d.
Employers, Meaning of
Art. 2180, New Civil Code
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who
are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan vs. Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., Archimedes J. Balingit And Fernando Pineda (1975)
Facts: On November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The
truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus
was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company
of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that
Balingit was not Pineda’s employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that
the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. As already
stated, the lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus company and its
driver appealed.
The Civil Code provides:
"ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
x x x
"The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any
business or industry.
x x x
"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
Issue: Whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise" used in article 2180 of the Civil Code, embrace the manager of a
corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the
vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
Decision: We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a
corporation.
It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in
the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer." Hence, under the allegations of
the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident
already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or
dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
WHEREFORE, the lower court’s order of dismissal is affirmed.
Jose E. Genson vs. Sps. Eduardo Adarle And Sherlita Mari-On, And Intermediate
Appellate Court(1987)
Facts: Arturo Arbatin was the successful bidder in the sale at public auction of junk and
other unserviceable government property located at the compound of the Highway
District Engineer's Office of Roxas City. Private respondent Eduardo Adarle was hired
as a laborer by Arbatin to gather and take away scrap iron from the said compound with
a daily wage of P12.00 or about 312.00 a month.
On September 8, 1979, at 4:00 o'clock in the morning, on a Saturday and a
non-working day, while the private respondent was tying a cable to a pile of scrap iron to
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be loaded on a truck inside the premises of the compound, and while the bucket of the
payloader driven by Ramon Buensalido was being raised, the bucket suddenly fell and
hit Adarle on the right back portion of his head just below the nape of his neck. Adarle
was rushed to the St. Anthony Hospital, Roxas City.
While still in the hospital, the private respondent instituted the action below for
damages against Arbatin, his employer; Buensalido, the payloader operator; Candelario
Marcelino, the civil engineer; and petitioner, the Highway District Engineer.
During the trial on the merits, the petitioner put up the defense that he had no
knowledge of or participation in the accident and that, when it happened, he was not
present in the government compound. Apart from the fact that it was a Saturday and a
non-working day, he was in Iloilo. The trial court found that, with the exception of the
petitioner, all of the defendants were present at the Highway's compound when the
accident occurred. However, it still adjudged the petitioner liable for damages because
the petitioner was supposed to know what his men do with their government equipment
within an area under his supervision. Thus, on January 19, 1982, the trial court rendered
a decision finding all the defendants liable for damages under Articles 1172 and 2176 of
the New Civil Code. The petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the trial court and further ordered the defendants to pay
P5,000.00 exemplary damages. Defendant Candelario Marcelino was, however,
absolved from liability.
In this present petition, the petitioner contends that the appellate court committed a
palpable error when it ruled that the petitioner was present when the accident happened
and that he had given permission to the other defendants to work on a Saturday, a non-
working day. The petitioner argues that considering these were the facts relied upon by
the said court in holding that he was negligent and thus liable for damages, such a
conclusion, is without basis.
Issue: Whether IAC committed a palpable error when it rules that Genson was present
when the accident happened and that he had given permission to the other defendants
to work on a Saturday, a non-working day thereby making Genson liable for damages
Decision: With regard to the main contention of the petitioner that the appellate court
based its conclusions on an erroneous finding of fact, we agree with him that the
appellate court's finding that he was present within the premises when the accident
happened is not supported by evidence indisputably showing that he was indeed there.
Since the evidence fails to establish petitioner Genson's presence when the
payloader's bucket fell on the head of Mr. Adarle, any liability on his part would be
based only on his alleged failure to exercise proper supervision over his subordinates.
There is likewise no sufficient basis for the "master-servant" doctrine in tort law to apply.
Buensalido was not working overtime as a government employee. It is doubtful if the
district engineer can be considered an "employer" for purposes of tort liability who may
be liable even if he was not there. No evidence was presented to show that an
application for overtime work or a claim for overtime pay from the district engineer's
office was ever filed. It is more logical to presume that Buensalido, the operator of the
payloader, was trying to earn a little money on the side from the junk buyer and that his
presence in the compound on that Saturday was a purely private arrangement. From the
records of this case, we are not disposed to rule that a supervisor who tolerates his
subordinates to moonlight on a non-working day in their office premises can be held
liable for everything that happens on that day. It would have been preferable if Mr.
Arbatin brought his own payloader operator and perhaps, his own equipment but we are
not dealing with sound office practice in this case. The issue before us is subsidiary
liability for tort comitted by a government employee who is moonlighting on a non-
working day.
There is no showing from the records that Genson received anything which
could be called "inordinate gain." It is possible that he permitted work on a Saturday to
accomodate an acquaintance but it is more plausible that he simply wanted to clear his
compound of junk and the best time for the winning bidder to do it was on a non-working
day.
At any rate, we see no malice, bad faith, or gross negligence on the part of
Genson to hold him liable for the acts of Buensalido and Arbatin.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The complaint against Jesus Genson is DISMISSED.
Ernesto Martin vs. Hon. Court Of Appeals And Manila Electric
Company(1992)
Facts: Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-
930. At around 2 o'clock in the morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor
Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal.
The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco subsequently demanded
reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him for
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging inter alia that he was liable to it in
the sum of P17,352.00 plus attorney's fees and litigation costs as the employer of
Nestor Martin. The petitioner's main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his
employee.
The Regional Trial Court held in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him the amount claimed,
with 12% interest, and P4,000.00 attorney's fees, plus costs. The decision was
seasonably elevated to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed it in toto on February 22,
1988, 2 prompting this petition for review.
Issue: Whether Ernesto Martin is the employer of Nestor Martin thereby liable for
damages
Decision: The petition has merit.
It is important to stress that the complaint for damages was filed by the private
respondent against only Ernesto Martin as alleged employer of Nestor Martin, the driver
of the car at the time of the accident. Nestor Martin was not impleaded. The action was
based on tort under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under
Article 2180 is liable for the torts committed by his employees within the scope of their
assigned task. But it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once
this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was
2
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed.
It is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee as allowed in
that article. In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to
show that the defendant was the employer of Nestor Martin at the time of the accident.
The trial court merely presumed the existence of the employer-employee relationship.
The facts proved, or not denied, viz., the ownership of the car and the
circumstances of the accident, are not enough bases for the inference that the petitioner
is the employer of Nestor Martin.
In the modern urban society, most male persons know how to drive and do not
have to employ others to drive for them unless this is needed for business reasons.
Many cannot afford this luxury, and even if they could, may consider it an unnecessary
expense and inconvenience. In the present case, the more plausible assumption is that
Nestor Martin is a close relative of Ernesto Martin and on the date in question borrowed
the car for some private purpose. Nestor would probably not have been accommodated
if he were a mere employee for employees do not usually enjoy the use of their
employer's car at two o'clock in the morning.
As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin
could not be presumed, it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish it by evidence.
Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty "to present evidence on the fact in issue
necessary to establish his claim" as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to its action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED.
Balbino Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co. (1930)
Facts: On the afternoon of August 9, 1928, Moises Cuison, a boy 7 years of age, the
son of the plaintiff Balbino Cusion, was on his way to the Santa Mesa School in Manila
in company with his sister Marciana. As they came near to the fire station, some large
pieces of lumber on a truck which had stopped fell from it pinning the boy beneath, and
causing his almost instant death. The truck in questioned was owned by Antonio Ora.
It was driven by Felix Jose, with Telesforo Binoya as the washing and Francisco
Bautista as the helper, the two latter being youths less than18 years of age. Jose
Binoya, and Bautista were employees of Ora. The truck was rented by Ora to Norton &
Harrison Co. On the truck were the letters "N-H," which were the first letters of the firm
name. Ora was in the employ of Norton & Harrison Co. as a capataz. It was his duty as
such employee to direct the loading and transportation of the lumber. When the
accident occurred the lumber had become loosened, and it was to rearrange it that the
truck halted, without, however, there arrangement having been made before the
pieces of lumber had fallen and killed the boy.
Plaintiff filed an action to recover damages in the amount of P30,000 for the
death of his son allegedly to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant.
