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1
INTRODUCTION TO
FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT
Answers to Concepts Review and Critical Thinking Questions
Q1.1
The Financial Management Decision Process.What are thethree types of financial management decisions? For each
type of decision, give an example of abusiness transaction that would be relevant.
1.
Capital budgeting/Investment Decisions(deciding on whether to expand amanufacturing plant),
2.
C
apital structure
/Financing Decisions
(deciding whether
to issue new equity and use the proceeds to r
etire outstanding debt), and
3.
W
orking
capital management
(modifying the firm’s credit collection policy with its
customers).
Q1.5
Goal of Financial Management.
What goal should always motivate the actions
of the firm's financial manager?
To maximize
the current market value (share price) of the equity of the firm
(whether it’s publicly traded or not).
Q1.6
Agency Problems.
Who owns a corporation? Describe the process whereby the
owners control the firm's management. What is the main reason that an
agency
relationship exists in the corporate form of organization? In this context, what kinds
of problems can arise?
In the corporate form of ownership, the
shareholders are the owners of the firm
.
firm. The shareholders elect the directors of the corporation,who in turn appoint the firm’smanagement. This separation
ofownership from control in the corporate form of organization is what causes agency problems to exist.
Management may act in its own or someone else’s best interests, rather than those of the shareholders. If such
events occur, they may contradict the goal of maximizing the share price of the
equity of the
2
Q1.7
Primary versus Secondary Markets.
You've probably noticed coverage in the
financial press of an
initial public offering (IPO
)
of a company's securities. Web
search company Google is a relatively recent example. Is an IPO a primary
-
market
transaction or a secondary
-
market transaction
?
A primary market transaction.
Q1.10
Ethics and Firm Goals.
Can our goal of maximizing the v
alue of the stock
conflict with other goals, such as avoiding unethical or illegal behavior? In
particular, do you think subjects such as customer and employee safety, the
environment, and the general good of society fit in this framework, or are they
esse
ntially ignored? Try to think of some specific scenarios to illustrate your answer.
An argument can be made either way.
At one extreme
, we could argue that in a
market economy, all of these things are priced. This implies an optimal level of
ethical and/
or illegal behavior and the framework of stock valuation explicitly
includes these.
At the other extreme
, we could argue that these are non
-
economic
phenomena and are best handled through the political process. The following is a
classic (and highly releva
nt) thought question that illustrates this debate: “A firm has
estimated that the cost of improving the safety of one of its products is $30 million.
However, the firm believes that improving the safety of the product will only save
$20 million in product
liability claims. What should the firm do?”
Q1.11
International Firm Goal.
Would our goal of maximizing the value of the stock
be different if we were thinking about financial management in a foreign country?
Why or why not?
The goal will be the same,
but the best course of action toward that goal may require
adjustments due different social, political, and economic climates.
Q1.13
Agency Problems and Corporate Ownership
. Corporate ownership varies
around the world. Historically, individuals have own
ed the majority of shares in
public corporations in the United States. In Germany and Japan, however, banks,
other large financial institutions, and other companies own most of the stock in
public corporations. Do you think
agency problems
are likely to be
more or less
severe in Germany and Japan than in the United States? Why? In recent years, large
financial institutions such as mutual funds and pension funds have been becoming
the dominant owners of stock in the United States, and these institutions are
becoming more active in corporate affairs. What are the implications of this trend for
agency problems and corporate control?
We would expect agency problems to be less severe in other countries, primarily due to the
relatively small percentage of indivi
dual ownership. Fewer individual owners should reduce
the number of diverse opinions concerning corporate goals. The high percentage of
institutional ownership might lead to a higher degree of agreement between owners and
managers on decisions concerning r
isky projects. In addition, institutions may be able to
implement more effective monitoring mechanisms than can individu
al owners, given an
institution
’ deeper resources and experiences with their own management. The increase in
institutional ownership of
stock in the United States and the growing activism of these large
shareholder groups may lead to a reduction in agency problems for U.S. corporations and a
more efficient market for corporate control.
In the corporate form of ownership, the shareholders are the owners of the firm. The shareholders elect
the directors of the corporation, who in turn appoint the firm's management. This separation of ownership
from control in the corporate form of organization is what causes agency problems to exist. Management
may act in its own or someone else's best interests, rather than those of the shareholders. If such events
occur, they may contradict the goal of maximizing the share price of the equity of the firm.
The lower percentage of individual ownership in other countries, such as Germany andJapan, should lead to less agency
problems. In these situations, there are more institutionalowners and fewer individual owners, leading to an overall smaller
number of shareholdersper company. This should reduce the number of differing opinions surrounding corporategoals and
actions. The increase of institutional ownership, particularly with the expertise thatcomes with participating in the market as a
firm, should lead to a higher degree of agreementamongst owners and management regarding what is acceptable and what is not
acceptable,especially in terms of risky projects. The increase of institutional...
In the corporate form of ownership, the shareholders are the owners of the firm. The shareholders elect
the directors of the corporation, who in turn appoint the firm's management. This separation of ownership
from control in the corporate form of organization is what causes agency problems to exist. Management
may act in its own or someone else's best interests, rather than those of the shareholders. If such events
occur, they may contradict the goal of maximizing the share price of the equity of the firm.