Long Range Planning, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 57 to 72, 1983 0024-6301/83$3.00+ .

OO 57
Printed in Great Britain Pergamon Press Ltd.

So What is Strategy?
Roger Evered, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey

This paper contrasts the notion of strategy that has developed an endeavor might be useful in advancing our
in the field of business policy over the past decade or so with understanding and practice in the policy field. I find
the conceptions of strategy that prevailin other loosely related
I do much of my own learning by alternate
fields-most notably the fields of military practice and of
futures research. processes of contrasting and synthesizing, so that
this paper is, in part, an explication of my own
internal process of inquiry.

Basically my aim is toward conceptual clarification

The concept of strategy is central to the policy and and development. The concept we call ‘strategy’
managerial sciences. In the past 5 years or so, refers to a familiar human activity, particularly
interest in strategic management has grown human activity in organized settings, that is
incredibly rapidly. In the field of business apparently crucially important, subtly complex and
administration new books on strategic manage- excruciatingly elusive to conceptualize with any
ment, strategic planning, strategy formulation and precision. The word strategy occurs in fields that
corporate strategy appear with increasing fre- deal with the practical management of human
quency and several new journals have appeared affairs, whether in business, in government, in
specifically dealing with strategy. Even textbooks warfare or in the development and transformation
on non-strategy topics often find it useful to have of society. Each subfield of human affairs
the word ‘strategy’ in their title. Most recently the management has evolved its own particular
public sector, including the military, has become conceptualization of strategy with very little
interested in strategic management. The current concern for how other subfields have con-
interest in the topic reflects its importance despite ceptualized it.
the conceptual confusion associated with the notion
of strategy. This is perhaps as it should be. But now that each
area has developed more-or-less independently its
Significant literatures on the concept of strategy, own specialized language set, it may be useful to
and the art of strategizing, have been developed in a explore across the distinct fields. A field can become
number of fields, most notably in the fields of locked in on how it frames strategic issues, so that
business management, military practice and, more the process of contrasting may shed light on what
recently, inftlttrres research. Over the past year or so I we are doing, or what we could be doing
have become increasingly aware that each of these differently, in the strategic management field. It
three literatures have their own ways of talking might lead us to appreciate new dimensions,
about strategy. Each has groped agonizingly slowly possibilities and alternative ways of approaching
toward conceptual clarification, but none has tried policy issues generally. In short, contrasting related
to compare and contrast their own conceptualiz- fields provides a means for becoming more self-
ation of strategy with that of the other two fields. I reflective about our own thinking.
want to explore and contrast the conceptions of
strategy in the three fields. My belief is that the quality of policy research will
be influenced significantly by the care we take with
Let me first try to express my motivation for conceptual clarity, particularly with regard to the
undertaking this comparison, and why I think such praxis of strategic management. In my view, the
rush to quantify and to apply advanced statistical
inference techniques is not likely to prove fruitful
for the field of strategic management, unless prior
The author is Associate Professor of Organizational Sciences at the care is taken with the concepts, constructs and
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93940, U.S.A.
theoretical orientation. Scientism in the policy/
This paper is based on a presentation to the conference on Non-
Traditional Approaches to Policy Research at the University of strategy field is likely to be even more sterile than it
California in November 1981. has been in the social sciences generally.
58 Long Range Planning Vol. 16 June 1983

Overall, my aim is to offer critical commentary on strutegia were considerably increased by important
these three conceptions and to stimulate dialogue political functions, especially in foreign affairs. The
on our conceptualizations of the praxis of strategic chief of the strategia was at once the commander of
management. the Army, the head of state, the president of the
federal assemblies and the foreign minister. This
appointment, however, was initially limited to one
The Origins of the Concept of year. By the time of Pericles, (c. 450 BC) the
Strategy strate@a had acquired prerogatives of great
importance, such as management of the treasury.
One way of gaining awareness of the core meaning And after the time of Alexander (320 BC),
of a concept is to examine the context in which the military power prevailed over civil authority
concept was first named. It may be useful to record throughout Greece. Under Roman domination the
the origin of the notion of strategy, since it is of leader or chief of the stratqiu was the chief state
considerable interest to those of us in the policy officer. After 480 BC the leader of this board of
sciences. generals (given the title strutegos mtocrutor) was the
most powerful man in the state. The most famous
The word strategy comes to us from the Greek such leader of the stratqia was Pericles, who was
word, strutegos, strictly meaning a general in continuously re-elected to the position from 460 to
command of an army (stratos, army; -ug, to lead). 429 BC, making him the undisputed political boss
Most early Greek states after 550 BC had a of Athens for 30 years.
strutegos, or general officer of the army. Originally
he was a military official, but later acquired The 10 strutegos that made up the strategiu board
increasing administrative, civic and political were for several hundred years essentially the
functions, to become an important state officer. In governors or chief-executive-officers of a region.
500 BC a strategia, or board of 10 generals was set The strategia was not, however, a board in the
up in Athens, as a way of coordinating 10 tribal modern sense; there was no collective responsibility
units and diffusing power. It was part of a radical and no unanimous policy. It was also not analogous
reform in governance. Each general commanded to the British cabinet. Each individual strategos
the army of his tribe and acted as occasional voted and acted as a private citizen, with extensive
supreme commander. The period from 509 BC to influence.
490 Bc-that is, from the fall of the tyrants to the
Battle of Marathon-is of immense historical In reading through the history of the strategia, three
interest. During this period Athens confronted a aspects stand out.
widespread revolutionary atmosphere (cf. present
day Poland), a crisis of the form of governance (1) The Simultaneous Stability and Fluidity of the
(democracy vs rule by council vs rule by strong Organizational Role of the Strategia
aristocrat), and a crisis of foreign policy (relations The board remained as a key structural entity for
with Persia, Sparta and Ionia). In 500 BC the several hundred years, yet it was in continuous flux
governance of Athens was radically reorganized, in relation to the other governance functions. At
and a number of structures and procedures were any given time, the role of a strategos might include
established that were eventually to democratize any combination of the following: provincial
Greece. Organizational forms were invented and governor, foreign minister, field commander, head
installed that would prevent the reemergence of a of state, treasury head or council member.
tyranny and which would involve a large fraction
of the population in state decisions. Over a period of several hundred years of change,
the governance of Athens was accomplished by the
Contemporary with these reforms was the interplay of three institutions; the Strategia (board
introduction of compulsory military service, (to of 10 elected generals), the Boll/e (council of 500,
counteract the power of the aristocracy), and the chosen by lot, meeting daily) and the Ecrlesiu
institution of the strategin, the high command of 10 (Assembly of all citizens, meeting weekly).
generals, (one from each of 10 tribes). These elected
generals were popularly supported in contrast to The combination of institutional stability and
the chief magistrate, who was chosen by lot from functional fluidity is striking.
the aristocracy. Command amongst the 10 generals
varied with the situation, the personality of the (2) The Evolution of the Idea of Strategy over
generals, and the prevailing relationship with the 200 Years
other governing bodies, such as the Council of Five Initially strategos referred to a role (a general in
Hundred. In times of crises the chief command command of an army). Later it came to mean ‘the
could be assigned to one of the 10, while at other art of the general’, which is to say the psychological
times they exercised chief command in turn, or and behavioral skills with which he occupied the
were given coordinate powers. role. By the time of Pericles (450 BC) it came to
mean managerial skill (administration, leadership,
During the 5th century BC, the powers of the oration, power). And by Alexander’s time (330
 So What is Strategy? 59