Court of First Instance absolved the defendant from the complaint.
Binoya and Bautista, pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless
negligence, and were sentenced accordingly.
Issue: Whether Ora was a servant of Norton & Harrison Co. or an independent
contractor.
Ruling: Ora was a contractor and an employee at the same time of Norton & Harrison
Co.
The basis of civil law liability is not respondeat superior but the relationship of
paterfamilias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own
negligece and not on that of his servant.
Under the civil law, an employer is only liable for the negligence of his
employees in the discharge of their respective duties. Here Ora was a contractor, but it
does not necessarily follow that he was an independent contractor. The reason for this
distinction is that the employer retained the power of directing and controlling the work.
The chauffeur and the two persons on the truck were the employees of Ora, the
contractor, but Ora, the contractor, was an employee of Norton & Harrison Co.,
charged with the duty of directing the loading and transportation of the lumber. And it
was the negligence in loading the lumber and the use of minors on the truck which
caused the death of the unfortunate boy. On the facts and the law, Ora was not an
independent contractor, but was the servant of the defendant, and for his negligence
defendant was responsible.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs. CA and CLARITA CAMACHO
TOPIC: Employee chosen by employer or through another
DATE: April 7, 1993
AWARD FOR DAMAGES: None
FACTS:
Private respondent Clarita Camacho was the gas station operator in Naguilian Road,
Baguio City where she sells petitioner Shell’s products. In April 1983, Clarita requested
Shell to conduct a hydro-pressure test on the underground storage tanks of the station
to determine whether the sales losses were due to leakages. A Jessie Feliciano with his
workers came to the station with a Job Order from Shell to perform the test.
The workers drained the underground storage tank to test the remaining gasoline. They
then filled it with water through a hose. After asking one of the gasoline boys to turn off
the water when the tank was filled, the workers left. The following day, Clarita noticed
that water had reached the lip of the pipe so she shut off the faucet.
Customers complained that their vehicles stalled because there was water in the
gasoline they bought. Clarita was forced to replace everything she sold. One of the
customers, Eduardo Villanueva, filed a complaint with the police against Clarita for
selling adulterated gasoline and had the incident published in 2 local newspapers.
Feliciano referred the problem to the Superintendent of Shell’s Poro Point
Installation in La Union. The latter went to the station to investigate. The two filled the
underground storage tank with water and noticed that it leaked into the other tanks filled
with the gasoline being sold. The driveway of the station was then excavated to expose
the pipeline and a new independent vent pipe for each tank was installed.
3
 Villanueva filed an Affidavit of Desistance. He explained that Clarita had no
fault on the filling of water in the tank his car and that Shell, in behalf of Clarita, has fully
satisfied his claim.
Clarita demanded from Shell payment of damages for P10,000 but Shell offered only
additional credit line and other beneficial terms which was rejected by Clarita.
Clarita filed for a Complaint Damages due to Shell’s negligence in the conduct
of the hydro-pressure test. Shell denied liability on the ground that the hydro-pressure
test was conducted by an independent contractor.
The trial court DENIED Clarita’s complaint since Feliciano who conducted the
test was neither an employee nor an agent nor a representative of Shell. He alone was
in control of the manner of how he is to undertake the test. It was solely and exclusively
under his control and supervision.
CA REVERSED the trial court’s decision and awarded P100,000 moral
damages; P2,639.25 and P15,000 as actual losses suffered by plaintiff. MR also
DENIED.
ISSUE: WON Shell is liable for Feliciano’s negligence. - NO
RULING:
It is a well-entrenched rule that an employer-employee relationship must exist before an
employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee. It is likewise firmly
settled that the existence or non-existence of the employer-employee relationship is
commonly to be determined by examination of certain factors or aspects of that
relationship. These include: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative
employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of a power
to control the putative employee's conduct, although the latter is the most important
element.  CFI Manila held petitioner and Luna solidarily liable to respondent for the
Petitioner did not exercise control and supervision over Feliciano with regard to the
manner in which he conducted the hydro-pressure test. All that petitioner did, through its
Field Engineer, Roberto Mitra, was relay to Feliciano the request of private respondent
for a hydro-pressure test, to determine any possible leakages in the storage tanks in her
gasoline station. The mere hiring of Feliciano by petitioner for that particular task is not
the form of control and supervision contemplated by may be the basis for establishing
an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Feliciano. The fact that there
was no such control is further amplified by the absence of any Shell representative in
the job site time when the test was conducted. Roberto Mitra was never there. Only
Feliciano and his men were.
Section 8 of Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
provides:
“Sec. 8. Job contracting. — There is job contracting permissible under the Code if the
following conditions are met:
(1) The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract
work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and
method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters
connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and
(2) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of
his business.”
Feliciano is an independent contractor and is responsible for his own acts and
omissions. He alone must bear the consequences of his negligence. Absent the
employer-employee relationship, petitioner cannot be held liable for the acts and
omissions of the independent contractor.
CA’s decision is SET ASIDE and the trial court’s decision is REINSTATED.
De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals (1962)
Facts: Respondent Angeline Steen suffered injuries as a result of the collision
between the passenger jeepney in which she was riding, and petitioner's (De Leon
Brokerage Co. , Inc.) cargo truck recklessly driven by its employee, Augusto Luna.
Luna had been prosecuted and convicted of the crime of homicide with physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence. In the criminal action against Luna (and the driver of
the passenger jeepney, who was, however, acquitted), respondent had reserved her
right to file a separate civil action.
After a judgment of conviction had been rendered, respondent filed in CFI
Manila an action for recovery of damages against Luna and petitioner. As proof of
Luna's negligence, she presented during the hearing the judgment of conviction in the
criminal case and likewise established her claim for actual, moral and exemplary
damages. Defendants (Luna and petitioner) sought to prove by means of the former's
testimony that he was not engaged in the performance of his duties at the time of the
accident.
sums of P1,183.70 for actual expenses; P3,000.00 for unpaid medical fees; P7,000.00
as moral damages; and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees. CA affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent was suing for damages resulting from a quasi-delict or
for civil liability arising from crime.
2. Whether the judgment of conviction is admissible against it as evidence of a
quasi-delict.
3. Whether the employee, Luna, was in the discharge of his duties at the time of
the accident.
4. Whether De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. can be held solidarily liable with Luna
for damages.
Ruling:
1. Respondent's complaint is based on a quasi delict. She alleged that she
suffered injuries because of the carelessness and imprudence of petitioner's
chauffeur who was driving the cargo truck belonging to petitioner, which truck
4
 collided with the passenger jeepney wherein she was riding. Since averment
had been made of the employer-employee relationship and of the damages
caused by the employee on occasion of his function, there is a clear
statement of a right of action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The
complaint does not, and did not have to allege that petitioner did not exercise
due deligence in choosing and supervising Luna, because this is a matter of
defense.
The reservation made in the criminal action does not preclude a
subsequent action based on a quasi-delict. It cannot be inferred therefrom
that respondent had chosen to file the very civil action she had reserved. The
only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn is that she did not want the
question of damages threshed out in the criminal action, but preferred to have
this issue decided in a separate civil action.
2. Considering that the judgment of conviction had been admitted without
objection, its competency can no longer be questioned on appeal. It
established the fact of Luna's negligence, giving rise to the presumption that
petitioner had been negligent in the selection and supervision of its
employees. And petitioner failed to prove that it had exercised such requisite
care and diligence as would relieve it from responsibility.
3. Luna testified that on the day of the accident he had been instructed to go to
Pampanga, from there to proceed to Nueva Ecija, but that after unloading his
cargo in Pampanga, he at once returned to Manila. However, his reason for
immediately returning to Manila is not clear. He could have returned for
purposes of repair. It does not appear that he was on an errand of his own. In
the absence of determinative proof that the deviation was so complete as
would constitute a cessation or suspension of his service, petitioner should be
held liable.
4. Since both Luna and petitioner are responsible for the quasi-delict, their
liablity is solidary, although the latter can recover from the former whatever
sums it pays to respondent.
