Description of document: Two (2) Army Counterintelligence documents, 1962-1963

Requested date: 12-February-2010

Release 1 date: 30-March-2018

Posted date: 03-December-2018

Source of document: Freedom Of Information Act Request

Commander, INSCOM
ATTN: IAMG-C-FOI
2600 Ernie Pyle St.
Fort Meade, MD 20755-5995

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 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMA TIONIPRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

Freedom of Information/ HAR 3 o zom

Privacy Office

This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of February 12, 201 O
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) requesting file FBI HQ 105-19581 and supplements our
letter of July 13, 2012.

As noted, coordination with another element this command has been completed and the referred
records have been returned to this office for final disposition and direct reply to you.

We have conducted a mandatory declassification review of the responsive records in accordance

with Executive Order (EO) 13526. As a result of this review, information has been sanitized from the
records as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according
to Sections 1.2(a)(2), 1.2(a)(3) and 1.4(c) of EO 13526. This information is exempt from public
disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1 ). The record is partially
releasable and is enclosed for your use. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.2(a)(2) of EO 13526 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its un-
authorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national
security.

Section 1.2(a)(3) of EO 13526 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if

its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national
security.

Section 1.4(c) of EO 13526 provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities,

intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for
classification protection.

The deleted information is also exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with EO 13526,
Section 3.3(b)(1) because its release would clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity
of a confidential human source, a human intelligence source, a relationship with an intelligence source;
or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under
development.

Information has been sanitized from the record as the release of such information would result in an
unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from
public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(6).

In addition, information which would reveal sensitive investigative methods and techniques has been
sanitized from the record. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by
withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon
 -2-

protection of sensitive intelligence methodologies. This information is exempt from public disclosure
pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA.

This withholding of information described above constitutes a partial denial of your request. This
denial is made on behalf of Major General Christopher S. Ballard, Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence
and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority in this matter under the FOIA. You may
appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal at this time, your appeal
must be postmarked no later than 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 90 day period
the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in
the courts. You should state the basis for your disagreement with the response and you should provide
justification for an additional administrative search to be conducted or reconsideration of the denial. An
appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new information. An appeal may only address
information denied in this response. Your appeal is to be made to this office to the below listed address
for forwarding, as appropriate, to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel:

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
2600 Ernie Pyle Street, Room 3S02-B
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-5910

Forty-eight pages have been withheld in their entirety as it is not possible to reasonably
segregate the withheld information. Deleted page sheets have been provided to explain the reason
for the withholdings and to identify the withheld pages.

There are no assessable FOIA fees for the processing of this request.

If you have any questions regarding this action, contact this office at 1-866-548-5651 or email the
INSCOM FOIA office at: usarmy.meade.902-mi-grp.mbx.inscom-foia-service-center@mail.mil and refer
to case #3487F-12. Please note that you now have the ability to check the status of your request online
via the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency website:
https://www.foia.army.mil/FACTS/CaseStatus.aspx. Please refer to FOIA Control Number: FP-12-
029672. You may also seek dispute resolution services by contacting the INSCOM FOIA Public Liaison,
Mrs. Joanne Benear, at 301-677-7856.

Sincerely, ~~

Micha~eaton
Director
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure
 : ··• ,·, ·· ..
, I '
.. .•
" :)
I•• 1

I - •. .I -- . ·: -- · .
...

ALL FBI HJFORMATI J N CONTAINED

HEREilJ IS ID1CLASSIFIED
DATE 11-04-2011 BY 60324 UC BAw/ SAB/MJS

(U) FOREWORD CU}

(tT) T~i-~ ;p~~'11~-fubli$~<}.J>yJ,\1~9fti€,;&1li the As&stant Chief of StafJ
for Intelligence, Ilepai:tment of the ~ ~ ~ i r d in a series to support
!l- program to inform the .Army apQu.t curxent..developments·a.nd· trends in the
technit{ues of espionage and subverisio~ which a.re employed by the Sino-Soviet
bloc to n,ttain i;ts Cold War objectiv~, anq. which have a direct or indirect
impa<.t upon the security 0£ the U.S. Army.
(U) The pamphlet contains information designed for use in implementing
AR 381-12, "Subversion o.nd Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army
(Short Title: SAEI)A (U) )," 8 September 1961, which establishes a. require-
ment to insure that !Ill military personnel and civilian employees of the Army
are given orientation on methods used by foreign intelligence services to gather
information pertaining to U.S. Army installations, activities and personnel.
Within the limit$ 9f. seourity classifications set forth in the articles, material
herein ma.y be used in the preparation of indoctrination lectures. In addition,
the contents of this pamphlet m~y be ~ed as background rnateria.l in the
preparation of troop training programs concerning Communist subversion
and espionage.
(U) Articles appea.rlng herein are gee.red to the exposition of current
intelligeµce activities of th~ Sino-Soviet Empire as they qccur a.round the
world. It is int.e~ded th.a.t the pamphlet be given the widest possible distribu-
tion consistent with its security classification in order that A,.J:my personnel may
· be CQnversa.nt with Communism i:o, all its fo~ms anc,i. t~us be better prepared
to cope with the security haze.~ which the Ar-µiy face;; in the conduct of
its prims.ry mission.
(U) Revisions 9f this pamphlet will be published from time to time in
order that its cont.ents may keep pac;e with woridwide developments in th~
counterint.elligence field. Readers are encou~ged to comment on its content
and to submit suggestions, either with respect to its improvement, or the
incluioiqp. of special artides in future editions.

SECRET- Regraded TJN'CLASSITTED lin

11 Anril 2012
bv USA.INSC731t FOJ!PA
..\uth Encl 5, para 1-d, DOD 5:!00-01-V l

l9- · 1
 -SEC-RE"F . \, Pam 30-20-3

PAMPHLET I HEADQUARTERS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
.

No. 30-20-3 WA.SBINOToN 25, D.C., SO November 1962

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS (U)
Table of Contents
ESPIONAGE (U)
Page
·Tlie lio.nd..That Reached Around the World (U) ••••••••••••• ··~····••"-······~· 2
· Chinese Communist Intelligence Agents (U) •••••• ••• • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • 12
The North Korean Agent (U)................................................ 16
The Suicidal Escort Agent (U)............................................... 23
Czech Espionage in Switzerla.nd (U) •. ·-·······-··········---•------·-······--- 27
Use of Cover Names by Red China (U) ••••·••.••.••.•••.•••••••••••.••••.•..... 28
ESPIONAGE RECRUITMENT TECHNIQUES (U)
The Friendly Doctor (U).................................................... 30
Sexual Entrapi:nent (U):........... •• ••. .••••• .•••..•.••.••• .•••• .••••• ••. . . . . . 31
SUBVERSION
American Reds Fight American Law.(U) •••••.••• ~.-~-------·----············· 36
Cuban-Communist Indootrina~ion of Latin American Youth (U).................. 41
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
They Put Ea.rs in the Walls (11).............................................. 44
SABOTAGE
Sabotage In Iran (U) ••••.•••.•••••.•..••...........•..... - . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . 56
PROPAGANDA (U)
Chinese Commwiist Publioa.tions (U) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• __ •••• - • • • • 58
Communist Propaganda. Exploitation of Captive US Army Personnel (U).......... 61
SECURITY (U)
Security Responsibilities (U) ••••••••••••• ,. ..................... ••.•..• ••• .•••. 64
Security Violatiollli are Bad lia.b;ta (U)......................................... 67
Security Measures of the Communist Party, USA (U)........................... 72
ESPIONAGE B~lEfS (~)
Items of Interest Around the World (U) •••••..•• ~............................. 76

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. . . ._..,.

( ),S);\: 2
 SECR~

..

ESPIONAGE

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.... 'J:--l.JOEX. ~
Uffi: . DOC---3 · ,4.() 3
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,.:..i
~ENTIAL
SECRET ·11

(S) THE HAND THAT REACHED AROUND THE WORLD (U}

(U) It was cold and damp on 7 January 1961 earlier in cities half a. world a.part-New York
when greying, 55 year old Harry Houghton a.nd and W rsaw.
Miss Ethel Eliza.beth Gee, plwnp and mid-forty-
ish, boarded the Salisbury_ train for London.
They didn't know it, but Chief Inspector Fergu-
son Smith of Scotla.nd Yard boarded the same
train.
tTJ} In 'Lond·on, tire 'two ~ g °l'()vers wo;lked·
closely together, towa.rd the Old Vic Theatre nea.r

b1
Waterloo Bridge. They didn't notice, but In-
spector Smith was also on his wa.y to the Old Vie.
(U) Near the theatre a younger ma.n, heavy but
with bouncing step, approached the couple from
behind. He placed friendly bands on their shoul-
ders and they walked on a bit, chatting amicably.
The younger ma.n reached over and ·took a shop-
ping bag :from Miss Gee.
(U) At that moment Inspector Smith briskly
stepped in front of the group. "You are under
arrest," he said. "I am a. police officer."
(U) The three friends looked around anxiously
and StLW a. swarm of British counterintelligence
agents materialize from nowhere.' They peace-
fully submitted to arrest. Six months of close
around-the-clock surveillance had come to an end. (U) Morris Cohen was an interesting man. He
Other arrests were quick to follow. wn.s born in the Bronx about 1910 and was gradu-
(U) In Miss Gee's shopping ba.g, the British ated from Ja.mes · Monroe High in 1928. Two
agents found four pamphlets and a tin can sealed yea.rs later he enrolled at the University of Ala.-
with adhesive tape. The pamphlets were ha.ma on an athletic scholarship, but he transferred
SECRET in:formation on British underwater to Mississippi State in 1931 a.nd was graduated
weapons. Inside the can was a roll of unde- from that school with o. BA degree in 1934. Then
veloped film-microfilm photographs of 212 pages he spent six months in graduate studies at the
of the SECRET British Roya.I Navy document University of Illinois and began to study the
entitled "Particulars of War Vessels." All the works of Karl Marx.
material was the property of the British Ad- {0}\
miralty Underwater Weapons Establishment in
Portland, Englan~, the site where Englana was
building her first nuclear submarine, the Dread-
naught, powered with, a US-built nuolea,r engine.
(U) This was the end· of e. successful Soviet
b1
espionage operation that had begun ten years

SECRET
Excluded from ~utomatic Ragradlng:Regraded CONFIDENTIAL on
2 DOD Dir, 5200,10 Does Not Apply l l April 2012
by USAINSCOM FOIIP A .
·Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-lR
 ---SEC-RET
CONft'IBENTlAL - I I

,:,,
world, he told the court. But he didn't say that
many of his customers were Soviet e.spionn.ge
b1 agents, and that some ·of the r11-re and' ancient vol-
umes the.t left his shop conta.ined messages in the
most modern mi(ll'o-dot photography-.
o en ma.rr1 na Teresa Petka in July (U) Although money was o-f no object to the
1941 in Norwich, Connecticut. Lona, born in · Cohens, they played their part, well, Upon arrival
19'13 of Pol~sh parents in Ada.ms, Massachusetts, in London, Morris Cohen rented a buck room over
was a, dominating woman who had already dedi- a tobo.coo shop for nin'e pounds a week and com-
cn.eed •~.........· ilLJ...._.iUR-'---""...,_._!..U.L!--'-'-"''-'-"'.....,.,.___ _ _---, plained bitterly about the cost. They rented a
~ house for IS guineas a week, a,nd finally bought a-
home in Ruislip for 4,200 pounds ($11,760), Mrs.
"Kroger'' ha.ndled all the money. The British
press later sa.ia the reµt oq the h~e and the price·
of the house had been -p~id by a Swiss bank, but
thjs was not menti · t

b1 (Ji!)

