APPEALS

Casolita v. CA, 275 SCRA (1997)

Facts: On March 1990, private respondent ATROP, INC., filed a complaint against petitioners with
the Regional Trial Court, for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. ATROP, INC. claimed
ownership, of said parcel of land under TCT No. 68927. In answer, petitioner alleged that he and his
family had been in continuous possession of the land since 1953, having been designated as
caretaker by the supposed “real owners” Ramon LeQuina.

The other petitioners represented by Atty Gatpatan, filed their answer adopting and incorporating the
allegations of Casolita in his answer to the complaint. They further asserted that they were not
“squatters” on the land as they occupied the same in open, public, adverse and continuous
possession for more than ten years invoking Article 1134 of the Civil Code.

On August 1993, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of ATROP, INC., ordering the
defendants to vacate the premises, to remove the structures they built, and to pay compensation for
the use of the land, attorney’s fees and costs. Atty. Aguilar received a copy of the decision but failed
to file a notice of appeal. On the other hand, Atty. Gatpatan, Jr. Filed a notice of appeal on August 23,
1993.

In its omnibus motion to dismiss the appeal and for the issuance of a writ of execution, ATROP INC.
argued that as far as petitioner Casolita was concerned, the decision had become final and executory
for his counsel, Atty. Aguilar, received a copy thereof without filing a notice of appeal. As to the other
petitioners, ATROP, INC., observed that while they timely filed the notice of appeal the notice was
fatally defective for they did not serve the same to the counsel of ATROP, INC. The lower court
granted the omnibus motion to dismiss and ordered the issuance of writ of execution.

Atty. Baylon, Jr. thereafter filed a notice of appearance as counsel for all the defendants and moved
for reconsideration of the October 18, 1993 Order alleging that the dismissal of the notice of appeal
mand the issuance of the writ of execution is repugnant to the principle of due process. He contended
that petitioners Casolita, et. al., were not properly notified of the August 5, 1993, decision since Atty.
Aguilar had withdrawn as counsel due to poor health; hence, the decision had not become final and
executory.

Issue : Whether or not the decision had already become final and executory?

Ruling: Yes. There are two Notices of Appeal submitted by two different lawyers without
particularizing which among the defendants they represent. The Notice submitted by Atty. Gatpatan,
Jr. was received on August 23, 1993 and records show that Atty. Gatpatan, Jr. Received the copy of
the decision on August 17, 1993, hence, well within the period of fifteen-day to interpose an Appeal.
Said lawyer represented at the trial the following defendants: himself, Arthur Aquino, Carlito Santosm,
Henry Relosa, Edgar La Torre, Bernardo Ocag and Cecilia Viernes, leaving defendant Epifanio
Casolita who was represented by Atty. Aquilar. Another Notice of Appeal was filed by a certain Atty.
Alfredo C. Bayhon, Jr. [should be Baylon], who at the trial was not a counsel of records for any
defendant. Atty. Bayhon, Jr. Formally appeared only, per his appearance received by this Court on
November 3, 1993, long after the lapse of fifteen-day period to Appeal, computed from the time Atty.
Aguilar received a copy of the decision on August 25, 1993. This Court presupposes that Atty.
Bayhon, Jr. represents the defendant Casolita only. The records, however, does not show that Atty.
Aguilar ever withdrew from the case, hence, the appearance of Atty. Bayhon, Jr. Is improper and
cannot be recognized by this Court, there being no showing that Atty. Aguilar withdrew from the case.
When the plaintiff [herein private respondent] submitted a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance
of a Writ of Execution on the ground that the Notice of Appeal is defective not having been served
either on plaintiff or its counsel, no opposition was filed. That was why the Court granted the motion
and issued the Writ prayed for.

The records show likewise, that Atty. Bayhon, Jr. submitted a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
of this Court dismissing the Appeal of Atty. Gatpatan, Jr., and granting execution. The motion for
reconsideration deserves scant consideration, because the lawyer who filed it has no personality in
the case. Moreover, the notice to the adverse counsel of the Notice of Appeal is a mandatory
requirement for perfecting an Appeal

Lao v. CA, 275 SCRA (1997)

PETITIONER: Manuel Lao
RESPONDENT:Court of Appeals and Better Homes Realty and Housing Corporation
NAME OF ACTION: Unlawful Detainer
FACTS:

The private respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MTC) a
complaint for unlawful detainer on the ground that it is the owner of the property on No. 21 N.
Domingo Street, Quezon City; that petitioner occupied the property without rent but on the
understanding that he would vacate the property upon demand. In his answer, the petitioner claimed
that he is the true owner of the property and that he purchased the same from N. Domingo Realty and
Development Corporation, but the agreement was actually a loan secured by a mortgage.

The MTC rendered a judgment ordering the petitioner to vacate the subject premises. On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City reversed the decision of the MTC. It held that the
property was acquired by N. Domingo Realty by way of a deed of sale and the private respondent is
the registered owner thereof, but in truth the petitioner is the beneficial owner because the real
transaction was not a sale but a loan secured by a mortgage.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and affirmed
the MTC decision. It held that as a general rule, the issue in an ejectment suit is possession de facto,
not possession de jure, and that in the event the issue of ownership is raised as a defense, the issue
is taken up for the limited purpose of determining who between the contending parties has the better
right to possession. However, where neither of the parties objects to the allegation of the question of
ownership in an ejectment suit and, indeed, both present evidence thereon, argue the question in
their various submissions and participate in all aspects of the trial without objecting to the MTC's
jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership, the Regional Trial Court, in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction under Sec. 11, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, may rule on the issue, including the corollary
question of whether the subject deed is one of sale or of equitable mortgage.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership only de facto, not de
jure?

2.) Whether or not the RTC may try an ejectment case involving issue of ownership previously
decided by an inferior court without jurisdiction in the exercise of its original jurisdiction?
RULING:
1.) The Court of Appeals held that as a general rule, the issue in an ejectment suit is possession
de facto, not possession de jure, and that in the event the issue of ownership is raised as a defense,
the issue is taken up for the limited purpose of determining who between the contending parties has
the better right to possession. Beyond this, the MTC acts in excess of its jurisdiction. However, we
hold that this is not a hard and fast rule that can be applied automatically to all unlawful detainer
cases.

2.) Section 11, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] case tried by an inferior court
without jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be dismissed on appeal by the Court of First
Instance. But instead of dismissing the case, the Court of First Instance, in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, may try the case on the merits if the parties therein le their pleadings and go to the trial
without any objection to such jurisdiction." After a thorough review of the records of this case, the
Court finds that the respondent appellate court failed to apply this Rule and erroneously reversed the
RTC Decision.

Francisco v. Permskul, 173 SCRA 324 (1989)

PETITIONER: VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO

RESPONDENT: WINAI PERMSKUL and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

NAME OF ACTION: It started out as an ordinary complaint for a sum of money however, it
transcended to a petition for review of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals adopting the
memorandum decision of the RTC.

FACTS:

On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the private respondent for a period
of one year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private
respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any
damage to the leased premises except when caused by reasonable wear and tear.
A year and 10 days after, the private respondent vacated the property. He requested the refund of
his deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten days of his
occupancy after the expiration of the lease, however such request was rejected. He said the lessee
still owed him for other charges, including the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for
repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their original condition.
The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. After the submission of
position papers by the parties, a summary judgment was rendered sustaining the complainant and
holding that the repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff
the amount of P7,750.00, representing the balance of the deposit after deducting the water and
electricity charges.
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was affirmed through a
memorandum decision justifying that such is authorized by Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 and invokes
the ruling of this Court in Romero v. Court of Appeals.
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review was as so too was his
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA has erred when it principally sustained the memorandum decision of the
RTC where the judge availed himself of the convenience offered by Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 and
invoked the ruling announced in Romero permitting the use of the memorandum decision.

RULING:

The Court is not hampered by such inhibitions.

The law does not define the memorandum decision and simply suggests that the court may adopt by
reference the findings of fact and the conclusions of law stated in the decision, order or resolution on
appeal before it. No particular form is prescribed; the conditions for its use are not indicated. In fact,
B.P. Blg. 129 does not even employ the term "memorandum decision" in Section 40 or elsewhere in
the rest of the statute. This phrase appears to have been introduced in this jurisdiction not by that law
but by Section 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, reading as follows:
Sec. 24. Memorandum decisions. — -The judgment or final resolution of a court in
appealed cases may adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law
contained in the decision or final order appealed from.
It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually reproduces the findings of fact or the
conclusions of law of the court below, it is not a memorandum decision as envisioned in the above
provision.
The distinctive features of the memorandum decision are:
1. it is rendered by an appellate court, and
2. it incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the
decision, order or ruling under review.
Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of the
findings of fact by the lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court. At any
rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome
reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court.
The Idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of
the lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway.
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not
easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the
incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law
being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words,
the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an
indispensable part of the decision.
Indeed, this court find that there was substancial compliance with Section 40 because of the direct
availability and actual review of the decision of Judge Balita incorporated by reference in the
memorandum decision of Judge de la Rama. The memorandum decision as then understood under
the Romero decision was a valid act at the time it was rendered by Judge de la Rama and produced
binding legal effect. We also affirm the finding of the respondent court that the summary judgment
without a formal trial was in accord with the Rule on Summary Procedure and that the award of
attorney's fees is not improper.

Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 118 or 180 SCRA 576 (1989)

PETITIONER: Municipality of Binan
RESPONDENT: Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Biñan, Laguna, and
Erlinda Francisco
NAME OF ACTION: Petition for Certiorari
FACTS:
The Municipality of Biñan, Laguna filed in the Regional Trial Court of Laguna and City of San
Pablo a complaint for expropriation. It was presided over by respondent Judge Jose Mar Garcia.
Defendants of this case were the owners of eleven (11) adjacent parcels of land in Biñan. The land
sought to be expropriated was intended for use as the new site of a modern public market and the
acquisition was authorized by a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of Biñan.

One of the defendants was Erlinda Francisco. She filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following
grounds:
(a) the allegations of the complaint are vague and conjectural;
(b) the complaint violates the constitutional limitations of law and jurisprudence on eminent
domain;
(c) it is oppressive;
(d) it is barred by prior decision and disposition on the subject matter; and
(e) it states no cause of action.

Now, her motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 3. Defenses and objections within the time specified in the summons, each
defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single motion to dismiss or for other
appropriate relief, all of his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his
property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. All such objections and defenses
not so presented are waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on the plaintiffs attorney of
record and filed with the court with the proof of service.

Her motion to dismiss was thus actually a pleading, taking the place of an answer in an ordinary
civil action. Later on, respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff
Municipality.

Erlinda Francisco filed a Motion for Separate Trial, invoking Section 2, Rule 31. She claimed that
she had a constitutional defense of vested right via a pre-existing approved Locational Clearance
from the H.S.R.C. According to her, until the clearance was revoked or the Municipality had submitted
and obtained approval of a rezoning of the lots in question, it was premature for it to file a case for
expropriation.

RTC: The Court granted the motion. It directed that a separate trial be held for defendant Erlinda
Francisco regarding her special defenses. In the separate trial, the Judge then issued an Order
dismissing the complaint against defendant ERLINDA FRANCISCO, and amending the Writ of
Possession to exclude therefrom and from its force and effects said defendant .. and her property ...

The Municipality filed a Motion for Reconsideration while Francisco filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Execution and/or Finality of Order, contending that the Order had become final and executory for
failure of the Municipality to file a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal within the reglementary
period, i.e fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order appealed from.

On October 10, 1984, the Court issued an Order declaring the Municipality's motion for
reconsideration dated August 15, 1984 to have been filed out of time, on account of which the Court
could not give due course to and/or act x x (thereon) except to dismiss (as it did thereby dismiss) the
same. It drew attention to the fact that notice of its Order of July 24, 1984 (dismissing the complaint
as against Francisco) was served on plaintiff Municipality on July 27, 1984, but its motion for
reconsideration was not presented until August 17, 1984, beyond the fifteen-day period for appeal
prescribed by law. And on October 15, 1985, His Honor promulgated another Order directing the
issuance of (1) a writ of execution of the Order of July 24, 1984, and (2) a certificate of finality of said
order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the special civil action of eminent domain under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court is a
case wherein multiple appeals are allowed and thereby, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days,
instead of fifteen (15) days.

RULING:
YES

The Supreme Court ruled that in actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no
less than two (2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is
thirty (30) days counted from notice of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen (15) days
prescribed for actions in general. It is conformable with the provision of Section 39 of BP129, in
relation to paragraph 19 (b) of the Implementing Rules to the effect that in appeals in special
proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required.

The municipality's Motion for Reconsideration filed on August 17, 1984, was therefore timely
presented, well within the thirty-day period laid down by law; therefor, it was error for the Trial Court to
have ruled otherwise and to have declared that the order sought to be considered had become final
and executory.
 As already observed, the Municipality's complaint for expropriation impleaded eleven (11)
defendants. A separate trial was held on motion of one of them because Erlinda Francisco had
asserted a defense personal and peculiar to her, and inapplicable to the other defendants.
Subsequently, and on the basis of the evidence presented by her, the Trial Court promulgated a
separate Order dismissing the action as to her, in accordance with Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of
Court reading as follows:

Sec. 4. Several judgments. — In an action against several defendants, the court may,
when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the
action to proceed against the others.

The Municipality is correct in saying that the issuance of such a separate, final order or judgment
had given rise ipso facto to a situation where multiple appeals became available. More than one
appeal being permitted in this case, therefore, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record
of appeal being required as provided by the Implementing Rules in relation to Section 39 of B.P. Blg.
129.

In this case, where a single complaint was filed against several defendants having individual,
separate interests, and a separate trial was held relative to one of said defendants after which a final
order or judgment was rendered on the merits of the plaintiff's claim against that particular defendant,
it is obvious that in the event of an appeal from that separate judgment, the original record cannot and
should not be sent up to the appellate tribunal. The record will have to stay with the trial court
because it will still try the case as regards the other defendants. As the rule above quoted states, in
an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render
judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others. In lieu of the
original record, a record on appeal will perforce have to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate
court. More than one appeal being permitted in this case, therefore, the period of appeal shall be
thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required, as provided by the Implementing Rules in relation
to Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129.

Elepante v. Manayag, 196 SCRA 399 (1991)

PETITIONER: Major Romeo G. Elepante
RESPONDENT: Hon. Judge Madayag, Makati RTC
NAME OF ACTION: Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45)

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari questioning the May 24, 1990 decision of the RTC dismissing
Major Elepante's petition for habeas corpus.

It appears on record that on May 11, 1990, Major Romeo Elepante filed a petition for habeas
corpus with this Court.

In the hearing on May 24, 1990, Romeo Elepante testified that he is a Major in the Philippine
Navy (Marines) and the Executive Officer of the Metropolitan Citizens Military Training Command;
that on April 15, 1990, at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning, he was awakened in his house by a
platoon of armed soldiers led by Captain Doctor who informed him that he was invited by the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; that the soldiers brought him to the
National Capital Region Defense Command where he was detained; that there was no warrant for his
arrest; that he was investigated for five (5) days and confined as prisoner at Fort Bonifacio; that no
formal charges have been filed against him.

On May 24, 1990, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for lack of merit. The
trial court opined that Major Elepante was arrested because of his involvement in several coup
attempts. Citing Article 70 of the Articles of War, the trial court stated that it is the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines who can order his release. It also pointed out that military procedure
does not require that a formal charge must be filed before a military officer may be arrested and
confined on orders of his commanding officer.

On June 11, 1990, Major Elepante filed this petition for review on certiorari, alleging inter alia,
that there is no criminal complaint filed against him so that his continued detention is a violation of the
Constitution.

The OSG filed its comment pointing out that counsel for petitioner received on May 29, 1990, a
copy of the trial court's decision dated May 24, 1990, so that when he filed this petition on June 11,
1990, the assailed decision had attained finality. Citing Rule 41, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of
Court, appeal in habeas corpus should be filed within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the
judgment. The Solicitor General also argued that petitioner may be confined or restricted on the mere
suspicion of having committed a crime or offense he being a military officer subject to the provisions
of Article 2 of the Articles of War and Section 8 of the Manual of Court Martial.

ISSUE:
WON the petition for review on certiorari was filed on time.

RULING:
NO.

Section 18 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, explicitly provides, viz:

"SEC. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. — An appeal in habeas corpus
cases shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court or the judge who rendered
the judgment, within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of such judgment, a statement
that the person making it appeals therefrom."

In the case of Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz (109 Phil. 379 [1960]), this Court ruled that the
requirement under Section 18 of Rule 41 of the Old Rules of Court which provides that an appeal in
habeas corpus should be perfected within twenty-four (24) hours (now forty-eight hours under
Rule 41, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court), is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.
Hence, this Court has no other alternative but to dismiss the appeal filed out of time.

The Saulo case was cited in Medina v. Yan (60 SCRA 73 [1974]) where the Court ruled that
appeal in habeas corpus from the decision of the CFI shall be taken to the Court of Appeals
where it involves factual questions or directly to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law .
Amplifying the Saulo ruling, this Court ruled that the decision of the Judge to whom the writ is made
returnable, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining his detention, if not appealed on
time, can become final just like an ordinary case.

In computing the forty-eight (48) hour period of appeal, this Court in Kabigting v. Director
of Prisons (6 SCRA 281 [1962]), ruled that the date on which the decision was promulgated
and/or served is not counted and the period starts to run the following day unless the same be
a Sunday or legal holiday in which case the period of appeal is to be considered from the succeeding
day. To perfect an appeal, a notice of appeal is required to be filed with the Clerk of Court or
Judge who rendered the judgment (Rule 41, Section 18, Revised Rules of Court).

In the case at bar, counsel for petitioner received on May 29, 1990 a copy of the trial court's
decision dated May 24, 1990 (Rollo, p. 8). Clearly, when he filed the instant petition on June 11,
1990, thirteen (13) days had lapsed, so it was filed outside the forty-eight (48) hour reglementary
period. This being so, the decision sought to be reviewed is already final so that this Court following
the Saulo ruling, has no alternative but to dismiss the instant petition.

Meneses v. CA, 237 SCRA 484 (1994)

PETITIONER: Gerson R. Meneses
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals and Proctor and Gamble Phils., Inc.
NAME OF ACTION:
FACTS:
Plaintiff was formerly employed by defendant in the Perla Department of its plant at No. 2279
Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila as an operator of its “jumbo machine” where the ingredients of soap
are mixed. He worked in the said plant for 12 years before the accident complained of herein.

In the course of his duties, plaintiff had to go to another area of the defendant's plant to switch on a
caustic system which feeds ingredients into the jumbo machine.

As early as April 25, 1986, plaintiff had already recommended to the defendant's management that
the caustic switch be transferred to a place nearer the jumbo machine. Defendant accepted this
recommendation but failed to act on it.

The switch to the caustic system was located in the vicinity of several giant steel storage kettles of
boiling soap oil. These kettles were provided with steel covers strong enough to contain the
tremendous pressure built-up inside the vessel upon boiling. Plaintiff does not know of any incident in
his 12 years in the said plaint when the said steel covers failed to contain pressure build-up.

For reasons known only to the defendant, shortly before the accident complained of herein it changed
the covers of one of these steel kettles near the caustic system switch from the original steel to a
cheaper but more brittle fiberglass cover, with total and reckless disregard of its plant workers’ safety.

On June 1, 1987 at around 3:30 in the afternoon, as plaintiff was leaving the jumbo caustic switch
after turning it on, the fiberglass cover of the said kettle exploded.

Plaintiff was drenched in, and burned by boiling soap oil coming from the kettle in question.

Shortly after the explosion, the kettle which exploded was repaired by the defendant. Its fiberglass
cover was replaced by a steel cover. Also after the accident, the defendant transferred the caustic
switch nearer the jumbo machine, away from the giant soap kettles.

On May 29, 1991, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint for damages against the
private respondent. In its Order of Feb. 4, 1992, the Trial Court deferred the resolution of the motion
until the trial.

On June 5, 1992, acting on the private respondent’s motion to reconsider the above order, the trial
court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioner’s motion to reconsider the order of dismissal was denied by the trial court in the order
of Oct. 13, 1992.

Instead of filing a notice of appeal, the petitioner filed within the period to appeal a petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court but with the respondent Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

RULING:
Negative.

At present then, except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua, there is no way by which judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to this Court
except by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation
to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended. The proposition is clearly stated in the Interim
Rules: “Appeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed
by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.”

On the other hand, it is not possible to take an appeal by certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Appeals to
that Court from the RTC are perfected in 2 ways, both of which are entirely distinct from an appeal by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. They are:

(a) by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error - where judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction and by petition for review -
where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
(b) by petition for review - where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction

The petition for review must be filed with the Court of Appeals within 15 days from notice of the
judgment, and as already stated, shall point out the error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or
modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. An ordinary appeal is taken by merely
filing a notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the judgment, except in special proceedings or
cases where multiple appeals are allowed in which event the period of appeal is 30 days and a record
on appeal is necessary.

In fine, if an appeal is essayed to either court by the wrong procedure, the only course of action open
is to dismiss the appeal. In other words, if an appeal is attempted from a judgment of a RTC by notice
of appeal, that appeal can and should never go to this court, regardless of any statement in the notice
that the court of choice is the Supreme Court; and more than once has this Court admonished a Trial
Judge and/or his Clerk of Court, as well as the attorney taking the appeal, for causing the records to
be sent up to this Court in such a case. Again, if an appeal by notice of appeal is taken from the RTC
to the CA and in the latter Court, the appellant raises naught but issues of law, the appeal should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. And finally, it may be stressed once more, it is only through petitions
for review on certiorari that the appellate jurisdiction of this court may properly be invoked.

There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to the
other, much less for tolerating continued ignorance of the law on appeals. It thus behooves every
attorney seeking review and reversal of a judgment or order promulgated against his client, to
determine clearly the errors he believes may be ascribed to the judgment or order, whether of fact or
of law; then to ascertain carefully which court properly has appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to
observe scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, with keen awareness that any error
or imprecision in compliance therewith may well be fatal to his client’s cause.

In the instant case then, if the petitioner had chosen to appeal from the dismissal order of the trial
court solely on questions of law, then he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
court. If he wanted to raise in his appeal both questions of law and of fact, then he should have
pursued the remedy of an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals and not by way of a petition for
review under RUle 45. The Court of Appeals did not then commit any reversible error when it
dismissed the petition for review of the petitioner.

Sesbreño v. CA, 240 SCRA 606 (1995)

Facts: Private respondents herein were charged with estafa at the regional trial court. Respondent
Rodis moved to quash the information on the ground that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), not the regular courts, had jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the facts stated
herein did not constitute an offense . The trial court denied the motion and private respondent
elevated the case to the then Intermediate Appellate Court on a petition for certiorari, subsequently
the appellate court dismissed the petition after finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in denying the motion to quash. The motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied. Thus,
private respondent was, likewise, denied. Thus, private respondent filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the SC but still denied. Hence trial ensued on the criminal case.
During the criminal case the respondent moved to dismiss on demurrer to evidence but however it
was denied, the respondent went to the appellate court via certiorari and the appellate court held
that the money market placement is in the nature of a loan which entails a transfer of ownership of
the money and thus cannot be a ground for estafa. Hence the criminal case was dismissed.
Aggrieved, the petitioner interposed the instant petition alleging that the CA gravely erred in taking
cognizance of the case even though it had no jurisdiction over the issue raised by petition for
certiorari.
The petitioner argues that the only issue raised by private respondent before the Court of Appeals,
i.e., whether or not he can be held liable for estafa under the facts obtaining in the case, is purely a
question of law for which said appellate court had no jurisdiction, citing the case of Bernardo v.
Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 224 (1992) which provided that: As distinguished from a question of law
which exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts" —
"there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of
alleged facts;" or when the "query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances,
their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation
Issue: w/n the appellate court had jurisdiction to try the case
Ruling: NO. indeed no question of fact was raised. What private respondent asserted therein was
that the facts as alleged and proved by petitioner did not constitute a criminal offense. Clearly then,
the only issue to be resolved by the Court of Appeals, which it did resolve, was whether private
respondent could be held liable for estafa under the facts obtaining in the criminal case. This certainly
is a question of law that should fall within the jurisdiction of this Court.
However, While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any time
of the proceedings, this rule presupposes that laches or estoppel has not supervened. This Court has
time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of party submitting his case for decision and
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable when adverse. Here, a party may be estopped or
barred from raising the question of jurisdiction for the first time in a petition before the Supreme Court
when it failed to do so in the early stages of the proceedings. This principle should deter those who
are disposed to tifle with the courts by taking inconsistent positions contrary to the elementary
principles of right dealing and good faith
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals, as modified by its
Resolution of May 27, 1988, is AFFIRMED

Bucad v. CA, 216 SCRA 423 (1992)

PETITIONER:Paterno, Natinga & Loreto M. Durano
RESPONDENT:Jesus Borromeo

FACTS: The case is a petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner Evangeline Bucad.

The case is one of a double sale. Conrado Bucad sold to petitioner her granddaughter a residential
land in Cebu City. But the sale was not registered because the duplicate copy was in the possession
of Filipe Valencia under mortgage. The same subject land was sold by Conrado Bucad to Asilda
Guanzon, who was able to register the same after it paid the mortgage lien to Filipe Valencia.

A suit brought by the defendant-appellees against plaintiff-appellant was dismissed for they don’t
have prior possession of the land. On the other hand plaintiff-appellant brought an annulment of the
sale was also denied for having failed to pay the mortgage lien to Filipe Valencia having no perfected
sale. The appellate court in dismissing its motion also found that the appeal did not comply with
Section 16, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court with regard to the contents of an appellant’s brief,
particularly paragraphs (b) and (d), and thus dismissable under Section 1 (g), Rule 50.

ISSUE: WON the appellate court was correct or dismissing petitioner’s appeal for her failure to
include a statement of facts with page references to the record and assignment of errors in her
appellant’s brief.

RULING: Yes. The purpose of an assignment of errors is to point out to the appellate court the
specific portions of the decision appealed from which the appellant seeks to controvert. This
requirement is deemed complied with where the assignment of errors are embodied in the
arguments, and the clear discussion of the points in issue have accomplished the task of informing
the Court which part of the appealed decision is sought to be reviewed. Her appeal failed appraise
the appellate court of the portions of the trial court’s decision which she contests, but rather, it quoted
at length the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the ejectment case.

The main issue of the case was the double sale made by Conrado Bucod. Article 1544 of the Civil
Code provides:
“Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith recorded it in the Registry of Property.”

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith recorded it in the Registry of Property. It cannot be said that the respondents were registrants in
good faith as alleged by the plaintiff since the plaintiff annotated petitioner’s adverse claim only three
days after the petitioner had known of the previous sale to the respondents. Petitioner’s actual
knowledge of the subsequent sale is equivalent to registration of the sale.

Petition for review was dismissed.