SC affirmed the decision of the CA.
Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals (1996)
Facts: Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the morning of
June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer
from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home. She was travelling along Aurora
Blvd. heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she
noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place to verify
whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. She parked along the sidewalk,
about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to
the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car
pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly
bumped by a Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the
name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact, plaintiff was
thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and
then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. She was
brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a
"traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)". She was confined in
the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The
expenses for the hospital confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg
(P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance.
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of P1
million, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other medical and
related expenses amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected
earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He
was on his way home.
Considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic
was light. He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of
Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly
confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the
opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he
instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and
bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with
no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged
in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then "at
a standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue.
Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or
negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.
The lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant
Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer,
jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. The Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained by
the plaintiff but absolved the Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc.
Both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two separate
petitions. Both petitions were consolidated.
Issue: Whether Alexander Commercial, Inc. is liable as the owner of the car driven by
Richard Li.
Ruling: The Supreme Court concluded that Li was negligent in driving his company-
issued Mitsubishi Lancer.
It sustained the finding of the CA that Valenzuela was not guilty of
contributory negligence. Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear
to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could
not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which
eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which
5
led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making,
and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
The relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat
superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias,
in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is
jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his testimony
before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did not
require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to
perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and
meeting with company clients. 30 These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to
routine hours because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing
his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-
related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc.
therefore enabled both Li - as well as the corporation - to put up the front of a highly
successful entity, increasing the latter's goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated
meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of
travel.
Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated that it exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No
allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to
determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of
demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li,
said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and
severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
during the accident.
(c) Illicit act of employee is by reason of the functions entrusted to him
Dulay v. Court of Appeal (1995)
FACTS: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty.
Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival,
shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Thereafter, the wife of the deceased filed an
action for damages (actual, exemplary, compensatory, and moral and Attorney’s fee)
against Torzuela together with his employer, the Superguard Investigation and
Security (Superguard). On its answer, the Superguard contends that the act of
Torzuela is beyond the scope of his duty and a complaint for damages based on
negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by
petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-
offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the filing of the complaint
is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a
condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. The lower court grant the
motion to dismiss of Superguard based on that ground, which later upheld by the CA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Superguard is also liable for damages on the illicit act committed by
its employee by reason of the function entrusted to him.
HELD: Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the
Revised Penal Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond
the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been established that the instant
action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the
private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when
an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it
is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are
intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to
dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant
negligence attributable to private respondents.
(d) Presumption of negligence and its effects
Umali v. Bacani (1976)
FACTS: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala
Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing on an elevated ground
were blown down and fell on the electric wire on the transmission line of Alcala Electric
Plant. As a result, the live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on
the electric post and the other fell to the ground under the fallen banana plants. On the
following morning, the barrio captain passed along the area and saw the broken
electric wire. Thus, he warned the people not to go near the live wire. He also notified
one of the laborer in the said Plant about the broken line and asked to fix it. However,
the laborer said he could not do it but he was going to find the lineman to fix the said
broken wire. Sometime after the barrio captain and Cipriano Baldomero had left the
place, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes,
whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the
broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and
subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution of Manuel Saynes that the
broken wire was fixed by the lineman of the electric plant.
ISSUE: Whether there was negligence on the part of Umali as the owner and manager
of Alcala Electric Plant and thus liable under the concept of quasi-delict as a proximate
cause for the death due to electrocution of the child.
HELD: A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of negligence on
the part of defendants' employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of
the victim by electrocution. (1) That the employees did not take precautionary
6
measures to eliminate the big and tall bananas as it could be a source of danger to the
electric line; (2) That known to the employees of the plant that possible damage may
brought by the storm, did not cut off the floe of electricity along the lines; and (3)
Employee Baldomero was negligent because even if he was already made aware of
the live cut wire, he did not have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody
from approaching the live wire; instead he left the premises and obviously forgetting
that if left unattended to it could endanger life and property.
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the
victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendants' lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by
the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury
caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, which states:
The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on tile occasion of their
functions.
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer
because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the
employees. This liability of the employer is primary and direct (Standard Vacuum Oil
Co. vs. Tan and Court of Appeals, 107 Phil. 109). In fact the proper defense for the
employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the
diligence of the good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the selection of
his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their work.
Secosa v. Francisco (2004)
FACTS: On June 27, 1996, at around 4:00 p.m., Erwin Suarez Francisco, an 18 yr old,
3rd yr. PT student of the Manila Central University, was riding a motorcycle along
Radial 10 Avenue, near the Veteran Shipyard Gate in the City of Manila. At the same
time, Raymundo Odani Secosa, was driving an Isuzu cargo truck owned by Dassad
Warehousing and Port services Inc. on the same road. Behind Francisco was a sand
and gravel truck, which in turn was being tailed by the Isuzu truck driven by Secosa.
The three vehicles were traversing the southbound lane at a fairly high speed. When
Secosa overtook the sand and gravel truck, he bumped the motorcycle causing
Francisco to fall. The rear wheels of the Isuzu truck then ran over Francisco, which
resulted in his instantaneous death. Fearing for his life, Secosa left his truck and fled
the scene of the collision. Thereafter, the parents of Francisco filed an action for
damages against Secosa and Dassad Warehousing impleading Sy, its president. The
lower court ruled against Secosa, which affirmed by the CA in toto. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees
HELD: When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly
arises a presumption that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in
the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The
presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer
that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. Hence, to evade solidary liability for quasi-delict
committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised
such degree of care.
How does an employer prove that he indeed exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee? xxx In the selection of
prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand, with respect to the
supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.
To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers
must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
Jurisprudentially, therefore, the employer must not merely present testimonial
evidence to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee, but he must also support such testimonial
evidence with concrete or documentary evidence. The reason for this is to obviate the
biased nature of the employer’s testimony or that of his witnesses.
Applying the foregoing doctrines to the present case, we hold that petitioner Dassad
Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. failed to conclusively prove that it had exercised
the requisite diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Sebastian M. Baking (2007)
Facts: Sebastian M. Baking (Baking) went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical
check-up. He underwent an ECG, blood, and hematology examinations and urinalysis,
Dr. Sy found that Baking’s blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal levels. Dr.
Sy then gave Baking two medical prescriptions – Diamicron for his blood sugar and
Benalize tablets for his triglyceride. Baking then proceeded to Mercury Drug
Corporation (Alabang Branch, hereinafter, Mercury) to buy the prescribed medicines.
However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for
Dormicum. Thus, what was sold to Baking was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet.
After taking the said medicine for three consecutive days, Baking figured in a vehicular
accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta. Baking fell
asleep while driving and could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its
impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and
mental state at the time of the collision, Baking returned to Dr. Sy’s clinic. Upon being
shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to respondent was
Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron.
Baking filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for damages against Mercury
where the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Baking ordering Mercury to pay the
former damages as fllows: (1) P250,000.00 as moral damages; (2) P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; (3) plus ½% of the cost of the suit. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, affirmed in toto the RTC judgment; MR was also
denied, hence, this petition.
Issues:
7

1. Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the
proximate cause of respondent’s accident; and
2. Whether the award of moral damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
cost of the suit is justified.
Ruling: Petition is denied.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the following requisites must concur:
(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c)
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
There is no dispute that respondent suffered damages.
It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest.
The health and safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees
will not exercise the highest degree of care and diligence in selling medicines.
Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a question of fact, we defer to the findings of
the trial court affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent in selling to Baking Dormicum,
instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter
of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very
cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she
gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care required
must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must
correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s
negligence in driving his car.
We disagree.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result
would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of
each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and
precedent.
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been
careful in reading Dr. Sy’s prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a
sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car,
resulting in a collision.
Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code which states:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible. x x x
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages
caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee,
there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the
part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over
him, after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear
showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Here,
petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for
damages caused by the latter.