: ,1 ·
;. !

., i'
hen served as a cook in the U.S. .Army

b1
I ,1

Quartermaster Corps during World War II, with

duty in .Ala.ska and France. During the wa.r, ','
Lona. worked in a munitions plant. Both were
fingerprinted in 1942. After the war, Cohen re-
·turned to New York City, took a 2-year course
at Teachers dollege, Columbia University, an<l in
1947 h ' 1
(j5)

b1 i il
: •i
: I
,I

'!
I

I. I'I
(U) But Cohen, ~etween 1950 and 1954, could I'!
hardly ho.ve accumulated a "life's savings" suffi- I
cient to purchase the 5,000 rare and ancient vol-
umes he had at the time of his arrest; nor did he
.I
have "considerable experience" as an antiquary I,
when he left the United States. His ·customers I.
were university and public libie.ries, professors,
dealers, and priva.te individuals throughout t.he i:.
1·,
i,i
-SECRET Regraded CONFIDENRAL on
11 April 2012
CONFIDENTIAL
---- ' by USAINSCOM FOI/PA l''
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Auth pora 4-102, DOD 5200 7~R.,: '
 b1
Figwro 1 (UNCLASSIFIED). Mom, Oohen allaa Peter
Kroger (U).

o ouy was e hea.vy man with the

boUJJ.cing step arrested with the Cohens as he at-
tempted to ta.ke a handbag :from Lona. At their
trial, the Cohens admitted to having met with

b1
A ter the Cohens' a.rrest, Ca.nadian pass-
ports were :found in their Ruislip home. The
passports were in the names of Thomas James
Wilson and Mary Jane Smith, both native•born
Canadians, and contained photographs of the
Cohens. Canadian authorities examined the pass•
ports and said they were complete forgeries. In-
formation in the passports indicated they bad been
issued by the Depau-tment af External Affairs at
Ottawa on 15 June 1956, so they could not have
been sed duri · 9o n

b1 Figure$ (UNCLASSIFIED).
Krouor
Lona Cohen aiiaa Helen
(U).

4 -SECR-E"f Re~aded CONFIDENTIAL on

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Molody, known to them as Gordon Arnold ·
Lonsdn le, in France in U156. This may explain
the Travelers Cheq\1e that was ca.shed in Paris that
spring. Cohen, at his tria.l said: "Attracted by
his effervescent personality a.nd stimulating com~
ments on literature, I invited (Lonsdale) to my
home. Our relationship developed into a. warm
friendship which was marked by his generous
nature. He w.ould drop into our home during the
week OJl.d on odd weekends."
(U)' Molody ,vas mol"6 than an intelligence
operative. He wns an astonishing, absorbing man
who immersed himself completely in his job-yet
h~ wrot~ so'\.1lnil micrQ-Q.Qt l\ltt\''fS "to hi!J wife in
Russia, whom he hadn't seen for yea.rs, He was
fluent in numerous languages, including English;
in spare moments he dabbled in the London stock
market, and mad& several thousa.nd dolllU'S. He
once took a tourist bus tour of Europe a.nd became
n. friend of a U.S. Army officer, but he a.ppa.rently
never used the friendship to gain military infor-
mation, ·This wa.s the man who had kept the
USSR abreast of the Western.world's·underwater
weapons development&,
(U) He was born Conon Molody on 17 J a.nua-ry
1922 in Moscow, the only son of Trofim Molody, a.
Soviet scientist, a,nd Evdokyia. Konsta.ntinovna..
His father died on 14 October 1929, but his mother
is.believed to be living in Moscow. (In·December
1960, Molody's wife wrote from Moscow: "I a.m
writing to tell you the truth so that you should
lmow that you must somehow ma.ke haste to come
~~ h' . "
(
b1
fl~teO O· SI• I SECRET
._._...,...
/
·t
(J.in I
b1
(U) There actually wB.S a. Gordon Arnold
Lonsda.le. He Wll.':I born 27 August 1924 in Cobalt,
Ontario, the son of British-Ca.na.dia.n Emroa.nual
Jack Lonsdale, a miner, a.nd Olga. Elina. Bousa, a
Finnish emigrant. Olga. and J a.ck were ma.rried
on 8 January 1924 at St. James Anglican Chuxch
and lived in Cobalt. But Olga. was hoII).esick for
Finland, a.nd the two did not have a. happy life
together. Olga. took young Gordon and left Jack
in 1981. She moved to Kirkland Lake, ·75 miles
north of Coba.lt, where she lived with a Finn
named Hja.lma,r Phila.ja. Philaja. realized Olga.
was homesick; he gave her money to return to her
home. When Olgn. tried to get passport, she found
that the birth of Gordon had never been registered,
She obtained a. record of delivery from the doctor,
got the passport, a.nd sailed :for Finland-never
t.o be heard of a.gain. The failure to register young
Gordon at the time of his birth provided damning
evidence against Molody a.this tria.l in 1961.
(U) Molody had his cover story down pat-
with documents to prove it, But the Canadian
doctor's record of delivery that Olga had to use to
backup the birth certificate has some small' print:
it indicated that. the teal Gordon had been circum-.
cised at birth. Molody had a.U the documentation,
but he was at a loss to explain his physical condi-
tion.' Even the best agents make mistakes.
(U) The Lonsdale passport showed that Mol-
ody left Canada on 22 February 1955 by way of
Niagara Falls,· New York. He sailed from New
5
 -SECRET- ..
firms, Master Switch Company 0£ Coplestone
Road, Peckham SE, a.nd a subsidiary firm, Allo
Security Products, Ltd., 19 Wardour Stre·et, Wl,
both concerned with selling patented safety lock-
ing devices.
(U) He' lived well, dressed well, and drove a
new Studebaker. Though he was a. devoted :family
man, he was lonely and had romances with
women-Yugosla.v, Belgian, Italian, Canadian-
that he met at the Overseas Club in St. James'.
He was never short of money. Besides the· 8,000
pounds that he had parle.yed into 30,000, he lmd.
a second income-it came from Moscow via the ·
-United· ·Sta.tee ·an·d ·Switzerl1nrd: Irt addition to
accounts with the Midland Bank in London,
Molody had o.n witouoha.ble account with the
Credit Suisse in Geneva.

Figure S (UNCLASSIFIED). Oonon Moloily aJla8 Gor4<1n

Arnoia Lonstiale (U). b1
York City on the SS America, e.rriving in South-
ampton, Engla,ndt on 8 March 1955. Well financed (U) Rudolf Iva,novitcll Abel never'talked. He
(8,000 pounds)°, he took up residence 11,t the White was silent at his trial, he wa.s pleasant but silent
House .A.partments near Regents Park. He im- through 5 yea.rs at the Federal prison in Atlanta,
mediately went to France to meet with the Cohens. 9.lld he was still silent when he crossed the ancient,
(U) In October 1900, Molody enrolled as a windswept bridge in southwest Berlin on 10 Feb-
student at the London University School of Ori- ruary 19'62, in exchange for American U-2 pilot
ental Languages and African Studies, and for 18 Fra.neµ,· C-UJIW...%'--'-'LLllJ=~----------,
months regularly attended the Chinese language
course. He was a master o::f languages, fluent in
English, French, Serbo-Croatian, and Chinese.
He was also successful in the financial world. He
operated businesses a.nd dabbled in the stock mar-
ket, on one occasion, making a large profit on a
flyer dealing with a. quick turnover in aircraft
shares.
(U) As a cover, he went into legitimate business
and made·money at it. He first bought used juke
boxes 11,nd rented them out; later he added bubble-
b1
gum vending machines. Finally he went into
partnership with two Britishers, Peter Ayers a,nd
Michael Bowers, in a company known as Auto-
matic Merchandising Company. Molody handled
the Continental accounts, travelibg to Italy,
France and Switzerland. When the business fal- • • • *
tered, Mo1ody got out with 30,000 British pounds (U) Far from New York and London, in We.r-
and joined the board of directors of two other saw, another part of Operation Portland began