BC) it referred to the skill of employing forces to (1) It concisely states the Harvard approach to business
overcome opposition and to create a unified system policy; namely a focus on the firm as a whole, on the
of global governance. Pericles provides a fine core function of the chief executive officer, on
example of strategy in the political and state decisions that affect the identity, character and
management sense, and Alexander provides the purpose of the firm, and which set its direction, on
ultimate example of strategy in the military sense. integrating and synthesizing rather than analyzing,
on professional and pragmatic education, on the use
(3) The Richness of Data that Pertains to of cases derived from consultations with the top
Policy/Strategy Research management of firms.
The story of classical Greece between 510 BC and
300 BC can be viewed as a vast data bank that may (2) It presents a consistent statement. It has a high
be used in a research mode to increase our degree of internal consistency which is unusual for a
understanding of strategic management. The Greek business policy/corporate strategy book. It is also
states are analogous to corporations that organize consistent with other Harvard-generated books on
themselves in a variety of ways, that compete, that policy/strategy. It is also remarkedly compatible
form coalitions, that must deal with massive with most other books in strategic management,
environmental threats (Persian invasions) and except that Andrews (and Harvard) use the broad
opportunities (creating a new unified world). definition of strategy (which includes the process of
Might not our theories of corporate strategic defining purpose, objective and goals) whereas
management be tested against the data base of many recent books take the narrow definition of
Greek history? strategy (namely, the means used to achieve given
objectives). Much of the recent literature can be
viewed as attempts to formalize, rationalize or
extend the conception of strategy that is presented
The Concept of Strategy in Business in Andrews.‘,’ * In this sense Andrews’ statement on
the concept of corporate strategy is central to the
Management field.
There have been a number of attempts to represent
the concept of strategy developed in management (3) It presents a balanced view of the strategy
practice. Most notable are the work by Ansoff, concept, which has gradually evolved over 20 years.
Andrews, Uyterhoven, Hofer and Schendel, King It presents no obvious polemical overstatement,
and Cleland, MacMillan, Schendel and Hofer, and it successfully balances teaching, consulting,
Moskow, Steiner, Quinn, Summer.‘-’ ’ These research and corporate practice. It is also concise and
writers provide a variety of conceptual frameworks up-to-date.
for representing the strategy concept. Some of
them, like Ansoff,’ give analytical or rationalistic For these reasons, Andrews’ books have probably
models, which while precise, are neither rich been the most influential statements in the
enough nor useful enough for actual practice. Other corporate strategy field.
writers, such as Steiner and Hofer and Schende14.”
are more eclectic and provide a range of Take as given then, if you will, my presumption
frameworks and ideas that collectively define the that Andrews’ articulation of strategy is the most
notion of strategy in business management. On the central and influential in the field of corporate
other hand, some writers, notably Andrews and strategy. Then let us ask, what stands out as
Quinn’,” have been primarily verbal in presenting characterizing his conception of strategy? What
their understanding of strategy. A comparison of distinguishes the Andrews approach? What might
some of the conceptions of strategy in the an intelligent reader notice?
management field is presented in Figure 1, taken
from Hofer and Schendel.4 I view the literature on My response to these questions is as follows:
strategy as a cluster of related notions and
representations that has so far defied synthesis (1) Andrews defines what strategy is with the
despite a number of sustained attempts (e.g. Hofer). following sentence. ‘Corporate strategy is the
Clearly our field still has some distance to go before pattern of decisions in a company that determines
the concept of strategy has been explicated to our and reveals its objectives, purposes or goals,
joint satisfaction. ‘Strategy’ is now one of the produces the principal policies and plans for
favorite words in the field of business management achieving those goals, and defines the range of
despite its unclear meaning. business the company is to pursue, the kind of
economic and human organization it is or intends
I have selected the Andrews books
entitled The to be, and the nature of the economic and non-
Concept of Corporate Strategy,*,‘*
as the most economic contribution it intends to make to its
significant and representative statement of the shareholders, employees, customers and
cluster of writings on strategy in business communities.” ’
management. My reasons for this choice are the
following. This definition is, in my view, one of the best in the
 Newman Uyeterhoeven Paine & Glueck Steiner Hofer
Chandler Andrews Ansoff CannO” Katz Ackoff McNichols
& Logan et al. Naumes &Miner & Schendel

Breadth of Does Not Both

Strategy Broad Broad Narrow Narrow Broad Recognize Narrow Braod Narrow Narrow Broad Narrow
Broad &
Definition/Concept Concept Narrow

Name for Broad Corporate Master Master Grand

Strategy Strategy X X X X Strategy X X
Concept of Strategy Strategy Strategy Strategy Design

Services
Components of Goals Missions
Scope Technology Objectives
Objectives Goals Objectives Purposes
Broad Concept Deployments X X Synergy
Action Plans Policies X X Strategic X X Objectives Strategy
of Strategy Specifications Sequencing
Resources Plans Posture Policies Policies
& Timing
Allocations
Targets

Goals & Objectives & Result Specifications Purposes

Name of Goals Goals & Objectives Goals & Goals & Goals &
& Strategic Targets Objectives Objectives &
& Objectives Objectives Objectives Constraints Strategy & Goals Obgectives Objectives Objectives
Criteria Objectives

Attributes
Differentiates Attributes
Characteristics None Attributes I “dices None None None None None None
None Between None Indices
of Objectives Specified Specified Yardsticks Targets 81 Time Specified Specified Specified Specified Specified Specified Official & Specified Targets
Goals Tied to Action
Operative Time
Strategies

Composite Program Corporate

Name of Narrow Root Strategic Overall
X X Strategy or Business Scope X X Strategy Strategy or Business
Concept Strategy Strategy Posture Strategy
Strategy Strategy

Product-Market Domain or Stop

Services
Components of Scope Resource
None Technology Scope None
Narrow Concept X X Growth Vector None None None None Deployments
X Competitive
Strategy Competitive Specified Specified Specified Synergy Specified Specified Specified Competitive
Sequencing Posture
Advantage. Advantage
&Timing Self - conQPt
Sww Synergy

Operating Functional Functional Functional

Names for Functional Action Functional Functional Functional
Policies Policies Policies Strategy Strategies Policies Strategies Strategies
Strategies & Policies X Strategy Policies Policies Policies
& Policies 84 Policies 81 Policies 84 Policies

Programs
Name for Plans
Action Committment Deployments Procedures, Master Programs Programs Plans & Programs
Implementation Plans Programs X Or
Plans Strategy & courses Plan & Plans & Roles Programs & Plans
Plans Action
of Action

;rtf;re”“tiates
Between
No No Yes No No Yes No No No
Objectives & No No Yes
Goals & Objectives
Constraints
& Constraints