MERCURY DRUG  CORPORATION and AURMELA GANZON v. RAUL DE LEON,
G.R. No. 165622. October 17, 2008
TOPIC: PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE AND ITS EFFECTS. - In cases where an
injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer,
either in the selection or supervision of ones employees. This presumption may
be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to overcome such
presumption.
(Pharmacist gave the wrong medicine – eardrops instead of eye drops)
Facts:
 Respondent Raul T. De Leon, the presiding judge of Paranaque RTC, noticed that his
left eye was reddish. He also had difficulty reading. He met a friend who happened to be
a doctor and had just arrived from abroad, Dr. Charles Milla.
The latter prescribed the drugs Cortisporin Opthalmic and Ceftin. De Leon went to a
branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. He showed
8
his prescription to petitioner Aurmela Ganzon, a pharmacist assistant and paid for what
was handed to him. Only when he requested his sheriff to assist him in using the eye
drops and felt searing pain did he find out that he was given eardrops instead of the
prescribed eye drops.
 
De Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug branch. When he confronted Ganzon
why he was given eardrops, instead of the prescribed eye drops, she did not apologize
and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription. It was
her supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have stock of the
needed eye drops.
 
De Leon wrote Mercury Drug, through its president about the incident, which did not
merit any response. Having been denied his simple desire for a written apology and
explanation, De Leon filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug.
Denying that they were negligent, Mercury Drug and Ganzon pointed out that De Leon’s
own negligence was the proximate cause of his injury. They argued that any injury
would have been averted had De Leon exercised due diligence before applying the
medicine on his eye. Had he cautiously read the medicine bottle label, he would have
known that he had the wrong medicine.
RTC: rendered judgment in favor of De Leon, awarding:
(1) Php 153.25 , the value of the medicine for pecuniary loss suffered;
(2) Php 100,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) Php 300,000.00) as exemplary damages;
(4) P50,000.00 attorneys fees plus litigation expenses.
Mercury Drug and Ganzon appealed to the CA. De Leon moved for the appeal’s
dismissal.
CA: granted respondents motion to dismiss because of petitioner’s failure to properly
cite reference to the original records; and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
(1) WON CA erred in favoring mere technicality over substantial justice
(2) WON Mercury Drug and Ganzon are liable
HELD:
(1) Dismissal of an appeal under Rule 50 is discretionary. This Court has held
that the failure to properly cite reference to the original records is not a
fatal procedural lapse. In the case under review, although there were no
page references to the records, the brief is sufficient in form and substance as
to apprise the appellate court of the essential facts, nature of the case, the
issues raised, and the laws necessary for the disposition of the same. Rules
of procedure are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice
(2) petitioners are liable. Mercury Drug and Ganzon failed to exercise the
highest degree of diligence expected of them as pharmacy
professionals.  Completo. Albayda alleged that because of the injury he sustained, he was required to
The drugstore business is imbued with public interest. As active players in the field of
dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence is
expected of them. Druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence
and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards
consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not
constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for
harmless medicines.
In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part
of the employer, either in the selection or supervision of ones employees. This
presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to
overcome such presumption.
Mercury Drug and Ganzon were grossly negligent in dispensing eardrops instead of the
prescribed eye drops to De Leon. This Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of
drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There exists an imperative duty
on the seller or the druggist to take precaution to prevent death or injury to any person
who relies on ones absolute honesty and peculiar learning. For druggists, mistake is
negligence and care is no defense.
The award of damages is proper and shall only be reduced considering the
peculiar facts of the case. The award of damages must be commensurate to the loss
or injury suffered. We reduce the amount of:
1) Moral damages from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 only; and
2) Exemplary damages from P300,000.00 to P25,000.00 only.
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decisions of the CA and are AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION.
Moral damages – include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of defendants wrongful act or omission.
HEIRS OF REDENTOR COMPLETO AND ABAD v. ALBAYDA
GR No. 172200
July 6, 2010
Topic: Persons made responsible for others
Facts: Master Sergeant Amano Albayda of Philippine Air Force was riding a bicycle on
his way to the office when he was bumped and sideswiped by a taxi driven by Redentor
Completo, and owned and operated by Elpidio Abiad. Albayda suffered a fracture in his
left knee. The same required an operation.
Albayda filed a complaint for physical injuries through reckless imprudence against
stay in the hospital for 7 months and to undergo medical physiotherapy. He further
stated that aggravating the physical sufferings, mental anguish, frights, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation resulting
9
from his injuries, his wife abandoned him in May 1998, and left their children in his
custody.
Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to property through reckless imprudence
against Albayda, which was eventually dismissed.
The trial court ruled in favor of Albayda and ordered Completo and Abiad to pay
P46,000.00 as actual damages, P400,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
On appeal, CA deleted the award for actual damages, ordered the award of temperate
damages in the amount of P40,000, reduced the moral damages to P200,000 and ruled
that appellants Redentor Completo and Elpidio Abiad are solidarily liable to pay appellee
Amando C. Albayda, Jr. said temperate and moral damages, as well as the attorney's
fees in the amount of Php 25,000.00 awarded by the trial court.
Issues
1. WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the
family – YES
2. WON the award of moral and temperate damages and attorney's fees to Albayda
had basis – YES (moral and temperate only)
Ruling
1. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for
whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees, but the employers' responsibility shall cease upon proof that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption
instantly arises that the employer was negligent. This presumption may be rebutted only
by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. The
civil liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee is also primary and
direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The civil
liability of the employer attaches even if the employer is not inside the vehicle at the time
of the collision.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as
to their qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand, with respect
to the supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
Abiad testified that before he hired Completo, he required the latter to show his bio-data,
NBI clearance, and driver's license. Abiad likewise stressed that Completo was never
involved in a vehicular accident prior to the instant case, and that, as operator of the
taxicab, he would wake up early to personally check the condition of the vehicle before it
is used. The protestation of Abiad to escape liability is short of the diligence required
under the law. Abiad's evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence, and the
unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony of Abiad was insufficient to overcome the
legal presumption that he was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver.
2. The CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages by the RTC because
Albayda failed to present documentary evidence to establish with certainty the amount
that he incurred during his hospitalization and treatment for the injuries he suffered.
Temperate damages, more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Moral damages are awarded in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. The permanent
deformity and the scar left by the wounds suffered by Albayba will forever be a reminder
of the pain and suffering that he had endured and continues to endure because of
petitioners' negligence. Thus, the award of moral damages is proper.
The award of attorney's fees is hereby deleted for failure to prove that petitioners acted
in bad faith in refusing to satisfy respondent's just and valid claim.
Decision
(1) The estate of the late Redentor Completo and Elpidio Abiad are solidarily liable to
pay One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), as temperate damages, and Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), as moral damages;
(2) The temperate and moral damages hereby awarded shall earn legal interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the promulgation of this Decision.
Upon finality of this Decision, an interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum shall
be imposed on the amount of the temperate and moral damages until full payment
thereof.
Costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. 185597 JOHN E.R. REYES and MERWIN JOSEPH REYES vs. ORICO
DOCTOLERO, ROMEO AVILA, GRANDEUR SECURITY AND SERVICES
CORPORATION, and MAKATI CINEMA SQUARE
Facts: The case arose from an altercation between respondent Orico Doctolero, a
security guard of respondent Grandeur Security and Services Corporation and
petitioners John E.R. Reyes and Merwin Joseph Reyes in the parking area of
respondent Makati Cinema Square. The respondents shot the petitioners but both
parties alleged different version of the incident.
Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against
respondents Doctolero and Avila and their employer Grandeur, charging the latter with
negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. They likewise impleaded
10
MCS on the ground that it was negligent in getting Grandeur’s services. In their
complaint, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered, jointly and severally, to pay
them actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation costs.
Respondents Doctolero and Avila failed to file an answer despite service of summons
upon them. Thus, they were declared in default in an Order dated December 12, 1997.
