ANSELM: THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

[1] Anselm (1033–1109): life and times. The early Middle Ages. Anselm’s project of “faith
seeking understanding” (fides quaerens intellectum).
[2] One branch of philosophy is metaphysics, which, among other things, deals with what exists
(the sub-branch known as ontology). Many philosophers have thought that the world includes
beings of a very special sort, namely divine beings, that are not as limited as human beings. After
the ‘monotheistic revolution’ in religion, this became the question of whether it is possible to
prove that there is a God (a divine being worthy of worship). Most proofs for the existence of
God start from some evident fact of experience: a direct mystical encounter with God, or the
observations that the world shows signs of (intelligent) design, or something of the sort. Yet
there are a few attempts to show that God exists from first principles alone. Anselm offered one
of the most famous such arguments, which has its own name—the Ontological Argument.
[3] Anselm’s Ontological Argument tries to show that the existence of God follows from the
very notion of what God is, or, to put it another way, God’s existence follows from very thin
theistic assumptions that (almost) everyone shares. It is not a mere matter of definition, though;
according to Anselm, God’s existence follows from one of His substantive characteristics.
[4] Here is the entire proof (Proslogion) 2:
Therefore, O Lord, You Who give understanding to faith, give to me that I understand
so much as You know to be fit: that You are as we believe, and You are that which
we believe. And, indeed, we believe You to be something than which nothing greater
can be thought. Or [can it be that] there is not some such nature, then, since “The
Fool hath said in his heart: There is no God” [Psalms 13:1]? But certainly, that same
Foole, when he hears this very thing I say, ‘something than which nothing greater can
be thought’, understands what he hears; and what he understands is in his understand-
ing, even if he were not to understand that to be. It is one matter that a thing is in
the understanding, another to understand a thing to be. For when the painter thinks
beforehand what is going to be done, he has [it] in the understanding but does not yet
understand to be what he does not yet make. Yet when he has painted, he both has [it]
in the understanding and also understands to be what he now makes. Therefore, even
the Foole is convinced that there is in the understanding even something than which
nothing greater can be thought, since when he hears this he understands, and whatever
is understood is in the understanding. And certainly that than which a greater cannot
be thought cannot be in the understanding alone. If indeed it is even in the understand-
ing only, it can be thought to be in reality, which is greater. Thus if that than which a
greater cannot be thought is in the understanding alone, the very thing than which a
greater cannot be thought is [that] than which a greater can be thought. But certainly
this cannot be. Therefore, without a doubt something than which a greater is not able
to be thought exists (exsistit), both in the understanding and in reality.
Everyone agrees that this is too good to be true. But no one agrees about what’s wrong with it.
[5] Here is one very tentative reconstruction of the argument:
(1) God is something than which nothing greater can be thought.
(2) Whatever is understood is in the understanding.
(3) The Fool says that God does not exist.
(4) The Fool understands (1).
(5) Understanding a proposition is a function of understanding its constituent parts.
(6) The Fool understands “something than which nothing greater can be thought” (a con-
stituent part of (1) above).
(7) Something than which nothing greater can be thought is in the Fool’s understanding.
(8) Something may exist either (a) in the understanding alone; (b) in the understanding
and in reality; (c) in reality alone; (d) in neither the understanding nor in reality.
(9) Something than which nothing greater can be thought exists either (a) in the under-
standing alone, or (b) in the understanding and in reality.
(10) Reductio-assumption: Assume (9a) is true, i. e. something than which nothing greater
can be thought exists only in the understanding.
(11) The Fool can imagine ‘Claude’, who is just like God but also exists in reality.
(12) Claude is greater than God, since Claude has every feature God does and in
addition exists.
(13) But then the Fool is thinking of something greater than God, that is, some-
thing greater than that than which nothing greater can be thought.
(14) Since (13) is impossible, the assumption in (10) has to be rejected: (9a) is false.
(15) Hence (9b) is true.

Therefore: God exists.

Does it work?
[6] Two mediæval objections. Gaunilon held that the Ontological Argument “proves too much”:
if it were able to show that God exists, it would prove the existence of all sorts of things. He
offers the “Lost Island Objection” in his defense of the Fool (translation by Jasper Hopkins):
For example, some people tell of an island existing somewhere in the ocean. Some call
it the Lost Island because of the difficulty—or rather, the impossibility—of finding what
does not exist. They say that it abounds with inestimable plenitude of riches and de-
lights of all sorts, even much more so than is reported of the Isles of the Blessed. Having
no owner or inhabitant [it is said] to excel completely—because of the superabundant
goods for the taking—all other lands in which men dwell. Now, should someone tell
me these tales I would easily understand what he said, for it is simple enough to com-
prehend. But suppose he were then to add, as if it followed logically: “You can no more
doubt that this island which is more excellent than all other lands exists somewhere in
reality than you can doubt that it is in your understanding. And since for it to exist in
reality as well as in the understanding is more excellent [than for it to exist in the under-
 standing alone], then, necessarily, it really exists. For if it did not exist, then any other
really existing country would be more excellent than it, and thus this island, which has
already been understood by you to be more excellent [than all other lands], would not
be more excellent [than all others].” Now if someone wanted in this way to prove to
me that I must not any longer doubt the existence of this island, then either I would
think he were jesting or else I would not know whom to regard as the more foolish
– either myself, were I to grant his argument, or him, were he to suppose that he had
proved to any extent the existence of this island. For he would first have to prove that
this island’s excellence is in my understanding only in the way that a thing which really
and certainly exists is in my understanding and not at all in the way that a thing which
is unreal or doubtful is in my understanding.
Second, Thomas Aquinas objected that, appearances notwithstanding, Anselm is trying to define
God into existence, by making existence a necessary part of God’s essence. But if I define a
“squond” as an existing round square, that doesn’t mean that there is such a thing.