Differentiates Between No, But Does

Recognize
Corporate Level & No Yes Yes, Yes,
No No No No No Different No No Yes
Business Level lmplicity Implicity &za;sizational in Places
Strategies

Differentiates Between
Goal Formulation No Not Yes,
No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Processes & Strategy Explicitly in Places
Formulation Processes

Differntiates Between Does Not Does Not Does Not Does Not
Analytical & Organiza- Does Not Discuss Discuss Discuss
Discuss Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Discuss Organizational Yes Yes Organizational Organizational
tional Aspects of the Organizational
Strategy Formulation Either Aspects
Aspects Aspects Aspects

Figure 1. A comparison of various authors’ concepts of strategy and the strategy formulation process in the business management field, from
Hofer and Schendel, Strategy Formulation: Analytical Concepts, West (1978)
 So What is Strategy? 61

business management literature, being both rele- Andrews makes the development of purpose and
vant and accurate. Yet it is highly verbal, imprecise, attention to theftlture the central functions of the
nonformal and not immediately useful. It does not chief executive and the core components of his
lend itself to being modeled, though it is supported conception of strategy. Of the hundreds of things
by a diagram, reproduced in Figure 2. that might be said about chief executive functions
and about the concept of strategy, Andrews gives
Both the definition and the figure highlight the central recognition to purpose-defining and future-
interconnectedness of purposes, policies and organ- attending.
ized action; the interdependence of the formulation
and implementation of corporate purpose; and the Human value judgments are integral to both
internal consistency of a firm’s choices of identity, functions.
position and character on the one hand and its
actions on the other. (4) Andrews articulates a process view of strategy.
Strategy is viewed more as a fluid to be worked
The definitions, the figure and the text presents a with than a thing to be actualized. Andrews’
non-linear, non-sequential, non-logical conception conception of strategy is described as ‘an
of strategy. Key words that reoccur in defining the organizational process forever in motion’ and as the
concept of corporate strategy are pattern, coher- interface between the organizational processes of
ence, interdependence, consistency, interrelation- formulation and the organizational process of
ship, character. That is to say, Andrews’ conception implementation (e.g. Figure 2). And ‘. . . the
of strategy appeals significantly to the right-brain determination of purpose is in reality in dynamic
rather than the left-brain. interrelation with its implementation’. Strategy is
seen as an attribute of a living system rather than a
static formula to be applied.
(2) Andrews’ development of the strategy concept
reveals a respect for the pructitioner, namely the
This view contrasts markedly with those who think
practicing chief executive officer, president or
of strategy in technological terms of PERT charts,
general manager of a firm. His conceptions were
goal-reaching, mission accomplishment, or design-
developed for consultive interaction with the senior
and-implement.
general managers of firms experiencing critical
problems of purpose or direction. The core
(5) Case studies played a significant role in the
phenomenon is the practice of the management at
development of the conception and theory of
the CEO level, which embraces the point of view of
strategy presented in Andrews.” Case studies of
the CEO and the perspective of the total
situations encountered by chief executives in real
organization. Andrews presents a ‘simple
organizations provided the source data for the
practitioner’s theory’ (ofthe CEO’sjob), the central
development of knowledge.
concept of which is his notion of ‘corporate
strategy’.
Additionally, the text is illustrated with examples
of actual firms and current events. And the book is
The book is also written in language that is readily
used primarily in MBA and executive policy
intelligible to a chief executive practitioner rather
courses which are predominantly case courses.
than in the technical jargon of a field of science.
Conceptions and theories are reality-tested with
practicing executives.
In summary, Andrews treats the policy/strategy
field as praxis rather than as technology or science.
Case studies have contributed significantly in the
acquisition of knowledge. What is not explicated
(3) Substantively Andrews’ conception of strategy are the details of this knowledge-generating
is dominated by the determination of corporate process.
purpose in economic, human and social terms, and
by consideration of thefcltcrre character of the firm These then are the five aspects that in my view,
in relation to opportunities, threats and constraints. distinguish Andrews conception of strategy.
‘
. . . the highest function of the chief executive is
the management of the future-oriented purposeful
development of the enterprise. . .’ (p. 170). ‘The The Concept of Strategy in the
chief executive’s role as architect of organization
purpose is the principal subject of this book’ (p. 5).
Military Field
‘The policy problems of business, like those of The literature in military strategy is vast and oflong
policy in public affairs, have to do with the choice standing. The first recorded statement on military
of purposes, the molding of corporate identity and strategy is that by Sun Tzu, written in China
character, the unending definition of what needs to around 360 BC, and now entitled, The Art of
be done, and the mobilization of resources for the WUY.13 It is also probably the most influential
attainment of goals in the face of aggressive military strategy book ever written. The classical
competition or adverse circumstances’ (p. iv). works on the notion of strategy in the military field
62 Long Range Planning Vol. 16 June 1983

FORMULATION
b IMPLEMENTATION
‘(DECIDING WHAT TO DO)
_ (ACHIEVING RESULTS)
\ +

- 1. Identification of CORPORATE
STRATEGY
1'_b 1. Organization Structure and 4
Opportunity and Risk - Relationships

1t
Division df Labor
Coordination of Divided
Responsibility
- 2. Determining the Company’s Information Systems
Material, Technical, ,
Financial and
2. Organizational Processes 4
Managerial Resources Pattern of
and Behavior

1t
Purposes
Standards and Measurement
and
Motivation and Incentive
Policies b
systems
_ 3. Personal Values and Defining
Control Systems
Aspirations of Senior the
Recruitment and Development
Management Company
of Managers

1t
- 4. Acknowledgement of
Noneconomic Responsibility
to Society
and its
Business
3. Top Leadership -b
I Strategic
- Organizational
’ Personal

ENVIRONMENTAL
CONDITIONS AND
TRENDS

Economic Capability:
Technical Financial
Physical Managerial
Political Functional
Social Organizational

Reputation
History

OPPORTUNITIES
AND RISKS

As Extending or
Identification Constraining
Inquiry Opportunity
Consideration of
Assessment of Risk
all Combinations
Identification
of Strengths and
Weaknesses

Programs for
Increasing Capability

PRODUCTS AND

Figure 2. Depictions of the corporate strategy process from The Concepts of Corporate Strategy
by K. R. Andrews, Irwin (1980)-obtainable from Richard D. Irwin, 1818 Ridge Road,
Homewood, Illinois
 So What is Strategy?

