra houses, landless households, households owning above 20
standard acres of land, households having an annual income of Rs.
5,000 and below, households having an annual income of Rs. 20,000
and above and finally, representation in Classes I, tr and III state
govemment jobs. If a caste or a community scored 9 and above points
in this set of l7 indicators, it was considered as educationally back-
ward. The castes and communities which scored less than 9 points
were classified as forward for the purpose of reservations under
Article 15(4).
For the purpose of reservation in government service under Article

16(4), the proportion of each caste population to the total population
was used. The castes and communities which had more than the
proportion of their population in government service were declared
as forward.
Using these criteria, the Commission recommended that32.98 per
cent of tle total population of the state was educationally backward
and required reservation under Article 15(4). But the Commission
recommended only 27 per cent of reservation for this 33 per cent of
population, which was identified as educationally backward. No
explanation was given as to why and how this 27 per cent wils
determined. Further, the Commission used separate tests for reserva-
tion under Articles 15(4) and 16(4). It used the proportion of each
caste representation in Classes I, II, and III jobs twice, once as a part
of 17 indicators for reservation under Article l5(4) and again while
identifying the castes for reservation under Article 16(4). Whenever
the Commission found contradictory results, such as when some of
the castes which were classified as educationally and economically
backward became forward caste for the purpose of reservation under
Article 16(4), the Commission tried to escape from such inconsisten-
cies by using l8 indicators for the purpose of resolving the tie.
The Commission used 17 indicators to classify the educational
backwardness of only 62 castes. The remaining 13 castes did not
consistently satisfy either the economic backwardness tests or educa-
tional backwardness tests. Some of these castes became education-
ally forward in terms of the basic tests but still economically back-
ward, while they appeared economically forward. In order to resolve
this contradiction, the Commission combined the educational test
criterion with the l7 socio-economic indicators, making a total of l8
indicators and prescribed 10 as a minimum score for qualifying for
the backward classes tag. Thus, for 62 castes the Commission used
17 indicators and for 13 castes it used 18 indicators.
The Commission recommended the application of a family in-
come ceiling of Rs. 15,00O per annum for eliminating economically
better-off families among the backward classes. It also recommended
abolition of 'Backward Special Group' and 'Backward Tribe'.
The Commission's report was not unanimous and therefore be-
came controversial. Almost half of the members gave dissenting
Karnataka Government's Reservation Policies 133
notes and five of them submitted a dissenting letter to ihe chief

minister of Kamataka, requesting him to reject the entire report. In
the course of this controversy, the choices of the multiple c$teria and
also the data used were questioned. The Commission's recommenda-
tions bristled with arbitrariness. First, the coverage of the survey was
disputed. As already mentioned, it varied from 70 per cent to 90 per
cent and more imponantly, Bangalore City was not adequately cov-
ered by the survey. Second, the data used for determining the status
of different castes in terms of illiteracy, percentage of students study-
ing in SSLC, percentage of urban population, and percentage of self-
employed were all found defective as they did not tally with the state
averages of the 1981 census. The criteria used werc not appropriate,
partly because there was double weightage given to each of the
criteria, like the percentage of families having an annual income of
Rs. 5,000 and below and having an annual income ofRs. 20,00O and
above, p€rcentage of landless families, percentage of families own-
ing 20 standard acres of land and above and percentage of families
livingin pucca and ftutcfta houses. The Commission used 9 points for
determining the backwardness of 62 castes and l0 points for the
remaining l3 castes. Besides, the Commission used the state average
equal to or above for determining the 62 castes as backward but only
above the state average for 13 castes.
The most important test for determining the educational back-
wardness of different castes was the percentage of SSLC pupils in
other castes. The Havanur Commission used the April 1972 SSLC
results, whereas the Venkataswamy Commission used the April 1985
results. The caste-wise information was reported to have been ob-
tained from 3017 High Schools out of a total of 3244 High Schools
in the state. It was found that the information about caste was not
insisted upon from the students appearing for the SSLC examination.
How reliable then was the data on caste-wise percentage of SSLC
passed students which the Commission used? Apart from this, the
results of one examination cannot really indicate the educational
backwardness of different caste-groups because education is a long-
drawn process. Therefore, we must take an average of all or several
years of SSLC qualified people to the total number of SSLC qualified
people to determine the educational status ofeach caste-group. Though
the Commission collected data on the total number of SSLC qualified
134 The Politics of Baclorardness
people in each caste through the household survey, it did not use
them for reasons not explained anywhere. What is rnore, the Havanur
Commission classified all those castes whose percentages of SSLC
passed students in the total population of different castes was equal to
and below the state average as backward and classified only those
whose percentages were clearly above the state average as forward.
But the Second Backward Classes Commission classified even those
castes whose percentages were equal to the state average as forward.
This has been found to be arbitrary and contrary to the existing
judicial interpretation.
As a result of all these weaknesses, the Second Backward Classes
Commission's report created heated political debates in the state. The
state govemment, while appointing the Second Backward Classes
Commission, had excluded representatives from the two major castes
(Lingayats and Vokkaligas) from the membership of the Commis-
sion. If this was done in the hope that it might ensure the impartial
working of the Commission or force it to include the dominant castes
in the list of backward classes, that hope did not materialise. Other
members, belonging mostly to minority backward castes did not
work as a united team, as is amply evident from the dissenting and
other submissions appended to the report. Subsequently, a lengthy
letter written by five members of the Commission to the chief minis-
ter disowning the recommendations exposed the weaknesses of the
Commission. As a result the govemment of Karnataka was forced to
reject the recommendations of the Commission and issue a tempo-
rary government policy. This brder retains the basic classification of
the backward classes made in the govemment order of 1977 . The
only difference is that it includes Lingayats also as a backward
community for the purpose of reservation under Articles 15(4) and
'16(4).
4. Extent of Reservation
We have got information on the extent of reservation for the
purpose of admission to €ducational institutions under Article l5(4)
and for government jobs under Article 16(4) from the recommenda-
tions of the Second Backward Classes Committee of 1960, the first
Backward Classes Commission of 1972, and the Second Backward
Classes Commission of 1983. Besides, we have got similar informa-
Karnataka G ove rnment's Re se rvation P olic ie s 135
tion on the extent of reservations actually made by the state govern-

ment through the government orders which were issued from time to
time. However, we do not have information about the extent of
reservation made in the princely policy based on the recommenda-
tions of the Miller Committee. The Miller Committee's recommen-
dations were accepted by the then state govemment and the govern-
ment order was issued in 1921. From l92l till the govemment order
was issued, it remained in operation. And this order covered almost
97 per cent of the population because it excluded only Brahmins,
Anglo-Indians and Europeans. People of all other castes and commu-
nities were made eligible for reservations. These castes and commu-
nities included all the non-Brahmins Hindu castes, SCs, STs, Indian
Christians, Muslims, Jains and others. But no clear-cut percentage of
feservation was made for each of these castes and communities. The
govemment order had broadly reserved about 50 per cent of the total
jobs and admissions to educational institutions for all backward
classes. Even this percentage was proposed to be achieved over a
period of seven years.
The Second Backward Classes Committee, (Nagana Gowda Com-
mittee), estimated that about 57 per cent of the population in the
integrated Kamataka state could be considered backward. This ex-
cluded SCs and STs who constituted 18 per cent of the total popula-
tion. Further, the Committee classified the backward classes into
'more backward'and 'backward'. It was estimated that the 'back-
ward' group would be about 33 per cent and 'more backward' would
be about 24 per cent. But the Committee recommended 28 per cent of
reservation under Article 15(4) for the backward group and 22 per
cent for the more backward group, thus making the total reservation
only 50 per cent. This excluded 18 per cent reservation for SCs and
STs. If we take into account both these reservations, the total reser-
vation would be 68 per cent, covering 75 per cent of the total
population of the state.
However, for the purpose of reservation in government service
under Article 16(4), the Committee recommended 45 per cent reser-
vation only. Accordingly, the Committee fixed 21 per cent for the
backward group and 24 per cent for the more backward group. Thus,
under reservation in govemment jobs under Article 16(4), the total
percentage of reservation came to 63 per cent. The details relating to
percentage of population covered and the percentage of quota of
reservation are indicated in Table V.

The Havanur Commission recommended classification of back-
ward classes into three groups for reservation under Article 15(4) and
l6(4), viz. Backward Tribes (BT), Backward Castes (BC), and Back-
ward Communities (BCM). The then govemment accepted the rec-
ommendations but added seven more castes to the BCM category and
the Christian converts from SC group to BC group. The extent of
reservations and the population covered by the recommendations of
Havanur Commission are shown below:
Percentage of reservation recommended by Havanur Commission

for purpose of Article 15(4)
Vo of popu- Quota of
lation Reservation
2. Backward Castes 14.49 1OVo
3. Backward Tribes 8.00 6%
Total 44.52 32%
Percentage of reservation recommended for purpose of

Article 16H)
% of popu- Quota of
lation Reservation
--EacEwffi-eommunitiei
T- 19.20 l6va
2. Backward Castes 14.47 t0%
3. Backward Tribes 8.00 6Vo
Total 4t.67
According to the Havanur Commission's report, 45 per cent of the

people of the state, excluding SCs and STs, were made eligible for
reservations. Including 18 per cent of SCs and STs, the total popula-
tion covered for reservation under Article 15(4) and l6(4) was 63 per
cent. But the govemment expanded the Havanur Commission's list
by adding seven more castes/communities, viz. Arasu, Ganiga, Balija'
Devanga, Satam, Rajput and Muslims. It also created a new category
of Backward Special Group (BSG), under which economic back-
wardness was the sole criterion and people from any caste or cornmu-
Karnataka Govemment's Reservation Policies 137
Table V
Extent of Coverage and Percentage o.f Rc ".:rvatwts
Recommended by Various Backward Clitr*" Committees/
Commissions in Karnataka
Population Percentage of Quota of

Percentage of
Covered Reservation
OBC + SC & ST = Total OBC + sC & ST -- Total
Popul- Per
ation cent
covered Quota
Reser-
vation
As per Miller 97Vo 50%
Committee's
Recommendations
As per Govemment
Order of 1921 9'IVo SOVa
As per Nagana Cowda

Committee's
Recommendations
Interim Report 57Vo + 187o =759o 25qe a l$/o = 4-l9t
As per Nagana Gowda
Committee's Recommen-
dations Final Report 57% + 18Vo = 75Vo 5O9o + lSVa = 68Vo
(45Eo)
As per Govemment
Order of 1960 57Vo + 18% =75Vo 22Vo + lSVo = 4OVa
As per Havanur
Commission's 45% + 18% = 63% 32% + 18Vo = 50Va
Recommendations
As per Govemment
Order of 1977 63% + 189o =81% 4O% + lSVa = 58Vo
As per Covemment
Order of 1979 499o + 18% =67% 4O7a + ISVo = 58?o
As per Venkataswamy
Commission's 33Vo + lSVo = 5l%o' 27% + lSVo = 45Vo
Recommendations
138 The Politics of Bacla,vardne ss
As per Govemment
Order of 1986 777o + lSVo = 95Vo 5OVo+189o=68%
Note: This is for reservation forjobs under l6(4).
nity could qualify for reservation under this category. Therefore, the
Govemment Order of 1977 covered 77 per cent of the total popula-
tion, including SCs and STs and also Muslims.
According to this order, the number of castes and the percentage
of reservations were as follows:
BCM 16 castes 20%

BC 129 castes lOTo
BT 62 castes 5Vo
BSG open to all 5%
But this order was questioned in the High Court and the High
Court removed seven castes from the list of backward classes. Ac-
cordingly, the government was forced to issue a fresh order in 1979.
According to the 1979 order, 63 per cent of the total population was
covered. This included SCs, STs, Muslims and the Backward Special
Group. The relative shares of reservations of OBCs under the 1979
government order were as follows:
Baclcward No. of Castes No. of Castes Modified % of

Class underArticle under Anicle Resemation
category 1s(4) 16(4) under Article
BCM 9 l) 20% t8%

BC 114 ln 'to% lOTo
BT 58 58 5% 5%
BSG open to all 5% 5%
- -
The Venkataswamy Commission's recommendations covered only
32.98 per cent of the population, excluding SCs and STs. Including
SCs and STs, it would be 5l per cent of the total population. This
reduction was mainly because of the elimination of a number of
castes from the list of backward classes.
The recommended percentage of reservations is shown as follows:
t39
Karnataka Govemment's Reservation Policies
No. o[ Castes PercenlaSe oJ Recommended Vo of

Backward
Class/ and Comrnunities PoPulation en'at ion unde
R es r Artic le
Group
15(4) 16(4
t< 17.77 147o
20 15.21 137o
But the government did not accept the recommendations of the

Second Ba&ward Classes Commission' Instead, it issued Lt
ad hoc
as educa-
order specifying the castes and communities to be treated
tionally baciward and the extent of reservations' The list of back-
ward ;lasses and the modified percentage of reservation made
ac-
cording to this order are as follows:
Group No. of No. of 9o of Reser' 9o of Reservation

Castes Castes vation wrder under Article
wd.er undcr Article 16(4)
Articlc Article 1s(4)
ts(4) I6(4)
A. Backward 61 6l 5 5
Tribe (BT)
B. Backward 135 119 l) l3
Caste (BC)
C. Backward 7 'l l6 16
Community (BCM-D
D. Backward 7 16 9 11
Community (BCM-II)
All ' f f
E. Backward
Special GrouP
The Janata Government order of 1986 has retained the earlier

existing total reservation quota of 68 per cent consisting of 50 per
cent for OBCs and 18 Per cent for SCs.
According to the Govemment Order of 1986, about 95 per cent of
the total population has been covered by the backward classes list and
the total percentage of reservation continues to be 68 per cent' This
is mainly because of the retention of backward special group under
which people from any community can claim backwardness if their
econornic position warrants it and also because Lingayats were brought
l4A The politics of Backwardness
back to the backward classes list. Consequently, the

recenr govem_
ment order covers a larger percentage of people for purposes
of
reservation.
However, it is necessary to remember that mere coverage
in terms
of^ total population will not benefit such a large population,
because
of the qualifying tests introduced in order to ditermine eligibility
for
reservation. These are the family income limits and the
minimum
prescribed educational qualifications which entitle people
to get into
government service. Looked at the coverage from
this angle, only
about 25 per cent of the total population might become eligible
for
competing for benefits under reservation. There are several reasons
for this.
The existing reservation for SCs and STs is lg per cent. Under the
new Government Order, about 5 per cent of the population (it is
actually 4.63 per cent as estimated by the Venkatasw;my Commis_
sion), is identified as Backward Tribes. Since there is no income
ceiling for them, the entire BT population is entitled for reservation.
In the case of OBCs, i.e., those who are covered under B, C, D and
E groups, there is a family income ceiling of Rs. 10,000 for castes
which are included under B, C and D groups and Rs. g,000 under E
group. The estimated poverty line for the state of Kamataka for
the
year 1983-84 is abour Rs. 5,750 for a family offive. people below
the
poverty line in rhe state in 1983-84 consriture about 36 per cent
of
people, of whom 18 per cent are SCs and STs and 5 per cent are BTs.
Out of 36 per cent of people who are below the poverty line, if we
deduct this 23 per cent, we are left with only 13 per cent. Since the
family income limit is up to Rs.10,000 we may reasonably assume
that another 20 per cent of the people will become eligible for
benefits under reservation. This means that the total percentage of
people other than SC, ST and BT, who will be eligible for reservation
under OBC category would be around 33 per cent. This 33 per cent
plus 23 per cent would be 56 per cent. Out of this 56 per cent, those
wbo qualify for admission into educational institutions and sovern_
ment jobs will be those who pass SSLC and above eduJational
examinations. This proportion of the population may be estimated by
using the literacy rate. At present, the literacy rate in Karnataka is
about 34 per cent, of which ar least 15 per cent would be eligible for
reservation benefits under OBCs, and another l0 per cent under SC
Kamatakn Government's Reservation Policies l4l
and ST categories. In other words, the effective percentage of popu-
Iation which will be eligible for competing for benefits under resewa-
tion will not exceed 25 per cent of the total population in the state.
This would be about one crore of people. Even out of this one crore,
those who are already over-age (above 30 years) may come to about
50 lakhs. So every year, 50 lakh persons will be eligible for reserva-
tion under the OBC, SC and ST quotas. This will come to about 12
per cent of the total population. Without attempting to estimate the
really eligible percentage of population, some people have unneces-
sarily magnified the percentage to give an impression that reservation
will benefit virtually 95 per cent of the total population of the state.
5. Applicability of Income Criterion

Articles 15(4) and 16(4) are intended to enable the government to
formulate such policies as are necessary to promote the educational
advancement of the socially backward sections of the society. How-
ever, they do not indicate clearly as to what constitutes social back-
wardness, though educational backwardness can be judged with a
reasonable degree of accuracy. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in the course
of his reply to the debate on the First Amendment to the Constitution,
clarified that social backwardness mentioned in Clause (4) of Article
15 included economic backwardness also. Accordingly, successive
judgements ofthe High Courts and the Supreme Court on the issue of
reservation have interpreted that caste alone cannot be considered as
an indicator of social backwardness. They have maintained that the
level of income of the family should also be considered as a neces-
sary criterion for determining the social backwardness of different
sections of the people.
It is curious to note that Article 335, which concems reservation
for SCs and STs in government service does not explicitly indicate
that government should take into account the family income of SCs
and STs. As a result, Courts have interpreted that there is no need for
applying the income criterion while making reservations for SCs and
STs. In contrast, even though Clause (4) of Article 15 does not
explicitly mention the income criterion, the Courts have held that it is
necessary to apply it in order to filter the better-off sections of the
OBCs from enjoying the benefits of reservation. This'varying inter-
pretation gives the impression that the Courts, while reviewing the
constitutional reservations for SCs, STs and OBCs have interpreted

similar constitutional provisions differently with regard to the appli-
cation of the income criterion. It looks as though the Courts have
themselves tried to create different constitutional provisions for res-
ervations for SCVSTs and OBCs. This has not been noticed by
scholars, members of backward classes, legislators and even legal
commentators.
Until such interpretation was given by the High Courts and the
Supreme Court, the state govemments, which were implementing the
reservation policy, did not impose the income criterion to eliminate
the better-off sections of the backward classes from enjoying the
benefits of reservation. In Kamataka, the Miller Committee did not
bother about the income criterion in 1919. After Independence and
even after the introduction of the new Constitution, the Second
Backward Classes Committee of 1960 did not prescribe any income
criterion for making reservation for the OBCs. The Committee only
indicated that those students whose family income did not exceed Rs.
1,200 per annum may be given free hostel facilities and other assis-
tance to enable them to improve their educational levels . The Havanur
Commission also did not impose any income criterion for limiting
reservations to only tle worse-off sections of the OBCs. However,
the Government Order of 1977 which was formulated on the basis of
the recommendations of the Havanur Commission did prescribe an
income criterion. All OBCs whose family income was Rs. 10,000
and above were disqualified from enjoying benefits of reservation
and a lower income limit of Rs. 4,800 was prescribed for those who
would claim reservation benefits under the BSG category. The Sec-
ond Backward Classes Commission justified this income criterion
and enhanced the family income limit to Rs 15,000. Accepting the
income criterion as a necessary test for preventing the better-off
sections of OBCs from enjoying the benefits of reservation, the
Government Order of 1986 has also prescribed the income criterion
of Rs 10,000 for backward castes and backward communities I and II
and Rs 800 for the BSG. No income criterion is prescribed for the
backward tribes.
Thus it may be observed that in Kamataka even those groups of
people who are identified as backward classes and who are in need of
special assistance under the reservation policy, have to satisfy the
Karnanka Government's Reservation Policies 143
minimum family income criterion. This has introduced a concept of

equity into the reservation policy. Unfortunately, the way it has been
implemented or enforced has made a mockery of the whole equity
principle. There have been innumerable cases of false income certifi-
cates being produced, particularly by the better-off sections of the
candidates from rural areas, belofging to backward castes and com-
munities and enjoying the benefits of reservation. Even members of
backward castes and communities employed in government service
have tried to resort to adoption of children to get the benefits of
rescrvation. It is true that the government of Karnatalia has started
prosecuting those who have submitted false income certificates but
such cases are very few and perhaps only to counter public criticism.
It has been rccognised by all right-thinking people that an income
criterion should be used to filter the better-off sections of both the
SCs and STs from enjoying the benefits of reservations under our
constitutional provisions. I-et us hope that the Govemment of India
and the state governments will muster sufficient political courage to
enforce this equity criterion for reservation, both for OBCs and SCV
STs, at least after 1990.
6. An Overall Evaluation
In the state of Kamataka a majority of the OBCs have been
enjoying benefits of the reservation policy for a long time, both in
admissions to educational institutions and in government service.
Consequently, some communities like the Vokkaligas and the
Lingayats have come to enjoy adequate representation in the state
government service. This is evident from the data published by the
Second Backward Classes Commission for 1984 (see Table VI).
Though the population of various castes and communities has been
underestimated by the Second Backward Classes Commission, we
may surmise with a reasonable degree of accuracy that these two
communities are adequately represented in the state government
service. However, the case of other castes and communities is open
to question, because of the unreliability of the data, even from official
sources.
As far as SCs and STs are concemed, Karnataka seems to have
achieved a miracle in the past l0 years. The SCs and STs have a
reasonable proportion of governnrent jobs. They have also been
Table VI
Representatiort of Various Castes and Communities in State
Government Semices in Kamataka
(, Religion/ Percentage of Percentage of

No. Caste population as representatnn
per l9E4 suney in State Govt. Service
Hindu
l. Agasa 1.00 0.75
2. Ambalavasi 0.00 0.00
3. Ambalakaran 0.00 0.00
4. Baandhi 0.02 0.03
5. Balija I,JJ 1.50
6. Bavaji 0.33 0.04
7. Beda 2.75 l.l1
8. Bestha 2.80 |.79
9. Brahmin 3.81 15.54
10. Budu-Buduki 0.03 0.03
ll. Bhunt 0.83 0.84
12. Darji 0.33 o.37
13. Dasaru 0.12 0.05
14. Deshabandari 0.01 0.00
15. Devadiga 0.29 o.29
16. Devanga 0.74 0.76
17. Ganiga 0.45
18. Gani 0.01 0.02
19. Golla t.46 0.76
20. Gondhali 0.05 0.03
21. Goniga 0.03 0.03
22. Gudigara 0.01 0.0r
23. Halwakki Wakkai 0.19 0.03
24. Helawa 0.07 0.02
25. Hindu Sikkaligara 0.01 0.00
26. Hindu Hugar 0.03 0.03
27. ldiga 2.54 0.18
28. Jeni 0.01 0.03
29. Iogi 0.06 0.04
30. Kamma 0.25 o.28
31. Kaniyan 0.00 0.01
32. Kanjirbat 0.00 o.0l
33. Khatik o.17 o.l4
34. Kodagaru o.23 1.56
Karnataka G ov e rnme nt' s Re se n ation P olic ie s 145
35. Kote Kshatriya 0.08 0.10

36. Kottari o.o2 0.o2
37. Kshatriya 0.44 o.62
38. Raju Kshatriya 0.01 0.07
39. Kudubi 0.07 0.03
40. Kumbara 0.70 0.50
41. Kuruba 6.92 2.81
42. Ladra 0.01 0.00
43. LingayataN eerashaival 6.92 19.68
44. Maratha 3.20 3.26
45. Medar 0.10 0.04
46. Mudaliar 0.48 0.49
47, Nagartharu 0.03 0.03
48. Nayar 0.16 0.18
49. Nayinda 0.60 0.47
50. Neygi 0.65 0.84
51. Pategar 0.04 0.03
52. Rajput 0.15 0.57
53. Ravula 0.00 0.01
54. Raya Ravut 0.01 0.00
55. Hindu Sadaru 0.06 0.02
56. Satani 0.06 0.17
57. SC 15.86 8.53
58, ST 2.82 2.75
59. Siddi 0.01 0.00
60. SomavamshaKshatriya 0.07 0.07
61. Tewar 0.01 0.00
62. Tigala 0.60 o.29
63. Uppara 1.31 0.83
64. Urs 0.08 0.17
65. Vaisya 0.77 1.34
66. ViswakarmaPanchala 1.96 2.24
67. Vokkaliga I 1.68 11.74
Other Religions
68. Buddhist 0.04 0.01
69. Christian 1.89 3.93
70. Gurka 0.00 o.o2
/1. Jaln 0.84 0.80
72. Muslim 10.97 9.45
73. Parsi 0.01 0.00
74. Sikh 0.02 0.00
Commission, Vol. I , 1986, pp. 245-47.

146 The Politics of Backwardne ss
enjoying a roster system and preference in promotions. The dis-

pute is only over achieving the maximum constitutional percentage
share ofjobs in each and every govemment department. Those who
are lagging behind in the field of education as well as in govemmenr
service have been the artisan castes like barbers, washerman, black-
smiths, carpenters and the like, whose main weakness lies in their
insignificant numbers. It looks as though it is mainly the numerical
strength of a caste or community which enables it to mobilise politi-
cal power and get its due adequate share in government service and
in educational institutions.
It is surprising that the govemment of Karnataka has not bothercd
to make an assessment of the impact of the reservation policy on
various castes and communities in the field of education and in the
wider socio-economic sphere. No attempt has been made, even by
the scholars, to throw light on this aspect. Further, no scholar has
attempted to find out the performance of the candidates of different
castes and communities who got admission into educational institu-
tions and entered govemment service under reservation as compared
to those who got admissions and jobs through open competition.
Though such a study will almost certainly be controversial as well as
difficult to conduct, its relevance from the point of view of policy and
social science research methodology cannot be overstated.
Finally, it looks as though the 'sociology of knowledge' is all-
pervading in formulating policies, rccommendations, and even imple-
menting reservation policy in this country and particularly in Karnataka
state. For example, the two members of the Miller Committee from
the Brahmin community gave dissenting notes by using merit as an
excuse. They cannot escape from the charge of trying to defend the
interests of their own caste; rnerit was only an excuse to rationalise
their arguments. In the case of the Second Backward Classes Com-
mittee, one member belonging to the Lingayat community submitted
a dissenting note against the majority recommendation of mi*ing
Lingayats forward. Though one may argue that he was equally inter-
ested in protecting the intercst of his own commdniry, the argument
had advanced in his minute of dissent gives an impression that the
Second B ackward Classes Comminee ( I 960) manipulated the data to
show that the educational status of Lingayats was above the state
average.
Karnataka G ovennment' s Reserv ation Policie s r47
The dissenting notes of the two members from the Brahmin com-
munity to the Miller Comrnittee did not deter the government from
accepting the majority recommendations' But the dissenting note of
a member from the Lingayat community created not only a political
uproar, but also judicial interference into an important social policy
in Karnataka, which ultimately distorted the reservation policy until
almost 1977. In the case of the Havanur Commission, though there
were differences of opinion, L.G. Havanur made sure that the report
would be acceptable to all. But of all backward classes commissions/
comrnittees, the work of the Second Backward Classes Commission
has been considered the most biased. First, the Janata Govemment
saw to it that no members from the major communities, i.e., Brah-
mins, Vokkaligas and Lingayats, were appointed to the Commission,
for fear that they block the work of the Commission or challenge the
recommendations by putting minutes of dissent. What followed was
a sad story. Almost half the members of the Commission submitted
dissenting notes, five of them submitted a separate letter to the chief
minister requesting him to reject the report and one of them charged
another mernber of having manipulated the whole report. The aborted
attempts of some members of the minority castes of backward classes
to remove Vokkaligas and Lingayats from the backward classes list
was evident from the dissenting notes and the letter written by five
members to the chief minister of Kamataka.e It appears as though the
Commission first decided on its recommendations and then started
using only relevant data and information to rationalise them. Wher-
ever the household survey data did not manipulated data were used.
From this it becomes evident that caste prejudice is deep-rooted in
Kamataka. The impression that one had, namely that only Brahmins
were jealous of others having reservation is not true. They were as
much guided by their self-interest as were the Vokkaligas and
Lingayats. The only difference was that the Brahmins, being numeri-
cally small, were not so powerful politically as to resist their exclu-
sion from the backward classes list.
The Lingayats and Vokkaligas, on the other hand, have been able
to muster sufficient political power to resist attempts to eliminate
them from the backward classes list. Even so, Urs had devised a
reservation policy so as to isolate Lingayats from other backward
classes by taking the support of Vokkaligas. But when both Vokkaligas
and Lingayats were made forward it was politically difficult for any
government to resist the combined strength of these two numerically
and politically powerful communities. The Second Backward Classes
Commission lost a great opportunity for formulating a meaningful
reservation policy based on hard facts and with a sense of faimess.
Though its intention seems to have been to eliminate both Vokkaligas
and Lingayats from the list of backward classes, the Commission
should have chosen appropriate criteria and used reliable data and
information to support such a recommendation.
The future of the backward classes in Karnataka bristles with
conflicts and contradictions. We have already mentioned some of
them at the end of the first section. It is desirable, at this stage of
socio-economic development of the state, to allow these castes spirit.
as otherwise too much spoon-feeding will make them unfit for sur-
vival in the competitive world. There was a time when they required
the government's protection and help for their educational advance-
ment. Time has come for them as well as for the government to
realise that perpetual continuation of the reservation policy will do
more harm than good. Therefore, both for SCVSTs and for OBCs the
reservation policy will have to be reviewed more frequently and the
relatively better-off sections among them should be asked to compete
rather than continue to ask for reservations.
Annexure l
Composition of the Backward Classes
CommitteedCommissions in Karnataka
(Miller Commitlee, 1918)
1. Sir Leslie C. Miller President European-Christian

2. Sri C. Srikanteswara Aiyar Member Brahmin
3. Sri M.C. Ranga Iyengar Member Brahmin
4. Sri M. Muthanna Member Kodava
5. Sri H. Chennaiah Member Vokkaliga
6. Mr. Nawab Ghulam Ahmad Kalami Member Muslim
7. Sri M. Basavaiah Member Lingayat (Sadar)
Mysore Backward Classes Committee

(Nagana Gowda Comminee, 1960)
Designation CastdReligion
l. Dr. R. Nagana Gowda, MLA Chairman Kuruba
2. Shri M.S. Patil Member Lingayat
Retd. District Judge
3. Sri B. Koragappa Member Not known
Retd. District Judge
4. Sri A. Bhimappa Naik, MLA Member Naik
5. Sri Ramachandra Rao Member Brahmin
Junga MLC
6. Sri F.D. Ghodke, Ex-MLC Member Brahmin
7. Sri K. Puttaswamy, MLA Member Vokkaliga
8. Sri Mahmood Sheriff*, MLA Member Muslim
9. Sri M.B. Shetty Secretary Bhunt
Under Secretary to the
Govemment, General
Administration Department
Note: +He was appointed as an additional member of the Committee vide
Govemment Order No. P & D 132 SAD 60 dated 26 September, 1960.
First Backward Classes Commission

(Havanur Commission, 1972)
Narne Designation CastelReligion

l. Sri L.C. Havanur, MLC Chairman Beda
2. Sri Y. Ramachandra Member Kuruba
Ex-Minister
3. Sri K.R. Srinivasulu Naidu, Member Velama Naidu
MLC
4. Sri K.M. Nagana Member Devanga
5. Sri A. Masana Shetty Member Uppara
6. Sri Dharam Singh, MLA Member Rajpul
7. Sri P.T. Habib Member Darzi
8. SriPuttasomachary Secretary Viswakarma
(Deputy Direcior of
Bureau of Economics
and Statistics)
Karnataka Second Backward Classes Commission

(VOnkataswamy Commission, 1983)
Name Designation CastelReligion
1. Sri T. Venkataswamy Chairman Yadava

Retd. Secretary,
Kamataka lrgislature
2. Dr. S. Bheemappa Member UPPara
Professor of Surgery,
Bangalorc Medical College
3. Dr. K.H. Cheluvaraju Member Raju Kshatriya
Professor of Pol. Science,
Bangalore University
4. Sri M-V. Soorachari,Advocate Member Viswakarma
5. Sri Vidhyadhar Guruji, Member Madiwala
Ex-MLA (Agasa)
6. Prof John B. Kutinha Member Christian
Professorof English,
Devar's College, Bangalore
7. Dr. Ammenbala Balappa Member Kumbara
Social Worker
8. Sri R.S. Naik Member Ediga
Labour lrader (Namdhari)
Karnataka Govemment's Reservation Policies l5l
9. Prof A.M. Dharmalingam Member Mudaliar

Professor of Law (Vellala)
10. Sri M.L, Muttennavar, MLA Member Bedar
11. Prof B. Puttaiah. Advocate Member Nayinda
12. Prof V. Venkataraman Member Balija
Ex-TDB President
13. Sri M.S. Helwar, Advocate Member Balija
14. Sri H. Chil*anna Member Kuruba
Ex-controller,
State Accounts Deptt.
tf. Sri V.D. Veerakyathiah Secretary Vokkaliga
IAS, Director, Backward
Minority Dept.,
Classes and
Govemment of Kamataka
16. Smt Shantha Kumari Secretary Christian
IAS Devraj from 12.6.84
lVora: Sri Basheeruddin, a Muslim, who was appointed as a member, resigned
on 17.6.1983 as he was concurrendy appointed member of the State Minorities
Commission.
Annexure 2
Terms of Reference of the Backward Classes

CommitteedCommissions
(Miller Committee, I 91 8)
t. Changes needed, if any, in the existing rules of recruitment to the public

scrvice.
Special facilities to encourage higher and professional education among
members of the backward communities.
Any other special measures which may be taken to increase the representa-
tion of the backward communities in the public service without materially
affecting efficiency, due regard being paid also to the state by a wider
difhrsion of education and a feeling of increased status, which, it is ex-
pected will thereby be produced in the backward communities'
Mysore Backward Classes Committee

(Nagana Gowda Comminee, 196O)
l. To suggest the criteria to be adopted in determining which sections of the

people in the state should b€ treated as socially and educationally back-
ward. and
To suggest the exact manner in which the criteria thus indicated should be
followed to enable the state govemment to determine the persons, who
should secure such preference, as may be determined by govemment, in
raspect of adrnission to technical institutions and appointments to Govem-
nrent services.
First Karnataka Backward Classes Commission

(Havanur Commission, 1972)
l. To suggest the criteria to be adopted for determining whether any classes of

persons in the state other than the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes
may be trcated as socially and educationally backward classes;
To investigate into the living and working conditions of all such classes of
persons with special reference to the difficulties under which they may be
labouring and to make recommendations as to the special provisions which
are necessary to be made by the Government for their advancement and for
the promotion of their social, educational and economic interests generally;
Kamataka Government's Reservation Policies 153
3. To make a list of all classes which may be regarded as backward classes in

the state;
4. To suggest what reservations should be made for such classes in tle
educational institutions maintained by the state or receiving aid out of the
state funds;
5. To suggest what other concessions like scholarships, etc., may be giv€n to
such classes bY way of assistance;
6. To determine to what extent such classes are represented in the senices
under the state and to recommend what reservation of posts in such services
may be made for them;
7. To generally advise the govemment about the steps to be taken to ensur€
adequate safeguards for the backward classes of citizens in the state.
Second Karnataka Backward Classes Commission

(Venkataswamy Commission, I 983)
1. The Commission shall review the existing list of Backward Classes as

approved in G.O. No. SWL 12 TBS 77 dated 22.2.1977 and as amended
from time to time and in the light of the provisions contained in Articles
l5(4) and l6(4) and other relevant provisions of the Constitution and in the
light of the various decisions of the Supreme Court bearing on the subject.
The Commission shall make a scientific and factual investigation of the
conditions of the Backward Classes in the state and recommend specific
measures for their advancement.
J. The Commission shall review tbe measures so far taken by the State
govemment for the welfare of the Backward Classes and the betterment of
their conditions and assess the effectiveness of such measures in improving
the conditions of backward classes and in particular in matters relating to
education and representation in public services of the state.
n
The Commission shall examine and assess with reference to concessions'
privileges and benefits given to them by the State Govemment, the im-
provement in the conditions of the "most backward classes" in education
and other matters.
5. The Commission may make recommendations as to the further steps that
should be taken by the State Govemment to improve the conditions of the
"Backward Classes" in resp€ct of:
(a) education, including reservation of seats in professional colleges and
institutions of higher leaming;
(b\ representation in public industry;
(c) trade. commerce and industry:
@ rural credit, marketing and cooperation;
(e) housing;
a grants; and
k) community development.
t54 The Politbs of Baclcwardness
6. The Commission may make recommendations in respect of short-term and

long+erm measurcs to be taken by the State govemrnent for raising the
level of backward classes.
7. The Commission shall on the basis of relevant material so gathercd by it
examine and recommend whether the reservation ordered in G.O. No. SWL
12 TBS 77 d^d, 22.2.1977 and as amended from time to rime may
continue or will need any modification.
The Commission shall cover all such questions and issues as have a bearing
upon:
(a) the question of enumeration and classification of Backward Classes in
the State;
(D) the question of reservation in dmission in educational institutions
including professional colleges and institutions of higher learning; and
(c) the question of reservation of appointment of posts in favour of
Backward Classes in the services under the state.
Annexure 3
Duration of the Backward Classes Committee/Commissions

Appointed in Karnataka
Commiuees/ of
Date of
Date Total time
Commissions appoinment submitting taken
the report
234
1. Miller Committee 23 August, 1918 July, 1919 I I months
( l9l8)
234
2. Nagana Gowda 8 January, 1960 16 May, 196l 16 months
Committee
0960)
3. Havanur September, 1972 19 Nov., 1975 3 years

Commission 2 months
(ln2)
4. Venkataswamy. l8 April, 1983 3l March, 1986 3 years
Commission
0 983)
Annexure 4
Table VII
Projected Population of Various Castes
and Communities in Karnataka
Caste 1971 Eoto total 1981 1984 1987

Hindus
2. Banajiga 3298M l.l9 404565 430123 457295

3. Beda 1595805 5.74 1957312 2080962 2212423
4. Besta s33892 1.92 654838 6962M 740188
5. Brahmin 1264873 4.55 t55t4l2 t649420 1153619
6. Darzi 83907 0.30 1029t5 109417 116329
7. Ganiga 142811 0.51 175163 186229 197993
8. Golia 1047063 3.76 r2842ffi 1365391 r451U7
9. Holeya 380815 1.37 467083 496590 527961
10. Idiga 202036 1.05 358193 380821 4f/;879
11. Jogi 34421 0.r2 42219 44886 47722
12. Koracha 27158 0.10 33310 35414 37651
13. Korama 39172 0.14 48046 51081 54308
14. Kahatriya 76665 0.28 94032 99972 106228
15. Kumbara 164751 0.59 202073 214839 2284rr
16. Kuruba 1719721 6.18 2109299 2242550 2384220
l7 . Lingayat 5079090 18.26 6229684 6623233 7041644
18. Lambani 360065 1.29 M1633 469533 499195
19. Madiga 3208344 11.53 3935148 4183744 4448U5
20. Meda 16551 0.06 20300 21582 22946
21. Mudali s2218 0.i9 64M7 6E093 72395
22. Nagxta 18319 0.07 22469 23888 25398
23. Nayinda 207968 0.75 25s080 271194 288326
Z. Neyge 282094 1.01 345998 367856 391094
25. Panchala 213419 0.77 261766 27&303 295884
26. Vaisya 669622 2.41 821315 873200 928363
27. Satani 52567 0.19 64475 68548 72878
28. Tigala 197112 0.7r 241765 257038 2',73276
29. Uppara 325263 1.71 398947 425150 450945
30. Vokkaliga 3928539 14.12 4818493 5122893 5446523
31. Vodda 534740 r.92 655878 697312 741364
Others 4580617 16.46 56t8288 5972213 6849854
Total Hindus 27819600 100.00 34121728 36277308 39068299
ly'ote: This projection is based on the national growth rate method assuming
that the average Hindu growth rate of O.O2M2 hold good for all castes.
P olicies r57
Kamatalea Government's Reservation
Table VIII
Projected Population of Various Castes in Karnanka
I9EI Eoto lotal 19E4 1967

Caste
Hindus
4t2339 1.29 423925 426873
l. Agasa
377654 1.19 388266 390965
2. Banajiga
J. Beda t827tt6 5.74 r87M59 l89l5l9
Besta 6rrn9 1.92 62il56 632E25
t448215 4.5s 148891I 1499'253
f. Brahmin
Dazi 96069 0.30 987685 9945s
6.
Ganiga 16351r 0.51 168106 169274
8. Golia 1198834 3.76 1232522 1241090
436014 1.37 4482.tr1 451383
9. Holeya
10. Idiga 334367 1.05 343763 346153
11. Jogi 39410 o.l2 40518 40800
12. Koracha 31095 o.lo 31968 32190
13. Korama ,14850 0.14 46lll 46/.3l
14. Kahatriya 87777 0.28 90244 90871
15. Kumbara l8E63l 0-59 193932 195230
i6. Kuruba 1968993 6.18 2A24322 2038396
17. Lingayat 5815300 1E.26 5vt8713 ffi20279
18. Lambani 412256 1.29 423841 426788
19. Madiga 367339r I1.53 377f615 38m871
20. Meda 18950 0.ffi 19483 19618
21. Mudali 59787 o.l9 6146;1 61895
22. Nagarta 20974 0.07 21563 2r7 t3
/.J. Nayinda 238113 0.?5 244404 246506
ai Neyge 322983 l.0l 332058 334366
25. Panchala 2A4354 o-77 251221 252967
26. Vaisya 7666,8r'. 2.41 788224 793708
27. Satani 60186 0.19 61477 623U1
28. Tigala 225643 0.71 232025 233639
29. Uppara 372410 l.7r 382875 385537
30. Vokkaliga 4497978 14.12 4AAy4 46565U
31. Vodda 612250 t.92 629455 633831
Others 5U4575 16.46 5391950 5429490
-tL.
Total Hindus 318s2029 100.00 3n47A90 32974757
Nrt '. Ttttr is based on the 1931 caste-wise proportions prorated for 1981
census Hindu population. Hindu population is prorated for I 93 I proportions and
-The for 1984
projected and 1987.
' relative proportions of differcnt castes would remain constant for all
three vears.
158 The Politics of B ackwardness
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159
Karnataka Covernment's Resemation Policies
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FE.
1. Report of the Committee appointed to Consider Necessary Steps

for the
Adequate Representation of communities in the public service (6hairman:
Leslie C. Miller), 1919, p. 4.
2. G. Thimmaiah and Abdul Aziz, The political Economy of Land Reforms
in Kamataka, New Delhi, Ashish publishing House, 1993.
3. Report of the First Baclcward Classes Commission (Chairman: L.G.
Havanur), vol. I, 1975, p. 7.
4. S. Bheepamappa and C. Thimmaiah, ..politics of ST list in Kamataka,,
(Mimeographed), 1985.
5. Op. cit., p. 2.
6. Op. cit., p. 2.
7. Op. cit., p. 3.
8. Op. cit., p. 4-
9. Govemment of K amataka, A Nett Deal For Baclovard Classes in Kamataka-
November 1986, pp. 10-12.
Chapter 6
Reservation and After: The Case of Bihar
Sachchidananda
Introduction
T'f 7 HEN India became free and the new Constitution was
\ru promulgated, a promise was made in the Preamble to
V Y secure to all its citizens social, economic and political
justice; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and
equality of status and opportunity. It had been realised by the fathers
of the Constitution that socio-economic conditions in India militated
against these principles; and, therefore, conscious and concerted
efforts had to be made to reduce inequalities and to liberate the
weaker sections of the community from the exploitation and injustice
meted out to them by oppressive social and economic structures. It is
in pursuance of this objective that Article 46 of the Constitution
stated that the "state shall promote with special care the educational
and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and in
particular of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and shall
protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation."
The follow up action in this regard constituted a package of
legislations, ameliorative programmes and preferential schemes for
the benefit of the weaker sections. It was hoped that this would lead
to removal of social and religious disabilities, social and special
segregation, facilitate larger participation by socially disadvantaged
groups in the national polity and to protect them from all forms of
exploitation and oppression.
Reservations or discrimination in the reverse, is part of this pack-
age of policies while reservations in posts and educational institu-
tions had been in vogue for the weaker sections of the population
even during British rule. The only innovation was reservation of seats
for scheduled castes and tribes in state and Union legislatures. The
justification for compensatory discrimination has been put in terms of
the need to compensate for past discrimination, rationalised by the
implied collective guilt of the ruling groups for past misdeeds and a
presumed collective right of the victimised group to redress through
this process, regardless of whether individual members of the group
suffered from past discrimination. This implied a kind of patemalism.
Many fonns of colonialism and despotism have been rationalised by
a paternal ideology that claimed that the system was benevolent to
the oppressed. The critics of this policy have held that whatever its
stated intent and ostensible rationale, its effect is to reinforce and
perpetuate group inequalities and differences it claims to diminish or
abolish. The compensatory discrimination is said to stigmatise and
demean everyone it touches and results in a system that has more in
common with intemal colonialism than with equal association.
Ifowever, few in independent India have voiced disagreement
over the view that the weaker sections of the population deserve and
need special help to bring them up quickly to the level of the other
s€ctions of the population. However, there has been considerable
debate about who is deserving of such help, about the form it should
take, whether enough has been done etc. A number of reports on the
scheduled tribes and castes have stressed the point that enough has
not been done for them. There are others who feel that the reserva-
tions have been overdone, and have proved to be costly in terms of
efficiency, utilisation of talent, morale and basic faimess. Reserva-
tion on the basis of caste has been taken as a regressive step since it
seems to have accentuated caste consciousness and has been detri-
nrental to the growth of secularism. It has been held that the reserva-
tions constitute a profound contradiction between the objective of a
casteless society and the method of evaluating backwardness on a
caste basis (Smith, 1963: 316). Rudolph and Rudotph (1962:150)
describe the caste basis as a critical contradiction in the govemment's
effort to eradicate the effects of untouchability.
hofile of the Population

Bihar is the second largest state in the country from the point of
Resemation and After: The Case of Bihar 163
view of population. It has a large percentage of people belonging to

the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other backward classes'
The scheduled castes account for 14.51 per cent of the total popula-
tion. They are spread all over the state. However, their presence in the
predominantly tribal region is marginal. In about 90 blocks their
population ranges between 2O and 4O per cent. However, a larger
population of scheduled castes live in the high density population
regions in north Bihar. The scheduled tribes form 8.31 per cent of the
total population. They are largely to be found on the Chotanagpur
plateau and in the Santhal Parganas Division. They are in majority
only in a couple of districts. Each of these communities is divided
into a number of distinctive castes or tribes. The Muslims form 13.5
per cent of the population but a part of the Muslim community
consists of the Muslim backward castes like the Momin, Kunjra,
Churihara, Idrisi, etc.
After 1941, no caste census has been published. It is, therefore' not
possible to know the exact population of each caste. However, an
attempt has been made by projecting the caste data on the basis of the
1931 census allowing for the natural increase in population. The four
higher castes, the Brahmanas, the Rajputs, the Bhumihars and the
Kayasthas constitute around 13 per cent of the total population of the
state. The backward castes altogether account for 52 per cent of the .
population. The largest single caste is that of the Yadavas who are
also known as Ahirs and Gwalas. They comprise l1 per cent of the
population and are spread in all the districts of the state except the
tribal areas. Earlier, their main occupation was cattle grazing and sale
of milk and milk products, but, in course of time, the bulk of them
have acquired land and in most cases, they constitute the majority of
small, medium and in some cases, rich farmers are also drawn from
their ranks. In some districts like Saharsa, they form the dominant
caste. In view of their large population they are represented in all
political parties and have a sizeable number of MLAs from their caste
in the Bihar Assembly. The next largest caste is that of the Kurmi
who form 4 per cent of the population. They have been traditionally
land-holders and in some districts, they constitute the bulk of the
medium and rich peasantry. Agricultural development in the districts
of Patna and Nalanda has been largely successful due to their efforts.
Koeri is another caste traditionally devoted to vegetable growing.
l& The politics of Backwardness
Yadava, Kurmi, Koeri and 3l other castes comprise the advanced

sections of the backward castes in Bihar and figure in Annexure II of
the List of Backward Castes. Annexure I consists of 94 educationally
and economically depressed communities who are only a shade
better than the scheduled castes. Among them the Nonia constitute a
very large caste. Originally they were devoted to production of
saltpetre but now most of them are landless agricultural labourers. A
number of Muslim castes who are weavers, tailors, vegetable sellers,
cloth dyers have been recognised as backward castes among the
Muslims.
Extent of Reservations
The scheduled castes have been allowed 15 per cent reservations
of posts whercas the tribals have been given l0 per cent in the state
as a whole. However, the percentage varies from district to district
depending upon the concentration of the tribal or the Harijan popula-
tion. 12 per cent reservation has been allowed to the comparatively
weaker sections of the backward castes or to the castes who figure in
Annex I and the rest of the backward c.rstes have been given 8 per
cent reservation with the proviso that if suitable candidates are not
available from Annex I to fill their quot^ of 12 per cent, the unfrlled
quota would go to members of Annexure II. As matters stand this is
usually the case as the membrs of Annexure I are educationally so
backward that candidates with the requisite qualifications required
for the different jobs are not available amongst them. This 20%
reservation for backward castes in posts does not include such candi-
dates from these castes who are selected in the general quota on their
own merit. In July 1979 the Chief Secretary issued a circular that
2O7o resenations would also include the candidates who got into the
services on their own merit, thus in effect reducing the reservation
quota for backward castes. However this circular has been rescinded
now. Up till now the backward caste reservations do not extend to
state government undertakings or to such institutions which are run
with government gnnts like universities or local bodies. Reservation
of 3 per cent of the posts has been allowed for women who may
belong to any caste and 3 per cent reservation has been provided to
the economically backward people (non-income tax payees) belong-
ing to the higher castes. Thus an effort was made to give some relief
Reservation and Afier: The Case of Bihar 165
to the poorer sections of the higher castes. All the reservations except
that for the scheduled castes and tribes came into being in 1978
during the Chief Ministership of Shri Karpoori Thakur.
Reservations have been provided for the scheduled castes and the
scheduled tribes and otherbackward classes in the various educational
institutions of all kinds and at all levels. Besides this, there are at
present 29 reserved seats for the scheduled tribes and 46 for the
scheduled castes in the state. The provision for reservation in Irgis-
lature has been extended from decade to decade by legislation. It may
be noted that the reserved seats for the scheduled tribes has gone down
from 33 to 29 due to slow rate of population growth among them. The
four extra seats were turned over to the scheduled castes whose rate of
growth is higher than that of the general population in the state.
Recommendations of Different Commissions