6 -6-EGRE~ Regraded CONFIDENTIAL on

11 Apil 2012
CO~.IDENTIAL by USAJNSCOM FOI/P A
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CONFIDENTIAL
:..-,-
SEC-R£1f
in 1951. Henry Frederick Houghton; the Secu-
rity Officer at the British Embassy in Wn.rsa.w,
was blackmailed by Polish Military Intelligence
and a · d to ·v ' · · h~ was trying to ·heip Clui!!ti:J;m out of Poland.
b1
.... · lioughton..met.:11.11d.,became ..intima.te-:w.ith. .t.wice,. :w.hen he..attempted. to. pas~. w.or.thless. ins
a young blonde Polish girl named Christin~
Christi.ii.ii. was a "frightened.'' temptress. She in-
sisted that their m~etings ·be "secret" and· would
come to his room at night only- a.fter an alt-clear
signal was given: by a l~ni.p at the window.
Houghton, during 15' months, in Warsaw, made
approximately 4,000 pounds in black-market op-
erations selling coffee and drugs. Because of his
growing drinking habits; his black.market acti'vi~
a
ties, and his family problems-he was m.a.rried · classified materia.l and wanted to· kndw if it were
man-Houghton was sent home in October 1952.
But the Z.-II, the Polish military intelligence
service; al~ knew of his activities and th~ acted
more quicl!:ly than the British. By thJ! time he
left Warsa.w; Houghton. ha~ been blackma.iied
into the service o;f Polish :intelligence.
(U)· When he retqrD,~d to Engl!Uld, Houghton · concerning underwater weapons.
was posted tQ the Adµiiralty,· •Vnderwater Wea.p-
ons EstabUshmeP.t.,o:p,~:of Bnta.iP,1s· mo~ ~ooret ex-
perimental bas~~;- '.itoughton pr~!l,biy' passed
information, to Soviet intelligell,CC·)V'hile wo1;king
here, anq twice he seemed to slip up.'. tn tSt4 and·
1956 he•w1;1-S undt;1rmvestigll,tio.n tor· ~i~g~41y tak-
ing secre~ :doouinents ~Q~· ~om' ~he .,A.~ralty
Underwater Weapqns Esta.blisrup~;n,t. · But the
charg% were never proven, anc'!; H;\¢fy· continued
to be a trust~d Acllpir&it-y. emplt?Y~• Tht1 _fµia,i
investiga.tio.n begl!Jl -1;,~µ~ of }Joughton's livi,ng
suspicioµsly in. ex~·-ofiiis :j.µ~iµe.
(U) Houghton tells anoth~r ·story. He said he
was not blae4mailed by.the-Pol8$in Warsaw, and
that his· first appi'•ti,Qh by .So:viet •intelligence
agents was in: Engla.nd in January 19.!S'r. :He re-
ceived a telephone call from a unidentified person
who insisted on meeting him concerning Ohrutina..
(...lol:t
,.,.,,.,.,
---.
~\\
,He met a man whoin ·he later knew only as
"Nikki," a Pole, outside the Pulwich Art Gallery
in London. NikW., i-;id Houghton to believe that
Aftei; establishing. rapport Qf a s<;>rt., Nikki then
n.sked Houghton to- g~fr _!or him some "snii_>;petit
of naval ~formation. }ioughtqn clqims that he
refused tQ cooperate··but thim hew~ {91:ced to be-
ca;lise "the t.na,n so.id thµigs would ,go· hard for me,
and· perhaps Chri_i;itina./,.: 'rhen· beg~n- a series. of
cla.ndestin,nneetings with Nikki and· another agent
named John to whoin. Houghtop fed the "snip-
pets" of naval informafi9n. H;otig}lto~ said that
formation, he was s~verely- l>e~fen and threatened
with death. .
(U) Houghton sa.i4 1i'e· in~t' o;non 'Mol'ody,
known to him as Alexander Johnson,.in June 1960.
Molody, posing as a U.S. Navy comma.t;1der a.s~
in
signed to the :U.$. Attache. office; Tuoncl9n,. tQl(i
Ho~ghton he he.d been asked to look him up by· a.
:friend of Houghton in Warsaw. "Johnson" said
the United St/l.tes Wl!,S· giving England val~able
ptoper.ly used. · He requested Houghton,'-apd
Houg~ton's ~~nd, Eth!:'l El~abetl,f G~e-'.-to ob-
tain .British secrets so lie could check on the mat-
ter 1;>~1).use, ·after ailJ ''we are ~li' iY.Orkil1g tQwa,rd
a co~on goal:'; H'.oughoon then supplied 'lihn
with fleet orders, coµununications sectets. and data
· ·
CU) N~i(;hl}r British or American intellig¢nce
is i~cli~ed to believe Houghton's st(ity of naive
coop~ratfon. · · , · • · ··
(U} :f{oughton firs.t met "Bunty'; Gee in 19p4.
Slie was
a; lonely old· maid'" who· wor:\ted in tlie
Secrets File roo~ at the B'ritish Establlsh.ment.
Her salary. was only $30 a weeJr, but ~he h.ad' a.
position of some resP,0~$ibi11ty---lhaking file ~eeks
and iss-qing classified dbcµme~.ts· to 6,llicialii re,-
q.u~ling res~:rch. i.n,fo11Patfc;>n. :.
JU). Mi~s G.ee; ~pioy~d, at th~ tt~de:rwater
We.a,pons tst1!,bli~lµpe11t sh:ice tMP; live<! ip J;>ort-
la.nd, with her .SO-year-old mother,. a 113:yeo.x:,oici
wicle and an octogenarian aunt who had been
bt:ip,i:4~<;lel), :(o~ 22 yea:ni,•. It was,11,,lcm,~y and- h!l,rd
ex.istence: 'l'hen,she .met .wonderf:ul•. light-hearted
Harr.y:,- Houghton. There wo.s- nothing: romantic
looking. about Rarey, He. was, in fact, mean
Regraded c·oNFIDErfn:AL on
11 Apil 2012
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-lR
 -SEGR£-r-
Figure 4 (UNCLASSIFIED). Henrt1 Fretlerlok "Harry"
Hougheon, (U).
looking, long nosed, cleft-chinned, and whisky
flushed. But t.o 11. womn.u like "Bunty"-long un-
loved n.nd umvanted-he must have seemed her
dream man. , subway to Ruislip. He strolled' leisurely along
(U) The friendship developed into something
more, and she begnn meeting "socinlly" wit.h Harry
when he bought a house trailer in 1958 n.nd set up
bachelor quarters in Portland .. When he later
moved into a. cottage in town, they decorated it
t.ogether. At her trml she admitted to the role of
mistress :for a period of some yea.rs.
(U) Bunty, too, sa.ys they never met Molody
until June of 1960. She said she took him to be
n,n American because of his accent, and because
he chewed gum, wore a. flashy ring, and had a
watch that told the date. But British and Ameri•
cnn intelligence do not believe her story, either.
(U) The story of the British surveillance of
the couple, as told in Old Baiiey Court, began on
9 July 1960. That summer afternoon, Harry met
Miss Gee in the lobby of the Cumberland Hotel
in London. Under the skillful, unobtrusive watch
of MI-5, the couple went to the Old Vic Theatre.
As they walked, Molody joined them and gave
Houghton a, small envelope. While Molody and
Miss Gee sa.t chatting in a small park, Harry went
away and returned carrying a light blue-grey
carrier bag which he gave to Molody. Molody
8 -SEC-RE"F-
left them and, following n. circuitous route, wnlked
to his car and drove away. The first observed
exchange had been ma.de.
(U) A month later, on 6 August 1960, Hough-
ton met Molody near the Old Vic. They walked
to a small cotfee house cnlled Steve's Cafe nep.r
Waterloo Station. Over a cup of coffee, they dis-
cussed a newspaper clipping concerning the de-
fection o.f Martin and Mitchell to Russio..
(U) Three weeks later, agents watched Molody
enter a London bank and put 11, large leather case
in a deposit vault. The next day he left England
o.nd traveled extensively on the Continent. MI-5
obtained a search W!U'.rll,nt .and. .opened..the case,
It contained the tools of a spy-ca.mern., tube-type
microscope for reading micro-dot messages, and
a Ronson table-type cigarette lighter with a secret
compartment in its base. ~he hidden cavity con-
tained coding and decoding instructions for radio
transmitted messages. The items were returned
to the vault. A. month later Molody returned to
England, retrieved the leather case, and took it to
his office in downtown London. The equipment
was next seen in the home of Morris Cohen.
(U) After: leaving his office, Melody took the
the residential streets, then came to a private ron.d
joined by a £ootpa.th. The path led to n. peaceful
country road called Cranleigh Drive. When he
entered No. 45, n. simple stucco and brick house,
Figure 6 (,UNOL.ASSIFIED). Ethel "B1mt11" Gee (U).
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
11 April 2012 .
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-lR
 SECRE-"F
Molody had led MI-5 to the long-missing Cohen-
Peter John Kroger, the antique book dealer.
(U) Following the arrest of Houghton, Ethel
_Gee and Melody near Waterloo B'ridge on 'r Jan-
uary, agents raided the Ruislip house . and took
"Peter John Kroger" n.nd his wife into custody.
A check of their fingerprints with the 1942 prints
of Morris and Lona Cohen, sent to Scotland Yard
by the FBI in 1951, confirmed the Cohen's identity.
(U) But Cohen didn't confess. He said he had
bought the Ruislip home in 1958, transferring hls
place of business from London to sa.ve money and
avoid the daily trip into the city.
(lJ) "frof0§~or1;1 !HlQ c~o.mer.s n:.om..the.United.
States, Canada, Great Britain and the Continent
visited me and stayed at my home/' Cohen said,
· adding, "I am a member of the .Antiquarian Book-
seU\111'! Association and the National Book
·League."
~-(U) To the casual. burglar, the house at 45
Cranleigh Drive would have been quite a shock.
The :front door had a Yale lQck, a mortise look,
and a securing chain and bolts, top and bottom.
The rear door had two mortise locks and bolts,
top and bottom. Four bolts and two patented
locking devices secured each of the windows, in
addition to their ordinary oa.tches. "After all,"
Cohen explained, "I have o,000 valuable books in
the house." There were other items o:f ·value to.
Cohen and his employers. , (U) "At ope time while the Krogers w~re
(U) Among the items fowid bidden in the
house were micro-dot microscopes (sma.Uer than
a cigarette), slides, microfilm-reading equipment,
di.µnmy flashlight batteries ( for hiding messages),
a 100-watt, 115-pound portable radio transmitter-
receiver which could be set up for immediate oper-
ation m about three minutes, a 150-foot cable an-
tenna capable of, receiving and ~ding messages to
Moscow, the copfing ca.mere. Molody had stored at
the bank-a $200 fraktina, also the Ronson lighter
with the secret compartment and pads of special
message paper thafawould dissolve a.s soon lloS it
was placed near heat. Also found were a list of
code numbers used in encoding messages, a.n· auto-
matic keying device enabling Morse code to be
transmitted at up to 21S0 words a minut6-& speed
which lessens the chance of the signal being de-
tl,'-Cted, or if detected, of pinpointing its origin. A
total of $29,171 in Amerie&n o.nd English currency,
.l:"rl:il:"T
S 11:.Vn.:.a-
;lf 11
~\I
travelers checks, British savings bonds and stocks
were also cached in the houso.
(U) In Miss Gee's home, ngents found an
English translation of a Russian 12-part question-
naire concerning the British nuclear submarine;
and they :found $11,200 in savings bonds-a size..
n.ble nestegg :for a woman- earning less than $150
n. month and supporting three other adults. The
British court confisca.ted e.11 the monies, declaring
"these are Russian monies," and charged the
amount against court costs. ·
(U) Only Houghton and Gee elected to testify
in their own behal£-tel1ing the. fantasy of the
.American Naval .A:t~b:e.
(U) Molody did make a stmnge W1sworn clos-
ing statement-strange because he attempted to
exonerate completely the Cohens und · accept full
responsibility himself. He alone, he said, and
without their knowledge, transfori;ned the Ruislip
home into a powerful radio transmitting station.
He to~d a fantastic story of night and weekend
labor at the home of his hosts-of which they were
never aware. During the weekend absences of the
Cohens, he said, he managed to secrete suph tools
o:f the espionage trade as radio direction finders,
forged passports, false-bottomed bookends and tal-
cum powder cans, and a small :fortune in Americll,.Il
and British currency.
awa,y," Molody said, "I constructed the hiding
place found in the foundation of the house and
deposited. there for long-term stor~e the radio
tra.nsmitter and other arthlles. I took great care
that no traces of its existence were le£t. I knew
if the contents of the hiding place,were discovered,
it would land Mr, and Mrs. Kroger in very serious
trouble. I ~ecided to obtain false passports whlch
could be used by the Krogers if such an event took
place." On innocent prete~t, he said, he took some
photographs of the Krogers, inserted them into
the passports, conceal1;1d them in a leather writing
pad and hid them in the home aJong with about
$4,000 ingeta.wa.y funds. (None of this,of course,
would have been necessary had the Cohens been
innocent.) ·
(U) Molody's London· days included· an in-
teresting side trip to the Continent that may ha.te
started simply as o; rele.xing vacation.
ARegraded UNCLA.SSIFlED on
r 11 A.pril 2012· 9
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102~ DOD 5200-lR