 Lianga Lumber v. Lianga Timber, 76 SCRA 197 (1977)
PETITIONER: Lianga Lumber Company and North Zambales Lumber Company
RESPONDENT: Lianga Timber Co., Inc. and Court of Appeals
NAME OF ACTION: Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 and at the same time as a special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the validity of the CA’s resolutions
DOCTRINE: A party may not change on appeal his theory tried and decided upon by the lower court.
As a general rule, questions not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

FACTS: Petitioner Lianga Lumber Company is the licensee of a timber concession in Agusan; while
private respondent Lianga Timber Co., Inc., is the licensee of another timber concession in Lianga,
Surigao. The common boundary of the two concessions is the interprovincial boundary line of Agusan
and Surigao.
The petitioners filed a complaint against the private respondent alleging that the latter conducted
logging activities in the former’s concession and that private respondent stationed armed men
preventing petitioners’ laborers from entering the subject area. The trial court rendered a decision
declaring the contested area or the place invaded by the private respondent as part of the timber
concession of the petitioners.

On appeal, the CA initially affirmed the RTC’s decision. However, upon several motions, the CA had
swayed from one side to the other, finally ending in an order for the remand of the case to the trial
court for a rehearing. The remand was with instruction that a resurvey of the disputed area, the
Agusan-Surigao boundary as provided for by law, and the area covered by the respective licenses of
the parties be conducted by the District Foresters of Surigao and Agusan.

Hence, this petition wherein private respondent now claims that it has been its theory even before the
trial court that the boundary between the two concessions is not the political boundary between the
provinces of Agusan and Surigao but the forestry boundary indicated in the control map of the Bureau
of Forestry, which may not actually coincide with the political boundary mentioned by law. Private
respondent's position, in effect, is that the location of the political boundary of the two provinces is not
relevant to the issue since the area of its concession may extend beyond such political boundary.
However, records showed that it had always insisted in the court a quo that its timber concession was
entirely located in the Province of Surigao, while that of petitioner is situated within the Province of
Agusan. It cannot be denied that private respondent never alleged in their answer that its timber
concession extended to the province of Agusan, since its forestry boundary is not necessarily
delimited by the political boundary of the two provinces.

ISSUE:Whether or not private respondent can change the issue in the appeal, which would be
different from that in the lower court.

RULING:No, private respondent cannot change the issue in the appeal.

The Court ruled that since the issue raised in the court a quo, on the basis of the evidence presented
and upon which the court rendered its judgments is whether or not the contested area is located
within the province of Surigao, such question could not now be changed by private respondent on
appeal.

Well-settled is the rule that questions which were not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. In order that the question may be raised on appeal, it is essential that it be within
the issue made by the parties in their pleadings. Consequently, when a party deliberately adopts a
certain theory and the case is tried and decided upon that theory in the lower court, he will not be
permitted to change his theory on appeal because to permit him to do so will be unfair to the adverse
party.

Indeed, the petitioners would have no more opportunity to present further evidence, material to the
new theory, which they could have done had they been aware earlier of the new theory at the time of
the hearing before the trial court, since a reopening for that purpose would be out of the question after
the appeal. In other words, in the interest of justice and within the sound discretion of the appellate
court, a party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not
require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly
meet the issue raised in the new theory.

Baclayon v. CA, 182 SCRA 761 (1990)

PETITIONER:
Leoncia, Manuel, Diosdada, Antonia, Isidro, Geronimo, Cresencio, Alejandro, Bonifacia, Aurelio,
Epifanio, Policarpo, Ireneo, All Surnamed Baclayon; Hrs. Of Agripina Baclayon, Rep. By Lucia
Baclayon; Hrs. Of Modesta Baclayon, Rep. By Filing Baclayon; Hrs. Of Hipolito Baclayon, Rep. By
Mario Baclayon; Hrs. Of Tomas Baclayon, Rep. By Cristito Baclayon; Silvestre Abanes; Hrs. Of
Leonica Abellare, Rep. By Felix Baclayon; Cecilia, Herminia, Felix, Concordia, All Surnamed Dela
Victoria; And The Hon. Judge German Lee, Jr.

RESPONDENT:
The Hon. Court Of Appeals, Heirs Of Spouses Marciano Bacalso And Gregoria Sabandeja, Namely,
Arcadia, Francisca, Josefa, Dionesia, Valentina, Angela, Venancio, Dominga And Felimon, All
Surnamed Bacalso

NAME OF ACTION: Recovery of Ownership and Possession

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint of ownership and possession and damages against respondents. The
trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondents and declared them owners of the subject
lot. This decision was appealed to the CA, which rendered a decision reversing the trial court. The
respondents then appealed the case to the SC, which was denied in a resolution. The decision in
favor of the petitioners having become final and executory, they filed a motion for execution of
judgment and possession which was opposed by the private respondents. RTC granted the motion
for execution of judgment and possession.

The respondents appealed the said order by filing an appeal, however this was dismissed. The
petitioners filed a motion for writ of possession and demolition, which was opposed by the
respondents. The court ruled in favored the petitioners. The respondents filed a petition for certiorari,
mandamus, and prohibition which was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed and denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents should be allowed, in a healing supplementary to execution,
to present evidence to prove that they are builders in good faith of the improvements and the value of
said improvements.

RULING:
The rule is well established that once a decision has become final and executory the only jurisdiction
left with the trial court is to order its execution. To require now the trial court in a hearing
supplementary to execution, to receive private respondents' evidence to prove that they are builders
in good faith of the improvements and the value of said improvements, is to disturb a final executory
decision; which may even cause its substantial amendment. It appears that the private respondent's
opposition to the motion for the execution of the judgment, possession and demolition is their last
straw to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment.

del Rosario v. CA, 241 SCRA 519 (1995)

PETITIONER: Dennis del Rosario

RESPONDENT: Hon. Court of Appeals and Jose Luna

NAME OF ACTION: Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Spouses Oseas and Loreta del Rosario, through their only child and attorney-in-fact Dennis del
Rosario, mortgaged a house and lot in favor of private respondent Jose Luna. When they could not
pay the loan, the property was sold to Luna. Luna gave the couple a chance to buy back the property
but the latter failed to do so.

Petitioner was allowed to stay in the property to give him enough time to find another place. He
wrote a letter to Luna asking for an extension of 90 days to vacate the premises. At the end of the 90-
day extension, he requested for another 40-day extension which was granted.

After seven months, Luna wrote to the petitioner demanding that he vacate the property. Such
letter went unheeded. After conciliation efforts at the barangay level failed, private respondent filed a
complaint for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 39.

Finding that the suit falls under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the court issued a summon
to petitioner. Petitioner contested the complaint alleging that the MTC had no jurisdiction since there
is a pending action in the RTC on the question of ownership of the property involved.

The MTC ruled for the private respondent.

Appeals to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99 and respondent Court of
Appeals made by petitioner were to no avail. The former affirmed in toto the assailed decision while
respondent court's Third Division dismissed the petition with costs against petitioner. The motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

The petition for review with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction faults the CA for
not conducting a hearing to resolve the factual issue raised by petitioner pursuant to sec. 9(3),
paragraph 3 of B.P. 129.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals should have conducted a trial of the case to determine whether
the claim of ownership is genuine, and the loan transaction is an equitable mortgage.

RULING:
No. The law did not intend that the respondent appellate court should conduct another trial of
the ejectment case appealed to it. The affidavits and positions papers submitted by petitioner and
private respondent contained all the material evidence necessary for the judicious disposition of the
ejectment case.

The power of the respondent appellate court to receive evidence is now a limited one. Under
section 9 paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by section 5 of E.O. No. 33, the power is
restricted, viz:

"The Court of Appeals shall have the power to receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in . . . (b) cases falling within its appellate jurisdiction
wherein a motion for new trial based only on the ground of newly discovered is granted by it."

Murillo v. Consul, 183 SCRA xi (1990)

Doctrine:
Except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua,
judgments of RTC may be appealed to the SC only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. Appeals to the CA from RTCs are perfected in 2 ways:
1) Ordinary appeal; and
2) Petition for review.
An appeal erroneous as to mode or forum shall not be transferred, but shall be dismissed. Notice of
appeal from RTC decisions on pure questions of law can not be entertained by either CA or SC and
should be dismissed. The remedy is to file a petition for review on certiorari with the SC, or file a
notice of appeal on questions of both law and fact, to be decided by the CA.

The Supreme Court en banc, through a resolution entitled Murillo v. Consul, UDK-9748, March
1, 1990 laid down the following guidelines for appeals in civil cases and criminal cases except where
the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed:
(1) If an appeal is attempted from a judgment of a Regional Trial Court by notice of appeal, that
appeal can and should never go to this Court, regardless of any statement in the notice that the court
of choice is the Supreme Court;
(2) If an appeal by notice of appeal is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals and
in the latter Court, the appellant raises naught but issues of law the appeal should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction;
(3) If an appeal is essayed from, the judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction by notice of appeal, instead of by petition for review, the appeal is
inefficacious and should be dismissed; and
(4) it is only through petitions for review on certiorari that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court may
properly be invoked.

Kho v. Camacho, 204 SCRA 151 (1991)

PETITIONER: NARCISO KHO
RESPONDENT: MANUEL CAMACHO, SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and HONORABLE OSCAR
LEVISTE, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 97

NAME OF ACTION:Petition for certiorari

FACTS:

Petitioner Narciso Kho, a businessman, issued in favor of private respondent Atty. Manuel
Camacho 6 postdated Manila Bank checks. One of the checks was lost by Atty. Camacho who
promptly notified petitioner. The other checks were returned uncleared because Manila Bank had
been ordered closed by the Central Bank. Respondent instituted an action for a sum of money
against petitioner before respondent court. Petitioner alleged that he was under no obligation to
replace the lost check and refused to issue new checks maintaining the closure of Manila Bank.
Respondent moved for a judgment on the pleadings which respondent Judge granted.

Petitioner seasonably filed a notice of appeal stating that he was appealing to the Court of
Appeals. Respondent made no move to contest the award. Instead, he filed a motion/manifestation
praying that petitioner’s notice of appeal be stricken off the record as a mere scrap of paper. Acting
on the aforesaid motion, respondent Judge issued the assailed order setting aside the previously
approved notice of appeal and adopting respondent’s view that the proper remedy from a judgment
on the pleadings was a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court since only questions of law are
involved.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling of the respondent court was proper that the proper remedy
was a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court?

RULING: NO

Jurisprudence provides that whether an appeal involves only question of law or both questions
of fact and law, this question should be left for the determination of an appellate court and not by the
court which rendered the subject decision appealed from. Issues that involve pure questions of law
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. However, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court does not
authorize the Trial Court to disallow an appeal on the ground that there is no question of fact, but only
a question of law, involved.”

What respondent Judge should have done under the circumstances was to sustain his
approval of the notice of appeal and leave it to the Court of Appeals to certify the case to the proper
tribunal if warranted. Indeed, Judge Leviste had absolutely no authority to disapprove the notice of
appeal. Under the present rules, his role is to approve or disapprove the record on appeal (when
required) and the appeal bond, but not a notice of appeal. A notice of appeal does not require the
approval of the trial court.

Nonetheless, although a procedural error was committed by respondent Judge in disapproving

petitioner’s notice of appeal, to require him to give due course to the appeal and then elevate the
records of Civil Case No. Q-52014 to the Appellate Court will serve no useful purpose and will only
delay the resolution of an otherwise open-and-shut case.

Vital-Gozon v. CA, 212 SCRA 235 (1992)

PETITIONER: Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, in her official capacity as Medical Center Chief of the
National Children's Hospital
RESPONDENT:Court of Appeals and Dr. Alejandro S. De La Fuente
NAME OF ACTION:Special civil action of certiorari questioning the CA’s legal competence to take
cognizance of and decide the question of damages in a mandamus suit
DOCTRINE:In original actions for mandamus filed before the CA, the CA is authorized to award
damages.

FACTS:Pursuant to EO 119, reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health

commenced; existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnel effected. At that time, Dr.
Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of the Clinics of the National Children's Hospital, having been
appointed to that position. Prior thereto, he occupied the post of Medical Specialist II of the same
hospital. Subsequently, he received notice from the Department of Health that he would be re-
appointed "Medical Specialist II." Considering this to be a demotion by no less than two ranks from
his current post, he filed a protest but the same was ignored.

Dr. de la Fuente then brought his case to the Civil Service Commission to which the latter ruled
in favor of the former declaring the said demotion/transfer as null and void and ordering that Dr. de la
Fuente be retained. There being no motion for reconsideration nor appeal therefrom, the resolution
became final.

De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon demanding the implementation
of the Commission's decision. Dr. Vital-Gozon referred "de la Fuente's claims to the Department of
Health Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs for appropriate advice and/or action, but she did not
answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters, not even to inform him of the said referral. Also, no one in the DOH
Legal Department bothered to reply to Dr. de la Fuente, or to take steps to comply or otherwise
advise compliance, with the final and executory resolution of the CSC.

Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or anyone in her behalf, or
any indication whatever that the CSC Resolution would be obeyed, Dr. de al Fuente instituted in the
CA an action of "mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-Gozon, and the
Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and executory
resolution of the CSC.

The CA required the respondents to answer but no answer was filed. De la Fuente
subsequently filed a "Supplemental/Amended Petition" but the same was not answered by the
respondents. The petitions were consequently "resolved on the basis of their allegations and the
annexes." The CA ruled in favor of De la Fuente, but denied the latter’s prayer for damages on the
ground that the "petitions for mandamus are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for said claim
of damages." However, after said decision became final, the CA modified it and scheduled "further
proceedings for the purpose of receiving evidence of damages”.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus against a public
officer, to take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered from the defendant
officer.

RULING: Yes, the CA has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter of damages in a special civil
action of mandamus.

The Rules authorize rendition of judgment in a mandamus action "commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the defendant." The provision makes plain that the damages are an incident, or the result of, the
defendant's wrongful act in failing and refusing to do the act required to be done.
 Moreover, the recovery of damages in a quo warranto action against a corporate officer — an
action within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals — is similarly authorized.

An award of damages was and is also allowed in connection with the auxiliary writ of
preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction or receivership which the CA has the power to issue in
common with the SC and the RTC, payable by the sureties of the bond given in support of the writ,
upon seasonable application and summary hearing.

In conferring on the CA original jurisdiction over the special civil action of mandamus, among
others, as well as over the issuance of auxiliary writs or processes, it should exercise all the powers
then possessed by it under the Rules of Court in relation to said action of mandamus and auxiliary
writs, including the adjudication of damages to the petitioner in the action in appropriate cases.

Cayaba v. CA, 219 SCRA 571 (1993)

PARTIES: Lucio M. Cayaba, petitioner, vs. CA and Spouses Rodolfo and Rosario Rapadas,
respondents
CAUSE OF ACTION: Annulment of Sale
DOCTRINE: A reversal of a judgment on appeal is binding on the parties to the suit but does not
inure to the benefit of parties who did not join in the appeal. The recognized exception is when their
rights and liabilities and those of the parties appealing are so interwoven and dependent so as to be
inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates as a reversal to all.

FACTS: The plaintiffs (Rapadas, et al) executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their parcel of
land located at Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City together with the improvements thereon to defendant
Rural Bank in the amount of P15,000.00. The property is not yet covered by any sales or free patent.
The defendant Rural Bank of Olongapo, Inc. extrajudicially foreclosed the property and was issued a
Certificate of Sale being the highest bidder in the amount of P17,557.15. Defendant Lucio Cayaba
bought the property from defendant bank under conditional sale on March 19, 1979. Before the
expiration of the redemption period of one year, plaintiffs tried to repurchase or redeem the property
from the defendant but the latter refused so they filed a motion to consignate the amount in Court.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents declaring that the Real Estate Mortgage
executed on August 18, 1971 is null and void and that the plaintiffs are allowed to repurchase the
property from the defendants.

Defendant Rural Bank of Olongapo seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals while the appeal of
petitioner Cayaba was dismissed for having been filed out of time and so with his motion for
reconsideration.

RTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution.Petitioner appealed said order by way of
certiorari to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed.

ISSUE: WHEN THE CO-DEFENDANT RURAL BANK OF OLONGAPO TIMELY APPEALED THE
ADVERSE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, DID
SUCH APPEAL BENEFIT PETITIONER? CONSEQUENTLY, COULD THE SAME DECISION BE
VALIDLY ENFORCED BY EXECUTION AGAINST PETITIONER WHO DID NOT PERFECT AN
APPEAL THEREFROM?

RULING: Yes. The rule on this matter is that a reversal of a judgment on appeal is binding on the
parties to the suit but does not inure to the benefit of parties who did not join in the appeal. The
recognized exception is when their rights and liabilities and those of the parties appealing are so
interwoven and dependent so as to be inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates as a
reversal to all.

If the Rural Bank of Olongapo wins the appeal, the victory of the bank inures to the petitioner's benefit
since he derives his title from said bank, thereby upholding his ownership of the property in question.
If the bank loses the appeal, it may still elevate the matter to this Court under Rule 45. And if it wins,
the petitioner is benefited.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned Court of Appeals' decision of

August 28, 1990 and its Resolution of October 19, 1990 affirming the same are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region Branch 72, seating at Olongapo
City, is hereby RESTRAINED from enforcing the Writ of Execution issued by virtue of its Order dated
February 27, 1990.
Go v. CA, 100 SCRA 549 (1980)

PETITIONER:FERNANDO GO, GO NAM, PONCIANO CUI VILLAS, FRANCISCO COSUANGCO

and SOUTH PACIFIC HARDWARE CO., (a registered partnership)
RESPONDENT:HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION, VISAYAN SURETY &
INSURANCE CORPORATION AND WESTERN CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.,
NAME OF ACTION: Collection of sum of money
DOCTRINE: Where only the plaintiff of the dismissed complaint appealed, the appellate court, in
reversing the decision, cannot render judgment on third party defendants where the third party
complainant did not appeal.

FACTS:
● Petitioners of this case are the indemnitors of Juanico Hubo and are the third-party defendants
of the original complaint, but were neither appellant nor appellees in the appeal when the said
case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. In the Court of Appeals decision, said petitioners
were held liable for the sums of money to appellee (VISAYAN) and to which, this petition seeks
to annul the said decision.
● In the original complaint filed before the CFI, WESTERN filed an action for collection of sum of
money against Juanito Hubo, and his bond furnished by VISAYAN for the faithful performance
of its obligation to the latter.
● In its answer to the complaint, VISAYAN filed a cross-claim against its co-defendant, Juanito
Hubo, and a third-party complaint against herein petitioners on their counter-bond executed in
favor of VISAYAN. Petitioners filed their answer to the third-party complaint against them.
● COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO - After trial, CFI dismissed the complaint of
WESTERN against VISAYAN and Juanito Hubo, as well as the third-party complaint of
VISAYAN against petitioners herein.
● Only WESTERN, the plaintiff, appealed to the Court of Appeals and furnished a copy of the
Notice of Appeal to both VISAYAN and Petitioner’s counsel.
 ● COURT OF APPEALS - CA rendered decision against petitioner imposing liability on them
despite not being parties of the appeal to the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court has jurisdiction to render judgment on third part
defendants who did not appeal

RULING:
● No. In this jurisdiction, the rule is pretty well-settled that a party who does not appeal from the
decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he has
obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.
● The respondent VISAYAN has not appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
for the simple reason that it dismissed the complaint against it. When its third-party complaint
against petitioners as third-party defendants was also dismissed, it nevertheless could have
appealed, if it wanted the appellate court to reverse the decision dismissing its third-party
complaint, in the event that, as was an ever-present possibility, the decision of the appellate
court would be adverse to it, and favorable to appellant. This would be the more prudent action
to take. It would be motivated by the same consideration of avoiding multiplicity of actions, as
was what prompted VISAYAN to file the third-party complaint in the lower court, as the Rules
allow and encourage, if not require and demand.
● Verily, it is the appeal taken by one of the parties against the other, that gives jurisdiction of the
appellate court over said parties. The appellate court cannot acquire jurisdiction over persons
who are neither appellants nor appellees. For the respondent court, in the instant case, to have
rendered a decision against petitioners who were neither appellants nor appellees in the
appeal brought before said court, is to act entirely without jurisdiction. As a corollary,
petitioners would also be denied due process, never having been put on notice that they were
involved in the appeal so that they would have tried to prevent the appellate court from
rendering an adverse decision against them in the ordinary course of law.
● The appellate court lacked in authority or jurisdiction and denied the petitioner their right to due
process. The judgment was rendered without giving the petitioners the opportunity to be heard
or oppose VISAYAN’s contention. As such, a clear manifestation of denial of due
process.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from hereby is reversed insofar as it holds the
petitioners liable as third-party defendants to the third-party plaintiff, the herein respondent Visayan
Surety & Insurance Corporation. No costs.

Heirs of Montinola-Sanson v. CA, 158 SCRA 247 (1988)

PETITIONER:
HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON

RESPONDENT:
COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ

NAME OF ACTION:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, declaring the holographic will as one wholly written, dated, and
signed freely by the late Herminia Montinola in accordance with law while in possession of full
testamentary capacity, and allowing and admitting the same to probate.

FACTS:
Private Respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez filed with the Regional Trial Court seeking the
probate of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola executed on January 1980. The
testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless on March 1981 at the age of 70 years, devised in
this will several of her real properties to specified persons.

On April 1981, private respondent who was named executor in the will filed an urgent motion for
appointment of special administrator. With the conformity of all the relatives and heirs of the testatrix
except oppositor, the court appointed private respondent as Special Administrator of the testate
estate of deceased.

On June 1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of the deceased but
who was not named in the said win, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, alleging inter alia: that the
subject will was not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same was
falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties to make
testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the person and mind of the testatrix
by the beneficiaries named in the win; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the
remainder of the estate.

After a hearing on the merits, the probate court rendered its decision allowing the probate of the
disputed will.

Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate court to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in
toto the decision.

On September 1986, petitioner filed with the respondent court a motion for new trial. Attached to her
motion was the Affidavit of Merit of Gregorio Montinola Sanson, petitioner's son, alleging that
witnesses have been located whose testimonies could shed light as to the ill health of the testatrix as
well as undue influence exerted on the latter.

The appellate court in its resolution denied the motion for new trial of petitioner on the following
grounds: (1) the Affidavit of merit attached to the motion alleged that efforts were exerted to locate
unnamed witnesses only after the court's decision was handed down, and (2) the unnamed witnesses
would allegedly shed light on the fact of grave illness of the testatrix as well as the undue influence
exerted on her which are merely corroborative or cumulative since these facts were brought to light
during the trial.

The motion for reconsideration of petitioner was likewise denied by the appellate court on the ground
that the affidavit of one Patricia Delgado submitted with the motion constitutes cumulative evidence
and the motion being in reality a second motion for reconsideration which is prescribed by law.

Petitioners maintain that the appellate court erred in denying the motion for new trial insisting that the
new evidence sought to be presented is not merely corroborative or cumulative.

On the other hand, the contention of private respondent is that the motion for new trial was a pro-
forma motion because it was not in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of the motion for new trial was invalid.

RULING: No.

Section 1, Rule 53 provides —

Before a final order or judgment rendered by the Court of appeals becomes executory, a motion for
new trial may be filed on the ground of newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of the diligence and which is of such a
character as would probably change the result. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits
showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly discovered evidence.

Said motion for new trial is not in substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 53. The lone
affidavit of a witness who was already presented said the hearing is hardly sufficient to justify the
holding of new trial. The alleged new witnesses were unnamed without any certainty as to their
appearance before the court to testify. Affiant attests only on his belief that they would testify if and
when they are subpoenaed by the court. Furthermore, the allegations in the affidavit as to the undue
influence exerted on the testatrix are mere conclusions and not statement of facts. The requisite
affidavits must state facts and not mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise they are not valid. The
affidavits are required to avoid waste of the court's time if the newly discovered evidence turns out to
be immaterial or of any evidentiary weight.

Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence sought to be presented is new having been
discovered only after the trial. It is apparent from the allegations of affiant that efforts to locate the
witnesses were exerted only after the decision of the appellate court was handed down. The trial
lasted for about four years so that petitioner had ample time to find said alleged witnesses who were
admittedly known to her. The evidence which the petitioner now propose to present could have been
discovered and presented during the hearing of the case, and there is no sufficient reason for
concluding that had the petitioner exercised proper diligence she would not have been able to
discover said evidence.

In addition, the Court agree with the appellate court that since the alleged illness of the testatrix as
well as the charges of undue influence exerted upon her had been brought to light during the trial,
and new evidence on this point is merely corroborative and cumulative which is generally not a
ground for new trial. Accordingly, such evidence even if presented win not carry much probative
weight which can alter the judgment.

Navarra v. CA, 204 SCRA 850 (1991)

PETITIONER: Jorge Navarra and Carmelito Bernardo Navarra and the RRRC Development Corp.

RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals and Planters Development Bank

NAME OF ACTION: Petition for review

FACTS: A real estate mortgage over five parcels of registered land was executed by petitioners in
favor of private respondent Planters to secure the payment of loan. Petitioners failed to pay their
obligation thus, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. A public auction was then held with
Planters as the highest bidder. After the laps of the 1 year period and petitioners failing to exercise
their right of redemption, the ownership of the property was transferred to the private respondents. A
letter of demand was then sent to the petitioners to vacate the premises but it was rejected. Planters
filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. There being no oppositor nor was a written
opposition filed, Planters was allowed to present its evidence ex parte.

Months thereafter, petitioners filed a written opposition, alleging that they were the plaintiffs in a
different civil case pending before RTC of Makati; that they were the owners of the subject properties
for they acquired it by virtue of a contract of sale; and private respondent had already been declared
in default in the said civil case. However, the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was
issued in favor of Planters. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. They then filed a
special civil action for certiorari before the CA but it was dismissed. Motion for reconsideration was
also denied. Thus, the present petition.

Petitioners submit that the writ of possession should not have been issued because they are already
the owners of the subject property by virtue of the perfected and partially consummated contract of
sale they had entered into with Planters. Letters were presented to prove their claim and asked the
Supreme Court to consider these letters claiming to be newly-discovered evidence.

ISSUE: WON the letters presented before the Supreme Court are newly-discovered evidence.

RULING: No. As defined, newly-discovered evidence is evidence which could not have been
discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence and which is of such
character as would probably change the result.

The decision of the CA was promulgated before the dates of the letters. As they were not existing at
the time the respondent court rendered its decision, and indeed prior to the trial, they could not by any
kind of diligence have been discovered at all during that period. It is clear that they do not qualify as
newly-discovered evidence under the definition as they came into existence only after the trial.

The Rules of Court allow only two occasions when a party may file a motion for new trial on the
ground of newly-discovered evidence. That motion may be filed only with the trial court under Rule 37
or with the Court of Appeals under Rule 53 but never with the Supreme Court.