The scheduled tribes and castes in Bihar were listed in the
President's order issued in October 1950. This list has been revised
from time to time every ten years. Many communities who feel that
on account of their socio-economic backwardness they should be
included in the list of scheduled tribes and castes, make representa-
tions to the Govemment. After detailed enquiries the State Govem-
ment forwards its own recommendation regarding the acceptance or
rejection of their representation to the Govemment of India. As a
result of this, certain changes have been made in the list. It may,
however, be noted that no community in Bihar has up till now been
descheduled. A few years after the promulgation of the Constitution,
the Kaka Kalelkar Commission was appointed to go into the question
of drawing up a list of other backward classes at the national level.
The Commission in its report listed 127 castes both Hindu and
Muslim with a total population of 15.3 million or 31.1 percent of tie
state's population. However, on account of certain political reasons,
the Commission's report was not accepted by the Govemment of
India and it was left to Commissions appointed by the state govem-
ment to draw up a list of backward communities in their area. For this
purpose and certain other ancillary tasks, the Bihar Government
appointed a Backward Classes Commission with seven members
under the Chairmanship of Shri Mungeri Lal, a former Congress
Minister in December 1971 . The terms of reference of the Commis-
sion were as follows:

1. to examine the extent to which the orders issued by the state
govemment in regard to the reservation of posts and services for
scheduled castes and tribes have been implemented by the various
departments and to explore the circumstances in which some of the
orders were not implemented;
2. to examine whether the different departments have considered
the claims of candidates belonging to the other backward classes in
making appointments;
3. to examine the extent of representation of scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes in the various state government undertakings;
4. to evaluate the different welfare programmes being imple-
mented for the scheduled tribeVcastes and other backward classes;
5. to assess whether the steps taken for the progress of other
backward classes are adequate.
The Commission discovered that the representation of scheduled
castes and tribes at the various levels in the services was highly
unsatisfactory. The following table shows their representation in the
various classes of services in 19'12.
Scheduled Castes
Classes of Total number Percentage of Number of Percentage

setvice of posts resetvation SC holding in position
posts
Class I 890 15.00 25 /.J
Class II 5229 15.00 t42 2.7
Class III 102859 15.00 4313 4.1
Class IV 27442 15.00 3685 13.4
Scheduled Tribes
Classes oJ Total Number Percentageof Nwnber of Percmtage

service of posts resenalion SC hol.ding in position
Class I 890 10.00 15 2.O

Class II 5229 10.00 60 l.l
Class III 102E59 lq.0o 4651 4.5
Class IV nM2 10.00 2273 8.2
Resemation and After: The Case of Bihar t6'l
The Commission was of the view that the Appointing Officers are
not fully aware of the various government orders and instructions,in
regard to reservations, rosters and carrying forward instituted by the
State Government for seeing that the level of representation, as
prescribed by the Govemment, in the services for scheduled castes
and tribes are attained. It was pointed out that many appointing
authorities did not care for such instructions even though they were
aware of them. The Commission emphasized the need for having an
Employment Cell in the Appointment Department which would see
that Government instructions in regard to reservation are imple-
mented. It also recommended the setting up of an Employment
Committee at the State level consisting of officials and non-officials
which would inspect Govemment, semi-Govemment and Govem-
ment aided offices to see whether the reservation orders are observed.
The Commission endorsed the provision for reservations in promo-
tions for scheduled castes and tribes only in the interest of social
justice even though it caused frustration among such officers who
had been superseded by their colleagues belonging to these-commu-
nities. The most important work of the Commission was to identify
128 backward communities in the State hailine from Hindu. Muslim
and Christian faiths.
The Roster System

Rosters have been prepared in respect of posts to be filled in by
general people and by scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Such
arrangement has also been made at the Divisional and District level.
There is a system of carry forward by which the reserved posts which
could not be filled at a particular point of time due to the dearth of
qualified persons from scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Close
observation, however, revealed that this practice was not strictly
followed and many of the posts reserved for the tribals and the
Harijans were promptly filled in by the Selection Committees with
candidates from outside as suitable candidates were not available. It
was, therefore, decided that since there is no dearth of people from
these groups to filI in the Class III posts the reserved posts in this
category should be filled solely by persons from the scheduled castes
and scheduled tribes. If, in spite of such effort, no scheduled caste or
scheduled tribe is available, a full report has to be furnished explain-
ing the whole situation to the Appointment Department which will

then issue them permission for the dereservation of the posts in
question. It was further desired that appointing authorities should try
to collect information from legislators from the SC/ST constituen-
cies, the Harijan Sewak Sangh, District Welfare Officers, the Dalit
Varg Sangh, Adimjati Seva Mandal, Ranchi, Santal Pahariya Seva
Mandal, Deoghar, and the Musahar Seva Mandal at Rosera,
Darbhanga. These organisations should inform the candidates about
these vacancies. The reserved vacancies should be advertised at least
three times. In spite of these efforts, if suitable candidates are not
available from a particular category, the persons from the other
category could be appointed. In case a competitive examination is
held for recruitment to a particular post, the qualifying marks for the
SC./ST candidates is 10 per cent lower than for otler candidates.
Filling up of the Reservation Quota

In 1990 with the advent of the Janata Dal government in the state,
a drive was mounted for filling up vacancies in the reservation quota.
At the end of the year, the position in this regard was as follows:
Class of No.
Total Percentage of
No. Percent- No. oJ Percent-
Services ofposts of reserva- SC age in S? age in
tion portion port on
Class I 6707 l47o lOVo 454 t4.77 186 4.U

Class II 23558 14% to% 1291 18.24 654 3.6
Class III 86482 t4% 10% 5l5l t6.79 ?414 3.58
Class IV 16327 14% IOVo 2049 7.99 917 1.78
Source: hptt. of Personnel, Govt. of Bihar.
These figures do not include the positions filled in the Department

of Minor Irrigation, Relief and Rehabilitation and Human Resource
Development as these were not available at the time of compilation.
It is thus clear that so far as the scheduled castes are concemed, in the
top three categories they have already exceeded the reservations
provided. The scheduled tribes are much behind in the race and they
have not reache d even SOVo in the Class II and IIL While in Class IV
they are very poorly represented. Their overall percentage would go
up in all categories of posts as the numbr of positions in the Minor
Reservation and After: The Case of Bihar 169
Irrigation and Human Resource Development are considerable.
Applicability of Income Criteria

Post-matric scholarships are awarded to all scheduled caste/tribe
students according to a means test based on the parents'/guardians'
income from all sources. Full maintenance allowance in the form of
scholarship and full fees are paid in the case of students whose
parents'/guardians' income does not exceed Rs. 150 per month.
However, for professional courses such as medical, engineering,
agriculture and higher technical courses, full maintenance and full
fees are admissible to students whose parents'/guardians' income
does not exceed 1,000. For suth students, half maintenance allow-
ance and full fees are admissible for other courses. For the other
backward classes, the applicants are divided into two categories:
(a) those whose family income is below Rs. 1,500 per year; and,
(D) those whose family income is between Rs. 1,500 and Rs.
2,000. For technical courses, the upper limit is Rs. 2,400. Priority is
given to applicants in the frst slab. The remaining funds are turned
over to the candidates in the higher slab. In case the income is the
same preference is given to merit.
Children of such members of the backward castes who paid
income tax were not entitled to reservation in posts. However, most
of the income tax payers belonged to govemment service or to
professional classes largely in towns. Tlte rich and middle peasants in
the villages are not in the income tax net and as such members of their
families have escaped the provisions of this restriction.
Performance Evaluation
It is generally alleged that compensatory discrimination in Gov-
ernment services at the time of recruitment and promotion is respon-
sible for a decline in administrative efficiency. This has been attrib-
uted to the presence of govemment servants with poorer qualifica-
tions. It is assumed that there is a direct conelation between tested
merit of govemment s€rvants and the effectiveness of administration.
Many research studies have shown thal in recent times there is a
general lowering of standards in the efficiency of government em-
ployees. This may be largely attributed to the rapid expansion in the
cadres and general lack of commitment to work. The contribution of
the poor quality recruits and the promotees to this phenomenon is

precious little. A study team of the Administrative Reforms Commis-
sion reported that in the All-India non-technical services, the percent-
age of first division entrants dropped from 42 per cent in 1950-55 to
25 per cent in 1960-65, while the entrants with third class degrees
rose from 4 per cent to 19 per cent. However, this phenomenon can
hardly be attributed to reservations. It merely shows that Government
service does not appeal to the academically most qualified people
since there are attractive openings in the business sector. Among the
third class entrants reported in the study, only a minority belonged to
scheduled castes and tribs.
In general, however, the perfonnances of adminiskative or educa-
tional institutionS in which a proportion of positionVseats arc re-
served for allocation on the basis other than merit does not reveal any
noticeable deterioration. This is on account of the fact that the num-
ber of such positions is so small that the impact, if any, on the total
performance of the institution is negligible. At the same time, the
effect of the reservations has not been positive so as to make the
institutions more rcsponsive to the needs of the deprived area or
communities. In some cases, there might be zealous members of the
deprived communities who may try to see that benefits of develop-
ment progranrmes reach their own needy bretlren. However, the
obstacles in this are so many that their efforts may be frustrated.
Sometimes reservations in recruitment or promotion may depress
the motivation or performance of those who feel that their just claims
have been bypassed. However, since it is the general norm, the bulk
of them are prepared to take the shock of routine supersession as they
cannot avoid it. The frustrations in govemment services arc so many
that one cannot suffer under them too long. As the general commit-
ment to work is low, the poor motivation of some workers does not
affeit the performance significantly. There is no difference between
the effect of reservations for SC/ST/OBC and for other categories
like women, ex-servicemen and economically backward people as
their percentage is very small. There has been no empirical work on
such themes. Even if nothing very different may emerge from such
research, it is worthwhile to go in for this.
It is another qdestion whether recruitment of people with lower
academic qualification really affects the administration. There are
Reservation and After: The Case of Bihar l7l
other factors that count for better performance in govemment service.
Some of these factors differ from post to post. The requirements at
the clerical level would indeed be different from those at the level of
officers. Similarly, the qualities required for extension officers in the
rural areas would be different from those required of establishment
officers in the Secretariat.
However, if at any point of time it is felt that the SCYST recruits
have lower efficiency as a group, special training can be devised for
them so that their skills, knowledge and insights are improved and
they are better able to face the challenges of their job. As we get
nearer to the prescribed percentage in each category, these relax-
ations can be withdrawn and-the deficiencies, if any, should be
removed by in-service training. It is also advisable to keep the reser-
vations only up to junior level posts in class I.
Genesis and Growth of Backward Class Movement

The other backward classes included a number of peasant castes.
They occupy a low position in the Varna hierarchy and have low
levels of literacy. They are poorly represented in Government jobs
and white-collar occupations but in some areas, such castes occupy a
dominant position in tle economic and political spheres of village
life. Not infrequently they are small land owners. In many cases,
where they are numerically predominant, their control over decision
making may be decisive. Dominant castes of this kind have devel-
oped a vested interest in remaining backward since it enables them to
have education and employment. On account of their voting strength
they also have political clout. .
The British rule released the backward castes from the grip of
traditional sanctions. New codes of laur refused to recognise the
rights of upper castes to the exclusive use of particular symbols of
status. Avenues of sanskritization were thrown open to ever increas-
ing sections of society. Those .who seized the first opportunities
naturally belonged to the intermediate or middle range castes who
were much above the pollution line. Caste associations helped them
claim higher status or intemal reform made them shed practices
considered degrading by the upper castes. Sanskritization lowered
the fences between sections of society which, at one time, were
sharply separated. Social mobility was enhanced by the spread of
education.
However, after some time, there was a conflict between the de_
mands of power and the demands of status. Whereas the backward
castes were prompted to merge their identity with the higher strata to
enhance their status, considerations of power and economic advan-
tage led them to define their identity in opposition to rhe higher
castes. This is the dilemma of backwardness. A low caste would like
to acquire a high sounding title, claim kshatriya status and assume the
symbols of a high caste, and at the same time, it would insist on its
right to be frustrated. In their attempts to gain social acceptance, the
backward castes are increasingly tuming to political action. The
general elections have shown the backward castes the importance of
organised politics. Adult suffrage has given them larger chances of
participation in the political system. According to Myron Weiner,
India has become tremendously politicised. Politics has become the
avenue for personal advancement in a society in which commercial
activities offer little status and administrative posts are relatively few
in number (Weiner, M.: 1960: 192).
The backward casies insist on underlining their separate identity
on account of the concessions and advantages given to them by the
Govemment. The Central Govemment decided to do away with the
communal definition of other backward classes but it left the State
Govemments free to take any action they deemed fit. Andre Beteille
(1967) writing in the early sixties had hoped that on account of the
vast changes in the structure of Indian society, the backward classes
are likely to lose much of their identity. However, in spite of the
profound changes, the traditional structure slill seems to be intact and
the backward classes instead of suffering the erosioo in their identity
still need the reservations as a prop for their progress. It is not that
social networks do not cut across the boundaries of caste, but at the
group level, caste identities still have an importance of their own.
Among the backward castes also, an elite has emerged. During the
struggle for backward class reservations in Bihar in 1978-79, the
backward caste elite were able to mobilise large sections of the
masses for the cause. Few among the latter realised that only some
were going to be benefited by this decision and these would be
members of the caste elite group. On the issue of reservations there
was a sharp conflict of interest between the upper caste elite and the
173
Reservation and Afier: The Case of Bihar
backward elite.
ac-
ln the post-Independence period two important developments
castes' The first
."t..ot"O ttt. political mobiliiation of the backward
was the abolition of landlordism' The landlords in
most areas be-
among the back-
longed to the upper castes. The advanced sections
*url .Utt were substantial landholders' They were liberated from
the subordination to the upper caste landlord and began to play a
their larger numb€rs'
more important role in village affairs by dint of
intro-
They were also the beneficiaries of agricultural developments
through communi{ development progmmmes' They took
ad-
duced
to raise their
vantage of tile spread of education. Thus they were able
sociai consciousness, ns well as their standard of living' Their in-
well as better prices of
creased income from larger production as
agricultural produce enabled them to accumulate a surplus which
ciuld be o."d fo. engaging in political activities' The Yadavas and
the Kurmis were firsi to take advantage of these opportunities since
that
some of their families were quite affluent' It may be mentioned
Sri Ras Bihari Mandal, the grandfather of Sri B'P' Mandal' Chairman
to the Inter-
of the Backward Classes Commission, was educated up
mediate standard and had attended the second session of the Indian
National Congress in Calcutta in 1896'
The introduction of adult franchise and of Panchayati Raj in the
state in the fifties enabled them to realise the strength of numbers
through voting power. The sha4r distinction between the upper back-
wards and the-lower backwards is on aciount of the very low level of
socio-economicdevelopmentamongthelatterwhichreducestheir
percent-
capacity to.absorb development. They have also very poor'
ug" of ilt"t""y and are more worried about their physical survival
than about social consciousness or political mobilisation'
The first move for the mobilisation of the backward caste in Bihar
couldbetracedtolST0whenKurmieducatedelitesfeltthenecessity
of social reform (Verma, K.K.:1979). For this purpose' two confer-
ences were held at Danapur and Sonepat in that year' This
was
followed by the formation of the Kurmi Kshatriya Sabha' In l9l0 the
and the
Sabha was registered at Patna' a constitution was drawn up
*u"*"nt *oi placed on an organised footing' Sri Sajivan Lal Sinha
who later on became th€ President of the Sabha claimed that the
Kurmi was the purest Kshatriya. Muzaffarpur was the venue of
the
r74 The Politics of B achoardness
lTth session of the Sabha in 1929. Some delegates

of the Kurmi
Mahto of Chotanagpur who were considered quie
distlnct from the
other Kurmis also attended the Conference. It w;s
at that meeting that
the Kurmi Mahto were recognised as akin to
other Kurmis. It was
recognised at the l gth session of the Sabha held purulia
at that unity
among different sections of the Kurmi would enable
the community
to gain power in the political field. The Sabha at the same
time
advanced a claim for Kshatriya status on behalf
of the Kurmi. In
1939, Sri Dasu Singh, an advocate from patna, stressed
the need for
the fusion of different Kurmi sub-castes for the purpose
of political
mobilisation. He hailed from a well-to_do Kurmi i"-ity
*u.
active in the Kisan Sabha as well as in the Coneress. "nd
Much earlier, Sri Singh tried to unire the Kirmi, Koeri and
the
Ahirs. The Kurmi were agriculturists, the Koeri were vegetable grow_
ers and the Ahirs made a living by rending cattle and seliing
milk. All
these communities had an agricultural base. The new organisation
called Triveni Sangh was formed in 1925.
In 1924 the All India yadava Mahasabha was inaugurated at
Allahabad. Yadav leaders from Bihar not only attended the Confer_
ence but also held important positions as office_bearers in that
organisation.
The first backward caste leader to become a Minister in the Bihar
government was Sri Guru Sahay Lal, a Kurmi advocate from patna
district. He was a member of the Interim Ministry headed by Mr.
Yunus in 1937 for three months. Another important Kurmi leader
was Sri Deo Saran Singh who took an active part in the freedom
movernent and was also a legislator for a long time. He became
Minister in the Congress government and later was president of the
Legislative Council. He was also rhe president of the Backward Class
Federation.
At the thirtieth session of the All India Kurmi Mahasabha at patna
in May 1972 leaders from other backward castes addressed the
.,pichhra
4th"ltng. The general slogan was Jagao Desh Bachao.,,
The Conference resolved to organise a youth cadre ,,Bhumi putra
Fauj" to bring about internal social rcform and mobilization of not
only Kurmi but ofother backward class people. It also demanded the
creation of a separate Public Service Commission for backward
classes. The Kurmi Sabha was an example of how a caste sabha
175
various dis-
might be deparochialised to a certain degree to include
It gave these communities consciousness of a new
tinlt .utt"
"ntities. mobilisation'
identity which was a basis for their political
fne faka Kalelkar Commission's report wurs submitted in 1956
By
but its recommendations were not ac@pted by the Government'
1960 the tide was strongly against the definition of
Backward Classes
by community. In 1961- theGovernment of India decided to drop the
iiea of drawing up a national list of Other Backward Classes' The
Govern-
States howeveiwJre free to do so' The view of the Central
test rather
ment was that it would be better to apply the economic
was
than so bv caste to determine backwardness' The caste criterion
held is contrary to the principle of social justice and was unfair
to the
other poor. The caste- criteria would tend to perpetuate caste and
*ood.r"u," in the recipient both vested interest and a sense of

helflessness. However, in 1966, the All India Backward Classes
Feieration pleaded that social backwardness could only be deter-
mined in terms of caste.
In Bihar the influence of the backward castes had been steadily
were
increasing. Sri Birchand Patel and Sri Shiva Nandan Mandal
influential ministers in the Bihar cabinet in the fifties and early
sixties. During the chief ministership of Sri K'B' Sahay
(1963-67)
Sri Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav was not only a minister but considered
his right hand man. The backward castes were represented in
good
strength in the Socialist, Communist and Jan Sangh parties'
Backward caste mobilization received a shot in the arm with the
party
advent of the Socialist Party on the political horizon' The
committed itself to securing 6O% in the leadership posts in political
parties, govemment services, business and armed forces for Shudras'
ifriiunt, Scheduled tribes, religious minorities and women- Dr' Lohia
had iealised that these backward classes could provide an important
source of support in the struggle to unseat the Congress'
By 1962, the upper backward castes accounted for 22% of the
."-b"o of the Congress Legislature Party' The K'B' Sahay cabinet
had 2OVo representation of these castes in 1963' In the year 1967
with
the Congreis debacle, the Socialist Party vote increased from 57o to
l'lVo and its seats from 7 to 68. In the Mahamaya hasad Sinha's
cabinet Karpoori Thakur became the Deputy Chief Minister' There
were 7l mimbers hailing from backward castes in the different
parties in the Bihar Assembly. The yadavas emerged

as the second
largest caste group after the Rajputs in 1967.
. During the next four years Bihar was plagued by political instabil_
ity with nine coalition ministries and three ipells of presiOent,s
rule.
Three of them were headed by backward class leaders like
Sri B.p.
Mandal, Daroga Prasad Rai and Karpoori Thakur. The new
barsain_
ing power of the upper backwards for getting a larger share ii
the
ministerial posts was very much evident. Atthougt the ministry
headed by Sri B.P. Mandal lasted only 47 days, it rJpresented more
than a symbolic breakthrough for the backward classes.
The split in the Congress party in Noyember 1969 created new
opportunities for backward castes. In the Daroga Rai ministry the
backward and scheduled castes received special attention and were
given 53Vo ministerial posts. During the Congress ministries between
I97217 backward class representation in the cabinet varied between
2O and 28Vo.In the 1977 elections, a large number of backward caste
candidates won the elections. The yadavas alone had 36 members. In
the Karpoori Thakur ministry the backward caste members got 42Vo
rcprcsentation while the forward castes had to remain content with
only 29Vo.In its election manifesto the Janata party had called for an
end to caste distinction and promised to ensure that the other back-
ward classes do not suffer from any discrimination or inequality. It
promised a radical reduction of disparities in favour of the weaker
sections of the society. There was also the promise to reserve 25 and
33Vo of all appointments to govemment service for backward classes.
The issue of reservations for backward castes came to a head early in
1978. Sri Jaya Prakash Narayan and the Janata party Chief
Chandrashekhar had declared themselves to be in favour of economic
criteria to judge a man's backwardness. The Janata Legislature party
and even the State cabinet were sharply divided over the issue. There
was persistent pressure from the backward caste lobby. A massive
demonstration demanding immediate declaration of the government's
intention in this regard was organised. The Backward Caste Federa_
tion offered satyagrah and courted arrest. Large processions were
organised for and against reservations by different youth organisations.
There were large scale disturbances in many parts of Bihar. Ulti_
mately, on 2l March 1978, the Bihar govemment adopted reserva_
tions with modifications. It provided reservations only in appoint_
177
Resemation and Afier: The Case of Bihar
not be availed by
ments and not in promotions. Reservations could
families whose income was Rs' 1'000 a month or more' These
violent distur-
amendments did not satisfy the warring groups and
iun.", .ontinued to grip ih" ttut"' In November 1978' the Chief
Minister announced thi revised reservation formula which
according
to Janata Chief Chandrashekhar was the best in the circumstances'
in the context
The Parliamentary election from Sitamarhi was fought
of backward cas6 reservations. Twelve per cent reservation in ser-
vices was given to communities of Annex-I' 87o to those
in Annex II'
3% reservitions were given for women in general Ni
3Va for eco-
nomically backward persons. At about that time the Central Govern-

with Sri B'P' Mandal as Chairman to
ment appointed a Comrnission
leaders had
determine the criteria of backwardness. Anti-reservation
to console themselves with the hope that the Mandal Commission
might look into the issue dispassionately and find.a solution to the
prJbt.rn. In course of time the Mandal Commission submitted its
ieport but the Govemment of India has up till now taken no action
upon it.
Absence of Scheduled Caste Movement

Although scheduled castes in Bihar form a substantial proportion
of the population they have not been able to pull their weight in
politica^l decision-making in the State. This is on account of their
extreme poverty and misery. Unlike the border states of Haryana and
West Bengal, untouchability is deeply entrenched in the state' Sev-
enty-six pir cent of the scheduled castes make a living by agriculture'
Howevei, very few of them are land owners' The percentage of
cultivators in the scheduled caste population is about 24 while the
percentage of agricultural labourers is 55. All the cultivators however
-are
not land owners and this group includes share croppers and others
who have leased lands from others. Under conditions of extreme
poverty, it is not possible for them to have any political conscious-
n.s. inty are all the time busy in solving problems of survival'
Absenie of mobilisation among them is also on account of their
educational backwardness. The percentage of literacy among the
scheduled castes in 1971 was 6.53. Literacy for males was 1l'92 and
that for females 1.03. Among those who go to school the enrollment
is also poor and the drop-out heavier as compared to the general
population. It is thus clear that even after Independence the growth

in
education among the scheduled castes is extremely slow. In lg1l
only 1.3 per cent had reached the level of matriculation or above.
During the time of the freedom struggle some young men from the
scheduled castes were impressed by Gandhdi's work and joined the
Congress party. The process was facilitated because very few of the
scheduled castes had turned to Christianity. In general, they accepted
the Congress party and in elections--before and after Independence_
they supported the Congress. As early as 1937 Shri Jagjivan Ram
was made a Parliamentary Secretary in Bihar and from 1946 onwards
there was always one Cabinet Minister from the scheduled castes in
Bihar.
After some time, when factionalism developed in the Congress the
Harijan leadership also came to be divided into important factions.
Some leaders, however, were also to be found in the Socialist party,
Communist Party and the Jan Sangh. However, except in 1977, the
Harijans have solidly voted for the Congress. In the Congress itself
they have not been able to build a united lobby of their own so that
they could ventilate their grievances jointly and press the government
for the solution of their most important problems.
The absence of a movement may also be attributed to the fact that
in no region do they form a majority ofthe population and even in the
constituencies reserved for them, they have to depend largely on the
votes of the non-scheduled castes. Thus, it is not possible for a very
outspoken or a belligercnt candidate to win a election. Only one who
is acceptable to the dominant population can be elected. In short, the
Harijan leaders are not leaders in their own right. They are sub-
Ieaders attached to dominant faction leaders in the Congress or other
national parties and their fortunes wax and wane with the fortunes of
their leaders. Under such circumstances, the scheduled caste move-
ment did not take off in Bihar.
An Overview
In Bihar there is no opposition to reservation for scheduled castes
and tribes. Some years back, there was great opposition to extending
the benefits to the other backward classes (OBCs). Even now reser-
vations for the OBCs arc resented particularly to those in respect of
promotions. However, public opinion has now bowed to the inevi-
179
table.
Reservations have got to be viewed as a strategy for raising the
quality of life of groups rather than of individuals' It is essentially
meant to mitigate backwardness emanating from historical processes
and conditions of social injustice in which certain groups have been
remaining for a long time. The state can initiate other steps for
eliminating socio-economic handicaps faced by individuals of any
community. Since caste is still a measure of evaluation of status in
society, it has to continue as a criterion for reservation' In the back-
ward caste, however, the economic criterion can be strictly enforced
so that the benefits do not accrue. to undeserving members of the
community and reach the persons who need it most. Those who have
enjoyed the benefits of reservation should not claim it for their
children. Unfortunately, this does not happen and communities de-
velop vested interest in backwardness.
It is not desirable to enlarge the percentage of reservations for such
categories as ex-servicemen, freedom fighters, handicapped, etc. Such
categories should be given all facilities including finance, skill' train-
ing, etc. to compete with other candidates on equal terms. Other
things being equal, preference may be given to them.
Our experience suggests that the aims of reservation could be
better achieved if they are supplemented by measures which would
enable the target groups to compete with others on equal terms in
open recruitment. This can be done through pre-service training or
supplementary coaching for entry into professional colleges like
medicine, engineering, etc. so that their initial handicap is removed
and they would no longer suffer from an inferiority complex all their
lives.
Reservations have definitely benefited the target groups in facili-
tating entry into educational institutions and in govemment service'
This has given them security, status and wealth. Many families have
moved to the middle class category and they are all the time striving
for moving up the social ladder. Unfortunately, however, the benefits
have tended to cluster around some communities and also in some
families. This is perfectly natural. Because of some pre-intervention'
endowments or opportunities, certain sections of the population take
time by the forelock and reap the benefits. It is, therefore, necessary
not to leave this to the natural process. Those in charge ofdistribution
of benefits must take special care to see that the most deserving
people get it and the distribution is more equitable. The more back_
ward communities among them must be identified. The income cri_
terion may be used to block certain families enjoying higher incomes
from getting benefiS. This step would also blunt the resentment of
the non-scheduled caste poor.
It would not be desirable to exclude entire communities from
getting the benefits as there would still be large numbers of people in
them who deserve such help. In isolating such sections of people use
may be made of the generation of the income criterion.
REFERENCES
l. Beteille, A., '"The Futurc of Backward Classes" in philip Mason (ed.),

India and Ceylan, Oxford University Press, New York, 1967.
2. Blair, H., "Rising Kulaks and Backward Classes in Bihaf', Economic and
Political WeeHy, Jan. 12, 1980.
3. Jha S.S., Pofirtcal Elite in Bilar, Yora & Co., Bombay, 1972.
4. Mukherjee, N., Perspectives for a Policy in Seminar No. 268, December
1981.
5. Roy, R., 'Caste and Political Development in Bihat'', in R. Kothari (ed.),
Caste in Indiar, Politics, Oriert l-nngmans, New Delhi, 1970.
6. Pflr&,,1., State Politics in India (A Study in Coalition Politics in an Indian
State), Uppal Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982.
7. Rudolph, S.H. and Rudolph, L.I., Thc Modemiry or Trad.ition, Political
D*elopment in India, Chicago Univenity Press, Chicago, 1967. .'
8. Sachchidananda, Haijan Elite,T\omson Press, Faridabad, 1977.
9. Smith, D-E , /z/rd as a Secular Snte, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
1963-
lO. Yerma"K.K, Changing Role of Caste Associations,National Publishing
House. New Delhi. 1979.
ll. Weiner, M., "Politics of South Asia" in G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman
@n.), The Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
1960.
181
Schedule I
List of Extremely Backward Classes
1. Kapadia 40. Dhimar

2. Kanu 41. Dhanwar
3. Kawar 42. Nonia
4. Kalandar 43. Naiya
5. Kochh 44. Nai
6. Kurmi (Mahto) (only for 45. Namsudar
ChhotanagPur Division) 46. Pandu
7. Kewat (Kaut) 47. Pal (BheriharXGaren)
8. Kadar 48. Pradhan
9. Kaura 49. Pingania
10. Korku 50. Pahira
1 1. Kaibart 51. Bari
12. Kumar Bhag Paharia 52. Beldar
13. Khatwa 53. Bind
14. Kharwar 54. Banjaraalakar
15. Khatouri 55. Shekhra
16. Klangar 56. Bagdi
1?. Khatik 57. BhuiYa
18. Khekta 58. Bhar
19. Khatwe 59. Bhuiya
20. Khond 60. Bhaskar
21. Gorhi (Chhabi) 61. Mali (Malakar)
22. Cangu (Nagesh) 62. Mangar
23. Gangeta 63. Madar
24. Gour or Gonr 64. Mallah (Surhia)
25. Gandharb 65. Majhwar
26. Gulgalia 66. MarkandeY
27. Gour 67. Moriyari
28. Chain 68. Malar (Malhor)
29. Chapota 69. Molik
30. Chandrabansi (Kahar) 70. Rajdhohi
31. Tikulhar 71. Rajbhar
32. Dhekaru 72. Rangwa
33- Tanti (Tatwa) 73. Banpar
34. Tamaria 74. BeAia
35. Turha 75. Shota (Shota)
36. Tiar 76. Sang-Trash (for
37. Tharu Nawadah distric0
38. Dhanuk 77. Agaria
39. Dhamin 78. Aghouri
79.
8o
Abdal
Kasab (Kasai)
81. Chik (Muslim)
il i,lXlffJj,'#1,.
Halalkhor Bhingi
82. Dafali (Muslim) (Muslim)
83. Dhunia (Muslim) 90. Miriasin (Muslim)
84. Dhobi (Muslim) 91. Madari (Muslim)
85. Nut (Muslim) 92. Meershiiar lUustiml
86. Pamaria (Muslim) 93. Saeen (Muslim)
87. Bhathiara 94. Momin (Muslim)
Nor€: Those castes and classes in respect of whom
the wordMuslim has not
specifically been mentioned, would belong to both Hindu
and Musrim commu-
nities. For example, Teli means both Hindu and Muslim
Teli.
Annexure II
List of B$kward Classes
l. Amat wani, Thathera, Kalwar, patwa,

2. KagJi Kamlapuri, Vaishya. Sinduria-
3. Kamar (Lohar & Karmkar) Bania, Mahuri-Vaishya, Awadh
4. *Kurmi Bania, Bangia Vaishya (Bengali
5. Kuswaha (Koiri) Bania), Barnwal. Agrahari
6. Kosta Vaishya, Poddar)
7. Gaddi 22. Mukri (Mukeri) (Muslim)
8. Ghatwar 23. Yadav (Gwala, Ahir, Gora, Ghasi,
9. Churihar (Muslim) Mehar)
10. Chanau 24. Rajbansi (Risia or Polia)
I L Jadupatia 25. Rangrej (Muslim)
12. Jogi (Jugi) )6 Rautia
13. Tamoli 11 Raeen or Kunjara (Muslim)
14. Teli 28. Laheri
15. Dewhar 29. Shivhari
16. Nalband (Muslim) 30. Sonar
17. Prajapati (Kumhar) 31. Sutardhar
18. Partha JZ. Sukiar
19. Barhi JJ. Idiris or Darzi (Muslim)
20. Barai 34. Isai Dharmawalambi (Harijan)
21. Bania (Sundi, Halwai, Roniar, 35. Ishai Dharmawalambi (Anya
Pansari, Modi, Kasera, Kesar- Pichari Jati)
Nare: Those castes and classes in respect of whom the word Muslim has
not
specifically been mentioned, would belong to both Hindu and Muslim commtr_
oities. For example, Teli means both Hindu and Muslim Teli.
+Added to this schedule by another ordinance.
Chapter 7
Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Scene
Mohit Bhattacharya
EFORE describing the policy of .reservation' in West Bengal

and its actual implementation, some preliminary remarks are
in order. The reservation policy, discussed here, relates exclu_
sively to jobs in govemment establishments. political reservation.
that is reservation in legislatures and local govemment bodies, is not
included in tlris discussion. Reservation of seats in educational insti-
tutions such as medical colleges, universities, etc., is also outside the
purview of this essay.
It is assumed that the rationale for .reservation' as discussed in the
course of the framing of the Constitution of India is well_known and
does not need rciteration here.r What can be mentioned, in passing, is
that the constitutional incorporation of the reservation provision was
preceded by the imperial policy of reservation during British rule,
when reservations were made for different sections of Indian society
using communal symbols like castes, in a bid to win political support
from these sections.
This is not the place to go into the evolution of reservation policy
as it was worked out during the colonial rule. Sensitivity to historv is.
however, helpfrrl in understanding the essentially p oliiicat natuie oi
reservation policy, that is apparently directed toward providing be_
nefits to designated sections of society blt really intended to ensure
group support for the ruling class.2
Since 1977, West Bengal has been having a distinctive political
regime under the leadership of the CpI(M). The l,eft Front govern_
184 The Potitics of Bac*wardness
ment has been consistent in declaring political and administrative

Through
support to the economically neglected sections of the society'
and decentralisation of pow-
u conrcioos policy of rural mobilisation
institutions' there
ers to the grass-roots (panchayats and municipal)
increase
has been a regular effort to politicise the rural masses and
their level oi political Alongside this' a series of
"onr"ioosness' benefits to the economi-
measures has been adopted to offer concrete
cally weaker sections. ihese include 'operation barga' or registration
of sirare croppers to guard against their eviction from land, redistribu-
tion of ceiling-surpius land to the rural poor and distribution of
homestead land to the rural homeless. Economic benefits have been
assured to the rural poor through the administration of beneficiary-
oriented rural development programmes. The law and order machin-
ery also been overtly tumed to the needs of the poor and instruc-
tras
tions have accordingly been issued to the local police to stand by the
side of the poor and the vulnerable sections of the society'
More importantly, the frontal organisations of the party have been
active in the rural areas, organising the masses and sensitising them
to the social and political environment within which they have to live
and struggle to survive.
It is *ithin this broad philosophy and strategy of governance
followed by the CPI(M)-led lrft Front govemment in West Bengal
that one has to review the working of the reservation policy in the
state. According to the CPI(M) theoreticians, caste-based reservation
policy tends to perpetuate narrow caste-consciousness and therefore
i. u itindtun." to the development of class-consciousness' Such a
policy is basically intended to serve the purposes of a bourgeois
i"-o.tu"y. By generating inner conflict among the toilers and splir
ting the unity of the oppressed class' the policy of reservation proves
to ie a stumbling block to the revolutionary class formation'3
The CPI(M)-ied Left Front government in West Bengal took
office on June 21, 197?. Even before the Left Front victory, the l'eft
parties, as partners in the successive united Front governments pre-
ieding the Left Front regime, had conducted vigorous political cam-
paigns among the peasantry to win electoral support' A common
minimum programme was now drafted to spell out the concrete
measur.es to be actually pursued and implemented by the newly
elected regime. The pro-poor decentralist development and rural
Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Scene 185
mobilisation featured boldly in the declared policy objective.a The

Chairman of the Left Front Committee, Promode Dasgupta,s gave a
call for "a struggle for establishing the rights of poor peasants,
agricultural labourers, village craftsmen, etc., against the vested in-
terests and exploiting classes in the villages," by activising the
panchayat bodies at the grass-roots level.
The caste-based reservation policy, in the context of this broader
political objective of the Left Front government, seems not only
antagonistic but also pernicrous.
Nevertheless, to the new regime, the policy is one of the many
"givens" of the Indian constitutional framework within which it has
to function, despite ideological differences.
According to the 1981 census, West Bengal has a total population
of 54.6 million, out of which the scheduled caste population is 12.00
million and the scheduled tribe population 3.00 million. Thus the SC
constitute 22 per cent and the ST component is about 6 per cent of the
state's total population. The geographical distribution of ST popula-
tion is uneven throughout the 16 districts of the state. The districts
with sizeable (more than l0 per cent) ST concenuation arb Purulia,
West Dinajpur, Bankura, Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling. High concentra-
tion of SC population (more than 20 per cent) can be found in the
districts of Burdhwan, Birbhum, Bankura, 24-Parganas, Nadia, West
Dinajpur, Jalpaiguri and Cooch Bihar.
The Mechanics of Reservation

In fulfilment of the constitutional obligation to ensure adequate
representation for the SC and ST communities in different employ-
ments under the state govemment, the Government of West Bengal
had been extending the right of reservation to the members ofthe two
communities' through executive orders issued by the govemment in
the Finance Department. Till August, 1976 this had been the practiae
and the prescribed percentages of jobs renewed for the SC and ST
communities were respectively 15 per cent and 5 per cent. In prac-
tice, however, the provision of executive orders was not actually
* In reply to the Mandal Commission's queries, the Govemment of West
Bengal did not agree to the idea of identifying other backward classes on the
basis of caste. The govemment argued instead, that poverty and low living
standards are better indicators of backwardness than caste.
186 e Politics of Backwardness
adhered to by most govemment establishments. It was discovered in

1976 thar the overall position of representation of the SC and ST
communities in the state services was not encouraging, the actual
percentages being far below the prescribed percentages.
In order to give statutory backing to the reservation policy' the
Congress state govemment enacted the West Bengal Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of Vacancies in Services and
Posts) Act, 1976. This Act, along with the Rules framed under it,
came into force with effect from August 15, 1976. Some of the major
highlights of the Act are as follows:
I . The Quota. As a general rule, a reservation quota is fixed for
direct recruitment to services and posts in an "establishment": 15 per
cent for SC and 5 per cent for ST. The state govemment may, from
time to time, increase the percentage so that the rcservation shall not
exceed 25 per cent in the case of SC and 10 per cent in the case of ST.
Also, different percentages may be fixed for different districts in
accordance with the percentages of population of SC and ST in such
districts.
ln respect of the West Bengal Civil Service (Judicial), the percent-
age shall be 10 for SC and 5 for ST.
2. The Scope. The Act applies to any offices of the state govern-
ment, a local or statutory authority constituted under any State Act, or
a corporation in which not less than 51 per cent of the paid-up share
capital is held by the state govemment, the universities and colleges,
primary and secondary schools and other educational institutions that
are owned or aided by the state govemment, and an establishment in
the public sector. The 'establishment in public.sector' means any
industry, trade, business or occupation owned, controlled or managed
by the state government or a government company as defined in
Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a corporation established
by or under a Central or State Act, in which not less than 51 per cent
of the paid-up share capital is held by the state govemment, on a local
or statutory authority constituted under any state Act.
The Act does not apply to any employment in the West Bengal
Higher Judicial Services on any employment which, in the opinion of
the state government is of a scientific and technical naturc. Central
government establishments, private sector units and employment in
domestic services fall outside the purview of the Act'
In view of the specialised qualification or experience necessary for

ajob, the state government, by notification, may exempt any particu-
lar services or post from the provisions of the Act.
3. Promotion Posts. The Act provides for reservation in vacan-
cies to be filled by promotion, as distinguished from direct recruit-
ment. The general principle of the 15 per cent and 5 per cent quota,
as applicable to direct recruitment, applies in this case also. Similarly,
the reservation in promotion posts may be increased to 25 percent for
SC and l0 per cent for ST. The number of SC or ST employees
appointed on promotion to unreserved vacancies will not be deducted
from the promotion quota reserved in such services or posts for the
members of the SCIST.
No reservation is envisaged to any post in the pay scale going up
to a maximum of Rs 2375.
4. The Roster System and the Carry-Forward Rule. Under a
notification dated August 16, 1976, the stare govemmenr had in-
creased tbe reservation quota to 25 per cent for SC and l0 per cent for
ST. It was explained that the enhanced percentage would be appli-
cable only if the total number of SC/ST employees in any service or
cadre was less than 15 per cent and 5 per cent respectively, of the
total number of employees in that service or cadre recruited since the
year 1972. The implication was that the enhanced percentage would
cease to be effective as soon as the prescribed percentage of reserva-
tion (15 and 5) would be attained in respect of any service or cadre.
In practice, the reservation system operates through a 2O-point
roster in which the third, thirteenth and eighteenth vacancies (i.e. 3
out of 20) are earmarked for the SC candidates, and the 8th vacancy
(i.e. one out of 20) is similarly earmarked for the ST.
In t}te absence of a qualified SC/ST candidate in a particular year,
the vacancy is carried forward for the next two years only and not
beyond.
5. Control Provision. For enforcement purposes, provisions have
been made in the Act for a reporting system from the appointing
authority to the state government (i.e. the administrative department
dealing with the Act). In every department under the state govern-
ment, an officer has been designated as the liaison officer for the
purpose of implementation of the provisions of the Act in the depart-
mental establishment. For the inspection of establishments (to check
whether the provisions of the Act and Rules are actually being
observed), a number of officers have been authorised to act as in-
specting officers.
Any SC/ST candidate, who is adversely affected on account of
non-compliance of the provisions of the Act or Rules, may bring the
fact to the notice of the state government. In that event, the state
govemment may call for the records from the establishment con-
cerned and take appropriate action.
As is customary in public administration, a number of registers
and forms and returr,s have been suggested for recording and report-
ing purposes. At least, formally speaking, the paper work in the
government seems thorough and aboveboard.
The Reality on the Ground

Despite legislative intention and formulation of elaborate rules
and regulations, the fact remains that accurate information and data
on the actual position in regard to reservation of posts for SC and ST
categories are not available. Since this is the situation in regard to
employments under the Government of West Bengal, the position in
other establishments in the public sector, universities, colleges and
local bodies is anybody's guess. Maintaining an information system
is surely not tle strong point of govemments, especially under present
conditions, *hen govemment organisations have proliferated at all
levels, both secretariat and field, making it well-nigh impossible to
keep track of employee data. The State Department of Scheduled
Castes and Tribes Welfare is the nodal agency charged with the
responsibility of administering the Act and maintaining and updating
statistical information on reservation. The departments are to statuto-
rily submit annual retums on reservation, both for vacancies and
promotion posts. But such returns are extremely irregular and the
defaulting departments are too many to count.
The machinery for regular collection, processing and retrieval of
employment (reservation) data within the Scheduled Castes and Tribes
Welfare Department is thoroughly inadequate. Staff census is under-
taken at certain intervals by the state govemment's Bureau of Ap-
plied Economics and Statistics. Whatever census data are made avail-
able by the Bureau tum out to be the only "authentic" information on
employment under the govemment. The last such staff census report
was published by the Bureau in 1982.