~RET~·'--:_ _ _ _____,
r - - - - - - - - - ~ ool
,--..x:=..L.J
b1
U This case shows the care ta.ken in develop-
ing sources: The sexual and black-market entrap-
ment of Houghton in Warsa.w a.nd ~e blackma,il
control pla.ced over him in England; the studied
approach to Miss Gee using the one thing she
wanted most-love--as a. device for entrapment.
10
.,../
b1
(U) Throughout the case, we see almost un•
believnhle examples 0£ the tenacious devotion to
duty shown by Soviet intelligence agents, yet they
remain poignantly human. During this case, both
the mother and father of Morris Cohen died, but
he attended neither :funeral. Molody, a devoted
family 'man, suffered , almost constantly from
sepn.ro.tion from his wife and fo.mily-o.nd his
wife longed for him, too.
(U) Molody wrote regulnrJy to his wiie and
family. He reduced the letters to micro•dots and
the Coh~s sent them to Moscoiv in their books.
When Lona Cohen was n.rrested, micro-dot letters
were found in her purse-one from Melody's wife
n.Ild the other, .lt{olody's reply. The letter from
Moscow, dated ODet1ember 1960, read, "Hello my
DarJing: I congratulate you on the past :forty-
third anniversary of the October Revolution . . . .
We were all deeply sorry you were not with us
11,lld so was I especially.... How unjust is life.
I fully understand you are working, and this is
your duty and you love your work antl try to do
all this• very conscientiously. Nevertheless, my
re11,SQning is, somehow, narrow•minded, in the fe•
male fashion, and I suffer drendfully."
(U) Molody responded with o. six•page reply
which said, in p!!,rt: "My bel9ved Galyusha. Just
received your mail. I am very happy to have
three letters from you in one lot. . . ."
(U) "I hope you don't think ~ am an entirely
ha.rd-hearted man who gives no thought to o.ny,
body. .All I am going to sa.y is, I myself bo.ve only
one life, a not entirely easy one at tliat. 'I want
to spend my life so that later on there is no shame
to lO<?k back on, if possible.
12
 -SECRET
(U) "I do know what loneliness is. From the
n,ge of ten, during the past 29 years, l have spent·
only ten years with my own people. I did not
wish it and I did not seek it, but so it turned out
to be. It did not depend on me. I-have thought
very much about it. . . .
(U) "I understand you quite well. You wrote
that seven October anniversaries were celebrated,.
without me. That is so, of course. But· I have
celebrated them without you and wit.bout the chil-
dren and without my people. . . . I am not com-
plaining, but even you cannot imagine how sad I
feel in general and especially at this moment..•.
. :,
This is the eig.llth year I have celebrated without
you. Such is life. Many kisses to my beloved
wife and children.
(signed) K.
"P.S. I will be thirty-nine shortly. Is there much
left i"
(U) Material presented in this article may be
used in the preparation of lectures required by
pn.ragraph 7,' AR 381-fa If presentation is to be
unclassified, those. paragraphs clnssified CONFI-
DENTIAL and SECRET must be deleted or re-
placed by fictitious material.
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
11 April 2012
by USAINSCOM FOI/P A
A,uth para 4-102, DOD 5200-lR
11
 /

SECRET
,../""

(S) CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE AGENTS (U}

L'?)j
b1
\
Intelligence Operations

b1
The Beginning

b1
b1 Overseas Chinese
(U) A considerable number of persons of Chi-
nese origin live iri the United States, as in nearly
every country of the world. The current total is
estimated at 287,000. Altogether, over 11 milHon .
Chinese live outside the borders of Communist
China, not including those on Taiwan and in
Hong Kong and Ma.oo.o, with roughly 10 million
of them living in southeast Asia. This lea.ves
about 2 million ChineS& residing in the Western
World, a sizeable pool :for potential recruitment.
There a.re currently 16,000 Chinese in Mexico,
~ in C:~ and 20,000 in Cuba.

12

3114 10 ~ _-HQ - 7CJ{:::}l( Stukl&,

 ~-------------------'~C---~
SECRrt' ··1'
The Chine5e in America
(U) The flow of Chinese into the United States
is both legal a.nd illegal. ~y o.ir n.nd sea. during
the year ending 80 ,Tune 1960, 3,626 aliens from
Hong Kong, 68,920 aliens from Japan, 1,241 aliens
from Korea, and 1,654 aliens :from the Ryukyu
Isla.nds, arrived in the United States-all legally,
but among them could.have been. numerous Com-
munist agent.a. The number entering illegally is

b1 difficult to determine since only 'those caught· can

be counted. During 1960 a total of 2,1015 Chinese
were apprehended in the United Scates 11s deport-
able aliens. Many of the Chinese ( approximately
80 .percent). -in--the -l.Jnited-.States are--not-citizens-
n.nd do not intend to-or cannot-become Ameri•
can citizens. Each Janua1:y all alien residents in
the United States must register with the Immigra-
tion and Naturll.lization .Service, giving their
nrune, address, and occuplt'tion. The last registra•
tion revealed that there are 4'7,895 noncitizen
Chin ·,r ·

b1
Total Allcn.t Oil#rw
Canadian Border ••••••••••••••••••••••• 55,494,307 29, 75/i, 396 26,738,912
Mexican Border••••••••• ; •••••••.••••.• 06, 825,995 55,629; 577 41:, 1!1'6, 418
Crewmen on Ships••..••••••••••.•...•.• 2, ~0,634 1,692,893 857, 741 )/..
Others••.......•....••...•••.•...••... 4,487,146 1,907,740 2, 679, 406 y>
Tot.ala Admitted••••••••••••.• ---· 159,358,082 88,986,605 70,372,477

Figure 6 (UNOLASSIB'IlDD), Oilu1111• and A.lim., admitted at US ports of. entrv J. July
J.959-80 Jun,e 1960 CU).

b1 w,\
Entry via Mexico

&UIBO O • U • ~ SECRET
.,...,..••'.
b1
13
\
........--·

um '3;) 15
 --SEC-REr .,
CO.N.FIDEITTIAL

~--------------'-----7
_(kn\,---''----------------,

b1
b1
U) The Chine'se a.re prominent ~embers of
Mexican border communities. The city of Mexi-
cali actually was...fpunded by Chinese who were
-working· -for- ·a· ~~~ ·development ·company -in·
Mexico. From a.bout ·19~0, the Chinese owned a.p-
proximately 80 percent Qf.. the farms and cotton
plantations and 90 perce:JJP:0£ the retail stores in Indicators
the Mexicali area. The Mexican anti-Chinese
movement in 1933 caused many of the Chinese to
flee or relinquish their economic h.Q~iW,l~· World
War II reversed this economic ,t,t,fid• £Or the small
number of Chinese who rema.m-esl in the li,rea. As
of August 1960, the Chines·e community m. "Mexi- .
cali totaled about 1,000 and most· of the large re-
tail stores were ~a.in in Chinese possession. Many
new Chinese are arriving in the border areas and
consist of two classes: Those with Republic of
China (Taiwan) passports and those admitted as
Mexican citizens. Many of those in the first cat.e-
gory have Republic of China passports issued at
Macao, . the Portuguese exclave on the Chinese
mainland. Chinese officio.ls state that these pass-
port-holders a.re screened carefully, but the system
b1
is not foolproof. As for those in the second cate-
gory who are admitted as Mexican citizens, it is
known that citizenship papers can be purchased
through irregular channels for prices from $2,000
to $4,000 in U.S. currency, Processing of the ap-
plico.tions and negotiations for· citizenship papers
are usually conducted in Mexico City; however,
such documentation can also be obtained in Hong Entry via Canada
Kong or Japan. Upon receipt of instructions
:from the Mexican Department of Interior, the
appropriate Mexican Consulate in the 'Far East,
usually Tokyo, issues the necessa,ry pa.pars. Chi-
nese resident.s in Mexico stated that a number of
the new, young Chinese arrivals a.re unusua.lly well
versed in Spanish.

14 . -SEC-R-E"'F- Regraded CONFIDENTIAL on

11 April 2012
coNFwENTIAL
.-- by USAINSCOM FOI/P A
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83 16 /05--f-lQ.. - zq S€-J ~ I~
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Page(s) 17-24
IAGPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93
 '!

SECRET

(.Qr THE SUICIDAL ESCORT AGENT (U)

(U) Thi., apecf,a}, article ia a contribution to
001.vn.terintelligence Tnmd.~ and Developmenta O'!J
the 6~d Military lnteUigeMe Batt.a'Uon, Eighth
U'Tlite<l, States A.rm.y, locf1.ted at Yonga(NI,. &01,l,
l(orea.,----------------~

b1 ;I
:I
I

:I

;I
i
Indoctrination

b1 .1
'
I

I
I

:
I

'
i

' . I

b1 ..., I :1
I

I
!
! t

Training-"One if by land, two if by sea" / i

I I

~I

I
; I
I
I

I :
I
i
SECRET , .
Downgraded at 12 • Year lntertals:. I : I
Not A11tomatloally Deolasslfled I

DOD Dir, 5200~ 10 . 23

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL on
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by USAINSCOM FOI/P A ~ 1
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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-lR
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2-5-----------------
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[8J Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the
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release.

D Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to

you and/or the subject of your request.

D Information originated with another government agency. It has been

referred to them for review and direct response to you.

D Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are

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Page( s) 26-28
IAGPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93
 SEGRE=f
tFOl:JQJ CZECH ESPIONAGE IN SWITZERLAND (U)
The trial Qf three Ciech a.gents arrested by
,witzerlp.,nd 11- year a.go ended late this spring with
he coµ:viotjo;o. of all tln:~e for terms from 5 to 12
ra11,rs. A £ourt\l. member of the spy ring, Bohu-
;lav P .AVLIK, died during the trial.
The Swiss Government revealed :few details of
Jhe-case, ..but.from. v..e,riAAft ~g~es the foll.<>wiDg
3ynopsis hllS been pieced together.
Otto SOl-IWA.RZENB~RGER and his wife
Eva cf!Jlle to Swttzerland in ~959 on e:.ccellently
forged dooum~nts. En worked with Otto, and
though she wo wu.s p. trP-ined age;nt, Ott9 diq most
of.the C(>Uectins, 'rb.1> c;ouple ha,d been tra.ii;ieq. m
Prague and hii.d passed ~ii- "exam', in the form
of a 2-month pr41,ctical exerci.se in ]i!l,St Ger.trulJ)y,
'rh~ir tra,inini i.noluded the usual ~ q u ~
geogra,phy, langu~e, short-wave overQ.tioP.- 1 w.icro-
filming, invisible writing.
When they a;rrived in Swi~edllol).d, the "desti-
tuten couple w~ given help by the ci,ty ot B:nitten.
But they weren't really d~titute; ~ h.ev clothini,
Eva. had sewn 10,000 Swl~ tran<;e giv~ h.Q;r by thQ
Czech Government.
They moved tQ Zurich a.nd hD.r»edia.t\11y besa:n
working. Otto was hired by the Oerllkon A,Ja...
· chine Works as plant bOQkkeeper. ~ pefmjtte~
him to report to Prague on. materials furntehed the
Swiss A~my and to collect secret prod-qction flgt,rreij
on strategic iwms. He m.io101ilnled reports on
his observations and delivered thl)lll tQ the Czech
legation in Bern in p, cigp.rette package,
Otto RlEJo transmitted infor!Ilo.tton about P<>liti,
clans, emigrants, JS".ATO offl.cials, 8.Jl.d otlli,r promi-•
nent persons. In a.14 the Sohwa.n.en];)er~rs a:re
known. to have sent (S~ messages to Pr11rgqe, Sl)VE:,P.-of
them with a. shortwa;ve transmitter gjven, to th~m
by Pl\.vlik. lt was tbj1rra~o th.at eventup.lly p,.-o,
vided the incriminating evidepce.
The Sohwa.rzenbergl!ri:i wer~ well ftn9,J1C(}d
by the C~ch Govermnent. Dul!big the 2 y~ra;
SECR&:+
·besides the 10,000 Swiss francs ($2,600) they bega.n
with, they received 2'7,000 Swiss francs ($6,020)
and 27,000 kronen ($1,850) was added to a special
account in their name in Prague. Po.rt. of their
pay came directly :from the Czech Legation in
Bern.
While he worked at OerJikon, Schwa,rzenberger
was remiirde"d··by-Swiss-a.uthorities-that..he .had.n.'t
performed his "obligatory" militu.ry duties. So
he entered the army and eventually was assigned
to an office of the general staff. There, two a.uxil-
iary soldiers became suspicious of Schwa.rzenber-
ger because of "certain behavior" that was never
ela.borQ.ted on. Schwa.:rzenberger WQ.S put under
sqrveilJa,nce 'by Swis~ intellige:p.<;ie, but the incrimi- ·
1111,ting evide.JJ-oe Q.ga.i.pst him w~ discqvered, l?y
ch11,.nce. ·
A QriclJ:layer, diggmg iµ IL yard in a su,bur~
o1 Zm;ich, fottnd the shortwayQ tra,nsµtttter that
$chwarzenl?erger hac} buri~c;l on ordt}r:s :from
l?l'a.~e when he went into the army.
Inte~stingly, whe:o, t;lle Swiss arr~sted the
Saliwu.rzimber~rs, they 11,lso arrested Pavlik a.11d
Vl~s~l GU.SER, their ha.n«J,ers, a.lthoqgh bQtb,
were Cz(leh D\\Qona.ls beal'lllg diploviatic pa,esports.
T~e Swiss pointed ~>Ut tl:i;i.t ·stnce the t'iVO rqeq
wefe I\Ot c:,;edi,ted ~ith~r tQ the Swtss Government
OJ: to 1\-'Jly fntQrna.tiona.l prg~~ation ~9caied ip.
Swit2;el']11,nd1 they wete not inwlvecl ip. a ~e~th+iate
di:,;>!Qmatio mi~sion, in Switzerland, they were sul,-
jec~ to Swiss COJ:l.trQl a.IJ,d pQSEi\Qle an;~t jor-ille·ga.1
IU}tlviti~.
Th~ fact tha.t th~ Czech Gov~~~t (}hoo~e1;1 to
is~e d!J?loinatic passporw to m,embers of its eEipi-
OI).I\~~ service, the Swiss said, wa,s indica~j,ve 0£ the
attitude ta.keq by the ~ecq GQvernm~µt toward
the tre,qiti011iiUy iccepted r9les 9:f ~+sops h,wing
dipiom(l.tic 11ta.tus. ·
'l{ote. Matn,Al l~ tbls artJcle me,;1 ~ \l~!l ln tbe
\lr~a1:p.tton of \ectux~ req,utnid l>Y J>&rl!gi:-ap~ 7, .a,.~
~-12.
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iif'.-----'=----=-=-=-=-=-=--=--=--=------_b_1=========-=.-----------__J ~
(JJ} I unclassified.; this prohibits inclusion of the follow-
ing in ·

b1
(U) The letterhead on the reque.9t gave the
address as Headqua,rters, Combined Armed Forces,
PO Box 14940, Hong Kong, a.nd the letter was
signe°r-9bt.Y....!hl.L~WlmlL_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ b1
b1
(U) A semiannual OACSI publication entitled
Solicitation ~f Post, Ca.ml?, Station a.n.d Unit
Newspapers a.nd Other Military Publications
(U) furnishes Continental .A:nny Commanders
with a listing of members and employees of Soviet (U) .Axly solicitation for information received.
and Soviet Bloc diploma.tic missions in the United from any of the above na.1ned parsons or organiza.-
States. It also provides identification of indi- tions should not b& honored if the infonna.tion is
viduoJs and agencies involved in the collection of unclassified, and such. solicitation addressed to
unclassified publications :from the U.S . .Army U.S. Army Commands should immediately be
agencies and installations. In order to aohieve teported to this headquarters through organiza-
maximum oiroulti.tion of the publication, the list is tional intelligence oha.nnels.

~ I : " 1~ .
Excluded ~ ; ; ; c Regrading1
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· ESPIONAGE RECRUITMENT TECHNIQUES

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£2( THE FRIENDLY DOCTOR (U}

(U) A Jong-range, well-executed entrapment
by Communist; agents was explained recently by
t-he victi~-an American Government employee.
(U) The employee, in January 1962, volun-
tn.rily told his agency that he had been compro-
mised ancl placed under control by Communist in-
telligence. He had been the victim of a plot that
n.Uowed tlfe Communists to blackmail him for a

b1
weakness he didn't have.

b1
(U) This cnse illustrates the extremes to wh1
Commwtlst intelligence services !!-re willing to go
to entrap and compromise potential sources of in-
format;ion nnd their abiJity to quickly exploit the
unwary ·for their ptU'poses.
Note. Material presented In this article may be used
In the preparation ot lectures required by paragraph 7,
AR 881-12.

)
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c~
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(gr SEXUAL ENTRAPME.NT-HOW

• •
THE COMMUNIST
I
USE IT FOR ESPIONAGE
(U) "I rea.lized that as a solgier my first duty
was to my country .. But I loved this girl so much
that it prevented me.from doing what I knew-was
right. I told her I w.ould give her whatever in•
formation I could' obta.in." An. .Army enlisted
man, no longer passionately ip love with a German
· girl, expla.ined a.t his court.martial w~y ~e h~g
given her an Army OBR mll.nue.l o.nd drawings
of Army installations. With the detachment
common to a cooled romance, the soldier explained
that love had simply outweighed patriotism. He
had never thought he would do such a thpig, a.nd
he wanted 'to think he would never do it ago.in.
· (U) Love and sex have dulled men's .con•
sciences throughout. ~istory. . .Although profes-
sional fem.ale spies 11,r'e ;rare-their nature does
not seem to permit the' ,necessary long-term. emo-
tional detach.ment---wo:ipen's natural allure is fre-
quently used by opposing intelligence services to
entrap an unwary target. O.ACSI files record
many cases of successful Soviet bloo intelligence
operations involving the use of women to obtain
information from military personnel. In all too
many instances they ha,ve resulted in the compro--
mise of military information and disgrace to those
involved. ·
•
(U)
enlisted man we will call Howard. Zett1 .had no
pe.rticular contact witli East German offici1?,ls until
· a day when she illegally entered, the S9.viet Zone
of Germany in the company of a friend. · She was
arrested a.nd searched. When police found o.
photograph of Howard in her purse, she was in-
~rr9gl}ted QY. S9vie.t agents and told .she must.
work for them. "We want you to get documents
and in-formation from your boy friend,'~ they said.
"And if you can, get him to come into East Berlin
with' you."
(U) Zettl told Howard what had happened.
She said she was in trouble a.nd needed military
inform&tion to protect herself. Since Howard
loved hel'-it wa.s from his court-martial we
quoted, he helped her. Even a..fter his wife arrived
in Germany and Howard's lo~ for Zettl cooled,
the'girl continued to command his coo~ration by
threa ' him tQ milita authorities.
)

b1
(U) Hostile irttellig~n~. services sometimes
thoroughly prepare a woman for an espionage
mission, and then send her out .to e.ccomplish it;
but more often they are merely- opportunists.
'l;'hey·happen upon a romance already in progress
and exert pressure on a. susceptible woman to re-
cruit her for their purpose. Then they simply
let her cajole military information in exchange
for her a.ft' tions.