Cuenca v. CA, 250 SCRA 485 (1995)

FACTS: After his petition for review of the CA’s judgment affirming his conviction for violation of the
"Trust Receipts Law" was denied by this Court in a Resolution, petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a
pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL.
The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution, granted the substitution but denied the motion for leave to
le motion for new trial, "the petition having been already denied on February 9, 1994.
Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL " and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17,
1994. The Court thereafter required the Solicitor General to comment on said motion and
manifestation within 10 days from notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, 1994.
Solicitor General himself recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the
same impression that a certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn statement is an
admission against interest which may ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for new trial may be granted
RULING: Yes.
The sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own interests under Section 38,
Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the culpability of his brother Edilberto
Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession of guilt should be given a hard look by the
Court.
Although in Goduco vs CA, decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled that it is not
authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly
discovered evidence the rationale of which being: "The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal
by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence, for only questions of fact are involved therein." the rule now
appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned.
In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition of the
Solicitor General, granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed
testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court considered as newly discovered and probably
sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no
nagging reason why herein petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more
plausible under the circumstances considering that the "People" does not raise any objection to a
new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially commended for displaying once
again such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General's nest hour, indeed.
St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494 (1998)

PETITIONER: St. Martin Funeral Home

RESPONDENT: NLRC and Bienvenido Aricayos
NAME OF ACTION: Petition for Certiorari

FACTS: Aricayos alleges that worked as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home
without any employment contract nor was his name in the payroll. He was dismissed for allegedly
misappropriating P38k w intended for payment to BIR.

Petitioner claims that Aricayos was not its employee but only voluntarily helped in overseeing the
business due to the financial assistance provided by the mother of the owner (Amelita).

The mother passed away, so Amelita took over the business and discovered arrears in the payment
of taxes and government fees. Aricayos was no longer allowed to participate in the management and
he filed a complaint for illegal termination. The Labor Arbiter decided declared that no employer-
employee relationship existed and thus, the case was outside his jurisdiction.

Aricayos appealed to the NLRC contending that the LA erred in not giving credence to the evidence
and holding that he worked as a "volunteer". NLRC remanded the case to the LA. Petitioner filed an
MR which was denied by the NLRC, hence the present petition alleging GAD to NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s appeal/petition for certiorari was properly filed in the Supreme
Court.

RULING: No. Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the Secretary of Labor,
whose decisions are then appealable to the Office of the President. However, the new rules do not
anymore provide provisions regarding appellate review for decisions rendered by the NLRC.
However in this case, the Supreme Court took it upon themselves to review such decisions from the
NLRC by virtue of their role under the check and balance system and the perceived intention of the
legislative body who enacted the new rules.

“It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of
judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial
rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation
of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.”

The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari should have
been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts. As
such, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

Mesina v. IAC, 145 SCRA 497 (1986)

PETITIONER: Marcelo A. Mesina
RESPONDENT: Intermediate Appellate Court and Albert Uy

NAME OF ACTION: Interpleader

FACTS: Jose Go purchased from Associate Bank a Cashier’s Check, which he left on top of the
manager’s desk when he left the bank. The bank manager then had it kept for safekeeping by
one of its employees. The employee was then in conference with one Alexander Lim. He left the
check on his desk and upon his return, Lim and the check were gone. When Go inquired about
his check, the same couldn't be found and Go was advised to request for the stoppage of payment
which he did. He also executed an affidavit of loss as well as reported it to the police.

The bank then received the check twice for clearing. For these two times, they dishonored the
payment by saying that payment has been stopped. After the second time, a lawyer
contacted it demanding payment. He refused to disclose the name of his client and threatened
to sue. Later, the name of Mesina was revealed. When asked by the police on how he
possessed the check, he said it was paid to him Lim. An information for theft was then filed against
Lim.

A case of interpleader was filed by the bank and Go moved to participate as intervenor in the
complaint for damages. Mesina moved for the dismissal of the case but was denied. The trial
court ruled in the interpleader case ordering the bank to replace the cashier’s check in favor of Go.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not IAC erred in countenancing the ling and maintenance of an interpleader suit by a
party who had earlier been sued on the same claim.
(2) Whether or not IAC erred in upholding the trial court's order declaring petitioner as in default when
there was no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader complaint.

RULING:
(1) Petitioner stubbornly insists that there is no showing of conflicting claims and the interpleader is
out of the question. There is enough evidence to establish the contrary. Considering the
aforementioned facts and circumstances, respondent bank merely took the necessary precaution not
to make a mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy. It has been
shown that the interpleader suit was led by respondent bank because petitioner and Jose Go were
both laying their claims on the check, petitioner asking payment thereon and Jose Go as the
purchaser or owner. The allegation of petitioner that respondent bank had effectively relieved itself of
its primary liability under the check by simply ling a complaint for interpleader is belied by the
willingness of respondent bank to issue a certificate of time deposit in the amount of P800,000
representing the cashier's check in question in the name of the Clerk of Court of Manila to be
awarded to whoever will be found by the court as validly entitled to it. Said validity will depend on the
strength of the parties' respective rights and titles thereto. Bank led the interpleader suit not because
the petitioner sued it but because the petitioner is laying claim to the same check that Go is claiming.
On the very day that the bank instituted the case in interpleader, it was not aware of any suit for
damages led by petitioner against it as supported by the fact that the interpleader case was first
entitled Associated Bank vs. Jose Go and John Doe, but later on changed to Marcelo A. Mesina for
John Doe when his name became known to respondent bank.
(2) Petitioner assails the then respondent IAC in upholding the trial court's order declaring petitioner
in default when there was no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader case. Again, such
contention is untenable. The trial court issued an order, compelling petitioner and respondent Jose
Go to file their Answers setting forth their respective claims. Subsequently, a Pre-Trial Conference
was set with notice to parties to submit position papers. Petitioner argues in his memorandum that
this order requiring petitioner to file his answer was issued without jurisdiction alleging that since he is
presumably a holder in due course and for value, how can he be compelled to litigate against Jose
Go who is not even a party to the check? Such an argument is trite and ridiculous if we have to
consider that neither his name or Jose Go's name appears on the check. Following such a line of
argument. petitioner is not a party to the check either and therefore has no valid claim to the Check.
Furthermore, the Order of the trial court requiring the parties to file their answers is to all intents and
purposes an order to interplead, substantially and essentially and therefore in compliance with the
provisions of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

Edades v. Edades, 99 Phil 675 (1956)

PETITIONER: JUAN EDADES, Plaintiff-Appellant
RESPONDENT: SEVERINO EDADES, ET AL. (MEMBERS OF THE EDADES CLAN)
NAME OF ACTION: Declaratory judgment on his hereditary rights
FACTS:
Petitioner Juan Edades alleges he is the illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades, that he had always
enjoyed the continuous and uninterrupted possession of the status of illegitimate child by direct and
positive acts of his father and of the legitimate children of the latter and as such illegitimate child he is
entitled to share in the inheritance of his father under the law. However the legitimate children of
Emigdio denied his right to inherit, and as a result Juan brought a case to the court an action for the
determination of his hereditary rights.

Defendants, instead of answering, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The lower court ruled in the defendants favor
saying:

“An action for declaratory relief just for the purpose of clearing away doubt, uncertainty, or insecurity
to the Plaintiff’s status or rights would seem to be improper and outside the purview of a declaratory
relief. Neither can it be availed of for the purpose of compelling recognition of such rights, if disputed
or objected to.”

Petitioner decided to appeal his case to the SC.

ISSUE: WON an action for declaratory relief is proper in this case

RULING:

Court said the action for declaratory relief should be predicated on the following conditions:

(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;

(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse;

(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy;

(4) the issue involved must be ripened for judicial determination. (Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy,
90 Phil., 83).

The present case does not come within the purview of the law authorizing an action for declaratory
relief for it neither concerns a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, nor does it affect a
statute or ordinance, the construction or validity of which is involved. In fact, his father had not yet
even died and was one of the defendants. Therefore it cannot be maintained if considered strictly as
one for declaratory relief.

However, though captioned as one for declaratory relief, it is not merely aimed at determining the
hereditary right of the petitioner to eventually preserve his right to the property of his alleged father,
but rather to establish his status as an illegitimate child so he may have rights. While there is no
express provision in the civil code as to how to establish such status, the court declared that a similar
action may be brought under similar circumstances considering that an illegitimate child other than
natural is now given successional rights and there is need to establish his status before such rights
can be asserted and enforced.

Hence, the court reversed the decision denying the complaint Juan filed and remanded it to the lower
court to investigate his status as an illegitimate child.

Santos v. Aquino, 94 Phil 65 (1953)

PETITIONER: ANGELES S. SANTOS

RESPONDENT: PATERIO AQUINO, as Municipal Mayor of Malabon, THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

OF MALABON, A. A. OLIVEROS, as Municipal Treasurer of Malabon, Province of Rizal

NAME OF ACTION: Action for declaratory relief but the prayer of the petition seeks to have the
ordinance declared null and void.

FACTS: This action purports to obtain a declaratory relief but the prayer of the petition seeks to have
Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946, and Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, of the Municipality of
Malabon, Province of Rizal, declared null and void xxx. Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946, adopted by
the Municipal Council of Malabon on 8 December 1946, imposes a license tax of P1,000 per annum
on the said theater in addition to a license tax on all tickets sold in theaters and cinemas in Malabon,
pursuant to Ordinance No.58, series of 1946, adopted on the same date as Ordinance No. 61, the
same series xxx

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can bring an action for declaratory relief.

RULING:

No. This is not an action for declaratory relief, because the terms of the ordinances assailed are not
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning which require a construction thereof by the Court. And granting
that the validity or legality of an ordinance may be drawn in question in an action for declaratory relief,
such relief must be asked before a violation of the ordinance be committed. When this action was
brought on 12 May 1949, payment of the municipal license taxes imposed by both ordinances, the tax
rate of the last having been reduced by the Department of Finance, was already due, and the prayer
of the petition shows that the petitioner had not paid them. In those circumstances the petitioner
cannot bring an action for declaratory relief. The rule that actions must be brought in the name of the
real party in interest applies to actions brought under Rule 66 for declaratory relief. The fact that he is
the manager of the theater does not make him a real party in interest.

Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827 (1968)

PETITIONER: BENJAMIN P. GOMEZ

RESPONDENT: ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as Postmaster General, et al

NAME OF ACTION: Action for Declaratory Relief

FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Gomez mailed a letter at the post office in San Fernando, Pampanga. It
did not bear the special anti-TB stamp required by the RA 1635 which intends to raise funds for the
Phil. Tuberculosis Society. Thus it was returned to the petitioner. Petitioner now assails the
constitutionality of the statute claiming that RA 1635 otherwise known as the Anti-TB Stamp law is
violative of the equal protection clause because it constitutes mail users into a class for the purpose
of the tax while leaving untaxed the rest of the population and that even among postal patrons the
statute discriminatorily grants exemptions. The law in question requires an additional 5 centavo stamp
for every mail being posted, and no mail shall be delivered unless bearing the said stamp.

In view of this development, the petitioner brough suit for declaratory relief in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga and the lower court declared the statute and the orders unconstitutional;
hence this appeal by the respondent postal authorities.

ISSUE: Whether or not an action for declaratory relief may be availed.

RULING: Affirmative;
The prime specification of an action for declaratory relief is that it must be brought "before breach
or violation" of the statute has been committed. Rule 64, section 1 so provides. Section 6 of the
same rule, which allows the court to treat an action for declaratory relief as an ordinary action, applies
only if the breach or violation occurs after the filing of the action but before the termination thereof.
Hence, if, as the trial court itself admitted, there had been a breach of the statute before the firing of
this action, then indeed the remedy of declaratory relief cannot be availed of, much less can the suit
be converted into an ordinary action.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is of the view that the petitioner's choice of remedy is correct
because this suit was filed not only with respect to the letter which he mailed on September 15, 1963,
but also with regard to any other mail that he might send in the future. Thus, in his complaint, the
petitioner prayed that due course be given to "other mails without the semi-postal stamps which he
may deliver for mailing ... if any, during the period covered by Republic Act 1635, as amended, as
well as other mails hereafter to be sent by or to other mailers which bear the required postage,
without collection of additional charge of five centavos prescribed by the same Republic Act." As one
whose mail was returned, the petitioner is certainly interested in a ruling on the validity of the statute
requiring the use of additional stamps.

Matalin Coconut v. Municipality of Malabang, 143 SCRA 404 (1986)

FACTS: The Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, invoking the authority of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, enacted Municipal Ordinance
No. 45-46, entitled "AN ORDINANCE IMPOSING A POLICE INSPECTION FEE OF P.30 PER SACK
OF CASSAVA STARCH PRODUCED AND SHIPPED OUT OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG
AND IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF." The ordinance made it unlawful for
any person, company or group of persons "to ship out of the Municipality of Malabang, cassava
starch or flour without paying a "police inspection fee" of P.30 per sack of cassava starch or flour.

The validity of the ordinance was challenged by the Matalin Coconut, Inc. in a petition for declaratory
relief filed with the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur against the Municipal Council, the
Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer of Malabang, Lanao del Sur. Alleging among others
that the ordinance is not only ultra vires, being violative of Republic Act No. 2264, but also
unreasonable, oppressive and confiscatory, the petitioner prayed that the ordinance be declared null
and void ab initio, and that the respondent Municipal Treasurer be ordered to refund the amounts
paid by petitioner under the ordinance.

After trial, the Court a quo rendered a decision declaring the municipal ordinance in question null and
void; ordering the respondent Municipal Treasurer to refund to the petitioner the payments.

The respondents appealed to this Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in adjudicating the money claim of the petitioner in an action for
declaratory relief;
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring the municipal ordinance in question null and void.

RULING:
1. No. Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be converted into an ordinary
action and the parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final
termination of the case "a breach or violation of an...ordinance, should take place." In the present
case, no breach or violation of the ordinance occurred. The petitioner decided to pay "under protest"
the fees imposed by the ordinance. Such payment did not affect the case; the declaratory relief action
was still proper because the applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still remained to be
resolved, although the matter could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes
paid.

2.No. The amount collected under the ordinance in question partakes of the nature of a tax, although
denominated as "police inspection fee". The tax imposed under the ordinance in question is not a
percentage tax on sales or any other form of tax based on sales. It is a fixed tax of P.30 per bag of
cassava starch or flour "shipped out" of the municipality. It is not based on sales. Under Section 2 of
the Local Autonomy Act the tax levied must be "for public purposes, just and uniform".The imposition
of a police inspection fee of P.30 per bag, imposed by said ordinance is unjust and unreasonable.

Fortich v. Corona, 289 SCRA 629 (Apr 1998)

Facts

On March 29, 1996, strikers went on protest concerning the decision of the Office of the President
issued through the executive secretary Ruben Torres which approved the conversion of a 144
hectare of agricultural land to an agro-industrial (institutional) area. That event led to the issuance of
the so-called “win-win” resolution made by the Office of the President on November 7, 1997 through
then Deputy Executive Secretary, Renato Corona, which substantially modified its earlier decision
after it had become final and executory. The said resolution modified the approval of the land
conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of 44 hectares and has ordered that the
remainder of 100 hectares to be distributed to the qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

The Case

The case involves a 144 hectare land owned by Norberto Quisumbing Sr. Management and
Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. In 1984, the land was leased as a
pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Philippines Inc.) which is a
multinational corporation for a period of 10 years under the Crop Producer and Grower’s Agreement.
The said lease had expired in April 1994. In October 1991, in the existence of the lease, the
Department of Agrarian Reform placed the entire land under compulsory acquisition. NQSRMDC
resisted the action committed by DAR; in February 1992, sought and was granted by DAR
adjudication board (DARAB), through its provincial agrarian reform adjudicator, a writ of prohibition
with preliminary injunction.
Despite the order from DARAB, the DAR regional director issued a memorandum directing the Land
Bank to open a trust account in the name of NQSRMDC and conduct summary proceedings to
determine the just compensation of the subjected property. NQSRMDC objected to these and filed an
Omnibus Motion on June 9, 1992 to enforce the DAR regional director and Land Bank on the
valuation of the subjected property.

DARAB acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by

1. ordering the DAR regional director and Land Bank “to seriously comply with the terms of the
order dated
2. nullifying the DAR regional director’s memorandum and the summary proceedings conducted
pursuant thereto; and
3. An order was issued by then executive secretary on June 23, 1997 denying the motion for
reconsideration having been filed by DAR beyond the reglementary period of 15 days. The said
 order further declared that the decision (by the Office of the President) on March 29, 1996 had
become final and executory. DAR filed a second motion for reconsideration on July 11, 1997 for
the June 23, 1997 order of the Office of the President.
4. On August 12, 1997, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by
some farmers before the CA (Court of Appeals) through a petition (for certiorari and prohibition)
praying for the lifting of the injunction and for issuance of writ of prohibition from further trying the
RTC case. Some alleged farmer-beneficiaries went on a hunger strike on October 9, 1997 in front
of the DAR compound in Quezon City protesting about the decision made by the Office of the
President on March 29, 1996. The Office of the President resolved the strikers’ protest by issuing
the so-called “win-win” resolution, which was drafted by then deputy executive secretary Renato
Corona, on November 7, 1997.
5. Governor Fortich and NQSRMDC received a copy of the said “win-win” resolution and filed the
present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with urgent prayer of TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction against then deputy secretary Renato Corona and DAR secretary Ernesto
Garilao. A motion for leave to intervene was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel,
claiming that they are real parties in interest.
6. In seeking the annulment of the “win-win” resolution, the petitioners claim that the OP came up
with a purely political decision to appease the farmers by reviving and modifying the decision
(made on March 29, 1996) which has been declared final and executory in an order issued on
June 23, 1997. They (petitioners) also allege that the respondent (then deputy secretary)
committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction when he drafted the
questioned resolution on November 7, 1997.

7. directing the Land Bank “to return the claim folder of petitioner NQRSMDC’s subjected
property to DAR until further orders.
Meanwhile, Governor Fortich passed Resolution No. 6 designating particular areas along Bukidnon-
Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subjected property is
located. On November 14, 1994, DAR (through its Secretary Garilao) issued an order denying the
instant application for the conversion of the subjected property from agricultural to an agro-industrial
and, in lieu, placed it under compulsory coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). The governor (Fortich) appealed the said order to the Office of the President and prayed for
the conversion or classification of the subjected property as the same would be favorable to the
people of Bukidnon.

Appeal with the Court of Appeals

On June 29, 1995, an appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals; a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the preliminary injunction. In resolving this, the Office of the President, through then
executive secretary, Ruben Torres, issued a decision approving the application of the petitioners.
Subsequently, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration. NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the RTC of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of the title, damages and injunction against
DAR and 141 others. The RTC issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction restraining DAR and
141 others from entering, occupying and wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subjected
property.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of Res Judicata applies in the case at bar

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the acts of the petitioner does not constitute forum shopping, “that
there is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion other than by appeal or certiorari in another”. The principle applies not only with
respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes in
anticipation of an favorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in
this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. Furthermore, the
court has explained that the test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgement in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other, which are absent in the case at bar.

Dela Cruz v. IAC, 134 SCRA 417 (1985)

Petitioners:

· Serafin Dela Cruz, Eladio Macenas and Rodrigo Diaz

Public Respondent:

· Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Hon. Antonio P. Solano,

Private Respondents:

· Eden Guevara de Baradi and Jose Baradi

Cause of Action:

· IAC DENIED any further due course and DISMISSED the petitioner’s petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.

Facts:

· On March 11, 1982 petitioners filed a complaint for 'Annulment and cancellation of T.C.T. Nos.
274534, 274535, 274537 and 274539 with damages' in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVI

· Private respondents immediately filed their Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground of 'lack of
jurisdiction.'

· Petitioners filed their' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.’

· Consequently, on July 26, 1982, respondent Judge issued an 'Order' denying the private
respondents' motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

· On August 13, 1982, the private respondents filed their 'Motion for Reconsideration' contending
among other things that the respondent Court has no jurisdiction over the case.

· Petitioner filed their pleading in 'Opposition' thereto.

· On October 20, 1982, the Honorable respondent Judge, issued the challenged 'Order' in favor of
the private respondents in this case and therein granted the Motion for Reconsideration. As a
consequence, petitioners' complaint was dismissed.

· On November 24, 1982 petitioners filed their own 'Motion for Reconsideration' wherein they
submitted and insisted that the respondent Court has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to pass
upon the issues raised in petitioners' complaint.

· Private respondents in due time filed their opposition;

· On January 14, 1983, the Honorable Respondent Judge, issued an 'Order' denying the
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

· Petitioners filed with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus instead of appealing from the order dismissing the complaint for annulment of titles.

· The Court denied further due course and dismissed said petition

Issue:

· Is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus a remedy for a case dismissal?

Held:

No, the Supreme Court in this case dismissed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
because the case could have, but have not, been appealed. “This special civil action does not lie
where the remedy by appeal has been lost because said remedy cannot take the place of an appeal.”
The High Court further noted that “where the Court has jurisdiction, over the subject matter, as
respondent judge has in this case, the orders or decision upon all questions pertaining to the cause
are orders or decision within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be
corrected by certiorari.

Dauz v. Eleosida, 1 SCRA 990 (1961)

PETITIONER: Gervacio Cruz

RESPONDENT: Hon. Felipe Eleosida et.al

FACTS: In 1958, Gervacio was prosecution before the Justice of Peace of Kidapawan, Cotabato,
because being a general merchant in that locality, and as such required to pay license fees under the
local Ordinance, he willfully failed to pay the second, third and fourth quarter fees for 1958.

Summoned to answer, Gervacio filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged did not
constitute a criminal offense. The justice of the peace denied the motion. Whereupon, he instituted in
the CFI this petition for certiorari and prohibition contending mainly that as he had paid the first
quarter for year 1958, the remedy of the Government was to collect civil action — not a criminal
prosecution — the other quarter fees, plus the surcharges which the same Ordinance had fixed. The
Hon. Sarenas, judge, dismissed the petition, explaining that petitioner's remedy was to appeal, if he
should after hearing on the merits, be convicted in the justice of the peace court.

ISSUE: Whether the direct institution of a petition for certioari and prohibition was appropriate.
RULING: NO. There is no doubt that the complaint alleged violation of an ordinance; there is also no
question that the ordinance provided the penalty of not more than P200.00 fine, or imprisonment not
to exceed 6 months or both. So the offense, if any, was within the original jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace court. [Republic Act 296, sec. 87]. Whether or not Dauz, having paid the first quarter for the
year 1958 constituted a defense, is a matter which he should prove and discuss upon the trial on the
merits, and if that defense should fail, the way is open for him to appeal to the court of first instance.
Needless to add, where appeal is available, certiorari and prohibition do not lie.

People v. Ramos, 83 SCRA 1 (1978)

PETITIONER: Socorro Ramos (General Manager, National Book Store)
RESPONDENT: Placido Ramos (Presiding Judge, CFI Manila); People of the Philippines
NAME OF ACTION: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
FACTS:
1. On September 3, 1965, two criminal cases were filed against Socorro Ramos (Ramos) for
alleged violations of the Copyright Law. The complaints were identical except for the fact that
they pertain to different editions of the same textbook.

2. On September 7, 1965, Ramos filed motions to quash the complaints on the ground of
prescription. Judge De Veyra granted one of the motions ratiocinating that the complaints were
filed one day after the end of the two-year prescriptive period for the offenses committed. The
other motion to quash for the other complaint was denied by judge Ramos, holding that in the
computation of the period of prescription, a year should be construed as the calendar year
comprising the whole period from January 1 to December 31, regardless of the number of days
it contains.

3. Ramos filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. The respondent's Answer
alleged
● that Ramos has no cause of action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus since
Judge Ramos did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the
information
● that petitioner's remedy is to appeal the judgment of conviction rendered after trial on
the merits

ISSUE:
Whether or not a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is proper.

RULING:
Yes. The Court has previously held in the case of Quizon vs. Baltazar, 76 SCRA 559, "that to allow
an accused to undergo the ordeals of trial and conviction when the information or complaint against
him is patently defective or the offense charged therein has been indisputably shown to have already
prescribed is unfair and unjust for which reason, procedurally, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot
be plain and adequate.

In this case, the Court ruled that the extra day in a leap year should be counted as a separate day in
the computation of the period of prescription. Thus, the two-year prescription period has lapsed when
the complaint was filed. Since the complaint was patently defective, a petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition is the proper remedy.

[Doctrine: Where an information or complaint has been allowed despite a patent defect (e.g.
prescription), appeal is not an adequate remedy. However, mandamus is not a proper remedy to
quash an information because the latter is not a ministerial function. The proper remedies are
certiorari and prohibition.]

Bautista v. Sarmiento, 128 SCRA 587 (1985)

PETITIONER: Fe J. Bautista and Milagros J. Corpus
RESPONDENT: Hon. Malcom G. Sarmiento, District Judge, CFI of Pampanga, Branch I and
People of PH

NAME OF ACTION: Special Civil Action of Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction.
FACTS:

An information charging Fe Bautista, Milagros Corpus and Teresita Vergere with estafa was filed
before the sala of Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento. The third accused, Teresita Vergere, was granted a
separate trial. To prove its case, the prosecution presented during the trial the private complainant,
Dr. Leticia C. Yap, as its only witness. Thereafter, petitioners, believing the prosecution failed to prove
their guilty beyond reasonable doubt, moved to dismissal the case by way of demurrer to the
evidence.

The following are the grounds alleged in the Motion to Dismiss are as follows: First, the information
alleges that the two accused received jewelries from Dr. Leticia C. Yap on April 19, 1975 on
consignment. The defense' contention is that the jewelries were received by the said accused by
virtue of purchase and sale.

In the information, Yap alleged that the jewelries should be sold by the accused on commission basis
and to pay or to deliver the proceeds thereof to Dr. Leticia C. Yap if sold, and if not sold to return said
jewelries. In spite of represented demands made on the said accused, said accused failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to return the jewelries or deliver the proceeds thereof to the damage
and prejudice of said Dr. Leticia C. Yap in the total amount of P77,300.00.

The offended party testified that the accused acted as her agents for the sale of the jewelries. Second
ground that the prosecution failed to establish the prior demand to prove misappropriation on the part
of the accused. Exhibits B and B-1 are documentary evidence to establish demand through Atty.
Gorospe made by the offended party prior to the filing of the case. This letter of demand was
subsequently made after several previous oral demands were made by the complainant on said
accused.

Judge Sarmiento denied the motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to the evidence. The Court
believes that the prosecution established a prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the Information
against said accused on the evidence presented so far on record. MR was also denied for lack of
merit.

Hence, petitioners filed a special civil action of certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.

ISSUE: Is certiorari the proper remedy?

RULING: No.

The remedy of certiorari is improper because Judge’s order is merely an interlocutory order. What
should have been done was to continue with the trial of the case and had the decision been adverse,
to raise the issue on appeal.
General rule is certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal. An exeption is when questioned order is
an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. But then, the exception is still not applicable as there was
no arbitrary exercise of judicial authority.