For its part, Grandeur asserted that it exercised the required diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees. It likewise averred that the shooting incident was
caused by the unlawful aggression of petitioners who took advantage of their “martial
arts” skills.
On the other hand, MCS contends that it cannot be held liable for damages simply
because of its ownership of the premises where the shooting incident occurred. It
argued that the injuries sustained by petitioners were caused by the acts of respondents
Doctolero and Avila, for whom respondent Grandeur should be solely responsible.
On January 18, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment against respondents Doctolero and
Avila, finding them responsible for the injuries sustained by petitioners. In reconsidering
its Decision, the RTC held that it re-evaluated the tacts and the attending circumstances
of the present case and was convinced that Grandeur has sufficiently overcome the
presumption of negligence. It gave credence to the testimony of Grandeur’s witness,
Eduardo Ungui, the head of the Human Resources Department (HRD) of Grandeur, as
regards the various procedures in its selection and hiring of security guards.
Issue: Whether Grandeur and MCS may be held vicariously liable for the damages
caused by respondents Doctolero and Avila to petitioners John and Mervin Reyes.
Ruling: MCS is not liable to petitioners. As a general rule, one is only responsible for his
own act or omission. This general rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The law, however, provides for exceptions when it makes certain persons liable for the
act or omission of another. One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable
for the tort committed by his employee under paragraph 5 of Article 2180. Here,
although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable
on the basis of the civil law principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and
vigilance over the acts of one’s subordinates to prevent damage to another.
It must be stressed, however, that the above rule is applicable only if there is an
employer-employee relationship. This employer-employee relationship cannot be
presumed but must be sufficiently proven by the plaintiff. The plaintiff must also show
that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort
complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it
necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees. In the absence of such relationship, vicarious liability under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code cannot be applied. We find no employer-employee relationship between
MCS and respondent guards. The guards were merely assigned by Grandeur to secure
MCS’ premises pursuant to their Contract of Guard Services. Thus, MCS cannot be held
vicariously liable for damages caused by these guards’ acts or omissions. Neither can it
be said that a principal-agency relationship existed between MCS and Grandeur.
On the other hand, paragraph 5 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code may be applicable to
Grandeur, it being undisputed that respondent guards were its employees. When the
employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties,
there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only
by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. The “diligence of a
good father” referred to in the last paragraph of Article 2180 means diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees.
To rebut the presumption of negligence, Grandeur must prove two things: first, that it
had exercised due diligence in the selection of respondents Doctolero and Avila, and
second, that after hiring Doctolero and Avila, Grandeur had exercised due diligence in
supervising them.
Here, both the RTC and the CA found that Grandeur was able to sufficiently prove,
through testimonial and documentary evidence, that it had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and hiring of its security guards. As testified to by
its HRD head Ungui, and corroborated by documentary evidence including clearances
from various government agencies, certificates, and favorable test results in medical
and psychiatric examinations.
The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the circumstances of
employment. Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised
diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter’s assigned tasks
would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Considering all the evidence borne by the records, we find that Grandeur has sufficiently
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. Hence, having successfully overcome the legal presumption of negligence,
it is relieved of liability from the negligent acts of its employees, respondents Doctolero
and Avila
11
VIVIAN B. TORREON v. GENEROSO APARRA, GR No. 188493, 2017-12-13
Facts: On November 1, 1989, Vivian's husband, Rodolfo Torreon (Rodolfo), and
daughters, Monalisa Torreon (Monalisa) and Johanna Ava Torreon (Johanna), arrived
with Felomina Abellana (Abellana) at the municipal wharf of Jetafe, Bohol. They came
from Cebu City aboard M/B Island Traders, a motor boat owned and operated by
Carmelo Simolde (Simolde).
After they disembarked from the motor boat, they looked for a vehicle that would
transport them from the wharf to the poblacion of Jetafe. A cargo truck entered the wharf
and their fellow passengers boarded it. Abellana, Rodolfo, and his daughters chose not
to board the already-overcrowded truck. Instead, they waited for a different vehicle to
bring them to the poblacion. However, they were informed that only the cargo truck,
which was also owned and operated by Simolde, would enter the wharf
Approximately 10 minutes later, the same cargo truck returned to the wharf. Again,
fellow passengers from M/B Island Traders started embarking it. This time, Rodolfo,
Monalisa, Johanna, and Abellana also boarded it. Abellana was seated in front, while
Rodolfo and his daughters were with the rest of the passengers at the back of the truck.
Because there were no proper seats at the back of the truck, the 30 or more passengers
were either standing or sitting on their bags
While passengers were getting on the truck, Simolde called Felix Caballes (Caballes),
the official truck driver. Caballes approached Simolde but left the engine running. While
Simolde and Caballes were talking, Generoso Aparra, Jr. (Aparra), Simolde's chief
diesel mechanic, started driving the truck. Upon seeing the truck move, Caballes rushed
to the truck and sat beside Aparra. However, instead of taking control of the vehicle,
Caballes allowed Aparra to drive
Shortly thereafter, Aparra maneuvered the truck to the right side of the road to avoid
hitting a parked bicycle. But as he turned, Aparra had to swerve to the left to avoid
hitting Marcelo Subiano, who was allegedly standing on the side of the road. Because
the road was only four (4) meters and 24 inches wide, rough, and full of potholes,
Aparra lost control of the truck and they fell off the wharf.[9] Consequently, Rodolfo and
Monalisa died while Johanna and Abellana were injured.[10] On April 3, 1990, Vivian
and Abellana filed a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence resulting to Double
Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property against Aparra
and Caballes
On January 4, 1991, Vivian and Abellana filed a separate complaint for damages
against Simolde, Caballes, and Aparra[
On November 17, 2000, the Regional Trial Court ruled that Caballes and Aparra
committed acts constituting a quasi-delict.[23] Since these acts were the proximate
cause of the deaths of Rodolfo and Monalisa and the injuries sustained by Abellana and
Johanna, Simolde, Caballes, and Aparra were held liable for damages
On April 3, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision[26] holding Simolde
solidarity liable with Caballes and Aparra. According to the Court of Appeals, Caballes
and Aparra were clearly negligent in transporting the passengers. Given that the road
was narrow and fall of pot holes, it was apparent that an experienced driver was needed
to safely navigate the vehicle out of the wharf. In allowing Aparra to drive the truck
despite having only a student driver's permit, Caballes risked the lives of the passengers
on board the truck. The Court of Appeals also held Simolde solidarity liable with his
employees for failing to exercise due diligence in supervising them.[27] However, the
Court of Appeals deleted the award of actual damages for Rodolfo's loss of earning
capacity. According to the Court of Appeals, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity.
Petitioner Vivian argues that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in deleting the
compensatory damages awarded for Rodolfo's loss of earning capacity.[32] She posits
that Abellana's testimony is enough to prove Rodolfo's income. As Rodolfo's employer,
Abellana had direct and personal knowledge of the compensation that he was receiving
prior to his death; thus, she is qualified to testify on his income.[33] Petitioner Vivian
cites Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[34] to point out that the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in concluding that Abellana's testimony, without any documentary
evidence, did not suffice to claim damages for lack of earning capacity.[35] Based on
Abellana's testimony, Rodolfo had an estimated gross monthly income of P15,000.00 or
an annual gross income of P195,000.00.[36] Using the formula[37] laid down in Negros
Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[38] Rodolfo's lost earnings would amount to
P2,079,675.00.