b1
rs; em Zettl was a. oa.m.p follower _of
middle-class origins who was dating an America.n

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11 Aprll 2012 Downgraded at 12-Year Interval~•
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(U) In 1961, newspapers gave prominent cov-
erage to a classic case of exploitation o:f illicit
romance by a. hostile intelligence service, the Irvin
Sca.rbeck and Urszula. Discher case. Scarbeck
was ~ U.S. Foreign Service career officer stationed
with the U.S. Embassy in Wars&w, Poland.
Urszula was not much to look at,·emacie.ted, with
sunken cheeks and hollow eyes, but possessed of a
seductive voice.
(U) Urszula.'s approach to Scarbeck was start-
lingly simple. · She called the Embassy late one
night when Scarbeck was on duty.· She talked
about an application she had made for a job. The
more they talked, Sca.rbeck related at his trial, the
more he became intrigued by her voice. Though
he did not lmow her, he arranged to meet her later
that night. They met, but only)b-ta few minutes.
Scarbeck's first thought was that Urszula was an
agent -for the Polish seoret police, the Urza.il
Bespieoaenatwa,-UB, but he wanted to see her
again. ·
~I
b1
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# ~~.
b1
(U) But it is not only men who are the targ~t
of sexual entrapment. There have been .a. number
of cases. in whic.h u.nw!IJ'Y WQID:~ have !1,lso fallen
into a rom9:ntJ.o snp.re carefully p~pai:ed by hostile
intelligence. Here are two ~a.lJlples.
(U) At the·beautiful America.ii Embassy.club
on the Rhein Ri:v~r in Bad. Godesberg, Germo.ny,
lonely Elea~or, an Americ11,n secreta.ry, met Paul,
·who claimed to be a na.tura.li:r;~· A,µierican. The
two bego.-q ·dating; a.~cl, Eiea.tu:>r ~]l: in love with
Paul. Wben Paul· moved to West Berlin, they
kept in to\\~h by ~P.,µ· aJJ.d=·t~lephQ:il.~... :
(U) Oli.e·day-; E.li'eitnt;ir-'i'ecei'v:e<j;•a;. w)bphone call.
Paul had"beei+ i;e;rio.usly,· hurt, tb.~·«?il.ller- sQ;id, -~nd
was hospita:Iii~g ll).· .:E:ast ~er]i.¢.:' A;t j;h~ · ~ op-
portunity, EJe~o~ visited.-Pa.uJ:.iJl.' th:e119wital-an~
as she lef(;·~e.gav.e her·111 paoka:ge-.~o~timi.ng~a..ro11
of film, asking: that she ,rtve it"t9 ]:jis·fa~dlord. i.Ji:
West Berlin. ·Outside tlte hosirl,~al; i1eanQr·w11,s
arrested by Co:qununist police:. They searcheii'p.er,
found the·fihrt, 1µ1d d.evelopeq.'it. !t:show~.d photo-
graphs of Ea$t (¾erJD,an . ;miµtary eqµtpmeilt,
Eleanor w11,s• data.me~, but. ~e :Y.,lt!? !1,llow~d .!I, ·
moment wj(h fe.~, He told _hep ·that l+e· w~~-
working for· w~em inte1ligence;. •@d .was .i11 •
· trouble bec~:us~ t,µe fUm. ~ad· be@. '.fo~d?
(U} El_eaAQr ·vt~ tii,kei;>.. to ~- :sov.jet: <,iiµ~. who
he
said he was ta.kiD:g: over her case ;'.he said wou'id
.,, release het anq. h~r ij11,ncl) if she womd agree to
steal -;:ode~ ~~legi,\ms oonce~g lJ:S, policy t<?•
ward Berlin and the USSR :ftoin her. office.
Eleanor agreed ab.ct was released~ B~ck in Bonn,
she reported the whole e.flii.ir to her superiors.
U.S. investigators soon found that Pe.ul was not
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H$UIO 0'• 62 • , s·ECRET.oc~
~-
an Americap. '. citizen, bµt it Soviet ag~µt. The
Sov.tet officer JVhohad made the deal with ·Eleanor
was tdentHied as a t9rmer Second Secret~ry at the
Soviet Emba~ in Washington who had been un-·
officially asked to .leava the United Sta.res in 1959.
(U): In the s~on.d instance, .l9yalty to her
country prompted the wi:fe o:f a wes~rn-diplomat
tci ma.ke wha.t. must have been an ago.nizing deci-
sion against beµig blackmailed by a Communist
intelli""'""" !'!Arvice•
. :..(,0) l
.~I b1
'rb(l'
(ct;). . w~ll1,~n· tor(;uµ~tely had ~e;C(?urage to
tell the e!:1-ti~,.~cy ·ti;,'qet·nusbapq.: ·and to her
country's·Ohie'f~l>f-M:i,ssion as soon P.,\tshe was able.
. She ~as :WJIDeqfa,wly seµt home aii,d;.)ier husband ·
··w~-~~p~: out oftne country -~Jew·days later.
(U)' The instances related i,n, this article OC·
cu~d auririg the·p~t :few y.~ars, They a.re but n
sampling. of th,e methods of fie~ual entra.pment
employeq l>y· So-viet blo.c int.elljge~c.e• services
ago.inst.the United.States. _¥any of th~rn were at
least ~a.rti.~y succ~:ful li,n~. t-'!i~· ~~thods a.re
more than likely t~> contin-g.e. CQfil!Patiders a.re
thereto~ urged to· qite thew., m.~1\~t!on with
,_• .4'.,by p11,ra.-
security ipdoctrip.ati.·9i:). lectures~rn,.
graph 7, AR 381'-l~. I:f ·uncl · ~ .. ectures are
be
to pre.s'$lted; cl!l,~ed pai:agpi,p . ,~vst be first
sanitized to omit dates and the identities of per-
sons, ple.ces, and installations.
..
··..
33
'!OS t!Q-::-: (C/5.?I
G,o-;t}u,
 SEGRET Best Copy Available

r
'

Figure 11 (UNOLASSill'IlDD), TMa eklofrical4' ohargs<l ,sauotreat' picture appeare<l in a Hunqariaft. magazine--
to warn Bufl{larlan o ~ i , agatmt ".A.merkla'a iatut apv tsollnl!l'f'GI," TM, et1enlng dtreaa, the maqa11wui'reporta,
"'8 e~oeptlonal1t1 ,ultar,i. for smhr,v or 1eqalfon reoepmm,." II mo1vde, mlcrophone, (No,. 1, :i, amt_ .j) a
• tape reoortler (6), an4 an ani.nna (6~. ne 1Mt1alline ob,erue, lluJl Bungarv "mud keep in atep with. the
ativan°'nq ucAniczun of oooJ:taa parlt1" (U).

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SUBVERSION

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'5!:f_ 37 tos~HQ-1q~
~_.orH---fl/1
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SECRET -1 1

(5) AMERICAN REDS FIGHT AMERICAN LAW CU)

(U) A legal net has been tightened aroWld the
Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA)
since the June 1961 deoision of the U.S. Supreme
C'ourt that upheld a previous ruling on the Mc-
Carran Act of 1950. The McCarran Act ordered
nll Communist-action organizations to register
with the Attorney General. The Supreme Court
decision, that the McCarran Act was l~ai,_ I!l8!lll,t
the CPtrSA wouid ha.ve to register its organiza-
tion and its officers.
(U) In April 1968, the Subversive Activities
Control Board, after lengthy hearings, determined
that the CPUSA is a. Communist-action organiza-
tion and ordered it to register with the Attorney
General. Court battles, including three appear-
ances before the Court of Appeals a.nd two before
the Supreme Court, resulted in two remands to
the Board for reconsideration. But the June 1961
decision of the Supreme Court was final, the Sub-
versive Activities Control Boo.rd was finished with
the case, and it became the funotion of the At-
torney General to enforce the order. Figure 18 (UNOLASSIFIEID). GUI Harl, General
(U) Since that day several moves and counter- Secretorv, OPUS.! (U).
moves have been ma.de by the Justice Department
nnd the OPUSA. . eral justice in Washington, D.C., on 8 December
(U) The Justice Department, immediately 1961 and show cause why the OPUSA should not
after the Supreme Court's action, issued a request be held in contempt. Hall answered the summons
for compliance by the CPUSA. There was no and pleaded not guilty. Trial was set for a later
answer. Then the Justice Department set spe- date.
cific dates for registration: National office by (U) The first Party official to be jailed was
20 November 1961; if the national office did not Philip Ba.rt, a longtime member and now orga-
comply, then all local or national districts should nizational secretary of the CPUSA. Bart ap~
register by 20 December 1961; if they did not peared before a. Grand Jury investigating the
comply, all individua.l CP members were to CPUS.A.'s failure to register and refused to answer
register. 47 questions about the officials and organization ot
(U) The CPUSA has not registered and has in- the Cl'US.A. and actions it had taken to thwart the
dicated it has no intention of registering. registration ruling.. The Court of Appeals or-
(U) The Justice Department, with no further dered Bart to jail on 6 March 1962. The Grand
warning, served Gus Hall, general secretary of the Jury indicted the Party itself and ordered it to
CPUSA, with a summons to appear before a. Fed- trial. ·