According to the data supplied by the Bureau, the "provisional"
estimate of the total number of state government employees is 4,01,000.
This includes even the miscellaneous category of employees drawing
pay on consolidated, piece-rate, work-charged and contingent basis.
On April 1,1982, the shares of the SC and ST in total government
employment in West Bengal stood as follows:
General 85.95
Scheduled Castes 1 1.58
Scheduled Tribes
Total 100.00
Clearly, the prescribed quota could not be reached in both catego-

ries. Appendix II presents a complete picture of the distribution of
SC/ST categories among the different job groups. Their representa-
tion on the higher class of jobs (A and B) is extremely low. In the
clerical (group C) category, the representation by contrast, is not
insignificant. But in the lowest category of group D jobs (peons,
messengers, sweepers, etc.), the share of SC/ST is substantial. Inter-
estingly, the sweepers and scavengers forming one part of Group D
employees are drawn largely from the Scheduled Castes (62.447o).ln
the case of other Group D jobs-peons, messengers, book-binders,
etc.-the statutory quota for both SC and ST has been fulfilled.
From the limited data, it can be safely infened that in purely
govemment jobs, the statutorily prescribed reservation quota for both
SC and ST could not be reached. The representation of these two
categories in lower jobs-mostly unskilled and manual-has nbt
posed any problem. But thejobs at higher levels, especially groups A
and B, have remained virtually out of their reach. Incidentally, the
posts at higher levels, including those in group C, are filled on
competitive basis through the State Public Service Commission. The
gatekeeping function in the hands of the State PSC may be so
rigorous as to dissuade the SC/ST candidates from applying for
higher governmentjobs. Alternatively, such candidates may be find-
ing the PSC's screening process too hard to fcllow. In this connection
it may be worthwhile looking at the failure rate of SC/ST candidates
in PSC's tests and exarninations.
In the absence of time series data, it is not possible to say if the
situation in regard to reservation has been improving or deteriorating

over the years. The enactment of the law in 1976 was motivated by
the desire to place the system of reservation on a statutory footing. It
was also stated at that point of time that "the overall position of
representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the State
services was not at all encouraging." From the 1982 statistics, it does
not appear that there has been any marked improvement in the overall
position since the enactment of the law.
This state of affairs has not gone unnoticed by the Govemment of
West Bengal. Recently (August, 1987), a meeting was convened to
review the position. Among others, the ministers present at the meet-
ing included the minister in charge of Land and Land Reforms and
the minister for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Welfare.
The secretaries and other officers of tlle different state departments,
including the chief secretary attended rhe meeting. The minister for
SC/ST Welfare was critical of the departments which had failed to
enforce the job reservation provisions of the Act. As the minister
said: "In a number of departments, including the Land and Land
Reforms Department and the Agriculture Department, not more than
13 per cent of the employees are Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes. Even the Public Service Commission had failed to provide
the requisite number of such applicants for the posts of lower-divi-
sion clerks in different departments of the state government. people
from these castes and tribes qualified for the posts of lower-division
clerks were not wanting and it was not clear why the PSC had failed
to select such candidates for the job."
A decision was taken at tle meeting to familiarise the senior
government officers with the provisions of the Act. Issues connected
with the jobs for the SC/ST members were to form part of the
administrative training cuniculum of the officers of the state govem-
ment. The upshot of the discussion at the meeting was that the Act
and the rules relating to reservation were henceforth to be strictly
enforced and the departments of govemment were reminded of their
statutory duties in this regard.6
Such 'shake-up's in government are not uncommon and the bu-
reaucracy has its own way of living with them. For the time being,
there is likely to be a lot of running around and issuance of letters and
reminders. But to keep up the tempo of data gathering and informa-
Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Scene l9l
tion processing in government on a regular basis is most
ungovernment-like. Unless there is an 'effective demand' for data
and information, collection of data for the sake of collection does not
make sense. In other words, the data on reservation have not so far
been of any consequence for the government of West Bengal. For the
future, one has only to keep one's fingers crossed.
The Efticiency Question

Against this background, it is frivolous to look for the impact of
the reservation policy on efficiency in govemment. Measurement of
efficiency in government is a highly complex job. Cutting red tape'
speeding up files and papers and the O&M kind of streamlining point
to a crude type of administrative efficiency. This is easy to achieve.
Then there is the question of efficiency in the sphere of major
decision-making which can be called p olicy efficiency. Major deci-
sions in regard to location of industries and plants, sectoral invest-
ments, multi-crore purchases of military hardware and so on call for
unusual tact. administrative sense, innovativeness and creative fore-
sight. This is where policy efficiency counts.
There is still another kind of efficiency which can be called
semices efficiency. The concern here is with the impact of govern-
ment programmes and projects on the ground. It is not uncommon in
govemment to come across frantic efforts to spend money on projects.
However, the outcome at the ground level in terms of crop productiv-
ity, disease eradication, poverty alleviation and, more importantly,
clientele satisfaction seems nobody's concem. Yet, service efficiency
is essential to improve the public image of government.
Of the three kinds of efficiency, policy efficiency is largely in the
hands of the top echelons in govemment. As stated earlier, in West
Bengal the representation of S(7ST in the highest category ofjobs is
insignificant (SC 4.63 and ST 0.92 respectively). So, the policy level
is virtually out of bounds for them.
At the clerical level, the reprcsenJation of SC and ST is signifi-
cantly high-9.50 per cent for the SC category and 2.08 per cent for
the ST category. But administrative efficiency, as defined earlier,
depends on a variety of factors such as organizational format, morale,
motivation, competent supervision, on-the-job training and above all,
a clear and obvious need for efficiency within the organization. This
is, no doubt, a short checklist of conditions of efficiency. Without a

thoroughgoing enquiry into the administrative structure and process,
it will be rash and unscientific to pass any judgement on the state of
administrative efficiency in West Bengal that could be attributed
solely to the reservation policy.
The third kind of efficiency is basically field-oriented. In recent
times, West Bengal's performance at the field level has been rated
high, be it in land reforms or the implementation of the Integrated
Rural Development Programme (IRDP), which is essentially an anti-
poverty programme. On the basis of somewhat sketchy information,
it may not be out of place to commend the efficiency of field services.
To the extent it is due.to the efforts of the lower level field bureau-
cracy, the credit should go, along with others, to the SC/ST members,
whose representation is much higher in the lower category of group
C jobs.
It would pose an extremely difficult methodological problem to
measure the impact of the performance of this very small section of
employees on total Govemmental performance. But, at least in public
forums like the press or the legislature there has not been even a ghost
of a complaint that the efficiency of the govemment of West Bengal
is going down because of the operation of the reservation policy.
The Political Framework

Instead of searching for the will-o'-the-wisp of efficiency in gov-
ernment, the more important question about West Bengal's reserva-
tion policy is : Why is there almost a rotal absence of agitafion on the
issue of 'reservation'? Why didn't West Bengal go the Gujarat way?
How does one account for the absence of the Bihar+ype caste con-
frontations in West Bengal? In other words, the policy on reservation
needs to be examined within a broader framework of the social basis
of regional politics.
Obviously, such large issues are likely to take us away from the
mundane problems of implementation of reservation policy and its
impact on govemment efficiency. We arc willy-nilly drawn into an
involved discussion on the social basis of political power.
To draw a broad-brush picture of politics in West Bengal, the first
item that deserves special mention is the role of the ,bhadralok' in
Bengal politics. The gentle, urbane and English-educated Bengali
Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Scene lg3
bhadralok has been basically urban and Calcutta-based. With the
collapse of the zamindari system of landownership by the early
1930s, the new bhadralok came forward to give leadership to
programmes of radical agrarian reform, and political movements.
There were successful attempts in many parts of undivided Bengal to
mobilise the peasantry against state extortions and oppressive
landlordism. The movement of the sharecroppers gathered momen-
tum, demanding a more favourable share of the produce. The Tebhaga
agitations durin g 1946-49 were spearheaded by the intelligentsia and
brought within its fold the small ar,d the landless peasants and a large
section of the scheduled castes. After Partition, the Calcutta-based
bhadralok had virtually very little interest in land. He was not a party
to the dispute over land, rent, share of produce-the entire gamut of
agrarian relations. As Partha Chatterjee describes the bhadralok pos-
ture:
"Whether it has been a question of landlord versus tenant, orjotdar
venus sharecropper, or the fixing of procurement prices for foodgrains,
the highly vocal and articulate bhadralok intelligentsia have judged
the issues not as insiders in a struggle between contending agrarian
parties, sharing the modes and categories of thought developed over
centuries of collective communal allocation of rights and entitle-
ments relating to the use of land and associated economic activities.
Rather, the bhadralok have viewed such questions from a distance,
from the p€rspective of urban consumers of agricultural products,
and issues of agrarian relations, land reforms, food prices-which
fonn the bread and butter of state politics under the Indian Constitu-
tion-have been seen in terms of much more .objective' categories:
landlord, rich peasant, middle peasant, small peasant, agricultural
labour, distress sales, terms of trade between agriculture and indus-
try, etc. These are the terms in which the debates have been con-
ducted in the political arena, party conclaves, mass meetings, and in
the media, and when battle lines have been drawn, the upper-casre
intelligentsia were to be found in leading roles in every contending
party-the ruling party and the party of the opposition, parties of
status quo and parties of change."z
The absence of any organised political articulation of the big
peasantry (West Bengal being basically a small farmer dominated
state), considerable fragmentation of the middle castes, and the over-
r94 Thc Politics of Backwardness
all cultural domination of the bhadralok have stood in the way of

aggregation of caste interests in West Bengal's political scene'
Politicization of caste and the resultant caste conflicts in many
states in India have mainly been due to the use of caste as a political
device for acquiring power, as the acquisition of power has provided
access to the scarce resources at the disposal of government' West
Bengal's story has been different. The rise of left and radical politics
has ied to the forging of links with the rural masses for purposes of
political mobilization. Even from the pre.Independence days, the left
parties have been active in mobilizing the peasantry against the major
issues of oppressive rents and taxes, and the appropriate share of
crop, and land to the tiller. Sharing of common political values by the
members of different castes has paved the ground for a 'class' orien-
tation among the rural masses- Hence' battles arre waged between
classes and not castes, and the slogans are political and not parochial'
Last, but not the least, the radical land reforms programme under-
taken by the Irft Front govemment and decentralised local develop-
ment through the aegis of the panchayats have ensured a degree of
distributive justice in the countryside. The radical politics of the Left
Front has so far been able to encapsulate tlre primordial social group-
ings in rural Bengal. The longevity of secular politics hinges on the
steady growth and dissemination of radical politics. It has to be seen
how long political radicalism survives in the midst of an inhospitable
pan-Indian political environment.
To sum up, West Bengal's response to the reservation policy has
been marginally administrative and basically political- Attempts are
no doubt being made to fill up the prescribed quota to fulfil the
constitutional obligation. But the real emphasis has been on
"conscientizing" the economically weaker sections and politicising
them. As the Government of West Bengal told the Mandal Commis-
sion, "poverty and low levels of living standards rather than caste
should be the most important criterion of backwardness," and what is
needed is to formulate comprehensive programmes of ecnonomic
development and educational advancement of the poorer sections of
the society. This, in brief, symbolises the political response of West
Bengal to the reservation PolicY.
Appendix I
(Report from The Statesman, Calcutta, August 1, l9g7)
"State failing to meet reservation quotas"
A number of departments in the West Bengal Covemment have failed to enforce

thejob reservation provisions of the West Bengal Seheduled Castes and Sched-
uled Tribes (Reservation of Vacancies in Service and posts) Act, 1976 accordins
to Mr Dinesh Chandra Dakua, the State's Minister for Scheduled Castes ani
Scheduled Tribes in Calcutta on Friday. About 2gVo of t}re State's population
belongs to these categories, he said.
Thejob reservation quota for Scheduled Castes and Tribes was 15./o and SVo,
respectively, in West Bengal. But in a number of departments, including the
Land and Land Reforms department, not more ahan lj% members of the
employees are Scheduled Caste and Tribe, Mr Dakua said. Even the public
Service Commission had failed to provide the re4uisite number of such appli-
cants for the posts of lower division clerks in different departments of the State
Govemment. People from these castes and tribes qualified for the posts oflower_
division clerks were not wanting and he wondered why the pSC had failed to
select such candidates for the job.
Mr Dakua said that on Friday a meeting ofthe secretaries and other officers
of the different departments of the State Govemment was held at Writers'
Building to review the job situation. Mr Benoy Chowdhury, West Bengal Land
and Land Reforms ,Minister, who was present at the meeting, also stressed the
need for strict implementation of the provisions of the Act. The State's Chief
Secretary, Mr Rathin Sen Gupta, also attended the meeting.
To make all the senior Govemment officers aware of the provisions of the
Act, issues connected with jobs for Scheduled Caste and Tribe members will be
included in the administrative training curriculum of the officers of the State
Govemment, Mr Dakua said.
Mr Dakua said in Calcutta on Thursday rhat thousands of Scheduled Caste
and Tribe students in West Bengal are being inconvenienced by delays in the
payment of their scholarship. The Minister said that administrative lapses were
the primary reason for the delay.
Mr Dakua said that in the pre-matriculation stage nearly Rs 7 crores were to
be given to the students as scholarships and in the post-matriculation stage
nearly Rs 6 crores were earmarked for this purpose. But for the past few years
the scholarship has never been available to the shldents on time. It was a sorry
state of affairs, he said.
The Minister convened two meetings recently in which it was decided that
the administrative machinery should be geared up so that eligible students can be
given the scholarships on time. It was suggested that the Gram panchayat bodies
should be involved in selecting the eligible candidates and that they refer the
names to the authorities concemed with the payment ofscholarships. Eadier, the
school authorities were entrusted with the job of selecting students but on many
occasions they failed to refer any names, he added'

Our Special Representative in New Delhi adds: The Central Govemment
has
decided to rename the Commission for the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and
Castes and Sched-
Scheduled Tribes as the National Commission for Scheduled
uled Tribes. The Commissioner will be vested with more powers-
The Commissioner will be concerned with reservation quotas for Scheduled
CastesandTribesinthepublicservices,theiradmissiontoeducationalinstitu.
The
tions and the execution of anti-poverty programmes among other things'
report to the President will be submitted by the end of July
Commissioner's
imple-
every year and to insure that the recommendations of the report are
it twice a year at his meetings with
rn"niei, ft" Prime Minister will review
Scheduled Castes and Tribes MPs and the Chief Ministers'
APPendix II
Distribution of Employees of the Government of West
Bengal by Category of Post and Caste as on lst April' 19E2
CateBory Total No. Scheduled Castes Schzduled Tibes

of of
post Emplo- No. of 7a to No. of % to No. of to
yecs Emplo- total hrplo- total Emplo- total
yi"t No. in Yees No. in tees No- in
Col.2 Col.2 Col' 2
Group B 57935 3479 6.01 475 0.82 53981 93.17

Group C 202726 t9256 9.50 4225 2.O8 179245 88.42
Croup D
(excluding 107540 t't 434 t6.2t 4350 4.05 85756 '19;14
swe.epers and
scavengers)
Group D 7'l 19 4789 62.M 530 6.8? 24c0 31.09
(sw€epers and
scavengers onlY)
*Others (exclud. 5955 570 9.57 140 2.35 5245 88.08
ing sweepers and
scavengers)
*Others (sw€€pers 7A l9 27.t4 6 8.57 45 64.29
and scavengers onlY)
Crand Total 401000 46430 I1.58 9901 2.47 344669 85.95

pay on
charged and contingent basis.
Slzrce: Staff census, 1982. Bureau of Applied Economics and Statistics'
Note: ()
Figures are Provisional.
(2) Total No. of state government employees as on 1 4 1982 as per provi-
sional estimate is---4.01,000.
Resenation Policy: The West Bengal Scene 197
REFERENCES
I. The debates of the Constih-rent Assembly on this issue have been summarised
in Rao, B. Shiva, ed., The Framing of India's Constitution: A Study. Vol. l, pp.
192-201 and Chap. 25. New Delhi: Indian Institure of public Administrsrion,
1968.
2. Gopal, Guru. "Politics of Reservations: A Class Approach.,' Sociery and
Change, vol. IV, nos. April and June, Calcutta: 1985.
3. Randive, B.T. Caste, Class and Property Relations. Calcutta: National
Book Agency, 1982.
4. Ghosh, Anjali. PeacefuI Transition to Power: A Study of Marxist politicat
Strategies in West Bengal, 1967-77. Appendix VI. Calcutta: Firma KLM private
Ltd., 1981.
5. AP. "Class-Caste Dimension of PanchayatiRaj;' The Marxist Review, vol.
XIV. No. 2, August 1980.
6. The Statesman (Calcutra Edition), August 1987. (See Appendix I.)
7. Chatterjee, Partha. "Caste and Politics in West Bengal" in Gail Omvedt
el., lnnd, Caste and Politics in Indian,lrares. Delhi: Authors Guild publica-
tions, 1982.
Chapter 8
The Reservation System in Gujarat
Shri Prakash
HERE are two basic reasons why an enquiry into the evolu-
tion and functioning of the system of reservations in Gujarat
would be more significant than a similar analysis of other
states in India. The first reason is that as a state and a distinct
economic and social region, Gujarat has produced a pattern of devel-
opment, in which there has been a grbater distribution of growth
downwards, for a variety of reasons. Such a distribution of gains
from development-relatively much better spread out than in states
like Bihar or West Bengal-has not required the help of an extensive
system of reservations, which has remained within moderate propor-
tions. The second reason is that among otier causes, the attempt to
expand-or in one sense overextend-the system of reservation quo-
tas has produced unnecessary social conflict that can only obstruct
the normal process of growth. In such a situation there is a need to
rely much more on alternative methods of generating growth and
helping to distribute the gains of development, methods that have the
sanction of a social consensus behind them. An argument of this kind
has an absolute cultural relevance in a region where the name and
philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi are a household word. At any rate,
the meaning of a non-violent strategy of social change and demo-
cratic transformation are the same. They involve an attempt at peace-
ful change of ideas and social practices and seek to minimize, if not
altogether abolish conflict and violence. In this sense the need to
work the reservations strategy within well defined limits nationally
and locally, has to be a conscious political decision.
The Resemation System in Gujarat 199
It is important to substantiate the claim that the gains from devel-

opment in Gujarat are better spread out than in other states. For this
purpose one can compare Gujarat with Bihar and West Bengal. In
terms of size and area the three states are more comparable than in
terms of population. All threc arc moderate-sized states as mav be
seen from Table I below.
Table I
Development Profile of j Indian States:
Gujarat, Bihar and West Bengal
l. Population in millions 34.1 69.9 54.6

(1981)
2. Persons per square mile 174 402 6t5
(1981)
3. Urban pop. as % of total 3l.l 12.5 26.5
(1981)
4. Totat inhabited villages t8l l4 67546 38024.
(198r)
5. Average population per 1297 906 1055
village (1981)
6. Per capita power consum- 252 85
ption (KWH) (198283)
7. Per cent villages electrified 87% 49% 5t%
8. No.of tubewellVpumpsets 29700)O 193000 41000
as on (31/3/1985)
9. Literacy (1981) 7o of total 44% 26% 4lVo
population
10. Students in Class I-V as % 94% 59Vo 83Vo
of total pop. in age group
6 to 11 (1976-77\
I l. Students in Class VI to VIII 42% u% 33Vo
as % of total pop. in age
group l1 to l4 (1976-77)
12. Students in Class IX to XII 2t% l4% 17Vo
as % of total pop. in age
group 14 to l7 (1976n7)
13. Number of colleges (1983-84) 285 473 348
14. Toral studenrs enrolled 2.04.697 2,28,441 2,48,559
(1983-84)
15. Women students as Vo of total 33% l5Vo 3O7o
2m The Politics of Backwardness
16. Population served per l062 2987

hospital bed (1984)
17. Estimated no. of couPles Jf /J t3061 8288
eligible for sterili sation
in March l98l (1000)
18. (a) % of estimated 16.5Vo 7 .1Vo 13%
no. sterilised
(b) between 1981 and 1984 915 1004 1066
(also total no. '000)
19. Area in hectares covered 5344 783 2707
under afforestation ( I 980-83)
20. New drinking water wells 12094 247 9220
built (1980-83)
21. Area benefited through 42385 1,49,401 72052
minor irrigatior/flood
works (hectares)( I 980-83)
22. Soil, waler conservation 78159 591 14893
and land reclamation (hect.)
(198G.83)
23. Number of tractors 47000 22040 4000
(as on 31.3.1983)
24. Total daily capacity of t277 r82 374
dairy plants in ('000
litres) 1979
25. Central l,and Development 4,81,216 3,15,000 78r9
Banks-regular members
(31/tr81)
26. Prirnary Land DeveloPment
Banks (31/6/81) members 5685 1,39,037
27. Number of Primary Housing 7902 269 1131
Societies (31/6n980)
28. Number of members of PHS 2,40,74r 16810 50300
(31/6/1980)
29. Bonowing by members of 22,383 92 1349
PHS (31/6/1980) Rs. lakhs
30. Minimum Needs Prograrnme
(1985-90) outlay (Rs. Lakhs)
(a) Rural housing (do) 6300 1400 600
(b) Rural water supply (do) 8000 9500 3500
(c) Rural roads (do) 15000 17500 3500
31. Post Offices in rural 3018 5965 5577
areas: Rural pop. per Post
Office (1982/83
on
Bureau, Bombay, October, 1986.
The Resenation System in Gujarat 2Ol
The key indicators which bring our the grearer distribution of

gains from growth relate to facts like per capita power consumption,
per cent of electrified villages, number of tubewells and pumpsets,
proportion of literate population, share of women among those en_
rolled for higher education, the number of couples sterilized, milk
production, membership of the Land Development Banks and pri_
mary Housing Societies, loans to members of these societies, invest_
ments in extending rural housing and water supply, the numbers of
people served by hospitals and post offices. On all of these counts,
Gujarat is ahead of Bihar and West Bengal, as may be seen from the
data presen0ed above, particularly when it is realized that in terms of
population Bihar has more than twice the numbers than Gujarat and
West Bengal 60 per cent more. Yet, even in absolute figures, Gujarat
is ahead of the other two states, when most of the indices are consid_
ered. This shows a grcater spread of gains from development in
Gujarat.
The main question to be considered is whether the system of
reservations has had much to do with this greater distribution of
gains. The answer has to be in the negative for two reasons. Firstly,
there were no reservations for OBCs in Gujarat in the educational
institutions and state serv'ces until April l,l97g. Secondly, even the
reservation system for the SCVSTs in Gujarat evolved slowly, over
time. It was formalized and expanded as the proportion of educated
persons within these communities grew and the govemment per_
ceived the possibility and the need for their greater presence and
participation within the administration.
Before looking at the actual evolution of the rcservation system in
Gujarat, it has to be emphasized that the SCVSTs have been able to
achieve much else, besides getting government jobs through the
reservations system. The percentage of literates among scheduled
castes in Gujarat is almost 40 per cent according to the lggl census
while the ratio for non-SC population is zl4 per cent. This is still
higher than the all-India averages which are 2l per cent for scheduled
castes and 39 per cent for the rest of the population. Similarly, in the
case of urbanization in Gujarat, 32.69 per cent among the SCs live in
cities, which is higher than the 30.98 per cent for the non-SC popu_
lation. In West Bengal, where the share of population estimated to be
Iiving in urban areas is 30.44 per cent, almost the same as Gujarat, the
share of SCs is only 12.41 per cent. Clearly, the process of social
integration between SC and non-SC communities will be more ad-
vanced in cities than in rural areas, in today's circumstances- This is
especially so in Gujarat where many of the SCs in urban arcas work
in textile mills.
From the time of its formation and before that as a part of Bombay
Province, there was reseryation of seats for S(YST in the kgislative
Assembly and the two Houses of Parliament in Gujarat, as in other
states. In 1967, out of 168 Irgislative Assembly seats I I werc
reserved for S(7ST and out of 24 Lok Sabha seats 2 were similarly
reserved. According to the Gujarat Panchayat Act of l96f in Gujarat
at least one seat in every panchayat had to be reserved for a scheduled
caste and one for a scheduled tribe, where they were in large num-
bers. In addition, the state governments had the power to increase the
number of seats prcportionate to the SC/ST population in a village or
a district.
As regards rcservations in the educational institutions and in gov-
ernment employment in the 1950s, very few posts were reserved in
the then Bombay Province, Saurashtra and Kutch for the depressed or
the backward classes who then consisted mostly of scheduled castes
and tribes. The Government Reporter of 16.5.51 carried a notifica-
tion for reserving some more posts in class III and class IV for the
backward classes and this provision was ofhcially implemented from
9.5.53. (Mahesh H. Dave, "Backward Classes and Reservation" in
Haroobahi Mehta and Hasmukh Patel ed', Dynamics of Reservation
Policy, Patiot Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, p.l0l.) In order to fill
these posts backward class candidates were to be called from the
General Administration Department and their number was to be fixed
on the basis of posts vacant since November 1950. (Government
Reporter of 8.12.54 in Dave, loc. cit.)
It is true that when stocktaking was done in October 1959, it was
found that there was a huge backlog of reserved posts that had not
been filled. Besides upper caste prejudices (which resisted the entry
of SC/ST candidates in posts filled through direct recruitment)' one
reason may be the lack of incentive on the part of SCVSTs to go in
for government employment when they were getting other jobs which
allowed them to stay with their families in the cities e.g., jobs in the
Ahmedabad mills. The govemment did not reserve any posts in Class
The Reservation System in Gujarat 203
I and Class II services until 20.9.1969, when the quotas were more
precisely defined. In Class I and II jobs, 5 and 10 per cent respec-
tively were reserved for the SC/ST; in Class III and IV it was 7 and
14 per cent. At the district level, since 1950, posts in Class III and IV
had all along been reserved more or less in proportion to the SCyST
population. Since 1964, if no backward class (or SC/ST) candidates
were available for the 'reserved' posts, such posts had to be carried
forward for the next two years within the limit of the district popula-
tion. Thereafter they could be filled from the unreserved class.
From the 1970s, efforts were made to publicise reserved posts
through voluntary agencies working among backward and tribal
people. The roster system was introduced in all classes of the ser-
vices. A 40-point roster was created for Class I and II posts and a
1OO-point roster for Class III and IV, whereby one post after every 40
or 100 was reserved for the backward classes with a maximum limit
of 45 per cent and a carry-forward prbvision for two years. The list of
backward classes was drawn, as before, from the lists of the sched-
uled castes and tribes and the lists maintained by the Ministry of
Education for the award of scholarships to students from among the
backward classes.
It was in the early 1970s that the issue of expanding reservations
for the OBCs acquired a renewed momentum. In the early 1960s, the
Kaka Kalelkar Commission Report, the Lokur Commission Report
and several significant judgements of the Supreme Court had pro-
moted a discussion on the reservations issue. The reasons for an
enhanced emphasis on state-sponsored redistribution of incomes in
the late 1960s and the early 1970s were several: the increase in the
rate of inflation after the drought of 1965, the growth in the numbers
of educated job seekers, and last but not least, the growing emphasis,
on the part of Congress (I) (led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi) and
some other political parties, on bringing the backward classes into the
arena of representative leadership. Hence the increasing presence of
legislators from the backward communities within the state and the
national legislatures. This created the impression that by expanding
reservation quotas from above through statutory action, the political
representatives of the backward classes would be able to enhance the
social and economic power of their own communities. The logic of
such thinking lead the political representatives drawn from the back-
ward communities to build up pressure for action on the OBC reser-

vations issue. The first step often was the appointment of a Backward
Classes Commission to finalize a list of those who would be entitled
to use OBC reservations and the size of reservation quotas. One can
count at least ten Backward Classes Commissions which were ap-
pointed between 1965 and 1978, whereas there had been very few in
the period 1947-1965. Additional measures like the sening up of
special schools or hostels meant only for the OBCs or specific castes
among them, finance commissions for giving loans, etc., were also
proposed and undertaken by varicus political leaders e.g., Devraj Urs
in Kamataka and Karpoori Thakur in Bihar.
Gujarat too was drawn into the vortex of the demand that an
expansion of the base of the political leadership should find an
immediate reflection within the bureaucracy, the academia and other
sections of the professional and business worlds. Unlike Karnataka
and Tamil Nadu, where there was a social consensus about the
operation of the reservation system through which the elite had
themselves risen in the British period, in, Gujarat the process of the
rise of new social groups, like the Pattidars, had been much more
self-propelled and carried out without an excess of state assistance.
Hence, ifa strategy of reservations was now to be prescribed, a social
consensus had to be built up around it. The appointment of the
Backward Classes Commission in 1972 wder the chairmanship of
Justice Baxi may be seen as the first step in trying to build such a
consensus. It must be realized, that it would be difficult to actually
implement successfully a policy of reservations, unless there was a
social consensus since those in charge of implementing it would not
be drawn from those communities for whom it was meant 4nd if they
did not agree with such a policy would seek to undermine, delay or
retard its implementation.
On this point, there is a marked contrast between the responses
evoked by reservations for SCVSTs and backward classes in the
legislatures and the reservations in govemment jobs and the public
sector. Whereas there has been little protest against political reserva-
tions for the SCVSTs and the period of their continuance has been
extended several times, that is not the case where attempts have been
made to expand the reservations system in the educational and em-
ployment spherc. The dominant elite groups consider the policy has
The Reservation System in Gujarat 2O5
gone beyond its function of providing social representation to the

backward classes and is now being used to oust them of areas which
they feel should be mainly controlled on the basis of skills and
training. They are sought to be removed through the use of unfair
state action, by blocking the avenues for their economic and social
mobility. This belief on the part of the elite is the real divider between
consensus and conflict. When the belief takes root that this limit has
been transgressed, protest is a natural corollary, whichever govem-
ment may be in power.
The case of Gujarat illustrates very clearly that while there is a
consensus ahut preferential treatment to the SC/ST/OBCs in every
sphere of education and employment, the elite groups are not ready to
countenance the use of the reservations policy as a battering ram to
forcefully deprive them of opportunities for social and economic
mobility. The Baxi Commission identified 82 communities as consti-
tuting the OBCs. These included the Bafan, Dafer, Fakir, Gadhai,
Galiara, Hingora, Julaha, Mir or Langha, Darban, Makrani, Miyana,
Pinjara, Sandhi, Sipai, Theba and Wagher who were Muslims and
Khristi or Gujarati Christian converts from the scheduled castes. Its
report was submitted on 27 February 1976. The Baxi Commission
Report estimated the OBC population to be 45 per cent of the overall
population in Gujarat. It recommended that l0 per cent seats should
be reserved in medical, engineering, dental, technical, agriculture and
veterinary colleges. It further recommended that for admission to
these seats, OBC candidates should have marks which were not more
than 5 per cent below the lowest for non-reserved admissions, with
an absolute minimum of 55 per cent as qualifying marks.In addition,
5 per cent seats were to be reserved for the OBCs in Class I and Class
II state services and 10 per cent in Class III and Class IV. The 10 per
cent OBC quota was to be reviewed by the governrnent after 10
years, in March 1988. These recommendations were accepted by the
then Janata Party govemment on April 1, 1978. Together with the
existing quota of7 per cent for the SC, 14 per cent for ST and l0 per
cent for the OBC, this brought the aggregate of jobs and seats
reserved to 31 per cent.
It is noteworthy that in 1978 there were no protests against the
Baxi Commission except complaints by some communities that they
had been unfairly excluded from the OBC list. The Baxi Commission
too did not publish the data it had collected through its survey, giving
rise to doubts about the complete validity of the classification pro-
posed by it. Indeed many of the prominent organisations who could
be said to be mobilizing the backward classes themselves did not
agree with the Baxi Commission. The Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha al-
leged that the Commission had left out the poor among the interme-
diate and even the upper castes, in its haste to include only castes like
the Kolis and the Barias who constituted almost 65 per cent of the list
of OBCs put together by the Baxi Commission. The Kshatriya Sabha
argued "that caste, community and religion should not be the citeria
to determine backwardness in the formation of a socialist state. Any
one whose income is below the limit of income tax, no matter of
which caste he is-be it Kshatriya, Patikar, Vaniya, Brahmin, Harijan,
Adivasi, etc.,-should be considered backward. One becomes back-
ward because of one's limited economic income." Some of the
leaders also pointed out that there were castes in the Baxi
Commission's list which did not even have a 5 per cent literacy rate
and they could not be expected to use the OBC reservation quotas.
Little information exists about the actual utilization of the 10 per cent
OBC quota and the social background of those who are able to use it.
Following these representations, the Congress(I) govemment ap-
pointed a second Backward Classes Commission in 1981 headed by
Justice C.V. Rane. It was asked to consider whether there were "any
other Castes/Communities/Classes which fell in the category of so-
cially and educationally backward classes". The Commission was
also entrusted with the task of making suitable recommendations on
the question whether certain number of seats and posts should be
reserved for the OBCs in proportion to their population.
The Rane Commission submitted its report in October, 1983. In a
major departure from the criteria used by the previous Commissions
the Rane Commission rejected caste as a measurement of backward-
ness. It argued that with occupational diversification and the emer-
gence of contractual relationships, an occupation criteria should be
used to classify the OBCs. It identified 63 occupations as backward,
covering about 35 per cent of the population, which was 10 per cent
less than the Baxi Commission's figure of 45 per cent at that time
accepted in Gujarat as denoting the size of the OBCs. It recom-
mended only 28 per cent total reservations for the OBCs so as to keep
The Reservation System in Guiarat 207
witlin the aggregate limit of 50 per cent set up by the Supreme Court'
At a meeting on l0 January 1985 the Gujarat Cabinet under the
leadership of Chief Minister Madhavsinh Solanki' accepted the rec-
ommendation to enhance the OBC reservation quota by l8 per cent
but rejected the new criteria of income and occupation'. It also set up
a one-flran committee to identify any other caste/communities eli-
gible for using the OBC reservations in terms of the criteria recom-
mended by the Baxi Comrnission. As is well known, following a
strong agitation, the implementation of this quota was postponed'
It is instructive to look at the pattern and causes of the persistent
unrest against the reservations system in Gujarat. What is noteworthy
is that as a new phenomenon, it has appeared on the social and
political scene only in the late 1970s. During the days of the Nav
Nirman agitation of the early 1970s, also led by the college students
of Ahmedabad. reservation was not an issue, although the carry-
forward system and the roster system had been in existence for
several years. Yet, in November 1979 some students of the B.J.
Medical College, Ahmedabad filed a case in the Gujarat High Court
against the carry-forward, the roster and the interchangeability sys-
tems. They lost the case in court, whereupon they resorted to direct
action.
Before analysing the pattern of the unrest, it would be useful to
look at the causes which have shifted the focus of social conflict on
to tlre reservation of seats and jobs. For several decades after 1947
there was little or no open protest against the rcservation system in
Gujarat. However, by the end of the 1970s several factors-among
them the most significant being the rapid expansion of the educa-
tional system at the school level--had begun to cause a growing
scarcity of college seats, for which competition was becoming fierce.
Between 1961 and 1981,literacy increased from 3l percent to 44 per
cent in Gujarat, the number of high schools from 1099 to 3153 and
the number of colleges from 102 to 371. Between 1965 and 1981 the
number of college students increased from 50,000 to 1,80,000' drawn
from a variety of castes. The number of govemment employees has
risen almost four times, from 1,06,0@ in 1960 to 4'43,952 in 1980.
During the decade 1970 to l980job seekers registered at the employ-
ment exchanges in Gujarat rose more than three times, from I '50,000
in l97Tto 5,21,000 in 1982. Among them, 58 per cent or 3,1 1'000
2O8 The politics of Backwardness
were educated. Evidently, college education is either producing more

degree holders than there are jobs or producing the wrong kind of
degree holders.
In spite of the increase in the number of the educated job seekers,
the numbcr of schools has gone on increasing. Between l9g0 and
1985 secondary schools in Gujarat increased from 3l lg to 4104_
486 more than the target set in the Sixth plan. Similarly, the state
government had sanctioned 558 new higher secondary schools dur_
ing the Sixth Plan when it was supposed only to have 525. As a result,
the number of students registered in l1 and 12 class has gone up at a
much faster rate to 3,45,0@ from 1,95,000. In addition, there is now
at least one Industrial Training Institute in every district of Gujarat
and among all the states it has the highest number ofstudents enrolled
in vocational courses. At the last count this was 63,00,000 in 19g5.
This data clearly reveals that the rapid expansion of the education
system at the base has created both a shortage of college seats and
govemment jobs at the same time. The pressure, especially on stu-
dents from upper caste/class families to get into professional colleges
such as engineering or medicine, has increased considerably.
Having lost the case they had filed against the system of carry-
forward, the roster system and that of interchangeability, the students
of BS Medical College in Ahmedabad put forward a set of demands
to the Ministry of Health of the Gujarat govemment on 3 I December,
1980. These demands reflected their intention of maximizing tlre
number of college seaG available for use through competition in any
one year. Apart from demanding the abolition of the carry-forward
and the roster systems, the memorandum went on to demand a
reduction of the reserved seats and an incrcase in unreserved seats at
the post-graduate level. The demand for the abolition of tlre carry_
forward system in the colleges must be seen in the light of the fact
that in practice, the specified number of SC7ST applicants is not
reached. In 1981, there were only 7 SCVST applicants for the 17
reserved seats in the post-graduate medical courses. In 1979-g0, in
the rrcdical courses, there werc only 507 SC/ST applicants out of a
total of 4500 seats. According to their share of the state's population
(2lVo) the number of applicants should have been 945. The students
felt that reserved seats were being carried forward when they were
not being made use of.
Th.e Reservation System in Gujarat 209
Although the government did not concede the demand of the

students for a total abolition of the reservation system, it agreed to
terminate the carry-forward system after some days of agitation on
the part of the students. The unfilled seats were now to accumulate
only up to 45 per cent. A ftesh list of the unfilled seats was to be made
every two years, even if the percentage of the unfrlled seats did not
reach 45. In addition, the govemment declared that the system of
interchangeability of seats would be abolished. According to this
system, vacant seats in one reserved category used to be transferred
first to the next reserved category (SC-ST-OBC carry-forward for 2
ye:us unreserved) within the defined limits of 13 per cent for ST and
25 per cent of the total reserved seas. Lastly, the govemment agreed
to add one seat to the unreserved category for each SC seat filled in
the specialised departments. All these measures helped to overcome
the shortage of seats and maximize the utilisation of existing seats in
any one year.
In the l98l agitation there was also some mobilization against the
SC cultivators and agricultural labourers in the rural areas surround-
ing Ahmedabad e.g., in the village of Jetalpur. But from the students'
point of view the issue of reservations was quite separate from
problems of wages for agricultural labourers, use of common grazing
grounds (gochar) in the villages or formation of Harijan cooperatives.
Even within reservations, ending the roster system was not as impor-
tant as winding up the carry-forward and interchangeability systems.
Proof of the students' priorities was that they unconditionally with-
drew their agitation on I 3 April, I 98 I after the government had made
the concessions noted earlier. Hence it cannot be said that the 1980
anti-reservation agitation in Gujarat was part of a broad social upper
caste reaction against the rising incomes and status of the SCVSTs.
The different strands need to be separated. The more general issue of
reforms in the reservation system within the colleges was a students'
issue. In demanding these reforms, the students could at best mobi-
lize an urban agitation.
The cause of the renewed anti-reservation agitation in 1985 was
the acceptance by the Madhavsinh Solanki gcvernment of the 18 per
cent increase proposed by the Rane Commission for the OBCs. A
month after the announcement of this decision by the Cabinet on
January I l, the engineering students of Morbi College in Saurashtra-
2to The Politics of Backwardness
who were also responsible for the Nav Nirman movement in 1974-
went on strike, protesting against the aggregate of reservations being
raised to 49 per cent of the seats. They werc soon followed by the
medical students of Ahmedabad, on whose call almost 30 colleges in
that city joined the agitation. Consequently, examinations were post-
poned and teaching suspended. No public leader of any importance
spoke out openly on this occasion, in sharp contrast to 1980-81 when
many had opposed the anti-reservation agitation. The. Ahmedabad
students soon formed the All Gujarat Educational Reform Agitation
Committee (.\GERAC). AGERAC began organising processicns
and bandhs which at first received a mixed reception but soon brought
forth a significant response from different social groups.
One of the major arguments advanced by the students was that
even the existing reservation quotas for SC, ST, OBC were not being
fully utilized. According to figures quoted by a Gujarat govemment
spokesman the actual utilization had ranged from I I .6 to 17 per cent
in various courses. The probable reason behind this was that very few
among the fifteen plus age groups from the SCJSTVOBCs were
enrolling for graduate courses and higher degrees. According to one
calculation only about I per cent of the population in the fifteen plus
age group among the SCVSTVOBCs enrolled themselves even for
the graduate courses, while this ratio was 6.6 per cent for the rest of
the population. (Vimal P. Shah, Az Assessrz ent of Education Among
the Scheduled Castes in Gujarat, Gujarat University, 198O.) The
students felt that the increase of l8 per cent for the OBCs in educa-
tion and public employment was clearly a case of overextending the
rcservation system. Whatever purpose it might have been intended to
serve politically, in terms of its social utility it could only serve to
delay the entry of qualified students to colleges and increase the
number of entrants with less than average marks. While many of
them were prepared to accept the existing l0 per cent OBC quota in
the name of rcpresentative justice, increasing this was in their view,
tantamount to forcefully excluding them from the chance of compet-
ing for a college seat. Some of the students were in fact demanding
the total abolition of the reservation system when the existing 10 per
cent OBC reservation quota would come up for review in 1988. It
may be recalled that the Baxi Commission had asked for a review of
the functioning of the OBC rcservation quota after l0 years-
The Reservation SYstem in Gujarat 2tl
The students set up two new organisations to carry forward the
anti-reservation stir, which lasted for 161 days from 18 February,
1985. Its highlight was an indefinite strike by college students, first in
Ahmedabad and later during several other bandhs. These two bodies
were known as the Akhil Gujarat Navrachna Samiti and the Navrachna
Jagritikaran Paglam Samiti. Unlike on previous occasions they were
now backed by the parents' federation known as the Gujarat Vali
Mahamandal. These bodies were an urban, middle class protest move-
ment, against the overextension of the reservations system. They
were not organised along caste lines and sought to unite all students
and parents.
The anti-reservation agitation acquired a rural base mainly through
the participation of the govemment and the district panchayat em-
ployees who were opposing the continuance of the roster system for
deciding on promotions for the SCs/STs/OBCs. They also put for-
ward the argument that the reservation criteria should be structured in
such a manner so as not to exclude the poor amongst the Brahmin, the
Bania or the Patidar communities.
In January 1985, the intemees and resident doctors of government
hospitals joined the students of medical and engineering colleges
when the latter organised a strike. The agitation continued despite the
announcement by the govemment in early April that it would appoint
a high-powered committee to look into the reservation issue and not
increase the OBC or SEBC (Socially and Educationally Backward
Classes) quota until tlis report was received. The agitation received
a further boost when, towards the end of April, the state government
employees went on strike demanding an end to the roster system.
They were soon joined by thejunior doctors, lawyers and the district
panchaya! employees, paralysing completely the functioning of the
state in May and June, 1985. At this time, more than 150 business
organisations of Ahmedabad observed a bandh for five days starting
from 5th June, to protest against lawlessness. They included cloth
merchants, dealers in books and stationery, edible oil' spices and
foodgrain, electrical appliances, radio and television, laundry own-
ers, footwear dealers, etc.The strike by govemment employees and
district panchayats was given a sharp focus when the confederation
of 118 unions of state government employees, known as the Gujarat
Rajya Karamchari Mahamandal announced an indefinite strike on 7
June. This was done with a view to forcing the implementation of the
eleven-point programme for reforming and restricting the roster sys-

tem, earlier suggested by the Sadhwani Committee appointed by the
Gujarat govemment. Soon the civic staff in Ahmedabad and Baroda
joined the strike. Between I July and 18 August when the strike
ended, 60 per cent of the govemment's workforce was on strike.
They had, in that period, been joined by 10 lakh primary teachers.
The numbers involved were truly significant and could not be brushed
aside as protest by the minority elite.
The government's position was made unenviable by the fact that
there was very little protest against the anti-reservationists. At the
outset the SC textile workers employed in the spinning and carding
departments in Ahmedabad struck work on 24th and 25th February
but this action failed to spark off any counter movement, apart from
some sporadic protest from the Harijan youth in some cities. It was at
once obvious that the issues of reservation policy only concemed a
tiny minority of the well-educated sections among the SCs/STs and
failed to enthuse the sweepers, scavengers, or cobblers, who had little
in common with the middle class dalits. Moreover. the scheduled
tribes in Gujarat numbering 37,33,422 in 1971 or 14 per cent of the
state population are concentrated mainly in Sabarkantha (17,88,004),
Surat (827,682), the Dangs (88,028), Banaskantha (77,758), Valsad
(77 6,215), Panchmahals (7 12,7 l3), Bharuch (486,90 I ), Kutch
(40,381), and Vadodra (473,117). In the remaining 9 districts, less
than one per cent are from among the $cheduled tribes. Many of the
tribal districts are contiguous, providing a thick belt inhabited by the
STs on the eastern and southern side of the state. Still, the basis for
uniting even the scheduled castes and tribes is very shaky, for even in
the rural areas they are divided by different occupations. This occu-
pational diversification may be seen from Table II.
The small and scattered middle classes among the SCs/STs do not
provide any basis for supporting an agitation for expanding the OBC
reservation quotas which does not benefit them directly. Economic
diversification among OBCs is much greater than that among SCs/
STs and they have very little social or political organisation. Associa-
tions like the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha which have existed since the
1950s are basically constitutional and electoral platforms at best
capable of acting as ginger grbups within one or several political
parties and not capable of running a mass agitation. They are also
Table II
Distribution of Total Workers by Industrial
Categories among SCs/STs: Gujarat 1971
Industial Category No. of SC Vo to No. of ST Vo to

Workers total SC Workers total ST
lflorkers Workers
2. Cultivators 110,371 18.3 14,609 I

3. Agricultural 280,355 46.59 728,380 48.34
labourers
4. Livestock, Forestry, 2,636 0.44 637,842 42.33
Fishing
5. Mining and Quarrying 5,064 0.84 3,400 0.22
6. Manufacturing:
31,110
(a) Household Industry 5.17 10312 0.68
63,414
(D) Other than Household 10.54 35,068 2.33
7. Construction 14,388 2.39 11,856 0.79
8. Trade and Commerce 6,451 1.07 12,762 0.85
9. Transport and 16,632 2.76 13,603 0.9
Communications
10. Other Services
Source: Census of India, 1971, Series 5 Part 1A, p.169
handicapped by the fact that among their supporters not many are
from the educated middle classes and hence directly interested in the
issue of reservations. Even the Gujarat Khet Vikas Parishad started
by Mr Jinabhai Da{i is concerned with organising the rural poor who
have little to gain from reservations.
The contrast was to be seen in the strcngth of the anti-reservation
agitation which disrupted life statewide and the weakness of those
who set out to oppose them. It has already been pointed out how
thousands of students and lakhs of government employees went on
strike. Certain towns in the Anand and Upleta districts observed
bandhs for as long as five to nine days in succession. Curfew was in
force over all of Ahmedabad for an unbroken period of nine days.
Certain middle class areas in the walled part of the city were under
curfew for more than 10 weeks. The five-day bandh by Mahajans in
Ahmedabad, the closure of clearing operations by banks for 27 days
and the simultaneous and prolonged curfew in 10 towns-all these
2I4 The Politics of Backwardness
It involved a vast expenditure

happened for the first time in Gujarat.
of time and energy on the part of thousands of people, time and
energy which could have been put to more constructive uses.
By contrast, those who tried to mobilize sections of tle backward
castes against the anti-reservation stir did not get much of a response.
A few sporadic protests were made by some scheduled caste students
in the colleges but to no avail. Towards the start of August there was
a rally in Rajkot by 7000 members of the Dalit Sangh from all over
Saurashtra to express support for the roster system. About 12,000
state government employees said to be belonging to the backward
castes and classes marched in a procession through the streets of
Baroda on a Sunday to counter the anti-roster agitation. The demon-
stration was organised by the Gujarat Karamchari Utkarsh Mandal. It
was the high watermark of the backward classes protest against the
anti-reservation stir but its weaknesses revealed why a strategy of
mobilizing the backward classes on a platform of expanding the
reservation system would not work in Gujarat-in the short run, or as
will be argued below, in the long run either.
The central govemment as well as the state government realized
that a strategy of confronting a movement lhat had the active support
of broad sections of the citizens could not yield anything but further
conflict and confrontation. Hence, the decision was taken to remove
the then chief minister Madhavsinh Solanki, who had become too
closely identified with the strategy of expanding reservations and to
bring in a new chief minister, Amarsinh Chaudhari. The Cabinet
appointed two sub-committees to look into the issues of reservation
and the roster system from 16 July onwards' An agreement was
signed with the majority of the students on 19th July and the dissident
minority was brought around later on. In this first accord the govern-
meni agreed to postpone the implementation of the new reservation
quota for the OBCs for one year and to appoint a committee to look
into the question of using the economic criteria to classify the OBCs'
when the original OBC quota of l0 per cent came up for review in
March, 1988. This committee would be appointed before the end of
1987. The students called off their stir on 30 July.
The anti-reservation agitation of the government employees con-
tinued, even after the strike of the municipal employees was called
off on 3 August. The workers of the Gujarat State Electricity Board
The Resemation System in Gujarat 215
started their strike on 6th August, again demanding the end of the
roster system. Subsequently, the leaders of the govemment and
panchayat employees signed an accord and the 73-day-old strike
came to an end. This agreement had 15 points. Although the full
abolition of the roster system was not conceded according to S.C.
Naik, Secretary of the Gujarat Rajya Karamchari Mahamandal, the
government and panchayat employees were happy about the terms of
the agreement. According to him they had imposed a brake on the
unresricted use of the roster system by persuading the government to
finalize the rules for service a..rd classification only in consultation
with the employees. The fixation of minimum experience for promo-
tion under the roster system would also be finalised in consultation
with the employees.
The highlights of the agreement are the introduction of minimum
experience rules, as recommended by the Sadhwani Commission. It
provides for an option to fix the minimum experience period in
consultation with the employees instead of accepting the set norms of
5, 7 and 8 years recommended by the Commission for different
categories of promotion. The minimum service rules will be fixed
with retrospective effect from tie date of issuing of orders by the
govemment. The government also finally agreed to retrospectively
consider, ftom 24 March 1981 the "hardship" cases, who had to be
bypassed in promotion due to the operation of the roster system. All
such cases would be considered on a one-to-one ratio and would be
given notional promotion from the retrospective date when they were
deemed to have been promoted. Furthermore, in cases where the SC
employees have already gained more than 8 per cent promotions in
their cadres, their further roster promotions will be frozen. This
agreement has succeeded in winning the consent of the majority of
the government employees. It also provides a kind of model for
subsequent national modifications that might b€ made in the working
of the roster system.
In my view, it is imperative to answer the question whether in the
long run, in a state like Gujarat, the OBC reservation system ought to
be expanded. Before answering this question it is worthwhile finding
out what proportion of the population in Gujarat is classified as
OBCs. The Baxi Commission Report (1976) had not publish€d its
survey data but had still estimated the OBC population to be about 45
per cent (Mahesh H. Dave, Backward Classes and Resemation, op.

cit., p. 102). The Rane Commission estimated the OBC population to
be 35 per cent of the overall state population (ibifi.It did not seek to
explain the reasons for the difference between the two estimates. The
Rane Commission, rather than solving the problem of how exactly to
use caste characteristics to measure backwardness, simply chose to
overlook the existence of castes altogether. It is necessary to work out
a schedule within which caste-generated backwardness is given due
weight and is specified in terms of measurable indices but is still
considered much less important than income, eCucation, culture and
occupation. Hence, the task of the committee which the Gujarat
government has promised to appoint before the end of 1987 should
be twofold:
l. It must first of all ascertain the population of the Other Back-
ward Classes in Gujarat in terms of a schedule that mainly encom-
passes income, education and occupation, while treating caste back-
wardness as a very small element of the overall schedule. It must
ascertain the proportion of OBC employees in the government on the
basis of such comprehensive criteria. The income criteria should not
be high in comparison to the poverty line family income.
2. It is only then that the question of a small representative reser-
vation quota should be considered for the OBCs. In doing so, two
factors must especially be kept in view: (a) the level of higher
education among the OBCs and (D) the actual utilization of reserva-
tion quotas by OBCs in the last ten years. In a state like Gujarat where
social consciousness against the restrictive aspects of reservations is
widespread, it is imperative to keep the size of reservation quotas as
low as possible. The need to introduce an exit system for families
who have used reservations for two or three generations should be
kept in mind.
It is important to realize that some of the reasons which militate
against the use of the reservation system on an extensive scale in
Gujarat have to do with the greater spread of gains from development
in Gujarat. During the British period the single most numerous caste,
the Patidars, were the main beneficiaries from the extremely limited
growth which took place. However, since the Brahmins did not
dominate in Gujarat in the same way as they did in Madras, the
Patidars did not have to struggle against them. The Vanias too were
amongst the elite castes and as such no common hostility could be

directed against the Brahmins. Hence, there was no basis for the
growth of a non-Brahmin movement. By the time the Kshatriya
Sabha was organised in the nineteen fifties the patidars as a social
group had risen high enough in most spheres not to be interested in
mobilizing a backward classes movement. The Kshatriya Sabha itself
was supported by multiple groups-Rajputs, Bariyas, Raniparaj, ar-
tisan castes, etc.-who were intemally differentiated and widely
spread out all over Gujarat. Unlike the Lingayats in Karnataka, there
was no compact social group to provide a leadership to the backward
classes, nor is one likely to emerge. Table III from the l93l census
gives an idea of the well spread out or scattered nature ofthe Gujarat
castes, a phenomenon which must have become even more devel-
oped with greater urbanization, education, travel, and migration.
Political alignments in Gujarat did not strictly follow caste lines, if
caste is n.urowly defined in terms of inter-marriage between village
groups or gotras. For one thing, Gujarati castes werc more like
clusters which had often been added to by new waves of invasions,
settlers, travellers or diminished by migrations. As the l93l census
pointed out, the Gujarat Brahmins had 84 divisions widely different
from each other because of dialect and social environment. Similarly,
the Gujarati Vanias had 40 sub-castes, each a real caste differer,t from
the others, and some recruited from Rajputs. They did not offer a
unified target for social protest as did the Madras Brahmins nor did
they organize as a single caste. The Patidars themselves were split
into landlords and Kanbis or cultivators with linle basis for building
a determined statewide caste unity.
No political party or group in Gujarat came to be based on single
caste groups. The Congress Party in Gujarat for instance, always had
a mix of different castes in its ranks and expanded its social base as
more groups entered education and modern politics. This further
lessened the chances of backward castes emerging as a cohesive
entity. Hence, a strategy of trying to mobilize backward castes through
a reservations system would be a non-starter in Gujarat. The need
there is to mainly use educational and economic indicators to identify
the backward classes. Any future effort at revising the OBC list
should keep this fact in view.
It should also be remembered that reservation as a means of
2t8 The Politics of Backwardness
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distributing the gains ofdevelopment is not very popular in states like

Gujarat where other delivery mechanisms-tenancy reform, co-op-
eratives, rural transport, education, welfare and panchayati admin-
istration have been successful in promoting a wider distribution of
economic gains. The industrialization and the urbanization p(ocesses
have created a middle class which is gradually absorbing elements of
different social and ethnic groups or sub-castes. Indeed, the greater
the success in promoting those institutions which distribute eco-
nomic, cultural and political gains, the less the demand for using
reservations to accelerate the entry of members of different rural and
urban social groups into the middle classes. Given the realization that
scarcity of resources and opportunities remain a major problem,
social groups, like individuals, will normally accept a moderate but
increasing representation within the modernization process. As long
as this takes place on its own, the demand for reservations will not
grow; it is likely to stagnate or decline. This is the single most
significant lesson from the experience of the reservation system in
Gujarat.
REFERENCES
A. Government Reports:
l. Report of the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Commission.

Gujarat State, 1976,2 vols.
2- Report of the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (Second)
Commission. Gujarat State, 1983.
3. Development Programme for the Gujarat State, 1987-88. Planning Divi-
sion, Ceneral Administration Department, Government of Gujarat, Gandhinagar,
February 1987.
4. Census of India, 1931, Vol. XIX, Baroda, Part I, Subsidiary Table l.
5. Census of India, 1971, Series 5, Part lA.
B. Newspaper Reports and Analyses:
l. Times of India, Delhi, 10 July, 1985, Girilal Jain, "Gujarat Politics."

2. Indian Express, Delhi, l9 July 1985, Parveen Sheth, "Gandhi to Solanki."
3. Indian Express, Delhi, 20 July, l985, "Prime Minister's Call for National
Consensus on OBC Reservation Policy."
4. The Hindu,21 July, 1985, "Gujarat Agitation Continues."
5. Times of India, Delhi, 30 July, 19E5, "Report on Gujarat Negotiations."
22O The Politics of Backwardness
6. The Hindu,31 July, 1985, "End to Agitation in Sight."