are those by Jomini and Moltke (see Earle14), evolved.’ Despite these theoretical distinctions it is
Clausewitz, Mahon, Corbett, Brodie, Aron, often impractical to separate strategy from tactics
Beaufre and Liddell-Hart.‘5-2’ Despite the scope of ‘because each not only influences but merges into
military strategy literature there is still no agreed the other’.”
definition of the precise meaning of the term
strategy (as in the corporate strategy field). I have selected the Liddell-Hart book, entitled
Strategy” as the most significant of the cluster of
The term strategy first gained currency in Europe writings on strategy in the military field. My
during the time of the Napoleonic wars. Prior to reasons for this choice are the following.
this time the term ‘strategem’ was used (since about
AD 1500) to denote a trick by a general designed (1) Liddell-Hart provides a concise and internally
to outwit or surprise an enemy. After the consistent statement of the concept of strategy
Napoleonic period, strategy referred to the art of in the military field.
projecting and directing the extensive military
operations of a campaign, which might be a (4 He is the most influential writer on military
strategy since 1930.
sequence of battles. Clausewitz defines strategy in
this post-Napoleonic sense; strategy is ‘the art of (3) His writings are entirely consistent with Sun
the employment ofbattles to gain the object ofwar. Tzu’s, The Art of War, thus spanning almost
In other words strategy forms the plan of the war, 2400 years of military history.
makes out the proposed course of the different
campaigns which compose the war, and regulates Assuming then that Liddell-Hart’s (and Sun Tzu’s)
the battles to be fought in each’. Clausewitz devotes articulation of strategy is the most central and
much of his writing to arguing that war is both a influential in the field of military strategy, what
social and political act. ‘War is not merely a political stands out as characterizing his conceptions of
act, but also a real political instrument, a strategy? What distinguishes Liddell-Hart’s ap-
continuation of policy carried out by other means.’ proach? What might an intelligent reader notice?
For Clausewitz, the aim of strategy is the
destruction of the enemy forces on the battlefield. My response to these questions is as follows:

With the growing complexity and interconnected- (1) Liddell-Hart defines strategy as ‘the art of
ness of societies, technology and warfare, nations distributing and applying military means to fulfil
found it necessary to manage their policies through the ends of policy’. He distinguishes strategy (pure,
political, economic, technological, psychological or military, strategy) from grand strategy (higher,
and even religious factors, along with the purely or total, strategy) as follows: ‘the term “strategy” is
military component. This broadening of the best confined to its literal meaning of
instruments of conflict combined with the blurring “generalship’‘-the actual direction of military
of distinctions between military and non-military force, as distinct from the policy governing its
and between war and peace, led to the appearance of employment and combining it with other
the term ‘grand strategy’ (or ‘total strategy’ or weapons: economic, political, psychological. Such
‘higher strategy’). Grand strategy meant the art of policy is in application a higher-level strategy, for
employing ul/ the resources of a nation (or coalition which the term “grand strategy” has been coined’.
of nations) to achieve policy objectives.
His conception of strategy in relation to grand
Thus the distinctions between strategy and strategy, policy tactics and objectives is as follows:
statesmanship, and strategy and policy, have ‘As tactics is an application of strategy on a lower
become blurred. At the other end of the spectrum, plane, so strategy is an application on the lower
the distinction between strategy and tactic is also plane of “grand strategy”. While practically
somewhat blurred. The traditional distinction is synonymous with the policy which guides the
that strategy deals with (a) deployments, (b) over conduct of war, as distinct from the more
wide spaces, long times and large movements, and fundamental policy which should govern its object,
(c) before contact with the enemy; tactics deal with the term “grand strategy” serves to bring out the
actions on the battlefield itself. Numerous other sense of “policy in execution”. For the role of grand
distinctions are spread throughout the literature. strategy-higher strategy-is to coordinate and
Rosinski” defines strategy as the comprehensive direct all the resources or a nation, or band of
direction of power, and tactics as the immediate nations, towards the attainment of the political
application of power-a distinction which is not object of the war-the goal defined by fundamental
limited to the military arena. Liddell-Hart states policy.’
that ‘tactics lies in the province offighting. Strategy
not only stops on the frontier, but has for its Hence Liddell-Hart explicitly defines strategy in
purpose the reduction of fighting to the slende,cst the narrow sense; it is conjned to military force only
possible proportions’. And from Sun Tzu; ‘All men and is an instrument of nutionul policy. Only rarely has
can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what strategy and policy been equated in the case of the
none can see is the strategy out of which victory is famous soldier-rulers-Alexander, Frederick and
64 Long Range Planning Vol. 16 June 1983

Napoleon. The field general is not normally the opponent. This is centrally a value issue, requiring
chief executive of the state. continuous reassessment of one’s own purpose.

(2) Crucial in the strategy conceptions of Liddell- (4) Throughout Liddell-Hart’s conception of
Hart (and his progenitor Sun Tzu) is the distinction strategy is the importance of having alternative (or
mtrltiple) objectives. This contrasts with the single-
between direct and indirect approaches, and their
interplay. Actions (and thoughts) are of two kinds; minded single-goal doctrine commonly espoused.
the normal, direct, more obvious (cheng); and the ‘In any problem where an opposing force exists, and
cannot be regulated, one must foresee and provide
unexpected, strange, extraordinary or indirect
for alternative courses’, he says. ‘The absence of an
(ch’i). They always work together in innumerable
alternative is contrary to the very nature of war.’
combinations, and each may be transferred into the
other.
Part of the logic behind this idea is as follows: ‘If the
enemy is certain as to your point of aim he has the
The essential skill of the general is to employ these
best possible chance of guarding himself. If, on the
twin forces of distraction (or dislocation) and
other hand, you take a line that threatens alternative
decisiveness (or exploitation). The business of the
general is to generate changes so as to create objectives, you distract his mind and forces.’ Also,
advantageous situations in which a minimum ‘alternative objectives allow you to keep the
application of force will achieve a decision. To opportunity of gaining an objective; whereas a
create such a situation is the ultimate responsibility single objective, unless the enemy is hopelessly
of the general. inferior, means the certainty that you will not gain
it’.
The indirect approach plays a predominant role
prior to encounter with the enemy, that is to say in (5) Much of the military literature attempts to
the strategic, rather than the tactical phase. In most distill the great mass of military experience into a
of the decisive battles of history the victor had his set of universal truths that might guide com-
opponent at extreme disadvantage before the clash manders. Most commonly seen is a set of ‘principles
occurred. A skillful general seeks to dislocate his of war’, usually containing such items as: main-
enemy’s balance in order to produce a favorable tenance of the objective, offensive actions, surprise,
outcome with minimum force. The purpose of concentration/mass, economy or force, security,
strategy is to diminish the possibility of resistance mobility/maneuver, cooperation/coordinated leader-
and to induce the enemy to abandon his purpose, ship, simplicity, flexibility, communications man-
rather than to win a battle or destroy him. The true agement, etc., etc.
aim ‘is not so much to seek battle as to seek a
strategic situation so advantageous that if it does In contrast to most of the literature, Liddell-Hart
not of itself produce the decision, its continuation develops a list ofpragmaticguides rather than abstract
by a battle is sure to achieve this’. ‘principles’. His list (here abbreviated) comprises
eight practical guides-six positive and two
The idea is also captured by Lenin: ‘the soundest negative. They are:
strategy in war is to postpone operations until the
+ 1. Adjust your end to your means.
moral disintegration of the enemy renders the
delivery of a mortal blow both possible and easy’. In + 2. Keep your objective always in mind.
strategy the longest way round, is often the shortest
+ 3. Choose the line (or course) of least
way home. expectations.
+ 4. Exploit the line of least resistance.
(3) A corollary of the indirect approach is the
necessity for deception. ‘All warfare is based on + 5. Take a line of operation which offers
deception’, said Sun Tzu. The history of strategy alternative objectives.
and tactics is a saga of bluff, feint, distraction, + 6. Ensure that both plan and dispositions are
camouflage, ruse, surprise, guile, illusion, trickery, flexible-adaptable to circumstances.
traps, bait, decoy, ambush, disguise, misinform-
ation and secrecy. The skillful general must master - 7. Do not throw your weight into a stroke
the art of dissimulation, in order to produce whilst your opponent is on guard.
vulnerability in the opponent and to prevent - 8. Do not renew an attack along the same line
himself from becoming vulnerable. (or in the same form) after it has once failed.