Petitioner argues that Judge lost jurisdiction to proceed the trial of the case and must acquit them
since prosecution merely established a prima facie case of estafa, which is contrary to the proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

A prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counter-balance the
general presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not encountered and controlled
by evidence tending to contradict it, and render it improbable, or to prove other facts
inconsistent with it, and the establishment of a prima facie case does not take away the
presumption of innocence which may in the opinion of the jury be such as to rebut and control
it.

SC agreed with the contention of petitioner. However, when the trial court denies petitioners' motion
to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution had established a
prima facie case against them, they assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent upon petitioners
to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against them. This is
due to the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners would seem to
believe.

When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar,
the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon
whom it is imposed—the prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party
depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. 8 This burden of going forward
with the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then the
burden shifts back.

A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater
weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in
equipoise is sufficient. As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen
that at the trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate
against plaintiff who has the burden of proof, he cannot prevail.

In the case at bar, the order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, required them to present their
evidence. They refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference of their guilt. The inevitable
result was that the burden of evidence shifted on them to prove their innocence, or at least, raises a
reasonable doubt as to their guilt.

Hence, petition is dismissed. However, Judge is hereby ordered to continue immediately with the trial
of Criminal Case 808.

Vda. de Bacang v. CA, 125 SCRA 137 (1983)

Facts:Manuel Abella died intestate, survived by two children, named Emilio and Joaquin, begotten
with his first wife Enriqueta Teves, and three other children named Manuela, Hermenigildo and
Carmen, begotten with his second wife, Leona Teves. All the five children carried the surname Teves.
Manuel Abella had another son named Manuel Abella y Regulo who was left in Spain and who died
as a soldier during the Cuban war.

Before his death, he transferred his said hacienda to his children by means of a simulated sale to
Joaquin for his share and another simulated deed of sale to the other four, Emilio, Carmen,
Hermenegildo, and Manuela, for their shares but this second sale was in Emilio’s name only because
the other three children were still minors who lived with Emilio in the family home.

Emilio died in 1911, survived by his wife Pilar Lajato, and five children. On September 26, 1912, the
three children by the second wife, Manuel, Carmen, and Hermenegildo, sold their hereditary shares in
the said hacienda for P10,500 to Pilar Lajato and her children. Intestate proceedings for the
settlement of Emilio Teves’ estate were pending in the lower court from 1912 to 1919. No claim
against the said estate or its administrator was filed during that period by the said three children.

In 1920, the same three children in Civil Case No. 576 sued the vendees, Pilar Lajato and her
children for the annulment of the said deed of sale and the recovery of their shares in the hacienda.
The trial court sustained the validity of the sale and dismissed the action. This Court also dismissed
the appeal of the three children.

In the cadastral proceeding, the hacienda was claimed by the five children of Emilio Teves. Original
Certificates of Title were issued in their names. Later, Rosa and Maria sold their shares to their
brothers, Serafin, Julian and Manuel, all surnamed Teves.

More than forty-three (43) years after the issuance of those titles, or on October 3, 1975, the instant
case was filed by the children of Carmen Teves and the children and grandchildren of Manuela Teves
(Carmen and Manuela were children of the second wife of Manuel Abella) against Serafin L. Teves
and the children of the deceased Manuel L. Teves and Julian L. Teves.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, inter alia, of res judicata, prescription,
laches and estoppel. The lower court denied the motion.

Issue: Whether or not the action is barred by prescription and res judicata.

Ruling: Yes. Private respondents’ Torrens titles over the hacienda have long become indefeasible.
Since the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to the more
speedy and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case.

Certiorari and prohibition, are the proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of trial court
in not dismissing a case founded on valid grounds.

Santiago v. CA, 184 SCRA 590 (1990)

PETITIONER: HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch 2, Bataan
RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS, LUZMINIA T. BAGALAWIS, AMADO SAMSON, JULIETA T.
BAGALAWIS, CESAR SICAT, CARLOS T. BAGALAWIS, FIDES ARMENGOL and the EXPORT
PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, Cleofe B. Villar-Verzola
NAME OF ACTION: Petition for Review
FACTS:
Petitioner was the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch 2, where the
petition of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) for expropriation was raffled. The subject of
the expropriation was two parcels of land owned by private respondents who were named as
defendants in the proceeding. The controversy was focused on the just compensation EPZA should
pay the private respondents for their land.

For the purpose, three (3) commissioners were appointed by the petitioner judge who later
submitted their findings. But before a judgment could be rendered the parties arrived at an agreement
as to the amount of compensation and the further sale to EPZA of another parcel of land. The parties
moved for the dismissal of the case but was denied by the petitioner.

The petitioner judge declared the amicable settlement as invalid. He found that the
compensations agreed upon by the parties is contrary to Presidential Decree No. 76 which provides
that just compensation, in cases of expropriation, shall be the current and fair market value as
declared by the owner or the market value as determined by the assessor whichever is lower. In the
agreement, it was grossly above both the market value as declared by the private respondents and
as determined by the Provincial Assessor.

Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, it was
elevated to the Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals: Set aside the order of petitioner rejecting the amicable settlement and
instead declared it valid. Petitioner judge, evidently motivated in protecting the government from what
he perceived as a manifestly inequitous and illegal contract, filed this present petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Pedro T. Santiago may file a petition for review in the Supreme Court?

RULING: No, Jude Pedro T. Santiago may not file a petition for review in the Supreme Court.

The answer must be in the negative. Section 1 of Rule 45 allows a party to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment of the Court of Appeals by filing with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. But
petitioner judge was not a party either in the expropriation proceeding or in the certiorari proceeding
in the Court of Appeals. His being named as respondent in the Court of Appeals was merely to
comply with the rule that in original petitions for certiorari, the court or the judge, in his capacity as
such, should be named as party respondent because the question in such a proceeding is the
jurisdiction of the court itself (See Mayol vs. Blanco, 61 Phil. 547 [1935], cited in Comments on the
Rules of Court, Moran, Vol. II, 1979 ed., p. 471). "In special proceedings, the judge whose order is
under attack is merely a nominal party; wherefore, a judge in his official capacity, should not be made
to appear as a party seeking reversal of a decision that is unfavorable to the action taken by him. A
decent regard for the judicial hierarchy bars a judge from suing against the adverse opinion of a
higher court, . . ." (Alcasid v. Samson, 102 Phil. 785, 740 [1957]).

Calderon v. Solicitor-General, 215 SCRA 876 (1992)

PETITIONER: HON. AMADO M. CALDERON in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan

RESPONDENT: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and MAURO DIONISIO

NAME OF ACTION: This is a joint petition for certiorari.

FACTS:
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed three separate informations for violation of BP Blg. 22
with the RTC of Bulacan (Malolos) against accused-private respondent involving the amounts:
P114,902.00, P141,710.00 and P110,923.00. These three informations were assigned to different
salas. Subsequently, the Provincial Prosecutor recommended bail of P1,000.00 for each case, and
conformably with the recommendation, private respondent filed three separate bail bonds of
P1,000.00 for his provisional liberty. On petition of private respondent, the aforementioned cases
were consolidated in the sala of petitioner.

Petitioner issued an order increasing the bail bond to P25,000.00 "after noting from the records that
the bonds posted by the private respondent was only P1,000.00 for each of the three cases.

The private respondent, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of said order
contending that the recommended bail in the amount of P1,000.00 was in accordance with the Bail
Bond Guide for the National Prosecution Service pursuant to Ministry of Justice Circular No. 36 dated
September 1, 1981. But the petitioner denied the motion and directed the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against private Respondent.

The private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with an
urgent prayer for preliminary injunction to nullify and set aside the orders issued by petitioner,
reiterating that the recommended bail bonds were in accordance with the guidelines on bail bonds
issued by the then Ministry of Justice and that the increase of the bail bond was violative of his
constitutional right against excessive bail.

CA required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition and show cause why a preliminary
injunction should not be issued within ten days from receipt.

The Appellate Court nullified the questioned orders issued by petitioner for failure to show the
reasons for the increase of the bail bonds as required by Section 17 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. Moreover, the CA added that the unwarranted increase of amount
violated private respondent’s constitutional right against excessive bail.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration after he was refused representation by the Office of
the Solicitor General. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this joint special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioner has standing to file this instant petition for certiorari; and
2. Whether or not a writ of mandamus may issue commanding the Solicitor General to appear
in behalf of petitioner.

RULING:

1. This joint petition for certiorari and mandamus must fail.

The court see no necessity in discussing the merits of petitioner’s order dated April 29, 1991
which motu proprio increased the bail bond of private respondent because this joint petition for
certiorari and mandamus suffers from a procedural infirmity.
To recall, this case originally started as "People of the Philippines v. Mauro Dionisio," in three
separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. After petitioner raised the bail
bonds of accused, the latter elevated his case before the Appellate Court entitled; "Mauro
Dionisio v. Hon. Amado Calderon, Presiding Judge, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan Branch II."
Subsequently, petitioner believing that he was a real party in interest filed this instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus against the Solicitor General and the accused Mauro Dionisio.

Petitioner, with his years of experience in the judiciary, should have known that he has no
standing to file this instant petition because he is merely a nominal party as gleaned from
Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which states
that:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

"Defendants and costs in certain cases. — When the petition filed relates to the
acts or omissions of a court or judge, the petitioner shall join, as parties defendant with
such court or judge, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in
the court; and it shall be the duty of such person or persons to appear and defend, both
in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings,
and costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the
person or persons in interest only and not against the court or judge." (Emphasis
supplied).

Accordingly, a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party. In such
capacity, therefore, he should not appear as a party seeking the reversal of a decision that is
unfavorable to the action taken by him.

In the case at bar, private complainant being the real party interested in upholding petitioner’s
questioned orders increasing the bail bonds, had the legal personality to file the instant case.
Since he did not even bother to assail the decision of the Court of Appeals holding petitioner’s
actuations as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, then much less should
petitioner go out of his way to file this joint petition for certiorari and mandamus.

2. The petition for mandamus also deserves scant consideration.

The court ruled that the petitioner cannot compel the Solicitor General to defend his
unwarranted act of increasing the private respondent’s bail. As a special civil action,
mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty.

It is evident that since the Solicitor General has the right to decide when and how to defend or
prosecute a case, his duty, therefore, is discretionary and not ministerial. A duty is ministerial
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment.

What would be the consequence if the Solicitor General were compelled to appear and defend
petitioner’s act of increasing private respondent’s bail? Obviously, he would be acting contrary
to the bail bond guidelines of the Executive Department, specifically the Department of Justice.
Taking up the cudgels for the petitioner would place him at cross purposes with the avowed
policies of the Executive Department of which he is undeniably a part, as expressed in the
different circulars issued by said agency.c
 Clearly, the pleadings show that petitioner is not entitled to the mandamus he seeks from this
Court, for he has neither shown a clear legal right to the thing demanded nor demonstrated
that it is the Solicitor General’s imperative duty to defend him on the sole ground that he is a
public officer.

Municipality of Biñan, Laguna v. CA, 219 SCRA 69 (1993)

PETITIONER:MUNICIPALITY OF BIÑAN
RESPONDENT: Hon. JOSE MAR GARCIA, Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Biñan, Laguna
(BRANCH XXXIV, Region IV), and ERLINDA FRANCISCO
NAME OF ACTION: Exproriation
FACTS:
Petitioner filed Civil Case No. 2473 for unlawful detainer, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, against private respondent in the Municipal Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna
alleging that it was no longer amenable to the renewal of its 25-year lease contract with private
respondent over the premises involved because of its pressing need to use the same for national and
provincial offices therein.

Private respondent filed his answer to the complaint contending that the contract of lease for the
original period of 25 years had not yet expired and, assuming that it had expired, he has exercised his
option to stay in the premises for another 25 years as expressly provided in the said contract.

The municipal trial court rendered judgment ordering private respondent to vacate the premises
subject of the ejectment case. Private respondent filed a "Manifestation/Motion" before said trial court
praying that the issues raised in the motion for preliminary hearing, apparently because it was in the
nature of a motion to dismiss, be first resolved instead of rendering judgment on the pleadings.

Respondent filed a notice of appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Laguna. Petitioner filed before said
court a motion for execution pending appeal which was granted by the court, a writ of execution was
then issued directing the deputy sheriff or his duly authorized representative to enforce the terms of
the judgment of the court a quo.

Private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing the aforesaid order of execution pending appeal
on the ground that petitioner failed to furnish private respondent with a copy of the motion therefore
filed by it in the aforementioned Civil Case No. B-3201, contrary to Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, hence the invalidity of the lower court's order of December 14, 1989 which granted the writ of
execution.

The Court of Appeals set aside the questioned order for being violative of the requirement in Section
6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which provides that no motion shall be acted upon by the court
without proof of prior notice thereof to the adverse party. Aside from annulling the controversial order,
however, respondent court likewise annulled the judgment of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 2473,
which judgment is pending on appeal in Civil Case No. B-3201 of the aforesaid regional trial court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the appeal was filed on time.

RULING:
Yes. The Court therefore holds that in actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no
less than two (2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is
thirty (30) days counted from notice of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen (15) days
prescribed for actions in general, conformably with the provision of Section 39 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129, in relation to paragraph 19 (b) of the Implementing Rules to the effect that in "appeals in
special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being
required."

The municipality’s motion for reconsideration filed on August 17, 1984 was therefore timely
presented, well within the thirty-day period laid down by law therefore; and it was an error for the Trial
Court to have ruled otherwise and to have declared that the order sought to be considered had
become final and executory.

Carabot v. CA 145 SCRA 377

PETITIONER: Bernardo Cabot, et.al.
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals, Pimentel, et.al.
NAME OF ACTION: Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65)

FACTS:
This petition for review seeks to set aside CA’s affirmance of the joint decision rendered by the
CFI in two Recovery of Possession cases filed by private respondents against the petitioners.

In the first case, private respondents Samuel Pimentel and his children, as plaintiffs, alleged
that they are the pro-indiviso owners of a 140- hectare parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No.
3814, having inherited the same from Samuel's wife, Estrella Ribargoso, who, in turn inherited the
property from Juan Ribargoso. The Pimentels claimed that during the lifetime of Estrella Ribargoso,
she placed as tenants on portions of the land the herein petitioners; and that, after the death of
Estrella, the Carabots and the Villanuevas asserted interest adverse to the Pimentels. The Pimentels
prayed that the Carabots and the Villanuevas "be compelled to disclose the facts on which they base
their claims" and be declared to have no title to or interest of any kind in the property.

In the second case, the herein private respondent, Natividad Rioflorido assisted by her
husband Gregorio Dinglasan, claimed ownership of a "portion of the land represented by Plan Psu-
96589" measuring 166.2594 hectares and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1013. Rioflorido alleged
that she inherited the land from her mother, Constantina Ribargoso, who, in turn, had inherited the
same from Juan Ribargoso. She alleged that the herein petitioners, "who have been hired as tenants
on the land have been illegally occupying for more than one year now several portions of the said
property, pretending or assuming to be public land applicants." Ribargoso prayed that she be
declared the lawful owner of the property and that her possession over the occupied portions be
restored.
 In both cases, the petitioners, as defendants, asserted that they have never been tenants of
the private respondents, that they occupied the land as their homesteads and that they have already
applied for patents under the Public Land Law.

The evidences presented by plaintiffs date back as early as the Spanish regime Agripina
Paguia was the owner and possessor of two parcels of land under two composition titles in her name
with an aggregate area of about 700 hectares more or less, as shown in Plan Psu-96589. She
subsequently sold said parcels of land to Juan Ribargoso who planted the same to coconut trees
through his tenants, petitioners, under the management of his overseer Juan Medenilla. Juan
Ribargoso declared the property for taxation purposes under Tax Dec. No. 947, as early as the year
1906. When he died he was succeeded by his children Maximino, Constantina and Estrella who
inherited the property. In an intestate proceedings the Court approved the inventory of the properties
of the deceased and a project of partition.

Petitioners' evidence as defendants tends to show that they were applicants for
homestead or free patent and that titles were issued in their favor by the Bureau of Lands over
the portions respectively occupied by them. The defendants all disclaimed knowledge of the
plaintiffs and the fact that the latter or their predecessors-in-interest own any real property in barrio
Tala, San Andres, (formerly San Narciso), Quezon. Defendants also vehemently asserted that they
never had been tenants of anybody's land respectively occupied by them believing the same to be
public land.

The trial court ruled that the homestead and free patent titles of the petitioners are null
and void because "the property in question was already of private ownership commencing from the
time the composition titles were issued by the Spanish Government in favor of Agripina Paguia on
November 8, 1894" and, as such, "can no longer be subject to a subsequent disposition by the
Government through the Bureau of Lands." The discrepancy between the area of 127.9325
hectares stated in the Spanish title and the area of 665.6877 hectares as shown in Plan Psu-96589
was considered by the trial court as "understandable" for the stated reason that "when the
composition title was issued in the name of Agripina Paguia, the property was not yet scientifically
surveyed by a surveyor." The trial court cited the ruling in Loyola vs. Bartolome, 39 Phil. 544, 550
that "where it appears that the land is so described by boundaries as to put its identification beyond
doubt, an erroneous statement relative to the area of the questioned parcel may be
disregarded because what really defines a piece of ground is not the area but the boundaries
therein laid down." The trial court sustained the private respondent's theory that the herein
petitioners are mere tenants on the land.

CA affirmed the appealed judgment in toto.

In essence, the submission of the petitioners is that they cannot be divested of

ownership and possession of the properties, titled in their names pursuant to sales and
homestead patents issued to them by the Government, on the basis of a survey plan which while
it purports to be a resurvey of lands covered by Spanish titles (Titulo de Composition con el Estado),
increased the area indicated in the Spanish titles by some Five Hundred (500) hectares.

ISSUE:
WON the lower courts acted with grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:
YES.
 This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked certain facts
of substance and value that if considered would affect the result of the case and where it appears that
the appellate court based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts. This case therefore is an
exception to the general rule that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive
and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court.

It is a fact that long before the private respondents filed the cases of recovery of possession
against the petitioners, the latter had already filed applications for public land grants and some have
already been issued original certificates of titles to the parcels they occupy. The truth is, as likewise
noted by the trial court, Original Certificate of Title No. 4267 was issued to petitioner Moises
Banquiles way back in 1936 and there was a title which was issued in 1957 (Decision, Ibid). All of
the applications for public land grants filed before the inception of the cases at bar were
granted and corresponding titles were issued to the petitioners during the pendency of the
trial and before the decision was rendered in the two recovery of possession cases.

The doctrine regarding the determination of a piece of land by boundaries was misapplied both
by the lower court and the appellate court.

This Court has already ruled that "In order that natural boundaries of land may be accepted for
the purpose of varying the extent of the land included in a deed of conveyance the evidence as to
such natural boundaries must be clear and convincing . In fact, the Court clarified that while the
proposition of law laid down by the court below may be true that natural boundaries will
prevail over area, yet when the land sought to be registered is almost seven times as much as that
described in the deed, the evidence as to natural boundaries must be very clear and convincing
before that rule can be applied. The great difference as to area, and the boundaries should be
properly explained and the identity of the property should be proven in a satisfactory manner.

The petitioners made it clear that in the survey plan, Plan Psu-96589, in which the total area of
135.3325 hectares stated in the two fincas was increased to 665.0377 hectares, the non-natural
boundaries were changed to properties of Maximino Ribargoso and the boundaries corresponding to
the Malibaguhan Creek and the Basyad River were extended far away and beyond the origin or main
source of such natural waters. (Brief for Petitioners, pp. 51 to 56). These statements were not
satisfactorily refuted by the private respondents who merely stated that "the description appearing in
the composition titles were made in 1894, whereas the plan was made in 1932" and that "during the
intervening 38 years, it is possible that the original adjacent owners may have ceded or sold their
portions to Maximino Ribargoso or they may have abandoned the same after Maximino Ribargoso
started to possess those portions." (Brief for Respondents, Rollo, p. 128, at p. 59 of Brief). This is not
the clear and convincing proof required by established jurisprudence in order that the rule on natural
boundaries can apply. There is no sufficient proof to show that what was described in the Spanish
titles was precisely the same piece of land measured under Plan Psu-96589. On the contrary, the
petitioners have sufficiently shown that the land measured under Plan Psu-96589 was
different from that shown in the Spanish titles. It was encompassed by longer boundaries,
Naturally, the resulting area was far larger in mass. The descriptive words used in Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, supra, aptly fit the discrepancy in the case at bar. It is "a monstrous and bewildering
discrepancy," . . . the trial court grievously erred in applying to this case the rule that the area
comprised in the boundaries should prevail over that stated in the muniments of title".

Likewise, the finding of the appellate court and the lower court that the petitioners are tenants
of the private respondents has no basis. The records reveal that the claim of private respondents that
petitioners are mere tenants of the land in dispute is based on testimonies of witnesses whose
partiality is questioned while petitioners' claim is based on evidence showing that they were
applicants for homestead or free patents and that titles were issued in their favor by the
Bureau of Lands. (Reply Brief for Petitioners, p. 5; Rollo, p. 144). Clearly, therefore, the regularity of
the proceedings in the Bureau of Lands not having been questioned, there is more weight in the
petitioners' assertion that they were never tenants on the land which they entered and occupied as
their own homesteads.

Furthermore, as previously stated, there is no sufficient proof to show that what was described
in the Spanish titles was precisely the same land in dispute. On the contrary, evidence of the
petitioners showed that they are different.

Thus, in a case where the State had granted free composition title to a parcel of land in favor
of certain individuals, and there were other persons who tried to show that such land was cultivated
by them for many years prior to the registration thereof in the name of the grantees, the Supreme
Court held that such persons who have not obtained any title to lands from the State or thru persons
who obtained titles from the State cannot question the titles legally issued by the State.

Campos v. Degamo, 6 SCRA 235 (1962)

PETITIONER: Ernesto Campos and Florencio Oroc
RESPONDENT: Esteban Degamo and Felino Palarca
NAME OF ACTION:

FACTS:

Petitioners Campos and Oroc (elected and proclaimed councilor no. 1 and 2, respectively, of the
municipality of Carmen, Agusan) filed a complaint quo warranto.

The complaint, styled “quo warranto”, filed by petitioners alleges:

● that respondents Degamo and Palarca were proclaimed Mayor and Vice Mayor, respectively,
of the said municipality, notwithstanding the protest and request that the proclamation be
suspended on the ground that the Board of Canvassers used in their canvass for election in
Precinct 6, the election return coming from the Provincial Treasurer’s Office, inspite of the fact
that the copy of election return in the hands of the municipal treasury of Carmen was available;
● that there was not valid canvass for the offices of Mayor and Vice Mayor effected and the
respondents could not legally occupy the said positions;
● that on Aug. 8, 1960, the respondents stalled their own offices in a temporary building near the
municipal hall, and appointed policemen, with the approval of the Provincial Treasurer; and
● that petitioner made verbal demands upon respondents to stop forming the duties and
functions of said offices but respondents denied and refused, thereby making the public
believe they were lawful officials of said municipality.
● prayed (a) that a writ quo warranto be issued ousting and excluding respondents Degamo and
Palarca from the office of Mayor and Vice Mayor of Carmen, and that they be declared entitled
to said offices and placed forthwith possession thereof.

Respondents:
● averred that the Board of Canvassers was created and appointed by and acted upon
instruction of, the Commission on Elections;
● that they were duly elected by the people and validly proclaimed by the said Board;
● that they occupied another building as their office, because the then incumbent and defeated
Municipal Mayor Jose Malimit only vacated the municipal building on Sept. 22, 1960; and
● that on Jan. 1960, Degamo, as the new mayor terminated the services of the policeman
appointed by the ex mayor, and on Sept. 22, 1960, the Philippine Constabulary disarmed all
the policemen appointed by said ex mayor.
 ● claimed that (1) the petition was filed outside the reglementary period; (2) there was no
sufficient cause of action; (3) the petitioners had no legal personality or authority to file the
present case; (4) the court had no jurisdiction over the petition and the petitioners; (5) there
was a pending case of the same nature and of substantially the same allegations against the
respondents, before the same court; and (6) the respondents took their oaths of office and
performed their respective duties starting Jan. 1 ,1960.

Lower Court:
● the allegations of the petition show that it is not based upon Sec. 173 of the Revised Election
code because the petitioners were not candidates for the same positions but for the positions
of councilors
● the period of one week from the proclamation for the filing of quo warranto under the election
law has long expired
● this quo warranto may therefore be considered as an ordinary quo warranto under the Rules of
Court, but it cannot prosper because it fails to state a cause of action, the petitioners not being
entitled to the positions of mayor and vice mayor of the municipality
● there is at present pending before the Supreme Court a case of quo warranto over these two
positions filed by Jose Malimit and Vicente Acain against the herein respondents. Although the
appealed case was dismissed by this court on jurisdictional grounds, the appellate court may
reverse the decision and order this court to proceed with the hearing of said quo warranto.
Hence, this action is premature.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that they are not entitled to the said positions of
Mayor and Vice Mayor.

RULING:
Revised Election Code Sec. 173 states:
When a person who is not eligible is elected to a provincial or municipal office, his right to the
office may be contested by any registered candidate for the same office before the Court of First
Instance of the province, within one week after the proclamation of his election, by filing a petition for
quo warranto. The case shall be conducted in accordance with the usual procedure and shall be
decided within thirty days from the filing of the complaint. A copy of the decision shall be furnished by
the Commission on Elections.

Petitioners were not registered candidates for the offices of mayor and vice mayor, and the quo
warranto was not filed within one week after the proclamation of the persons sought to be ousted -
the respondents herein. The proclamation of the respondents was made on December 7, 1959, and
the present quo warranto complaint was filed on Sept. 27, 1960, about a year later.

On the assumption that the present action is presented as an ordinary quo warranto case, same
cannot also prosper.

Section 7, Rule 68, provides:

What complaint for usurpation to set forth, and who may be made parties. - When the action is
against a person for usurping an office or franchise, the complaint shall set forth the name of the
person who claims to be entitled thereto. If any, with an averment of his right to the same and that the
defendant is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who claim to be entitled to the office or
franchise may be made parties, and their respective rights to such office or franchise determined, in
the same action.
Malimit and Acain who claimed to be entitled to the offices of mayor and vice mayor, respectively, are
not parties herein. The complaint must likewise allege that plaintiffs were duly elected to such
positions. Where the office in question is an elective one, the complaint must show that the plaintiff
was duly elected thereto.

Petitioners, having been candidates and elected for the office of councilors and not for the office of
mayor and vice mayor, are not the proper parties to institute the present action.

Moreover, there being a pending case for quo warranto before this court filed by Malimit and Acain
against the same Degamo and Palarca, for the office of mayor and vice mayor of Carmer,
respectively, the filing of the case at bar was premature and the cause of action had not as yet
accrued.