T.lndian Erpress, Delhi,3l July. l985. "Repon on Gujarat Stir."
8. Indian Express, Delh|5 August, 1985, Report on Gujarat Stir.
9. The Statesman, New Delhi, l2 August, 1985, Report on Gujarat Stir.
10. Indian Express, Delhi, 19 August, 1985, Report on Gujarat Stir.
11. Times of India, Delh|20 August, 1985, Report on end to govemment
employees strike in Gujarat.
12. Indian Express, Delhi,6 December, 1985, Report on Gujarat Stir.
13. Indian Express, Delhi, S December, 1985, Report on Cujarat Chief
Minister's call for a "national consensus on the reservation quotas for the Other
Backward Classes."
14. Indian E-rpress, Delhi, l1 December, 1985, Report on Students' Stir in
Gujarat.
15. Times of India, Delhi, 14 December, 1985, Report on Accord Reached
with Gujarat Students.
C, Unpublished Papers and Surveys:
l. C.P. Barthwal, Ph.D Dissertation, Lucknow University, " Safeguards for

Scheduled Castes in thc Indian Consthution and Their Working," Social Sci-
ences Documentation Centre, ICSSR, New Delhi.
2. Ghanshyam Shah, Middle Class Politics: A Case of Anti-reservation
Agitations in Gujarat. Centre for Social Studies, Surat, December, 1986.
D. Non-Government Published Sources of Data:
l. Statistical Outline of Gujarar, 1983. Bureau of Economics and Statistics,

Govemment of Gujarat, Gandhinagar.
2. Statistical Outline of India, 1984. Tata Services Limited, Depanment of
Economics and Statistics, Bombay.
3. Basic Statistics on State Economies of India. Enonomic Monitoring Ser-
vice, Commerce Research Bureau, Bombay.
Books:
l. A.K. Vakil, Resenation Policy and Scheduled Castes in 1nda. New Delhi,
1985.
2. A.M. Zudi, Annual Register of Indian Political Parties. Haroobhai Mehta
and Hasmukh Patel, eds., Dynamics of Resenation Pollcy. New Delhi, 1985.
3. Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: law and the Backward Classes in
India. OUP. Delhi. 1984.
Chapter 9
Reservations Policv Revisited
D.L. Sheth
HE anti-reservation agitations, which began in the late seven-

ties in Bihar and spread to other parts of the country, seem to
have succeeded in two important respects. At one level, tley
have succeeded in reopening the basic issue of the validity of provi-
sions of positive discrimination for, and preferential treatment of, the
weaker sections of society-a policy embedded in the Constitution of
India. At another level, the agitations have forced the state to rcstore
the status quo ante with respect to further implementation of the
policy. In a state like Gujarat, where the agitations were more persis-
tent and virulent, they have forced reversals of policy on the govem-
ment.
The impact that the agitations have made on the minds of the
policy makers and of the intelligentsia in the counry is quite signifi-
cant. The agitations have in fact been able to exercise political power
and influence quite out of proportion to their bases of support in
society.
The policy is now questioned both at the level of principle and at
the operational level. Two inter-related questions are posed: (i) Are
reservations consistent witn the principles of equality and secularism
as enshrined in our Constitution? and (ii) What criteria for identifying
beneficiaries should be devised, so that they promote, rather than
militate against, the basic values and goals of social transformation
envisaged in the Directive Principles of State Policy laid down in the
Indian Constitution? It is in the light of these questions that we shall
222 The Politics of Baclo,vardness
examine in this paper the policy of reservations and its rationale,

evaluate its performance and make some suggestions for making the
policy more effective.
The Policy and its Rationale

It should be remembered that reservations are part of a much
larger policy package. It comprises a series of legislations, ameliora-
tive programmes and preferential schemes, designed to benefit the
weaker sections of society. The package has evolved over a long
period of time and has been administered by the Central as well as the
State govemments. Although the history of these policies dates back
to the first decade of this century, the present set of policies derive
their legal status and legitimacy from the Indian Constitution.
The overall package, as it operates today, is addressed to three sets
of policy goals. First, to remove social and religious disabilities of
certain specified groups suffering disabilities on account of their
social segregation and spatial and cultural isolation; namely the sched-
uled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST). Second, to facilitate and
promote equal participation with others, of all socially disabled and
disadvantaged groups in organized sectors of the country's economic
and political life. This is sought to be achieved through provisions for
preferential treatment in education, in government employment, rcs-
ervation of seats in Parliament, state legislatures and local bodies and
through other ameliorative measures and schemes designed to im-
prove their life chances. With the exception of reservations in legis-
latures, the other preferential measures are not confined only to the
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes; they also extend to the cate-
gory described in the Constitution as socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens, better known as the Other Backward
Classes (OBC). Third, to protect, if necessary through legislative
action and executive orders, all these groups, also described in the
Constitution as weaker sections of society, or simply, the backward
classes, from all forms of social injustice and exploitation.
Reservations, along with other measures of protection and
upliftment of the weaker sections of society, should thus be viewed as
an instrument of a larger social policy of the state, addressed to a
long-term goal of creating a civil society through extending effective
citizenship rights to the vast sections of the population who have
Reservations Policy Revisited 223
been historically deprived and marginalized.

In articulating these goals, the policy has acquired multifarious
contents, of which reservations is one. Thus, we have a series of laws
which aim at removing disabilities, such as the Untouchability Of-
fences Act of 1955, the subsequently amended and tightened Protec-
tion of Civil Rights Act of 1976, the legislation to prevent forced
labour, and the amended Criminal Tribes Act of 1952, removing the
legal disabilities suffered by the so-called criminal tribes. We also
have protective laws preventing alienation of tribal lands, regulating
moneyJending and providing debt-relief and legal aid to the weaker
sections. Besides, there are schemes and programmes for land allot-
ments, housing, scholarships, subsidies, etc., aimed at providing
physical security and promoting occupational mobility of these groups.
The Five Year Plans have a special feature in the form of tribal and
scheduled castes components of plans. The most significant and now
a controversial aspect of the policy is however the provision of
reservations. Although these provisions are based on the same valzes
and rationale that inform other parts of the policy package, their
impact is felt adversely and directly by those outside the beneficiary
groups and that too in the vital area of social mobility where the
means of mobility are always scarce and competition intense.
The beneficiaries of reservations comprise three types of commu-
nities: ex-untouchables, designated as Scheduled Castes (SC) (over
104 million), the spatially and culturally isolated communities of
tribals designated as the Scheduled Tribes (ST) (over 5l million) and
the vaguely defined category of the socially and educationally back-
ward classes of citizens called OBC (an estimated 300 million). The
OBC is a category consisting of a wide array of groups in need of
preferential treatment, but it does not have any centrally identifiable,
systemic characteristics such as social segregation or spatial isolation
found respectively in the case of SCs and STs. By and large, the
groups in the OBC category are at the lower rungs of che Sudra
castes. They are socially disadvantaged in terms of occupational
mobility and have, in the past, suffered from different degrees of
ritual prohibitions.
Let us now briefly review the extent of benefits each of the above
categories is entitled to receive and has, in fact, been receiving. For
the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes reservations arc made
for seats in the legislatures, in govemment employment and in edu-

cational institutions, in proportion to their strength in the population.
Forjobs in government services and seats in the educational institu-
tions only those who meet certain minimum prescribed standards
qualify. These standards are fixed with reference to the prevailing
competitive standards for all, except that in the case of the scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes candidates they are relaxed or lowered
only to a certain degree.
For the other backward classes there is no provision for legislative
reservations; nor are reservetions in governmentjobs and educational
seats, in their case, mandated by the Constitution. Instead, the matter
of reservations for the OBCS in these two areas is left to the discretion
of the state govemments. Similarly, there are no provisions of reser-
vations for the Other Backward Classes in Central Government ser-
vices. Since the constitutional provisions in their case are only en-
abling and not mandatory, no such reservations for them exist in
West Bengal, Orissa, Assam, states of the north-east, Rajasthan or in
any Union Territory. It is only since the mid-seventies, thanks to
electoral pressures, that the states of north India, Gujarat and
Maharashtra have begun to extend the benefits of reservations to
Other Backward Classes. But the extent of benefits is quite moderate
in these states. Compared to their massive strength in the population,
the reservations made for tlem are only 10 per cent in Cujarat, 14 per
cent in Maharashtra, 15 per cent in Uttar Pradesh and 14 per cent in
Himachal Pradesh. For entry into educational institutions, the stan-
dards are only marginally lowered for them. For example, all the
OBC students admitted between 1979-80 and 1983-84 under the
reservation provisions in a medical college in Ahmedabad, had ob-
tained between 76 to 79 per cent marks at the Standard XII examina-
tion.t
The story is quite different in the southern Indian states. There
reseNations for the Other Backward Classes have existed, in one
form or the other, for over half a century. The extent of reservations
there has reached the point of saturation, covering almost their pro-
portional strength in the population.2
Performance
What has the policy achieved? Even after half a century of prefer-
ential treatment only a negligible number of the SC, ST and OBC

officers can be found in Class I positions of the government services.
For example, of all the Class I officers on the rolls of the Central
Government in 1979, only 5.68 per cent belonged to the scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes taken together and a mere 4.69 per cent
came from the OBC category.3 In the public sector, in 1975, there
were only 1.4 per cent scheduled caste and 0.6 per cent scheduled
tribe officers in Class I positions. A 1971 survey of Indian managers
showed that only one per cent among them came from all the three
categories of the backward classes taken together.a In the north
Indian states and in Gujarat and Maharashtra the utilization raie of
reservations in govemment services and educational institutions by
the Other Backward Classes is much less than the allocations made
for them. For example, in Gujarat, against 10 per cent reservation, the
utilization of seats by the OBC students in the engineering and
medical colleges has not exceeded 5 per cent since 1980.s The
unfilled seats have since been dereserved and made available to the
non-backward population. To sum up, the backward classes have
registered some progress in social mobility through reservations. But
their presence in professional and white-collar jobs is, even today,
insignificant.
Clearly, the provision of reservadons is not enough. For reserva-
tions to improve the life chances of the socially disadvantaged sig-
nificantly, other components of the policy will have to show a much
higher operational efficiency. The low rates of utilization, for in-
stance, are indicative of the poor performance of the entire policy; for
utilization is essentially a function, not of availability of benefits, but
of the capacity of the potential beneficiaries to receive the benefits.
For developing this capacity, effective performance of other aspects
of the policy is equally, if not more, important. For example, in
Maharashtra and Gujarat, the scheduled castes have, over the last
decade, reached the national level of literacy. More importantly, over
the last ten to fifteen years, the number of scheduled caste graduates,
postgraduates and professionally trained graduates has increased
phenomenally in these states. Their number runs into thousands. This
has obviously increased their capacity of receiving the benefits of
reservation. Given the very low base of the sixties there has been a
rapid increase in the number of SCs in sovernment offices and in
educational institutions, making their presence more visible in the

eighties. And yet, even in these two states, the rate of utilization by
the SCs and STs remains considerably low compared to the extent of
allocations made for them.
To a significant extent, it is this improvement in the rate of
utilization that has led to elite resentment and agitations against the
policy. It is not accidental that the anti-dalit agitations have since
acquired a persistent, even vicious, character in these two states.
konically enough, the degree of protest against the policy seems to be
related to the extent of its successful implementation. Here lies the
paradox: when judged by the policy's own objectives and the values
and goals that underlie it, its performance on all counts is much
below any reasonable expectation. In no event, does it pose any
serious threat to the life chances of the upper and the middle castes.
But with the change in the overall climate of elite opinion on the issue
of reservations. even a small increase in the rates of utilization is seen
as disturbing the status quo ante and brings the policy under attack.
The upper and middle castes hgan to feel acutely insecure in the
mid-seventies, when many states in north India, and the states of
Gujarat and Maharashtra, started providing reservations for the Other
Backward Classes. It was not only the higher rates of utilization by
the scheduled castes, but the actions that were taken, although belat-
edly, to extend reservations to the OBCs, that was responsible for the
agitations.
In the mid-seventies, the backward classes commissions appointed
by many of these states stafled submitting their reports, recommend-
ing reservations for the Other Backward Classes. In 1978 the Central
Government appointed the Second Backward Classes Commission
which, in its report, submitted in 1980, recommended central action
in regard to reservations for the Other Backward Classes, assigning
to the Centre the same role that it plays vis-a-vis the scheduled castes
and scheduled tribes. The Commission used caste as a criterion to
determine the social and educational backwardness of the groups of
potential kneficiaries. The population of the Other Backward Classes
thus included was around 52 per cent of the total population. But in
order to keep the total reservations for all categories within the limit
of 5O per cent, prescribed by the Supreme Court, the Commission
recommended only 27 per cent reservations for the OBC with the
caveat that the south Indian states, which had already made reserva;
tions above 27 per cent, would remain unaffected by this recommen-
dation. Taking a cue from the Commission's recommendations, the
state of Gujarat appoinled its own Second Commission in 1981. It
recommended an increase of 18 per cent reservations for the OBCs,
thereby raising the quantum ofexisting reservations for them from l0
per cent to 28 per cent, thus keeping the total reservations in the state
wifhin the prescribed limit of 50 per cent. That increase had to be
withheld in the face of agitation. Prior to rhis event, in 1977 govern-
ment directive3 were issued to semi- and non-govemmental organr
zations receiving government grants or subsidies to reserve 13 per
cent of jobs for the scheduled castes. Although, by and large, the
provision remained on paper, it gave rise to acute resentment in the
middle classes. The agitations in Bihar, Maharashtra and lately in
Gujarat were thus a sequel to this belated, even if diluted, implemen-
tation of the policy. These agitations have successfully stalled any
further implementation of the policy or its rationalization in the north
and westem states.
The agitations seem to have 'succeeded' in one other respect.
They have created an acute fear of conflict among those of our elite,
who think that these problems can be resolved painlessly and whose
rhetoric implies avoidance of a clash of interests that social change
inevitably entails. Instead of gearing the state and its policies to meet
such conflicts they would rather retreat to the safer ground of the
status quo ante. Any honest and effective measure to implement a
transformative social policy-be it land reforms, reservations or the
removal of untouchability-is bound to generate conflicts. Maintain-
ing the sfaras quo on such issues is no guarantee that it will not be
disturbed. In fact, what actually happens is that issues that are at one
time solvable in the legal-rational frame of a policy process, get
pushed into the arena of direct action; for the implementation of a
policy is often not backed by the political will. The population
affected by the sratus quo and the disaffected political activisrs then
take the issues to the streets, away from the legislatures and admin-
istrative apparatus of the state. It is in this context that the two major
issues, thrown up by the agitations, need to be considered.
Two Major Policy Issues

Two issues have prominently figured in recent agitations and in
the debates they have triggered off in intellectual circles. One per-
tains to the legitimacy of reservations for the Other Backward Classes
and the other to the criteria used for identifying beneficiary groups.
We shall now examine these two issues in the larger perspective of
the values that underlie the policy.
lrt us first take up the issue of reservations for the Other Back-
ward Classes. We have seen that the provisions of reservations made
for this category are not at all sinilar, either in type or extent, to those
made for the scheduled castes and tribes. But the rationale is similar.
Although, the OBCs are not direct victims of untouchability or
physical and cultural isolation, some communities among them are
disadvantaged and oppressed by the hierarchical system of castes and
as such in need of preferential treatment. But the problem of identi-
fying specific beneficiary groups among the OBCs is quite complex.
This has caused several legal battles, constitutional amendments
and movements and agitations as well. And yet the solution is no-
wherc in sight. In fact, reservation has ceased to be a problem of
administrative decision-making. It has now become an acute political
problem, complicated by the history of policy itself as well as by the
economic and social changes that have taken place since Indepen-
dence. These changes have affected the OBC communities much
more than any other section of the society.
Unlike the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes' the Other Back-
ward Classes were tie first to enter the reservation system and that
too by using political means. Not being totally oppressed and
marginalised like the scheduled castes and tribes, they were the first
among the backwards to organize and mobilize themselves in the
form of a movement. Its beginning can be traced to tle formation of
the Justice Party in 1916 in Madras. It began as a social reform
movement to fight the ritual domination and cultural pre-eminence of
the Brahmins. But it soon entered the then prevailing scene of com-
petitive ethnic politics, with a view to wrenching concessions and
benefits from the British Govemment. In the process, the non-Brah-
min groups distanced themselves from the independence movement
led by the Congress and earned for themselves the label of being
'British loyalists'. When the reservation policy was reconsidered at
Reservations Policy Revisitid 229
the time of making the Constitution, this label probably came in rheir
way. But, by then, they had acquired significant political clour, ar
least in the states of South India and in parts of the erstwhile Bombay
Presidency-areas beyond which the movement did not spread. The
movement succeeded in obtaining for the backward classes of the
south a series of concessions and reservations, both from the British
Govemment and from the princely rulers who themselves were against
the Brahmin domination. As far back as in 1918 the princely state of
Mysore declared all non-Brahmin communities as "backward classes"
and allocated for them caste-wise quotas of seats in colleges and jobs
in state services. This measure in fact marked the beginning of the
system of reservations in India. The movement then demanded and
got from the British Govemment in 1919, a share of political repre-
sentation. Thus, the movement politically established the claims of
the backward classes for reservations at the national level and won
them in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies.
Although the movement started as a front for all backward classes,
including the lowest ones, as it developed, it became an organization
of the middle and lower castes. The scheduled castes, then known as
the "Depressed Ciasses" had to chart out a different political route for
themselves. A part of the leadership and organization of the De-
pressed Classes operated from within the Congress party. But an-
other part acted separately and autonomously, often in tandem, with
the backward classes.
In the process of making the Constitution when the policy of
reservations was being considered anew, the problem of the back-
ward classes appeared different from that of the scheduled castes and
tribes. This is because the fear of ethnic conflicts that had character-
ized the independence movement, loomed large in the minds of our
Constitution makers. There was also a change in their perception
caused by the improved economic and political conditions of the
Other Backward Classes. As a result, although their claims for pre-
ferential treatment were conceded in principle, the Constitution
remained silent on the criteria and mechanisms of sustaining and
realizing these claims. It seems the claims were conceded only grudg-
ingly and half-heartedly.
It is important to remember that the whole issue of reservations
was debated and the policy was conceived by the makers of our
Constitution in the context of minority rights. The policy, as then

conceived, had a two-fold objective: One, to protect the interests and
rights of those religious and other minorities who were likely to be
affected adversely by the change in the balance of power after Inde-
pendence. Accordingly, reservations for Muslims, Sikhs, Christians,
Anglo-Indians and some groups of the backward classes in legisla-
tures, the cabinet, government service and education were discussed
and recommended by the Minority Rights Sub-Committee of the
Constituent Assembly. Two, to extend special privileges to the de-
prcssed castes, tribal population and other backward classes to help
them overcome their social disabilities and backwardness and thus
enable tlem to participate in the 'national mainstream' with full
citizenship rights.
It is an interesting chapter of the politics of Constitution-making
that, by the end of the process, through a resolution moved by Dr
Ambedkar, all the previously existing reservations, except for the
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes were abolished. Specific pro-
visions for reservation of seats in legislatures and in the services were
made in the Constitution only for these two categories. For the Other
Backward Classes only a refer€nce to the protection of their interests
was made in one of the Directive Principles. Later, a general refer-
ence in the amended Article 15 allowed the states to take steps for the
advancement of the Socially and Fducationally Backward Classes.
Only Clause 4 of Article 16 made a somewhat direct reference in this
regard. This Article is about guaranteeing equality of opportunities
for all, but Clause 4 makes provision for reservations of posts for
what it describes as "any backward class of citizens" and that too
only if a class is not adequately represented in the services of the
state. The worrds any and adequarely arc significant. Moreover, through
Article 340, the procedure to determine the need for reservations and
the criteria for identifying beneficiary groups within the category of
socially and educationally backward classes were left to investiga-
tions by commissions which the President may appoint. As against
this, Article 335 makes explicit provision of reservations for sched-
uled castes and scheduled tribes. In addition, some time-bound pro-
visions, which have now expired, were made for Anglo-Indians. On
the insistence of the Sikh leadership, the depressed castes of Sikhs
were eventuallv included in the scheduled castes list. As for the
Resemations Policy Revisited 231
religious minorities per se, they were all kept out of the reservations
provisions. Indeed, some like the Parsis opted out of their own
volition.
Vy'hat does this add up to? The Constitution is unambiguous and
emphatic about according preferential treatment to the scheduled
castes and tribes. It has however left a great deal of ambiguity with
rcspect to the OBCs-in the matter of specifying the benefits, in
laying down criteria for identifying the beneficiary groups and in
making provisions for monitoring and implementing the policy. Con-
sequently, as noted earlier, there is no central policy of reservations
for the Other Backward Classes. It is largely left to the discretion of
the respective state governments. Such ambiguity has led to innumer-
able law suits. And now the issue is being fought in the streets in
those states which have exercised their discretion in favour of the
OBCs in the recent past. This is a dangerous development since it
seriously threatens the legitimacy of the entire policy of positive
discrimination, not just in favour of the OBCs but also in favour of
the scheduled castes and tribes. Issues which were settled long ago
are now being reopened.
Reopening the issues has become possible because the criteria for
classification, even of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are
not clearly defined in the Constitution. It more or less accepts lhe
classification made by the Govemment of India Act of 1935: any
caste, race or tribe designated by the President as "scheduled", can be
included in the list. And once included, only Parliament has the
powers of exclusion. It was possible-then, as it is possible now, to
include in the scheduled liss several communities currently classi-
fied as OBCs whose conditions are no better than those of the
scheduled castes and tribes. But theso communities have been inatio-
nally lumped with the well-to-do and upwardly mobile middle castes
among the OBCs. Many among the OBCs, once considered as back-
ward, have over the years acquired considerable political clout and
some economic power. They have also improved their social status.
Yet, because they are classihed as OBCs, they continue to receive the
benefits of rcservations.
It is precisely for this reason that the problem of inclusion and
exclusion of groups in this category has become a political, rather
than an administrative problem. In it also lies the source of increasing
rcsentment among the non-beneficiary groups. The prevalent criteria

of identification are essentially social, rather than economic. Hence,
the OBC category today includes, especially in some southem states,
the dominant castes of agriculturists, who at the local level are often
locked in conflict with the scheduled castes. At the same time, the
category also includes a large number of extremely backward and
socially deprived groups whose condition of disability and disadvan-
tage is in no way better-in some cases even worse-than that of the
scheduled castes and tribes. In the states of north India and in Gujarat
and Maharashtra, where reservations for the Other Backward Classes
have been introduced only recently, the groups identified as socially
and educationally backward, by and large, include communities of
the latter type. They comprise ex-criminal tribes, nomadic communi-
ties, scheduled castes converted to Christianity or Islam and a whole
range of small castes which suffered from untouchability in relative,
though not in absolute terms and are engaged in caste-bound mar-
ginal occupations. These groups have little or no capacity to receive
benefits. Yet, enhanced reservations are demanded and given in their
name. But, in reality, a large part of the benefits actually go not to
them but to a minority of the well-to-do and advanced communities,
which are technically classified as "backward". If strict criteria of
disability or social disadvantage were to be applied, they would no
longer qualify for the benefits of reservations. And this is what the
upper castes strongly resent.
It is significant that the states in which reservations for the OBCs
have recently been enhanced and where agitations have taken place
happen precisely to be the states where the issue of classification has
been wmngly handled. In these states, the category of scheduled
castes has been artificially restricted and the category of OBCs
correspondingly expanded. Whereas the national ayerage of sched-
uled caste population is about 16 per cent, in states like Punjab,
Haryana and Himachal Pradesh around 25 per cent are classified in
that category. In West Bengal the comparable figure is 22 pr cent.
As against this, a meagre 7 per cent are included in the category of SC
in Gujarat and Maharashtra. This obviously means that many a
marginal caste suffering only relative untouchability is included in
the scheduled castes list, say in a state like West Bengal. Similar
castes are included in the OBC lists in states like Guiarat and
Resewations Policy Revisited 233
Maharashtra. This imbalance in classification has led several states to

enhance reservations for the OBCs. The enhancement is intended to
cover the deserving but has so far left out backward communities in
the prevailing SC and ST lists.
Clearly, there is a case for disaggregating the category of the Other
Backward Classes and for thoroughly rationalizing the scheduled
lists.o A number of communities included in the Other Backward
Classes, which by their condition of disability and disadvantage are
closer to the scheduled castes or tribes, need to be integrated into the
respective lists of scheduled castes and tribes.T This will not only
remove the patent anomalies we now see in the OBC category, it will
do much more. At present, the scheduled castes carry the social
identification of untouchability. The entry of several "touchable" but
extremely backward castes into the schedule will erode such identi-
fication.
Now let us consider the issue of criteria for reservations. We saw
that there is ambiguity in the Constitution about tlre status of the
Other Backward Classes, and there is also the rise of a section of
politically dominant castes among tlem. These factors together have
led to a demand for changing the prevalent criteria of reservations.
The demand, now being made through agitations, is not only for
modifying the criteria. The agitators seek to alter the very basis of the
present system of blassification, which will affect not just the Other
Backward Classes but also the scheduled castes and tribes. The crux
of their argument is that economic backwardness should be the
criterion for identification of beneficiaries, in place of the present
complex one, based on social disability and disadvantage.
Such a demand, if it is conceded, will call for changes in the basic
structure of our Constitution, involving the Fundamental Rights, not
only of the s'bclally disabled groups but also of the religious minori-
ties. For the neif$-bmand recognizes equality only among individuals
4ua individuals, didt between groups. The Constitution, on the other
hand, is sensitive to the problems involved in realizing equality in a
country of religious and cultural pluralities on the one hand and
oppressive caste hierarchies on the other. So, it has, through various
provisions, worked out a fine balance between these two notions of
equality. The Indian Constitution cannot accommodate any demand
that trades one notion of equality for the other, without undermining
234 The Politics oJ Bacltwardness
its basic character.

As it now stands, there is little doubt that the Constitution stipu-
lates social and retgious disabilities (e.g., untouchability) as criteria
for the identification of beneficiary groups. These characteristics,
when compounded with economic and educational backwardness,
cre.ate a structural situation of backwardness, which the policy seeks
to overcome. The policy of preferential treatment is thus conceived in
the context of membenhip of a group, that is socially disabled and
disadvantaged. It is zor for any individual or household which may
be poor or otherwise economically deprived.
Put differently, reservation is a device to eliminate backwardness
arising from historic conditions of social injustice in which certain
grcups arc located. It is not meant as a scheme to counter conditions
of economic backwardness or poverty of individuals or groups that
may arise as a by-product of the development prooess itsef. Of
coursc, there is nothing to prevent the State from formulating special
schemes for overcoming economic backwardness. But rcservation is
not fipant for that pupos€. So, to repeat my poinL there is no
sanction in the Constinrtion for applying economic criteria" either
exclusively or primarily for reservations. There seems to be no es-
cape from using caste as a primary critcrion for identifying the
beneficiary groups of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and for
including the other truly marginalized groups from among the OBCs
into the scheduled lists.
As for the rcmaining communities within the OBC category, other
criteria such as income, education, or occupation can be brought in.
There is oo constitutional impedinrcnt in doing this because the
courts have already offered interpretations of the OBCs' ambiguous
status in the Constitution. While holding caste as the primary crite-
rion for identifying social and educational backwardness the courts
have'approved the use of other criteria as well. In fact, in many states
the identification of beneficiaries is done at the individual and house-
hold levels from among the OBC communities, by applying the
income and educational criteria. This means that only the deserving
individuals or households within the communities and not the com-
munities as a whole are entitled to preferential treatnrent.
The status of the scheduled castes and tribes, in the Constirution,
unlike that of the OBC, is however, quitc different. These categories,
specified in the Constitution, have substantial social content.They are

referred to as "castes", "races" and "tribes" and specific lists of them
are constitutionally authorised. While the lists were, for the most part'
inherited from the 1935 Act, the Constitution gave a wide latitude to
the govemment to include any new group, which in its opinion,
deserved to be included. But the Constitution did not empower the
government to change the rationale of classification itself which is
based on considerations of social disability and not of economic
backwardness per se. "social disability" is a condition shared by all
the members of a group; it is not a characteristic of only a few
households within that group.
Constitutional stipulations apart, it will be a mistake to apply the
logic of economic criteria to scheduled castes and tribes. It is true that
there is among them a small section which has improved its eco-
nomic condition. But, for them, the problem does not end with
economic upliftment. In fact, it often begins with it because they
continue to suffer acutely from status disability.
There is abundant empirical evidence to show that wherever they
have improved their economic position by availing themselves of
benefits from special schemes, they have become targets of atrocities.
The perpetrators are often the locally dominant castes of the so-called
backwards. Reservdtions, thus, allow the scheduled castes a route to
escape from the life of social tenor in villages to the anonymity of
towns and cities with the help of education and government jobs.
The problem of the scheduled castes and tribes is thus qualita-
tively different. For them, both the economic and social disadvan-
tages constitute two sides ofthe same coin. They are poor because of
their status disability; and in order that they may get rid of their status
disability, the first thing they have to do is to move out of poverty.
And when they begin to move out of poverty they become targets of
atrocities. A recent analysis based on 1977 -78 data shows how differ-
ent the problem of poverty is for.the SC/ST population from that of
the general population.E The rural population of the SCs and STs,
taken together, is about 27 per cent and the incidence of poverty
among them is over 70 per cent. Whereas, the 73 per cent non-
scheduled rural population has an incidence ofpoverty of 54 per cent.
(Among the se 54 per cent, a vast majority are members of the
communities belonging to the OBCs.) The picture of urban poverty
in terms of divergence between the scheduled and non_scheduled

populations is even worse. For 13 per cent urban scheduled popula_
tion the incidence of poverty is close to 60 per cent; for g7 per cent
non-scheduled urban population the incidence of poverty is 43 per
cent. A similar pattem was observed with respect to per capita
consumption. The average per capita expenditure among the bottom
half of the population was found to be substantially low for the
scheduled population than for the rest of the population.
These data leave little doubt about the fact that economic back_
wardness for the scheduled population is of a systemic nature, arising
out of their social condition; for them it is not a random occunence.
Unless the barriers of social structure are removed, they cannot
graduate either from their present state of penury to any livable
standard, or from social bondage to a state offull citizenship. Ifsocial
policies of the state were aimed at creating a civil society, they have
to protect and promote the interests of these communities through
reverse discrimination in their favour.
The upper castes, which are getting agitated about reservations
forget that for long they have been the beneficiaries of a parallel and
on-going system of discrimination in their own favour. It is not
accidental that in Madhya Pradesh, the govemment bureaucracy is
dominated by Kanya-Kubja Brahmins, or that the clerks and officers
in a particular nationalized bank have, for long, been recruited largely
from two sub-castes of Gujarat-one of the Brahmins and another of
the Banias; or that, until recently, jobs in the Western Railway were
almost monopolized by the Anavil Brahmins from Gujarat. Again, in
Gujarat, the sons and daughters of medical doctors, irrespective of .
their poor performance in schools, manage to get admission to medi-
cal colleges. One can go on and on with such examples. The point is
that it is not the application of social criteria for reservations which
consolidates the caste system. It in fact enables the backward popu-
lation to move out of traditional, caste-bound occupations. By
decoupling caste and occupation it destroys the material base of the
caste system. Once this process is accomplished, caste may remain as
a form of social consciousness, a political identity, whose members
are socially and occupationally so differentiated that it loses its basis
in any collective sense in society. What has consolidated the caste
system in modem times is, in fact, the informal but ongoing system
of social preference and discrimination in favour of the upper castes,

described above. It has imparted a peculiar composition and charac-
ter to our middle class.
Our middle class, as it is now constituted, comprises largely the
dwija castes and the upper rungs of the Sudra castes. This narrow
caste character of our middle class can change only if its members are
recruited from a wider social base. The middle class is, no doubt,
quantitatively expanding. But it is not getting sufhciently diversified.
Such a socially stagnant middle class cannot process or dissolve
identities that lie outside its limited cultural ambit. An expanding and
diversifuing middle class, on tle other hand, can become a solvent of
old identities, with the new groups drawn into its fold also contribut-
ing to shaping its culture. Reservations reverse the process of ongo-
ing discrimination, and prevent the social and cultural self-perpetua-
tion of our traditional upper-caste based middle class. By enabling
people from a cross-section of castes and religions to get into the
system of higher education and white-collar jobs, reservations con-
tribute to the diversification of the middle class.
Suggestions for the Policy

From the analysis presented so far, follow certain conclusions and
suggestions for policy. The rcservation policy has been wavering in
several of its aspects and has been diluted in its implementation. My
first conclusion is that it needs to be firmly reoriented in the basic
values enshrined in the Constitution, namely of equality and social
justice. Hence, preferential treatment must continue until the basic
goal of bringing significant numbers from the lower social strata of
the population into professions, white-collar jobs and govemnrcnt
services. is achieved.
The problem, as it is now unfortunately formulated, is not of
favouring specific groups. It is a problem about the kind of society
and political system we want to build. Let me illustrate this with an
episode from the past. During the discussions in the Constituent
Assembly, Sardar Patel argued against a time limit for reservations.
He suggested that reservations continue until the backward classes
had visibly improved their position. But Dr Ambedkar, who is today
thought ofby some people as a sectional leader, pleaded that the issue
should be considered in larger national terms. He argued that on a
238 The Politics ofBackwardness
matter like this the future generations of parliamentarians should not

be bound by the Constitution. So, a time limir should be ser so thar
future parliaments, in their wisdom, could continue or discontinue it.
In contrast, our discussions on the issue today have come to be
narrowed down to only legal, constitutional and parochial aspects;
they lack the political imagination that should inform thinking on
such a problem of vital importance for the system as a whole. We
must, therefore, elevate the discussion of this issue to the larger
framework of values and goals for a social policy.
Secondly, the cther aspects of the policy, especially the enabling
measures aimed at increasing the capability of beneficiary groups to
receive benefits of reservations, need to be vigorously implemented.
At present the constitutional obligation of the State is remembered
only at the time of elections. The action appears as a political gim-
mick and tends, thereby, to discredit the entire policy.
Lastly, I shall recapitulate the suggestion I have already made, in
somewhat clearer terms. The state should, after detailed surveys,
incorporate the oppressed communities of the Other Backward Classes,
which today exist on the margins of scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes, into the scheduled lists, and the allotments should be propor-
tionately increased for these categories. This will not only remove the
persistent anomaly and reduce the resentment felt by the non-benefi-
ciaries, it will help blur the social identification of groups comprising
the ST and SC categories.
From the remaining communities of the Other Backward Classes,
those with comparable educational and economic levels (say, above
poverty line) to that of the non-scheduled and non-backward popula-
tion, should be identified and listed separately. While they may
continue to receive benefits of enabling provisions of the policy, they
should be excluded from the benefits of reservations. For tbe still
remaining ones, who have yet not graduated to the specified level of
economic and educational attainment and could also not be included
in the scheduled lists, the beneficiaries should be identified by apply-
ing the economic and educational criteria from within the communi-
ties listed as OBCs. Thus, by first applying the criterion of social
identification, we can proceed with applying other criteria such as
income, land-holding, occupation, education and habitation to locate
the beneficiaries from within each OBC community. This will ensure
Reservations P olicy Revisited 239
that households within each community of the OBCs,which may be

in feed of preferential treatment can actually get it, as also exclude
those who have improved, over time, their economic and educational
position. This calls for a centralized policy of reservations for the
OBCs to be followed uniformly by the states. Also needed will be
systematic surveys by an independent authority to assess changeV
improvements in their economic and educational conditions. But I
wish to end this paper by repeating what I have already said: For the
scheduled categories, even after the lists are enhanced, only the social
criteria will have to be used, at least until their status disability ceases
to come in the way of their social mobility.
l. Mahesh Dave. 'tsackward Classes and Reservation' in Haroobhai Mehta

and Hasmukh Patel, cds., Dywnics of Resemation Po&cy' New Delhi. 1985'
p. 100 Gable 7)-
2. The rqsefvations for OBC are 50 per cent each in Kamataka and Tamilnadu,
rto per cent in Kerala and 25 pe.r cent in Andhra Pradesh . IbA., p. 97 Clable 2).
3. Govemment of lndia:. Reports of the Backward Classes Cotnmission,Fitst
Part (vols. | & 2), 198O, p. 42.
4. Data from Sagra C. Jain, "Indian Manager: His Origin and Career," 1971.
Reproduced in Mahesh Dave, op. ar., p. 98.
5. Mahesh Dave, op. crt , p. 100 (table E).
6. The classification of OBCs in Bihar, for example, recogrrizes this division.
Accordingly, Bihar has two OBC lists: one comprising the rclatively advanced
backward communities and the second listing the extremely backward commu-
nities. Separate quotas are allocated to each with a view to prevent comering of
the benefis by the 'dominant' castes among the backwards.
7- This anomaly was recognized in Cujarat, but only a partial attempt was
made to correct it. For example the Bavchas, Bhils and Padharias who in the first
instance should have been included in the Scheduled Tribes list were excluded
from any benelit of reservations. It was only in the mid-seventies that they were
included in the OBC list by the First Backward Class (Baxi) Commission of
Gujarat- Subsequently, on the recommendation of the State Govemment they
were included in the Scheduled Tribes list. In the sarne way, the Mochis,
ctassified as OBC by the Baxi Commission were included in the Scheduled
Caste list. Such an exercise needs to be undertaken on a larger scale, not only in
Gujarat but also for other states.
8- K. Sundaram, "Economic Growth and Endemic Poverty in India ' in Ponna
Wignaraja and Akmaal Hussain, eds., D*elopment, Democracy and Regional
Caopemtion.Tokyo: United Nations University (forthcoming publication), I 987.
Chapter I0
Consequences of Reservations
Ghanshyam Shah
major objective of the various provisions enshrined in the

Constitution providing reservations for the scheduled castes,
the scheduled tribes and the other backward castes is to build
an egalitarian social order in place of tlle fragmented and homo-
hierarchical social order. The provisions aim at improving their socio-
economic condition and integrate them with the mainstream. A re-
view of the implementation of these provisions raises two questions:
One, to what extent have the deprived communities in general and
certain groups or individuals among them in particular taken advan-
tage of the legal provisions and improved their condition? And what
are its consequences on the deprived communities, in regard to their
unity and common identity? Two, how does the dominant stratum of
society react to these provisions and what are the consequences of the
provisions on the present socio-political system?
At the outset, it should be mentioned that the ruling class had
evolved the strategy of making provisions for reservation in the
Indian Constitution out ofpolitical exigency to resolve the challenges
that they faced in maintaining their dominance.t It is a different thing
that the measures have further sharpened the social contradictions. It
should be mentioned that the Congress recognised, as far back as in
1917, the necessity of "removing disabilities imposed on rhe De-
pressed Classes" when the depressed classes demanded .communal
representation' like that of the Muslims and the sikhs. And the
Congress agreed to accommodate the Hariians in the distribution of
Conse que nce s of Re se rvations 241
Assembly and Parliament seats when the British govemment offered

'communal representation' to the depressed classes at the Round
Table Conference. Initially Gandhi refused, in the Second Round
Table Conference (1932), not only to consider separate electorates
but he opposed any form of special representation involving reserved
seats for the SCs. Without belittling the moral ground on which
Gandhi opposed separate representation, his political calculation also
should not be ignored. Gandhi feared that 'the separate electorate
will create division among Hindus, so much so that it will lead to
bloodshed. 'Untouchable' hooligans will make common cause with
Muslim hooligans and kill caste-Hindus."2 Several tribal groups de-
manded separate electorates in the 1930s and some of the tribes,
particularly from North-East India demanded a separate state outside
India on the eve of Independence. These tribes entertained apprehen-
sions that the Hindus would introduce their laws and customs "to
supersede our own customary laws."3 I mention this with a view to
underscore two points: One, the dominant groups accepted reserva-
tion not because of the conviction that it was necessary to build an
egalitarian social order, but because of the pressure exerted by differ-
ent minorities. Two, the groups exercising political domination in
India desired to secure the support of the depressed classes for
maintaining their own power vis-a-vis the dominant groups of other
communities.
Political
Reservations for political positions has apparently reduced the
monopoly of political power of the traditionally dominant groups.
The latter have been compelled to part with some parliamentary or
legislative seats to the SC/ST individuals. Consequently, members of
the dominant groups resent political reservation, as their chances for
contesting from their home constituencies, which happen to have
been declared as reserved, are sealed. One can cite examples where
the influential political leaders successfully notified and denotified
some of the constituencies as 'reserved' or 'general' to enable them
to contest from a 'safe' constituency. Moreover, the double-member
constituencies were abolished in 1961 . One of the underlying reasons
for the abolition was that it favoured the election of SC/ST legislators
from the unreserved seats. "Having (by their own estimate) done
most of the work, spent most of the money, and mobilized most of the
votes for the party ticket, non-scheduled caste politicians faced the
prospect of being edged out of the contest by scheduled caste bloc
voting. If untouchables gave both of their votes to scheduled caste
candidates regardless of party affiliation, a non-untouchable candi-
date might be defeated for the general seat by his own party running
mate."4 For instance, V.V. Giri was defeated in the 1959 election by
a scheduled tribe candidate. Thus, the double-member constituency
provided an oppornrnity to S(7ST candidates to get elected from the
general constituency.
With the abolition of tle double-member constituency, the S9ST
candidates have been gradually pushed to the reserved constituencies
only. This is evident from the fact that the number of SCYST candi-
dates elected from unreserved constituencies for the Vidhan Sabhas
have declined after the 1962 general elections. ln 1962,48 SCyST
members were elected for Vidhan Sabhas from unreserved constitu-
encies. In 1977 only three were elected instead.s
Though SC/ST political leaders have secured legislative positions,
they have not proved very effective in implementing the laws enacted
for the benefit of the SCYST. A number of studies on the contribution
of the SCTST legislators show that they did not actively participate in
the debates in the state Assemblies or the Parliament concerning
issues affecting the deprived communities.6 Despite the constitu-
tional directive "to make laws prcscribing punishment" for acts con-
travening fundamental rights related to disability arising out of'un-
touchability', SC members of Parliament could not effectively expe-
dite the Untouchability (Offences) Act. It took Parliarnent five years
to pass such an Act, which however, by and large, remained on paper.
During the I 960s, the total number of case s registered with the police
under this Act, throughout the country, was less than 5,000, with only
700 cases rcsulting in conviction. After repeated demands from the
press and the liberal-minded intelligentsia for stronger protective
legislation, the Protection of Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1976.
The Bill was lying with the Parliament for six years, indicating not
only the callousness ofthe ruling party but also the ineffectiveness of
the scheduled caste MPs in pressing the government to pass the Bill.
The authorities have by and large rcmained indifferent in implement-
ing the Act with any seriousness. A police officer of Tamilnadu was
C onsequences of Re se rvat io ns 243
reported to have said: "If we (the police) take this law seriously, half
the population of Tamilnadu will have to be arrested. In any case, the
police have better things to do than go poking their nose into the
private affairs of the people."7 Nor did scheduled caste MLAs use
their political power for the effective implementation of the Acts.
Even SC/ST chief ministers could do very little to protect the civil
rights of the communities they represented. For instance, an SC
leader, D. Sanjeeviah, of Andhra Pradesh became the chief minister
because of the numerical strength of the scheduled caste MLAs in the
Assembly in the early 1960s. But the state's per capita expenditure on
SC welfare was the lowest in the country. The scheduled caste MLAs
of Andhra were indifferent to the Kanchikaderla "Harijan burning"
incident in | 968.8 Similarly, the scheduled tribe chief minister of
Gujarat, Amarsinh Chaudhari, could do very little to prevent the
atrocities against the tribals of Valia taluka. He failed to arrest the
police officer who raped a tribal woman. In fact, the police depart-
ment did not cooperate in the inquiry against the culprit and the chief
minister was helpless.
The SC/ST MLAs and MPs do use their numerical strength as a
bloc power in the faction-ridden party politics and they work as a
balancing force between two rival factions. In retum for their support
to one or another faction, they bargain for political positions in the
Cabinet or various committees or statutory bodies. But they cannot
act effectively when the atrocities are committed against members of
their communities; nor do they pressurise the administration for the
implementation of minimum wages or distribution of land.
The SC/ST MLAs and MPs owe allegiance to their parry. They
contest as party nominees and get the benefit of the party machinery,
both in terms of numerical and financial support, which enable them
to secure victory. Moreover, the political parties select those SC/ST
persons as the party candidates who are willing to toe the line of the
party bosses, and avoid taking militant positions on problems con-
ceming the SCsiSTs. The party bosses are more interested in captur-
ing power rather than in improving the conditions of the deprived
communities. Moreover, they select those persons as party candi-
dates who are educated and relatively better off. Hence, a majority of
MLAs and MPs belong to the upper strata of these communiries. It is
significant to note that a large majority of the scheduled caste MLAS
244 The Politics of Bachanrdness
of Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra have no personal expe-

rience of untouchability. This is indicative of their decaste status.e
One of the SC leaders complained: "This system does the scheduled
castes no good because the people in the reserved seats belong to the
party in power and are often incapable persons. Although they are
educated, they dare not speak out against the party in power. They do
not represent their people to the party and government, but represent
the party in power to their people."ro
l.ooking at the rcpresentation of the various caste groups in legis-
lative bodies, it is safe to assume that there would not have been
significant differences in the numerical strength of the SC/ST mem-
bers in the state Assemblies and Parliament without reservation. It
may be possible that these numbers would have been smaller in the
fifties, but it would have been increased like that of the OBCs in the
subsequent elections. However, it is certain that because of reserva-
tion, S(YST political leaders, whose numbers are assured, have been
co-opted easily by the national political parties. As the SC population
is scattered unlike that of the STs, one may speculate that the SCs
might not have got adequate number of seats in the Assemblies and
Parliament proportionate to their population. Like the Muslims, they
would have had to depend mainly on the 'good will' of the party
bosses; or they would have become more militant and would have
opted for the extra-parliamentary path.
Government Employment
Reservation in government employment for the depressed classes
was introduced in 1943 by the British govemment. But at that time,
hardly any qualified persons from the 'untouchables' and tribals were
available to take advantage of the reservations. In fact, "in 1941 the
government decided that no useful purpose would be served by
reservations for scheduled tribes as too few were available for ap-
pointments."rr In 1953, SC and ST combined together did not occupy
even half-a-per cent (0.35 per cent SC and 0.6 per cent ST) of Class
I; and 2 per cent of the Class [I (1.29 per cent SC and 0.6 per cent ST)
positions. They werc less than 7 per cent in Class III (4.52 per cent
SC and 2.3 per cent ST). SC occupied 2l per cent of the Class IV
menial positions, including sweepers. In the caste hierarchy, the
upper and middle castes consider menial work as polluted and meant
Consequences of Reservations 245
for the ati-sudras. Hence, the concentration of SC in Class IV posi-

tions is not surprising.
The position of SC and ST did not substantially improve in the
first decade because in order to secure govemment jobs, they were
required to pass qualifying examinations for which at least eleven
years of education even for Class Itr jobs was needed. This was the
initial period for reservation as well as for the higher education of the
SCs and the STs. Moreover, some of the states did not enforce
reservations in the early fifties for state government jobs. And, there
was no reservation for internal promotion till 1957.12 Some depart-
ments, on the recommendation of the Home Ministry, extended
reservations to the promotion posts filled by departmental examina-
tions. But it was severely curtailed in 1963. As a result, ". . . not a
single scheduled casteitribe candidate has been promoted either on
the basis of departmental promotion examination or on the basis of ad
hoc selections,"r3 an organisation of SC/ST employees declared. The
roster system for promotion was introduced in the early seventies,
thanks to the mounting pressure built up by the SC/ST govemment
employees against discrimination experienced by them in depart-
mental promotion and dereservation of the posts. By the end of the
seventies the presenpe of SC/ST employees in different departments
at various levels had become conspicuous. The proportion of the SC
was 5, 7 and l3 per cent respectively in the Class I, II and III in 1979;
though the STs were lagging behind the SCs, they occupied I per
cent each of Class I and II and 3 per cent in Class IIL The reservation
of posts in public sector undertakings came into force in the mid-
sixties, though it was agreed to "in principle" as far back as 1954.
Consequently, SCs occupied 2,4 and 16 per cent and STs occupied
0.47,0.97 andT.41 per cent in Class I, II and III respectively in the
public sector in 1978.14
It should be noted that the SCs and STs could occupy govemment
positions in such numbers primarily, though not solely, due to reser-
vations. The OBCs who got reservations in the late sixties and early
seventies lag behind SCs and STs in govemment jobs despite their
larger numerical strength. They constitute 5 and 11 percentages in
Class I and II respectively as against 6 and 18 per cent of the SC/ST
in the respective classes.rs Thus, reservation has positively helped
(though not to the extent expected) members of SC and ST, who were
246 The Politics of Backwardnes s
able to qualify. This has sharpened the stratification among the SCs
and the STs. A small stratum has become middle class, getting
disassociated from their traditional caste ties in day-to-day relation-
ships because of their imitation of the life-style and values of the
established middle class. As a result, the composition of the middle
class has changed to some extent during the last three decades. In the
past, the middle class was almost solely constituted of upper and
middle castes. Now, low castes including SCs, and STs have entered
it. This has paved the way for the middle class to become cosmopoli-
tan in terms of its caste character, providing opportunity to persons of
different castes to share its class character.r6 To my mind, this is a
prerequisite for building a secular society.
On the other hand, the number of students studying for higher
education has increased more than 15 times (from 3.6 lakhs in 1950-
51 to 47.5 lakhs in 1982-83).t7 Of course, this size is confined to a
microscopic minority of the Indian population,- only 5 per cent of
persons in the age group between 17 and 23 years. A vast majority of
them belong to the upper social strata-traditionally the upper and
middle castes. However, all those who have studied up to or above
matriculation are not absorbed in the job market. In fact, the rate of
the educated (matriculates and above) unemployed is far higher than
the rate of rise in education. There were 1,61,599 educated unem-
ployed in 1952. The number has gone up at an alarming rate-
81,43,900 educated unemployed persons in 1980.18 Since education
among higher castes is higher than that among the SC' ST and OBC'
they constitute a larger proportion of the educated unemployed.
The upper and middle castes, which have had a monopoly of
middle class jobs, have increasingly felt threatene& as SC/ST and
OBC started taking advantage of reservation in greater numbers'
Though some members of the Constituent Assembly opposed the
constitutional provisions related to reservations for SC, ST and OBC
in 1948-49, there was no widespread uproar at that time from the
upper and middle castes. This was perhaps because of two reasons:
One, at that time, reservations were abstract and did not directly
affect them as there were not many SC/ST qualified candidates
seeking government employment; and two, in the prevailing atmo-
sp-here of democracy and equality there was wishful thinking that the
country would be so prosperous in a decade or so that reservation for
Consequences of Resemations 247
jobs would be redundant, and caste and religious differences would

disappear. Today the situation is more gloomy than in the early
fifties. Overall unemployment has increased. On the other hand, the
SCs, STs and OBCs have started asserting their rights and are taking
greater advantage of the reservation policy.
Despite past ideological and ritual mechanisms to control the
exploited castes, in the course of history, conflict between the domi-
nant castes and lower castes has come to the surface. The so-called
harmonious relationship among the castes continued so long as the
lower castes did not resist exploitation and social injustice. Contem-
porary tensions between upper and middle castes and lower castes on
the issue of reservations reveal the same pattern.
The dominant castes have started opposing reservations on vari-
ous grounds. And wherever possible they have sabotaged the imple-
mentation of reservation orders. Govemment officers belonging to
upper and middle castes who are against reservations hesitate and, if
possible, delay the implementation of govemment orders regarding
recruitment or promotion of SCs, STs and the OBCs. One can offer
a number of examples showing the delaying tactics on the part of
upper caste officers in implementing reservation orders. Wherever
possible they dereserve the positions on one excuse or another. And
those who are recruited often experience humiliation. Their errors are
magnified. They get alienated from their other colleagues in the
office and are compelled to join hands with their caste fellows. The
caste bias is reflected in the trade unions as well. The union leaders
who belong to upper or middle castes not only do not show sympathy
for the SC, ST and OBC employees but they also openly oppose the
reservation policy. The grievances of SC/ST employees are not prop-
erly attended to. Some ofthe trade unions have even given a call that
the members of the unions who are not SCVSTs "must be united to
start a struggle" against the SCVSTs.le Consequently, trade unions
tend to split, and in some places SC/ST/OBC employees form their
own unions to protect their interests.
The conflict between the dominant castes and deprived castes has
come to the surface before in High Courts and the Supreme Court.
There were 113 cases reported in law reports about 'compensatory
discrimination' from 1950 to 1977. A majority of the cases relared ro
departmental promotions and admission to professional courses. The
judiciary, like the government administration, is dominated by the

upper and middle castes; and their caste/class bias is reflected ;n their
judgements. Marc Galanter observes: "No judge has emerged as the
champion of compensatory discrimination; Justice (later Chief Jus-
tice) Gajendragadkar probably comes closest by virtue of his opinion
in Dora and Rangachari, two of the small number of Supreme Court
cases in which the scope of preferential treatment was given a broad-
ening, expansive interpretation. A few other judges sat often enough
to display a consistent tendency to curtail its operation."2O Those
judge: who have been in favour of preferential treatment often vac-
illate on the question of whether caste should be the basis for
recognising backwardness, including that of SC and ST.2l
Upper and middle castes launched agitations against reservations
for SC, ST and OBC in Gujarat, Bihar, Madhya hadesh and Andhra.
Particularly, the numerically large groups such as Harijans and some
backward castes who have taken to higher education and secured
govemment jobs were the targets of attacks by the agitators. In
Gujarat and elsewhere, houses of the Harijans and backward castes
were set on fire and some were killed, injured and terrorised. The
upper caste agitators have succeeded in curtailing the reservation
facilities.22
It is often argued that reservation on caste basis is responsible for
the ugly face of casteism. It invokes caste feeling and strengthens
caste consciousness which is antithetical to secularism. This view
assumes that casteism was not strong before the introduction of
reservation. It also assumes that the members of the upper-middle
castes are benevolent, tolerant and secular. They oppose reservation
because it strengthens casteism and hampers the process of
secularisation. To my mind, this assumption is unfounded. The upper
castes are 'secular' so long as their monopoly is maintained and they
are allowed to share the benefits among themselves. There was no
reservation for the OBCs in many states, including Gujarat, till the
mid-seventies. But even a cursory analysis of Gujarat politics would
convince anyone that before 1976 caste consciousness was as strong-
if not more so-than after the introduction of reservation for OBC in
1978. The only difference is that after 1978, the upper and middle
castes have had to share at least some of the govemment positions
with the OBCs when the latter began to assert their rights. Gujarat
C onse quence s of Re s e rv ations 249
politics in the fifties was often considered as non-casteist because

there was no apparent conflict between the upper-middle castes and
OBCs.23 Such an illusory situation had been treated as reality because
at that time power was shared by political leaders belonging to upper
and middle castes. As the OBCs started asserting their rights their
demands were branded as 'communal'. To my mind, one of the
prerequisites for building a secular society is to create a mechanism,
whereby persons from different castes and communities can enter the
same arena and work together. In the present Indian situation, reser-
vation is the mechanism whereby persons from different castes can
come together for secular activities.
Merit and Efficiency

It is often argued that though reservation provides socialjustice to
the deprived groups, it entails a heavy cost by sacrificing efficiency
and merit. At the outset, let me state that I do not consider efficiency
as a non-issue, nor do I believe that reservation has no impact
whatsoever on efficiency. Nevertheless, the above argument of effi-
ciency displays either a great degree of bias against the deprived
groups by prejudging their ability, or an abstract and partial notion of
efficiency.
The above argument is at best based on stray cases rather than on
a systematic study. It assumes that performance in examination and
efficiency are closely related. While judging academic performance,
one needs to keep in mind the educational system which is structured,
in more ways than one, in favour of the better-off sections of soci-
ety.24 Students belonging to upper and middle castes/classes not only
have a more congenial environment, they also study in relatively
better schools and enjoy other facilities such as private coaching. On
the other hand, students from deprived groups, besides suffering
from discrimination, lack the facilities and environment for studies.
Teachers belonging to the upper and middle castes generally pay less
attention to the SC/ST/OBC students. The inability of these teachers
to bring students at least up to minimum standards should also be
considered inefficiency. However, the inability of teachers to create
confidence among all the students, irrespective of caste, and their
failure to bring them up to a minimum level have yet to become an
issue of academic or political debate. The efficiency of those teachers
who violate the basic legal and ethical principles of teaching by

practising discrimination against students in the classroom and ex-
amination usually go unchallenged.
The assumption of a'direct relationship between efficiency and
examination performance needs thorough scrutiny. I have not seen
any published empirical study examining the co-relationship be-
tween these two variables. The University Commission Repon (1950),
known as the Radhakrishnan Commission Report pointed out that the
examination system is'linvalid, inadequate, subjective and therefore
not reliable." As late as 1976, the University Grants Commission
observed: "Examinations have come to dominate the educational
process; passing them is more important than acquiring education."2s
It also admits that, "The marking ofthe scripts even at the best public
examination is hurried and superficial. The marks obtained in exami-
nations are not a reliable measure of a student's performance (leave
aside achievement); the combination of raw marks lacks validity."
The studies by Edwin Ha4ler,26 Mukherjee,2T George,2E etc. show
variations of 15 marks by different examiners for the same set of
scripts. This is applicable not only to literature but also to mathemat-
ics, physics, zoology, botany, chemistry, etc. The evidence presented
by these studies clearly shows that difference in percentages in
marks, even of 15 per cent, do not definitely reveal a high or low
ability.
Notwithstanding these in-built limitations of the examination sys-
tem, and assuming that the system is not defective, the fact remains
that classroom studies have very little bearing on most of tle work in
non-professional spheres of administration. Govemment servants of
Class I, tI and trI ranks find very little relevance from what they
studied at graduate or post-graduate level in their day+o-day office
work. Even a cursory look into the list of the employees of large
private companies reveals quite a few in each company who are just
matriculates or graduates holding very high executive positions. Some
of them have even less than ten years' experience. Needless to say,
more often than not they are the sons arid daughters of relatives or
friends of the directors. Here I am not questioning their efficiency.
What I am arguing is that examination performance and actual work
do not necessarily go together. And 'under-qualification' of these
executives in private sectors, who gotjobs through nepotism has not
Consequences of Reservations 251
been questioned by those who worry about merit.