The primary target is the mind of the opposing Elsewhere he has distilled out two simple maxims
general. Fundamentally strategy is a process of for which he says there is overwhelming historical
altering the reality experience of the opponent such evidence:
that he gives up his purpose. Conversely a
commander must continuously be aware of his own (a) No general is justified in directly attacking an
purpose and defend it against dislocation by the enemy firmly in position.
 So What is Strategy? 65

(b) Instead of seeking to upset the enemy’s capability. This is seen as a threat to the firm, since
equilibrium by one attack, it must be upset market share may be lost and growth may suffer if
before a real attack is, or can be, successfully the threat is not responded to. The firm evaluates
launched. the situation and selects its response.

(6) Liddell-H ar t ‘s conception of strategy, theories (b) The second ‘other’ military use of the term
and practical guides are derived from historical strategy has arisen since the ‘strategic bombings’ of
research. Conclusions are derived from a systematic World War II. The use of militaryforce against the non-
study of decisive battles and wars over 2500 years. military aspects of enemy-industry, raw materials,
The source data is essentially a comprehensive series population, etc.-is often called strategic. The
of cases. His results are produced by intelligent advent of nuclear weapons, carried by aircraft,
historical research. missiles or submarines, has increased the use of the
term ‘strategic’ in this sense, almost to the point
(7) There are two other uses of the term strategy in where ‘strategic’ and ‘nuclear weapon’ are syn-
the military. onymous. What is really implied however, is that
nuclear weapons are being used as instruments of
(a) The first has to do with ‘force acquisition’ or threat to the enemy’s non-military components.
new military force. The traditional meaning of
strategy has to do with deployment and use of forces.
Throughout the present-day defense establishment, It must be noted, however, that both these extended
however, strategy is used to denote the acquisition of meanings of strategy----force acquisition and threat to
the enemy’s vesources-are compatible with Liddell-
new weapons and technologies to deal with the
‘threat’ that is presumed because the Soviet Union Hart’s conception of strategy. They are both
examples of the indirect approach by which
has acquired new weapons or technologies.
‘Models’ of this process are familiar components of military forces are being used potentially to gain
presentations given within the Defense national advantage without direct use in battle.
Department. A typical model is reproduced in Military forces are used to modify the psychologi-
Figure 3, taken from Kline et a1.23 What is cal experience of the enemy in order to destroy his
particularly interesting here, is the analogy it purpose, rather than to destroy his assets.
represents to competitive business strategy. A
competitor is found to have, or be working on, a Such is the essence of Liddell-Hart’s concept of
new produce that has significantly increased strategy.

Information
Inputs
Prepare
Operational
Requirement

t
Deficiency
Acceptable
RFk

Threat and

, ,.,““r,r, L ( -I
Mission
Analvsis
-m
1_y-q -
No Deficiency

L-_-I
;
--_-
I Iteration
Deficiency
High Risk

Physical Functional Engagement Outcome Effectiveness

Example Size Range Missions/Modes No. of Hits/Misses Kill Probability
Parameters Weight Speed Rate of Fire Damage Availability
Hardness Maneuverability No. of Targets Casualty Losses Reliability
Radar Cross Vulnerability One-on-one Expenditure of Downtime
Section Accuracy Force Structure Consumables Survivability
No. and Type Maneuvers No. of Targets
Weapons Duration Engaged
Figure 3. A typical model to identify requirements for new systems, from Conceptual
Phase Requirements Determination Methodolo<qy and its Application to the Advanced Naval Gun System
by M. B. Kline, Report No. NPS SSKx75121 (1975)
 66 Long Range Planning Vol. 16 June 1983

The Concept of Strategy in Futures significant and representative of the writing on

strategy in futures research. My reasons for this
Research choice are the following.
The term strategy is also frequently used in the field
of futures research. While the notion has received (1) M’ICh ae 1’s b oo k. 1s probably the most comprehen-
no systematic conceptual treatment, such as is sive and advanced statement yet on the task of
found in the military field, it is nevertheless used changing society in the direction of a future-
with sufficient consistency to distinguish it from responsive societal learning system. His book
the other varieties of strategy discussed here. presents a strategy for generating long-range
societal planning.
In futures research, strategy is viewed as a task of
appreciating a complex of environmental changes (2) Michael’s book h as b een seminal for a number of
and making core existential choices in situations of later writers on the requirements involved in
massive change. Strategy here is essentially that of changing toward a future-responsive societal
coping constructively with the challenge of a learning system.
changing environment rather than with opponents.
(3) I view Michael’s statement of strategy of futures-
Sometimes the term strategy is explicitly used in creating as a leading-edge statement that is at least a
titles, such as Laszlo’s A Strategy for the Future, or decade ahead of its time. The field of futures
Toffler’s ‘Strategies for Survival’, and ‘The Strategy research is to some extent catching up with what
of Social Futurism’ in Future Shock.24,25 More Michael wrote a decade ago.
commonly the concept is used more diffusely and
implicitly. (4) Michael h as b een most influential on my own
thinking. If you will then go along with my
The futures research notion of strategy is to be selection of Michael as the most central and
found in most of the leading works; such as influential work in the field of futures research,
DeJouvenel, Tugwell and Fowles.‘6-‘” In a sense what stands out as characterizing his strategy
nearly all futures research is a form of strategic conception? What distinguishes Michael’s ap-
thinking. To be a futurist is to feel personal proach? What might an intelligent reader notice?
responsibility for the future and to commit oneself
to generating a different kind of world, a better
My response to these questions is as follows:
kind of world, in which familiar or impending
societal ills can be avoided. The process by which
(1) Michael’s conception of a strategy for taking
the societal organism can be transformed from
collective responsibility for the future is not easily
what we currently are to something, yet to be
defined. Even after 300 pages, the notion seems rich
defined, that will avoid the plethora ofdisasters that
but still fuzzy. Part of the difficulty is in breaking
threaten and will generate a more desirable world new ground, but much of it is inherent in the
for our heirs. The avoidance of nuclear war, mass problem.
starvation, and street violence are obvious
examples.
A strategy may be viewed as a device for deciding
The futurist is not content with elaborating on which actions to take. In the futures research field
possibilities, alternatives and expectations but is we can think of three levels of sophistication:
committed to the strategic thinking that is
necessary to realize a more desirable society.
(4 where actions are taken to achieve a particular,
desired future state (goal or end point) which is
Strategic thinking is involved whenever we discuss explicitly stated (e.g. erecting a building);
how we might move society from here to there
(wherever the ‘there’ might be); or how to bring 04 where actions are taken to set up processes that
about total system change and outcomes; or how an lead to a range of desireable future states (e.g.
organic system (of which we are part) might be changing the tax structure);
transformed.
(4 where organizational processes are set up that
move society in the direction of being able to
All futurists know that this is not a design problem.
manage its future, whichever way it chooses
It is not a problem of gaining power and control to
(e.g. setting up reward structures for the
rebuild the world with a new blueprint. Rather it is a
planning).
shared task of creating the processes for organiz-
ational learning, for future-responsive societal
regulation, and for supporting the development of Michael deals with the latter. His statement deals
collective-future-consciousness in relation to not with enacting a particular end state, and not
action. with creating a particular process. Rather it deals
with the meta-problem of changing our current
I have selected the Don Michael’s book entitled, On societal processes toward new societal processes
Learning to Plan-and Planning to LearnI as the most that meet three requirements:
 So What is Strategy? 67