The appeal is dismissed and the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

Sison v. Pangramuyen, 84 SCRA 364 (1978)

Facts: Petition denominated as for certiorari us and quo warranto and (1) seeking the annulment of
the actions of respondents Regional Director and commissioner of Civil Service in respectively
attesting and affirming such attestation of private respondent Eureka F. Maliwanag's appointment as
Assistant City Assessor of Olongapo City, extended by the respondent Mayor of said city on
November 23, 1973, and (2) assailing the validity of said respondent Commissioner's decision of May
3, 1974 dismissing petitioner's protest and his resolution dated June 24, 1974 denying
reconsideration of said decision, and (3) further asking that respondent Commissioner be mandated
to appoint petitioner as such Assistant City Assessor and that private respondent Maliwanag be
declared as unlawfully usurping said position under a void and illegal appointment.
In sum, petitioner would want the Court to hold that since at the time of the appointment in dispute, he
was Chief Deputy Assessor exercising, according to his allegation, immediate administrative control
and supervision over respondent Maliwanag, who was Senior Deputy Assessor, and inasmuch as he
has superior educational and appropriate civil service eligibilities to those of said respondent, the
appointment aforementioned extended to the latter by respondent City Mayor is illegal and contrary to
law being violative of the rule of next-in-rank. Petitioner maintains that upon the promotion of the
Assistant City Assessor to the position of City Assessor, he, petitioner, instead of respondent
Maliwanag should have been appointed thereto.
Issue: w/n certiorari is the proper remedy, and w/n respondent can be removed
Ruling: Maliwanag's appointment was recommended by the City Assessor and his reasons therefor,
stated in said official's indorsement to the Mayor recommending dismissal of petitioner's protest
thereto and quoted in the record, are substantial and well taken, as, in fact, they have been reviewed
by respondent Commissioner and found to be sustainable, as he did sustain them. We are loathe to
substitute Our own judgment for that of the Commissioner of Civil Service who is primarily charged
with the administration of the Civil Service Law and rules and regulations, absent, as in this case,
convincing showing of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.
Withal, the most fatal drawback of petitioner's cause is that he came to the courts out of time. As
already stated, the appointment in controversy was made on November 23, 1973 and respondent
Maliwanag assumed office on the strength thereof, albeit she claims she has not been paid her
salary. On the other hand, the petition herein was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more than one
year after the pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in question arose. This single
circumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor.
As earlier noted in this decision, the allegations supporting petitioner's cause or causes of action boil
down to no more than the removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to which she has been
appointed in order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor. Necessarily, the ouster
of Maliwanag by quo warranto has to be based on a nullification o her appointment, which petitioner
seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo warranto.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the restraining order heretofore issued is hereby lifted
effective immediately. No. costs.

Municipality of San Narciso v. Mendez, 239 SCRA 11 (1994)

PETITIONER: Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon; Mayor Juan K. Uy; Councilors: Deogracias R.
Argosino Iii, Benito T. Capio, Emmanuel R. Cortez, Normando Montilla, Leonardo C. Uy, Fidel C.
Aurellana, Pedro C. Carabit, Leonardo D. Aurellana, Fabian M. Medenilla, Trinidad F. Cortez,
Salvador M. Medenilla, Cerelito B. Aureada And Francisca A. Bamba

RESPONDENT: Hon. Antonio V. Mendez, Sr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, 4th
Judicial Region, Gumaca, Quezon; Municipality Of San Andres, Quezon; Mayor Francisco De Leon;
Councilors: Fe Lupinac, Tomas Averia, Manuel O. Osas, Wilfredo O. Fontanil, Enrico U. Nadres,
Rodelito Luzoir, Lenac, Jose L. Carabot, Doming Ausa, Vidal Banqueles And Corazon M. Maximo

NAME OF ACTION: Petition for Quo Warranto

FACTS: The case is all about the payment of lawyers fees herein petitioner owed to Manual
Camacho. Petitioner issued 6 posted checks. But one of the checks was lost by the respondent to
which he notified the petitioner and which refused to replace it contending that it wasn’t his fault. On
the other hand the remaining checks were returned uncleared because Manila Bank had been
ordered closed by the Central Bank.
Petitioner also refused to reissue checks for he had no other funds other than those deposited in
Manilad Bank. Camacho filed a judgment of pleadings to which Kho appealed and was granted by the
appellate court. Camacho appealed and the court believing that only questions of law are involved,
hence the proper remedy should be a petition for certiorari, there being no question of fact presented
by the pleadings and the order in Summary Judgment, the order of this Court approving the notice of
appeal is hereby cancelled and a new order is hereby made that said notice of appeal is disapproved.

ISSUE: WON notice appeals should involve only pure questions of law.

RULING: No. Whether an appeal involves only question of law or both questions of fact and law, this
question should be left for the determination of an appellate court and not by the court which
rendered the subject decision appealed from. The court committed error when it dismiss the appeal
on the ground that it on pure questions of law. Respondent Judge should have allowed the appellate
court to decide on whether the appeal involves only questions of aw and not arrogate unto himself the
determination of this question.

City of Manila v. Arellano Law Colleges, 85 Phil 663 (1950)

PETITIONER: THE CITY OF MANILA
RESPONDENT: THE ARRELANO LAW COLLEGES
NAME OF ACTION: This is an Appeal from a judgement of the CFI of Manila.
DOCTRINE: To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of power of eminent
domain, a necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the uses and purposes.

FACTS: RA 267 provides that cities and municipalities are authorized to contract loans from
Reconstruction Finance Corporation for the purpose of purchasing or expropriating home sites within
their territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents.
The court below rules that this provision empower cities to purchase but not expropriate and so
dismissed then the action, which seeks to condemn several parcels of land situated in Legarda St.
Manila.

ISSUE: WON the City of Manila may expropriate the subject parcels of land.

RULING: NO, City of Manila may NOT expropriate the subject parcels of land.
● Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchase lands for homesites.
● The power to expropriate is necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions cited in Guido
v. Progress Administration: (i.e. that expropriation be for public benefit, public utility, or public
advantage, especially where the interests involved are of considerable magnitude.)
The case at bar is a weak case for condemnation. The Arellano College’s land is situated in a highly
commercial section of the city and is occupied by persons who are not bona fide tenants. This land
was bought by the respondent Arellano for a university site to take the place of
rented buildings that are unsuitable for schools of higher learning.
● To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power of eminent
domain, a necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes. This
is because the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity,
and that necessity must be of a public character.
● The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of
the land.

EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987)

PETITIONER: Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA)
RESPONDENT: Hon. Deferino Dulay & San Antonio Development Corporation
NAME OF ACTION: Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Preliminary Restraining Order

FACTS:
Under Proclamation No. 1811, a certain parcel of land of the public domain was reserved for the
establishment of an export processing zone by Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). The
proclamation, however, also included 4 parcels of land owned and registered in the name of San
Antonio Development Corporation. EPZA offered to purchase the parcels of land but the parties failed
to reach an agreement. EPZA then filed a complaint for expropriation. At the pre-trial conference, the
judge issued an order stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just
compensation for the properties. A few days later, the respondent judge issued an order of
condemnation declaring EPZA as having the lawful right to take the properties. A second order was
also issued, appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. The 3 commissioners submitted their
consolidated report, recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and
reasonable value of just compensation for the properties.

EPZA filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that
PD 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court but this was denied. EPZA
filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order. EPZA claims
that PD 1533 is the applicable law which states that the basis of just compensation shall be the fair
and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such
market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no more need to
appoint commissioners and for said commissioners to consider other highly variable factors in order
to determine just compensation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 5-8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or
deemed amended by PD 1533 insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just
compensation is concerned.

RULING:
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings,
its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. The valuation in the decree may only serve
as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute
the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.

The determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no stature, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the “just-ness” of the decreed compensation.

Statutes that seek to impose otherwise, or seek to limit judicial “discretion” to determining which is
lower between the set values are unconstitutional. PD 1533, which eliminates the court’s discretion to
appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To
hold otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why the Court exists in the first place.

Manila Electric Company v. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196 (1992)

PETITIONER: Manila Electric Company (MERALCO)

RESPONDENT: The Hon. Gregorio G. Pineda, Presiding Judge, CFI of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig
Metro Manila, Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucio Santiago and Teresa Bautista

NAME OF ACTION: Petition for review on certiorari of the orders of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Br. 21

FACTS:
A complaint for eminent domain was filed by MERALCO against 42 defendants with the CFI of
Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila on October 29, 1974. The complaint alleges that for the
purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line, petitioner needs portions of the land of the
private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite petitioner’s
offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents’, the parties failed to
reach an agreement.

Despite the opposition of the private respondents, the court issued an Order dated January 13,
1975 authorizing the petitioner to take or enter upon the possession of the property sought to be
expropriated.

Pursuant to a government policy, the petitioners on October 30, 1979 sold to the National
Power Corporation (Napocor) the power plants and transmission lines, including the transmission
lines traversing private respondents’ property.

On February 11, 1980, respondent court issued an Order appointing the members of the Board
of Commissioners to make an appraisal of the properties. On June 5, 1980, petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has lost all its interests over the transmission lines and
properties under expropriation because of their sale to Napocor. In view of this motion, the work of
the Commissioners was suspended.

Motions for payment were filed by the private respondents. In response to private respondents’
motion for payment, petitioner filed an opposition alleging that private respondents are not entitled to
payment of just compensation at this stage of the proceeding because there is still no appraisal and
valuation of the property. Despite the opposition of the petitioner, the respondent court granted the
motion for payment. The court ordered MERALCO to pay the movants the fair market value of the
property taken at P40.00 per square meter. Furthermore, the respondent court stressed in said order
that "at this stage, the Court starts to appoint commissioners to determine just compensation or
dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a credible real estate broker, or the Judge himself
would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in question.
Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence."

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners
in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.

RULING:
No. The applicable laws in the case at bar are Sections 5 and 3 of Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The said sections particularly deal with the ascertainment of compensation and the
court’s action upon commissioners’ report.

In the case at bar, respondent judge arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a
property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture
Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by A.B.A. Homes and private
respondents. This agreement was merely attached to the motion to withdraw from petitioner’s
deposit. Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper
reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners.

Private respondents as landowners have not proved by competent evidence the value of their
respective properties at a proper hearing Likewise, petitioner has not been given the opportunity to
rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents. In an expropriation case
such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the
Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just
compensation.
 The appointment of at least 3 competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just
compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases.
While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its
own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons. Thus, trial with the aid of the
commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at
all.

Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the
trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from
the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the respondent judge, in the
absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine just
compensation.

Rehabilitation Finance Corporation v. Alto Surety, 107 Phil 387 (1960)

PETITIONER: Rehabilitation Finance Corporation

RESPONDENT: Alto Surety & Insurance Company, Inc.
NAME OF ACTION: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
DOCTRINE: An interest in the mortgaged property acquired subsequent to the First mortgage may be
divested or barred only by making the holder thereof a party to the proceedings to foreclose .

FACTS:

Eustaqio Palma, the registered owner of a parcel of land in Camarines Sur, executed a
first mortgage to secure a loan in favor of the petitioner. Subsequently, with the consent of petitioner,
Palma executed another mortgage in favor of the respondent. Both mortgages were registered in the
register of deeds and annotated on the corresponding certificate of title. Upon Palma’s failure to settle
the loan, petitioner extra judicially foreclosed the property and sold it in public auction where he was
the highest bidder.

Months later, Palma, by a deed of assignment, transferred and conveyed all his rights,
title, and interest in and to the mortgaged property to Spouses Trinidad as the assignee assuming the
obligation of Palma. The assignees and the petitioner executed a deed of resale whereby the
mortgaged property was resold and reconveyed in favor of the redemptioners. However, the full
amount was not paid. Respondent, as a junior encumbrancer inquired to the petitioner as to the
actual status of the property subject to redemption. In its reply, petitioner told the respondent that the
property was already sold to Spouses Trinidad. Petitioner later consolidated ownership on the
property stating that the period for redemption has expired and such consolidation was registered.
The second mortgage in favor of respondent was carried and annotated at the back of the new title
issued to the petitioner.

Petitioner sought to cancel the annotation on the back of its title in favor of the
respondent. Respondent however opposed the petition contending that with the execution of the deed
of resale between petitioner and Spouses Trinidad, the mortgaged property had been completely
released from the first mortgage and the second mortgage had been automatically transformed into a
first lien on the property. The court denied the petition to cancel the annotation and upon appeal to
the Court of Appeals, the case was certified to the Supreme Court.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the rights of the respondent were terminated when the property was
foreclosed?

RULING: NO

The court a quo acted correctly in denying, under the circumstances, the petition to cancel the
annotation of the second mortgage at the back of the title covering the property originally owned by
Eustaquio Palma. The foreclosure of the first mortgage cannot be considered to have terminated or
extinguished the rights of said junior encumbrancer over the property. An interest in the mortgaged
property acquired subsequent to the (first) mortgage may be divested or barred only by making the
holder thereof a party to the proceedings to foreclose.

While as a general rule, the junior encumbrancer is not a necessary party to a suit to foreclose
by a senior mortgagee, it is always proper and prudent to join him as a defendant, both to give an
opportunity to defend and to extinguish his right of redemption. When a senior mortgagee forecloses
and becomes the purchaser at his own foreclosure sale, but the holder of a subsequent mortgage or
other subordinate interest has not been joined or has been eliminated from the proceeding, equity will
keep the senior mortgage alive against the subsequent encumbrance and the senior mortgagee will
be entitled to an action de novo to foreclose the mortgage as to the omitted persons

DISPOSITIVE: In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from denying the First mortgagee's
petition to cancel the annotation of the second mortgage at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 1155, is hereby affirmed.

Tiglao v. Botones, 90 Phil 275 (1951)

PETITIONER: BERNARDO TIGLAO

RESPONDENT:ENGRACIO BOTONES

NAME OF ACTION: Action for foreclosure of sale

FACTS:

Judgement was rendered in favor of Tiglao in civil case No. 5115 of the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac in which Bernardo Tiglao was the plaintiff and Engracio Botones the defendant. Upon
motion of Tiglao, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Accordingly, the provincial
sheriff sold at public auction the mortgaged properties to the plaintiff as the highest bidder. Tiglao
then filed an ex parte motion for the confirmation of the sale in his favor which was approved by the
trial court. Subsequently, Tiglao filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession.

The defendant filed an opposition alleging (1) that the judgment of March 24, 1943, is null and
void, because the defendant’s former counsel had no special authority to settle the case in the
manner stated in said judgment, and (2) that the sheriff’s sale was not legally confirmed, because the
defendant was not given notice of the motion for confirmation or its hearing.
 Tiglao’s motion for writ of possession was granted. Defendant motion for reconsideration
invoking moratorium under Republic Act No. 342 and praying that all proceedings be suspended but
was denied by the court.

Hence the appeal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in sustaining the order confirming the
sheriff’s sale and in issuing the corresponding writ of possession in favor of the appellee?
YES

2. Whether or not the trial court erred in not suspending the proceedings because of
the Moratorium Law (Republic Act No. 342)? NO

RULING:

1. Yes. The title to mortgaged real property does not vest in the purchaser until after the
confirmation of the sale, he has, prior to that time, no right to the possession of such property, and
no legal cause of complaint against the defendants, who remain in possession, exercising the
rights of ownership. The confirmation operates to divest the title out of the former owner and to
vest it in the purchaser. In order that a foreclosure sale may be validly confirmed by the court, it is
necessary that a hearing be given the interested parties at which they may have an opportunity to
show cause why the sale should not be confirmed; that a failure to give notice is good cause for
setting aside the sale. Notice and hearing of a motion for confirmation are therefore essential to
the validity of the order of confirmation, not only to enable the interested parties to resist the
motion but also to inform them of the time when their right of redemption is cut off.

2. No. The foreclosure judgment had long become final. The debt moratorium merely
prohibited the enforcement by action of the debts therein included; and in this case no one is
attempting to force anybody to pay his debt. The judgment debtor whose property has been sold
is not in debt for the redemption money. He could not be required by action to redeem. Hence, he
is not entitled to invoke the suspension.

GSIS v. CFI of Iloilo, 175 SCRA 19 (1989)

Petitioner: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
Respondents: The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, Iloilo City and Nelita M. Vda. De
Bacaling & Maria Teresa Integrated Development Corporation
Action: Petition for certiorari on the CFI’s order granting another period for the redemption of the
foreclosed property by the private respondent MTIDC
Doctrine: There is no right of redemption from a judicial foreclosure after confirmation, except those
granted in case of mortgagees who are banks or banking institutions.
Only judicial foreclosure of mortgages to banking institutions, and those made extrajudicially are
subject to legal redemption.
Facts: GSIS granted a real estate loan to spouses Bacaling for the development of the Bacaling-
Moreno subdivision. To secure the repayment of the loan, the Bacalings executed in favor of the
GSIS a real estate mortgage on four lots owned by them.

The Bacalings failed to finish the subdivision project and pay the amortizations on the loan so the
GSIS filed in the CFI of Iloilo a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Judgment was
rendered in favor of the GSIS and the Bacalings were ordered to pay.

Mrs. Bacaling failed to pay the judgment debt within 90 days after receipt of the decision of the court.
Consequently, the mortgaged lots were sold at public auction and the GSIS was the highest bidder.

GSIS then filed a motion for confirmation of the sale of the property to it and further asked for a
deficiency judgment against the mortgagor. However, respondent Maria Teresa Integrated
Development Corporation (MTIDC), as alleged assignee of the mortgagor's "right of redemption," filed
a "Motion to Exercise the Right of Redemption", which was granted by the trial court. A check was
delivered by MTIDC to the GSIS as payment of the redemption price, but it was dishonored by the
drawee bank because it was drawn against a closed account.

On motion of the GSIS, the court declared null and void the redemption of the property by respondent
MTIDC.

Fourteen years after the foreclosure sale and almost three years after the court had annulled its
redemption of the foreclosed property, respondent MTIDC filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court's order and sought the restoration of its right of redemption. CFI granted said motion despite
strong opposition from GSIS. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not, after the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the confirmation
of the sale, the private respondents can exercise the right of redemption.

Ruling: No, after the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the confirmation of the sale,
the private respondents cannot exercise the right of redemption.

There is no right of redemption from a judicial foreclosure sale after the confirmation of the sale,
except those granted by banks or banking institutions.

When the foreclosure sale is validly confirmed by the court title vests upon the purchaser in the
foreclosure sale, and the confirmation retroacts to the date of the sale. Only foreclosure of mortgages
to banking institutions and those made extrajudicially are subject to legal redemption, by express
provision of statute.

Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of redemption exists. There
exists only what is known as the equity of redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant
mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured
debt within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final or even after the foreclosure sale but
prior to its confirmation.

Since the GSIS is not a bank or banking institution, its mortgage is covered by the general rule that
there is no right of redemption after the judicial foreclosure sale has been confirmed.

Cruz v. IAC, 169 SCRA 9 (1989)

PARTIES: EPIFANIO CRUZ and EVELINA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLANT
COURT, CALIXTRO O. ADRIATICO, RUFINO J. SANTIAGO and GODOFREDO VALMEO,
respondents.
CAUSE OF ACTION: non-payment and for the judicial foreclosure of mortgages
DOCTRINE: Jurisprudentially, it has also been held that the exercise of the equity of redemption
may be made beyond the 90-days period but before the foreclosure sale is confirmed by the
court.
FACTS:
·         Epifanio Cruz and Evelina Cruz, petitioners, mortgaged certain properties to private respondents
who eventually sued them for non-payment and for the judicial foreclosure of mortgages under Rule
68 of the Rules of Court. In the course of the proceedings, a compromise agreement was reached
and this became the basis of the Judgment on Compromise issued by the respondent Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan.
Pertinent parts of the Agreement, as embodied in the decision, reads:

3. Upon full payment of the sums of P55,000.00 and P320,000.00 within the period agreed
upon, the plaintiff shall deliver to the defendants Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-32286 (M) of
the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, Meycauayan Branch, together with all the documents
submitted to the plaintiff;

4. Should the defendants fail to pay the sums agreed upon within the period stipulated, the
defendants shall pay plaintiff the entire sum of P92,149.00 under the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage attached to the complaint as Annex 'C' and an additional sum of P44,700.00 as
attorney's fees;

5. Upon failure of the defendants to pay the sums agreed upon within the period stipulated,
plaintiff shall be entitled to a writ of execution directing the foreclosure of all the mortgages
subject matter of this litigation and to the principal sum of P300,000.00 in the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage attached to the complaint as Annex 'B shall be added the sum of P44,700.00
as attorney's fees.

·         For failure of the petitioners to comply with certain provisions of the agreement, private
respondent moved for a writ of execution. The mortgaged properties were foreclosed upon in an
auction sale and were purchased by the private respondents as the highest bidder. The sale was
latter judicially confirmed.

·         Preliminarily, We dispose of the procedural issue raised by petitioners over the statement of
respondent court that appeal should have been their proper remedy in said court at that juncture,
since their objections to the judicial foreclosure proceeding and the subsequent confirmation of the
sale, if correct, would constitute errors of judgment and not of jurisdiction. 
ISSUES: Whether the aforestated judgment on compromise was null and void ab initio because it
allegedly "denied petitioners their equity of redemption under Sec. 2, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court,
by not allowing the petitioners to pay 'into court within a period of not less
than ninety (90) days from the date of the service of said order,' and that it is only if the
petitioners default in said payment that the property should be sold to pay the judgment
debt

RULING: NO. The parties outlined in Section 2, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court refers to the situation
where a full-blown trial, with the introduction of evidence is entailed, such that the trial court has to
thereafter determine whether the allegations in the complaint have been proved, then ascertain the
total amount due to the plaintiff, and thereafter render judgment for such amount with an order for the
payment thereof in accordance with the prescription of the aforequoted section, sans the agreement
of the parties on those particulars. There being no such agreement, the specified procedure has
necessarily to be followed and the minimum period of ninety (90) days for payment, also referred to
as the period for the exercise of the equity, as distinguished from the right, of redemption has to be
observed and provided for in the judgment in the foreclosure suit.

Jurisprudentially, it has also been held that the exercise of the equity of redemption may be made
beyond the 90-days period but before the foreclosure sale is confirmed by the court.

The dispositions of Section 2 of Rule 68, Rules of Court, cannot be substantial application to, and can
be modified by, a valid agreement of the parties, such as in the compromise agreement subject of
and constituting the basis for the judgment on compromise rendered in Civil Case No. 7418-M of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, since the parties therein had specifically agreed on the amounts to
be paid, when they should be paid and the effects of non-payment or violation of the terms of their
agreements.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is hereby DENIED, with costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Kho v. CA, 203 SCRA 160 (1991)

PETITIONER: SPS. MIGUEL S. KHO and JUANITA KHO

RESPONDENT:COURT OF APPEALS and BANCO FILIPINO
NAME OF ACTION:Annulment of Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction, etc
DOCTRINE: The law and jurisprudence are clear that both during and after the redemption period,
the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, regardless whether there is a pending suit for
annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself.

FACTS:
● Spouses Kho constituted in favor of Banco Filipino a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land
to guarantee a loan granted them by petitioner bank. After managing to pay the sum of
P688,060.00, the Kho spouses defaulted in the payment of some amortizations. Hence, Banco
Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. As the sole and highest bidder in the auction
sale, the petitioner bank purchased the mortgaged property for the sum of P4,153,865.47
covering the plaintiff’s obligations, interests, penalties and attorney’s fees as agreed in the
mortgage contract. The certificate of sale was then duly registered on June 17, 1982.
○
● Counting one year from June 17, 1982, the petitioners had until June 17, 1983, within which to
redeem the property. In the meantime, the foreclosed property was leased out to third parties
and the rentals (fruits thereof) were remitted monthly by petitioners to respondent bank, being
 the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure. The end of the redemption period was then fast
approaching but still petitioners had not made any move to redeem the foreclosed property.
○
● RTC Cebu – Then just about 10 days before the end of the redemption period, petitioners filed
for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. RTC Judge granted the prayer
of petitioners for Preliminary Injunction restraining and enjoining the Bank from obtaining a writ
of possession or a final deed of conveyance over plaintiffs’ land and restrain the Bank from
registering the same; as well as restraining and enjoining the defendants from collecting any
rentals of the properties of the plaintiffs.
○
● Court of Appeals – The CA reversed. Hence, this appeal by petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued in favor of the Spouses

RULING:
● The law and jurisprudence are clear that both during and after the period of redemption, the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale is entitled as of right to a writ of possession, regardless of
whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself
(without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of said case).
● Hence, an injunction to prohibit the issuance of the writ of possession is entirely out of place
(See Act 3135).

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision
of respondent Court of Appeals lifting the writ of preliminary injunction is hereby AFFIRMED. Let this
case be REMANDED to the RTC of Cebu City for further proceedings.

Roxas v. CA, 221 SCRA (1993)

PETITIONER:
BLANCA CONSUELO ROXAS
RESPONDENT:
COURT OF APPEALS and RURAL BANK OF DUMALAG, INC.

NAME OF ACTION:
Petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the decision of public respondent Court of Appeals
which set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court

FACTS:
Petitioner Blanca Consuelo Roxas is the owner of a parcel of land located at Tanza Norte, Panay,
Capiz. On December 22, 1969, she executed a special power of attorney appointing her brother, the
late Manuel Roxas, as her attorney-in-fact for the purpose of applying for an agricultural loan with
private respondent Rural Bank of Dumalag, Inc. using said land as collateral. Armed with said special
power of attorney, Manuel Roxas applied for, was granted and received an agricultural loan in the
amount of P2,000.00 from private respondent on December 26, 1969. As security for the loan, he
executed the corresponding real estate mortgage over the subject land.

On October 24, 1973, private respondent foreclosed the real estate mortgage for failure to pay the
loan on maturity. The subject land was sold at public auction to private respondent being the highest
bidder. For failure to exercise the right of redemption, private respondent consolidated its ownership
over the subject land. On October 4, 1982, possession thereof was taken from Jennifer Roxas,
daughter of Manuel Roxas, and delivered by the sheriff to private respondent.
Petitioner filed a complaint for cancellation of foreclosure of mortgage and annulment of auction sale
against private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City claiming that Manuel Roxas
never informed her about the approval of the loan. When the loan matured, she did not received any
demand for payment from private respondent nor was there any information from Manuel Roxas
about the maturity of the loan. The foreclosure did not comply with the requirement of giving written
notices to all possible redemptioners, neither did Manuel Roxas inform her about the foreclosure and
she only learned of the foreclosure for a certain Rosario Pelobello in 1974.

In that same year, she went to private respondent to inquire about the status of her loan and asked
for a statement of account. Her request was refused or ignored. After repeated requests went
unheeded, she consulted her lawyer, who sent a letter to private respondent, requesting for said
statement of account. On May 10, 1981, private respondent finally replied, informing petitioner that it
already foreclosed the subject land and it can no longer be redeemed since the redemption period
has expired on March 6, 1975. Petitioner was able to obtain her statement of account only on August
19, 1981. She consigned with the trial court the amount of P4,194.50 as redemption price of the
subject land.

On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. The trial court
ratiocinated that private respondent failed to give notice of foreclosure to petitioner as owner of the
property and there was no compliance with the requirements of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720,as
amended by Republic Act No. 5939. The notices of foreclosure were posted in the municipality where
the subject land was located and in Roxas City, but not in the barrio. Moreover, there was no affidavit
of the sheriff who conducted the sale, attached to the records of the case.