Efficiency is related to commitment to one's profession and a
sensitivity towards the societal problems; not to mere ranking in
examinations. This is true of all technical and professional courses. It
should be bome in mind that all those who qualify to join professions,
say medicine, engineering or aeronautics, have passed the required
examinations. A recent study of Bombay medical students by Padma
Velasker shows, that SC/OBC students have more commitment to-
wards the profession and the poor patients than students of the upper
castes and classes. The latter are more interested in making money
rather than in serving the patients.2e By now, we are familiar with the
malpractices committed by well-qualified medical doctors who are in
the rat race for status and money.
It is often argued that the present day inefficiency in the adminis-
tration is due to reservation as less qualified persons are recruited.
This argument has no validity whatsoever. Even today the total
number of persons in government departments recruited through
reservation is very small. One wonders how such a small number can
have such a determining influence on the very large number of
employees who are recruited on 'merit' and claim to be more effi-
cient. West Bengal has relatively less reserved seats in government
jobs than Tamilnadu or Gujarat. But on any count, the administration
in West Bengal is no more efficient than that of these two states. By
rearranging the data of the Administrative Reforms Commission,
Marc Galanter demonstrates that even if the SC/ST candidates who
secured third division were not recruited on reserved seats, the posi-
tions would have gone to the "others" who were also placed in the
third division, though "higher percentage of third class degrees."3o
Moreover, there are quite a number of departments which still do .
not have SC/ST/OBC members. Such cases are many in the univer-
sities at undergraduate and post-graduate levels. Do we require a
study to show their inefficiency in imparting knowledge and under-
taking meaningful research? I feel that we should examine the issue
of efficiency in the context of the overall work ethos prevailing in
contemporary Indian society, irrespective of a person's caste or com-
munity. The issue is equally related to the administrative structure
and procedures which are formed by upper-caste/class mer.nbers who
provide administrative leadership.
252 The Politics of Bachoardness
Uneven Distribution of Benelits and Its Consequences

Reservations have by and large not improved the overall condition
of the deprived communities i.e., the SCs, the STs and the OBCs.
They still lag behind the upper and middle castes in educational and
economic spheres. Only a small number have succeeded in acquiring
the benefits of reservation. The fortunate among the deprived com-
munities are those who have property or marketable skills which
enable them to acquire secondary or higher education. It should be
noted that the SCs, the STs and the OBCs are not homogeneous
communities. They are divided not only into several endogarnous
groups of high and low status, but economic differentiations also
exist among them. For instance, 6 per cent of the ST households in
Gujarat own more than 15 acres of land. Some of them have irriga-
tion and other infrastructure facilities to produce marketable sur-
plus.3l In the north-east frontier regions, till recently, slavery existed
as an institution among some tribes, in which one tribe conquered
another and enslaved its members. These slaves worked as agricul-
tural labourers.32 In Mizoram, land is auctioned by the government or
leased out for a specific period to so-called 'progressive' farmers
who can afford to pay the price. Such land is taken by a new class of
capitalist farmers who take to "farming with the purpose of finding a
profitable channel for their accumulation."33 Similar economic dif-
ferentiations exist among the SCs and the OBCs.
The differentiations are accentuated by the development strategies
of the post-Independence period. In the present development stra-
tegy, only those who have a viable quantum of land and possess
infrastructure facilities produce a marketable surplus. And those who
can produce a marketable surplus can afford to provide education to
their children. Our educational system, needless to say, caters to the
needs of a small section of society which is in a privileged position.
It condemns the bulk of the children belonging to the poor to be rlrop-
outs and failures.3a Hence, despite scholarships and o\er facilities
only very few students from the deprived communities can have high
school and college education. One needs money to travel from one's
village to the town where the high school is located. And without
secondary education, they have no scope for taking professional
education or govemment jobs. Similarly, looking to the prevalent
electoral system, no one can successfully fight elections for an As-
Consequences of Resewations 253
sembly or Parliament seat without at least some financial standing.

One needs a piece of land with infrastructure, a business or a perma-
nent job with an assured income which enable one to contest elec-
tions.35
As a result of the reservations, those who acquired political posi-
tions and govemment white-collar jobs have formed a tiny middle
class. They have adopted the life-style in dress, diet, etiquette, lan-
guage etc., of their peer group, the upper and middle classes. Their
interaction with their kin and clan brethren is limited and they find it
difficult to adjust themselves to their traditional way of life. They are
alienated from their communities. On the other hand, they experience
iubtle discrimination from the non-deprived communities who domi-
nate the political and economic sectors. The situation frustrates them.
Overview
Reservations have certainly helped, at least a very small number of
SC/ST/OBC, in acquiring political and administrative positions. As a

result the circle of the middle class has been widened. Economic
differentiations among the deprived communities have become sharp,
which have initiated the process of disintegration of these groups.
However, the privileged strata of the deprived communities have not
yet integrated in the middle class dominated by upper and middle
castes. To some extent, reservations have throttled the growth of
militancy among the deprived groups. On the other hand, the tension
between the traditionally upper and middle castes and lower castes
have come to tlle surface. Violence erupted in the streets for settling
the issues. This is inevitable because those who dominate political
and economic spheres would not like to share the benefits; whereas
the deprived groups arc bound to assert their rights.
NOTES
l. See Ghanshyam Shah, "The Congress and the Deprived Communities" in

Ram Joshi and R.K. Hebsur eds., Social Intemention for lustice. Bombay:
Popular Prakashan, 1986.
2. Quoted by Eleanoi Zelliot, 'Gandhi and Amhedkar: A Study in L€ader-
ship" in Michael M ahar, The Ilntouchables in Contemporary lndiaTuscon: The
University of Arizona Press, 1972.
3 . Ghanshyam Shah , Minoitizs and Nation Building: A Case of Muslims and
254 ' The politics of Backwardness
Scheduled Tribes in Ind.ia. Y aranasi: Banaras Hindu University, 19g3.

4. Lelah Dushkin, "Scheduled Caste polirics', in Michael Mahu ed., The
Untouchables in Contemporary India. Aizona: The University of Arizona
Press, 1972.
5. Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and, Schedukd Tribes
1978-79, (fwenty-sixth Reporr), Delhi, Manager, Covemmenr of India press,
1980. For further discussion see Ghanshyam Shah, "protective Discrimination,
Equality and Politi calWill" in Reservatian: Policy, programmz and Issues, eds.,
Vimal Shah and Binod C. Agrawal. Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1986.
6. G. Narayana, "Rule Making for Scheduled Castes: Analysis ofLok Sabha
Debates," Economic and Political WeeHy, vol. XV, no. 8, February 23, 1990.
7. Dilip Hiro, The Untouchables in India. Lnndon: The Minority Rights
Group, 1982.
8. Dushkin, ap. cir.
9. Manseesha Tikekat " Scheduled Caste Legislators in Maharashtra." ph.D.
thesis, Bombay, Department ofCivics and Politics, 1986. See also Shiva Reddy,
" Harijan Elite in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh." Ph.D. study under progress,
Surat, Centre for Social Studies.

10. Dushkin, op. clr.
ll. Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities. Delhi: Oxford University press,
1984.
12. Ibid.
13. rbid.
14. Repon of the Commissioner- op. cit.
r5. rba.
16. Ghanshyam Shah, " Middle Class Politics: A Case of Anti-Reservation
Agitation in Gujarat." Mimeographed. Surat: Centre for Social Studies, 1985.
17 . India 1954 and 1984. Delhi: Publications Division, covemmenr of India,
1955 aad 1985.
18. India 1954 and Basic Statistics Relating to the Indian Economy. Bombay:
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, 1982.
19. Repon of the Commissioner. op. cir.
20. Galanter, op. cit.
21. For Justice D.A. Desai's views, see Haroobhai Mehta and Hasmukh
Patel, eds., Dynamics oJ Reservation Poiicy. New Delhi: patriot publication,
1985.
22. Ghanshyam Shah, "Middle Class Politics: A study of Anti-Reservation
Agitations," Economic and Political WeeHy, Annual Number, May 1987.
23. Ghanshyam Shah, "Caste Sentiments, Class Formation and Dominance
in Gujarat" in Frankel and M.S.A. Rao, eds., Caste, Class, Ethnicity and Domi-
nance. Delhi: Oxford University Press (in Press). See also, "strategies of Social
Engineering: Reservation and Mobility of Backward Communities in Gujarat.',
Paper presented in the seminar on Comparative Dimensions of Ind.ian Elections
and Party Politics, organised by the University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles, June
t987.
C ons equenc e s of Re s e rv ations 255
24. Citizens for Democracy, Education for Our People. Bombay: Allied
Publishers, 1978.
25 . University Grants Commissi on, Examination Reform: A Plan of Action.
Delhi: University Grants Commission, 1976.
26. A. Edwin Harper Jr., "Ninety Marking Ten: A Study of Examinations,"
Indinn Educational Review, vol. 2, no.l, January 1987. See also Research on
Examinations in India. Delhr: National Council of Educational Research and
Training, 1976.
27. N. Mukherjee, "On Examinations," Journal ofGuiarat Research Society,
vol. 23, 1961.
28. A. George, Srurdy on Assessment of Standard Valuation and Comparative
Performance of Collcges in the Pre-University Emmination-Kerala: Department
of Statistics, Kerala University, 1964.
29. Padma Ramkrishna Velasker, lnz quality in Highzr Education: A study of
Scheduled Caste Students in Medical Colleges of Bombay. Bombay: Tata Insti-
tute of Social Sciences, 1986.
30. Galufier, op. cit.
31. Ghanshyam Shah, "stratification among the Scheduled Tribes in the
Bharuch and Panchmahal Districts of Gujarat" in S.C. Malik, e.d., Determinants
of Social Sntus in India- Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1986.
32. B.P. Mishra, "Kirata Karyokinesis: Mode of Production in Tribal Societ-
ies in North-East India" in Arvind Das and V. Nilakant e'ds', Agraian Relations
in India. Delhi: Manohar, 1979.
33. IbA.
34. Citizens for Democracy, Education for Our People. Bombay: Allied
Publishers, 1978.
35. Ghanshyam Shah, "Stratification and Reservation," Mainstrmm, vol.
XIX, no.41. June 13, 1981.
(I thank Mrs Deviyani Punalekar for drawing my attention to the study on

examinations.)
Epilogue
B.G. Verghese
NDIA is a very large, plural, diverse society, more diverse than

any in the world. With the burden of ancient wrongs, mistaken
priorities and lags in performance much that is inegalitarian
remains. The Constitution the people of India gave to themselves in
1950 pledged Justice, Liberty, Equality of status and opportunity,
and Fratemity. While it provided for equality of opportunity it did
recognise social and economic realities and admit of special consid-
eration for the claims of members of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in the making of appointments to public services
"consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration".
It also provided for the appointment of a Commission to investigate
the condition of (other) socially and economically backward classes
and to recommend measures for their amelioration.
In the one case the reference was to certain disadvantaged caste
categories and to tribes and in the other to "backward classes". In
either case the categorisation is on the basis of collectivities deserv-
ing of group benefit rather than of individuals meriting compensa-
tion.
The idea of preferences or positive discrimination through affir-
mative action has been well articulated and many variants have been
in vogue in the United States and elsewhere. Preferences or reserva-
tions as they have been called in India are not novel either, going
back to a century and more in the former Madras presidency and the
princely state of Mysore. These preferences were based on elaborate
government orders prescribing recruitment to specific posts in a
Epilogue 257
given communal rotation. These have been discussed in the earlier

chapters.
Post-Independence saw no controversy about reservations for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as they were and still are
clearly seen as having suffered historical prejudice or neglect for
which they must be compensated. As notified by the President with-
out any fuss or acrimony, they were found to constitute around 22.5
per cent of the population, 15 per cent being Scheduled Castes and
the rest Scheduled Tribes.
Problems however arose with the attempt to define the backward
classes, these being far more numerous and far less distinctive at any
boundary. [n a poor country, most people are "backward". But where
to draw the line among those who claim to be more backward than
others?
The first Backward Classes Commission under Kaka Kalelkar
was defeated by this challenge. The second so-called Mandal Com-
mission enumerated 52 per cent of the population as "backward" but
limited the cut off point for preferences to some 27 per cent. With the
22.5 pr cent SC and ST reservation, the Commission wished to
remain within the outer limit of 50 per cent reservation which the
Supreme Court had once prescribed with reference to equality of
opportunity, though some States subsequently exceeded that limit.
This is where the country stood when the storm broke in August
1990 with the National Front Prime Minister, V.P. Singh's resolve to
implement the Mandal Report. The course of events that followed
have been described. The country divided. Protest spilled on to the
streets. Passions reached a dangerously strident pitch with numerous
anti-reservation immolations by impressionable youth.
The eye of the storm was in the northern, largely Hindi states
rather than in the South, where this battle had been fought decades
back, or in the Western shtes where the reservation issue peaked
about a decade ago. The eastem region was least affected as the
backward classes here constitute a rather small proportion of the
population.
The criticism against "Mandal" was that it defied merit in a
situation of large and growing educated unemployment. Further, it
was felt to b€ "unscientific" in defining who was backward, lacking
in proper economic criteria in failing to provide for any exit; and
burdensome in appearing to include a system of rostering, carry-over

and promotions. Some of these latter objections disappeared follow-
ing clarification that they did not form part of the package. But there
remained strong objections on the ground of merit and of splitting the
nation into what could become a pe(manent caste divide when inte-
gration and national unity were the need of the hour.
Admittedly, implementation of the Mandal Report had been in-
cluded in the National Front manifesto and the President's Address.
But the actual announcement was made with such little public prepa-
ration and in such a highly political context, as if to counter a
troublesome party warlord, that the matter came to be seen as a
further unfolding of political gamesmanship rather than as a mea-
sured step forward towards social reform.
Equally, many critics found the announcernent begged the ques-
tion of the uplift of the backward classes in a more comprehensively
structured manner. It made no reference initially and subsequently
only in passing to attacking the roots of backwardness by pressing
forward energetically with universalisation of primary education,
vocational training and skill formation, agrarian reform, access to
credit and employment opportunities to the backward and so on.
Without emphasis on tlese, the Mandal package appeared only to
touch the fringe of the problem, offering a cosmetic solution for a real
problem by coopting some among those who had been unable to
ascend the escalator of social progress and economic opportunity
through primary schooling.
The critics certainly had a case. But so did the champions of the
Mandal package. V.P. Singh defended his proposal on political
grounds. In his words, only by sharing the "throne" (of bureaucratic
power) would the backward ever be in a position to control the
"treasury" or the decision-making process leading to the prioritisation
and funding of economic opportunity. [n his view, the permanent
government in the form of the bureaucracy wields great power and
unless the backward classes become part of that apparatus as power
brokers or decision makers they will not be in a position to steer the
ship of state towards preferred shores. Hence, in his judgement, it is
futile to wait for the educational system to create a meritocracy
among the backward classes who might be able to compete and enter
the privileged halls of bureaucratic or govemmental power. On the
Epilogue 259
contrary, once empowered, the rest would follow.

The Mandal protagonists argued that the Mandal Commission had
built certain economic criteria into the definition of backwardness on
a point-system and they defended the absence of any exit on the
ground that the percentage of backward classes cunently employed
in Class I and II posts in the Central Govemment was way below
their numbers and that the preference accorded was to a class rather
than merely to individuals. Further, caste was taken only as one
element in determining class and the ambit of backwardness ex-
tended to Muslims, Christians and others who qualified under the test
ofbackwardness. In order to answer the criticism that backward class
reservation would squeeze out the disadvantaged among the so-
called forward castes, some reservation was to be accorded to the
poor irrespective of caste.
Despite these clarifications, conffoversy raged. The merit issue
was repeatedly stressed. Not only should meritorious applicants not
be excluded from opportunity in govemment service to accommo-
date less qualified backward class candidates, but the constitutional
injunction about "maintenance of effi ciency in administration" should
not be ignored. The pros and cons were debated back and forth. What
is merit? How is it to be evaluated and by whom? If the administra-
tion has thus far been carried on predominantly by "meritorious"
candidates of the forward castes then how is one to explain the mess
and muddle in which the country finds itself? Furthermore, backward
class candidates could be given special coaching and training both
before and after selection.
For some the din and dust appeared to tum more on issues of
degree than of kind. With some sronger and more visible eligibility
and exit criteria the package might be acceptable alongside other
measures for attacking rural and artisanal backwardness, and through
education. But it is also quite evident that a certain middle class
hysteria had also been unleashed among other urban forward class
circles on the basis of an unspoken triage-type or first-come-first-
served theorem in a situation of job-seekers outpacing new job
opportunities.
Howsoever one measures it, anyone who has looked at the prob-
lem objectively must admit that there are categories of persons out-
side the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who are genuinely
zffi The Politics of Bachuardness
socially and educationally backward. Such backwardness not merely

handicaps them but constitutes a drag on society, sharply militating
against the constitutional imperative of equality and fraternity. It may
well be that the Mandal figure of 52 per cent wrongly estimates the
size of the backward classes and that if the political fat is taken off the
reality may be nearer 30 per cent. Be this as it may, while accuracy
is necessary and important in all things, the impact of reservation for
the backward classes in terms of substituting competition and merit
by preference was to be limited to 27 per cent under the National
Front package. There could be heartburning among the backward
classes as to who might be included or excluded, but reservations
would remain limited to 27 per cent.
Against this though, it can equally be argued that a deserving
candidate qualifying in open competition might be prepared to be
displaced by a truly backward class candidate deserving of prefer-
ence. He or she would, however, resent being elbowed out by one
who might in fact be more privileged than himself or herself in life
but more "backward" by notification in the list of backward classes.
Some of the more rerent state backward class commissions like
the Chinappa Reddy Commission in Andhra Pradesh have clearly
defined an exit criterion which would exclude children of parents
who have attained a given and easily measureable social or economic
status. Adoption of such a system would be relatively simple, auto-
matic and non-discriminatory and would have the further merit of
creating space within the reserved 27 per cent quota for the more
deserving among the backward categories.
This is an important consideration as the backward classes, like
the Scheduled Castes are not an undifferentiated, monolithic mass
but a highly stratified group distinguished by deepening shades of
disadvantage and deprivation. Ifno differentiation is made within the
group then the highest castes or class among those Scheduled or
defined as backward will garner all the benefits not just in the first
round but in succeeding rounds as well, depriving the less privileged
of any share of the cake. This factor has been repeatedly brought to
notice in rcspect of 40 years of Scheduled Class reservation and has
been a cause for much dissatisfaction among the lower rungs of
Scheduled Castes who have seen a new and sometimes parasitic elite
rise on their backs. The point is well taken as no Scheduled Caste has
Epilogue 261
ever been denotified. Once in, always in and the devil take the
hindmost, defeating one of the principal pulposes of reservation-to
uplift the lowest and most deprived.
The entire debate must of course be seen in the context of popula-
tion growth far outstripping job opportunities. India is today adding
16 to l7 million net to its population annually. More significantly, it
is adding between eight and nine million net annually to the labour
force. This is a horrendous burden and weighs even more harshly on
a developing society with large numbers at or below the poverty line.
And since social status moves fairly closely with economic opportu-
nities, placement in the job market and the acquisition of skills to
move up the ladder or to be upwardly mobile becomes very impor-
tant.
Any consideration of reservations without reference to the growth
of the economy and opportunities for people to improve their position
in life must therefore be inadequate and incomplete. Unfortunately,
the debate on preferences in India has tended to ignore these larger
and ultimately more relevant secular trends. As a result, public policy
has focussed too much on the micro aspects of who is in and who is
out by juggling with definitions without giving equal thought to tlre
far more basic task of enlarging the cake, widening opportunities and
placing a rein on numbers.
When everything is said in favour of reservations for the backward
classes it still remains less important to legislate fair shares of a small
cake than to strive to make everybody more competitive through
education and otherwise enable them to take a full and equal place in
an achieving society in which the cake grows far more rapidly.
Levelling up in the end is a better answer than levelling down,
although the latter is not to be altogether excluded or.denied.
Postscript
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver:

The Mandal Controversy
Rajeev Dhavan
J NDIA's Constitution makers are partly to blame for subordinat-

I ing the "justice" texts of the Constitution to the "political" texts.
I Many of the promises wrinen into the Constitution resulted from
' political compromises ratler tian a deeply felt commitment to par-
ticular values. For fear that a nation torn by distress may not come
. together, many demands were symbolically brushed under a mythical
carpet which was yet to be woven. Many compromises were intended
to remain compromises unless the coincidence of strong political will
and fortuitous good luck made their fulfilment possible. This is not
intended to belittle the Justice' texts of the Constitution, nor dampen
, the ardour of those who think that politics is more than the 'art of the
possible'. Yet, politics-no less democratic politics as any other-
often suffers Justice' into further compromise. The various forces
that compete for success are unequally poised and rewarded with
unequal and uneven results. Constitutional controversies are firmly
located in the politics that give rise to them. This is no less true of the
controvprsies which erupt in courts of law as those which find ex-
pression in parliamentary fora or on the streets.l
We are concerned here with the vague promises of special treat-
ment made to a nebulously defined class of persons who have come
, to be known as the "other backward classes" (OBC).'?The term itself
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Contoversy 263
suggests a residuary concem and puzzled many in its relatively short

joumey into constitutional acceplance. Before Independence, the
OBCs were variously included amongst the "depressed classes", with
the term 'backward' acquiring administrative meaning in the princely
state of Mysore in 19183 and a loose definition in the Hartog Com-
mittee as consisting of "(c)astes and classes which are educationally
backward".a At least one politician-S.D. Singh Chaurasia-claimed
that he coined the phrase around 1930. Yet, by 1948 a vigilant
Constituent Assembly was confused by the term-not quite sure who
the OBCs were and what their 'otherness' (aird, if so, from whom)
consisted of.5 Decades would elapse before various persons and
authorities sought the courage to provide clear constitutional answers
to this question.
At the time of Constitution making, spokespersons for many groups
and communities demanded "special treatment". The more heady
demands-such as those by the Muslim League-for separate repre-
sentation led to Partition. Had the logic of special electoral represen-
tation in parliament and the administration on communal lines been
accepted, each religious group or community would have been justi
fied in demanding similar representation in ways that could only have
been divisive.6
The cardinal principle evolved by the Constitution appears to be
thatfear of majoritarian discrimination was not by itself a sufficient
ground for constitutionally designated preferential treatment which
would be accorded to only such communities and groups which had
historically suffered both hostile discrimination and disadvantage.
To this end, three kinds of preferences were envisaged: special
electoral representation in legislative bodies Qtreferential electoral
representation) 7, special recruitment in public services Qtreferential
employment)8 and special schemes, action and accommodations in
other areas especially those relating to welfare and education (prefer-
ential teatmenr).e The formal decision that there should be just one
electoral roll did not exclude providing for special reservations for
untouchables, tribals and the Anglo-Indian community for a transi-
tional period of l0 years which has, in tum, been extended decenni-
ally from time to time into the next century.r0 As far as preferential
treatment and employment were concerned, the largest anticipated
beneficiaries---other than untouchables and tribals (and. to a more
limited extent, women and children)-were the OBCs.rr The absence

of criteria to define OBCs and the lack of awareness of the potential
benefits that could accrye as a result of preferential progftImmes
rendered these constitutional promises relatively non-contentious.
They have yet to acquire a politics that would give them substance.
Even though the Constituent Assembly had no reason to doubt
K.M. Munshi's explanation that the term 'OBC' "signifies people-
touchable or untouchable belonging to this community or that, who
are so backward that special protection is required (for them) in the
services"t2, the term was less of a misnomer for delegates from the
south of India where such preferential schemes for such backward or
depressed classes had been in operation for some time. In 1921, the
princely state of Mysore had already instituted a programme for
"recruiting all communities other than Brahmins who (were) . . . not
adequately represented in the public service".l3 By 1925, similar
programmes in Bombay virtually covering all backward classes otler
than Brahmins, Prabhus, Marwaris, Parsis, Banias and Christians
even though a later committee in 1930 clarified that "in ordinary
usage the phrase Depressed Classes is taken to mean untouchables".ra
'sensing the opening up of preferential benefits, a nascent politics
rapidly gathered momentum to voice the demands of the yet to be
clearly defined OBCs. The breeding ground for such demands was to
be found in the many movements against brahmin domination in the
South as opposed to movements elsewhere (such as the UP Hindu
Backward Classes League) which interpreted terms like 'depressed'
and 'backward' classes ejusdem generis as-4roadly speaking----of
the same genre as classes that suffered from the practice of untouch-
ability. In Madras, the Madras Provincial Backward Classes League
(started in 1934) wanted to extend special treatment to a large num-
ber of non-brahmin communities-a goal that found substantial rec-
ognition in special public jobs reservations provisions of l947.ts
With opportunities in the air, backward classes federations were
formed in many States (such as Bihar in 1947) and nationally (such
as the All India Backward Classes Federation founded in 1950)
because the intended beneficiaries felt that the Constituent Assembly
had "mustered courage to take up the problem of (OBCs) . . . and
place it on a national plane".to By 1954, it was estimated that there
were some 88 reasonably known such organizations. But, apart from
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 265
the broad object of maximizing the possible uses of the new dispen-
sation, each group had its own agenda.l7 It is not surprising that the
first cases that reached the Supreme Court in l95lr8 concemed a
distinctly anti-brahmin Madras scheme which sought to divide the
benefit of reserved job and other quotas principally to non-brabnin
communities. That the scheme was struck down as being communal
in nature was inevitable. Yet the scheme was not formulated with
malafide intent but was based on a genuine mal-understanding of
who were to be included amongst the 'backward classes'. The ab-
sence of any r-rational indication of the criteria to be used to identify
the backward classes meant that each State (or, conceivably local
authority or institution) could devise their own definition and
programme until a national policy or the judiciary caught up with
them.
In order to ensure that tle OBCs were identified, high powered
State Commissions were appointed amongst which the more well
known are the ones appointed by Mysore in 1960-1, Maharashtra in
1964, Kerala in 1966, Kashmir in 1969, Tamil Nadu in 1971,
Kamataka in 1975, Gujarat in 1976, Bihar in 1978 and various other
States at different times.re By this time, electoral politics had become
imbricated in the formulation of OBC policy. The wider and more
extensive the definition of beneficiaries and benefits, the larger tle
grateful vote bank that would vote for the regime. Each of these
schemes ran into constitutional rough weather when they came to be
examined by the judiciary.
Unsure of the deadly mix of righteous 'justice' and 'unscrupulous'
politics that such preferential programmes could engender, the Union
Govemment steered clear of taking a definite position. The strong
modemist secularism of Nehru abjured caste based divisions to tra-
verse from social life into public policy. Since the OBC programme
was in relation to classes other than the untouchables and tribals in
whose favour favourable schemes had already been inaugurated,
there was an intuitive de-prioritilation of the OBC cause. A Commis-
sion was appointed in 1953 to determine the criteria for identifying
the BCs other than the untouchables and the tribals (who by this time
had come to be described as the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Sched-
uled Tribes (ST) after the "Schedules" in which tleir names were
included). The task of the (Kalelkar) Backward Classes Commission
which reported in 195520 was not to identify the 'poor' but those
communities and groups who suffered additional or special disadvan-
tage so as to entitle them to special preferential treatment. Its exercise
ended by identifying 113.5 million people comprising some 3l.8Vo of
the population which was in addition n rhe 2O% (or so) for SC and
ST. It had received 3344 memoranda and interviewed 5636 persons,
but in the main relied on census reports and the general impressions
of public persons and social workers. Where data was sparse or
unavailable, a 'benefit-of+he-doubt' - principle was used in favour of
inclusion of that community in the OBC list. The prescriptive mea-
sures suggested were reservations for jobs in public services on a
sliding scale (257a,33tlrrd, and 4O7o in Class I, [I, and III and IV
services respectively) and massive reservations (of 70Vo) in medical,
scientific and technical colleges in addition to various other support-
ive educational welfare measures. In a society in which social status
mobility had come to be identified with government jobs and special-
ist professional technical opportunities, such extensive'reservations'
of posts in services and admission seats in educational institutions
could not but alarm the mainstream non-beneficiary communities
whose members would be directly affected by this 'reservations'
programme. Quite apart from the predictable consequentialist effects
of the Commission's prescriptions, there was an ideological resis-
tance to using 'caste' as a basis for identifying disadvantage in an
India which had set its aims at establishing a casteless society. The
Report was undermined-in this regard by a dissenting note by its
own Chairperson and three others who rejected caste as a basis for
identifying OBCs,2t It was this question of caste to identify OBCs
that provided the vehicle to attack the Commissionk recommenda-
tions and put them in cold storage for several decades. Even if
various lists were used by the state governments to provide educa-
tional and other benefits, the initiative of devising comprehensive
preferential employment and benefit schemes for the OBCs passed
on to the State Governments; and, came under the shadow ofjudicial
scrutiny.
But, the Backward Classes Commission's report of 1955 defined
the central issue for future controversy namely, could 'caste' ever be
acriterionfor futennining backwardness? Rather than concern itself
with the plight of backward classes who deserved preferential treat-
ment, the controversy became both ideological and political in na-

ture. Politically, it was easier and electorally more fortuitous to
define backwardness in terms of 'caste', especially because there was
no denying that caste considerations were chiefly responsible for the
combination of discrimination and disadvantage that led to back-
wardness. However, since Nehru's India had committed itself to
eradicating caste and creating a casteless society, any kind of adher-
ence to caste was seen as a symbolic surrender that undermined the
very foundations of India's egalitarian constitutional order.z2
The argument represented the triumph of symbolism over reality.
Nor did it make sense to argue that the Constitution forbade helping
victims of caste on the grounds that they belonged to one. To the
Government the answer lay in using "economic criteria", hoping that
the States would adopt such a pattern because casie criteria were
inimical to justice. Not willing to throw the electoral baby out with
the ideological bath water, the central government in its letter of 14
August 1961 permitted the state govemments to choose their own
criteria for defining backwardness but added that in its view "it
would be better to apply economic tests than go by caste".23 By
emphasizing the discretion of the state government and yet making
its ideological stance clear, it sought to have the best of all possibili-
ties. But, surely, it was justice considerations that required the Gov-
emment to get to the root of the true causes of the injustice; and, not
the symptoms that might manifest itself as the social description of a
class. If the economic criteria consisted of a 'means' or 'income' test,
the term 'backwardness' would become inter-changeable with 'pov-
erty'. If a more complex occupational test were used, any honest
proposal could not discount 'caste' for the purpose of defining 'back-
ward' occupations or exclude the strong possibility that the identified
class had caste characteristics. Meanwhile, the States went their own
way. It is misleading to conclude that preferential schemes for 'back-
ward' classes were motivated solely for the electoralr benefit of
building political vote banks for elections. Such schemes were in
operation in Princely States, like Mysore, long before electoral con-
siderations loomed ahead as rewarding possibilities. Anti-brahmin
movements in the South were notjust rooted in historical anger but
also inspired by genuine considerations of justice which-at least, at
that fime-had not been devalued to a point fiat they were viewed
purely as devices for electoral gains, de hors the sentiments that

inspired them. Be that as it may, from the early sixties the dominant
tone of the debate-both in courts and otherwise---concerned itself,
in the main, with the use of 'caste' criteria to define backwardness.
The ideological indecision of the government was reflected in Court
decisions.
il
Before we turn :c judicial pronouncements, the constitutional dispen-
sation merits scrutiny. A family of articles of the Constitution in the
fundamental rights chapter deal with equality,2a commencing with
the foundation right that the "State shall not deny to any person
equality before law and equal protection of laws" (Article l4). From
this flow further injunctions against general discrimination by the
State (Article 15(1)) only on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex and
place of birth as well as discrimination in the matter of State employ-
ment only on these grounds as well as on the grounds of descent and
place of birth (Article 16(2)). Inherent in rhe promise of equality is
the assurance that unequals will not be treated unequally. This, by
itself, provides the basis for preferential treatment of, amongst others,
socially disadvantaged groups and persons. But, the Constitution
went further. Specific provision was made in the original Constitu-
tion for preferential employment for the 'backward classes':
"Nothing in this (equality) article shall prevent the Srate from

making any provision for tle reservation of appointments of posts
in favour of any backward class of citizens which-, in the opinion
of the State is not adequately represented in the services under the
State" (Article 16(4)).
Following some awkward observations in the Madras communal

reservations cases (1951),b the Constitution was amended to add to
the already existing provision permitting "any special provision for
women and children" (Article 15 (3)), a further clause to make
explicit what was already implicit:
"Nothing in this article (general equality in respect of State

action) or Afticle 29(2)) (admissions to aided minority schools)

shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the
advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes
of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes"
(Article l5(4))
The provisions in the general discrimination article (Article 15) werc

different from those in the State employment article (Article 16). The
common thread was that preferential discrimination was permissible
both generally and for state jobs. It also seemed that the employment
provision used the wider term "any backward classes" whereas the
general provision included within its catchnrent Scheduled Castes
and Tribes; and, in addition, "any (other) socially and educationally
backward classes". Hence, the question: who were the "other back-
ward classes?" Although the Constitution made specific provision
for the President to appoint a Commission to investigate the condi-
tions of socially and educationally backward classes and make rec-
ommendations on the steps to be taken by the Union and States on
dealing with their problems, tle question of how they would be
identified and by what criteria remained open.
But, in order to fully comprehend the context in which schemes
were being devised and considered by the various High Courts, it is
necessary to understand what was at stake. Apart from financial
support and earmarked welfare schemes, the general preferential
programmes acquired a cutting edge when professional educational
schemes 'reserved' special seats and quotas for the SC and ST as well
as the other backward classes. This has come to include notjust seats
in mainstream tertiary education but also preferential access to scarcely
available seats for professional education; and, through such access,
to jobs. Every reserved seat meant a lesser chance for general candi-
dates to become doctors, engineers, lawyers and such professionals.
The speciJic employment related reservations cut deeply into the
availability of public service jobs which were highly prized in India
as secune constitutionally protected employment, the incumbents of
which exercised the power of the State at all levels of administration.
As far as the SC, ST and OBCs were concemed, there was no way
(other than by reservations of seats and jobs) that their members
could ever join the ranks of professionals or occupy govemment
positions of power. It was, to use a now famous phrase, a question of

'competing equalities'26 and determining whether the edge would be
given to the backward classes to achieve real and substantive equality
or to the merit candidates from the forward classes. It was understood
that while some relaxation could be made in favour of the backward
classes, both reserved and mainstream candidates would have to meet
the prescribed minimum eligibility criteria. In other words, illiterates
would not be treated as literates. nor would butchers be selected as
surgeons. The requirement of competence would not be compro-
mised. It is in this context that the issue of reservations slowly, but
surely, exploded into law and politics. A rapidly transforming nation
was opening up professional and public service opportunities in an
India whose populace were hungry for social mobility jobs, status,
wealth and power. Such an issue could only attract controversy.
The ideological resistance to using 'caste' to identify 'un-equals'
and redress inequality by giving preference to groups identified on
the basis of 'caste' sought to make the Constitution 'caste blind' in
precisely those areas of social action on which its egalitarian eyes
should have been wide open. The initial reaction of the judiciary was
enviably balanced. Following the Supreme Court's lead in the Ma-
dras cases (1951)'z7, in 1958, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court2E
refused to permit these provisions to be used to "remove communal
disparity", and the Mysore High Courtze refused to countenance a
thinly disguised attempt to cover all but the Brahmin communities.
But, while the Mysore Court had misgivings about the identified
groups, it was perceptively just in concluding that while criteria other
than caste could be used to identify such beneficiaries,
". . . (it was not possible to accept) . . . that backward classes

cannot be determined on the basis of castes, and tley must always
be determined on the territorial, economical, occupational or some
such basis . . . (IX cannot be said with any such rigidity that
determination can in no case be made on the basis of caste".3o
This set a realistic tone on the discussion, and should have quelled all
sensible controversy. No doubt, this did not obviate the need for
showing the backwardness of the 'caste' in question and the kind of
disadvantage or discrimination it suffered. But, the desire of diverse
governments to assist identifiable groups and communities whose
inclusion in the list of beneficiaries was controversial added more
fuel to fire. By the time the Supreme Courtsr dealt with the Mysore
cases in 1963, it was obvious that the schemes would fail for other
reasons (concerning the relative level of literacy required to qualify
as 'backward classes'). But, Justice Gajendragadkar did not want to
miss the ideological wood for the trees. Aware-perhaps annoyed-
by the anti-brahmanical nature of the reservations but unwilling to
state this intuition openly, ideologically against the use of casre to
define governmental programmes, inspired by a Hindu reformism,
anxious to project the view that 'caste' was an aberrational and
artificial addition to Hinduism and not its basis, Justice Gajendra-
gadkar, in the Supreme Court, placed his anxieties on an eclectic
pedestal to make the plea tlat the issue had to be examined in a
"rational and scientific way".32 For him this meant that both caste and
poverty were relevant for determining backwardness, but caste could
not be the sole or dominant test.33 It is this aspect that was emphasised
by Justice Subba Rao in a case that was reported in the next year in
1964, where he refused to equate 'caste' witi ,class' but permitted
caste to be one of the factors that would define a class.3a Such an
approach was practically impossible even if theoretically sound. To
undertake the task of identifying individuals who share .backward'
common characteristics was asking for a national social census from
which, new and old groups would be identified. Such a task was
nothing short of Hercuiean. Apart from being unmanageable and
expensive, it was like determining which needles in a multitudinous
nation full of haystacks were socially similar. Surely, the correct
approach was to start with groups (including caste groups which
would invariably be the most numerous); and, then, consider whether
the groups were backward. Apart from this impracticality, this ap-
proach has conectly been described as "flagrantly unhistorical"3s
since the choice of the word "classes" in the constitutional text could
not, by any stretch of imagination, have implied that the Constitution
makers wanted to exclude 'castes' from consideration as OBCs.
Indeed, the very identification of SCs (untouchables) and STs (disad-
vantaged tribes) showed that hostility to, and rhe disadvantage suf-
fered by, traditional disadvantaged caste groups was precisely what
the Constitution makers wished to amend.
Juristic proclamation had secured the ideological victory of mini-

mizing the importance of caste in identifying backwardness, but it
brought its own problems. If the OBCs could not be just caste groups,
there was no knowing where to stop' Surely, traditional groups and
communities were all entitled to be considered for preferential
prograflrmes as long as they were able to show that they fell within
the prescribed indicia of backwardness. Elections, and the need for
captive vote banks, drove the govemment into increasing the catchment
of groups identified for preference. Kerala's attempt to include the
Ezhavas and the Muslims found judicial rebuke-not necessarily
because of the manner in which the group was defined but because of
the lack of supporting data.36 If one Pandora's box Oased on 'caste')
was partly half shut, another more general box was re-opened. Com-
munal reservations or reservations of rural communities were sported
for examination and found wanting. But the resistance to 'caste' as a
criterion continued on the strikingly reductionist and over-simplified
argument that the Constitution's aim of a 'casteless' society pre-
vented constitutional functionaries from rectifying the cumulated
injustice of centuries encrusted in the caste system. A fragile refuge
from proceeding in this over-stylized manner was sought in declaring
that a class could never solely be based on 'caste', which probably
meant no more than saying that although the group tested for 'back-
wardness' could be a caste group, it would still have to be shown that
the group was socially and educationally backward.3T But, the ideo-
logical tone of the judgements shows resistance to the idea of groups
being identified by their caste. The attempt to exclude caste groups as
beneficiaries is all the more inacceptable because the arguments over
caste are confined to the OBCs even though they apply with a
similarly forceful logic to the SC (if not the ST) as well. Yet' the
question is not one ofjust academic importance because it goes to the
heart of the purpose behind the reservations. Are reservations only
about rectifying the imbalances of the past? If that is the case, it
would be limited to those categories or classes who were 'backward'
at the time the Constitution was promulgated and who would, by the
by, become 'forward' as time passes. In this view, although these
provisions of the Constitution were not expressly transitional, they
could be treated as transitional by force of interpretation in that no
new groups would be added to the OBCs list on the basis that some
future social, economic or political circumstances may create new