‘(A) that present actions be deeply influenced by the processes for generating change. A crucial
sophisticated conjectures about relevant future element in the view articulated by Michael is the
societal contexts; (future-thinking) balance between (a) personal/interpersonal change,
and (b) structural/organizational change. They are
(B) that, at all stages of moving from present actions two sides of a coin that augment each other.
into the future, the societal and natural environ- Michael focuses on how to set up the organizational
ment be scanned and the feedback from it be processes and arrangements that enable people in
controlling in the unfolding and alteration of the those organizations to be more future-cognizant,
future-oriented plans; (feedback) future-responsive and future-influencing.

(C) that explicit social goals and the implementation Michael specifies the new ways of acting and being,
of programs to realize them be intertwined and discusses the organizational systems that must
conceptually and operationally, with the goals be developed to support them. ‘Changing toward
serving as highly salient regulators of social long-range societal planning would require that
development rather than as rigid end-points’ people working in organizations, and in the social
(regulation) _ and natural environments linked to them, find it
rewarding to learn how to do these things:
As stated earlier, the definition is both rich and
(4 Live with and acknowledge great uncertainty.
fuzzy.
(w Embrace error.
(2) Michael’s statement deals with the task of selJ-
(4 Seek and accept the ethical responsibility and
transformation, that is directed, conscious, and
the conflict-laden circumstances that attend
jointly managed. It necessitates that we collectively
goal-setting.
acquire the skills to generate a transformation in our
culture, our organizations and ourselves. It means (4 Evaluate the present in the light of anticipated
that we must begin to learn how to change from futures, and commit themselves to actions in
one whole societal pattern to another, increasingly the present intended to meet such long-range
by choice and less-and-less by muddling along anticipations.
(disjointed incrementalism). First we must learn
(4 Live with the role stress and forego the
how to generate a learningful mode before we can
satisfactions of stable, on-the-job, social group
generate societal transformation. Then the direc-
relationships.
tion to go is toward a future-responsive and future-
guiding society. 63 Be open to changes in commitments and
directions, as suggested by changes in the
Value issues pervade the process. conjectured pictures of the future and evalu-
ations of ongoing activities.’
(3) Michael’s strategy is not an explicit program for
any particular future. Rather it focuses attention to The strategic task is to move toward these new
the requirements, circumstances, constraints and ways of being and acting, that are organizationally
criteria necessary to change from one whole system supported in such a way as to continuously balance
or culture to another whole system or culture. The the private interest, the public interest and the
new system/culture is defined only by its processes, global interest.
particularly processes for continued self-directed
transitioning. (5) The method by which Michael arrives at his
long-range societal planning conception of strategy
The objective is to bring about a paradigm shift in is essentially an iterative, interpretive, inductive
our societal system and ourselves. ‘Social reality approach. Michael describes the process as ‘a
now operates as it does because we “created” it that constant and deliberate interplay between specu-
way.’ The haphazard, piecemeal evolution of lation, reading and interviewing’. He collects data
society has produced the current package of human in the form of interesting incidents and vignettes on
behaviors, organizational procedures and images of the general theme of the social/organizational
human nature that jointly generate our current psychology issues associated with shifting our
collective problems (or problematique). It has paradigm from a technocratic society to a different
resulted in technocratic problem-solving, hierarchi- society having procedures for accomplishing
cal organizations, social engineering orientations, future-responsive societal learning.
material acquisitions and power preemption.
‘People are rewarded for behaving in ways that are This new society has the characteristics of Michael’s
producing an ungovernable, unsatisfying society.’ research in these respects:
The aim is to take such actions that we can begin to
(a) it is a process that is continuously evolving, and
learn which alternative reward structures might
everlastingly incomplete;
lead to a more governable, more satisfying society.
(b) it is a d’la 1ec t.ic process continuously synthesiz-
(4) Strategy in the futures research field focuses on ing contrasting data;
68 Long Range Planning Vol. 16 June 1983

(c) it is an interactive process that collaboratively Military: Strategy, B. H. Liddell-Hart, Praeger,

involves a large number of people (at least 150 1967.
were interviewed) ; Futures Research: On Learning to Plan--and
Planning to Learn, D. N. Michael, Jossey-Bass,
(d) it builds a network, or infrastructure, of future-
1973.
responsive persons;

(e) it involves the development of new values, new I summarized the most noticeable features (to me)
interest, new ways of looking at the world; of these books; as presented in Table 1 (a, b and c).
(f) it learns as it goes along, but not in a prescribed
Next I compared the items listed for each pair of
manner.
books, e.g. Andrews vs Liddell-Hart. I systematic-
ally compared items on the Andrews list of
This is to say, theprocess of his research has the same
noticeable features with those on the Liddell-Hart
characteristics as the topic or substance of his
list. The result is shown in Table 2 (a and b), which
research.
list similarities and differences. Comparable tables
were drawn up for the other two pairs: namely,

Comparison of the Three Strategy Table l(b). Summary of the most noticeable
Conceptions features of Liddell-Hurt
In the preceding pages I have outlined the most
1. & Concise definition
noticeable or distinguishing features of three * Defined as an ‘art’
works., They represent, in my opinion, internally * Distinguishes between ‘pure’ and ‘grand’ strategy
consistent and sophisticated statements in the three & Strategy serves national policy
fields. These works are: & Confined to the management of military resources only

Corporate: The Concepts
K. R. Andrews, Irwin,
Table l(a). Summary
features of Andrews
of Corporate Strategy, 2. fi Distinction between direct and indirect approaches
1980. * Obvious (cheng) vs unexpected (ch’i)
+ Dislocation to create advantageous situation and then
exploitation of the situation
+ Minimum use of force; minimum destruction; minimum
of the most noticeable cost
& Aim is to cause enemy to abandon purpose

1. * Lengthy definition 3. * Centrality of deception

b Difficult to model * Dissimulation as a mandatory skill
ti Highlights pattern, consistency, interrelatedness * Reducing one’s own vulnerability to deception
fi Significantly a right-brain definition fi Primary target is the mind of the opposing general
* Incorporates identity-defining, character-shaping =& Strategy is a psychological struggle predominantly