On elevating the matter to the Court of Appeals, said court reversed the decision of the trial court.
According to the appellate court, Section 5 of R.A. NO. 720 does not require personal notification to
the mortgagor in case of foreclosure and there was substantial compliance with the requirements of
said law.

Petitioner invokes the ruling in the case of Tambunting, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. which held
that the statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be
strictly complied with, and that a slight deviation therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the
sale voidable. If recovery cannot be had under the strict provisions of law, it must be allowed under
the liberal consideration of equity in view of the special circumstances.

ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to post the notice in the barrio where the mortgaged property is situated
rendered the foreclosure and sale by public auction is void.

RULING: Yes.
It is settled doctrine that failure to publish notice of auction sale as required by the statute constitutes
a jurisdiction defects with invalidates the sale. Even slight deviations therefrom are not allowed.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 720, as amended by R.A. No. 5939, provides that notices of foreclosure should
be posted in at least three (3) of the most conspicuous public places in the municipality and barrio
where the land mortgaged is situated.

In the case at bar, the Certificate of Posting which was executed by the sheriff states that he posted
three (3) copies of the notice of public auction sale in three (3) conspicuous public places in the
municipality of Panay, where the subject land was situated and in like manner in Roxas City, where
the public auction sale took place.
It is beyond dispute that there was a failure to publish the notices of auction sale as required by law.
Section 5 provides further that proof of publication shall be accomplished by an affidavit of the sheriff
or officer conducting the foreclosure sale. In this case, the sheriff executed a certificate of posting,
which is not the affidavit required by law. The rationale behind this is simple: an affidavit is a sworn
statement in writing. Strict compliance with the aforementioned provisions is mandated.

We, therefore, cannot sustain the view of respondent court that there was substantial compliance with
Section 5 of R.A. No. 720, as amended, with respect to the affidavit of posting by the sheriff and the
non-posting of the required notice in the barrio where the land mortgaged is situated. Instead, We
declare the foreclosure and public auction sale of the subject land void.

San Jose v. CA, 225 SCRA 450 (1993)

PETITIONER: CESAR SAN JOSE AND MARGARITA BATONGBAKAL

RESPONDENT: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. MARCOS DE GUZMAN AND GLORIA DE

GUZMAN

NAME OF ACTION: Extra-judicial foreclosure sale

FACTS: Spouses San Jose mortgaged a land to Spouses to de Guzman as security for the payment
of a loan. For failing to comply with the conditions the Spouses de Guzman extra-judicially foreclosed
the mortgage and was sold at a sheriff’s sale. Spouses San Jose contend that the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale was null and void. The trial court upheld the validity of the foreclosure sale. The
Court of Appeals held that the foreclosure was valid. A motion for reconsideration was filed and
denied. A petition for review was filed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial foreclosure sale complied with the requirements of Act No.
3135 as amended by Act No. 4118 which governs the extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage.

RULING: Requirement of publication of notice must be substantially complied with. An incorrect and
technical description appearing therein does not constitute substantial compliance. The Court is not
unaware of the fact that the majority of the population do not have the necessary knowledge to be
able to understand technical descriptions in certificates of title. It is to be noted and stressed that the
Notice is not meant only for individuals with the training to understand technical descriptions of
property but also for the layman with an interest in the property to be sold, who normally relies on the
number of the certificate of title. To hold that the publication of the correct technical description, with
an incorrect title number, of the property to be sold constitutes substantial compliance would certainly
defeat the purpose of the Notice. This is not to say that a correct statement of the title number but
with an incorrect technical description in the notice of sale constitutes a valid notice of sale. The
Notice of Sheriff's Sale, to be valid, must contain the correct title number and the correct technical
description of the property to be sold.

IFC v. Apostol 177 SCRA (15sep1989) L-35453

FACTS: The present petition is a direct appeal from the summary judgment dated March 15, 1972 of
the then CFI Quezon City as well as the order of said court dated July 7, 1972 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of said judgment.
In 1968, spouses Joaquin Padilla and Socorro Padilla bought on credit three units of Isuzu trucks
from the Industrial Transport and Equipment, Inc. They executed a promissory note for P159,600, the
balance of the purchase price, securing payment by a chattel mortgage of said trucks and, as
additional collateral, a real estate mortgage on their property.
Industrial Transport and Equipment, Inc. indorsed the note and assigned the real estate mortgage to
petitioner Industrial Finance Corporation (IFC), which assignment was duly registered in the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City and annotated on the title of the mortgaged realty.
1971, private respondents Delmendo filed a complaint against petitioner IFC, as principal party, and
the Padilla spouses, as formal parties. The Delmendos alleged that they were the transferees of the
real property which was mortgaged earlier by the Padillas to the Industrial Transport and Equipment,
Inc. and then assigned to petitioner IFC. The Delmendos prayed for the cancellation of the mortgage
lien, considering that petitioner IFC had waived its rights over the mortgage when it instituted a
personal action against the Padillas for collection of a sum of money.
Petitioner IFC moved for the dismissal of the complaint, contending that it had not waived its right
over the mortgage lien.
ISSUE: Whether or not by filing a personal action for the recovery of a debt secured by a real estate
mortgage, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned, ipso jure, its mortgage lien on the property in
question.
RULING: Yes.
In Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Co Kim and So Tek we declared: "The rule is now settled that a
mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an ordinary action to recover the
indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor,
including the subject-matter of the mortgage, subject to the qualification that if he fails in the remedy
by him elected, he cannot pursue further the remedy he has waived."
Therefore, by instituting Civil Case to recover the unpaid balance on the promissory note from the
Padilla spouses and by subsequently obtaining a judgment in its favor, petitioner IFC is considered to
have abandoned its mortgage lien on the subject property.
The end result is the discharge of the real estate mortgage and the Delmendos, having purchased the
mortgaged property, automatically step into the shoes of the original mortgagors with every right to
have the title delivered to them free from said encumbrance.

Roque v. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 (1988)

PETITIONER: CONCEPCION ROQUE
RESPONDENT: HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ERNESTO ROQUE, FILOMENA
NAME OF ACTION: Complaint for Partition with Specific Performance
FACTS:
1. The controversy in this case involves a parcel of land situated in Malolos, Bulacan. The property
was registered originally in the name of Januario Avendaño, a bachelor who died intestate and
without issue. The intestate heirs of Januario Avendaño executed a document entitled "Paghahati at
Pagtagabuyan ng Mana sa Labas ng Hukuman." Through this instrument, extrajudicial partition of the
lot was effected:

a. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Illuminada Avendaño.

b. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Gregorio Avendaño and Miguel Avendaño.
c. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano
and Rufina, all surnamed Avendaño.
d. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor
Roque.

2. Co-owners Illuminada, Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina

transferred their collective and undivided three-fourths (3/4) share to respondent Ernesto Roque and
Victor Roque, thereby vesting in the latter full and complete ownership of the property. The
transactions were embodied in two (2) separate deeds of sale. Subsequently, in an unnotarized
"Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan”, Ernesto and Victor Roque (who died) purportedly sold a three-fourths
(3/4) undivided portion of Lot to their half-sister, petitioner Concepcion Roque. The property, however,
remained registered in the name of the decedent, Januario Avendaño.

3. Upon the instance of the parties, a Subdivision Plan was drawn delineating a one-fourth (1/4)
portion of the property as belonging to respondent, and a three-fourths (3/4) portion belonging to
petitioner. Respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque, however, refused to
acknowledge petitioner's claim of ownership of any portion of the lot and rejected the plan to divide
the land.

4. Attempts at amicable settlement fell. Because of this, petitioner Concepcion Roque filed a
Complaint for Partition with Specific Performance in the RTC of Malolos. In an Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim filed by respondents, it impugned the genuineness and due execution of
the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan"; alleged that petitioner "occupied a portion of the lot in question by
mere tolerance of the respondents; refused to honor the unnotarized Kasulatan and, additionally,
denied having had any participation in the preparation of the Subdivision Plan.

RTC: Rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff.

IAC: Reversed the decision of RTC. From the decision of IAC, it can be implied that from the moment
respondents alleged absolute and exclusive ownership of the whole of lot in their Answer, the trial
court should have immediately ordered the dismissal of the action for partition and petitioner, if she so
desired, should have refiled the case but this time as an accion reivindicatoria. Taking this analysis a
step further should the reinvindicatory action prosper — i.e., a co-ownership relation is found to have
existed between the parties — a second action for partition would still have to be instituted in order to
effect division of
the property among the co-owners

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be refiled and this time, the action to be commenced is
accion reinvindicatoria.

RULING: NO.

An action for partition — which is typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a

specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners
— may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is the issue of whether the
plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned. Second, assuming that the
plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be
divided between plaintiff and defendant(s) — i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.

Should the trial court find that the defendants do not dispute the status of the plaintiff as co-
owner, the court can forthwith proceed to the actual partitioning of the property involved. In case the
defendants assert in their Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the court
should not dismiss the plaintiff's action for partition but, on the contrary and in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction, resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should the trial
court find that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his claimed status as co-owner, or that the
defendants are or have become the sole and exclusive owners of the property involved, the court will
necessarily have to dismiss the action for partition. This result would be reached, not because the
wrong action was commenced by the plaintiff, but rather because the plaintiff having been unable to
show co-ownership rights in himself, no basis exists for requiring the defendants to submit to partition
the property at stake. If, upon the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co-
ownership among the parties litigant, the court may and should order the partition of the property in
the same action. Judgment for one or the other party being on the merits, the losing party may then
appeal (by record on appeal because the case for partition will note be suspended and the records
will be used in the trial court) the same. In either case, however, it is unnecessary to require the
plaintiff to file another action, separate and independent from that for partition originally instituted, just
to determine who the co-owners are. Functionally, an action for partition may be seen to be at once
an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the property involved.

Furthermore, no matter how long the co-ownership has lasted, a co- owner can always opt out of
the co-ownership, and provided the defendant co-owners or co-heirs have theretofore expressly or
impliedly recognized the co-ownership, they cannot set up as a defense the prescription of the action
for partition. But if the defendants show that they had previously asserted title in themselves
adversely to the plaintiff and for the requisite period of time, the plaintiff’s right to require recognition
of his status as a co-owner will have been lost by prescription and the court cannot issue an order
requiring partition.

In the case at bar, there is no need for refiling of the case and converting it to accion
reinvindicatoria based on the rule mentioned above. With regard to the issue on prescription, SC said
that it is unnecessary. Petitioner Concepcion Roque — the co-owner seeking partition — has been
and is presently in open and continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of the property
owned in common ever since the execution of the “Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan”. Respondents do not
dispute this finding of fact, although they would claim that petitioner's possession is merely tolerated
by them. The attack on the validity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" had already prescribed. The
Court noted that sixteen (16) years had passed until respondents first questioned the genuineness
and authenticity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan." Not once during those sixteen (16) years did
respondents contest petitioner's occupation of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of the Lot.

Fabrica v. CA, 146 SCRA 250 (1986)

PETITIONER: PETRA FABRICA, EUGENIO BAS, PETRONA BAS, ANTONIO BAS, VICENTE BAS,
FLAVIANA BAS, JOSEFINA BAS, NUMERIANA BAS, PASCUAL ZAFRA, MARCIAL BAS, RUFINA
LAREGO, FAUSTA OBEJERO, TEOFILO TABAY, VICTORIA OBEJERO, PEDRO GAHUM,
ARSENIO CANEDA, FAUSTINA BAS, MOISES BAS, and GIL OBEJERO, petitioners,
RESPONDENT: HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ZACARIAS BAS, CIPRIANO BAS,
ELEUTERIA BAS, AGUSTIN BAS, ISIDRO OBEJERO, DEMETRIA BAS, JOSE BAS, OSMUNDO
BAS, ANDREA BAS, VIVENCIA BAS, FRANCISCO BAS, ESTELITA BAS, BUENAVENTURA BAS,
JUANA BAS, DOMINGO BAS, DOLORES BAS and DULCE BAS, respondents.
NAME OF ACTION: Petition for review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS:
This is a case regarding a land dispute. The instant case is for partition of properties left by the
deceased spouses Catalino Bas and Cristeta Niebres filed with the lower court by private
respondents against petitioners. The defendants in this case (Petra Fabrica, surviving spouse of the
late Pedro Bas, and her children, private respondents herein) took possession of two (2) parcels of
land in question and claimed that they are the owners thereof, despite repeated demands for partition
made upon them.

Respondents show documents in the records of the Office of the District Land Officer of Cebu that
say deeds of conveyance were issued in their favor. Defendants (petitioners) in their answer as their
affirmative defenses alleged that Pedro Bas took possession of the lots after Cristeta Niebres and her
children orally and extrajudicially partitioned the estate in question. And also that they have been in
the actual physical, material and exclusive possession and dominion of the lots in question, declaring
same for taxation and paying the taxes thereon.

The trial court ruled that the only issue to be resolved in this case is whether the lots are still owned in
common pro-indiviso by the heirs of Catalino Bas and Cristeta Niebres (respondents in this case), or
whether the said lots belong exclusively to Pedro Bas or his heirs(petitioners in this case). After trial,
the lower court rendered judgment in favor of respondents.

Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which ruled that the judgment of the court a
quo in the partition case is not appealable, it being interlocutory, and ordered the remanding of the
case to the lower court.

ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in denying the appeal of petitioners

RULING:
Court ruled the CA was mistaken.

The records of the case clearly reveal that the main purpose of the complaint is to determine who
between the parties are the true owners and entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed properties.
While it is true that the complaint is one for partition, it is one which is premised on the resolution of
the issue on the validity of the oral partition allegedly made in favor of defendants and the two deeds
of conveyance executed in the names of the heirs of the deceased spouses Catalino Bas and
Cristeta Niebres. Unless this issue of ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. Thus, when the trial court rendered its
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, rejecting defendants' claim of exclusive ownership of the properties
by oral partition, it rendered a final or definitive judgment on the merits from which the party adversely
affected can make an appeal.

Hence, the court ruled to set aside the CA’s decision and remand the case back to them for further
proceedings.
 Francel Realty v. CA, 252 SCRA 127 (1996)

PETITIONER: FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION

RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO T. SYCIP

NAME OF ACTION: Complaint for unlawful detainer against private respondent Francisco T. Sycip

FACTS:
Francel alleged that it had executed a Contract to Sell to Sycip a property in Cavite, for P451,000.00.
The Contract to Sell provides that in case of default in the payment of two or more installments, the
whole obligation will become due and demandable and the seller will then be entitled to rescind the
contract and take possession of the property; the buyer will vacate the premises without the necessity
of any court action and the downpayment will be treated as earnest money or as rental for the use of
the premises. Francel alleged that Sycip failed to pay the monthly amortization of P9,303.00 since
October 30, 1990 despite demands to update his payments and to vacate the premises, the latest of
which was the demand made in the letter dated September 26, 1992, so Francel filed in the MTC an
action for unlawful detainer and award for costs and damages.

Sycip, on the other hand filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that he stopped paying
because the townhouse sold to him was of defective construction; that in fact a case for unsound real
estate business practice is pending in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

MTC granted the dismissal on the ground that it had no jurisdiction and that the case was cognizable
by the HLURB. RTC affirmed. CA reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not MTC had jurisdiction?

RULING:

No.

Petitioner's complaint is for unlawful detainer. While generally speaking such action falls within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, the determination of the ground for ejectment requires
a consideration of the rights of a buyer on installment basis of real property. Indeed private
respondent claims that he has a right under P.D. No. 957, §23 to stop paying monthly amortizations
after giving due notice to the owner or developer of his decision to do so because of petitioner's
alleged failure to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans
and within the time for complying with the same. The case thus involves a determination of the rights
and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. No. 957, Private respondent has in fact
filed a complaint against petitioner for unsound real estate business practice with the HLURB.

This is, therefore, not a simple case for unlawful detainer arising from the failure of the lessee to pay.

Javier v. Veridiano II, 237 SCRA 565 (1994)

PETITIONER: Felicidad Javier

RESPONDENT: Hon. Regino T. Veridiano II

NAME OF ACTION: Petition for Review on Certiorari

FACTS: On 25 January 1963, petitioner Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot No.
1641, of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision. Sometime in December 1970, alleged that she is the
true, lawful and in actual prior physical possession of a certain parcel of land up to the present time
until the the day of the incident; that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of the land by a
certain Ben Babol, she instituted a complaint for forcible entry before the City Court of Olongapo City,
alleging that sometime on December 12, 1970, the defendant, without express consent of plaintiff and
without lawful authority, through scheme, strategy and stealth, forcibly entered a portion on the
southwestern part of the subject lot with the assistance of hired helpers, started construction of riprap
along the Kalaklan River perimeter of said portion of land; said entry was further augmented by
removing plaintiff's chain link, fence with galvanized iron posts embedded in concrete, likewise
destroying plants introduced by plaintiff by removing existing BL (Bureau of Lands) monuments
thereon, and by these actions, defendant started exercising illegal possession of said portion of land
which contains an area of 200 square meters, more or less.

On November 1972, the City Court of Olongapo dismissed the case ruling that "it appears to the
Court that the Bureau of Lands has considered the area in question to be outside Lot 1641 of the
plaintiff”, which decision then became final and executory.

Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent.

Meanwhile, Ben Babol who was the defendant and appellee in the complaint for forcible entry had
sold the property he was occupying, including the portion of about 200 square meters in question, to
a certain Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner demanded the surrender of the same area in dispute from
Reino Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply with the demand. On 29 June 1977, or after about
four (4) years from the finality of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 926, petitioner instituted a complaint
for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Ben Babol and Reino Rosete
stating that plaintiff is the absolute owner in fee simple of a parcel of land and until present,
defendants, relying on an application filed on December 23, 1969, with the Bureau of Lands, however
have squatted, illegally occupied and unlawfully possessed the southwestern portion of plaintiff's
above-described property of about 200 square meters, then by defendant BEN BABOL and now by
defendant REINO ROSETE, the former having sold the entirety of his property to the latter, including
the portion in question.

Instead of filing a responsive pleading, therein defendant Reino Rosete (private respondent herein)
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Defendant Ben Babol did not file any
pleading.

In its Order, the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br. 1, sustained the argument of Rosete
and granted his motion to dismiss. Thereafter, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not res judicata may be applied in the instant case.

RULING:Negative;

Time and again it has been said that for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the
following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The court rendering
the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The former judgment is a judgment
on the merits; and, (4) There is between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject
matter and of causes of action. 10The presence of the first three requirements and the identity of
subject matter in the fourth requirement are not disputed.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is required is not
absolute but only substantial identity of parties. It is fundamental that the application of res judicata
may not be evaded by simply including additional parties in a subsequent litigation. In fact we have
said that there is still identity of parties although in the second action there is one party who was not
joined in the first action, if it appears that such party is not a necessary party either in the first or
second action, or is a mere nominal party. Thus, Sec. 49, par. (b), Rule 39, Rules of Court, provides
that ". . . the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity."

In the case at bench, it is evident that private respondent Reino Rosete is a successor in interest of
Ben Babol by title subsequent to the commencement and termination of the first action. Hence, there
is actual, if not substantial, identity of the parties between the two actions. But, there is merit in
petitioner's argument that there is no identity of causes of action between the two cases.

Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior possession,
regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed property. Thus, "[t]he only issue in an action for
forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and
not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by
strong hand, violence or terror." And, a judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is
conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way bind
the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.

On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 while inaccurately captioned as an action for "Quieting of
Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages" is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or
an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434 17of the Civil Code, and should be distinguished from Civil
Case No. 926, which is an accion interdictal. From the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No.
2203-0, plaintiff therein (petitioner herein) clearly sets up title to herself and prays that respondent
Rosete be ejected from the disputed land and that she be declared the owner and given possession
thereof. Certainly, the allegations partake of the nature of an accion reivindicatoria.

In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed
area without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she
expressly alleged ownership, specifically praying that she be declared the rightful owner and given
possession of the disputed portion. Hence, in Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely alleged that she
was "the true, lawful (possessor) and in actual, prior physical possession" of the subject parcel of
land, whereas in Civil Case No. 2203-0 she asserted that she was "the absolute owner in fee simple"
of the parcel of land "covered by Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-3259." The complaint in
Civil Case No. 2203-0 definitely raises the question of ownership and clearly gives defendants therein
notice of plaintiff's claim of exclusive and absolute ownership, including the right to possess which is
an elemental attribute of such ownership. Thus, this Court has ruled that a judgment in forcible entry
or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who has the right of
possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or
title of ownership.

Applying the ruling of the Court En Banc in Quimpo v. De la Victoria, even if we treat Civil Case No.
2203-0 as a petition to quiet title, as its caption suggests, still it has a cause of action different from
that for ejectment. Consequently, there being no identity of causes of action between Civil Case No.
926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0, the prior complaint for ejectment cannot bar the subsequent action for
recovery, or petition to quiet title.

Baens v. CA, 125 SCRA 634 (1983)

FACTS:

● Chua Seng and Dra. Paz Baens are lessee and lessor, respectively, are bound by oral
contract of lease over the subject premises. In 1975, Chua left the premises to be treated by a
hilot in Valenzuela, Bulacan. Before he left, he padlocked the steel door of the premises. Next
day, he and his brother-in-law, Ong Hai returned. They found that in addition to the padlock of
Chua placed, other padlocks were placed at the door of the premises at the instance of Dra.
Baens.
● Chua Seng, Ong Hai and their spouses sought the audience of Dra. Baens at St. Paul
Hospital; in that meeting, Dra. Baens refused to remove the padlocks on the premises. They
also went to Dra. Baens' lawyer; but still the premises were not opened. Subsequently, Chua
Seng thru Atty. Mariano, wrote a letter to Dra. Baens, tendering the rentals for October and
November, 1975 by means of a check and requesting the removal of the Dra. Baens' padlocks
from the premises.
● Chua Seng filed a complaint for forcible entry with the City Court of Manila against Dra. Baens.
Chua Seng alleged that Dra. Baens' refusal to remove the padlocks was a breach of the
contract of lease consisting in the deprivation of plaintiff's right to occupy and use the leased
premises.
● On February 12, 1976, petitioner Baens filed her answer to the complaint for forcible entry
alleging inter alia that Chua Seng right to occupy said premises had long expired and that he
failed to pay the rentals due and had voluntarily vacated the premises.
● On February 18, 1976, the Baens filed with the City Court of Manila her own complaint for
unlawful detainer against lessee Chua Seng, alleging the same facts raised in her answer to
Chua Seng's complaint for forcible entry.
● The two cases were assigned to the same branch of the City Court of Manila which conducted
a joint trial and rendered a consolidated decision in favor of Chua Seng, ordering Dra. Baens
to restore him to the possession and enjoyment of the leased premises. Petitioner’s complaint
is dismissed.
● On November 5, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision affirming the
City Court's decision but reversing the decision insofar as it only awarded said private
respondent the sum of P1,000.00 for attorney's fees and dismissed his other claim for
damages.
● The private respondent filed a motion for immediate execution pending appeal which was
granted. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered its decision, annulling
the order of immediate execution and modifying the awarded damges, reducing the award of
moral damages to P3,000, exemplary damages to P2,000, and the attorney's fees to P3,000. A
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

ISSUES: Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave error of law in merely
reducing, instead of eliminating the award for alleged moral and exemplary damages to private
respondent Chua Seng and in not applying to petitioner, the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, which limited the kind of damages recoverable in actions for
forcible entry and detainer to such damages caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the
property.

RULING: Yes.
Reyes v. Court of Appeals (38 SCRA 138), interprets the scope of damages that may be recovered in
an action for forcible entry. "It has been held that while damages may be adjudged in forcible entry
and detainer casts, these `damages` mean `rents` or `the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises,` (Mitschiener v. Barrios, 76 Phil. 55, cited in Garcia v. Pena, 77 Phil.
1011) or `fair rental value of the property.` (Sparrevohn v. Fisher, 2 Phil. 676; Mitschiener v. Barrios,
supra; Castueras v. Bayona, 106 Phil. 340). Profits which the plaintiff might have received were it not
for the forcible entry or detainer do not represent a fair rental value." (Sparrevohn v. Fisher, 2 Phil.
676; supra; Igama v. Soria, 42 Phil. 11) Although Section 1 of Rule 70 uses the word "damages," the
authors of the Rules of Court, in drafting Section 6 of Rule 70 on the judgment to be pronounced,
eliminated the word "damages," placing in lieu thereof, the words "reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the premises." The damages which a plaintiff expects to obtain from his
business to be located in the premises, or for material injury caused to the premises cannot also be
claimed in connection with or as incidental to an action of illegal detainer or forcible entry. (Torres v.
Ocampo, 80 Phil. 36)

Since moral, exemplary, and actual damages are neither "rents" nor "reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises," nor "fair rental value" as abovestated, we are constrained to
deny the P3,000.00 moral damages and P2,000.00 exemplary damages awarded by the respondent
Court of Appeals and the P1,000.00 actual damages awarded by the City Court of Manila.

Penas, Jr. v. CA, 233 SCRA 744 (1994)

PETITIONER:
RESPONDENT:
NAME OF ACTION: Unlawful detainer: 1 year prescription should be counted from the LAST letter of
demand to vacate.

FACTS
Spouses Penas leased to Calaycay a certain property in Quezon City. The original written contract
was on a month to month basis and for P110.00 per month. The price was continuously increased
until it reached P2000.00 per month.

In a letter of January 18, 1990, Penas notified Calaycay that effective March 1990, they were
terminating the written month to month lease contract as they were no longer interested to renew the
same and demanded from the latter to vacate the premises in question on or before February 28,
1990. In the same letter, Penas opted to allow the defendant to continue occupying the leased
premises provided he will agree to execute a new lease contract for a period of one (1) year at an
increased monthly rental P2500.00, plus two (2) months deposit and, further, gave the Calaycay up to
February 28, 1990 to decide, otherwise judicial action for unlawful detainer shall ensue. Penas later
finally reduced the monthly rental to P2000.00.

Calaycay did not vacate but instead consigned the monthly rents in a bank.
On August 10, 1992, Penas sent another letter to the defendant to vacate and demanded back
rentals, which Calaycay failed to satisfy.
On September 25, 1992, Penas filed an action for unlawful detainer. MTC dismissed the case for
being filed more than 1 year after the unlawful occupation. RTC and CA affirmed.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the case for unlawful detainer was filed in time?
RULING

The established rule that the one (1) year period provided for in section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the LAST
letter of demand to vacate, the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action
based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises.

The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the
land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. When after
such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be
ejected until he defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made. The demand was
made on 10 August 1992, followed by the action for unlawful detainer on 25 September 1992. Hence
it was filed within 1 year from the beginning of the unlawful possession.