Issues: whether or not actual damages for loss of earning capacity should be awarded
to petitioner Vivian B. Torreon;
Ruling:
Instead of helping his defense, Simolde's testimony proves his failure to supervise his
employees. Simolde should have been more diligent in ensuring that his employees
acted within the parameters of their jobs. He should have taken steps to ensure that his
instructions were followed. His failure to control the behavior of his employees makes
him liable for the consequences of their actions. Thus, Simolde is solidarity liable with
Caballes and Aparra for the payment of the damages granted by law. The Civil Code
holds Simolde liable for the damages that his actions have caused.[57] Article 2206
specifically applies when a death occurs as a result of a crime or a quasi-delict: Article
2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least Three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death;
Civil or death indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need
of proof other than the commission of the crime.[59] Initially fixed by the Civil Code at
P3,000.00, the amount of the indemnity is currently fixed at P50,000.00.[60] Thus,
respondents are liable to pay Rodolfo's heirs P50,000.00. They are liable to pay another
P50,000.00 to answer for the death of Monalisa. In Pestaño v. Spouses Sumayang,[61]
this Court applied Article 2206 of the Civil Code and awarded compensation for the
deceased's lost earning capacity in addition to the award of civil indemnity. The
indemnity for the deceased's lost earning capacity is meant to compensate the heirs for
the income they would have received had the deceased continued to live.[62] Pleyto v.
Lomboy[63] provided the formula to compute a deceased's earning capacity: It is well-
settled in jurisprudence that the factors that should be taken into account in determining
the compensable amount of lost earnings are: (1) the number of years for which the
victim would otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the
deceased. Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, is computed
12
by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy
Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. As to the
second factor, it is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of
the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such
earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. The net earning is
ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula used
by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80
- age at time of death) x (gross annual income - reasonable and necessary living
expenses)].[64] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) The reason behind the formula
for loss of earning capacity was discussed in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
[65] [The award of damages for loss of earning capacity is] concerned with the
determination of the losses or damages sustained by the Private respondents, as
dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased, and that said damages consist, not of
the full amount of his earnings, but of the support they received or would have received
from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of petitioner's agent. In
fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon with the "necessary expenses of his
own living", which should be deducted from his earnings. Thus, it has been consistently
held that earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by
wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money,
"less the necessary expense for his own living." Stated otherwise, the amount
recoverable is not loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the
earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net earnings,
not gross earning, are to be considered that is, the total of the earnings less expenses
necessary in creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental
expenses.[66] (Citations omitted) The formula provided in these cases is presumptive,
i.e., it should be applied in the absence of proof in terms of statistics and actuarial
presented by the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals deleted the award of actual damages
granted to petitioner for Rodolfo's lost earnings. According to the Court of Appeals,
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for the deceased's
lost income.[67] This Court disagrees. In civil cases, Vivian is o
In civil cases, Vivian is only required to establish her claim by a preponderance of
evidence. Allowing testimonial evidence to prove loss of earning capacity is consistent
with the nature of civil actions.[68] Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
In determining if this quantum of proof is met, this Court is not required to exclusively
consider documentary evidence: Nothing in the Rules of Court requires that only
documentary evidence is allowed in civil cases. All that is required is the satisfaction of
the quantum of evidence, that is, preponderance of evidence. In addition, the Civil Code
does not prohibit a claim for loss of earning capacity on the basis that it is not proven by
documentary evidence. Testimonial evidence, if not questioned for credibility, bears the
same weight as documentary evidence. Testimonies given by the deceased's spouse,
parent, or child should be given weight because these individuals are presumed to know
the income of their spouse, child, or parent. If the amount of income testified to seemed
incredible or unrealistic, the defense could always raise their objections and discredit the
witness or, better yet, present evidence that would outweigh the evidence of the
prosecution.[69]... his Court has previously accepted a competent witness' testimony to
determine the deceased's income. In Pleyto v. Lomboy,[70] this Court used the
testimony of the deceased's widow as basis to estimate his earning capacity:
Petitioners' claim that no substantial proof was presented to prove Ricardo Lomboy's
gross income lacks merit. Failure to present documentary evidence to support a claim
for loss of earning capacity of the deceased need not be fatal to its cause. Testimonial
evidence suffices to establish a basis for which the court can make a fair and
reasonable estimate of the loss of earning capacity. Hence, the testimony of respondent
Maria Lomboy, Ricardo's widow, that her husband was earning a monthly income of
P8,000 is sufficient to establish a basis for an estimate of damages for loss of earning
capacity.[71] (Citation omitted)
In a torts case, this Court also accepted testimony from co-workers of the deceased to
establish his income before his death. The witnesses Mate and Reyes, who were
respectively the manager and auditor of Allied Overseas Trading Company and Padilla
Shipping Company, were competent to testify on matters within their personal
knowledge because of their positions, such as the income and salary of the deceased,
Nicanor A. Padilla (Sec. 30, Rule 130, Rules of Court). As observed by the Court of
Appeals, since they were cross-examined by petitioner's counsel, any objections to their
competence and the admissibility of their testimonies, were deemed waived. The
payrolls of the companies and the decedent's income tax returns could, it is true, have
constituted the best evidence of his salaries, but there is no rule disqualifying competent
officers of the corporation from testifying on the compensation of the deceased as an
officer of the same corporation, and in any event, no timely objection was made to their
testimonies.[72] If co-workers were deemed competent to testify on the compensation
that the deceased was receiving, all the more should an employer be allowed to testify
on the amount she was paying her deceased employee. Abellana testified that at the
time of his death, deceased Rodolfo was earning P15,000.00 per month:
The concurring opinion in Wahiman was instructive on how to properly apply this
formula: This is a step-by-step guide to compute an award for loss of earning capacity.
(1) Subtract the age of the deceased from 80. (2) Multiply the answer in (1) by 2, and
divide it by 3 (these operations, are interchangeable). (3) Multiply 50% to the annual
gross income of the deceased. (4) Multiply the answer in (2) by the answer in (3). This is
the loss of earning capacity to be awarded. When the evidence on record only shows
monthly gross income, annual gross income is derived from multiplying the monthly
gross income by 12. When the daily wage is the only information provided during trial,
such amount may be multiplied by 260, or the number of usual workdays in a year, to
arrive at annual gross income.[76] At the time of his death, Rodolfo was 48 years old
and was earning P15,000.00 monthly.[77] To determine his annual gross income, this
Court multiplied his gross monthly income by 12 to get the result of P180,000.00.
Computing for life expectancy, or steps 1 and 2, results: Life Expectancy = 2/3 x (80 -
48) Life Expectancy = 2/3 x (32) Life Expectancy = 21.33 years Applying his life
expectancy and annual gross income to the general formula, or step 3: Loss of Earning
Capacity = Life Expectancy x 1/2 annual gross income Loss of Earning Capacity = 21.33
x (P180,000.00/2) Loss of Earning Capacity = 21.33 x P90,000.00 Loss of Earning
Capacity = P1,919,700.00 Respondents are liable to pay P1,919,700.00 to compensate
for the income Rodolfo's heirs would have received had he lived. On the other hand,
Vivian failed to prove the actual damages she suffered for the death of her daughter,
Monalisa. Vivian merely testified as to the funeral and burial expenses she incurred
without producing any receipt or other evidence to support her claim.[78] Consequently,
she cannot be entitled to an award of actual damages on account of Monalisa's loss.
WHEREFORE, the April 3, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71090 is MODIFIED. Respondents Carmelo T. Simolde, Felix Caballes, and Generoso
Aparra, Jr., are ORDERED to pay solidarity petitioner Vivian B. Torreon
(ii) Employer need not be engaged in business to be held liable
13

Jose A. Ortaliz vs. Corado Echarri (1957)
Facts: Jose A. Ortaliz (Jose) is the lawful father of the child, Winston Ortaliz. On or
about December 18, 1953, at the corner of Washington and Justicia Streets, Bacolod
City, Philippines, the Studebaker Sedan Car with Plate No. 35-1138 of the Corado
Echarri (Echarri), which was, at that time of accident was driven and controlled by
Segundino Estanda, a driver under the employ of the Echarri. The said vehicle struck
Winston Ortaliz causing upon him physical injuries as a result he was taken to the
Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital.
A criminal case was filed against Segundino Estanda for the crime of Slight Physical
Injuries Through Reckless Imprudence, where the latter pleaded guilty to the crime
charge where he was sentence to suffer the penalty of five (5) days of Arresto Menor
and to pay the costs in a Decision rendered in said case. Jose is now claiming in a
separate civil case damages he had suffered in the form of expenses paid for the
hospitalization, medicines, physicians' fees and incidental expense of his son, Winston
Ortaliz, in the amount of P446.58; and further asks for moral damages of Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000), Philippine Currency.