2. + Practitioner-oriented 4. fi Importance of multiple or alternative objectives

a Developed from direct interaction with CEO s/general * ‘The absence of an alternative is contrary to the very
manager nature of war’
e Uses non-technical language; avoids jargon & A single objective almost guarantees that it cannot be
fi Presents a ‘simple practitioner’s theory’ based on prac- reached
titioners’ point of view * Keeping the opponent guessing, off-balance
+ A praxis rather than technology or science
5. * Pragmatic guides (not abstract principles)
3. a Determination of corporate purpose fi Military strategy is continuously adaptive to the
+ Attention to future situations circumstances
* Management of the future-oriented purposeful develop- =& Avoid direct attack on opponent in position
ment of the enterprise =& Upsetting the opponent’s equilibrium must be done
+ Definition of what needs to be done, and why before an attack, not by the attack
& Mobilization of resources for preferred futures _ttr Strategy requires situational judgment skills

4. * Process view of strategy; continual revision 6. & Developed from historical research
* Organizational process forever in motion, never Zps Developed from a set of cases
complete & Based on real-world practitioners
* Interdependence of formulation and implementation =& Ideas tested out with modern generals
* Non-technological
7. * Strategy may also denote acquisition of military force
5. * Developed from case studies * Strategy may also denote threatening opponent’s non-
* Based on real-world CEO situations military resources
* Historical method of research =& Strategy may also denote nuclear weaponry
a Reality-testing with executive practitioners =& All examples of indirect approach; using military to
* Continues cycle of knowledge-generating and modify opponent’s psychological reality without de-
knowledge-using stroying the opponent
 So What is Strategy? 69

Table l(c). Summary of the most noticeable Table 2(a). Comparison between Andrews and
features of Michael Liddell-Hart

1. * Definition obscure, implied and diffused Derived difference (no particular order)
* Highly verbal presentation of ideas; rich but fuzzy
definition e Both express strategy as an art (vs a technology), pattern
& Deciding which actions to take (vs
sequence), right-brain (vs left-brain)
* End state is a set of processes * Both work from historical case studies as the primary data
* Aim is to develop regulators of social development source
* Both arepractitioner-oriented; both are based on real world
2. b Task is directed self-transformation practitioners; both generate pragmatic action guides; both
fi Acquire skills to transform our culture, organizations and are praxis vs technology
selves b Both articulate interdependence of formulations and im-
+ Dealing with the whole pattern plementing actions; the thinking+doing dialectic
& Generate a communal learning mode * Both require economy of force
ti Avoidance of disjointed incrementalism fi Both involve value judgments
& Necessity of value choices + Both advise against attacking an opponent who occupies a
secure position
+ Both use non-technical, non-scientific language
3. * Not an explicit program of any particular future
* Both view strategy as a process forever in motion, never
z?s Attention to requirements, circumstances, constraints
complete
and criteria for generating change
& Both deal extensively with organizational and interactive
* Taking responsibility for societal development
aspects of the process
* Learning to collectively govern; organizational learning
* Both find identity-molding and character-shaping to be
* Not technocratic problem-solving
essential
+ Both demonstrate the importance of reality-testing their
4. * Focus is on the process of generating change concepts with practitioners
+ Balance between personal and organizational processes + Both must deal with the issue of whatneeds to be doneand
* Public interest and private interest why
+ Specification of new skills * Both must mobilize resources in relation to preferred futures
* Future-cognizant, future-responsive, future-influencing + Both seek cohesion and the avoidance of uncoordinated
human systems perceived actions
* Both express the importance of assessing the opportunities
5. * Research mode is iterative, interpretive, inductive and risks
+ Interplay between reading, speculating and interviewing ti Both attend to future situations and outcomes
(more like investigative reporting) * Both have concerns with survival
* Paradigm shift from technocratic to future-responsive
societal learning
& Use of practitioner workshops for reality-testing
*The process of the research is like the substance of
research; evolving, dialectical, collaborative, develops
new values, builds network, no prescribed end point

Table 2(b). Comparison between Andrews and

Andrews and Michael; Liddell-Hart and Michael Liddell-Hart
(not presented in the interest of brevity).
Derived similarities (no particular order)
From these lists of similarities and differences
between each pair of writers, two additional tables 1. * Corporate: CEO sets own policies and directions
+ Military: General follows policies and directions set
were generated. Table 3 lists items that I found
down by other policy-making bodies
common to all three writers; and Table 4 lists items 2. * Corporate: Deception not mentioned
that were unique to each of the three writers. & Military: Deception is central
3. + Corporate: Direct approach only implied
The procedure used for contrasting the three ti Military: Distinction between direct and indirect
conceptions of strategy-Andrews, Liddell-Hart approaches
4. * Corporate: Usually clear single goal, but with some
and Michael-is summarized in Figures 4 and 5.
contingency planning
fi Military: Necessity of multiple or alternative
In Figure 4 each circle represents a particular objectives
conceptualization of strategy by a researcher 5. b Corporate: Awareness of situation change but not
(regardless of his field). The circle is presumed to be equilibrium/disequilibrium
* Military: Notion of the equilibrium/disequilibrium of a
in some unlabelled semantic space. The union of all
situation
the circles is the broadest notion of strategy, as 6. * Corporate: Can interview practitioners for source data
commonly understood in the English language. It is fi Military: Generally cannot interview practitioners
postulated that there are three major clusters of who provide source data
meaning in this mess of circles, generated by the 7. & Corporate: Purpose must be explicated and developed
* Military: Purpose is given
fields of corporate management, military practice
8. zis Corporate: Resources are primarily economic
and futures research. The particular circles I selected a Military: Resources are primarily weaponry
to best represent these three clusters are the books
70 Long Range Planning Vol. 16 June 1983

Table 3. Items common to all three statements Semantic Envelope

of strategy-Andrews, Liddell-Hart, Michael of the Term “Strategy”

(no particular order)

fi Each views strategy as a process, forever in motion, never

complete
z’t Each is practitioner-oriented; generates pragmatic action
guides, is praxis vs technology. Each deals with the
thinkinggdoing dialetic
213 Each must deal with the issue of what needs to be done and
why
& Each deals with the whole pattern, whole situation and
whole organization
* Each involves value judgments
* Each is oriented toward assessing changes in the situation
and consciously generating change
$$ Each uses non-technical, non-scientific language
* Each seeks cohesive action and the avoidance of disjointed
incrementalism
* Each deals extensively with organizational and interactive
aspects of the process
+ Each must mobilize resources in relation to preferred
futures
* Each demonstrates the importance of reality-testing their
concepts with practitioners
+ Each attends to future situations and outcomes