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(U) James Jackson, editor of The Worker, the · (U} In an effort to obscure the rea.l issues 11,nd
Communist Party newspaper in the United Stntes, OP aims and to attract as many persons as possible
faced a Grand Jury on 9 March 1962 and also was to the Party's cause, Communists were instructed
jailed for refusing to e.nsw~r questions. to ''participate to the fullest extent in the bat.tle
(U) The main blow against CPUSA was a gov- for peace, for equality for Negroes, and for the
ernment civil suit filed 19 March 1962. The Gov- everyday crucial issues o:f the people." They were
ernment, contending that the Communist Control specifically instructed to support civil liberties
Act of 1054 took the Communist Party out of the bodies and to work for repeal of the Internal
political party tax exemption class, sued to collect Security Act. '
more than $1500,000 in income ta.xes and interest ·{U) .The current project of CPUSA is to make
for the year 1951. {It ma.y be coincidental, but secure ·its own organization. AJl national offices
the real assets of CPUSA at the end of 1961 were were abolished in December 1961, and the affairs
vi!Jq~q. at $500,oq9.) _';{'l}e CPUSA leaders named of the Party are now conducted by a three-
in the suit were Gus Hail, general secretary; Ben- member -execut!ve committee wnsi&ting. of Elizn.-
iam;in Davis, national secretary; Eliza.beth Gurley beth Gurley Flynn, Gus Hall, and Benjn.min
Ffyful, na.tional chairman; and Philip "Bo.rt, or- Davis. Party leaders plan to streamline all opera-
ganizational chairman. tions, but to ma.into.in the clubs, particularly in
(U} Orga.nizational changes have been made hea.vily populated centers.• The leaders have de-
at all levels of the CPUSA. Except 'for the top clared that the CP must remain intact and must
national officers, n~rly a.11 official positions have plan for future rapid growth, although they ex-
been stricken from the books to limit the number pect to be somewhat restricted in open operations.
of persons who may be required to register as Some CP clubs have begun recording dues pay-
officers. The :rank and file members are getting ments in code so that members cannot be identified
nervous; this has bean reflected in a rash of fac- from dues records. Clubs ha.ve been told tha.t
tional disputes and internal bickering by several most of their activity will have to b~ ·private;
clubs. Some clubs and individuals ha.ve been ex- they must refrain from meeting publicly.
pelled from the Pa.rty. New organizations have (U) At the moment the Pa.rty does not seem to
been formed by dissidents. · speak with one voice. The national headquarters
~~~ ~·

'~-~ .

J.

Figure 18 (UNCLASSIFilllp). BenJamm Da1>il, Mtio1iai .s~oretal"I/; Ji]u;sa~Bt/1. GtsritW Fl1111"', rnu,om,i chairman; and.
PMHp Bari, orqanua,~ chairm<m, OommunAsl Parlt1, USA. (U).

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has issued a policy statement on its failure to reg-
ister, but the various state groups have given it
different interpretn.tions. Each district seems to
be formula.ting its own defense against any ,Justice
Department action. One suggestion is that CP
members depend on help from the larger front
organizations, ·on the theory that the front orgn.ni-
zations should realize they will be the next target
of the Justice Department.
(U) Because the Justice Dep11.rtment has been
silent on its plans, the reactions of OP members .
hnve been confused. They don't know what to
expect, because the ,Justice Department has pre-
ceded talk witn action. This bas nnd the e:lfeot of·
making the members and leaders apprehensive and
the ditl'ering opinions and solutions have com-
pounded the confusion. It canuot yet be ca.lied
chaos, but the disagreements have ca.used serious
internal strife and lack of discip1ine within the
Party.
(U) A New Jersey OP group was expelled
from the Party in 1961 for factionalism and open
opposition to national policy; they immedin.tely
set up the beginning of whe.t they called a "new
OP in USA." In October several members of the
OP "Rn.ilroad Industry" trnde union were expelled
from the Party; they ple.nned to. set up another
OP group, ta.king the- leftist, anti-imperialist
position n.s opposed to the "rightist" pacifist group
that is represented by the N ationa.l CP leaders.
Another group of insurgent members were ex-
pelled in the Southern California OP District a.nd
reportedly formed a new group that they hope will
eventually be the nucleus of a new OPUSA. In
a stinging attack on recently expelled "factional-
ists ·and disrupters," the national office of the Party
reaffirmed its adherence to the Khrushchev line in
the Sino-Soviet dispute, and it expects the mem-
bership to follow suit.
(U) A number of changes have been made· in
the operation of the Southern California OP Dis-
trict. All local Party officials were told to resign
their positions as section and club officers. All
section committees have been dissolved and OP
clubs will -meet only once each month. Each club
will receive directions £rom. a. designa.ted member
of the pre~ous district board. Members are
having savings accounts made joint accounts with
non-Party persons, to prow:t their personal
38 SECRET
3....l;\____:::t_AJ___;;;;.087_---..;....__c_ _ _ _ _5~r--.;M,140-
...V....
'bee., 3
·1
sn.vings should nn attempt be made to confiscate
the funds under provisions of the Internal Se-
curity Act of 1950. No OP literature or Party
material is to be sent through the mail. Party
cl\lbs will meet as pence groups, forums, or readers'
groups with not more than 12 members at any
meeting.
(U) The organizations that are high priority
OP targets Me: trade unions ( especially the Team-
sters') ; National Association £or the Advancement
of Colored People; a.11 youth nnd student move-
ments; Negro American Labor Conncil ; and peace
movements. .
(U) ·To capitalize on Amenciifi interest in tlre
Sovi~t, Union, Communist speakers-American
and of6i.leign-have been busily touring the United
States, addressing any group that will listen to
them. CPUSA leaders have delighted in this re-
newed interest and in the free publicity given by
press coverage of the speeches. At a recent meet-
ing o'f Comnw,n,i~t leaders on the west coast, Gus
Hall said tha~lt:"SuTTey has shown that there are
millions of AmericaG,B,, who are tired of hearing
about Communists an~p want the right to hea.r
from Communists, even if they disag'ree with them.
Han said the "uncertainties of the :future of the
United States and its policies" open up tremendous
possibilities fol' the Communist Party to explain
its position. He said the possibilities of the new
generation are "explosive."
(U) One result of the current CP emphasis on
youth work wa.s the response Gus Hall received
from University of California students in recent
a.ppeara.nce in Berkeley. Hall was elated over
the reception he received and he said it proved pis
belief that the main Party effort should be directed
toward youth. People' 8 World, a. west coast Com-
munist publication, described the student reaction
to Hall as "warm a.nd friendly" and noted that one
o:f his speeches was interrupted a number of times
by applause. The pa.per estimated attendance for
Hall's first speech at 171> and the second at 3P0,
(U) Student organizations all over the nation
are scheduling or attempting to schedule speeche.s .
by representatives of the CPUSA. The argument
of some student bodies is that no restrictions should
be placed on the free expression of ideas inside or
outside th~ classroom. The eleventh report of the
1961 California. Legislature's Senate Fact Find-
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ing Subcommittee on ·Un-.America.n Activities· that in00,me ·from dues a.nd initiation :fees will be
says: ''We know from an. intensive survey that apportioned among the subdivisions o:f the.Pa.rty;
Communist propaganda has been alarmingly-effec- and that special assessments mo.y be -levied by the
tive among our students during the past two National Co:n.vention or by a two-thirds vote of
years." . . the-National-Committee. (The·National·-Conven-
(U) OP leadership found it hard to explain tion is the highest authority of tµa CPUSA: when
Russia.'s resumption of nuclear testing 11,nd-for a this body_ is not convening, "the National Commit-
while ,they considered critioizing Ru.ssia through. teeis.the1hi2hest a.uthoritv.) ·
People'a W ~rld. This, they thought, would win
more public sentiment to their side because it·
Pnl
would be taken as an indication that.there is no
connection between the OPUSA a.nd tlie Com-
. munist Party of the Soviet Union.
(0) The· CPUS-A Tea.detship "has also been put
in an emba.rrassing position by a. message fro:in
Peiping. On- 15 Ja.nua.ry 1962, the CPUSA re-
. ceived a cablegram from the Communist Party
b1
of China encouraging the CPUSA and .con-
demning the United States for its .persecution
through tha MoCarra.n a.nd Smith Acts. Since the
CPU~.A. has unequivocally supported the Sbviet
Union in the Sino-Soviet dispute, ojpcials in the ~ _New Organizati~'1S
CPUS.A. haven't decided how to respond to~ (U) Several new organi~~tions. were b,egun by
messa. e. · American Communists ·ciuring the past 18 months•
.A.mongw.will....l"'-'lln...--~--------,

b1 b1
U Article VIII of the CPUS.A. constitution,
adopted in 1957, provides for the assessment of· N TION.AL ASSEMBLY FOR
dues, initiation fees, and special collection. The DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS (NA~R). It was
article sa.ys initiation tees and dues will be paid· _ organized aftei: a. OP meeting in June 1961. The
aceording to rates set by the National 0011-vention; assembly was held 28-24 September 1961 in New

~T- 39

11
........siiiii,,les____TM)_...::;_c":_·~_c....
_ _ _ _ _ _·5"0_. 4 J. _ _ _ _ _ _ _1_~_-___
H-Q~----'c:t.-~