On the other hand, Echarri filed a motion to dismiss wherein, after admitting the
ownership of the Studebaker Sedan car with plate No. 35-1138, he alleged that the
complaint does not allege that defendant was nor is engaged in any business or
industry in conjunction with which he has at any time used the said car, much less on
the occasion of the alleged accident, nor the defendant had at any time put out the
said car for hire; and that the obligation or liability of Echarri, if any, for the damages
alleged in the complaint, being an obligation arising from a criminal offense, is
governed by Article 1161 of the Civil Code, which, in turn, makes the penal laws
applicable thereto; and under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, it is essential, in
order for an employer to be liable subsidiarily for felonies committed by his employee,
that the former be engaged in some kind of industry, and that the employer had
committed the crime in the discharge of his duties in connection with such industry.
Therefore, defendant cannot be held subsidiarily liable for the crime committed by his
driver as alleged in plaintiff's complaint.
Trial court (Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental) granted said motion to
dismiss, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not CFI erred in dismissing the case for failure to state the cause of
action.
Ruling: Petition granted. Remanded back to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Jose contends that under paragraph 2 of Article 2884 of the Civil Code and paragraph
1 and 5 of Article 2180, a sufficient cause of action has been clearly alleged in the
disputed complaint and therefore the same should not have been dismissed. Article
2180 in part provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omission but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
and Article 2184 in its last paragraph provides:
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are
applicable.
Having in view the aforequoted provisions of law and those of Article 2176 to the effect
that "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done", there seems to be good reason to
support plaintiff's contention that the complaint in question states sufficient cause of
action. Defendant-appellee, however, claims that there is no allegation in the complaint
that "the defendant was engaged in some kind of industry and that the employee had
committed the crime in the discharge of his duties in connection with such industry,"
hence the defendant cannot be held subsidiarily liable for the crime committed by his
driver and therefore the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. But paragraph 5 of Article 2180 refutes this contention for it clearly provides
that “Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.”
Echarri also contends that when the judgment in Criminal Case No. 2607 of the
Municipal Court of Bacolod was rendered against the driver Segundino Estanda, Jose
did not reserve the civil action and thus he lost his right thereto and consequently the
present action against the defendant-appellee would not lie. This contention, however,
is untenable, for Article 33 of the Civil Code clearly provides:
ART. 33. In cases of physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(iii) Defense of negligence in selection and supervision of employees
Mr. and Mrs. Amador C. Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District (1958)
Facts: Metropolitan Water District (MWD) owns and operates three recreational
swimming pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited
and for which a nominal fee. The main pool it between two small pools of oval shape
known as the "Wading pool" and the "Beginners Pool." The care and supervision of the
pools and the users thereof is entrusted to a recreational section composed of Simeon
Chongco as chief, Armando Rule, a male nurse, and six lifeguards who had taken the
life-saving course given by the Philippine Red Cross at the YMCA in Manila. For the
safety of its patrons, MWD has provided the pools with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing
line, saving kit and a resuscitator. There is also a sanitary inspector who is in charge of
a clinic established for the benefit of the patrons. MWD has also on display in a
conspicuous place certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools, one of
which prohibits the swimming in the pool alone or without any attendant. Although
MWD does not maintain a full-time physician in the swimming pool compound, it has
14
however a nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer injections or operate the
oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise.
In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school student
and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to MWC’s swimming pools.
After paying the requisite admission fee, they immediately went to one of the small
pools where the water was shallow. After a while, Dominador Ong told his brothers
that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke.
Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in
the small pool and so they did not see the latter when he left the pool to get a bottle of
coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the pool compound,
namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva. Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys
who were in the pool area informed a bather by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that
somebody was swimming under water for quite a long time. Another boy informed
lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the same happening and Abaño immediately jumped into
the big swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong
from the bottom. The body was placed at the edge of the pool and Abaño immediately
applied manual artificial respiration. Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to
render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after being
called by phone from the clinic by one of the security guards, boarded a jeep carrying
with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected the boy with
camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao
from the University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abaño continued the artificial
manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator
until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted. Not long thereafter, Dr. Ayuyao arrived
with another resuscitator, but the same became of no use because he found the boy
already dead. The doctor ordered that the body be taken to the clinic.
In the evening of the same day, July 5, 1952, the incident was investigated by the
Police Department of Quezon City and in the investigation boys Ruben Ong and
Andres Hagad, Jr. gave written statements. On the following day, July 6, 1952, an
autopsy was performed by Dr. Enrique V. de los Santos, Chief, Medico Legal Division,
National Bureau of Investigation, who found in the body of the deceased the following:
an abrasion on the right elbow lateral aspect; contusion on the right forehead;
hematoma on the scalp, frontal region, right side; a congestion in the brain with
petechial subcortical hemorrhage, frontal lobe; cyanosis on the face and on the nails;
the lung was soggy with fine froth in the bronchioles; dark fluid blood in the heart;
congestion in the visceral organs, and brownish fluid in the stomach. The death was
due to asphyxia by submersion in water.
Issue: Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence
of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages.
Ruling: Petition is denied.
There is no question that appellants had striven to prove that MWD failed to take the
necessary precaution to protect the lives of its patrons by not placing at the swimming
pools efficient and competent employees who may render help at a moment's notice,
and they ascribed such negligence to MWD because the lifeguard it had on the
occasion minor Ong was drowning was not available or was attending to something
else with the result that his help came late. Thus, Ongs tried to prove through the
testimony of Andres Hagad, Jr. and Ruben Ong that when Eusebio Ong and Hagad,
Jr. detected that there was a drowning person in the bottom of the big swimming pool
and shouted to the lifeguard for help, lifeguard Manuel Abaño did not immediately
respond to the alarm and it was only upon the third call that he threw away the
magazine he was reading and allowed three or four minutes to elapse before retrieving
the body from the water. This negligence of Abaño, they contend, is attributable to
MWD.
But the claim of these two witnesses not only was vehemently denied by lifeguard
Abaño, but is belied by the written statements given by them in the investigation
conducted by the Police Department of Quezon City approximately three hours after
the happening of the accident. Thus, these two boys admitted in the investigation that
they narrated in their statements everything they knew of the accident, but, as found
by the trial, nowhere in said statements do they state that the lifeguard was chatting
with the security guard at the gate of the swimming pool or was reading a comic
magazine when the alarm was given for which reason he failed to immediately
respond to the alarm. On the contrary, what Ruben Ong particularly emphasized
therein was that after the lifeguard heard the shouts for help, the latter immediately
dived into the pool to retrieve the person under water who turned out to be his brother.
For this reason, the trial court made this conclusion: “The testimony of Ruben Ong and
Andres Hagad, Jr. as to the alleged failure of the lifeguard Abaño to immediately
respond to their call may therefore be disregarded because they are belied by their
written statements. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence to show that MWD has taken all
necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident
which may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of
MWD are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a
first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to
insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain
rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. MWD employs six lifeguards who
are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates
of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged
in such a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the
bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with
oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of
emergency. The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved
from the bottom of the pool, the employees of MWD did everything possible to bring
him back to life.
Sensing that their former theory as regards the liability of MWD may not be of much
help, appellants now switch to the theory that even if it be assumed that the deceased
is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate incident, still MWD may be held liable under
the doctrine of "last clear chance" for the reason that, having the last opportunity to
save the victim, it failed to do so. We do not see how this doctrine may apply
considering that the record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming
pool. The only thing the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers
that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on
nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine
of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude
a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences
to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Or, "As the doctrine usually is stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person
15
which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident." (38 Am. Jur. pp. 900-902)
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself in the wrong side of
the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent;
and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of
the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable
interval. Under these circumstances, the law is that a person who has the last
clear chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable
with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party. (Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil., 809)
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being
apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the
regulations of MWD as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard
Abaño responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and
immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of MWD had been put
into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the
application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to MWD.