0 Strategy Conceptions in Corporate Management

bY Andrews, Liddell-Hart and Michael

Strategy Conceptions in Military Practice
respectively. i’j

,- -.
In Figure 5 the semantic relationship between these , \
three selected circles is depicted. The area marked as : ’ Strategy Conceptions in Futures Research
\ II
‘Table la’ represents the essential meaning (i.e. ‘-__/
most noticeable features) of Andrews’ conception Figure 4. Representation of the semantic
of strategy. The area marked ‘Table 2a/2b’ problem
represents the intersection of essential meaning
(similarities and differences in noticeable features), to satisfactory performance in the market place,
between Andrews and Liddell-Hart. The area given a variety of legal constraints and the existence
marked as ‘Table 3’ represents the core meaning of competitors. Strategy is characterized as rivalry
that is common to all three conceptions of amongst peers, for prizes in a defined and shared
strategy-Andrews, Liddell-Hart and Michael.
game.
And finally the area marked ‘Table 4a’ represents
those meanings which seem to be unique to In the military field, strategy is viewed as the art of
Andrews. winning a protracted struggle against adversaries.
Strategy here is seen as an enduring struggle
between enemies. Power and control of the other’s
Conclusions behavior is the prize.
In general terms the difference between the three
conceptions of strategy is as follows: In the futures research field, strategy is viewed as a
joint task of appreciating a complex of environ-
Strategy, in the corporate management field, is seen as mental changes and making core existential choices
a process for generating viable directions that lead in situations of massive change. It comes from a

Table 4. Features unique to each of the three fields

(a) Unique to corporate (b) Unique to military (c) Unique to futures research

+ Purpose-defining * Opponent-transformation * Self-transformation

fi Identity-molding e Deception * Trust, openness, collaboration
+ Market exchange medium + Indirect approach fi Organizational learning
* Continuous measure of performance * Policies, directions and purpose given * Error embracing and sharing
fi Non zero-sum game * Danger of single objective fi Obscure definition of strategy
+ Multi-party game for payoff fi Game against opponent * Game against own characteristics
 So What is Strategy? 71

Table la The list helps to establish criteria for research

Andrews / relevancy in the policy/strategy field.

Let me end by repeating these 12 core items of

commonality from Table 3.

Whether in the corporate, military or futures

Michael Lidde II-Hart
research fields, the conception of strategy has these
features in common:
continuous process
practitioner-oriented
I Tables 2a and 2b
what needs to be done, and why
whole pattern
value choices
change generating
practitioner language
cohesive actions
organizational processes
@ resource-mobilizing
reality-testing with practitioners
Table 3
future-attending.

kind ofpolicylstrategy research we choose to do must

. . . . . _. ?
be consonant with the essential attributes oj our conception
of policy and strategy. If the phenomenon we are
studying has the nature indicated by the 12 items
listed above, then positivistic research must
inevitably be peripheral to our field.
@
Table 4a Finally, as a result of this study, I have come to view
the conception of corporate strategy as a mix of both
military strategy and futures research strategy. Seven
of the critical dimensions that distinguish the
military conception and the futures research
conception of strategy are shown in Table 5. Three
points can be noted: (1) the corporate conception of
strategy is a mix along each of these seven
dimensions; (2) some companies are closer to the
military end and some are closer to the futures
Figure 5. Relationships discussed in this paper research end; and (3) the overall historical trend is
between the three strategy fields away from the military conception and toward the
futures research conception.

realization that our current collective behaviors Table 5 has, I believe, some important implications
may be generating collective disaster. Strategy here for corporate management practitioners.
is essentially that of collectively learning how to
transform our collective selves. The corporate strategist’s task is essentially differ-
ent from the military strategist’s despite some
More concretely the paper has identified a set of similarities of language-capturing and defending
twelve common features, and six unique features of market share, cut-throat competition, corporate
each area. takeover, market penetration, room to maneuver,
beating ‘em to the punch, making our move,
Of particular interest to me is the relevance of this retrenching, etc. To articulate corporate strategy
simple comparison for research in the policy field. merely in military terms should alert us that
Surely the list of 12 items (Table 3) found to be important opportunities are probably being
common to all three conceptions of strategy- overlooked.
corporate, military and futures research-is of
fundamental importance to policy research. The list The challenge of corporate strategy management is
is suggestive of broad researchable areas. to learn how to work at the ‘futures research’ end of
the strategy spectrum as well as at the ‘military’ end.
But most importantly it enlightens us on For most of us, the military mode of formulating
epistemological and methodological relevancy. strategy is more familiar, and therefore more
72 Long Range Planning Vol. 16 June 1983

Table 5. The strategy spectrum: the relation of corporate strategy to military strategy andftltrnres research
strategy

Military Corporate ) Futures research

strategy strategy strategy

Dimensions of
difference
1. US vs THEM + Mix ) US and THEM
2. Transform opponent t Mix > Self-transformation
3. Purpose given c Mix + Generating collective purpose
4. Clear, precise language t Mix + Fuzzy, emergent language
5. Bounded problem 4 Mix ) Unbounded problem
6. Scientific mode of inquiry f Mix + Holistic mode of inquiry
7. Concepts established 4 Mix )Concepts under development

acceptable, than the futures research mode, which (4) C. Hofer and D. Schendel, Strategy Formulations: Analytical
Concepts, West (1978)
does not yet feel natural. The futures research mode
is really a different way of thinking rather than a set (5) W. R. King and D. I. Cleland, Strategic Planning and Policy, Van
Nostrand (1978).
of forecasting techniques. Whereas the military
formulation relies heavily on past determinants, the (5) I. C. MacMillan, Strategy Formulation: Political Concepts, West
(1978).
futures research formulation invites us to experi-
ence the indeterminacy of the future. (7) D. Schendel and C. Hofer, Strategic Management, Little-Brown
(1979).

The two ends of the strategy spectrum represent (8) M. H. Moskow, Strategic Behavior in Business and Government,
Little-Brown (1978).
two essentially different world views, which imply
two different ways of framing complexity, change (9) G. A. Steiner, Strategic Planning, Free Press (1979).

and action. They also imply fundamentally (10) J. B. Quinn, Strategies for Change, Irwin (1980).
different kinds of personal experience for the C. E. Summer, Strategic Behavior in Business and Government,
(11)
corporate manager. Little-Brown (1980).

(12) K. R. Andrews, The Concept of Corporate Strategy, Irwin,

The effective corporate strategist is comfortable Homewood, Illinois (1980).
and skillful at either end of the strategy spectrum,
(13) Tzu, Sun, The Art of War, Oxford (1963).
and at all points in between. He knows how to
(14) E. M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton (1944).
bridge, mediate, synthesize or mix, the two ends of
the spectrum in a way that is appropriate to the (15) Clausewitz, On War, Dutton (1918).

immediate, local present, and to the long-range, (18) A. T. Mahon, Naval Strategy, Praeger (1918).
collective future. He also knows how to manage his J. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Longmans,
(17)
own feelings of ambiguity and uncertainty in Green (1981).
mediating between the two views or reality. B. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton (1959).
(18)

(19) R. Aron, On War, Doubleday (1958).

If my formulation is correct, (that corporate
strategy mediates between military and futures (29) Beaufre. An Introduction to Strategy, Praeger (1965).

research conceptions of strategy), then it may well (21) B. H. Liddell-Hart, Strategy, Praeger, New York (1968).
be that corporate managers have much to teach the
(22) H. Rosinski, The Development of Naval Thought, Naval War
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