OBC groups who constitutionally deserved preferential treatment. It
is not necessary for our present purposes to explore this further
except for the limited purpose of accepting that although 'caste'
groups were historically the main intended beneficiaries of prefer-
ence, other groups could also be included within the rubric of such
remedial justice. To that extent, the 'not-caste-alone' formula could
not be ignored. But, such an approach was not intended to exclude
'caste' groups but to include others. The possibility that new groups
can also claim preference as part of the mandate of equality cannot be
foreclosed for the future. Where the Constitution does not intend a
provision to be transitional, interpretation should not render the use
of its beneficial provisions otiose for the future. After all, apan from
electoral reservations, special provisions for SC and ST, women and
children have not been declared transitional. The Constitution is a
living document, to be used to achieve its Justice' imperatives in the
future with as much force as it might have endeavoured to have done
so in the past. There are many new disadvantaged groups that could
be created-whether by migration or the exigencies of social and
economic life. To exclude the possibility of a substantive justice for
such groups does not sit easily with the Constitution's aims and
objects.
The muddle over the issue of 'caste' was inspired by ideological
considerations; but it soon acquired a social momentum bordering on
an undeclared 'caste'war-at least at the level of perceptions, litiga-
tion, public response and politics. As the govemments responded by
identifying a large number of enormous OBC expectants, the Courts
were invited to intervene. The judiciary's initial intervention echoed
both the views of the central government and Nehru's philosophy.
This symbiosis of juristic instinct and government policy is by no
means 'a-typical' of judicial decision making in India; or-for that
matter 'anywhere'----else. There was a distinct 'class' (in the Marxist
sense) element in all this. Having lost their campaign with the state
govemments, the privileged classes looked to the central govemment
and the Courts for protection. It is a matter of record that they won a
partial success with the Courts. But it was a success which-over the
sixties and into the seventies-slowly lost ground.
ilI
The judicial response of the sixties failed to interpret the mandate of
equality contained in the Constitution in all its fullness. The mandate
of equality in the Constitution encompasse s both anti-discrimination
(that citizens be dealt with on the basis of their merit without taking
into account their antecedents of caste, race, sex, place of birth,
residence and so on) as well as a positive commitment to eliminate
disadvantage (by giving preferential treatment to persons to over-
come their disadvantage). Needless to say, even the anti-discrimina-
tion principle is founded on the assumption that unequals should not
be treated equally. So, if disadvantaged persons are treated on par
with the advantaged such action would be, ex facie, discriminatory.
Preferential treatment is not an exception (or for that matter even an
addition) to the anti-discrimination principle. It is very much a part of
equality.3s Even if preferential treatment were not written into the
Constitution, schemes of preferences-no less in tle matter of oppor-
tunities for professional education as well as government jobs-
would not fall foul of formal principles of equality. If nothing else,
the joumey of the American Supreme Court into issues related with
affirmative action demonstrate this most ably even though a recent
judgement of the Supreme Court may support a break in the continu-
ity of that Court's egalitarian commitment to substantive social equal-
ity.3e It is, of course, arguable that preferential discrimination is of
two distinct kinds.4 Thelrsr relates to preferential treatment in the
matter of welfare and the creation of special schemes in order to
enable self improvement. The second is preferential employment
which'entails either the preferential selection of disadvantaged can-
didates (where the candidate otherwise meets the eligibility require-
ment for the job) or the relaxation of some of the eligibility require-
ments Out never below the qualificatory level consistent with an
efficient discharge of thejob in question) or the creation of special in-
service training and other programmes and benefits (which both
compensate disadvantage as well as enable self development).at These
distinctions betw een p refe rential tre atment and p referential employ-
ment arc by no means water tight. During the course of arguments in
the Mandal case, it was suggested that India's Constitution itself
acknowledges and accepts this distinction since it locates the com-
pensatory discrimination programme in two distinct locations in the

chapter on Fundamental Rights, namely the general preferential treat'
ment prograrnme which is in the Article which otherwise injuncts
general discrimination by the State inter alia, on grounds of caste
(Article 15(4)) and the p referential employment programme whichis
in the Article dealing with a similar non-discrimination in matters of
public employment (Article 16(4)).42 But the Supreme Court rejected
the argument that the compensatory schemes could be put in such
rigid compartments.a3 Yet, the distinction is both rational and not
without constitutional or public significance. Time and time again,
those against reservation in public employment have argued that the
proper approach is not to reserve jobs for the less meritorious (even
if minimally qualified), but to create educational and other opportu-
nities so that, in the course of time, the disadvantaged and their
children may overcome their handicap. So, the war cry of even some
of the sympathetic anti-reservationists in relation to preferential em-
ployment was "Training: Yes; Jobs: No". Such an argument gets
increasingly thin in its generosity when the anti-reservationists fur-
ther argue that preferential admission to courses in professional edu-
cation (such as to medical, engineering, law, architecture and so on)
should be placed on par with preferential employment-since such
admission to and success in such courses is a pre-condition to a
professional career in these fields. This argument has now been
decisively rejected by the Supreme Court which has-it would ap-
pear-affirmed the distinction between affirmative action and prefer-
ential employment which it rejected somewhat cursorily in its Mandal
judgement.aa Some anti-reservationists take the argument further and
assert that there should be no reservations in tertiary education at all;
and all that should be done is to either minimally relax the examining
criteria to give the disadvantaged a fighting edge over merit candi-
dates or to create special facilities for their self improvement at
primary and secondary levels. By leaving even the conceptual foun-
dations of reservations under Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) unclear,
the Supreme Court has left many options open and invited litigation
on the application of the principles flowing from the Mandal jtdge-
ment on employment questions to other areas.
Without getting into too many finite distinctions, one important
Indian aspect of preferential public employment cannot be over-
looked. Govemment jobs in India have a special status. In order to

ensure the independence of the civil service, the Constitution con-
tains various protections for govemment employees in the mat[er of
their dismissal, removal or rcduction in rank.as Since any action taken
against public employees is a function of the government, all such
actions are liable to be tested against the fundamental rights chapter
and set aside ifthey are arbitrary or unreasonable. But these layers of
constitutional protection-and all the litigation that they have given
rise to-are expressions of the importance of the status attached to
government jobs and nc: the reason for it. Apart from the importance
attached to the 'job' security of state employment, a social and
cultural importance is attached to government jobs in India at all
levels-be they ever so low. The IAS (Indian Administrative Ser-
vice) and the other services carry a special significance in the matri-
monial market which is eclipsed only (even if that) by the importance
of well-off business and industrial families and groups. With the
growth of private s€ctor, the eclipse is gathering ground, but not
sufficiently to take away the social shine from the status of civil
servants and bureaucrats. After Independence, India's massive regu-
latory economy made bureaucracy extremely powerful because the
latter was the custodian of the power exercised by the Indian State. In
a 'license' Raj in which permits and permissions arc required for
virtually everything, govemment servants soon became possessed of
the kind of absolute power that corupts absolutely.
But, quite apart from the dividends that would flow from power
corrupting itself, there is no denying that the formal power of the
State in India is visibly exercised by politicians and administrators. It
is in this sense that the present writer successfully argued before the
Supreme Court in the Mandal case that job reserving for the SC, ST
and OBCs were an instrument for their empowerment in order to
enable them to share the power of the State.$ The form in which this
submission was made found favour with the majority judgement of
the Court. To a cynic, it may seem that the Indian State was up for
grabs and any reservation programme was no more than an unscrupu-
lous conspiracy to capture as much of it as possible. Such a cynical
reading ignores the social reality that certain castes, groups and
communities had not only been systematically excluded from sharing
both social power and the power of the State by a combination of
The Supreme Court as problem Solver:
Mandal Controversy 277
sustained discrimination and deprivation,
but were likely to be so
excluded for many years to come.
The reservation p.og.u*rn" *ur,
thus, not just a vehicle to achieve
,*Af ,oUlity;.but, no less, an
exercise in egalitarian democracy
enabling the .have nots, to share
power with the ,haves'. It is these
normati;e urp".u of rrc constitu_
tional scheme rhat seem to have been
dr"*;.;1;;;robsrs
- -' *-, of the
elite resisting an assault on their priuileges.
During the fifties and sixties, the fun'damental
fallacy in the ap_
proach of the courts_led by the
Suprem" Coun_*u. a steadfast
yl.usal 1o give due importance to the ieleological aims of
the Consti_
tution. Faced with a massive litigation
rhe su_
preme court silenced appeals to "r;i;;';;"r,rs,
social justice .onoin"o in the Direc_
tive Principles of State policy on
a format Ufu"t_iJt". .."Aing of the
constitutional text that such principles
were ..not eiiorceable by any
though) . . . fundamenial in the governan-ce
"oy.Ij"]"n
try".i? Thi: had,its impact on rhe inrerprjation oi
of the coun_
irre .equality,
mandate of the Constitution. In the
very first ,"r"*utlon, aur" in
195148, the Court made it clear
rr,r uair..tiu.l.in.iiiJUurra upp"uf
to the reasonably clear provisions
interpr.et O"aIng *itfr equality was
not permissible . By 1962, when the
Supreme c""n *", considering
the applicability of reservarions to promoti;;;;';;"n
through
both Justice Gajendragadkar and Justice
Wanchoo ui"r1o trc p."f"._
ential employment provisions a s exceptions
to the equality provisions
and nor as a parr of them.ae Once the
,.r.*u,io;;;;;ramme was
relegated to the status of an
rost-itsentitrem;;;;;;##;"":"Jr".r"il:'Jtiilil,l.iiir,;ll
quest for real equality. This was -io'
f"rtt ;urtin"O U" fu*ou,
". iasis that
Mysore case ( 1963) on the consequentialist
"(t)he demand for technicians. scientists,

doctors, economists,
engineers and experts for the economic
advancern#
try is so great that it would cause great pr.:rOl." of the coun_
interesrs if considerations of merit-aie
to national
by
wholesale reservations of seats in "o;;;;.il""tuded
all technical, _Ji*f
neering colleges or institutions of that ---- and engi_
kind,,.sd
Put in this form, the dilemmas inherent
in the compensation discrimi_
nation programme were highly exagger"t"d.
d;-;;;;ramme (as
The Politics of B ackwardnes s
278
posts
in professional education or
manifest in the reservation of seats the
seen as not only against
in qovemment employment.l was' thus' con-
p,i";;;ffi;'iilq""ritv which was perceived. as being
overall national interest' It
i"t".i*itt.,i"t, but aiso inimical to the
view that the Constitution did
was not the case that the Court
took the
of seats and posts' Much rather' it
not empower such "reservations"
were available also for promo-
even conceded that "reservationJ'
take the view that although such
donal posts.sl But, it seemed to
"reservations" could be made, they
were-ty and large-against the
an exception:
gtJrn p""ciple of equalityio which they were
"iii"further a-threat to the national inrcrest'
ini *.t" one aspect of the equality
The fundamental fallacy in emphasizing the
.unJu* in*-oiscriminaiion on grounds of merit) and ignoring
redrlsinc the inequi
substantive and remedial utf""t li"Aing
w-ith
social disadvantage) was highlighted
ties of cumulatively sedimented
l"ui* Rao in a 1964 case in a powerful passage:
ily S"UUa
of equality' Article 16 is
"Article 14 lays down the general rule
the general rule with special
an instance of the applicatiin of It says
under the State'
reference to opportunity of appointments
all citizens in matters
ii.iit .rt"ri te "qo"tity or opportunity for *.L:ll"t
"t
relating to t' oppointt"nt to under the
"mployment communities would go to
State. If it stood alone, all the backward
social structure; the said rule
the wall in a society of uneven basic
conception' unless a
oi equafity would remain only an utopian enforcement brings
practical content was tiven to it' Its itrict
avoid. To make my point clear'
about the very situationit seeks to
horses arsset down to run
iJ" o" ilfoutution of a horse race' Two and the an ordinary
horse
a race-one is a first class race -other
the same starting point' Though
one. Both are made to run from
opporrunity torun the race' in
theoretically they are given equal to
opportunitv
;;;;; ordinary io's" is-not given an equal
that is denied to it' So a
compete with the race horse' Indeed' or a
of extra weight
;;;ii;"p may be iiven either in the nature
doing so' what rvould otherwise
start from a longer distance' By
would be made a real one' The
have been u tu'"t of u totpetition
same difficulty had confronted
the makers of the Constitution at
-Centuries
the time it was maOe'
of calculated oppression and
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 27g
habitual submission reduced a considerable section of our com_
munity to a life of serfdom. It would be well nigh impossible to
raise their standards if the doctrine of equal opportunity was
strictly enforced in their case. They would not have any chance if
they were made to enter the open field of competition without
advertitious side till such time when they could stand on their own
legs. That is why the makers of the Constitution introduced cl.(4)
in Article 16. The expression .,nothing in this article', is a legisla-
tive device to express its intention in a most emphatic way thit the
power confened thereunder is not limited in any way by the
rriain
provision that falls outside it. It has not really carved out an
exception, but has preserved a power untremelled by the other
provisions of the Article."52
However, despite the lucidity of this explanation, the emphasis on the

anti-meritorian principle and the ideological resistance to using caste
as a criterion for identifying backwardness continued with a
desree
of uniform ambiguity. The judgements went out of their way to mlake
it clear that the compensation discrimination programme was an
exception to equality and not a fulfilment of it, confening no
more
than a discretionary power in the State.
The truth is that till the end ofthe sixties, the socialjustice aims of
the Constitution (whether contained in its preamble, the Directive
Principles or the chapter on Fundamental Rights) were not given
the
constitutional weight they deserved. This recognition came slowly
as
judges came to talk of the pivotal importance of the
Directive prin_
ciples. In the famous Fundanental Rights Case (1g73)s3 due impor_
tance was given to the broad commitment of democratic
iustice in the
Preamble to the Constitution which-despite its unabashldly rhetori_
cal tone--did, after all, reflect the Objectives Resolution of 22 lanu_
uy 1947, passed by the Constituent Assembly after so much unex_
pected discussion.sa In this case-which represents a turning point
in
India's constitutional history in more wayJ than one_all tt
iuOg",
werc agrced as to the importance of a truly egalitarian society.sl " Later
on, when Justice Krishna Iyer reflected on the importance of this
sea
change in the Supreme Court's approach, he felt that the Fundamen-
tal Rights case (1923) '.had clinched the issue of primacy between
. . . Fundamental Rights and Directive principles . . ., neither part
justice- texts began to

being superior".s6 Over the years' the social
guiOi the interpretation of fundamental rights which had' hitherto'
rather than
foncemed themselves much more with individual claims
justice within which they had to be
in. UrouA"t conspectus of social
understood and interpreted.
It was in the famous Thomas casesT that the basis of this funda-
was examined
mental fallacy about the substantive aims of equality
with the issues in the case
and found wanting. We are not concerned
for reserved SC cand!
concerning the relaxation on certain criteria
dates. Theimajority took the view that "special
provisions ' ' ' for the
advancement tf backward classes and reservations of appointments
and posts for them to secure adequate represen'."d?1 :; t
brile oyt
Another judge
fe
conient of equality guaranteed (by the Constitution)"'s8
exhorted: "ti*" ari to achieve equality' we can never afford to relax'
;wrtif" in"qourity is easy, since itdemands no more than to float with
tfr" equality is Oimcut for it involves swimming against
"orrtnt,
it'."se As if to underscore the parameters of the reversal' Justice
iisf,na Iyer emphasized that "(rFservation based on classification
.f tt t*itq and^forward classes without detriment to adminisrative
of equality"' For
standards . . . is but an application of the principle
fri- "t"l clear vision oi the true intendment of these provisions
idea that
O"*onOt u O""p understanding of the Indian spiritual secular
pollution and
ilt"-y dwells in all and that ancient environmental
for the
account
,o"iuf pfu..."nt, which the State must extirpate'
.ocio-economic backwardness of the blacked out
human
"orrent view of equality being
areas . . ."e All this did not silence the narrow
judges who found refuge in the earlier
.unuurr"a by some of the
jurisprudence to take a mu"h rnot" formal view of equality' To them
treatment for
it" 'l.r"ution of classes for favoured and preferential
(would) ' ' ' erode the concept of equality of
poifi.
".pfoy."nt
ipp"n*iiy for all citizens in matters relating to the employm€nt
under the State".6l
shifted the
But once the Thomas case (1976) had successively
equality mandate was to be under:
Uatance of focus by which the
time in seeking recourse to the
,iooO,joOg"t like Iirishna Iyer lost no
ino^i, titing to emphasize that "equality clalses in our constitu-
iionat etttic trive an equalizing ttttug" and egalitarian
meaning"'62
Iyer went out
Tho^o, *a, con""m"d with SC' But' Iustice Krishna
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy Zgl
of his way to state that
"But the core reasoning has crucial significance in all cases

of
protective discrimination. The process of equalisation
and benign
discrimination are integral, and not antagonistic, to the principle
of
equaliry. In a hierarchical society with an indelible feudal stamp
and incurable actual inequality, it is sophistry to argue that pro_
gressive merBures to eliminate group disabilities and promote
collective equality are anathema on the score that every individual
has entitlement on pure merit of makers. This nanow .unsocial,
pedantry subverts the seminal essence of equal opportunity
even
for those who are humble and handicapped. Meriiocracy, cannor
displace equality when the utterly backward masses labour under
group disabilities. So we may weave those special facilities
into
the web of equality which, in an equitable setiing, provide for the
weak and promote their levelling up so that, in tni tong run, the
community at large may enjoy a general measure of real equal
opportunity. So we hold, even apart from Article l5(3) and (4) that
equality is not negated or neglected where special provisions are
geared to the larger goal ofthe disabled getting over their disable_
ment consistently with the general good and individual merit.
Indeed, Article 14 implies all this, in its wider connotation. and
has to inform the interpretation of Article 15."63
Iustice Krishna lyer's view found support from various colleagues

who stressed the importance of State action being directed to ensur_
.ing that "under-privileged, the deprived and
exploited are . . . pro-
tected and nourished so as to take their place in an egalitarian soci-
that "equality of opportunity', musr be ,u"h u. ro yield to
:ry", :9
"equality of results" .".6a The argument was not that ,,public
employment may be treated as a new form of private property-_
because there was a danger that the reservatirons programme be
viewed in that light.6s Much rather, it was because the Indian State
had an overall remedial commitment to uplift the OBCs from the
marginalised predicament into which their future had been rnsensi_
tively mortgaged and from which they were unlikely to emerge in the
near future without the help of a comprehensive compensatorv dis_
criminatory programme.
There is one other constitutional aspect that merits examination'

Even under the general doctrine of equality, there is a broad
principle
and ear-
that the State may classify persons into various categories
mark tle various categories for differential treatment' Recognising
difference is not, by itself, conuary to equality' Accordingly'
the
founded on
doctrine of classification permits classification which is
with the purpose
rational criteria which bears a nexus or relationship
for, and in the context of which, the classification was made' If no
classifications were made, the cause of equality would suffer'
No
doubtJusticeSubbaRao'swarningthatthedoctrineofclassification
shouldnotbecomeasubstituteforequalityitselfneedstobebornein
no
mind.6 But, for our present purposes, it is important to stress that
one has ever proteited where preferential admissions have been
given to parti;hr classes of persons irrespective of-merit and not-
iuitttrt-&ng the fact that the class so earmarked for preferential
treatment his not been a disadvantaged class' Under the not so well
known doctrine of'source', admissions to tertiary and even profes-
sional education have been permitted to classes like sportsperson'
children of freedom fighters' children 'of India's diplomats abroad'
children of foreigners from certain countries and so on'67
If reserva-
tionscanbemadeonthebasisofarationalclassificationinfavourof
otherwise privileged persons' the case for reservations for the disad-
vantaged can hardly be without egalitarian merit' Such reservations
are mentioned only to emphasize that apart from the compensatory
discrimination programme there are various other kinds of reserva-
tions which also eat intG-but have not been regarded as an impedi-
ment to-the narrow concepts of a merit based equality' This also
demonstrates that the prejudice against caste based compensatory
discrimination may be founded more on social prejudice and less on
intimations of the public interest to which appeals have been made'
This prejudice is demonstrated by the fact that the concept of a
"creamy layer" (denying the benefit of reservations to the truly better
off amongst the disadvantaged) has been imposed on the OBC reser-
vation but not on reservations either under the doctrine of source or
res€rvations for the SC and 5T.68
Animated by the personality of individual judges constitutional
theory has to keep pace with political crisis. Unfortunately' accounts
of thi Supreme Court's jurisprudence on compensatory discrimina-
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 2gj
tion have tended to be 'a-historical' , treating the whole period of its
development en bloc without recognising the social and political
nuances that gave rise to thejuristic change ofheart.6e Since the form
in which law is practised is declaratory in nature, the historical-as
opposed to the factual---4ontext within which the decision occurred
is often flattened out of the discourse. Of course, lawyers and judges
playing around with precedents are aware of the circumstances in
which precedents are born-no less the tussles in court and the
ambitions and personality of the judges that dominate the creation of
constitutional jurisprudence. However much one would like to be-
lieve that judicial decision making is preconceivedly bounded by the
cast iron constraints of the rule of law, the truth runs much further and
goes well beyond this declaratory assertion. euite apart from the vast
discretions which the 'law' itself concedes to the judges and the
expectation judges will decide on neutral and principled grounds,To
the internal politics of a Court and the extemal circumstances in
which it is situated and to which it responds play a pivotal role.?r
When judges (especially those of the higher judiciary) decide, they
are both policy makers and legislators. That they err on the side of
caution and hide behind the mysticism of legal argument in articulat-
ing their power is inevitable. Many judges stay within rhe confines of
the received arguments within the law because of their personality,
their conservative perception of their own role and their belief that
their overall function is to decide and, perhaps, warn, but not inno-
vate. Yet, even such conservatism must not be tom out of its context
ai a mere personality trait. As experienced actors in a complex
political economy, the judges-more than anyone else-know the
value of the stakes involved in any legal argument, not just for the
litigants but also the class and other interests which are visibly and
invisibly also before the Court.72 The Court does not just confront
public discourse with its judicial wisdom. In most cases, it works
with government to resolve issues, sometimes taking the lead and
sometimes embarrassing the government into constructive response.
There are more than occasional failures in this equation of under-
standings. Invariably, the govemment, using its power to appoint
judges, seeks to insure itself against unexpected risks. But, even the
govemment is aware that a wholly captive judiciary will lack the
credibility that gives legitimacy to the constitutional enterprise as a
whole.
It is in this context that we have to view the interplay between the
judiciary, and the Union Pnd state govemments over the finite edges
of the jurisprudence of 'reservation'. Even though the 'Congress'
Union Government in the fifties and sixties had taken the ideological
stance that reservations should not really extend beyond the SC and
ST to extend to caste based OBCs because this was inconsistent with
the goal of a casteless society, the Congress state governments of the
South, animated by powerful anti-Brahmin sentiments' had plans of
their own. While the Supreme Ccurt in 1951 had no difficulty in
knocking out generally communal reservations, it failed to give cre-
dence to the historicity of the claim of a large number of caste
communities who had been systematically deprived of access to
wealth, power, status and opportunity and who were determined by
the sheer dint of their numbers to stake their claims through the new
democratic process. Both electorally and otherwise, no govemment
could ignore their claim or 'rubbish' it as unreasonable. The histori-
cal facts were incontrovertible; and the demands that flowed from
these facts more than insistent. It was typical of Nehru's policy to
wax eloquent in Delhi about a casteless society, but permit-for
electoral and otler reasons-the exploration of caste based reserva-
tions by Congress State govemments.T3 Nehru's party-as opposed
to his government-could have tried to resolve these controversies
by shessing the egalitarian and remedial nature of caste based reser-
vations and entering a caution against the political exacerbation of
the issue beyond responsible proportions. But' the Congress chose
not to evolve a base-line of principles from which constructive think-
ing on this issue could commence. The Central Government bowed
out, leaving the Supreme Court to deal with the issue without being
unmindful of the ideological stance that Nehru and his government
had generally taken on this issue.
At the tum of the fifties, the Supreme Court was just coming out
of a major controversy with the govemment over land reform.Ta
Political distrust of the Court was slowly easing. A series of 'fair'
non-political appointments to the Supreme Court (which are a credit
to Nehru's govemment), left the Court with an interestingly brilliant
crop ofjudges.?s In this scenario, it was Justice Gajendragadkar who
stepped forward to take charge of the situation in various areas of
contention where it was felt a stable jurisprudence was called for'

Gajendragadkar came to the court with an apparatus for Sanskrit
learning, a reputation in labour matters, a suave capacity for judicial
management, an affinity with the Nehru government views on secu-
larism and socialism and a fund of patience and energy. If anyone
could restore consensus to a divided court and tidy up the Court's
negative image, he was the judge to do it. We are not here concerned
with his contribution to labour law or issues concerning freedom of
religion and the numerous other matters on which he pronounced
with authority.?6 What is significant is that apart from the occasional
unimportant judgement, Justice Gajendragadkar somehow managed
never to be in dissent. He found the median point around which he
could build his consensus and if this meant a more enduring' albeit
eclectic jurisprudence, there were a thousand pragmatic reasons for
steering the middle path without giving the game away. His landmark
Mysore jldgement (1963)?7, set the tone for all the other judgements
on reservations that followed. Symbolically, it accepted the central
govemment's stance on caste based groups without foreclosing the
issue. Practically, it left the state govemments free to pursue their
policy of reservations but threatened future judicial interference if
they went over the top (although it was not entirely clear what the top
was!). When his colleagues struck a slightly different note' he let
tlose comments sit on the record knowing that his 'constitution
bench' judgement could not be dislodged easily. He defended his
judicial approach as being consistent with the task of achieving
'social engineering through law'' For several years, the arguments on
reservations used his efforts as their starting point.?8
After the Congress split of 1969, the official testarnent of the
Union Government was a socialism in favour of the 'have nots"
Having won the 1971 war with Pakistan, the govemment came in
with a landslide victory. That was not enough'to sustain electoral
support. 'Underdog' socialism was presented as a reason for the
empowerment of the govemment against its opponents. The super-
session of the claims of three judges to be appointed Chief Justice of
India in 1973-(which was a needless and arbitrary act) did not add
to the government's reputation. The Emergency (1975-77) further
sullied that reputation.Te It was around this time that some judges
appointed in the seventies went about reconsffucting the jurispru-
dence of the Court. If the name of Justice Krishna Iyer comes to

mind, it is because it is often eclipsed by reference to some of his
colleagues who constituted a cabal which slowly but steadily re-
wrote the socialist jurisprudence of the Court. This time the jurispru-
dence of the Court was less concemed with the empowerment of the
state whose arbitrariness was itself sought to be disciplined by the
Court. Human rights and socialism were not treated as antithetical.so
Nor was 'human rights' a bourgeois concept, but one which could be
used to protect ordinary people from the everyday atrocities that
plague their lives. Like Gajendragadkar, Krishna lyer, too, possessed
masterly skills. Like him he, too, had never ventured into dissent-
using supportive judgements to advance his arguments and cause. In
such exercises, issues do get fudged; and, they did at the hands of
Justice Krishna Iyer as well. To describe his judicial universe is to
traverse vast intricate areas of decision making and judgement writ_
ing.81 The Thomas case is not just his testament, but also the state-
ment of the other judges. It constitutes a major, albeit symbolic, re-
statement of the equality mandate. Reservations were not a necessary
evil and exception to the principles of equality but very much a part
of them. Speaking for himself, Krishna lyer would not have gone too
far in favour of backward classes. His brief stopped with the protec-
tion of SC and ST. For him the really disadvantaged were the un-
touchables. They were a 'super classification' whom the Constitution
had joined for special attention. Since Thomas was concerned with
SC and with relaxation of criteria rather than reservations, he seized
this opportunity to force the reinterpretation of the mandate of equal-
ity itself.82 Once the juristic reversal was complete and the new
human rights based socialism found its feet, he moved away from the
controversy. Even after retirement when his voice was heard on so
many issues from powerful national platforms he was relatively silent
on the issue of reservations for OBCs and the Mandal controversies
of 1992 which tore India's politics apart in 1990. As his colleagues
confronted these issues, they were aware that the reservations debate
had become stodgy and would need refinement. Krishna lyer,s en-
dorsement of an American professor's insight that there was a .creamy
layer' among the OBCs which had been 'liberated' from disadvan-
tage found independent endorsement from Justice Chinappa Reddy
in 1985.83 The Court seemed to take the view reservations were an
acceptable part of equality- But the jurisprudence of the entire

progiu*. *ould need to be re-examined if it ever reached contro-
veJial levels again. Particular focus was diverted towards ensuring
that the prograrnme was not abused by being appropriated
by the
'.r"u.y iuy"t' amongst the disadvantaged' No less troubling was the
programme
maintenance of standards and the lengths to which the
would be allowed to go. As long as Pandora's box was not opened'
these issues jogged along under the scrutiny of the Courts' But' when
the lid was itu"g op"n, they unleashed controversies
which became
sufficiently potiiicatty unmanageable for the govemment to off-load
the entire controversy on to the Supreme Court which was expected
to devise the final solution.
IV
ever
B.P. Mandal, M.P., was destined to be more famous than anyone
or
imagined he would be. Whether it was in quest of a vote bank
socii justice, the Janata Manifesto of 19?7 made it clear that it would
implement the now forgotten Kalelkar Commission of 1955'
make
reservations betw een 25-33Vo for government service jobs and "for-
mulate a special programme within the framework of the five year
plans for the substantial advancement of the scheduled caste and
trites ana other . ' . backward classes ' ' ' provide adequate funds for
the
the purpose . . . (and set up) special machinery ' ' ' to implement
of relevant constitutional guar-
pro!ra*-" and assure fulfilment the
antees".* A large number of States had evolved their own compen-
perhaps
satory discrimination. The arguments of principle lay buried'
had eluded the
on"oioforr"bly so. But, what was at issue and what
reservationisti was the inclusion of prognmmes of preferential em-
ployment in the Central government. This was the prized service-
ailegedfy the real home of the administrative power
of the Indian
statJ. Ai officer level, only a handful of jobs were affected' At lower
handful of jobs that were
levels, there were a great deal more. But' the
at stake were the ones that were regarded as the cream of the civil
away their lives'
service-jobs for which many werc willing to paYe
To go back and use the Kalelkar lists of 1955 simply did not
make
,"nJ". So, u n"* Commission was appointed under the Chairmanship
of B-P. Mandal:
"(i) to determine the criteria for defining the socially and edu_
cationally backward classes;
(ri) to recomrrrcnd steps to be taken for the advancement
of the
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens so identi_
fied:
(irr) to examine the desirability or otherwise of
making provi_
sion for tle reservation of appointments or posts in favour of such
backward classes ofcitizens which are not idequately represented
in public services and posts in connection witi the affairs of the
Union or of any State; and
(iu) prcsent to the president a rcport setting out the
facts as
found by them and making such recommendations as they
think
proper."
The Commission was empowered to
"(a) obtain such information as th'ey may consider necessary

or
relevant for their purpose in such form and such manner
as thev
may think appropriate, from the Central Govemment, the State
Govemrnent, the Union Territory Administrations and such
other
authorities, organisations or individuals as may in the opinion
of
the Commission, be of assistance to them; and
(D) hold their sittings or the sittings of such sub_committees
as
they may appoint from amongst their own members at such
times
and such places as may be determined by, or under the authoritv
- of
the Chairman."8s
The Commission had the usual power to obtain information
and
organize its work and sittings as determined by the Chairman.
With
t_r:l:"" extended by one year, the Commission rcported on 3l Dec.
1980 rather than the sarne date in 1979. By thii time,
the Janata
government had gone. The Congress governnrent, carrying
the bag_
gage of the past and unsure whether the Mandal report
w:rs a gift or
a liability, pleaded for more rime and consultation in
l9g2 and made
a weak promise to implement Mandal in lgg3 as it transited
closer to
the next general election.e
By late 1989, a new Janata govemment was sworn in. Its prime
Minister, V.P. Singh, had resolved to impletrcnt MandaL Despite
the
massivecriticismofthisdecision-bothatthetimeandafterthefall
of the Singh govemrnent as a conse{luence of pursuing this
policy-
this decision was a canny decision-not half as foolish or foolhardy
as it is made out to be. Singh and his colleagues knew that
there was
a tremendous discontent with caste dominated politics that had
ex-
emerged in the North of India which not only systematically
cludeil certain backward castes from power' position, property and
politics but also maltreated the latter. One chapter of Mandal was
ievoted to the differences between the North and the South and drew
pointed anention to the absence of mass movements in UP and Bihar
io forward the cause of the backward castes against the "tradi
"urry
tions oi semi feudalism in UP and Bihar (whereby) the forward castes
. , . keep tight control over smaller backward castes and prevent(ed)
them fromJoining the mainstream backward classes movement"'87
The OBCs had notjust to be preferentially treated but also
politically
mobilised. Electoral politics and social justice had found a powerful
meeting ground which would alter the very basis on which elections
would be-fought in the near futurc- Mandal was the means by which
of South was to be
the highly successful antihigher caste politics the
new political
ernutu:ted. What was being sought to be released was a
energy.
To re-capitulate the events of 1990 is as unnecessary as rt rs
necessary to analyse them' Singh's fateful memorandum of 13
Au-
gust 199b was prefaced by a powerful statement in ?arliament' For
tirn n" *gontint of principle was already concluded- SC and ST
reservation-s existed. Self betterment schemes were not enough'
It
was a question of empowerrnent.
"We consciously want to give them a position in the decision

making of the country, a share in the power sructurc ' ' ' Merely
makin! programmes of economic benefit for various sections of
society will not do . . . There is a very big forc,e in the argument
to
involve the poorest in the power structute''a
He was conscious that "when changing the structure, there will be

resistance". We do not really have to go into grcat detail on the events
of August to October 1990 which led to chaos in Delhi as students
soughi to immolate themselves, protesting that Mandal was
anti-
meritorian, ruinous, unfair, political, caste based and communal and

wholly contrary to the public interest. The newspaperF-led by Shourie
in the Indian Erpress-swung into action, pretending that what was
happening was in fact, a popular revolt.se The newspapers carried
portentous stories that implementing Mandal would result in illiter-
ates running the country and unqualified butchers becoming qualified
surgeons. Such portrayals were literally inflammatory. The argu-
ments proceeded with guile and speed. The object was not to discuss
the issue but to bring down Singh's govemment which-left to
itself-was poised to alter the very basis on which the future of
electoral North Indian politics was to be written. It was also clear that
in a short span of a few months, the Singh government had demon-
strated an intent to fulfil their election promises on a number of issues
with speed. Given is uncertain party position in parliament, Singh
could have been defeated on the floor of the House. But. the other
parties did not want to be seen as paralysing parliarnent. They wanted
the issue out in the strcets in the form of a popular revolt to silence
Janata's ambitions once and for all, by depicting the latter as a party
not fit to govern.
For our present purposes, it is not necessary to do more than
highlight some aspects of the controversy. In the first place, the
argument about merit had little merit in it. The scare that was beins
paraded by way of incitemenr overlooked the simple truth that ttrei
werc 22Vo reservations in the Union Government for SC and ST. All
the arguments pertaining to 'nrerit' applied equally to the SC and ST
reservations. But, no party or public person dared to speak too loudly
about the SC and ST dispensation. Mandal would increase the per-
centage to 2'l%o more.If that was the issue, it _was a far narrower issue
than the one that was being paraded for incitement. Second, there
were OBC programmes already in place in virtually every State up to
the permissible limits of 50% which had earlier been suggested by
the Supreme Court as a rule of thumb. So, what was at issue here
were a handful of officer class jobs in central Govemment with
which the protesting middle class students were directly concemed.
The issue of backward class reservations had been settled for all
govemments except the central govemment. All that was being done
by Mandal was to rcduce central govemment's resistance to accept-
ing what was settled policy in every state of the Union. Third, the
entire campaign was politically inspired and for the sole political
purpose ofiringlng down the then lanata govemment'e0 This is self
eviient from the attitude of the other political parties whilst the
controversy was set alight on the streets of Delhi and elsewhere' Like
the dog in Sherlock Holmes's adventure of the Silver Blaze, it was
curious that the political parties said virtually nothing about their own
commitment to implementing Ma ndat while the controversy was still
raging. If contraryto their nature, they failed to bark, like Nero they
dJo cho.e to fiddle while Delhi and other cities were victims of
manipulated conflagration. There is one question which the other
political parties should have asked themselves and answered with the
direct honesty that it deserved while the Mandal controversy was
at
its pitch and 6eing used as an instrument to bring down V'P' Singh's
Govemment. The question was : apart from minor adjustment to the
caste based lists approved by Mandal, would the other parties
have
implemented Maiial to create OBC reservation for the Centre and
Union Territories; and, if so, whether they would do so to the same

remains
extenr of 49Vo (including the 22Va for SC and ST)? The fact
that the major political parties-conscious that they were to fight
an
election sotn-failed to ask and answer this question honestly for

fear that they might lose the OBC vote' Yet, in retrospect' the
position of iach one of the potitical parties was to support the
'implemeniation
ofMandalbutto remain silent about it' In fact' when
the Congress came to power, they issued a further memorandum'
They noionly approved the 277o reservation ordainedby Man"dalbut
wentfurthertodetaill0%furthervacanciesfor..othereconomically
backward sections of the people who are not covered by any of the
existing schemes of reservation"'er Consider the consequences if the
Congress had made this position clear in the August of 1990
when
the Mandal controversy erupted. This would have broken the con-
also to assume a clear
spiracy of silence and forced the other parties
position on Mandal. The real failure of govemance was not Janata's
iecision to implement Mandal which, by itself, could have been
democratically discussed. The real failure was on the part of other
political parties who were determined to have the issue decided on
ihe streets. This colossal failure to countenance the most elementary
requirement of honesty put the then govemment to ransom' A matter
(since they
that could have been resolved by the parties tlemselves
were all really ad idem on the issue of implementin g Mandat) went

to the Courts for solution, with Justice Ranganath Mishra (the presid_
ingjudge in the initial stages) assuming a wait-and_see posture in the
granting of an interim injunction instead of taking a definite stance.
The Mandal conroversy was politically engineered and contrived
into fame.
into controversy, the Mandal Report was nakedly pa_
,Plunged
raded for scrutiny. Experts associated with it, disclaimed their ap_
proval. Sociologists who had been waiting in the wings ro have their
say joined the chorus.e2 Every aspect of the Report was attacked.
Unlike the Kalelkar Commission, what Man dal uted to do was stress
the need for empirical data while emphasizing its paucity.e3 If castes
were a starting point, it was only natural to refer to the l93l census
after which reference to caste was not available in any later census.
Since the 1961 census contained information about various tribes, it
was used for that purpose.ea The Mandal Commission could not
overlook the fact that various state govemments had compiled lists of
OBCs which-along with the criteria they were based on_hud b""n
approved by various High Court and Supreme Court judgements.
But, it went one step further and conducted a survey with the advice
of a distinguished panel of experts. In 405 out of 406 districts everv
household in two villages and one urban block were surveyed and the
data analysed.es Even this was not regarded as definitive. Having
toured the country and got .personal' impressions, various other
groups were also tested for backwardness. The test for backwardness
was contained in an eleven point criterion:
"As a result of the above exercise, the Commission evolved

eleven 'Indicators' or 'criteria' for determining social and educa_
tional backwardness. These I I .indicators' were grouped under
three broad heads, i.e., Social, Education and Economic. They are:
(A) Social
(i) Castes/Classes considered as socially backward by oth_
ers.
(ii) CasteVClasses which mainly depend on manual labour
for their livelihood.
(iii) CasteVClasses where at least 25% females and 1096 males
above the state average get married at an age below 17

years in rural areas and at least l0% females and SVo
males do so in urban areas.
(tv) CasteVClasses where participation of females in work is
al least 25Eo above the State averase.
(B) Educational
(v) Castes/Classes where the number of children in the age
group of 5- 15 years who never attended school is at least
25Vo above the State average.
(vr) Castes/Classes where the rate of student drop-out in the
age group of 5-15 years is at least 25Vo above the State
average.
(vii) CasteVClasses amongst whom the proportion of ma-
triculates is at least 25Vo below the State average.
(C) Economic
(viii) CasteVClasses where the average value of family assets
is at least 25Vo below tle State average.
(ix) Castes/Classes where the number of families living in
Kutcha houses is at least 25Va above the State average.
(r) CasteVClasses where the source of drinking water is
beyond half a kilometre for more than 50Vo of the house-
holds.
(xt) Castes/Classes where the number of households having
taken consumption loan is at least 257o above the State
average.
As the above three groups are not of equal importance for our
purpose, separate weightage was given to 'Indicators' in each
group. All the social 'Indicators' were given a weightage of 3
points each. Educational 'Indicators' a weightage of 2 points each
and Economic 'Indicators' a weightage of one point each. Eco-
nomic, in addition to Social and Educational Indicators, were
considered important as they directly flowed from social and
educational backwardness. This also helped ro highlight rhe lacts
that socially and educationally backward classes are economically
backward also.
294 The Politics of Bachuardness
It will be seen that from the values given to each Indicator, the
total score adds up lo 22. All these l l Indicators were applied to
all the castes covered by the survey for a particular State' As a
result of this application, all castes which had a score of 507o
(i.e.,ll points) or above were listed as socially and educationally
backward and the rest were treated as 'advanced'. (It is a sheer
coincidence that the number of indicators and minimum point
score for backwardness, both happen to be eleven.) Further, in
case the number of households covered by the survey for any
particular caste were below 20, it was left out of consideration, as
ihe sample was considered too small for any dependable infer-
ence."
"In the end it may be emphasised that this survey has no
pretensions to being a piece of academic research' It has been
conducted by the administrative machinery of the Government
of simple
and used as a rough and ready tool for evolving a set
criteria for identifying social and educational backwardness'
Throughout this survey our approach has been conditioned by
practical considerations, realities of field conditions, constraints of
iesou.ces and trained manpower and paucity of time' All these
factors obviously militate against the requirements of technically
sophisticated and academically satisfying operation."e6
The 'social indicators' were weighted at 3 points each' the educa-

tional at 2 and the economic at l. Having identified the groups
(including caste and other occupational group), it was unable to get a
fix on the exact number of OBCs since no head count had been done'
On the basis of the 1931 census, it made a guess that after excluding
the forward classes and assuming a uniform rate of demographic
growth for all, the OBCs were approximately 527o. Although the use
of 50 year old data and the crude method of calculation have been
criticised, not too much turns on the figure of 52Vo- In line with
Supreme Court judgements that the overall reservation should not
exceed 5O%, the Commission did not rely on its own guess to
propose a further 52Vo reservation but chose to propose 27Vo as
sufficient to provide the compensatory equity that would tilt the
balance in favour of OBC empowerment. Given the nature of the task
and the experience of the Commissions appointed by various states'
the Mandal Commission had done well. The only real attack on it was
the old ideological attack that it entrenched caste, took reservations to
the farthest limits of around 50% and failed to isolate the creamy
layer.
The Government Memorandum of 13 August 1990 was to be
prospectively applied from 7 August 1990, with 27Vo OBC reserva-
tions excluding all those OBCs who had been selected on merit
anyway and giving preference to those OBCs who were in the lists
that were cofilmon to Mandal and the State.eT Wlen the Congress
came in with the experience of a post-Mandal election behind them,
they did not, in their Memorandum of 25 September 1991, alter the
27 Vo but created a further sub-section-not of the creamv laver but of
the 'more backward' comprising of the .poorer' sections of ihe OBCs
who would be given a preferential edge over the mainstream OBCs.
They also added a further residuary 10Zo of .economically' backward
not covered by the list of OBCs.e8 The extra l0qo took the total
reservation over the 5OVo level, perhaps deliberately to tempt consti-
tutional providence. The distinction between the .more backward'
and the 'backward' was an interesting political gimmick (even if the
distinction could be constitutionally justified), because the memoran_
dum evolved no method of determining who the more backward
would be; and, merely, promised that a separate list would be issued
separately. The Congress's attempt to appear different_and justify
its earlier silence-floundered for content. The matter was literally
dumped before the Supreme Court which, in turn, constituted a nine
judge bench partly to enable a safety of numbers; and, partly to give
itself the leeway to reassess the entire issue without being hindered
by earlier Constitution benches which had authoritatively quelled
previous controversies.
Since emotions and politics had been charged in exaggerated
proportions, the circumstances under which the Ma ndal case came to
be argued were necessarily dramatic. To the imposing presence of
nine judges were added a battery of lawyers.ee What may have added
to the drama was the unlikely figure of Ram Jethmalani, (who is
usually associated with the causes of well-off accused and detenus),
defending Mandnl with zest. With this kind of Bench, the judges
were in the commanding position of re-inventing the entire jurispru-
dence on reservations. Conscious that they were ,.sitting in a larger
296 The Politics of Bachttardness
bench", they "kept in mind the relevance and significance of the

principle oi ttorc decisis (not disturbing a previous decision) ' ' '
to
unless, of course, there (were) . . ' compelling and strong reasons
depart from it."rm Yet thb Bench split into a majorily consisting of
Justice Jeewan Reddy (writing for Kania C'J, and Venkatachaliah'
Ahmadi and himselfl and Sawant J writing for himself and a minority
consisting of lustices Thommen, Kuldip Singh and Sahai---+ach
their own judgements.lor Justice Pandian's judgement was
writing-*ith
*o.. the majority although he differed with them on crucial
questions by taking a stance against the exclusion of the creamy
luy.r, on giving preference to the more backward on the basis of
on
economic means tests and on rigidly holding on to the 507o ceiling
reservations inespective of taking into account the adequacy of rep-
resentation.lo2 The differences between the majority and minority
were principally on the importance which the latter attached to merit
and to using the economic criteria to identiS backwardness'
The Court began by posing 8 issues to itself' These were:
(i) Whether Article 16(4) is an exception to Article 16(1) and
would be exhaustive of the right to reservation to posts in services

under the State?
(it) What would be the content of the phrase 'Backward Class' in
Article 16(4) of the Constitution and whether caste by itself could
constitute a class and whether economic criterion by itself could
identify a class for Article 16(4) and whether Backward Classes in
Article 16(4) would include the Article 46 as well?
(iii) If economic criterion by itself could not constitute a Back-
ward Class under Article 16(4) whether reservation of posts in ser-
vices under the State based exclusively on economic criteria would
be covered by Article 16(1) of the Constitution?
(iv) Can the extent of reservation to posts in the services under the
State under Article 16(4) or, if permitted under Article 16(l) and
16(4) tosether, exceed 5O7a of the posts in a cadre or service under
the State-or exceed 56Vo of the appointments in a cadre or service in
any particular year and can such extent of reservation be determined
wiihbut determining the inadequacy of representation of each class in
the di'fferent categories and grades of services under the State?
(v) Does Article 16(4) permit the classification of 'Backward
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 2g7
Classes' into Backward Classes and Most Backward Classes or

permit classification among them based on economic or other consid_
erations?
(vi) Would making "any provision" under Article 16(4) for reser_
vation "by the State" necessarily have ro be by law made by the
legislatures of the State or by law made by parliament? Or could such
provisions be made by an executive order?
(vi;) Will the extent of judiciat review be limited or restricted
in
regard to the identification of Backward Classes and the percentage
of reservations made for such classes, to a demonstrably perverie
identifi cation or a demonstrably unreasonable percentage?
(viii) Would reservarion of appointments oi posts .in favour of
any Backward Class" be restricted to the initial appointment to
the
post or would it extend to promotions as well?
Th9^1e were re-cast by Justice Jeewan Reddy into 10 sets of ques-