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party
charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury. O'Mally vs. Eagan,
77 ALR 582, 43 Wyo. 233, 350, 2, P2d 1063. (A.L.R. Digest, Vol. 8, pp. 955-
956)
Ramos v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co (1967)
FACTS: Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling and Andres Bonifacio
in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a consequence of a collision, on May 10,
1958, involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPESI-
COLA. Said car was at the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-
plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and co-
defendant Andres Bonifacio.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ramos, finding Bonifacio negligent and
declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved its having exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
Not satisfied with the judgment, PEPSI appealed to the CA saying that he had
observed due diligence in selecting its employees. PEPSI has explained their process
in selecting their drivers thru the testimony of Anasco. they looked into his background,
submitted clearances, previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was
sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of theoretical
and practical exam.
CA found the employer PEPSI not liable. hence the petition of Ramos.
ISSUE: WON PEPSI has observed due diligence in selecting its employees? WON it
is liable to Ramos?
DECISION: No.
Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-COLA exercised the required
due diligence in the selection of its driver. As ruled by this Court in Campo vs.
Camarote 53 O.G. 2794, 2797: "In order that the defendant may be considered as
having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied
with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have carefully
examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experience and
record of service.
Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very explicit that the owner's responsibility shall cease
once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage. The Bahia case merely clarified what that diligence consists of, namely,
diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver-employee. Neither could SC
apply the respondent superior principle. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis
of an employer's liability is his own negligence, not that of his employees. The former
is made responsible for failing to properly and diligently select and supervise his erring
employees. We do not — and have never — followed the respondent superior rule.
So, the American rulings cited by petitioners, based as they are on said doctrine, are
not authoritative here.
Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC (1992)
FACTS: Daniel Funtecha was a working student of Filamer. He was assigned as the
school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was the son of
the school president and at the same time he was the school’s jeepney service driver.
On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa
returned to the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that
he could fetch the students early in the morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same
place so they usually go home together. Funtecha had a student driver’s license so
Masa let him take the driver’s seat. While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit an
elderly Kapunan which led to his hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal
case and an independent civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.
In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable
for the tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on
Article 2180 which provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.
Filamer assailed the decision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of
the Labor Code IRR, working scholars are excluded from the employment coverage
hence there is no employer-employee relations between Filamer and Funcheta; that
the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence only attributable to him alone as it
is outside his assigned task of being the school janitor. The CA denied Filamer’s
appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.
DECISION: Yes.
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This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this time
Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the
Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not
in any way affect the provisions of any other laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot
defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the
enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction hence Section 14,
Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted
by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school
and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment
between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by
one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against
both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule
on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a
shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a
driver’s position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent
act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the
benefit of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is
beneficial to the school because this enables Masa to do a timely school transportation
service in the morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was
not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden
of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in
the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. Filamer has
failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a
family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
Child Learning Center v Tagorio (2005)
Facts: In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the
boy’s comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of
nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy
started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for
help. When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for help. In the
process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories.
Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical
injuries.
In its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking
mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or
negligence. CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of
a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its
students.
The trial court decided in favor of Tagorio. P200,253.12 as actual and compensatory
damages, P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, P100,000
as attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit. CA affirmed its decision.
Issue: WON CLC is negligent?
Decision: Yes. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff
has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the
plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose
act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence and the damages incurred. In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC
failed to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its students in two
instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been notified of the
problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on the window where Timothy fell from.
Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being held
responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In
this case, CLC’s liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of
its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained.
Mercury Drug Corp. & Rolando J. Del Rosario vs Spouses Richard Huang and
Carmen Huang, and Stephen Huang
Facts: Personal circumstance of the victim before the accident: 17 years old, nearly 6
ft. tall and weighed 175 pounds; in 4th year high school, and a member of the school
varsity basketball team; class president and editor-in-chief of the school annual; had
shown very good leadership qualities and was looking forward to his college life,
having just passed the entrance examinations of the UP, DLSU, and the UA&P. UST
even offered him a chance to obtain an athletic scholarship, but the accident prevented
him from attending the basketball try-outs; an exceptional student who excelled both in
his academics & extracurricular undertakings.
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation is the registered owner of a six-wheeler
1990 Mitsubishi Truck (14, 058 kg.) driven by petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario. While
Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the parents of respondent
Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan (1, 450 kg). These
two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m.
within the municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. Both were traversing the C-5 Highway,
north bound, coming from the general direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The car
was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right, when
the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car.
The collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and
landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit a lamppost, ran over the car and
zigzagged towards, and finally stopped in front of Buellah Land Church.
At the time of the accident, Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt
(TVR). His driver’s license had been confiscated because he had been previously
apprehended for reckless driving. As a result of the accident, the car, valued at
P300,000.00, was a total wreck and Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his
spinal cord, head, face, and lung leaving him paralyzed for life from his chest down
and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment.
Respondent’s arguments: Del Rosario is at fault for committing gross negligence
and reckless imprudence while driving, and petitioner Mercury Drug is also at fault for
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failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its driver.
Petitioner’s arguments: it was Stephen Huang’s recklessness that is the immediate
and proximate cause of the accident. According to Del Rosario, he was driving on the
left innermost lane when the car bumped the truck’s front right tire. The truck then
swerved to the left, smashed into an electric post, crossed the center island, and
stopped on the other side of the highway. The car likewise crossed over the center
island and landed on the same portion of C-5. Further, Mercury Drug claims that it
exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
all its employees.
Ruling of the Trial Court: the petitioners are jointly and severally liable to pay
respondents actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees,
and litigation expenses.
CA: Affirmed. The evidence does not support petitioners’ claim that at the time of the
accident, the truck was at the left inner lane and that it was respondent Stephen
Huang’s car, at its right, which bumped the right front side of the truck. Firstly,
petitioner Del Rosario could not precisely tell which part of the truck was hit by the car,
despite the fact that the truck was snub-nosed and a lot higher than the car. Del
Rosario could not also explain why the car landed on the opposite lane of C-5 which
was on its left side. He said that "the car did not pass in front of him after it hit him or
under him or over him or behind him." If the truck were really at the left lane and the
car were at its right, and the car hit the truck at its front right side, the car would not
have landed on the opposite side, but would have been thrown to the right side of the
C-5 Highway (this conclusion is arrived at by giving credit to the testimony of Dr.
Marlon Rosendo H. Daza, an expert in the field of physics).
Issue: WON Mercury Drug Corp. is liable for failing to exercise the due diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver.
Decision:
Clearly, there is no question that petitioner Del Rosario’s negligence is the
direct and proximate cause of the injuries suffered by respondent Stephen Huang as
he failed to do what a reasonable and prudent man would have done under the
circumstances.
As to the liability of petitioner Mercury Drug as employer of Del Rosario,
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. x x x
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
xxx
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or
immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent
employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also joint
and solidary with the employee.
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection of the
employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the
selection of its prospective employees, the employer is required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to the supervision of
its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor
their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish
compliance with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
We therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed to
discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario for the ff reasons:
5. According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic (petitioner’s testimonial evidence on its
hiring procedure), the Recruitment and Training Manager of Mercury Drug, applicants
are required to take theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological
examination. However, she admitted that he took the driving tests and psychological
examination when he applied for the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied
for the position of Truck Man.
6. She also admitted that he used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of
a truck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor skills
development, perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye and hand
coordination and steadiness of Del Rosario. No NBI and police clearances were also
presented. Lastly, he attended only three driving seminars – on June 30, 2001, Feb. 5,
2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the accident
which occurred in 1996 was held 12 years ago in 1984.
7. At the time of the accident, he has been out on the road for more than
thirteen hours, without any alternate. It appears that Mercury Drug does not provide for
a back-up driver for long trips.
8. Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the
supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, he
was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testified
that he reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not
suspended or reprimanded. No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against him.
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