Lim Kieh Tong v. CA, 195 SCRA 398 (1991)

Petitioners:
· Lim Kieh Tong, Inc.
Public Respondent:
· Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Hon. Judge Rogelio M. Pizarro
Private Respondents:
· Reginaldo Y. Lim

Facts:
· Plaintiff and his family had for some time resided in Room 301 of the building until
they transferred to their present residence at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon City;
· The said room 301 has thereafter been utilized by plaintiff as a place where he keeps
some of his important belongings, such as his law books, important documents,
appliances, etc.;
· The building has only one common main door through which all the occupants of
the various rooms therein, including that of plaintiff, can get in and out therefrom;
· Every occupant of any and all of the rooms of the building including plaintiff has
been given a key or a duplicate key to the doorlock.
· When plaintiff wanted to go inside his he was surprised to find out that the key given
him could no longer fit the door lock which was then already changed;
· Consequently, plaintiff had to buy three (3) new law books for which he incurred
expenses in the sum of Pl,253.00, if only to be able to prepare for his cases.
 · 9. Plaintiff was able to contact defendant through its Officer-in-Charge, Mr. Rafael
Lim, the following day, October 1, 1987, but his request for him to be provided with
the appropriate key produced negative result.
· Hence, the petitioner filed an action for damages and a separate action for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction
Procedural History:
· On November 2, 1987, a temporary restraining order was issued by respondent judge
pending trial on the merits, commanding petitioner to deliver the appropriate keys to
private respondent and allow him to enter the premises and occupancy of Room No.
301 of the building.
· On November 3, 1987, petitioners instituted a motion to dismiss. Such motion was
denied
· An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed for lack of merit
· The petitioner filed a petition for review contending that the action being one for
specific performance the jurisdiction thereof is vested in the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
· Does MTC lack jurisdiction over the case since the thrust of the issue is one of
specific performance?
Held:
· No, MTC does not lack jurisdiction over the suit.

The Supreme Court in this case dismissed the petition for certiorari because the suit is
one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, and that “any
person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof, may file an action
for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person unlawfully
depriving or withholding possession from him.”

The High Court further discussed that “this relief is not only available to a landlord,
vendor, or vendee, but also to a lessee or tenant or any other person against whom the
possession of any land or building, or a part thereof, is unlawfully withheld, or is
otherwise unlawfully deprived possession thereof, within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.

Therefore, MTC has the jurisdiction over the case.

Clutario v. CA, 216 SCRA 341 (1992)

Petitioner: SPS. Clutario
Respondent: Hon. Court Of Appeals, Hon. George C. Macli-Ing, Rtc Judge Of Quezon City, Branch
C (100), and Spouses Gandia
NAME OF ACTION: Petition for review under Rule 45
FACTS: Sps Gandia, are the owners a residential apartment and stayed at the upper story while Sps
Clutario occupied the ground floor by virtue of a verbal lease agreement. Sps Gandia gave Sps.
Clutario 90 days to vacate the premises. According to them, due to their advanced age and failing
health, they have decided to occupy the entire apartment. Sps. Clutario did not heed the demand
letter so Sps Gandia brought the matter to the Katarungan Pambarangay but this did not meet with
success.

In the meantime, Petitioners were in arrears in the payment of their rentals. Sps. Gandia filed a
complaint for ejectment before the MTC of Quezon City citing ther need for the premises and non-
payment of rentals. Pending the proceedings, petitioners paid the back rentals.

After trial, the MTC dismissed for failure to support cause of action with substantial evidence.
Respondents then filed an appeal with the RTC which reversed the MTC decision. RTC ruled that
non-payment of rentals for 3 months and the genuine need for the leased premises are sufficient
causes for petitioners' ejectment.

Petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA. CA affirmed RTC. Petitioners now file in the SC a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: NO. Whether or not the acceptance of payment of back rentals constitute a waiver

RULING: BP 25 was governing law at the time which provides that two of the six ejectment grounds
are arrears in payment of rent for 3 months at any one time and need of the lessors to repossess their
property for their own use or for the use of any immediate member of their family as residential unit.
However, petitioners contend the acceptance of the payment of the back rentals, waived their non-
payment of rentals for more than three (3) months as a ground for ejectment.

Such is not the case. Acceptance by the lessor of the payment by the lessee of the rentals in arrears
does not constitute a waiver of the default in the payment of rentals as a valid cause of action for
ejectment. Respondents had already filed their ejectment complaint before the payment of back
rentals. The subsequent acceptance belies any intention to waive their right to eject petitioners. They
did not enter into an amicable settlement. Neither did they notify the trial court of their intention to
have the complaint dismissed.

Instead, they participated actively in the proceedings before the MTC up to the RTC. Not only have
they participated even after they obtained favorable judgments from the RTC and the CA, but they
have likewise been consistent in their position.

In light of the circumstances of the case, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, the Court rules that
the acceptance by private respondents of the back rentals did not constitute a waiver or
abandonment of their cause of action for ejectment against the latter.

Cursino v. Bautista, 176 SCRA 65 (1989)

PETITIONER: Florentino Cursino (Lessee)
RESPONDENT: Pedro Bautista (District Judge, CFI Pasay City); Nicanor Cruz (Presiding
Judge, Mun. Court of Paranaque); Maria James (Lessor)
NAME OF ACTION: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:
1. Cursino leased from James a property in Baclaran, Paranaque at a monthly rental of 100.00.
 2. Cursino defaulted in the payment of his monthly rental for the months of October, November,
and December, 1977.

3. After James demanded for the payment of the unpaid rentals, but before the the ejectment suit
was filed, Cursino sent James two postal money orders as rental payments.

4. James filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Cursino. The court ruled in favor of
James and ordered Cursino to vacate the subject property.

5. Cursino appealed to CFI Rizal, which affirmed the decision of the municipal court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lessor has a cause of action against the lessee if the former has already received
the overdue rentals before the filing of the ejectment suit.

RULING:
Yes.

The lessor exercised two unquestionable prerogatives of the owner-lessor when a tenant-lessee
defaults in the payment of the rent, i.e., to demand that (a) the back rentals be paid and (b) the
premises be vacated.

In this case, Cursino was able to pay the back rentals but refused to vacate the premises. His belated
payment of his back rentals do not automatically restore the contract of lease without the private
respondent's concent. The terms of the contract of lease have been violated and the lessor-owner
has the unquestionable right to withdraw from the said contract or agreement whether oral or written.
The respondent-lessor did not consent to petitioner's possession of the leased premises after the
latter's defailt in the payment of the monthly rents. On the contrary, respondent demanded that
petitioner pay the back rentals and vacate the premises. The refusal of the petitioner to vacate the
premises after demand, makes his withholding of possession unlawful.

[Doctrine: Acceptance of back rentals after written demand to vacate having been made, but before
the ejectment case is even filed, is not a waiver of the ground for ejectment for non-payment of
rentals.
Note: Note that in Clutario, acceptance of back rentals was pending the ejectment case. In Cursino,
acceptance of back rentals was even before the ejectment case was filed. In both cases, a written
demand to vacate had already been served. Therefore, if written demand to pay and to vacate has
already been made, subsequent acceptance of back rentals, whether before or pending ejectment
action, does not waive the ground for ejectment.]

Acab v. CA, 241 SCRA 546 (1995) #112285 21Feb95

PETITIONER: Loida, Bienvenido & Joselito, all surnamed Acab, Carina Valerio & Esmeralda Zapanta
RESPONDENT: Court Of Appeals and Amparo C. Villanueva
NAME OF ACTION:
FACTS:

Petitioners' father, Jose R. Acab was the owner of the subject residential lot located on 128
Rodriguez St., Kalookan City. In 1942, he entered into a verbal lease agreement with private
respondent and her now-deceased husband. Under the agreement, the Villanueva spouses were
obliged to pay Acab a monthly rental of fifty pesos (P50.00).
Petitioner’s counsel then wrote the respondents informing them that they are the new owners of the
land and they didn’t have the intention to renew the contract of lease. Since rent is monthly paid,
contract should be deemed terminated by the end of the month or 30 days from today. The reason for
the termination is the need of my clients to repossess the property for their own personal use.

Respondent did not vacate the premises which then prompted petitioner to file an ejectment case with
MTC, armed with certification to file action from proper barangay Lupon Tagapayapa.

MTC and RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. However, CA reversed the lower court’s ruling.

CA reasoned:

1. petitioners failed to prove that they do not own any other available residential units within
Kalookan;

2. consequently, petitioner's claim that they need the subject premises is unsubstantiated;

3. therefore, private respondent's ejectment from the subject premises may only be based on the
termination of the month-to-month lease agreement; and

4. ejectment based solely on termination of a month-to-month lease contract is not justified.

ISSUE:

Whether private respondent may legally be ejected from the subject property on the sole basis of the
expiration of the verbal lease agreement under which rentals are paid monthly

RULING: YES.

Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to
year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to
week, if its is weekly; and from day to day, even if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even
though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the court may fix a
longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the
rent is weekly, the court may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in
possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may fix a longer period after
the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month.

Thus, We have held that lease agreements with no specified period, but in which rentals are paid
monthly, are considered to be on a month-to-month

basis. They are for a definite period and expire after the last day of any given thirty-day period, upon
proper demand and notice by the lessor to vacate.

The verbal lease agreement enterred into by private respondent and petitioners' father and
predecessor-in-interest has been validly terminated, in which case there is sufficient cause of
ejectment under Section 5(f) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 which reads:

Sec. 5. Grounds for Judicial Ejectment. — Ejectment shall be allowed on the following
grounds:
 xxx xxx xxx

(f) Expiration of the period of the lease contract.

Furthermore, it must be noted, that since the moth-to-month lease in the case at bench is considered
one with a definite period, it falls within the exception provided in Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
877. In other words, the first paragraph of Article 1673 of the New Civil Code which provides that:

Art. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes:

(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases under
Articles 1687 has expired;

Hence, petition is granted.

German Management v. CA, 177 SCRA 495 (1989) #76216 14Sep89

Facts: Sps Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal, covered by TCT No.
50023 of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal.

On February 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner
German Management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision. Consequently,
petitioner obtained Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission. Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other
persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless,
petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions
occupied and cultivated by private respondents.

Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that the petitioner deprived them of their property without due process of
law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings
without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and other crops of private respondents
by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P. D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing
and threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings
in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028.

On January 1985, Municipal Trial Court dismissed the complaint for forcible entry, which was also
affirmed by the RTC upon appeal.

Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeal and was given due
course by the court, reversing decisions of the lower courts. Hence, this recourse.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitioner when it reversed the
decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer and whether or
not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner.

Ruling: No. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process to
exist. The comment filed by petitioner has sufficiently addressed the issues presented in the petition
for review filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals. Having heard both parties, the
Appellate Court need not await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that
petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration negates any violation
of due process.

Notwithstanding petitioner’s claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject
property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against
petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private respondents
were already in possession thereof. There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in
possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents’ peaceable possession was
manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years
prior to petitioner’s act of destroying their crops.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it
presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised
in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence
or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against
the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor
priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

Bandoy v. CA, 175 SCRA 459 (1989)

PETITIONER: SPOUSES MARCIANO BANDOY and SEGUNDINA BANDOY
RESPONDENT: HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DOMINGO P. EMPAYNADO
NAME OF ACTION: Complaint for Ejectment
FACTS:

Petitioners were lessees of a residential house and lot . Sometime in April 1984, petitioners
sublet certain spaces of the property to Eduardo Empaynado, herein private respondent, for a
monthly rental of P550.00. Empaynado failed to pay the rental for the month of July, 1985. Upon
demand by petitioners, Empaynado still failed and refused to pay.

Petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment against Empaynado and attached thereto the
certification to file action issued by the barangay captain. The case was filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Metro Manila, Quezon City .

In his answer, Empaynado admitted that he did not pay the rentals since July 1985 but denied
that there was a demand to vacate and pay made upon him by spouses Marciano and Segundina
Bandoy.

MTC rendered judgement in favor of the spouses. Domingo Empaynado appealed the decision
to the Regional Trial Court dismissing the ejectment suit for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a
petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals which also
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR
REVIEW AND IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE?
RULING:
NO. The complaint contains no allegation that there was a prior demand to vacate made by the
petitioners upon private respondent. It is a settled rule that "where the complaint contains no
allegation that a demand had been made upon the defendant to vacate the premises but only an
allegation that a demand was made for payment of the rentals agreed upon, it is held that such
allegation is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a justice of the peace court". An intention to oust is
different from an actually or definitely demanded to vacate. It is the latter which confers jurisdiction
upon the municipal court.

Peran v. Presiding Judge, 125 SCRA 78 (1983) L-57259 13Oct83

PETITIONER: ANGEL P. PERAN

RESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH II, COURT OF FIRST

INSTANCE OF SORSOGON, 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, RAMON ESPERA and ENCARNACION
EVASCO

NAME OF ACTION: Petition for Review on certiorari

FACTS:

Jose Evasco executed a "Reparticion Ex-trajudicial" whereby he partitioned his properties among his
five heirs. Subject property was one of those alloted to his son, Alejandro, who had it surveyed in
1956 who had it declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 1900. The property in question, an
unregistered residential land, with an area of 1,225 square meters more or less, situated at Tagdon
Barcelona, Sorsogon, was originally owned by Evasco. The other heirs received their own shares,
one of them, the deceased Anacleto Evasco, one of whose children was listed as Encarnacion,
possibly, the principal private respondent herein.

Alejandro sold his property to Jose E. Torella and, in turn, sold the land to Jose Enriquez Sabater.
Petitioner Peran acquired the land by purchase from Sabater and subsequently declared it, too, in his
name under a Tax Declaration. The sale was duly recorded in the Register of Deeds' Office of the
province of Sorsogon.
Sometime in January 1979, petitioner personally asked private respondents, Encarnacion Evasco
and her common-law husband Espera, whose house is erected on a 440 square meter portion (44 sq,
ms. according to petitioner) of the lot in question, to remove the same and vacate the premises.
Respondents refused, and consequently, a confrontation between the parties was had before the,
Municipal Mayor of Barcelona and later before the Municipal Judge of Bulusan-Barcelona to settle the
dispute, but to no avail.

The petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Illegal Detainer against private respondents
before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona, seeking the ejectment of the latter from
the portion in question contending that respondents are mere squatters thereon; that they had
prevented plaintiff from entering the property and deprived him of possession; and that they were
tolerating persons in getting soil and bringing about a gradual erosion of the land to his extreme
prejudice.

Private respondents answered alleged in defense that they are the lawful possessors for more than
twenty (20) years of the said portion, which formerly belonged to Jose Evasco, grandfather of
Encarnacion Evasco and that petitioner has no right to eject them therefrom.
The 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona rendered its Decision ordering private
respondents to vacate the lot in question, return its possession to petitioner, reimburse him attorney's
fees of P300.00 and litigation expenses, and to pay the costs. Reconsideration of the said decision
filed by private respondents was denied by said Court and appealed to respondent Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II.

Respondent Court reversed the Municipal Circuit Court and dismissed the case ruling that said Court
had no jurisdiction over the case as the same was filed only on February 4, (8), 1979, which was well
beyond the one-year-period of limitation, the cause of action having accrued from the sale of the
property by Alejandro Evasco to Jose E. Torella on December 31, 1972; and that since the only issue
in an illegal detainer case is physical possession, "whoever has prior possession, no matter in what
character, is protected by law."

Reconsideration of the said Decision sought by petitioner was denied by respondent Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court was in error when for purposes of determining the jurisdiction of
the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona, to try Civil Case No. 1227, for Illegal Detainer:
(a) it reckoned the counting of one-year period within which to file the action from the sale of the
property in question by Alejandro Evasco to Jose Torella on December 31, 1972 and not from the
date of demand made by the petitioner upon the respondents; and
(b) by assuming that "prior possession in whatever character is protected by law.

RULING:

The court ruled for the petitioner.

Private respondents admit that the land in question was originally owned by Jose Evasco. The tax
declarations covering their house clearly state "house built on land owned by Jose Evasco under Tax
No. 1599". Since the land had been partitioned to Alejandro Evasco by his father, Jose Evasco,
respondent Encarnacion can lay no claim to the property even as a grand-daughter of Jose Evasco.
Respondents may have been in possession of the portion they occupy prior to petitioner but they
have not proved their title thereto, nor their right to possess the same. As the 2nd Municipal Circuit
Court of Bulusan-Barcelona found, no concrete evidence was introduced by respondents on this
point. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the validity of the "Reparticion Extrajudicial" whereby said lot
was adjudicated to Alejandro Evasco by his father Jose Evasco, predecessors-in-interest of
petitioner, had never been challenged.
If at all, private respondents' possession of their portion of the property was by mere tolerance of
petitioner's predecessors-in-interest, which, however, does not vest in them a right which they can
assert against petitioner. Possession by tolerance is lawful but this becomes illegal when, upon
demand to vacate by the owner, the possessor refuses to comply with such demand. A possessor by
tolerance is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. It is not necessary that there be a
formal agreement or contract of lease before an unlawful detainer suit may be filed against a
possessor by tolerance. Neither is prior physical possession of the property by petitioner an
indispensable requisite.The ruling of respondent Court, therefore, that "since the only issue in forcible
entry and illegal detainer action is the physical possession of real property—possession de facto and
not possession de jure—whoever has prior possession, no matter in what character, is protected by
law," is erroneous under the factual milieu herein,
A Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer action must be brought within one year from the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession.The one-year-period of limitation commences from the time
of demand to vacate, and when several demands are made, the same is counted from the last letter
of demand. Demand may either be personal or in writing. The demand to vacate having been made
by petitioner in January 1979, and the ejectment suit having been instituted on February 8, 1979, the
2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona acted well within its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the case.

Once v. Gonzales, 76 SCRA 258 (1977) L-44806 31Mar77

PETITIONER: : Bienvenido Once
RESPONDENT: Hon. Carlos Y. GOnales, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
branch VI; Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, and Juanta Pena
NAME OF ACTION: Eviction
FACTS: The city court of Iloilo City ordered Bienvenido Once to vacate an apartment in a building
owned by Juanita Peña and to pay a monthly rental of P290 until the premises have been vacated. It
was not indicated in the decision when the payment of the monthly rental should commence. No back
rentals were adjudged (Civil Case No 11312).

· Bienvenido Once filed a motion for reconsideration. He alleged that he had been occupying the
apartment since 1966; that he was the only one singled out for ejectment; that the commissioner's
report on the alleged dilapidated condition of the building was not set for hearing, and that he should
be given a preference to reoccupy the apartment after the completion of the repairs.

· The city court denied the motion. Bienvenido Once appealed. Juanito Peña, the owner of the
apartment, filed in the Court of First Instance a motion for immediate execution of the city court's
judgment. He invoked, as grounds, Once's alleged failure to file a supersedeas bond and the
supposed untenantable condition of the apartment.

· Executive Judge Valerio V. Rovira granted the motion for execution in terse order, issuing a
writ of execution to effect the ejectment of the defendant from the premises for not filing the
supersedeas bond and considering the provisions of section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

· Bienvenido Once filed a motion for reconsideration, which the lower court denied. It issued a
writ of execution. Bienvenido Once filed a motion for suspension of the execution and offered to file a
supersedeas bond. He stressed that he had occupied the apartment for ten years and that his
ejection was in contravention of Presidential Decree No. 20. The motion was denied.

· On October 14, 1976 Bienvenido Once, through three CLAO lawyers, filed in this Court the
instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition in order to set aside the order and writ of
execution. A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court but before it could be implemented
Bienvenido Once was constrained to vacate the apartment in litigation

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering execution of the city court’s judgment
pending appeal on the ground that Bienvenido Once did not file a supersedeas bond

RULING:
 Yes. No such bond was necessary because no back rentals were adjudged in the city court's
judgment. The attorney's fees of P1,000 need not be covered by a supersedeas bond. (De Laureano
vs. Adil, L-43345, July 29, 1976, 72 SCRA 148, 155).

Once's timely deposit of the rentals for April, May, June, July and August, 1976 stayed the
execution of the judgment pending appeal. In such a situation, no supersedeas bond was required
to stay execution of the city court's judgment. (Sison vs. Bayona, 109 Phil. 557, 561).

Consequently, the order of execution was groundless. It was not justified under section 8, Rule 70 of
the Rule of Court. Section 8 requires a supersedeas bond only if there are accrued rentals in arrears.
It dispenses with that bond if the defeated tenant deposits in court the rentals due from time to time.
The execution proceeding already mentioned is void.

Pharma Industries Inc v. Pajarillaga, 100SCRA339(1980) L-53788 17Oct80

PETITIONER: Pharma Industries, Inc.
RESPONDENT: Hon. Judge Pajarillaga
NAME OF ACTION: Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65)

FACTS:
In a complaint for ejectment, the plaintiff alleges that:
● On November 12, 1977, the defendant del Rosario executed in favor of the plaintiff a
Deed of Sale with Right to repurchase over a piece of land duly registered together with
all improvements;
● That defendant executed to exercise her right of redemption which expired November
12, 1978, and despite notice to her, the plaintiff was constrained to file a petition for
consolidation of ownership;
● That on April 3, 1979, a decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
was made, declaring the plaintiff to be the full owner of the property and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City, to cancel the old title and issue a new title in the
name of the plaintiff;
● That on June 8, 1979, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant and all persons claiming
ownership, to vacate the premises in question;
● That despite receipt by the defendant on June 13, 1979, she failed and refused and still
fails to vacate the premises without justification.

The defendant filed her answer:

● Admitting the allegations on Par. 1, 2, & 3, and denied the allegation in Par. 4, alleging
that the defendant, thru her representative Alfredo del Rosario, verbally agreed to the
counsel of the plaintiff, that after recomputation of the amount demanded being
enormous unconscionable, the latter should pay her obligation but contrary to the
agreement to plaintiff thru counsel, did not honor the same and still continued the
prosecution in this case, until the decision was rendered by this Court, to the damage a
prejudice of the defendant, who is ready and able to pay her obligation;
● That defendant admitted the allegation in Par. 5 of the answer of the complaint, as far
as the decision rendered for consolidation, but denies the rest of the allegations,
because of the agreement which was dishonored by the plaintiff;
● That defendant also admitted the allegations in Par. 6, 7 & 8, but denies the allegation
in Par. 9.
 On November 28, 1979, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleading, on the ground
that the defendant admitted all the material averments of the complaint and does not tender at all an
issue.

The defendant filed an opposition to the motion of judgment on the pleading, and a motion to
dismiss, on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction, and that it is the Court of First Instance,
which has jurisdiction over the action.

The complaint filed by the plaintiff is for ejectment. There are three kinds of action in ejecting a
person from the land. It is clear in the complaint that the plaintiff is intending to eject the defendant
from the land under the kind of ejectment, forcible entry or detainer. But it must be alleged in the
complaint prior possession of the land by the plaintiff. But in the complaint it is alleged that the
defendant is in possession of the land and not the plaintiff, and therefore the complaint should be for
recovery of the right to possess the land, and the action should be filed in the Court of First Instance
and not in this Court.

The Court in its opinion, held that the complaint must be filed with the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, because it is for a recovery of possession which is under the law, belong to the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Hence the dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction holding that this case is one
of recovery of right to possess the land which should be filed in the CFI.

RULING:
YES.

The proper remedy is ejectment under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and not accion
publiciana. Sec. 1 of said Rule provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of
the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of
any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
landlord, vendor, vendee, or other persons, may, at any time within one (1) year a such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior
court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,
or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs. The complaint must be verified."

It should be noted that the summary action provided above is one to obtain possession only,
filed in a municipal court within one year after the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession
complained of has taken place. It should also be noted that the remedy provides for two distinct
causes of action: (1) forcible entry in which the defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab
initio, and (2) unlawful detainer wherein the defendant's possession was originally lawful but to be so
by the expiration of his right to possess.

The present case which is to obtain possession only is one for unlawful detainer because
Sergia A. del Rosario, the vendor a retro, failed to repurchase the property and after the consolidation
of title in favor of the vendee a retro had been con?rmed, she refused to vacate the property upon
demand and after her right to possess it had ceased to be lawful.
 The mistake of the respondent judge in his belief that the cause of action is forcible entry
wherein it is necessary to alleged prior possession and forcible deprivation thereof. But as stated
above, the cause of action in this case is for unlawful detainer and it is sufficient to allege, as was
done, that the defendant was unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff.

Where the cause of action is unlawful detainer, prior possession is not always a condition sine
qua non. This is especially so where a vendee seeks to obtain possession of the thing to him from the
vendor. But if prior possession be insisted upon, Pharma Industries, Inc. had it before the suit for
unlawful detainer was filed.

Art. 531 of the Civil Code provides: "Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a
thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. (438a)" According to Tolentino, "proper
acts and formalities" refer "to judicial acts, or the acquisition of possession by suKcient title, inter
vivos or mortis causa, onerous or lucrative. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of
possession.

Pharma Industries, Inc. acquired possession when Sergia A. del Rosario executed in its favor
on November 12, 1977, the deed of sale with right to repurchase over the land in question and the
vendee's title was con?rmed upon failure of the vendor to repurchase the property.

Racaza v. Susana Realty, 18 SCRA 1172 (1966)

PETITIONER: Adolfo Racaza
RESPONDENT: Susana Realty, Inc.
NAME OF ACTION: Unlawful Detainer

FACTS:
On Feb. 10, 1956, Susana Realty, Inc. filed a complaint for ejectment in the Municipal Court of Pasay
City against Adolfo Racaza. This was however dismissed on Nov. 23, 1955 for failure of respondent
to proceed to trial.

On Feb. 19, 1958, another ejectment suit was filed and the court then ordered petitioner to vacate the
premises. Accordingly, the petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance of Pasay demanding
counterclaim for what he had spent to finish the construction of the house and for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court to try it. But then again, petitioner
was ordered evicted and his counterclaim was thrown out for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, petitioner
raised this issue to the Higher Court.

Petitioner rented a portion of a piece of land owned by respondent located at San Juan Street, Pasay
City. He started renting in 1962 when his wife bought an unfinished house that was built on it. On
assurance of respondent that petitioner’s family could stay on the land by paying a monthly rent of
P15.00, petitioner finished the construction of the house and lived in it. Years later, respondent asked
petitioner to vacate the land because they already needed it. Respondent twice filed an ejectment
suit, only the second was granted.

On appeal, petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the municipal court to try it. He claimed that the complaint was filed more than one year after the
alleged unlawful detainer or from July 1955, when he stopped paying rent. The first complaint for
ejectment was dismissed on Nov. 23, 1956, while the second was not filed until Feb. 19, 1958.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipal court have jurisdiction over the ejectment case though the complaint did
not state the date when the alleged unlawful detainer started.

RULING:
The case falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Pasay city. Municipal courts shall have
jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer cases where the defendant’s possession was originally lawful
but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess and must be brought before it from the
date of last demand. This case, however, was brought not on the theory that petitioner, as lessee,
failed to pay rents, but on the theory that the lease had expired and that respondent had asked
petitioner to vacate the land. The averment that the lease was on a month to month basis is
equivalent to an allegation that the lease expired at the end of every month. It is therefore immaterial
that rents had not been paid since July 1955, since what made petitioner liable for ejectment was the
expiration of the lease.