. It is not necessary to analyse the response to all of them but
tions.r03
only identify the core issues that were important both to public
discourse and which occasioned differences amongst thejudges
them_
selves.
Thefrsr preliminary quesrion was much too easily disposed of. It
-
related to whetherthe government could simply by executive
order
launch on such an extensive and controversiil .t ung.. The answer
that, in the absence of rules (which, too, could be promulgated
by the
govemment), the government could introduce reservations
on its
mere ipse drxir is far from satisfactory. No doubt, in service jurispru_
dence, the govemment could determine the contractual terms
on
which it was going to recruit its civil seryants and deal with their
conditions of service as long as such terms did not offend the
Consti_
tution. Yet, it is necessary to record the discomfiture ofJustice
Sahai:
"Reservation by executive order may not be invalid but since it

was being made for the first time in services under the Union,
propriety demanded that it should have been laid before parlia_
ment not only to lay down (a) healthy convention but also to
consider the change in social, economic and political conditions
in
the country as nearly ten years had elapsed from the date
of the
submission of the Report, a period considered sufficient for evalu_
2g8 The Politics of Backwardness
ation if the reservation should be continued or not'"ro4
The argument of the majority tlat insistence that reservations should

te proiideO ty tarliament would disable local bodies from introduc-
inj ro.tt progr*", does not seem convincing''* we were con-
ceined here with the national civil service who were given special
protection by the Constitution-a policy that could well have been
chall"nged on grounds of violation of fundamental rights' Indeed'
an
context, had warned that the 'execu-
old ruling of 1t5516, in another
tive' poier could be used to fashion policy but not to interfere with
p"opl"', rights. Schemes involving reservation for the.civil service
they
rfroofO U" Jonceived and evolved on a statutory basis because
involve more than a simple condition of service' If they are not
declared by law and Eimply left to the ipse dixit of the.govemment
without any parliamentary oversight' the important policies that un-
-..
derlie thern n"n.t subjected to democratic scrutiny' Once the
government has gone through the exercise of appointing a Commis-
iion and making responsible statements in Parliament, later govern-
ments should h;ve either implemented the recommendations
by leg-
into
islation; or at least,-as Justice Sahai put it-taken Parliament
confidence. No doubt, to deny the govemment the
power to make
day-to-day rules without parliamentary apgrolral may bring both
and Parliameni to a halt' But we are concerned
executivelovemment
-a
major policy issue. Parliament should have been the
here with
major testing ground fot the nalidity of such a policy' V'P' Singh had
maie the relevant statement to Parliament' But' then' Parliament

protests' Had
abdicated the issue to politically manipulated mob
Parliamentexaminedtheissueandvotedonitateachstage'each
political party-indeed, each member-would have had to take a
,t-d on ihir-itsue. This would have pr€vented politicians standing
by and gleefully watching the fun as they watched V'P' Singh's
gou.-ni.o* to a halt and crumble' The reason underlying the
irt" ttt"t executive orders without legislative backing cannot alter
questions
peopte's rights is founded on the sound assumption that
routed through Parliament and deter-
ionceming-suctr righs must be
renders Parlia-
mined by Law. The procedure approved by the C,orrrt
ment entirely powerless on this major issue' If no
legislation is
prima facie unassailable' Even
lquired, the nttification becomes
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 2gg
parliamentary disapproval would not be enough to dislodge it
or the
govemment making it. The purposes of democracy are ill_served
if
Parliament (and, therefore, the people) are kept outof the discussion
to be confronted with a notiftcatory fait accompli.
Beyond the preliminary question as to how such policies should be
_
declared lay the main question which goes to the hiart of the debate:
Is the Constitution caste blind"ttot For a society to agree nor ro
discriminate on grounds of caste, colour or religion is unexceptional,
but can any society be totally blind to the fact that discrimination
stems from very deep rooted prejudices which the Constitution seeks
to outlaw. The whole point of positive discrimination mandate is to
empower-€ven mandate-the govemment to take steps to evolve a
programme to combat the social circumstances whictr would
eradi_
cate the evils that flow from casteism, racism and bigotry. America
has a serious problem of racism. Can the State in that country simply
ignore what is happening in society on the basis that since the law
forbids the State to discriminate on grounds of race, it has no other
choice but to do nothing for black people on the assumption that the
Constitution forces the State to be .colour blind'. If thi agencies of
State in America were to assume total colour blindness in respect
of
their actions, they would, in fact, be perpetuating injustice of the
worst possible kind and inviting riots and unrest. The simple injunc_
tion of non-discrimination does not enjoin the State to be a spectator
to racism. If special protection has to be given to protect blacks from
rascist attacks, it is the duty of the State to provide this protection. If
the victims of racism require special schemes, the Stateiannot plead
colour blindness and refuse such remedial justice. The constitutional
command not to discriminate falls miserably to the ground if endemic
disadvantage continues to be sustained in society. The injunction
against discrimination cannot apply to compensatory discrimination.
If it did, the latter concept would be totally dissolved in a way that
would endanger and mal-construct the concept of equality whlch is
fundamental to the constitutionai enterprise as a whole. By its very
nature, discrimination involves actions that are d irected work againit
persons who belong to the group or class against whom discrimina_
tion is impermissible. A scheme that is discriminatory in
favour of
such a person, group or class does not discriminate against them.
The
fact that it may mal-effect others is precisely why such schemes are
300 The Politics of Baclatt ardne s s
subjected to tests of proportionality. But positive discrimination

must be
schlmes, by virtue of being part of the mandate of equality'
liberally construed since they seek to achieve equality much
in the
harshly construed
,.." *uy, just as anti-discrimination actions are
Equal-
since ttrey.perpetuate and promote the injustice of inequality'
ity is a compoiite social concept of pivotal constitutional significance
*A not iuti a black letter law rule to be applied mechanically' One
would h"ave thought that the one lesson to be leamt from American
jurisprudence is tie refusal of its Courts to accept that the American
"Constitotion
is colour blind-even if the judges have wavered on the
extent and length to which schemes of compensatory discrimination
judges' the
can go. Whatever the reservations of some American
mea-
ma.lo-rity in a 1990 caser08 insisted that "benign race-conscious
not 'reme-
surls mandated by Congress---+ven if those measures are
dial' in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of
past
constitutionally per-
governmental or societal discrimination-are
government objec-
irissible to the extent that they serve important
suffer
tives . . .". It refused to accept that such programmes should
rather than be
strict scrutiny and be kept within narrow confines
allowed to flower with the flavour of the Constitution's comprehen-
presence of
sive egalitarian imagination' Perhaps, unnerved by the
-<lissent, in Mandal----even after
some the Indian Supreme Court
full value of the American precedent
Thomas-refused to accept the
after having been apprised of it thoroughly'r@ Instead it chose
to
"no single uni-
make the somewhat lame summary that in America
form pattem of thought can be discemed ' ' ' Ideas appear to be
still
inevolution''.ll0Infact,onthebasicquestionof.colourblindness'
American legal thought is reasonably uncompromiziag even if recent
-suggest
judgements a less full throated support of reservations in
higher education.
The real argument was not about reservations and compensatory
principle of
discrimination being or not being a primary part of the
equality (for only Justice Thommen saw the compensatory discrimi-
part of
nation programme as an exception to equality rather than a
the judges
i,ttor"1 ir o-ver the permissibility of affirmative action' All
*"r" in no doubt ihat affirmative action was a necessary and proper
part of the equality mandate. The majority linked affirmative action
ly ,nt S,u,. to the goals of the Directive Principles' going beyond a
The Supreme Couft as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 301
simple appeal to substantive equality.rrr The minority was a little less

exuberant. One of the minority judges frowned on the idea of job
reservations, preferring the creation of educational and other oppor-
tunities, with the added caveat that any measure must be narrowly
tailored to achieve int€nded goals.rr2 The real debate was over whether
the use of 'caste' to identify 'beneficiaries' of compensatory dis-
crimination was part of a massive resurection of a caste ridden
society in which people would acquire a vested interest in sporting
caste identities, and with it caste biases, prejudices and enmities. If
Justices Gajendragadkar and Subba Rao had somewhat fudged thc
issue by suggesting that 'caste' could be a criterion but not necessar-
ily the only onerr3, later judgements in the late sixties had been less
equivocal and accepted that the term 'class' could be equated with
caste.rra If the wrong that was sought to be redressed was 'caste', how
could 'caste' be eliminated from defining the wrong which, itself,
was perceived as being caste based? Thomas had closed the issue.r15
But the fact that a political wedge had been used to open Pandora's
box helped its juristic lid from being thrown open.
The majority judges very cautiously steered themselves out of
getting bogged into the controversy over 'caste'. For them, such a
controversy was arid. It was a hangover from the past. By invoking
Ambedkar for the view that backward classes "are nothing else but a
collection of certain castes", the majority dived for historical cover
precisely where they could find it because Ambedkar was both an
untouchable leader as well as the person entrusted with piloting
India's Constitution through the Assembly.r16 He was, thus, the oracle
on this question twice over. But having neutralized the controversy
by appealing to legislative intent, Justice Jeewan Reddy sought to
minimize the importance of 'caste' to the whole issue. For him the
identification of group was only a preliminary steprrT. A 'caste' was
not even a potential beneficiary until and unless it met the test of
'backwardness'. As if to soften the blow, it was reiterated by way of
logical possibility that the preliminary identification need not be a
caste group. There was a tendency on the part of a majority to take the
theoretical stance that a 'class' could mean anything--€ven a caste.
By accepting that the historical intent was to benefit caste groups but
the definitional sprawl encompassed others, the majority managed to
steer its way past the somewhat over-charged discussion over Mandal
entrenching a caste based society.rrE In a sense, there was nothing

more to say; and, much of it had been said before.
Yet, the harsh truth was that once Mandal was electorally appro-
priated, it polarised politics along caste lines. There was no point
pretending that the identification of groups along caste lines was
purely 'preliminary' in nature; and the reality was fulfilling the test of
'backwardness'. Justice Kuldip Singh expressed himself with his
usual candour by projecting the simple truth that Mandal and its
discontents showed that the caste system was "trying to raise its ugly
head in various forms".rre Justice Sahai, as was his wont, put his
finger on the problem when he said: "The real issue is not reservation
but identification".r20 He was surely right in hinting that the debate on
the inclusion of 'caste' had prevented the Court from evolving a test
to identify backwardness. For him although backwardness was not
limited to SC and ST, any OBC should have suffered from similar
discriminations and disadvantage.r2r If the majority were right and
the real issue was one of 'backwardness', its jurisprudence on this
vexed issue did not really travel too far. While Justice Kuldip Singh
eliminated 'caste' considerations from featuring in the test of back-
wardness altogetherr22 and Justice Sahai refused to read backward
caste as synonymous with backward classr23, Justice Thommen looked
for secular criteria grounded in material circumstances so that the
benefits of reservation were extended to those who suffered as a
consequence of "segregation in slums and ghettos and afflicted by
grinding poverty, disease, ignorance, ill health and (being) haunted
by fear and anxiety".r2a All these were, in most cases, felt more
pointedly by caste groups. Yet, for the minority, that was not the
point. They wanted the Court to reassess its previous wisdom and
look at the matter afresh. It was not enough to leave these matters to
the executive. For them, it was for the Court to be a little more
forward in its definition bf 'backwardness'. The minority were right
to the extent that the majority had left things fuzzy on the issue of
caste in a way that virtually all the pending uncertainties about
backwardness remained uncertain. When the dust has settled, people
will look in vain in the majority texts for a consistent and reliable
meaning of 'backwardness'. What the majority explicated did not
add fresh insights into our understanding of the compensatory dis-
crimination programme. Confronted with the issue of caste, the ma-
joriry skilfully depicted it as unproblematic in theory and a mere

preliminary step in the identification of BCs in practice. But' the
majority did not venture further than that. It had solved its immediate
problem by conceming itself with the criterion and methodology
used by Mandal and concluded that it was not wanting. But, many
things were kept in the air. Should the backward classes be similar to
the SC and ST? Could there be future OBCs? What exactly were the
criteria to define OBCs if they were not just 'caste' and not just
poverty or economic deprivation? For the majority, this was for a
future Commission to decide. And if they got it wrong, there was
always judicial review !
Having accepted the argument of the reservationists in the context
of the political situation in which it surfaced, the majority did not
send away the meritocratists empty handed. There were several
important concessions that were made to the latter. One such concos-
sion was in response to the common sense intuition that the reserva-
tions were going to the wrong people. This did not necessarily arise
from either Ma ndal or the notification implementing it except to the
limited extent that the Congrcss notification entailed giving prefer-
ence to the "poorer sections" of the OBCs125. There was no doubt that
within every "clasJ', some would be less well off, others much better
off. The question was whether it was wise to devise criteria to give
preference within the class to the 'more backward' (M/BC). More
important, could these distinctions be taken to their logical limits so
that the 'more forward' amongst the BC who were alleged to consti-
tnte the 'creamy layer' of the OBCs De excluded from reservations
altogether2 Way back in 1963, Justice Gajendragadkar refused to
accept that the Constitution coantenanced breaking a class into 'back-
ward' and 'more backward'126. Years later, in 1985, Justice Chinappa
Reddy felt that such distinctions "would be necessary to help the
More Backward Classes, otherwise those . . . who might be a little
more advanced . . . might walk away with all the seats".127 This
distinction would make no difference to the merit candidates who
were to be excluded anyway. If any thing, the argument was that the
potentially more meritorious amongst the OBCs should be excluded
because they belonged to a creamy layer amongst the OBCs and were
no longer OBCs. Nothing would be gained by the merit candidates
from such a distinction except the satisfaction (if it can be called that)
3M The politics of Baclcwarfurcss
of splitting the OBCs into rwo groups and depriving possibly the best
of them of rcservational benefits. What was not clear-and remains
unclear-is whether the purpose behind these distinaiow is to efiect
a more equitable distribution of benefits or whether it was to exclude
some persons altogether2 What may have been lost sight of was the
peculiar nature of the right involved. Although the right claimed was
by an 'individual', it arose out of belonging to a .group'. If the
'group' as a whole transited out of 'backwardness', it would not be
entitled to any preference at all.r28 But, was there really any scope for
making mini-distinctions? And, would such mini{istinctions be based
on individual characteristics? Or, would the endeavour be to identifv
a sub-group? Justice Pandian refused to be drawn into this contro-
versy. It was not required for the purposes of the case.r2e While there
was some truth in the assertion that the crcamy layer may be usurping
reservations, but this was not to deny that they were members of that
backward class. He felt that the fact some individuals were success
stories neither affected the beneficiary status of that OBC nor occa-
sioned the circumstances whercby some individuals were ..segre-
gated, picked up and thrown ovemight out of the arena of backward
classes".r3o The answer lay in eliminating . pseudo communities who
have smuggled into rhe backward classes (being) . . . weeded out
from the list of backward classes . . . by the Government on proper
verification"- 13r The learned judge was egainst these mini-classifica-
tions. They were an invitation to trouble. Where the .creamy layer'
was of significant proportions, the entire community could be
redesignated and would cease to be OBC. The arguments over the
'creamy layer' appear attractive, but are fundamentally flawed. A
family does not cease to be a member of a group that is subject to
caste and other discrimination because, it had through sheer dint of
personal effort, achieved some professional or financial success. The
creamy layer policy says to individual members of a class: ..Do well
and your children will be penalized". The whole controveny over the
creamy layer may well be an attempt to penalize those who have
made a good effort to struggle against their inequitous condition. yet,
the 'merit' lobby could not be sent back empty handed. The .crcamy
layer' solution was a response to the grouse (rather than a grievance)
nursed by the merit candidates. The majority judgement of Justice
Jeewan Reddy saw no impediment to creating the lower classifica_
tion of 'more backward classes', but refused to make such a classifi-

cation mandatory, but found fault with the ambiguous promise of the
Congress notification to threaten to create such a category without
devising the basis on which it was made.r32 However, the majority
clearly felt obliged to respond to the discontent which rumoured that
reservations werc going to the better off amongst the OBCs such as
children of parliamentarians, civil servants and the like. But, how
was this to be done? The majority accepted that reservations aimed at
group backwardness. They also agreed that no simple income test
could be used to sepuate the cream from the nflk.r33 Such a separa-
tion would necessarily be based on criteria as complex as those for
determining backwardness. Financial success or income could never
be a test by itsef. It is precisely this controversy that was somewhat
perfunctorily disposed ofby a twojudge bench ofthe Supreme Court
which considered the Bihar and UP creamy layer schemesr33(u) which
had created a 'thin' creamy layer designed to exclude only those who
were superlatively successful. Indeed, a 'thick' creamy layer to in-
clude mere success stories would destroy the rcservation programme
and overlook the fact that the 'creamy layer' concept took away an
already accrued right. This could not be done lightly on the same
basis as the normal constitutional jurisprudence dispensation (based
on the doctrine of classification), invoked in respect of granting
privileges to distinct classes. In the Bihar-UP Creamy Layer case
judgement-Kuldip Singh J (one of the minority 'Mandal' judges)
and Justice Saghir Ahmad J.-the court simply accepted, that certain
classes of 'success stories were per se excluded without elucidating
the concept of'social advancement' which is crucial to defining the
creamy layer; and overlooking the fact that even if a 'success' story
person may have conquered his disadvantage he remains the victim
of discrimination. The 'creamy layer' judgement is unsatisfactory-
if for no other reason because it is incomplete. Shocked by the
thinness of the Bihar-UP creamy layer, it missed a real opportunity to
found its decision on this vexed question on a sound juristic basis.
As if grappling with 'backwardness' was not difFrcult enough, the
Court invented a new but skewed and unlimited concept of'social
advancement' to exclude those "whose advancement . . . renders
them misfits as backward classes".r3a Unlike the creation of 'more
backward classes' which was optional, the identification of the 'creamy
layer' was treated as compulsory, without which the govemment' s

reservation progran ne would, itself, not survive unless the govem-
ment devised acceptable 'social advancement' criteria within four
months.r35 It would follow-although this was not expressly stated-
that every OBC reservation scheme in the states or elsewhere would
become otiose unless 'creamy layer' exclusions were incorporated in
the scheme. This put at risk all OBC reservations. Having done this
the Court seems to have conceded the argument in principle by
explicitly stating that the 'creamy layer' exclusion would not apply to
SC and ST candidates.ri6 If the Court was right in principle, there is
no justification for not extending such exclusions to the SC and ST.
What made the contradiction even glaring was the fact that most of
the complaints about the 'cream' hi-jacking the benefits of reserva-
tion werc in relation to the SC and ST. Both the form and content by
which the majority defined the creamy layer was acceptable to the
minority judges. However, they settled for simpler tests-such as
means tests (Justice Thommen)r37, economic ceilings (Justice Kuldip
Singh)t3E, social status or economic affluence (Justice Sahai).r3e Such
simpler tests were naturally more manageable. But mere income or
means testing would result in arbitrary exclusions. Income windfalls
would not by, themselves, eliminate backwardness. At the same time,
more complex tests on which the constitutionality of the whole
programme depended, was inviting trouble. Justice Pandian was
right when he said that the "argument for the exclusion of the 'crcamy
layer' on the face of it appears to be attractive and reasonable"r{ yet,
it was over-simplified and, arbitrary, and concerned evolving criteria
that were possibly so complex that they were virtually unmanageable
and ignored the very nature of the group rights on which the entire
concept of reservations was based. The majority's zealousness in
picking up this issue (when it did not warrant examination) was a
concession to the meritocrats without advancing the cause of
meritocrats any further or benefitting their number.
This concessionary over-zealousness to the meritocrats manifested
itself in one other major controversy which was picked up gratu-
itously without any relevance to the case. This concemed the main-
tenance of "reservations" for promotions. The impugned notification
was not concerned with promotional reservations but only initial
direct recruitment. But, reservations in matters of promotions was
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 3Oj
framed as an issue to be discussed and answered by the Court. During

arguments, some counsel got the impression that the issue had been
dropped.rarln fact, Justice Ahmadi specifically dissociated from the
majority judgement on this aspect because it "did not arise for consid-
eration and hence need not be answered".la2
The minority who-in any event-felt that the reservations
programme went over the top had little difficulty in supporting the
elimination of promotions from the catchment of reservations. Agree-
ing that it did not arise for consideration, they felt it was "too vital
. . . to be overlooked"ra3 (Justice Thommen), "violative" of equal-
ityraa (Justice Kuldip Singh) and defeated the "entire object of equal-
ization'tas (Justice Sahai). Even Justice Pandian joined this aspect of
the decision which permitted reservations in promotions to continue
for five years before the final discontinuance. ta6 The iustification
offered by the majority was rhar the 9 judge Constitution bench was
constituted, "to finally settle the legal position relating to reserva-
dons"147 The Mandal case was the 'final look'. But, if that were the
case, why was not a final shape given to the criteria for backwardness
and social advancement? What the Court decided to do was to
ovemrle a long standing decision of 1962, the challenge to which was
repelled in 1982.ra8 In the Mandal case, the Court ovemrled the 1962
decision with prospective effect five years hence. Promotional reser-
vations were also to be abolished for SC and STs (who were not
before the Court) and not just the OBCs (who were before the Court).
Here we see a marked-and unexplained---contrast with the 'creamy
layer' exclusions which were applicable only to OBCs. Since both
were decided ostensibly as issues of principle, there was no reason
for treating the various backward classes differentially on issues as
important as this unless one accepted Justice Krishna Iyer's view that
the SC and ST were a group who were 'super-classified' by the
Constitution itself for super preferential treatmentlae. And, if that was
the underlying intuition for not applying the creamy layer exclusion
to them, there were equally strong reasons for applying promotional
reservations to them even if they were not applicable to the OBCs.
This is without prejudice to our argument that the Court should not
have pronounced on this issue at a1l. Both the creamy layer and
promotional reservations issues seemed to have entered the Mandal
discourse as side issues to support the general argument that reserva-
tions were too extensive and overgenerous. The court appears to have
rushed into these issues, leaving behind a debris of unresolved politi-
cal and juristic questions. In May 1995' Parliament stepped in to use
its power to amend the Constitution to reverse the Mandal Judgement
on ih" irro" of promotion in so far as it affects the SC and
ST'r50
Somewhere along the line, the majority seemed to have ceased to

discuss the issue on principle and concerned itself with the psychol-
ogy of those for and against such reservations' They felt that such
re-servations would "destroy the will to work, compete and excel" and
were "bound t(: generate a feeling of despondence and 'heart bum
ing' among members of the general non-reserved categories"' Con-
viiced thai this would happen, the 'birth mark' of reserved candi
dates was sought to be eliminated because it was felt that such birth
marks were "crutches" which neither blessed them that gave nor
those that received-apart from not being "in the interest of effi-
ciency (and) . . . not in the larger interest of the nation'"I50(") During
nrguments, the anti-reservationists had made much of the constitu-
tiJral provision that recommends that claims of the SC and ST shall
be considered "consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of
administration".r5r There was no evidence whatsoever that 30 years
of promotional reservations had undermined efficiency' It was as-
sumed that this would instill 'heart bumifrg' in the general candidates
and induce a 'crutches' mentality in the reserved candidates' It has
already been stressed that no scheme of reservations sacrifices com-
petence, even though merit may be compromised to some extent' So'
th"r" *u. a bottom line on the extent to which efficiency would be
undermined. In fact, the Supreme Court specifically allowed relax-
ations and concessions from merit requirements to continue'rs2 Un-
fortunately, the Court lost sight of, and did not discuss the reasons for
which resirvations exist. Reservations become necessary because the
beneficiary class not only suffers from cumulative disadvantage but
also because they are likely targets for future discrimination' lf the
intuitions about 'heart buming' are important, there was no less a
resentment on the part of the BCs to whom prefereqtial access to the
really important posts and positions of power were denied' Reserva-
tions in piomotion guarded against future discrimination to important
posts rather than simply secured easy promotions' If such reserva-
iion. *"r" not made, the OBCs, SC and ST would be open to
precisely those prejudices and biases that had plagued them over time
in trying to get "adequate representation,' in those areas (of promo-
tional posts) where real power was exercised by senior officials. One
cannot help feeling that the Court's decision on promotions con-
cerned itself more with the emotions Mandal had generated rather
than with all the issues that should have been considered.
Ifconcessions to the merit candidates were in the air, there was, at
least, one more to come in the shape of the ceiling that could be
imposed. Having treated reservations as part of the principle of
equality, the Court unanimcusly took the view that reservations made
in the enabling provision (Article l5(4) and l6(4)) were .exhaustive'
of reservations and preferences for the OBCs.r53 If this was so,
nothing tumed on the somewhat grander principled stance that reser-
vations were part of equality and not an exception to it.lsa Once
reservations were confined within their own narrow sphere, the Court
(with the exception of Justice pandian) took the view that the 5OVo
rule in educational institutions admissions should be applied also to
job reservations.r5s Unlike Justice Pandian who accepted the argu-
ment that the test was 'adequacy of representation' in the services at
the given point in time under review; (and, therefore, leeway had to
be given to the administration to achieve adequate levels irrespective
of any mechanically pre-ordained percentage test),rs6 the majority
took the view that 'adequate representation' was not proportional
representation. 15? The figure of SOVo was simply accepted while
leaving open the possibility that the rule may be transgressed after
exercising "extreme caution" in "extraordinary situations" where
people in remote are:rs have to .be brought into mainstream national
life.t5E The 507o rule was not to be applied to the cadre as a whole, but
only to the year in question.rse This would place a .go-slow' on the
programme as a whole especially because any carry forwards from
the previous year would also have to meet the 5OVo tariff. 160
There were some concessions to the reservationists. The
trst was
that the tariff would apply to reservations proper and not to exemp_
tions, concessions and relaxations which lowered the merit criterion
and incrcased the competitiveness of the BCs.r6r The sec ond conces_
sion was that the BCs selected by merit would not be included in the
computation of the 5O% threshold of promissible reservations. How_
ever, the pithy paragraph dealing with this concession did not clarifv
whether it was open to a govemment to fix a lesser quantum

where
was to
sufficient candidates got in on meritr62' The third corcession
treat reservations other than those of the BC (such as those
of rela-
tively privileged persons under the doctrine of source) as a

separate
as to whether
compartmentJ63 However, there remains a question mark
tne sOEo rule would cover all reservations (in the wider sense as
preference or prefer-
including all persons or groups who are given a
declare that
ential tre-atment) even though the Court did ambiguously
it would not.r6a The reason for keeping BC (including SC and ST)
and other reservations separate was to ens'rre that BC reservations
were not conespondingly whittled downr65' But' what would
happen
greatly in
if the combined strength of BC and other reservations went
rigorous on whether
excess of 507o? The Court was also insufficiently
theextranon.BCreservationswereconfinedtocategoriesofdisad.
whether they
vantaged persons (for example, the handicapped) or
could-atso be extended (as they had under the doctrine
of source) to
the doctrine of
the relatively privileged (such as those identified by
children of diplomats abroad being reserved
,oo.." u*, fo,
"*a*ple' untidyness' the majority
educational seats and so on)?r6 Amidst this
did endeav-ur to do some tidying up'
govemments
Aware that lack of courage had made successive
the
over the years-and even more so in the Mandal case-pass
'buck' of deciding these very difficult questions on to the Court' the
judges found themselves dealing with matters that could-and
with a
sfroita-nuu" U"en decided by responsible politicians liaising
responsible govemment and,-perforce, the people' in a responsible
W" n"* already drawn attention to various parties maintaining
".y. going on' but takiog a pro-
a si'lence when the Mandal agitations were
the storm had
ftfunauf position (with even greater reservations)-orce
the
tfo*n ou"t and the V.P. Singh Govemment had fallen' But' once
judge bench, the
court was seized of the issuJand referred it to a nine
all the principl es de novo and
Bench was torn between deciding
solving' the instant crisis' The long drawn arguments in
1.Ut"* protests were directed against
iourt showed linle let up. The popular
of
noriust OnC reservations but ieJervations pet se'
The arguments
different and exaggerat-
tfre anti-t"tanOal lawyers in Court were no
u,ti.utut O sentiments that rese ations (including and' perhaps'
SC and ST reservations) were going to be-if
"aiy they had not
rp."iuffy
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 3ll
already become-the ruination of the country. The nation was at
peril. That is the reason why the Court ventured into questions
concerning SC and ST reservations with such ease. Once the 'na-
tional peril' argument found an emotional place in the intellectual
apparatus of legal argument, the Court was invited into a compromise
that would save reservations programmes while at the same time
being egged on to respond to the ire of meritocratists whose protests
struck a chord with the Cout.t. It cannot be overlooked that what was
before the Court was not the reservation poli cy per se which was part
of the Constitution's dispensation and which no amount of legal
frowning could drive into obsolescence. What was involved was a
very small programme of the central govemment which the latter's
political cowardice and ideological confusion had allowed to lay
fallow for many years. The Court could have chosen to nanow its
focus, but it did not do so overtly.
T\e Mandal judgenrent contains a mass of material. Since what was

in issue was the report itself and its methodology, a summary of the
report became necessary. The judicial summary was dry and matter
of fact-making as little of the Report and its critique as possible.16T
Since the Supreme Court of India and America had both painted their
gray in gray on these questions, reference to American decisions
added ballast to the arguments.r6s In fact, the majority judgements
add very little to the received precendental wisdom of the past. When
past jurisprudence was put into question-such as in the case of
promotional reservations-the reversal was based on a calculus of
gauging competing sentiments on the issue rather than exhausting all
the principled arguments. The Court seemed determined to make a
policy decision and did so with majoritarian self assurance. On the
very crucial question of defining 'backwardness', the majority seemed
to accept that the Constitution was not caste blind, but its hesitation
in blessing the use of 'caste' as the determinant criterion seemed to
suggest some empathy for the critics for reservation, even though this
empathy lay hidden in its reasoning and was not frankly explicated.
The majority judgement seems inconsistent especially in relation to
not applying the creamy layer to SC and ST but applying the aboli-
312 The Politics ofBackwardness
tion of promotional reservations to them. The latter decision on

rennving reservations in the matter of promotions caused the gov-
ernrnent to seek a constitutional amendment to rectify the Court's
decision on promotions in so far as they were applicable to the SC
and ST. The Court did not strike down the proposals in the Mandal
Report, but interpreted them in a way that made it difficult to imple-
ment thes€ proposals because of the insistence on excluding the
creamy layer without providing reasonably identifiable criteria to
identify the cream. The truth is that the Court's decision on the
Mandal care cannct be the last word, on many matters-both politi
cally and constitutionally. This has already surfaced in certain cases
before the Supreme Court. Equally, the issue of reservations for
promotions and the extent of reservations have become live political
issues once again.
Despite the length of the judgements, the Mandal judgement was
really a'problem solving' decision.r6e The problem that was to be
resolved was not the compensatory discrimination programme, but
the protest to it. After Thomas the answers to many of the ques-
tions---cspecially the manner in which the issue was to be ap-
pmached-were, more or less, settled. There were a few loose threads
conceming the carry over rule which could have been resolved less
expensively.rTo The Govemment had diverted anti-reservation pro-
test in the direction of the Court. Within the Court itself, the minority
judges were in sympathy with such protest. They successfully pushed
the majority into a post-Iftomds assessment of the entire jurispru-
dence on this vexed issue. The majority, too, yielded to the anti-
reservationists in various ways, but, aimed for a compromise. That is
exactly how the judgement turned out. It was essentially a compro-
mise. Principled decision making was given the go by.
After the judgement, more protests could have ensued; but they
did'not. As with so many publicly contentious cases-of which
Mandal and the Babri Masjid cases are examplesrTr-the cooling
period during which the arguments were heard in Court had a sober-
ing effect. Besides, Indian democracy continues to exude some re-
spect for the Supreme Court so as to give a qualified social and
political finality to the latter's decisions.
VI
The Mandal controversy pre-occupied the nation for a period of one
and a half years. By itself, it was a controversy of finite proportions.
All that was involved was an extension of similar programmes that
already existed in various states to the cadres of the central govem-
ment-a move that was long overdue. Since no political party was
against the changes proposed in the Mandal report (especially the
Congress which not only implemented it but added a further rcsidu-
ary lOVo reservation to the Mandal recommendations of 2il%), the
silence and reticence of the vaf.ous political parties whenthe Mandal
agitation was at its pitch was nothing short of dishonest. There is
every reason to believe that there was an overt nexus between the
politics of bringing down the V.P. Singh government andthe Mandal
agitation. But, let us assume that this was not the case. Under these
circumstances, the politioal parties were obliged to take a stance; and,
not stand idly by. It is their forbearance that-precipitated the crisis.
Those against Mandal pitched their legal and political case very
high as a general anti-reservationists case, by re-arguing basic issues
which had long been settled by both politics and law. Their two
central arguments were: the importance of merit to equality and the
public interest and the need for the Constitution to be 'caste-blind' in
identifying beneficiaries for the compensatory discrimination
programme. But, both these arguments did not just apply to the
Mandal Report on OBCs. They applied with equal force to SC and
ST reservations. Instead of these efforts being treated as settled by the
Supreme Court, they struck a chord with the minority judges (who
sought to reassess the very basis of reservation in so far as they
affected the OBC) as well as the majority judges (who also went
along with the minority on the crucial questions of the creamy layer,
percentage of reservations and the applicability of reservations to
promotions). Trying to minimize the importance of 'caste', tle ma-
jority sought to demonstrate it was a preliminary starting point,
'backwardness' being the second and more important ttr,st. But, they
failed to shed too much light on the criteria to be nken into account
while considering backwardness. Yielding to the anti-reservation
argument as a whole, they conceded exclusion of reservations for
promotions even for SC and ST (which was not in issue before the
Court) but excluded the 'creamy layer' exclusion for the SC and ST
without elucidating the meaning of 'social advancement' which was

crucial to determine the nature and extent of the creamy layer. The
result was somewhat chaotic. When UP and Bihar decided to link
'social advancement' to.property ownership and income, the civil
service status of the parents and their graduate qualifications, these
tests were immediately challenged before the Supreme Court which
has now notjust approved but almost mandated the creation of a thick
'creamy layer' which-taken to its logical conclusion-will swallow
up the reservation itself. When the whole question of using .effi-
ciency based public interest arguments' and the 50Zo ceiling on
reservations was raised in the context of professional medical educa-
tion after the Mandal judgement, the Court backed down-hinting
that these questions were really for the govemment and not for the
Courts.rT2 The Mandal judgement had declared that reserved candi-
dates who had been selected on merit would be wholly excluded from
computing the reservation quota. But, a later Constitution bench
made it clear that the "fact that (a) considerable number of members
of a Backward Class have been appointed/promoted against general
seats in the state services may be a relevant factor for the state
government to review the question of iontinuing reservation for the
said class".r73 Most important of all, faced with the Mandal judge-
ment exclusion of reservations from promotion from 1997 the Con-
gress Government amended the Constitution to reverse the decision
of the Court on this question. The States of Kerala and Tamil Nadu
have expressed their discomfort with the imposition of the 5070 rule
and would like to take reservations beyond that level. In retrospect,
the Supreme Court did not quell controversies but raised fresh ones
anew. Many have already surfaced and are before the Supreme
Court.
But, the more lasting effect of the Mandal controversy was on
electoral politics. The V.P. Singh Govemment may have fallen be-
cause of the controversy. But the Janata party and its allies made
much of the whole controversy in the elections that followed-in
particular, in the States of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar where they
managed to secure the trust and vote of the beneficiary 'backward
classes'. The other parties tried tc cash in on the 'Mandal' vote bank
but failed. This was especially true of Congress which had tried to
enlarge the Mandal dispensation after the V.P. Singh govemment
The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Contoversyr' 315
fell, but had kept silent when the controversy was in full swing' What
the Mandal controversy did for a large number of neglected commu-
nities was to galvanise them-provoking them from their p-olitical
stupor. Since they had been vilified during the campaign, they were
noiembarrassed to strike back. Aware that elections and reservations
were a source ofobtaining power of a kind that they had not imagined
in their life time, their members organised their political life in
pursuit of power. If V.P' Singh had driven his govemment to disaster'
ih" irtu" he had raised was responsible for transforming issues of
social justice into avenues for political opportunities and claims for
political power and political justice. So far, India's polity has man-
iged to keep these two aspects ofjustice separate' The aftermath of
tl:re Mandal controversy volunteered the demand of
"political justice
and empowerment for the backward classes, now!". Development
generally benefits the advantaged. Social equity is thrown in to
upp.ut" the badly off. The new demands for political justice and
empowerment meant that the various agendas of the State would no
longer be decided by the advantaged with the disadvantaged as
onlooker beneficiaries. A particular patronizing concept of power
and welfare that had been the hallmark of the Indian state was being
challenged at the hustings. South Indian politics had already been
transformed by these new intimations of political justice' Now, it was
the tum of the North. If India had not noticed that it was walking on
a razor's edge, it would now have to cope with "a million muti-
nies".r7a And, if some blame is to be pointed in some direction, it
must be in the direction of the advantaged who had for too long
neglected the disadvantaged communities. The revolt of the BCs
seems unequivocal, possibly irreversible-at least, for the moment'
l. See R. Dhavan: "The constitution as the situs of struggle: lndia's Consti-

tution Forty Years on" in L. Beer(ed) Cottstitutional Systems in late Twentieth
Century Asia (London, 1992) 373-461. For an account of the discourse in
India's Constituent Assembly on questions of human rights see R Dhavan:
"Tidy Intuitions, untidy discourse :Conversations on Human Rights Discourse
in Iniia's Constituent Assembly (1993) PILSARC Working Paper No' 20)'
2. The term "Other Backward Classes" (OBC) stems from the distinctio'l
between Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) who are given
3r6 The Politics of Backwardness
express recognition by the Constirution in varjous anicles (e.g., article. l5 (4)

(positive-action) l7 (dealing with "untouchabres"),
art. 243 (Di and article 243
(T),_art. 330,332, 334 (Special legislative
arr i:S (recognition
representation),'provisions))
of their special claims), art.,338-9 (specij officer and
and the
'backward classes' (mentioned jn 16 (4) preferential state employment),
-article
art 15(4) (positive action); arricle Z3(DX6) and arricl e U3 (.f)(6) (ele€tions to
lo-cal bodies), art 340 (Commission to investigate
neir conOitiong. See further
Marc Galanter who first asked .,Who are tf,e other gu"k*uio
Classes? An
Introducrion to a Constiturional puzzle', (197g) 13 EpW
lSl2-2g. The title ofhis
essay echoes the exasperated question asked
by one member of the constituent
assembly : "Who are those Backward classes,,(197g)
7 CAD 697.
G.O. (Govemment Order) of 1921 (referring earlier
.the 1state GOs) is ro be found in
of Mysore's Nagan Gowda Rep ort of thi Backward Classes
Committee
(Mysore 1961) pp. 57-61. The discussion
on these historical urp""t. i, ,o b"
f:lld I Y Galanter: Competing Equatities : Law and the Ba.iara Ch"se" in
India (Delhi, Oxford, 1984) 154-62 who has made the task
ofevery researcher
easier and more focussed and who directed me to
these and other references.--
4. Indian Statutory Commission (lg2g') 39g.
5. For the Constituent Assembly Debates
[C.A.D. (194g) 7 CAD 672-jo4:for
the antecedent discussion in Committees see B. Shiva Rao:
The Framing of
India's Constitutian : Study Volume (196g) pp. 192-201. For
an anatysis see M.
Galanter (supran.3) pp. 159-62 and contrasiihe Suple4e
Court,s own handling
of these discussion s in I ndra S aw hney v. IJnion of I iia (l
992) Supp. 3 S C C ZSO
(]y1e1!ter tle Mandal case) at pr. 38-41 pp.
37 4-5 (per pandian J); pr. 265 pp.
jll-jO_ ana nn, 466-469 (per Thommen ljfpr. :S:_its pp. a77_8a (per Kuldip
Sineh JI pr.4,?7-s pp.544-5 (per Sawant rj; pr. 570 p. !i6; pr.
!z+_5; pr. 6lo
p 615-6 pr. 687-694 pp. 658-662; pr. 772_717 pp. Zt t_S; pr. 779 pp.'714_5.
Unfortu-nately, the supreme court did not examine the hisioricat
context and
tenor of the discussions in the Constituent Assembly and its
Committees.
6. The initial plan was to havejoint electorates se;arate communal
_
being veroed by the Constituent Asse mbly (Vl CAD )47).
electorate
It was only on 16 June
1949, that an amendment was moved that there should
be u
r,oll f9r
4l (see VIII-CAD 930): For a summary see "o.;";;;;;;
Shiva Rao. Framing of
India's Constitution : Study Volume (1968) 466_g.
7. Article 330 and 332 (reservations for Scheduled Castes (SC)
_ and Sched_
uled rribes (sr)) (note art. 331 and 333 also reserved
special seats tbr Anglo-
Indians). All these were for l0 years; but they have been periodicatty
extended
ten Jears at a time. At present, they are due
to expire on 26 Jan. 2000 for the
background, see M. Galanter: "compensatory Discriminations
in politicar Rep-
resentatlon : A preliminary assessment of India,s Thirty year
experience with
reserved seats in Legislature,, (1979) 14 Economic
and bolitical Weekly (EpW)
437-54.
8. Article 16(l) and (4) read with article 335 of the Constitution.
9. Article l5(3) (speciat provision for women and children);
l5(4) (special
provision for SC and ST and other backward classes).
10. Constitution (Eighth Arnendment) Acr, 1959; Constitution (fwenty rhird
Amendment) Act, 1969; Constitution (Forry fifth Amendment) Act, l9g0; Con_
stitution (Sixty Second Arnendment) Act, 1989.
I l. It is difficult to say whether the magnitude of the OBC's was as large as
a mixture of patronage and belated discovery has enabled it to become. By the
mid seventies, the constitutional importance of the .OBC's was well established
as the link between group favoritism and electoral victory were becoming more
and more apparent. See M. Galanter : "Who are the other Backward Classes?'
(1978) 13 EPW tEt2-28.
12. WI CAD 697 (30 Nov. 1948).
13. The G.O. is reprinted in the (Nagan Gowda Mysore) Brckwelrd Classes .
Committee (1961) 57 at 5E.

I 4. See [O.H.B. Starte'l Depressed Classes and Abongirml Tnbes Committee
(Bombay Presidency).
15. See G.O. 190 of 20 t?[|,. 1944l. @ 343 of 2t Nov 1947 of rhe pubtic
Services Deparnnent and the discussion in S- Saraswarhi: Mittoities in the
Madras State; Group Interests in Modem Poiirrcs (Delhi 1974) l2l-12,4; irrtd
more generally R- Hardgrave: The Dravidian Movemenr @ombay 1965)
16- A phrase taken from Dr. Punjabrao Deshmukh spokesman for the OBCs
who claims to be responsible for the initiation of such courage; see Galanter
(supm n.3) p. 162 f,.n. 44;The Report of the Working of the All-India Backward
Classes Federation from the date of its Fonution upto 30th September 1955.
(1955) and subsequenr rcports.
17. The protferation of OBC Groups was necessarily created because of the
constitutional opportunities and noa the other way round. Ambedkar, well aware
that so many problems exist at local level, described the future with his usual
perspicacity when he said "we have left it to be determined by each local
govemment. A backward community is a community which is backward in the
opinion of the Govemmenf' (see VII CAD 7(D; n nb"d*o had not visualiz€d
that the rnassive political appropriation of the 'Opinion of the Government"
would tum India upside down. Galanter's cornment that the .opinion' of the
govemment "is determinative only of the group's 'hnder-representation" not of
its backwardness" (supra n. 3 p: 16O frr. 34) seems to beg the question : who,
then, would determine "backwardness"?
18. State o;f Madras v- Champakam Dorairajan AIR l95l SC 226;
Venkntaranmna v. State of Madms AIR 1951 SC 229; see also the High Court
discussion reported AIR 1951 Mad lm.
^t
I 9. A list of the various Commissions is gSva in the Mandal cue, (supra n.
5) in judgement of Jeewan Reddy J's at pp. 7ffi-762 and,pandran J at pp. 367

which include.s the following in the Table as shown below:
'"The list of Commissions appotnted by the various States and the Central
Govemment is given as under:
COMMISSIONS OF BACKWARD CZ"ASSES

l9l8-1990
Andhra Pradesh Manohar Pershad Committee (1968-69)

Ananta Raman Commission (1970)
Muralidhara Rao Commission (1982)
Bihar Mungeri Lal Commission (197l-76)
Gujarat A.R. Bakshi Commission (1972-76)
Justice C.V. Rane Commission (1981-83)
Justice R.C. Mankad Commission (1987)
Haryana Gumam Singh Commission (1990)
Justice Gajendragadkar Commission (196 /-68)
Justice J.N. Wazir Commission (1969)
Justice Adarsh Anand Commission (1976-77)
Karnataka Justice L.C. Miller Committee (1918-1920: Mysore)
Naganna Gowda Commission (1960-61)
L.G. Havanur Commission (1972-75)
T. Venkataswamy Commission (1983-86)
Justice Chinappa Reddy Commission (1989-90)
Kerala Justice C.D. Nokes Committee (1935; Travancore-Cochin)
V.K. Vioshvanatham Commission (1961-63)
G. Kumar Pillai Commission (1964-66)
N.P. Damodaran Commission (1967 -70)
Maharashtra O.H.B. Starte Committee (1928-30; Bombay Presidency)
B.D. Deshmukh Committee (1961-64)
Punjab Brish Bhan Committee (1965-66)
Tamit Nadu A.N. Sattanathan Commission (1969-70)
J.M. Ambasankar Commission (1982-86)
Uttar Pradesh Chhedi Lal Sathi Commission (1975-77)
Atl India Kaka Kalelkar Commission (1953-55)
B.P. Mandal Commission (1979-80)
Notes:
l. Where two dates are mentioned they refer to year of appointment and
year of submission. Where only one is mentioned it refers to year of submis-
sion which is also the year of appointment in some cases.
2. The three commissions of the colonial period mentioned here had an
ambit wider than those groups that later came to be known as "Backward
Classes".
20. (Kalelkar Report ofl) Backwartl Classes Conmtisslon (1955 in three
volumes); see further N.D. Majumdar: "The Backward Classes Commission and
its work" in Planning Commission: Social Welfure in India (Delhi 1955). For
comments on Kalelkar in the Mandal case (supra n. 5) at pr. 584 pp. 599 (per
Sahai J.) pr. 656-658 pp. 638-640 (per Jeewan Reddv).
2l . Kalelkar felt "it would have been better if we could determine the criteria
of backwardness on principles other than caste". (Report supra note 20: l, xiv).
On this second thought s€e Jeewan Reddy, I - in the Mandal Case (pr. 656 p.
639.) Dissents objecting to the use ofcaste were also entered by Dr. Anup Singh,
Shri Arunanshu De and Shri P.G. Shah. The Govemment (in the Ministry of
Home Affairs) Memorandum on thc Repon of the Backward Classes Corunis-
sdoz [Delhi, 1956] criticized the report. Later the Study Teatn on Social Welfare
of the Backward Classes (Delhi 1959), amidst contradictions in the Repon
formally insisted that economic criteria should be the basis of the dispensation
of benefits in govemment programmes.
22. ln the debate on the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, whilst
Ambedkar was clear that OBC's were "nothing else but a collection of certain
castes" (1951) XII-XIII P.D. (ft.II) Col. 9006 (18 May) Nehru wanted ro
eliminate "all these infinite divisions" around which a "vast number of fissures
or divisions" have developed "including" the "caste system and religious divi-
sions". (iDrd, Col 9616). On Nehru generally on law and the constihrrion see R.
Dhavan "Introduction" in R. Dhavan (ed) Nehru and the Constitution (Delhi
1992).
23. Laater of 14 August 196l reproduced in the Report of the Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribes (1960-l) II, 366; also referred to in the Mandal case
(supra n.5) at pr. 658 pp. 639-40).
24. Articles 14-18, Constitution of India.
25. Supra n. 18.
26. The title of M. Galanter's book (supra n. 3).
27. Supra n. 18.
28. Sen Jagar Nath Babu v. State of J&K AIR 1958 J&K I affirmed AIR
1958 J&K 14.
29. See Rana Kishna Singh v. Mysore AIR 19ffi Mys 338; see also A.R,V.
Achar v. Madras AIR 1954 Mad 561; Hariharan Pillai v. Kerala AIR 1968 Ker
42,Cf Kerala v. Jacob Mathzw (1964'12 Ker 39 rev: AIR 1964 Ker42 cf cases
in which religious groups gratified for reservation irrclude Kesava lyengar v.
Mysore AIR 1956 Mys 2O.
30. Ramakishna Singh v. State of Mysore AIR 1960 Mys. 338.
31. Balaji v. State of Mysore AIR 1963 SC 649.
32. Ibid., pr. 36 p. 664, pr.23 p.659.
33. Ibid., pt.22-25 pp. 659-660.
34. Chitalekha v. Mysore AIR 1964 SC 1823 at 1834.
35. M. Galanter (supra n. 3) p. 194.
36.Kerala v. Jacob Mathcw (supra n. 29).
37.P. Rajendran v. Madras AIR 1968 SCi0l2 at l0l4-15; A.P. v. Sagar
AIR 1968 SC 1379. High Court reactions betwe.en BaIQi (supra n. 3t) and
Rajendran include Jacob Mathew (supn n. 29) and Hariharan v. Kerala (AlR
1968 Ker 42) Sukhdev v. Govt. (1966) | Andh.WLR 294, Desa Rayadu v. AP
PSC AIR 1967 AP 353 and Sagar y. AP AIR 1968 AP 165; Nanda Kisftore
Sharma v.,Bihar AIR 1965 Pat 372; Umesh Chandra v. Singh AIR 1968 Pat. 8;
Chait Ram v . Sikander AIR 1968 Pat. 337; Hridaya v. Mohd. Shnrif AIR 1968
Pat.296.
38: While these debates were ostensibly put to rest by Stcte of Kerala v. N.M.
Thomas (19'16) 1 SCR 906, the Mandaljudges obviously felt that they simmered
sufficiently for the Mandal case to finally hold that preferential discrimination
was part of the corrective mandate of equality and not an exception to it (see pr.
741-2 pp.69l-2 (per Jeewan Reddy J.); pr. 165-72 pp. 406-8; (Pandian J.); pr.
428-32 pp.515-7 (per Sawant J.). While Kuldip Singh J. admitted that they
operate in the same field, he opined that "article 16(4) being a special provision
regarding reservation, it completely takes away such classification from article
16(l)" (at pr. 382 p. 491) - suggesting that article 16(4) is really an exception to
article 16(1). He specifically agrees (at pr. 383 p. 491) with Sahai J. who (at pr.
563 pp. 580-l) demarcates constitutionally allocatable areas to each of these
articles. Art. 16 (1) deals with substantive equality which is a fundamental right
of the citizen enforceable in a Court of Law whereas art. 16(4) is part of ". . .
equality which is an obligation of the State not carrying a constitutional compul-
sion." This approach greatly reduces the importance of 16(4) but raises the
question of its enforceability as a power coupled with a duty (on which see
Comptroller and Auditor General v. K.S. Jaganathan AIR 1987 SC 537 at 546).
Morc generally see A. Goldman : Jr stice and Reverse Discriminalion (Pnnceton
1979); W.T. Blackstone and R.D. Heslep (ed) Social Justice and Preferential
Treatmmt (Atheni, Georgia 1977): N.E. Bowie: "Equality and Distributive
Justicd'(1970) 45 (142) Philosoplry 140-8; B.R. Gross (ed) Reverse Discrimi-
nation (Blrffalo, 1977); ibid: Reverse Discrimination (New York 1978); M.
Cohen, T. Nagel T. Scanton (ed) Equa liry and Preferential Treatmzn s erinceton
1977). R. Dworkin : "What is Equality2" (1981) Philosoplry and Public Affairs
185-U6.283-345.
39. See generally Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 98 L. Ed.843 (347
US 483); Billing v. Sharpe (1954) 98 L. Ed 884 (347 US 497); and more
spe*ifically De Funis v. Charles Odegaard (1974) 40 L.Edn (2d) 164 (416 US
312); Regents of the University of Califumia v. Bakka (1978) 57 L Ed. (2d), 750
(438 US 265); Fallilovev. Phillip M. Khitznbk (1980) 65 L. Edn. (2d) 9O2 (448)
US 448); Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission
(1990) 58 fW (5053). More recently, the US Supreme Court seems to have
become less enthusiastic in its support for preferential discrimination.
For how US case Law was dealt within the Mandal case see L Reddy J at pr.
715-733 pp.675-686; Pandian J. at pr. 161-4 pp. z105-6; Thommen at pr. 258 p.
436; pr.322p.461; Sawant J. at pr. 419 pp. 512:,pr.47O-473 pp. 531-2 (quoting
Brennan J's view on Bakka (supra) that the Constitution is not "colour blind");
Sahai J. at pr. 557 p. 573-4 (on the political question doctrine), pr. 558-9 pp.
515-6i pt.565 p. 583, pr. 575 p. 591-2; pr. 614 p. 618, pr. 624 p. 624: pr. 628
p.626. What is siglificant is that each judge seems to draw their own conclusions
from the same American decisions.
40. The Supreme Court in the Mandal case (supra n. 5) rejected this distinc-
tion, reftising to accept that such initiatives can be confined within water tight
constitutional compartments see pr. 846 pp. 755-6.
41. For aspects of the importance of this distinction in terms of definine
govemment programmes see J. Edwards: positive Discimination,
Social Justici
and Social Policy: Moral Scrutiny of a policy practice (Inndon 19g7) which
advocates the somewhat conservative approach of restricting state action
to
positive action schemes for disadvantaged groups to better tiemselves
rather
than preferential appointments and benefits in particular areas such as
employ-
ment, distribution of land and the like.
42. This was suggested by R. Dhavan both in oral arguments and the written
submission in the companion case (S reenarayana Dharma paipalana yogatn v.
Union of India WP 1094 of 1991 : Written Submissions of Rajeev Dhavan for
the Petitioner) to Mandal case along with which it was heard.
43. Supra n. 40.
,14. See Ajai Kumar's case (infra
n. 172). Even in the Mandal case what is
rejected is not the distinction but the exclusive location ofeach such programme
in specified articles in the equarity dispensation of the constitution and no
other.
45. Article 3 I I of the Constitution of India. For an interesting exploration
of
providing bureaucracy such protections see U. Baxi,s ..Introduction to M. Rama
Jois: Serylces und.er the Slare " (Bombay t927) xiv - xii.
46. This was the strong submission made by R. Dhavan to the effect that
"reservation" were a form of , power sharing" (see Wittm
Submisslon supra n.
42, see Jeewan Reddy J. at pr. 750 p. 699 and esp. pr. ?gg p. 720). Ttre
maiority
judges accept this argument (see Jeewan Reddy at pr.
694 p. 662; pr.7gg p.7V5;
Sawant J. at W.414, p. 509 pr. 482 p. 538).
47.The afticle37, Constitution oflndia. For the earlier view ofthe Directive
Principles which marginalized the importance of Directive principles see R.
Dltayy: The Sunreme Court of India : A Socio-I*gal Analysis of its Juristic
Techniques (Bombay 1977) 87-94. The turning point was tie famous h-unda-
mental Rights case (Kesavananda v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC Z2). There_
after these principles were trcated notjust as a source of empowerment but also
responsibility. On the need to emphasize the importance of socio_economic
rights see R. Dhavan: "Ambedtar's prophecy: poverty of Hwnan Rights in
India" (1994) 36 loumal of The Indian Law Institute g-36. imbedkar,s famous
speech that by igloring social and economicjustice India was entering
a.,life of
contradiction" see Xl CAD 979-80. More generally see B.p. Jeewan Reddy and
R. Dhavan "The Jurisprudence of Human Rights" in D.N. Beatty (d) Hunan
Rights and Judicial R*iew: A Comparative perspective (London, 1gg4) 175_
2_26. On the Directive Principles see K. Markandam : Direcrive principtes
of
State Policy (Delhi, 1960): P. Diwan and V. Kumar(ed) Directive principles
Juisprudence (Delhi, I 982).
48. Champakatn (supra n. 18)
49. General Manager v. Rangachari AIR 1962 SC 36 (per Gajendragadkar
_
J and per Wanchoo J.).
50. Balaji (supra n.3l) ar pr. 32 p. 662.
5l . Rangachai (supra n. 49) eventhough the Mandal case rcversed the view
promotions'
that reservations were constitutionally permissable in the matter of
52. Devadassan v. Union of India (1964) 4 SCR 680 at 700'
53. Kesavananda (suPra n. 47).
54- See I CAD 57-65 (13 Dec. 1946). But the Resolution ran into
trouble and
: "Introduction" in R' Dhavan (ed)
was debated at length; see further R. Dhavan
NehruandtheConsriruriaz(Bombay1992)XXIv-XxvllandProfessorMittal,s
contribution in the same volume (at pp- 22-44)'
55. Kesavananda (supra n.47) on the importance of the
Objectives Resolu-
pr. 15 p 306; pr' 82-91 pp' 32O-3; pt 292
tion of 22 Jan. 194? and its goals at
JJ); at pr' 648
;. 366 (p€r Sikd CJ); pr. 486-9 pp. 408-410 (per Shelat and Grover
Mukerjea JJ); pr. 890 p' 849 (Ray J last sentence); pr'
p. +'le ip"t Hegde and
i r Se pp. ell-slper Reddy J.); pr- 1302
p. 709-10 (per Palekar J);.pr' l47l-5 pp'
ZSZ-O 1p.t Xfta"na J); pr. 162G1 pp.852-3 (per Mathew,J); pr ' 1863-7 pp' 922-
3 (per bwivedi l.); pi. ZOIS p. 986 (per Chandrachud J') On the question of
pp 330; pr' 178
sutstantive equality see Sikri CJ at prs. 82-91 pp' 320-3 ' 136
pr
p. 339 (on minorities); Shelat and Grover JJ at pr' 489 p' 410 Hegde and
at pr. fl8 p. 479; Ray J at pr' 1013-4 pp' 500;-pr' 1016 p' 581;
i"tuke4ea JJ
J at pr'
ReAdy f at pr. t 159 pp. 637-8; Palekar I at pr' 1302 709-10;Xianna
p'
J' atpr' p' 879; Beg J at pr'
1475'p.789; pr. l+tii-Z pp.792-4; Mathew 17O7
1303-7 pp. g0Z-4; Owivedi J at pr. 1867 p. 923; Chandrachud I xpr'212Opp'
999-1000.
56. N.M. Tlnmas (supra n. 38\ 906 at 976-77 '
57 . Thomas (suPra n. 38).
58. Ibid at Pr. 932-3.
59. Ibid atp.95l-2 (Per Mathew J).
6O. Ibid at 973 (per Krishna lyer J).
at 959 (agreeing
61. Ibid ar942-41(per Khanna J); Gupta J at pp' 986-7; Beg
with Gupta and Khanna JJ) and at pp. 960-l '
62. (risnna Iyer J in A.S. Iyer v' Balasubramanyam (1980) I SCR 1036 at
1066 G-H.
(1980\ 2 SCC 768 at
63. Krishna lyer J. in Jagdish Saran v. lJnion of India
pr. 29 pp. ?81-2; see also Charles Skaria v. C' Mathew (1980)2SCCatpr' 15
pp.767-69.
(1981) 2 SCR l8-5
64. Chinappa Reddy J' in ABSK Sangh v' IJnion of India
ar 257-259 generallY-
65. Chin-appa neOOy f. in State of Maharashtra v' Chandra Pradhan
TaIe
(1983) 3 SCb'387 at pr. 2 p. 390; Cf. Varadarajan at pr' 19 pp 39l-2' On
ireating benefits as 'property' see Chaies Reich: Iha Greening of America
(London 1970) and hii article'The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale LI 733' But
notethecriticismofthisviewR.Defriend:"WelfareLawLegaltheoryandlegal
(London)
education" in M. Paning and J. Jowell (ed) llelfore law and Policl'
43-64.
66. See Inchrnn Das v. State of Punjab (1963) 2 SCR 353 at 395 see also
A.S. Iyer (supra n. 62) at 1067-8.
67. On the doctrine of source rr:e Chitra Ghosh v' Union <tf India
(1970\ |
SCR 413; D.MCftanchala v. State of Mysore (197 t) S'tpp. SCR 6O8; Nidamarati
v. State of Maharashtra (1986) 2 SCC 534; Deepak Sibal v. State of Punjab
(1989) 2 SCC 145. For an interesting decision on reservations for women see
Government ofAP v. PB Vijaykumar (1995) 4 SCC 520. lt is not clear whether
this is treated as a form of reservation or part of the doctrine of source as a
reasonable classification. For a situation which has both aspects of "source" and
"reservation" see Swati Gupta v. State of UP (1995) 2 SCC 560. An estimate of
constitutionally permissible quotas after taking into account both "source" and
"reservations" quota is overdue. I had raised this in my submissions in Mandal-
The Court, however, treated "Source" reservations in addition to the 50% SC/ST
and OBC reservation. This leaves open the possibility of IOOEa reservations.
68. On the creamy layer concept see infra n. 83.
69. This is no less true of Galanter's Competing Equalities (supra n. 3); ser-
a review of this book by R. Dhavan : "Marc Galanter's Competing Equalities"
(1986) 28 kw and Policy 365-377.
70. The idea of'neutral principles' is taken from H. Weschler : "Towards
neutral principles of law" (1959)'13 Harvard LR l.
71. Unfortunately, too much legal analysis tends to be over-reductionist and
simplistic in its approach to judicial decision making, as for example J.A.G.
Griffths : Policies of the Judiciary (London 1980), or U. Baxi's: The Supreme
Court and Politics (Lucknow. 1980).
72. Apaft from Sastri CJ's candidly confessorial statement in this regard in
State ofMadrasv. 14G. Rop AIR 1952 SC 196 at 200 that even the predilections
of a judge are part of judicial decision making, the actu4l process of such
decision making is much more complex. For an account of the Supreme Court
in the early years see R. Dbavan : The Supreme Court of India (supra n. 47).
Judges do belong to a class but their class bias is tempered by their intimations
of their judicial role. Judges are purposive in their intent and artful in their use
ofjuristic techniques but they do not wholly abandon their craft to the momen-
tary exigencies of the bias of the moment. Were that not the case, the reputation
of the judiciary as an institution of governance would surely have fallen to
dubious levels of malappreciation.
73. See P. Singh : "Nelrru on equality and compensatory discrimination" in
R. Dhavan (ed). Nehru and the Constitution (Delhi,l992) I l0 generally. Nehru
was uncomfortable with reservations on caste lines but was forced to give a free
hand to his party to appeal to caste in elections. It is Nehru's legacy that there
was no OBC reservation in the Union's civil services till 1992
-long after his
death. It is no less Nehru's legacy to substitute words for wisdom, allow rhetoric
to triumph over reality and allow pragmatic considerations to give way to
arguments over principle.
74. The legal slory is recounted in R. Dhavan : Suprente Court of lnclia
(supra n. 47) 128-205.
75. Clcarly the formula now evolved of the Chief Justice having a decisive
say was extant in the 50's and 60's. The following line of Chief Justices from
1950 to 1973 Kania, Shasrri, Mahajan, Das, Sinha Gajendragadkar, Sarkar,
324 The Polirtcs ofBackwardness
Subba Rao, Wanchoo, Hidayanrllah, Shah, andSikri speaks for itself.

