JAIME C.

TANGPOS

L.L.B. 3

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (SATURDAY 8AM TO 11AM)

TOPIC: THE JURISPRUDENTIAL EVOLUTION/TRANSFORMATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

In our jurisdiction, the constitutional guarantee of due process is also not limited to an exact definition.
It is flexible in that it depends on the circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the
necessities of the situation.

The cardinal primary rights and principles in administrative proceedings that must be respected are
those outlined in the landmark case of AngTibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,quoted below:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

The first of the enumerated rights pertains to the substantive rights of a party at the hearing stage of the
proceedings.

The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the AngTibay requirements are reinforcements of
the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision
maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing.11 These standards set forth the guiding
considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of decision
making.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body,
further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to
the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon
which it is based. (ANG TIBAY VS. CIR 69 PHIL. 635)

Administrative determinations of contested cases are by their nature quasi-judicial; there is no

requirement for strict adherence to technical rules that are observed in truly judicial proceedings. As a
rule, technical rules of procedure and evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings in order "to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and
defenses. By relaxing technical rules, administrative agencies are, thus, given leeway in coming up with a
decision.

Due process in administrative cases, in essence, is simply an opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling. For as long as the parties were given fair and reasonable
opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently
met. (MAGCAMIT VS. INTERNAL AFFAIRS SERVICE G.R. NO. 198140)

The Court expounded that administrative due process does not necessarily connote full adversarial
proceedings, to wit:

The requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases does not connote full adversarial
proceedings as elucidated in numerous cases decided by this Court. Actual adversarial proceedings
become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to
witnesses who give vague testimonies. This is a procedural right which the employee must ask for since
it is not an inherent right, and summary proceedings may be conducted thereon. (ARBOLDE VS.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. NO.119509)

This Court has stressed the importance of due process in administrative proceedings:

The principle of due process furnishes a standard to which governmental action should conform in order
to impress it with the stamp of validity. Fidelity to such standard must of necessity be the overriding
concern of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions. Although a speedy administration of
action implies a speedy trial, speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Respect for the rights of all parties
and the requirements of procedural due process equally apply in proceedings before
administrativeagencies with quasi-judicial perspective in administrative decision making and for
maintaining the vision which led to the creation of the administrative office. ( CIR VS. AVON PRODUCTS
MANUFACTURING, INC. G.R. NO. 201398-99)

Due process is a malleable concept anchored on fairness and equity. The due process requirement
before administrative bodies are not as strict compared to judicial tribunals in that it suffices that a party
is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, such "reasonable opportunity" should not
be confined to the mere submission of position papers and/or affidavits and the parties must be given
the opportunity to examine the witnesses against them. The right to a hearing is a right which may be
invoked by the parties to thresh out substantial factual issues. It becomes even more imperative when
the rules itself of the administrative body provides for one. While the absence of a formal hearing does
not necessarily result in the deprivation of due process, it should be acceptable only when the party
does not invoke the said right or waives the same. (SAUNAR VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA G.R.
NO. 186502)

A closer perusal of past jurisprudence shows that the Court did not intend to trivialize the conduct of a
formal hearing but merely afforded latitude to administrative bodies especially in cases where a party
fails to invoke the right to hearing or is given the opportunity but opts not to avail of it.