Rule 70, Section 2, requires previous demand only when the action is for failure to pay rent due or to
comply with the conditions of his lease. Where the action is to terminate the lease because of the
expiration of its term, no such demand is necessary. In the latter case, upon the expiration of the term
of the lease, the landlord may go into the property and occupy it. If the lessee refuses to vacate the
premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him even ebfore the
expiration of the fifteen or five days provided in Rule 70, Section 2.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

San Manuel v. Tupas, 249 SCRA 466 (1995) AM MTJ-93-892 25Oct95

Facts: In a sworn Complaint, petitioners charged respondents with grave partiality, serious
misconduct, abuse of authority and/or ignorance of the law. petitioner is the defendant in an unlawful
detainer case.
respondent judge rendered a decision, in favor of the plaintiffs therein and against herein petitioner.
Within the reglementary period to appeal, the plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Immediate Execution, the
motion was opposed by complainant.
while the motion for immediate execution was pending in the MTCC, petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal and Approval of Cash/Supersedeas Bond to stay the execution of the Decision. The notice of
appeal and the supersedeas bond were approved by respondent judge. However respondent judge
issued a special order granting plaintiffs' motion for a writ of execution pending appeal.
petitioner now accuses respondent judge of grave partiality, serious misconduct, abuse of authority
and/or ignorance of the law. Respondents contends that, upon perfection of its appeal respondent
judge lost its jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the Special Order, granting the issuance of the writ of
execution pending appeal, is null and void. furthermore, petitioner points out that the rule governing
execution of judgment in ejectment cases is Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, not Section 2 of
Rule 39, the provision relied upon by respondent judge.
Issue: w/n respondent has jurisdiction to grant execution even though the appeal was already
perfected in an unlawful detainer case.
Ruling: It is well settled that to stay the immediate execution in an ejectment proceeding, it is
required that the defendant must (a) perfect his appeal; (b) file the supersedeas bond and (c)
periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.
As to the perfection of the appeal, with the advent of BP 129, it is now settled that the perfection of
appeal is upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by ANY party contrary to Judge Tupas' thinking
that he has to approve the Notice of Appeal.
Since both plaintiffs and defendant (complainant in this case) received their respective copies of the
decision on June 14, 1993, the last day to appeal was June 29, 1993 and, by operation of law, the
appeal of complainant was perfected on June 30, 1993, it having filed its Notice of Appeal on June
24, 1993.
The complainant deposited with the Clerk of Court, MTCC, Davao City the correct amount of P41,000
to cover the rentals for thirteen (13) months at P2,000.00 a month and (a)ttorney's fees of
P15,000.00. . . . .
It is clear that immediate execution was thus stayed.
Complainant, however, did not deposit periodically — in this case, monthly — (the) P2,000.00 a
month (rental) with the Clerk of Court. This is clear from complainant's own Annex "C" which shows
that the amount of P8,000.00 was paid only on September 3, 1993 to the Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao
City to cover the rental due from June 6, 1993 to October 5, 1993.
Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the
pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of which the defendant shall
have notice, and upon proof of such failure shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from
with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal
taking its course until the final disposition thereof on its merits. (emphasis supplied)
Judge Tupas had, therefore, NO jurisdiction and authority to issue his Special Order of August 11,
1993; He should have dismissed all of the plaintiffs' motion for execution pending appeal because
Section 8, Rule 70 and not Section 2, Rule 39 is what is applicable as this is an ejectment case.
It is only the appellate court — the RTC for ejectment cases — which can order the issuance of the
writ of execution pending appeal but only for the EXPLICIT reason that the periodic rentals as found
in the inferior court decision were not paid, with notice and hearing mandated.
It does not appear that Judge Tupas acted out of malice or a corrupt motive but rather a
misapprehension of the law on ejectment.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Petition granted respondents are administratively liable for gross ignorance of
the rules.

Vda. de Ampil v. Alvendia, 10 SCRA 828 (1964)

PETITIONER: Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon; Mayor Juan K. Uy; Councilors: Deogracias R.
Argosino Iii, Benito T. Capio, Emmanuel R. Cortez, Normando Montilla, Leonardo C. Uy, Fidel C.
Aurellana, Pedro C. Carabit, Leonardo D. Aurellana, Fabian M. Medenilla, Trinidad F. Cortez,
Salvador M. Medenilla, Cerelito B. Aureada And Francisca A. Bamba

RESPONDENT: Hon. Antonio V. Mendez, Sr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, 4th
Judicial Region, Gumaca, Quezon; Municipality Of San Andres, Quezon; Mayor Francisco De Leon;
Councilors: Fe Lupinac, Tomas Averia, Manuel O. Osas, Wilfredo O. Fontanil, Enrico U. Nadres,
Rodelito Luzoir, Lenac, Jose L. Carabot, Doming Ausa, Vidal Banqueles And Corazon M. Maximo

NAME OF ACTION: Ejectment Case

FACTS:
An ejectment case was filed against Vicente Manuel ordering him to vacate the property. However a
judgment was made on Manuel for him to pay the unpaid rentals for two years and make succeeding
payments within the first 5 days of each month if he wanted to stay while appeal is pending. Manuel
appealed the case to the CA and made payments for the unpaid rentals within the first 10 days but
not what was ordered by court to pay within the first 5 days. Because of his failure to do so the
petitioners move to execute judgment and for defendant to vacate the premises.
ISSUE: WON the time of making payments as decided by the court is controlling which was not
stipulated in the contract.
RULING: NO. Section 8 of Rule 72 expressly prescribes that the defendant-appellant should pay or
deposit, during the dependency of the appeal,
the amount of rent from time to time under the contract, as found by the judgment of the justice of the
peace or municipal court to exist, or in the absence of contract, he pays to the plaintiff or unto the
Court, on or before the tenth day of each calendar month,

City of Manila v. CA, 149 SCRA 183 (1987)

PETITIONER: CITY OF MANILA and HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, CFI Judge of Manila and the CITY
SHERIFF OF MANILA
RESPONDENT: HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AUGUSTO SANTOS
NAME OF ACTION: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 04293-SP 1 which voided the Writ of Execution issued by the Court of First Instance
of Manila.
DOCTRINE: Even if the plaintiff appeals a judgment ordering ejectment on the ground that rentals
awarded were not enough, the judgment is still executory pending appeal. If the lessee desires to
prevent execution pending appeal, he must file a supersedeas bond and deposit in court the accruing
rentals.

FACTS: It appears that after the expiration of its contract of lease involving two market stalls (owned
by the City of Manila) in the Lacson Underpass in Quiapo, Manila, the lessor-City wanted to increase
the lease rentals. Despite the refusal of the lessee (herein private respondent) to agree to the
increased rates, it refused to vacate the premises, prompting the City to file ejectment proceedings
against it.
Thus the Court fixed new rental rates and allowed the eventual ejectment of the lessee in case of
non-compliance.

The City of Manila, as lessor of the stalls appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) because it was
not satisfied with the increased rentals granted by the City Court.

The City of Manila, as lessor of the stalls appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) because it was
not satisfied with the increased rentals granted by the City Court.

ISSUE: WON execution can be issued during pendency of the appeal

RULING: Yes, judgement is still executory pending appeal.

It was ruled that Sec. 8 of Rule 70 can apply even if it is the lessor who appeals in the sense that in
such a case, if the lessee desires to prevent execution pending appeal, he (the lessee) must still file
the supersedeas bond and deposit in court the accruing rentals. Our doctrine in CRUZ, ET AL. vs.
FERNANDO JUGO, ET AL, (supra) is reversed insofar as it conflicts with the present case.

The rationale for the ruling is simple: why should the lessee continue occupying the premises without
filing the supersedeas bond and making the necessary deposit for ensuing rentals (particularly when,
by his failure to appeal, the lessee does not question said accrued and incoming rents).

Buenaventura v. Halili-Uy, 149 SCRA 22 (1987)

PETITIONER: Antonio Buenaventura
RESPONDENT: Geronima Halili-Uy, Sylvia Te, Fely Te, Helen Te, Regino Te, Benjamin Te, Luis Te,
Belen Te Lim, Manuel Lim, Virginia Te Duy, Charlie Duy, Lourdes Te Lim, Segundo Lim, and Henry
Te

NAME OF ACTION: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Davao

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant Antonio Buenaventura by virtue of a written contract of lease, leased unto the
defendant-appellee and her husband a portion of his residential lot located at Bolton Street, Davao
City, where the latter constructed their residential house. The appellees however, occupied an area of
279 square meters or 135 square meters in excess of the leased premises. Appellant notified
appellees to remove the additional construction on the excess portion. However, appellees agreed to
pay an additional rent a month for the area in question and appellant allowed them to occupy the
same until the time he would need the premises. Sometime late, appellant thru counsel demanded
that appellees vacate the excess portion. Upon refusal to vacate, an action was filed for "forcible entry
and detainer," before the City Court of Davao City.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the forcible entry took place almost seventeen
years ago which does not vest jurisdiction on the court. Plaintiff changed the caption of complaint to
ejectment but the facts remained the same. The City Court rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff. On appeal, the court of first instance of Davao sustained the position of counsel for the
defendant and dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suit instituted by the plaintiff is a forcible entry?

RULING: NO.

The Supreme Court in Dikit v Ycasiano laid down the distinction between a forcible entry and unlawful
detainer.

1. As to possession: the possession of the intruder or person who deprives another of the
possession of a land or building in forcible entry is illegal from the beginning because his entry
into or taking possession thereof is made against the will or without the consent of the former
possessor; while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the detainer is originally legal or
lawful, but it becomes illegal after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession of
the land or building by virtue of a contract;
 2. As to demand to vacate: in forcible entry, no previous demand to vacate is required by law
before the Cling of the action; while in an action for unlawful detainer by a landlord against his
tenant, such demand is required.

Coming back to the case at bar, there is no question that the action filed by herein plaintiff-appellant
is not one of forcible entry but of unlawful detainer. For it is clear that when appellant asked appellees
to vacate the excess portion of the land (which excess had been the subject of the additional lease
agreement) because of his need for the premises, and the appellees refused, their continued
possession of the excess became unlawful — the Cling of the complaint within the one-year statutory
period makes the case fall under the jurisdiction of the City Court.

San Pedro v. CA, 235 SCRA 145 (1994)

PETITIONER: Catalino San Pedro and Spouses Pedie & Cecilia Guanzon Loresto

RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals, RTC Judge of Kalookan City

NAME OF ACTION: Petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS:
On January 13, 1993, private respondent William Ledesma filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Kalookan City a complaint against spouses Pedie and Cecilia Loresto for unlawful detainer
with preliminary injunction.

On May 14, 1993, the court rendered judgment against the Lorestos ordering them to: 1)
vacate and surrender to the private respondent the possession of the premises in Kalookan CIty; 2)
pay the amount of P12,000.00 monthly as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the said premises from September 6, 1992, up to the time they actually surrender the premises; and
3) pay attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.

The spouses appealed.

Later, the spouses and Catalino San Pedro instituted an action for the annulment of
Ledesma’s title over the disputed property, premised mainly on the ground that it had already been
titled in the name of Don Mariano San Pedro and has been in the possession of the predecessors of
Catalino San Pedro since 1900.

On September 14, 1993, Ledesma filed a motion for execution pending appeal for failure of the
petitioner spouses to make the periodic deposits ordered in the appealed decision. The motion was
granted and a writ of execution and notice to vacate were issued.

The petitioners then filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition, which was denied. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.

ISSUE:
Whether a pending separate action for annulment of title stays the execution of an ejectment
case.

RULING:
No. Judgments in ejectment cases which are favorable to the plaintiff are immediately
executory. They can be stayed by the defendant only by: a) perfecting an appeal; b) filing a
supersedeas bond; and c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites must
concur. The only exceptions are the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
which prevented the defendant from making the monthly deposit, or the occurrence of supervening
events which have brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and would make the
execution inequitable.

Thus, even if the defendant had appealed and filed a supersedeas bond but failed to pay the
accruing rentals, the appellate court could, upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the defendant,
and upon proof of such failure, order the immediate execution of the appealed decision without
prejudice to the appeal taking its course. Such deposit, like the supersedeas bond, is a mandatory
requirement; hence, if it is not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of right.

In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses do not deny having failed to make the monthly
deposits of P12,000.00. Neither do they claim that the exception applies in this case. The lower court
cannot therefore be faulted for merely complying with its ministerial duty under the Rules of Court to
issue the writ of execution pending appeal. Neither can lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion be ascribed to the respondent Court when it sustained the issuance of the writ.

Firmly settled is the rule that the pendency of an action questioning the ownership of property
will not abate ejectment suits or bar the execution of the judgments therein. The rationale of the rule
is that an ejectment suit involves only the issue of material possession or possession de facto while
an action for annulment of title, such as the case at bar, involves the question of ownership. There
may be identity of parties and subject matter but not of the cause of action or the relief prayed for.

Ang v. Castro, 136 SCRA 453 (1985)

PETITIONER: Armando Ang
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Judge Jose P. Castro, Regional Trial Judge, Branch LXXXIV and Hon. Judge
Jose P. Arro, Branch CIII, both of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, and Assistant Fiscal Narciso T.
Atienza of Quezon City
NAME OF ACTION: Petition for certiorari
DOCTRINE: The use of disrespectful of contemptuous language against a particular judge in
pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not
tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. Stated differently, if the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or
malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it
is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.

FACTS:

An administrative complaint was filed by petitioner to the Office of the Presidential Assistant on
Legal Affairs against the respondent judge for ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence,
incompetence, manifest partiality, grave abuse of discretion, grave misconduct, rendering unjust
decision in a civil case and dereliction of duties in not resolving his motion for reconsideration of the
adverse decision in said civil case.
 Respondent judge ordered the petitioner to appear before him to show why he should not be
punished for contempt of court, for malicious, insolent, inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous
attitude towards the court and towards him. Petitioner was then found guilty of contempt of court. A
notice of appeal was filed by the petitioner but it was denied. A criminal complaint for libel against the
petitioner was filed by respondent judge on the ground of using malicious, insolent and contemptuous
language against him in his letter-complaint filed before the SC. Hence, instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conduct of petitioner constitutes direct contempt

RULING: No. Petitioner’s conduct constitutes indirect contempt. The alleged malicious imputations
were not uttered in the presence of so near respondent Judge as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before him; rather, they were contained in the pleadings and/or letters-complaint filed by
petitioner before the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs and before the Supreme
Court in the aforementioned administrative case filed by petitioner against him.

The Rules of Court cannot be any clearer. The use of disrespectful of contemptuous language
against a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct,
contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
interrupt the administration of justice. Stated differently, if the pleading containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings
are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence
of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Considering the aforecited
provisions, petitioner's conduct if at all, constitutes indirect contempt and if found guilty, he may
appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

DISPOSITIVE: ACCORDINGLY, the petition with respect to the action against respondent Judge
Jose P. Castro of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXXIV, Quezon City is granted and said
respondent judge is hereby ordered to elevate the records of Civil Case No. Q- 35466 to the
Intermediate Appellate Court at once for disposition in accordance with the terms hereof.

Respondent trial judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the libel case (Criminal Case No. Q-31587).

The temporary restraining order issued on February 20, 1984 enjoining respondent Judge Jose O.
Castro from enforcing or carrying out the warrant of arrest issued in Civil Case No. Q35466 is made
permanent.

People v. Torio, 118 SCRA 17 (1982)

PETITIONER: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

RESPONDENT:LUIS E. TORIO, ET AL., accused, BRIGIDO G. ESTRADA

NAME OF ACTION:Appeal from order of CFI of Pampanga

FACTS:
 Brigido G. Estrada, appellant, was the attorney of record for the accused Jose Vinluan, one of
the four accused in Criminal Case No. 21677, Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
presided by the Honorable Antonio C. Masaquel. Upon hearing, the presiding judge noticed that the
accused Jose Vinluan, although present, was not represented by counsel.

Accused Vinluan called the appellant by telephone in his residence but there was no answer.
In view of the failure of appellant Estrada, as counsel for accused Vinluan, to appear for the
scheduled hearing (2:00 pm but later called to 2:30 July 28, 1966). Fifteen minutes later, the appellant
arrived and the Court ordered the resumption of the trial.

Estrada’s excuse was that his car stopped while on his way to the Court house’ and after
sometime it was able to run again. Appellant was cited by the presiding judge for contempt of court
(not finding the explanation satisfactory), and without written charge or hearing, was summarily
sentenced "to pay a fine of P50.00 within twenty four hours from receipt of the copy of the order."

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in holding the appellant in contempt of court without the
benefit of hearing thus depriving him of an opportunity to prove his innocence?

RULING: NO

Failure to appear in court for trial is not a direct contempt summarily punishable under Section
1 of Rule 71 of the New Rules of Court, for it is not a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. It may, however, constitute an indirect
contempt punishable only after written charges and hearing under Section 3, Rule 71, par. (b)
(People vs. Gaqui, 2 SCRA 752).

Cabilan v. Ramolete, 192 SCRA 674 (1990)

Petitioners: Atty. Teodoro V. Cabilan & Alejandro A. Paralisan

Respondents: Hon. Judge Jose R. Ramolete & Provincial/City Jail Warden of Cebu City
Action: Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of the
respondent Judge’s judgment declaring petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court
Doctrine: Even a pleading submitted to the court may contain derogatory or malicious statements
which constitute direct contempt against such court. It amounts to misbehavior committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Direct contempt
may be punished summarily, without hearing.

Facts: Respondent judge was the presiding judge in a criminal case, and petitioner Cabilan was the
private prosecutor. Petitioner Paralisan was the husband of one of the prosecution witnesses who
was ordered arrested by respondent judge for failure to attend the scheduled hearing of the said
case. Mrs. Paralisan wrote a letter to respondent judge, explaining her failure and attached an
unverified medical certificate.

Petitioner Paralisan, in his affidavit, claimed that during the hearing, respondent judge allegedly
approached him and a heated exchange of words transpired between them. Paralisan alleged that,
among others, the respondent judge show of partiality is conduct unbecoming of a judge; that his
partiality is very apparent; that he threatened witnesses for the prosecution; that he had suspicious
behavior like allowing counsel for the accused and even the accused himself to enter his chambers
without the presence of the fiscal and/or private prosecutor. Paralisan also alleged that the judge is
fond of issuing illegal orders and such was the case of his wife’s order of arrest. Said affidavit was
attached to a motion to disqualify respondent judge from further hearing the case.

Respondent judge, finding the allegations in the said affidavit contemptuous, rendered the questioned
judgment. Petitioner Paralisan was escorted to the City Jail and had already served the sentence.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge erred in declaring petitioners guilty of direct contempt of
court.

Ruling: No, respondent judge did not err in declaring petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court.

The Court has repeatedly declared that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and
is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.

Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified into direct and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge and can be punished summarily without
hearing. Indirect contempt is not committed in the presence of the court and can be punished only
after hearing. If the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is submitted in
the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is
equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt
the administration of justice.

In the case at bar, the basis of the judgment for contempt of court is petitioner Paralisan's affidavit
which was attached and made as an integral part of the motion for disqualification filed by petitioner
Cabilan which therefore falls squarely under the abovementioned rule.

Pascua v. Heirs of Simeon, 161 SCRA 1 (1988)

PARTIES:
Petitioners - IGNACIO PASCUA, and URSULA DUGAY, in representation of her deceased
husband, CATALINO DUGAY
Respondents - HEIRS OF SEGUNDO SIMEON, HON. JUDGE ANACLETO ALZATE, Tarlac Court
of First Instance, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF TARLAC, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TARLAC
CAUSE OF ACTION: Contempt

DOCTRINE: Mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of petitioners to relinquish the

properties would not constitute contempt. The contumacious act punishable under Rule 71,
Section 3(b) is: "Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, including the act of a person
who after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of
any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or
upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in
any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto." The
writ of possession was directed to the sheriff, not to the petitioners.

FACTS:
The judgment was rendered in a civil case in 1969. Real properties belonging to
the judgment debtors were levied upon and sold on execution to satisfy the judgment debt. To
this day, however, the highest bidders at the public auction have yet to enjoy the properties
sold to them.
Petitioners were among the defendants in Civil Case No. 3606 before the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac, Branch II, Judge Anacleto B. Alzate, presiding, while private
respondents are the heirs of the plaintiff in said civil case. On June 28, 1969, judgment was
rendered in favor of respondents and against the defendants therein ordering the latter to pay
P19,720.00. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals but for failure of their counsel to
submit the brief within the reglementary period, the appeal was dismissed and the case was
remanded to the trial court for execution of judgment.

To satisfy the judgment, twenty (20) parcels of land were levied upon and then
sold at public auction in which the highest bidders were the respondents. As the judgment
debtors failed to redeem the properties within the twelve-month period, the Provincial Sheriff
of Tarlac issued a Certi􏰀cate of Absolute Sale on February 20, 1972. On motion, Judge Alzate
ordered on January 21, 1973 the issuance of a writ of possession. However, the
defendants/judgment debtors would not vacate the premises. So, on May 23, 1973,
respondents filed a motion before the trial court to declare the defendants in contempt of
court. Resolving the motion, Judge Alzate issued an order declaring that they are liable for
contempt of court as de􏰀ned and penalized under Section 3(b) and 7, Rule 71, New Rules of
Court. And also issued an alias writ of possession, if said defendants refuse to obey said alias
writ of possession, this Court will be constrained, much to its regret, to declare them in
contempt of court and order them to be committed to the provincial jail of Tarlac and to
remain therein until they obey said alias writ of possession.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring that petitioners are liable for contempt of
court?
2.) Whether or not the trial court erred when it issued an alias writ of possession, if not
complied with the petitioners will be liable for contempt?

RULING:
1.) It may be stated, however, that the mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of
petitioners to relinquish the properties would not constitute contempt. The contumacious act
punishable under Rule 71, Section 3(b) is:

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a

court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, including the act of a person who after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner
disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
Note that the writ of possession was directed not to petitioners, but to the sheriff
for him to deliver the properties to respondents. As the writ did not command the petitioners
to do anything, they cannot be held guilty of "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment or command of a court."
The proper procedure if the petitioners refuse to deliver possession of the lands
is not for the court to cite them for contempt but for the sheriff to dispossess them of the
premises and deliver the possession thereof to the respondents. However, if subsequent to
such dispossession, petitioners enter into or upon the properties for the purpose of executing
acts of ownership or possession or in any manner disturb the possession of respondents,
then and only then may they be charged with and punished for contempt.

2.) The order partakes of the nature of a "conditional judgment," the citation for
contempt being dependent upon the happening of a future event, namely, "petitioners' refusal
to obey (the) alias writ of possession." Being a conditional judgment, it is null and void.

Moreover, as stated above, refusal to relinquish possession does not constitute

contempt, as the alias writ is directed to the sheriff and not to petitioners.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the questioned Order of January 13, 1978 is AFFIRMED only
insofar as it directed the issuance of an alias writ of possession. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued on February 1, 1978 is hereby LIFTED. Let the court of origin forthwith issue an
alias writ of possession. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Barrete v. Amila, 230 SCRA 219 (1994)

PETITIONER:ROSITA M. BARRETE
RESPONDENT: JUDGE VENANCIO J. AMILA
NAME OF ACTION:Administrative complaint against Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC") Judge
Venancio J. Amila, for grave abuse of power and authority relative to Civil Case No. 313 for unlawful
detainer, entitled "Juanita Bungabong vs. Rosita Barrete."
DOCTRINE:
● When the judgment requires the delivery of real property, it must be executed in accordance
with Sec. 8(d), Rule 39, and any contempt proceeding arising therefrom must be based on the
second part of Sec. 3(b), Rule 71 and not on "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge" in
relation to Sec. 9, Rule 39.
● When the judgment requires the delivery of real property, any contempt proceeding arising
therefrom must be based on “act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from
any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to
the person adjudged to be entitled thereto” and not on "the disobedience of or resistance to a
 lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court
or judge."

FACTS:
● The instant complaint originated from the decision rendered by respondent Judge Amila in Civil
Case No. 313, in favor of plaintiff Juanita Bungabong, which ordered defendant Rosita Barrete,
herein complainant, to vacate the house owned by plaintiff which was occupied by
complainant.
● A writ of execution was subsequently issued by respondent Judge. However, pursuant to
Barrete's request, the Sheriff gave her until the end of the month to vacate the subject
premises. 6mos thereafter, Barrete had not vacated; hence, an alias writ of execution was
issued. Again, Barrete was given an extension of 2 days to pack up and leave. Sheriff went
back to the premises and although he did not find Barrete there, it was clear that she had not
vacated because her furniture and other belongings were still in the house. Upon inquiry, the
Sheriff learned that Barrete had gone to Tacloban City and was due to return anytime. The
Sheriff then put a padlock on the door of Barrete’s house.
● Barrete then left for Tagbilaran City and meanwhile, the Sheriff locked her house. Upon her
return, Barrete entered said house by passing through two (2) wooden jalousie blades, to
continue packing her things.
● It was in the early morning of 25Jul92 that Barrete was arrested in the subject house and with
her three (3) minor children, was detained at the Municipal Jail of Batuan, Bohol, until 28Jul92.
● Barrete avers that her arrest and detention without according her a day in court constituted a
flagrant violation of her right to due process.
● Respondent Judge alleges that after the motion to declare Barrete in contempt was filed, he
conducted an ocular inspection of the subject house only to find out that Barrete had indeed
not vacated the same. For Barrete's disobedience, he issued an Order for her arrest.
However, respondent Judge ordered her release right after complainant promised to vacate
the premises.
● After respondent's comment and complainant's reply were filed, the Court referred the matter
to Executive Judge Antonio Bautista of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Tagbilaran, Bohol,
for investigation, report and recommendation.
● RTC TAGBILARAN - Judge Bautista recommended that Judge Amila be exonerated from the
charges made by complainant upon a finding that he had not been motivated by malice nor
any evil purpose in ordering the arrest of complainant. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not mere refusal to vacate the property constitute as contempt

RULING:
● NO, the mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of the losing party in an ejectment case to
vacate the property did not constitute contempt.
● The writ of possession was directed not to the losing party, but to the Sheriff, who was to
deliver the properties to the prevailing party. As the writ did not command the losing party to do
anything, the losing party could not be held guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court. Moreover, the losing party could not be
punished for contempt for “disobedience of or resistance to the judgment of the trial court”
because said judgment was not a special judgment.
● When the judgment requires the delivery of real property, any contempt proceeding arising
therefrom must be based on “act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from
any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to
the person adjudged to be entitled thereto” and not on "the disobedience of or resistance to a
 lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court
or judge."
● To constitute direct contempt, the alleged misbehavior must have been committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings before the court.
Complainant was not guilty of such misbehavior.

DISPOSITIVE: ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE

respondent Judge Venancio Amila pay a fine equivalent to Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) with a
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar offense will be met with a more severe penalty.