76. On his judicial decision making see P.K. Tripathi : "Mr. Justice
Gajendragadkar and Constitutional Interpretation" (196) I J-I-LI. 479; S-N.
Dhyani : "Justice Gajendragadkar and Labour Lad'(1967) 7 Jur IJ 69; P.W.
Rege: "Contributions of Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar to Hindu Law" (f966) 8
JII"I 58E. In the field of 'secular-socialism' , apart from Barzii (sr?ra n. 3 I )' note
his judgements on the freedom of religron (e.g. Tilkayat v - Raiasthan AIR I 963
SC 649; Dursah Conminee v. Hussain Ati AIR l%l SC 1'z02) and his re-
definition of the very concept of a 'Hindu' (on which see YagnapurusMasji v.
Mullas NR 1966 SC I19, on which see Galanter : 'Law and Society in Modem
India' (Delhi 1989) 237 and J.D.M. DerretL '"The definition of a Hindu" (1966)
2 SCC Inl 6?; "Hindu - a definition wanted for the purpose of applying a
personal law' (1968) 70 Tzitschrifi Verglcisclunde Rechswissensch{t.
77 . Balaji (supm n. 3l).
78. For his general appmach see : P.B. Gajendmgadkar I'aw' Liberty and
Justire (I-ondon 1965); Constitution of India (l-llrldlon l97O); Secularism and
the Constitution of India @ombay 1972); Indian Democmcy : Its Maior
Impemarives (Delhi 1975); Indian Parlianunt and the Fundanenml Rights
(Calcutta 19721; Kashmir : Prospea and Retmspect (Bombay, 1967); Tradition
and Social CIwryc (Bornbay 1967): lau'aharlnl Nehm : Glimpses of the Man
and his Teaching (Nagpur 1967); Imperatives of Indian Federalism
(Bombay,l968) as also his autobiography .The etr*. of Balaji (sr?ra n. 3l) is
self evident. It was cited and refened n ia Devadasan v- Union of India
(Mudholkar J.) AIR l95/- SC l79i Tiloki Nath v - Statc a/J&K (Subbarao C.J.)
AIR t967 SC 1283; C.A. Rajendran v. Union of hdia (Rann Swami J.) AIR
1968 SC 507; P. Ralendran v. Stalte of Madms (Wanchoo C-J.) AIR 1968 SC
l}l2: Sute of A-P- v. P. &gar (Shah J.) AIR 1968 SC 1379; D'N. Charnhala
v . Smu of Mysore AIR l97l SC 1762; A Periakarruppan v - State ofTamil Nadu
(Hegde J) AIR l97l SC 23O31' Janki Pmsadv. State of J&K NR 1973 SC930;
A.R. Chomdhry v. Ilnion of India AIR 1974 SC 532; A-B-S.K. Sangh (RIv) v.
Union of Indb NR l98l SC 298; S.S. Shatma v. Union of India AIR l98l SC
588; A.B.S.K. Sangh (Ny) v- Ilnion of India (1981) I SCC 246 at707'l SCC
397 at4os; K.C- Vasanth Kuur v. Sarc of Kantnla (1985) Supp. SCC1|4
at725,746,777; Chotdradtur Paswan v' Snte ol Bihar (lgaA\ 2 SCC 214
^t
217 Deepak Sibal v - Punjab Universitt (1989) 2 SCC 145 at 1591' Smte of AP v .
K. Ranganathan (199()) 4 SCC 636 at 638; Sr. Stzplcn's College v- University
of Delhi {1992) I SCC 558 x 612: Molan Singlania v. Union (1992) Supp I
SCC 594 il 6311' Indm Sawhney (the Mandal case) (1992) Supp- | SCC2l7
^t
381, 394, 396, 4Al, M, 4lO, 4r2. 4m, $8, 44A, 44r, 444, 44E, M9, 451' 452'
4s4. n6,477,5r9,52r,522,526,545, 555, 558, 559, 584, 585, 593, 598' 613'
616, f43, 656, 665, ffi,
6l l, 6t2, 687, 692, 700, 713, 715,7 19, 721, 722' 725'
726, 729,731,736,738,'139,749, 759: T. Sudhaknr Reddv v- Govt' of A.P.
(1993) Supp. 4 SCC 439. But Balaji had that 'tu2ry' quality of landmark
judgements of the period interpretative rather than pontificatory but leaving a
considcrable roorr fa judicial manoeuvre" After reviewing Baloii and Chitmlatllta
Justice Sawant rightly observed in the Mandal case (sap ra n. S) xpr.459 p. 527
that the observations in those cases "leave many things unanswered".
79. The literature on this is summed up in R. Dhavan : The Supreme Court
of India (Bonrbay 1977) 27-28.
80. See R. Dhavan: "Human rights and Socialism : India,s unfinished experi-
ment" in J. Chan and Y. Ghai : The Hong Kong Bill of Rights: A Comparative
Approach (Hong Kong, 1993) 451-466.
81. See generally H . Swap: For whom the Law is Made : Mind and Faith of
lustice V.R. Kislma lyer (Seelisburg 1984), K.M. Sharma : .,The Judicial
Universe of Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer" in R. Dhavan (et at1 Judges and the
Judicial Power 316-336 ibid : Judicial grandiloquence : Would Fewer Words
and Shorter Judgments do" (1973) 4Inwasia 192; N.C. Bedhan: Justice V.R.
Krishna lyer-A Statesman 'Judge' (1981) 1 Jabalpur Law euarterly 24.
82. Thonas (supra n.38). Although Thonns hu been criticized as being
purely symbolic in significance (see M. Galanter : ,.Symbolic activism: A
judicial encounter with the contours of India's Compensatory Discrimination
Policy" in R. Dhavan et aI. Judges and the Judicial power (supra n.8l) 229) yet
an important controveny conceming the egalitarian basis of reservations neeCed
to be resolved.
83. In an interview Krishna Iyer J. says that it was professor Marc Galanter
who coined the word and it was passed on by Justice Krishna Iyer to Chinappa
Reddy J. who used it in K. C. Vasanth Kumarv. State of Kamamka (19g5) Supp.
SCC 714 at pr.72 p.225 from where it entered the discourse of the law and
policy on reservations. For the discusiion on the creamy layer in the Mandal case
(supra n.5) per Jeewan Reddy I at pr. 79O-93 pp. 722-725; per Sawant J. at pr.
. 520-22 pp. 553-54; per Thommen J. pr.295-7 pp.454-65; per Kuldip Singh J.
pr. 385 p. 492; per Sahai I xpr.627 p. 626; per pandian J. at pr. 219-211 pp.
422-25 . ln the UP-Bihar Creamy layer judgement (see Ashoka Kumar Thakur v .
State of Bihar (1995) 5 SCC 503) Kuldip Singh J. seems ro rely more on
economic criteri^to determine "backwardness',, thereby converting his minority
view in the Mandal case (shared with Thommen and Sahai JJ) into the view of
the Court.
84. Manifesto of the Janata Party (1989).
85. Report of the Backward Classes Commission (Delhi 1980) - {hereafter
Mandal Reportl pp; vii reproduced in the Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pr.659 p.
640.
86. In the first debate in 1982. Shri R. Venkararaman (later president oflndia,
then the Minister of Defence and Home Affairs) felt that ,lhe problem that
confronts Govemment today is to arrive at a satisfactory definition of backward
classes and bring about an acceptance of the same by all the States concemed".
A meeting of Chief Ministers was to be called. By 1983 - as the general election
drew near - P.C. Sethi, Minister for Home Affairs stated more confidently and
with less reserve : ". we now desire to continue this commission and
implement its re.ommendations". These statements are quoted in the Mandal
case (supra n. 5) pr. 672-3 pp. 649-50 per Jeewan Reddy J.).
87 . Mandal Report (supra n. 5) p. 36 subpara 6 see "Chapter VIII : North

South Comparison of Other Backward Classes Welfare" pp. 31-36'
88. V.P. Singh speech in Parliament quoted in the Mandal case (supra n' 5)
pr. 674 pp.650-1. The Memorandum of l3 August 1990 is reproduced at pr' 675
pp.65l-2.
89. Arun Shourie, then, editor of the India E;?ress led the campaign instill-
ing doubt where there was conviction and fear where there was doubt. Thus, it
is a matter of record that Singh had introduced legislation about the electronic
media and ombudsperson (Lokpal) and initiated a debate on official secrecy'
This was a part of a unique and marked eagemess to implement the manifesto
quickly and comprehensively.
90. For further elaboration on this see R. Dhavan: "Reservations :Equality or
Deceit" (1990) Hindu (4 Dec.); ibid: "Economic criteria relied on by Mandal"
(1990) Hindu (5 Dec.)
91. See the Congress's Memorandum of 25 Sept. 1991 (quoted in Mandal
case (supra n. 5)) which added lOVo of vacancies in civil posts and services
under the Govemment of India for "other economically backward sections ofthe
people, . . . uncovered by any of the existing schemes ofreservations" in addition
iothe2TVo for the other OBC's already suggested by the Mandal Report (r pra
n. 85) and declared in the Memorandum of 13 August 1990 (sapra n 88)'
92. The 'Preface' to the Mandal Reporl (supra n.85) (ix) acknowledged, the
service of Professors M.N. Srinivas, Jogindra Singh, B.K. Roy Burman who
seem to have abjured their contribution when, years later, the Report became
controversial. In fact the Report (pr. 3.12 p 13) suggests Prof. Srinivas headed
a panel to devise the methodology (pr. 41.4 p. 50; Vol. II' 99-101)'
93. Mandal Report (supra n- 85) pr. 3.1-3.2 pp. 12 also quoted in the Mandal
case(supran.5) pr. 661 p. 641. Note also the survey of state programmes in the
Mandal Report (supra n. 85) Chapter II pp. 5-1 l.
94. See Mandal Report (ruprd n. 85). The location of the 1931 Census
containing "considerable detail" is in the Experts Report (rlid pr. 5 p' 99)' The
Census of 1961 was used to identify tribals and the like (ibid pt. 12.7 p. 54) The
Census of 1931 was used for projecting numbers under broad, but necessarily,
crude assumptions about demographic growth.
95. Mandal Report (supra n. 85) Chapter XI : "Socio-economic field survey
and Criteria of Backwardness pp. 50-53. The various Schedules are found at
Vol.II pp. 102-112; and the list of the floods survived at pp. 1 13-1 19; see also
the study by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Part II Volume IV of the
Report (at pp. 139-164) and the Socio-educational survey tables in Vol' V pp'
t6'1-225.
96. Mandal Report (srpra n. 85) pr. 11.23 - p 11.25 pp. 52; also Mandal
Judgement (supra n. 5) y.667 pp 645-7.
97. Supra n. 88.
98. Supra n. 91.
99. Mandal case (s upra n' 5), Sahai J's judgement thanks the various lawyers
at pr. 637-8 pp. 631 which read as follows :
"Valuable assistance was rendered by Shri K.K. Venugopal and Shri N.A.
Palkhivala, the leamed senior counsel, who led the arguments and placed one
view. They were ably supported by Shri P.P. Rao and Smt. Shyamala pappu,
Senior Advocates. Arguments were also advanced by Smt. Hingorani, Mr.
Mehta, Mr. K.L. Sharma, Mr. S.M. Ashri, Mr. Vishal Jeet, Shri K.N. Rao and
Col. (Dr) D-M. Khanna appeared in person as interveners and were of
assistance.
Shri Ram Jethmalani, the leamed Senior Advocate appearing.for rhe State
ofBihar was equally helpful in projecting the other view. Shri K. parasaran,
the leamed Senior Counsel for the Union of India while supporring Shri
Jethmalani placed a very dispassionate view ofthe entire matter: Dr. Rajeev
Dhavan was also very helpful. Shri R.K. Garg, Shri Shiv Pujan Singh, Shri
S. Siva Subramaniam, Shri Poti, Smt. Rani Jethmalani also made submis-
sions. Shri Ram Avadesh Singh argued in person."
l00. Mandal case (supra n.5) at pr. 683 p. 657. For the manner in which the
referedce to the larger bench took place see pr. 679-685 pp. 654-658
l0l. The judgements (see Mandal case, supra n. 5 pp. 217-772) occupy a
total of around 450 printed pages divide as follows : headnote (pp217-360); and
then thejudgements of Pandian (pp 361-430), Thommen (pp. 430-469), Kuldip
Singh (pp. 469'501); Sawant (pp. 501-579); Sahai (pp. 57 t-631) and Jeewan
Reddy JJ (pp. 631-772) - containing, as they do; a mixture of detailed analysis
and hyperbole.
102. Mandal case (supra n. 5) Pandian I at V. 200-207 pp. 415-19 (on the
means test); at pr. 211-218 pp. 420-422, ageeing with Balaji (supra n. 31) that,
the division into 'backward' and 'more backward' was not salutary ; atpr.219-
234 pp.422-426 on the need to reject the creamy layer; at pr. 178-191 pp. 410-
3 on the need for a flexible percentage as approved to a rigid 507o ceiling on
reservations.
1O3. Mandal case (supra n.5) pr. 681 pp. 654-655 ar pr. 682 pp. 655-7 (per
Jeewan Reddy J).
104. Mandal case (supra n.5) per Sahai J. pr. 636 pp. 630-l
105. Mandal case (supra n. 5) pr. 735-6 pp. 687-8; see also Pandian J at pr.
170-2; pp. 407-8 Kuldip Singh J, at pr. 392 pp. 495; Sawanr J. at pr. 526-8 pp.
357-8.
106. State of Punjab v. Ram Jawayya Kapur AIR 1955 SC 549.
107. Constitutional Caste blindness in India is like Constitutional 'Colour'
blindness in America where the argument has been rejected in a series of cases
which affirm the duty to de-segregate (see Edwards v . Califurnia (1941) 31 4 US
16O; Brown v . Board of Education (1954) 347 US 483; Green v. County School
Board of New Kent Counry Q968) 391 US 430; Swann v . Charlotte - Mecklenburg
Board of Education (1971) 402 US.; Wright v. Council of City Emphoia (1972)
407 US 451) and the need to take affirmarive action on rhe basis of the forbidden
categories e.g. colour; or, as in our case, caste (see DaFanis v. Odegaard (1974)
416 US 312; Regents of University of Califurnia v. Bakke (1978) 438 US 265;
Steelworkers v.lleber (1979) 443 IJS 193; Fullilove v. Khutznkk (1980) /148
us 448).
lO8. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC (1990) 58 IW 5053 A powerful
minority (consisting of O'Connor for herself, Rhenquist CJ, Scalia and Kennedy
JJ) demanded greater scrutiny.
109. Mandal case (supra n. 5) and the references (supra n' 3).
1lO. Mandal car,e (supra n.5) at pr. 733 p. 686.
llDa. Mandal case (supra n. 5) and the details cited at fn 38.
lll.Mandal case (supra t. 5) per Jeewan Reddy (at pr' 641-2 pp. 632-3; pr'
649-655 pp. 635-40; per Sawant J (at pr. 415-8 pp. 508-1 l; pr. 429 pp. 515t pr.
480-482 pp. 536-8); per Pandian I (at pr. 11 p.364; pt.2l'2 pp.365-66; pr' 37
p.373).
112. In the Mandal Case (supra n. 5) the minority does not question the
importance of the Directive Principles (e.8. Thommen I at pr- 297 -8 p' 455'
Sahai J at pr. 564 p. 582 pr. 627 pp.625-6 and also on Rawls and Dworkin at pr.
615-6 pp. 619-20).lt simply ignored their importance - its intuition being that
positive action to help OBCS, rather than reservations, is the answer.
I 13. See Balaji (supra n. 31) and (Chitralekha (supra n. 34)
ll4. Supra n. 37 .
115. Thomas (supra n. 38).
116. Mandal case (supra n. 5) refeting to Ambedkar at pr. 40 pp. 37 4-6 (per
Pandian J) pr. 251 p. 433-4, pr. 265 pp. 439'4O, pp. 446-469 (per Thommen J)
pr.356-7 pp. 479-80 pr.362-3 pp. 481-483 (per Kuldip Singh J), pt 446 pp.
322-3i pr.49?-8 pp. 3zl4-5 (per Sawant J); pr. 569 pp. 585-6 pp. 574 p. 589, pr.
618 p. 622 (per Sahai J) pr. 687-94 pp. 658-662 (per Jeewan Reddy J), with each
judge deriving different strengXhs and accents from the same intervention.
ll7 . Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pa lewan Reddy J. that the identification of
the group was only a preliminary step at pr. 782 p.716. This muddles the issue
somewhat. The cri teia for backw^rdness is "seculat''not 'cas!e', which, in tum,
is one of the principal causes of "backwardness"
ll8. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 756 to 765 (pp' 700-706) pr.772-779
pp.710-714; pr.784 p. 717-8 (per Jeewan Reddy J); at$.44-89 pp 376-385
(per Pandian J.)
ll9. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Kuldip Singh J at pt 34O p. 472.
l2O. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Sahai J at pr. 567 p. 584.
l2l. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Sahai J at pr. 571 p. 586-7.
122. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Kuldip Singh J at pr' 349-351pp. 47 5'76.
123. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Sahai J at pr. 568-570 pp. 585-6.
124. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Thommen J . pt ' 323 sub. pr. 4 pp. 462-
^t
125. Mandal Case (supran.5) atpr.677 p.653 where the Memorandum of
25 Sept. 1991 is reproduced in full. The reference to "poorer" sections is in pr.
(1) and is relatively easier to handle as a principle of preference on the basis of
a simple means test.
126. Balaji (supra n.31) at pr. 29 p. 661.
127. Chinappa Reddy J in K C. Vasanth Kumar v. Srate of Kamataka (1985)
Supp, SCC 714 at V. 72 p. 763 using graphic language to suggest the "creamy
layer" is "snapping away" posts. lnthe Mandal case (supra n. 5),Iewan Reddy
J uses the imagery of "lapping" up the benefits at pr. 79O p.723.
128. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Pandian J. pr. 228 p.4Z and generally
on subdivisions within a group at pr. 21A-234 pp.^t 42U426.
129. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 229-234 pp.4%-426 per Pandian J.
130. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Pandian J at pr.225-6 pp. 4234 rclying
on Chinnappa Reddy J. in Vasant (rupra n. 127).
131. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pet Pandinn I x pr- 228 p. 424.
132. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr. 801-803 pp. 729-
731; pr. 843-5 pp. 753-755; pr. 793 - pp. 725.
133. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr.792 pp.7?-45.
133(a) Ashol<a Kwnar Thakur v. State of Bihar (1995) 5 SCC ,103.
134. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy at pr. 792 p. 72,4., Sawmt
J. has a more comprehensive approach atqr,.520-22 pp. 553-554 requiring the
development of "sufficient capacities" before exit frorn the reserved category is
warranted.
135. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 793 p.725.
136. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pet le,ewan Reddy J at pr.792 p.725. Clearly,
the non-application of the creamy layer concept to SC and ST.
137 . Mandal Case (snpra n. 5) per Thommen J at pr. 295 -6 pp. 454-5; pr.323
(6) and (7) pp. 463.
138. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Kuldip Singh J. at pr. 385 p. 492.'
139. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Sahai J at pr.629 p.626 suggesting a
slightly wider exchtsion in addition to the income test.
l4O. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Pandian J at pr. 221 p. 422.
141. Even on the very last day, it seemed that although the question of
promotions had been framed as one of the issues (see Manda I case supra n. 5 at
pr. 681 pp. 654-5 Issue VIII), this question would not be re-examined since it did
not necessarily arise in respect ofthe impugned notifications. Yet, it is arguable
that it did so arise in that allocation of reservation was in rcspect of all vacancies.
But this point was not adumbrated as the reason for going into this question.
142. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Ahmadi J atp.74A fn.145. The majority
conceded that the promotion issue was not before the Court (pef Jeewan Reddy
J at V. 220-l pp. 741-2).
143. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Thommen J. at pr. 300 p. 456; also prs.
300-314 pp. 456-460.
144. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Kuldip Singh J at pr. 379 p. 490; and
generally at prs. 371-381 pp. 487-91.
145. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Sahai I pr. 622 p. 623 and generally pr.
620-625 pp.623-4.
146. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Pandian J at W. 2A2 p. 4n.
147 . Mandal Case (sipra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J. at pr. 321 p.741.
148. General Manager, S Rly v. Rangaclai (19621 2 SCR 586:' Suu o!
Punjab v. Hira Lal (1971) 3 SCR 267i ABSK Sangh u. Union of India (1981) 2
330 The Politics of Backw ardness
SCR l8-5; see also Comptoller and Auditor General v. K.S. Jaganathan (1986)
2 SCC 679 at 694.
149. Thomas (supra n.38) Krishna Iyer J at p. 9'74.
150. The Constitution (Eighty Fifth) Act 1995 which added article l6(4A) to
the Constitution which reads as follows:
"Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from makilg any provision
for reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes of posts in the
services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in
the services under the State."
l5oa. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr. 828 p.746;'
l5l. Mandal Case (supra n.5) at pr. 819 pp. 741-1. This is a Constitutional
requirement emanating from article 335 of the Constitution which reads as
follows:
"The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of
efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services and
posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State."
152. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 831 p. 748 (in respect of promotions);
also pr. 837-8 pp. 751 citing Snte of MP v. Nivedin larn (1981) 4 SCC 296 as
an example, but cautioning (at pr. 83 of p.752\ that in certain technical posts
pertaining to the physical sciences and mathematics reservations may not be
advisable at all.
153. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr. 743-5 pp. 693-5,
per Pandian J at pr. 168-9 pp. 407, per Sawant J at pr. 4304 pp. 516-7; per
Thommen J at pr.323(3) pp 4621' per Kuldip Singh J atpr.382-3 pp. 491; per
Sahai J at pr. 566 pp. 583.
154. This is best brought out by Sawant J in Mandal at pr.430-l pp. 516 who
saw article 16(4) being used for OBC reservations and article 16(1) reservations
being used for generally handicapped persons bringing the latter within the
general concept of equality (see Mdndal case supran.5 pr. 430 p. 516). Indeed,
the only real justification offered by the majority for the 5OVo ceiling on reser-
vations is that reservations are "special provisions" to be keptirithin "reasonable
limits" - so much for reservations being a part of equality and not an exception
to it;
155. Mandal Judgement (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J (at pr. 804-814) pp.
731-737; Thommen I (at pr. 299 p. 456); Kuldip Singh pr. 384 p. 491-2
(agreeing with Sahai J); Sawant J at pr. 495-518 pp. 542-552; Sahai J at pr. 6l I -
619 pp. 616-622. Earlier precedent seems 1o have twisted. Balaji v. State of
Mysore (1963) | Supp. SCR 439', Devadassan v. Union (1964) 4 SCR 680 and
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310 are made to sound more
definitive than they were or intended to be. Insufficient emphasis was placed on
the difference between Chinappa Reddy J and Venkataramiah J respectively in
K.C. Vasant Kumar v. Kamataka (1985) Supp. SCC 714 on the interpretation of
Balaji.
156. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at prs. 177-l9l pp 409-413.

157. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 807 p. 734.
158. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pr. 810 p. 735 (per Jeewan Reddy J.).
159. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pr. 814 pp.736-7 (per Jeewan Reddy J).
16O. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 817 pp. 739-40.
161. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) note the references at pr. 152 supra..
162. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 811 p. 735. This was reiterated in R.K.
Sabarwal (infra n 173) but has given rise to a considerable amount of confusion
on whether a person who has got promotion can get the benefit of access to
further promotion on the basis of his seniority which has, admittedly been
accelerated because he was promoted earlier with the aid of reservation. This
was not tully conceded in Union oJ'India v. V.P.S. Chauhan (1995) 6 SCC 6 but
was in a further case from Punjab (see A7'lr Singh v. State of Punjab (1996) 2
SCALE 526.
163. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 812 pp. 735 where Jeewan Reddy J
makes a distinction between "horizontal reservations" (across caste lines) and
"vertical reservations" under art.l6(4). But horizontal reservations are not just
limited to "handicapped' (as Justice Jeewan Reddy suggests) or such similarly
situated disadvantaged persons but to all persons who are specially classifiable
as deserving of an allocative quota. This is based on the doctrine of source (on
which see fn.67 supra and cases cited there).
164. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 812 pp. 735.
165. Ibid. But there is nothing to prevent the executive from reducing the
numbers (see Kuldip Singh J in Sabha rwal (infra n.173) and Jeewan Reddy J. in
V.P.S. Chauhan (infra n. 173). Equally, reservations and quotas could well block
merit candidates altogether (Cf Deepak Sibal supra n. 67)
166. On the doctrine of source see further the cases cited at n. 67 supra and
note the comments at n. 165.
167 . Mandal case (supra n.5) per Pandian J (at pr. 30-2 pp. 368-9, pr. 124-
150 pp. 395-402); per Thommen J (^t pt.246-249 pp. 931-33) per Kuldip Singh
J (at pr. 369 p. 485; pr. 393-4 pp.495-500); per Sawant J. (atpr.423 p.5i 3); per
Sahai J (at pr. 556 p. 571 pr. 585-88 p. 599-602) per Jeewan Reddy J (at pr. 659-
673 pp. 640--50). It is almost difficult to believe from a reading ofthejudgement
that controversies conceming this issue and case brought down a govemment
judgement in 1990 and threw, at least, Delhi into chaos.
168. Supra n. 39.
169. Curiously, there have been very few critical appraisals of the Mandal
judgement and its aftermath.
l'10. Mandal Case (supran.5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr. 814-8 pp. 736-740.
l7l. Mandal Case (supra n. 5); Babri Masjid case (M. Ishmail Faruqui v.
Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 360.
172. On the 'Creamy layer see the UP - Bihar cases (supra n.83) and on post-
graduate medical education see Ajai Kutnar Singh v. State of Bihar (1994) 4
scc 401.
173. R.K. Sablrurwal v. State of Punjab (1995) 2 SCC'145 which stopped the
operation ofthe quota beyond the prescribed percentage limits. While the author
of this Constiturion Bench ruling (Kuldip Singh J) was in a minoriry in Mandal
(supra n. 5) and clearly wanted to restrict rcservations in the matter of promo-
tions till 1997, the author of the majority judgement in Mandal (supra n. 5),
Justice Jeewan Reddy, was more circumspect and left it to the Govemment in
Union v. V.P.S. Chauhan (1995) 6 SCC 684. Justice K. Ramaswami J. however
felt preferential seniority could be given even at the initial stage (see Ghaulat's
case (1995) 5 SCC 625).
174. A phrase taken fiom V.S. Naipaul's : India A Million Mutinics now
(London l99l ).
'This is PILSARC Working Paper No.l09 and anybody who will reproduce
it may kindly acknowledge that it is a PILSARC Working Paper.
Index
A Long Way n Go: Report on a Sur- 216

vey of Schcdaled Caste HighSclnol Backward Classes Comrnission, 17, 31
and College Sndents in Fifieen Backward Classes movement, in Bihar,
Swes of India,35 l7l-77
Adi Andhra movenpnt,36 Backwadne,ss, changing parameters of,
Adi Dharma movement 35 9l-92
Adi Dravida Andolan,35 Baines,99
Adi Hindu movernent, 36 Balaji cw,59, 8G8l
Adi Kamataka Andolan, 35 Baxi Comrnission ,20!-cf.,210, Zl5
Adimjati Seva Mandal, 168 Beteille, Andre, 172
Agarker,35 Bhanacharya Mohit,2+25, t83
Ahmadi, Saghir, 296,3O5,3Ul Bhumi Putra Fauj, 174
Akhil Bharatiya Anrt-Untorclability Bihar,
Lcague, 36 absence of Scheduled Caste move-
Akhil Gujarat Navr*hna Samiti, 2l I ment in, 177-78
Ali, Hyder, ll0 backward casres, 164, 181-82
All Gujarat Educational ReformAgi- backward class movenent in, l?l-
tation Commin€e (AGEIIAC),2IO 77
All India Backward Classes Federa- development profile, 199-2OO
tion, 175,264 population, 162-64
All India Kurmi Mahasabh4 t74 reservation in, l&-82
All lndia Yadava Mahasabha, l?4 exrent of, 164-65
Ambedkar, 8.R., l, 3, 3G31, 35, 45- filling up quota for, 168-69
' 46,97-98, IO2-03,23O,237,3O1 income criteria appticability,
An Assessnent among
of Education 169
thz Schedtled Castes in Gujarat, perfonnance evaluation, 169-71
2lO recommendations, 165-67
Aurangzeb, roster system, 167-68
Bihar-UP Creamy Lster case, !O5
BAMCEF,4I Buddha 6
Babi Masjid cw,3l2 Burke, Edmund, 3
Backward classe.s, 9rl-96
Bacl<ward Classes and Resemation, Casu Prcjudice anong Colkge Sal.
dents : A Socio- Psycholo gical Sndy, AruIysk,56

35 Dharam Prakash, 43
Chandrashekhar, 176-77 Dhavan, Rajeev, 262
Chandrika Ram, 43 Dhavan, Rajiv, 12
Chatterjee, Parth, 193 Dhobar Commission, 105
Chaudhari, Amarsinh, 21 4, 243 Disabiliry, 100-01
Chaurasia, S.D. Singh, 263 Dushkin, Lelah, 101
Chinappa Reddy, 303 Dynamic s of Reservation P olicy, 202
Chinappa Reddy Commission, 206
Chitnis, Suma, A-25,88 Economic and Political Weekly,34
Chopr4 Pran, 13 Employment exchanges, job seekers
Communal Award, 98-99, 103 regi stration with, 77
Companies Act 1956, 186
Compensatory discrimination, theory First Backward Class Commission, see,
of, 3-9 Havanur Commission
Competing Equalities, 40,7 | Franchise Committee, 99, 102
Constituent Assembly, and constitu-
tional provisions for reservations. Gajendragadkar, 271, 277, 284-86,
4t-46 301,303
Constitution of India, Galanter, Marc, 40, M,71,73, lO1,
article 14, 268 z5r
afiicle 15, 22,30, 42-43, 46, 67, Gandhi, Indira, 5,203, 241
79-80, 131-32, 134-36, r4t, Gandhi, Mahatma, 6, 17, 36, 97-98,
230, 268-69, 27 5, 28r, 309 178, 198
article 16, 22, 30, 42-43, 46, 67, Gandhi, Rajiv, 29
79-80, 129-30, 132, 134-36, George, A., 250
| 41, 230, 268-69, 27 5, 27 8-7 9, Ghurye, G.S., 104
296-97,309 Gillion, Kenneth, 38
article 29,269 Gin, v.v.,242
article 38, ,14 Girijans,98
article 46, 44, 161,296 Gokhale, 35
uticle 334, 44 Govemment job, reservation policy for
article 335, 22, 45, 141 SCs/STs and OBCs, 13-28, 108-
article 340, 43, 8l 59, |64-96, 198-21 9, 221-53,256-
afticle 342, 92 316
Criminal Tribes Act of 1952,223 appraisal, 256-61
consequences, 240-53
Dakua, Dinesh Chandra, 195 evaluation, 221-39
Dalit Varg Sangh, Ranchi, 168 in Bihar, 164-82
Darji, Jinabhai, 213 in Gujarat, 198-219
Dasgupta, Promode, 185 in Kamataka, 108-59
Dave, Mahesh H.,202, 216 in West Bengal, 183-96
Depressed classes, 47, 94-100. 225. Supreme Court judgement and,
240 262-316
Determinants of Fertiliry Decline: An Govemment of India Act 1935,47,
Index 335
99-100, 104,231,235 Kaka Kalelkar Commission, 30, 48-

Gowda, Nagana, 111, 118,121 51, 56, 165, 175, 2'0.3, 257, 265,
cujarat, 287,292
development profile, 199-200 Kalelkar, Kaka, 30, 48-51, 56, 165,
literacy in,207-08 175, m3,257,265
reservation policy and system, 198- Kamath, H.V., 2
219 Kania,296
workers by industrial categories
Kamataka, in,
213 govemment service,
Gujarat Karamchari Utkarsh Mandal,
caste and communities rcpresen-
214 tation in, 143-45
Gujaiat Khet Vikas Parishad,2i3
population,
GujaratKshatriyaSabhu2o6,2I2,2lT caste-wise, 115-25
Gujarat Panchayat Actof 1961,2O2 pmjected caste wise, ll8-21,
cujarat Rajya Karamchari 156-59
Mahamandal, 21I,215 relative share, 122-24
Gujarat Vali Mahamandal, 21 I share oi OBCs, SCVSTS, I 15-
Guruswami. Narain. 35 25
reservation policies for SCs/STs
104
Haimendorf, and OBCs in, 108-59
Harijan,36 extent of, l3z1-41
Harijan Sevak Sangh, Ranchi,36, 168 evaluation of, 143-48
Harijan3,98-99 income criterion applicability,
Harper, A. Edwin,250 141-43
Hartog Committee,gg percentage of reservation rec-
Havanur, L.G., 57, ll2-14, 147 ommended, 13G37
Havanur Commission, 57-58, 112-15, population, 115-25
ll8,121-22,130-31,133-34,136- recommendation of Commis-
37,142, 147,150, 152-53, 155 sions, 125-34
composition, 150 socio-political background of,
duration, 155 108-15
recommendations, 130-31 Krishna Iyer, 279-81,286, 3O7
term of reference, 152-53 Krishnamachari, T.T.,46
Higher education, patternof,76 Kurmi Kshatriya Sabha, 173
Holdemess, 99
Holmes, Sherlock,29l Lal, Guru Sahay, 174
102
Hutton,99-100, Lal, Jagat Narain,45
Lal, Mungeri, 165
Inamdari system, I 1 I kgislation and Cases on Unnuchabil-
Indian Express,Z90 ity and Scheduled Castes in India,
Iyengar, M.C. Ranga, 128 34
Literucy rate,76
Jeewan Reddy, 296-97,3Ol,3O5 Lohia, Ram Manohar, 18,31
Job seekers, registration with Employ- Lokhitwadi, 35
ment Exchanges, 77 Lokur Committee,92, lO5,203
Madhusudhan Reddy, K., 32 Nair Committee, 99

Mandal, B.P., 173, 176-77,287 Nama Sudra Andolan, 35
Mandal Commission, 31, 48-51, 54, Narayan, Jaya Prakash, 176
56, 58-61, 65-66, 70-71, 78-79, Naroji, Dadabhai, 97
r77 . r85 . 257 -58 National Backward Classes Commis-
and Supreme Court judgement, sion, 3l
262-3r6 Navrachna Jagritikaran Paglam Samiti,
critgria for determination of back- 211
wardness, 292-93 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 30, 43, 56, 141,
Mandal. Ras Bihari. 173 265,267,273,284-85
Mandal, Shiva Nandan, 175 Nijalingappa, S., I l2
Manu, 4-5
Manusmriti, 4 Other Backward Classes (OBCs)
Mayawati, 5 classificati on of, 47-74
Mehta, Haroobhai, 202 income criteria fot, 7 l -7 3
Meston, 39 reservation policy for, 29-82
Miller Comminee, 40, 109, lll,ll5, constitutional provisions, 41 46
125 -28, 135, 137, 1 42, 1 4647, 1 49, fu ture perspectives, 72t82
152, 155 in Bihar, l6l-82
composition of, 149 in Gujarat, 198-219
duration, 155 in Kamataka, 108-59
recommendations, 1 25-28 in West Bengal, 183-96
term of reference, 152 national consensus on, 29-37
Miller, Lesley, 40 non-Brahmin movefienL 37 -42
Miller. Leslie C.. 109 see also, Reservation Policy
Mishra, Ranganath, 292 see also, Scheduled Castes, Sched-
Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, 39 uled Tribes and OBCs
Mookherjee, 2
Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909, 96 Pai Panandiker, V.A., I
Mudaliar Committee, 99 Pandian, 296, 304, 306, 309
Mudaliar, Ramaswamy, 41 Pantulu, B., 35
Mukherjee, N., 250 Patel. Birchand. 175
Mungeri Lal Commission, 165-67 Patel, Hasmukb, 202
Musahar Seva Mandal. Rosera. 168 Patel. Sulekha- 56
Mysore case.27'7 Parel, vallabhbhai, 2
Patil. M.S.. 129
Nagana Gowda Committee, 17, 1l l- Patil. Veerendra. 1 12
15, 118, 121-22, t28-30,135, 137 , Permanent Settlement, Bengal, 37
142, 146, 149, 152, 155 Philanthropy, politics of, 95-96
composition, 149 Phule, Jyotiba, 35, 94
duration, 155 Pillai, Muniswami. 2
recommendation, I 28-30 Planning Commission, 9
term of reference, 152 Poona Pact, 99
Naicker, Ramaswami, 35 Population,
Naik, S.C., 215 Bihar, 162-64, l8l-82
Index 5.J1
caste and traditional ocorpation- suggesdons, 237-39

wise, 62-63, 115-25, 156-59, Supreme Court judgement and,
t96,218 262-316
classification, 50-51 uneven distribution of benefits of,
growth,54-55 252-53
Gujarat, 218 Resemation Policy in India,32
indicators of classification, 61-62, Risely, 99
292-93 Ritual disability, 101-02
job seekers, 77 Rudolph, L.1., 162
Kamataka, 115-25, 156-59 Rudolph, S.H., 162
literacy rate,76 Ryotwari setdement, 37
variations in', 52-53
West Bengal, 185, 196 Sadhwani Committee, 212,215
Positive discrimination, principle of, Sahai, 296-98, 302, 306-07
19 Sahay, K.B., 175
Prasad, R.N., 35 Sanjeeviah, D., 243
Premchand, Munshi,35 Sanskritization process, 8
Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955, Santal Pahariya Seva Mandal, Deoglar,
83-84.223.242 169
Sawant, 296
RadhakrishnanCommission,250 Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes
176
Rai, Daroga Prasad, and OBCs,
N.,32
Ramchander, changing parameters of,9l-92
97
Ranade, M.G., 95, definition of, 88-106
Rane, C.V.,206 initial acceptance, 90-91
Rane Commission , 29, 206, 2O9 need to deschedule,92-93
Reservationpolicy, politics of evolution of, 93-94
appraisal,256-61 Presidential Order, 103
consequences of provisions in Constitution, 89
Govemmentemployment,244- reservationpolicyfor,
49 appraisal, 256-61
meritandefficiency,249-51 consequences,240-53
political, Ul-44 evabation,221-39
Constitutional provisions, 22, 30, in Bihar, 162-82
42-44, 46, 67,79-80, 92, 129- in Gujarat, 198-219
32. 134-36, 141, 23O-3'l, 262- in Kamataka, 108-59
316 in West Bengal, 183-96
evaluation, 221-39 Supreme Courtjudgernent,262-
in Bihar, 162-82 316
in Guj arat, 1 98-2 1 9 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
in Kamataka, 108-59 Lists (Modification) Order 1956,
in West Bengal, 183-96 47
major issues,228 Second Backward Classes Commis-
perfornance, 224-27 sion, J?e, Venkataswamy Commis-
rationale,222-24 sion
338 The Politics of Backw ardness
Second Backward Classes Committee, Untouchability, 33, 83-84

Karnataka, sae, Nagana Gowda Untouchability Offences Act of 1955,
Committee 223,242
Secular disability, l0l -02 Urs, Devraj, 31, 66, 112-13,204
S*gopta Rathin, 195
Servants of Untouchables Society, 36 Velasker, Padma Ramkrishna, 251
Shah, Ghanshyaq 240 Venkatachaliah, 296
Shah, Vimal P., 210 Venkataswamy, T., 57 , 122
Sharma, B.A.V., 32 Venkataswamy Commission, 31, 57-
Sharma. G.S., 34 61, 65, 67, 70, 8r, 122, 131-34,
Sharp, Henry, 99 140, 137-38, 150-51, 153-55
Sheth, D.L., 23-25,221 composition, 150-5 i
Shri Prakash, 2l , 23 , 29 , 198 duration of, 155
Silver Blaze,291 recommendation, 131-34
Simon Commission. 98-99 term of reference, 153-54
Singh, Charan, 19 Venkatraman. R.. 35
Singh, Dasu, 174 Verghese, B. George, 11, 256
Singh, Deo Saran, 174 Verma. K.K.. 173
Singh, Kuldip, 296, 3O2, 3O5 -W Visveswaraya, M., 109-10
Singh, V.P.,3-5, 257-58, 288-89, 298, Vivekananda, Swami, 35
310. 313-15
Sinha, Mahamaya Prasad, 175 Wanchoo, 277
Sinha, Sajivan Lal, 173 Weiner, Myron, 172
Smith. D.E.. 162 West Bengal,
Socially and Educationally Backward development profi le, 1 99-200
Classes Commission, Gujarat, 69 reservation policy, 183-96
Solanki, Madhavsinh, 2Ul, 209, 21 4 actual position of, 188-91
Srinivas, M.N., 8 impact of, 191-92
State economies, of lndia,77-82 mechanics of, 185-88
Subba Rao, 271, n8,282, 301 political framework, I 92-94
Sultan, Tipu, 110 report on, 195-96
West Bengal Scheduled Castes and
Tebhaga agltatons, 193 Scheduled Tribes (Reservation Va-
Thakkar. Amridal V.. 36 cancies in Services and Posts) Act
Thakur, Karpoori, 165, 175-76, ?M t976, 186, r95
Thimmaiah. G.. 16-17 World Bank, 56
Thomas case, 280, 286, 300-01, 3 12
Thommen, 296, 30O, 302, 3O7 Yadav. Laloo Prasad, 5
Titrles of India,83 Yadav, Mulayam Singh, 5
Tribals. 103-04 Yadav, Ram Lakhan Singh, 175
Triveni Sangh, 174 Yunus, 174
Untouchable. 9+98. 100-01 Zachariah. K.C.. 56

political leverage from, 96-98

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THE POLITICS OF BACKWARDNESS

Reservation PolicY in India

under the auspices of

Copyright @ Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, 1997

All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or

Typeset by Cardinal Access, Delhi and printed at

O social issue is perhaps as explosive in India, especially

As India stands in the 1990s, the reservation issue---cspecially in

V.A. PAI PANANDIKER

V. A. Pai Panandiker has been Director of the Centre for Policy

Chairman, Population Policy Committee, Plarming Commission and

lard Univenity, Australia and was later Visiting Scholar at Australian

Sachchidananda, D. Lit., is a distinguished anthropologist who was

Mrhit Bhattacharya was earlier Chairman, West Bengal Municipal

Prof. D. L. Sheth is Senior Fellow at the Crntre for the study of

Ghanshyam Shah is a professor at Lal Bahadur Shastri National

B. G. Verghese was educated at Delhi and Cambridge Universities. He

Rqieev Dhavaru M.A. (Cantab), 8.A., LL. B. (Allahabad), Ph. D.

Li$ of Contibutors vii

India was to be a casteless society. Freed from the chains of

Speaking on this very issue on 25 August 1949, DrB.R. Ambedkar

4 The Politics of Backwardness

better technology of administratiori but also "good" people. If this

the broadest sense, education to everyone, and to enable every indi

societal change. That is what has worked in all achieving countries

growing and integrated India than by the divisive and

l. Constituent Assetnbly Debates-efrcial Reporr, Vol. X, Lnk Sabha Sec_

fIE practice of reserving or restricting jobs in govemment

necessary qualification for applying for jobs' especially those

which they least resisted their ouster from pre-eminence in govern_

A fourth stream was soon added by the dynamics of the electoral

backward among the non-Brahmins---{hat is for occupation groups,

result the backward castes became a major factor in Indian politics

cannot be resolved without running into a more basic dilemma.

Muslims, which are generally localised by the location of the antago-

whether at the level of the Union or State govemments). The Su-

contrary opinion, that they are substantially lowered, is much more

society might be below average? I would much rather put my faith in

reservations. The disabilities of the poor of the highest castes cannot

ing it more effective. Though opinions differed on the specific ways

Reservations Policy for Other Backward

tIE call for evolving a national consensus on the issue of

common national understanding of this

parted company with their

Of the leaders interviewed, 72 per c,entbelonged

clearly ahead of others. Among the sutars or carpenters,

that they contin-

to Go: Repoi on a Survey of Scheiluleil Caste High School and

groups started movements against untouchability.

The Non-Brahmin Movement: Largely a Regional Phenomenon

One of the factors that distinguished the social structure in Tamil

or.where clan systems were more prevalent than sub-castes. Govern_

in the administration and aloofness from cultivation were responsible

considerations were always crucial in the pre-1947 period in the

The perspective in terms of which the issue of reservations for the

the services under

reduce and finally to abolish caste as

evolved subsequently at the national or local levels, giving rise to

ciency would be the likely cisualty. In purely formal terms, no

Problems Regarding Classification of Backward

The question ofbeing able to clearly demarcate the Scheduled Castes/

(1968), Nagaland (1970) and Sikkim (1978). This again demon-

The two principal difficulties in classifying backward classes are