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 SECRET .., \

York City. It reportedly had an average daily

attendance of 8,000, of which 2,000 were registered
delegates. Many different organizations through-
out the United States were represented, including ie'J/
the Nation of Islam, an organization which before
that time had not participated in a.ny OP activities.
The assembly's concern was the "repressive meas-
ures against citizens by government branches,"
b1
and it sought means of comba.tting these "illegal,
un-A.merican and undemocratic tactics." Al-
though the assembly was· not intended to be per- (U) Material presented in this article may be
™ffe} lit,~~ York ollice is still in operation. used, within the limits of security classifications
set forth, in: the preparation of lectures :required
by para_graph 71 AR 381-12. If the presentations
are to be wiclassified, the material concerning
CPUSA .finances and new organizations must be
excluded. ·
1

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FiQUre 14 ~QNJDIB001'L\'.Z), ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ (9r,

b1 b1
(U) Material presented in this article may be
used, within the limits of security classifications

46 SECRET
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~tt~C-
1)C£._, 3 0 ~47 · 1oc::r- --HQ - rq -s_8'_,_J_ _
~~-t;;t- { (a
 SECRET -~
set forth, in the prepa.ra.tion of leeture.s required be sanitized-to omit cl.a~ e.ndthe id~ntiti~ of per-
by para.graph 7, AR 381-12. If the lectures are to sons 1m4 plqc~ Th1> photo~phs of ~eniy·olan-
be presented as uncla.ssified, the ma.teria.i:must-first de~ine listenmg ~evi~ . 0~9t.
lie d~lassified.
.

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~
PRQfiAGANDA.

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57

... -.
1'I'
:Cf0~C f

-1-t2$~f:\l,____J,,,,;D~cJ~t-.:_:::5_ _ _ _1S lCZ: l--tv- t9s-~

58
 SECRET
(UJ CHINESE COMMUNIST PUBLICATIONS (UJ
(U) The importance which Peiping attaches to
the export of books, magazines, and other printed
matter in foreign languages is vividly manifested
by the fact that, despite the ch~nic a.nd frequently
severe shortage of pa.per stock on the China main-
land, the outflow of foreign-language magazines
and books has remained at a. high level. Equally
significant, particularly in recent years, are the
impressive advances which ~eipi:ng's _ Forei~
Language Press liaa achieved in the visual and
technical aspects o~ its o~eration. Despite some
heavy-handed propaganda themes, the foreign-
language publicatioiis reflect an expertise in for-
eign language exposition, effective organization
and pleasing arrangements of graphic and photo-
graphic materials.
(U) During 1961, Peiping capitalized upon
Sino-Cuban amity by introducing Spanish-lan-
guage books a.nd magazines into Cuba. in quantity.
During the first nine months of 1961 over 250,000
copies of Mao Tse-tung's works were sold there as
well as 180,000 copies of various books on China.
The word "sold" is used aqvisedly, since Havana
is known to serve as a distribution center of Com-
munist publications for the rest of Latin America.
An estimated 145,000 copies of three books by
Mao, Anna Louise Strong ( elderly China apolo-
gist residing in Peiping), a1,1d the late Chinese
writer, Lu Hsun, were released in October 1961.
There is also evidence that during 1961 Peiping
took the lead in publication of Communist propa-
ganda in Esperanto language, distributed prin-
cipally in Europe and La.tin America.. 1 Chinese
Communist presses were kept busy during the year
rolling off an Esperanto version of a 102-page
booklet presenting Peiping's version of Lenin's
1 In September 1861, the Cblnesa (Commnnlat) lDaperanto
Le&lrlle lieut the ''Norffl A.mmcon Bapff'IJnto BfflJIO", publlthed
ID Chicago, Dl., th~ ach·ertlnme11t1 tor publlcaU011, '.rhe1e ada
concerned the worka r,t M:110 T8e-tung, Anna Loulae StrODI' and
Lenin. In A.p.r11 1962, an article "China &ad World Peace," ap.
peartd In the A.me:rican Esperanto mqulDt, Pooa (Peace),
Poca le publlalled alternately la dlll'erent countries, Baatern 1111d
Western, and 11 reeo8'QJ:r:ed as an lnllt1'1lment of the "World Pea.ce
E1perantlat :Movement (KEM)", toullded at St. Pollen, A.uatrla,
·10. 19GB. . eign languages other tha.n English, Mn.o's writings
58 SECRET
.,.,_ G,
.
• 1
teachings entitled "Long Live Leninism." The
compilation which was first issued in the after-
math of the 1860 Moscow meeting, is under-
standably top heavy with tracts stressing the
inevitability of warfare between the ca.pita.list and
Communist camps and the "anomalies" of Khru-
shchev's policy of peaceful co-existence. Other
works published in Esperanto during the year
included a. 4i2-pa~ Ohinese !!,ntholqgy-!!, ~!'§t
volume--and Mao's "On Practice" and "On Peo-
ple's Democratic Dictatorship."
(U) Among the 45-odd titles published in Eng-
lish by Peiping's English Language Press in 1061,
two publications received particulo.rly heo.vy pub-
licity in Chinese Communist foreign language
magazines a.nd journals. Foremost-was the Eng-
lish-language version of volume IV o-! Chairman
Mao's selected works, covering the decisive period
of the Chinese Communist revolution :fo11owing
Japan's surrender. This work ha.d been issued
with great fanfare in late 1960 in' time for· the
October 1 "National Day" commemoration. Pei-
ping's detennination to insure its heavy sale
a.broad was apparent by the full page advertise-
ment of the book in the widely distributed Peking .
Review £or 'r consecutive weeks, beginning- in
ApriL
(U) Rwming a close second was a voli,une en-
titled "Stories About Not Being Afraid of
Ghosts" which brings together a collection of an-
cient Chinese tales. .A pointed introduction calls
attention to the fact tha.t while there are no
demons today like those described in the tales,
"there are m&ny things which resemble them-
imperia.Iism, reactionaries, difficulties and obsta-
cles in work, etc." Throughout the preface, the
author, Ho Chi-fa.ng, reiterates that the ghost
stories are propagated as current ideological
parables. As a promotional stunt, the editors of
Peking Review offered overseas subscribers a, copy
of "Ghosts" £or every subscription or renewal to
the RsviwJ.
(U) With respect to works published in for-
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
11 April 2012
by US.A.INSCOM FOIIPA
Auth para 4-1-02, D0:0 5200-lR
59_
r--·-'· u_
 SECRET
in ·vo,dous- foreig1i"fangu11ges in bQQk anc;l booklet '~g ;English;. enj01,s ~Y:Je.r'_ the wiqe.st circulation
1

fo~ we~ released in ~ t number:;· Th~~ Wa$• among· the. group, esti.1.n$:te~r.to be iQ. tM neighl;>or-
a Portuguese, µ-e.nsla.tiq:µ 9:f his. .tint. volmne. ..A. -hopd,. 9.U willl.9n copil$ per iµonth, .
contrl!,-gt was iet, to publish ~ J apa.n~· ve~on of . . (U) j pfyni!'?tJo~-4,~vfoe•W:Qrl}iy·µt allresp~ts
his. v:olurhe W., 4~·.µi. t,he ye&r;:p,,P~p'~'I-Do,i'&y; ·ofMo.dioo:il: Aven~e WIJ.S mttj>q.µced by tlie·edj.tors
advertisemimt stated .t}iat I!.: J1$ber o~ articles of. (J'M,na [lec971,B~t8, In !tll a._tteinpt tcr ~ t
fro?µ volim1.e IV were. be~g. issued ip; 11 ljlepiµ-ate averse~ cµ-ctila.tiol)'.; n~w subsc~be-rs pr old sub-
pamphlet\3, •tte.nsle.~d, int~ o~e ·or ':qipre· Qf eignt. - '~be!'!!; ~~w~g Wlµ'e offered l!, ~citen: sheets.- of
different la.ngua~.: T~e-cllciic.~-of la.ngue.~ in- · st,a~ioµ.¢1- 4~<iQra.~d. with c;oiorful Ohbl~ prints •
dice.ted.that the W:i'ge~ fot-these pu'fiUe(l.tiofl.s·are- in.the ttaditiQUi!,!i$ty)e,(fig-,.22)... ..
the Mn-El~·09lilitri~._ · •.(."O} 'Qro,iiese;·Qol'.lllllunist pu'bli~a.ti'qn~· have re-
(-U) For the.firj;t·'tim~ since l,9&~, eereral major flect!ld a·growµigundeyrstandfug ohf!~tive ad'\!e'r-
m~h.1land newsp~p~~' 1~8.tn,!11• av~ole 9u~ide ti.sin,g tecbniques,:lm~.this wiis.the-fi·~t ~vid~Qc~.of
Chfoa.. I~ 1960~-P.eqpitia D(J,ity'was tqe o~y-0,m- · theusoo¾ ~ellgivea.wal"•:proJ]lotiqfi~J&avi~;
munist Chin~Il8"f'Sp~per obtaina.J:>i, tbroµgb: sub- (0) Peipih~s internation'a.l propa.g11-ndli. O~®-
scription. In 19e1 .this silbscriptj.¢1. li~t was· ex- siye in 1962 shows-no_~iwis ~~ac]:~ij.ingi a~pite
pan~~ to s,µcl;l, ?tl;l-e~ ~ewspa);iers ~Ta, K'11/ftU,, P°:°; .econo~c aisasters and •rJjtretlchJnent on. th,~ Chfua,
K ul1tn.{/ ?J.'1-ii:g ;(1,()1- ~~rle~ra· Dailty •~ Y ~fl,, ·• mamla~li Chl.nese Coiµmuni'Btpr6p~~~ists 11on-
N ews. 'rhe b1weelfly. pll.tty theoretic.. Jou~a.1 . tiz).ue 00 o-ivep· iirticullloi'-~mphasiij ._ttr the i'c;orrec.t-
Red>Ji'U1,g.,_ w~ e.l$9·,1ewme~lto th~ f'9r.eign-exwtii e··
list... A yearjl~d' i!-!lv'~rtise#J,ei,lt;. fl.lso. posted Ui . n:ess!' of' Peiping's, toreigJi.-.p,olicy--aa,.esp~ra.u:y:_-Jl,S
Peop~e?a· D(),il,y; -~Uli~d,.. that 2~ ~~!kl!$.,. it p~rtains·to differences wit~ the So:viet. l;Tmt?f!~.
guage scient,nc, ·:1µ14: .te.elulical peri.o.di¢~s :i>µh. a.nd·.tp. th~-drive to solidi:fy, ~la.tiopJt:wlth'.bot}l.its
lisp.&,1: QY tM ·Science P~most- 9f whieb, h~ C9mmuilist ~µcl non~Com:giu:nist µeiglib9~,. As
~d~let;ed.:fro~· ~port ·ll! 1959-,-would-'J:;e,a,vail- in pl1}v.fo:us y~~~,-~pp·oi::1;.·1or. :ii11,~Qi:i11,l• reyolv.t\9il.-
nbfo· :for. SUQ~riptio~ iii-1962. .- couple<} with ~peited W.!'~:-of.\the_ .tiil.Ii.g~i"f<?t
f'G',), f19op,t~i~: (Jhfnf) 0'h1lfUI, Piel~,. O~e "oolQni~,; ~ woi:18; pea~'. J.m>~de, ~~ ~ajor
Litetiitwre, :Pelfing., R ~ ,:and Oh~ R~cimr ingred.i~ts of '.P!3iping's:.:p~pa~1¢9~. ~~a.~. to'
stiwta coI!tintJ.e<f ~-·iiS{iresep..t Peipinc,s. 4ve-1no~ the underdeveloped: ~•· ,At_sµsta.µieq ii:J!d.•espe-
proiµiilen~ fo.r~gii:'ltingui'gt} ,Eetjoq.ic~. Al- eially. vitu~rative :persoµab,..'\tt~ ~_µ· l,i~q~~t
though ~J.i'Vw,ilQQn
' '
J.Jgtires.
L!
are urui,v'aila.~1.1e .1,or
,_ .~ed··y and. 1,;,-:-
'Ki. ~s·• a\l,W,!J,1.U!IIJ."'
J:....:!.;.!:.....!.timt _. . ,a;.. care#,·.
. . and· 11y,
_. ,. . "-~
th~·.pubji9li,tjona;, Qh~rw,-l'iQtQ'f'ial, an illbst1"11-tecl -executoo.· pnte to line· µp s)1ppo~ ·for U.:N; inem-
mojithfy· ina,gazmo d~gnea f!)n·popul\1.r.oo~p,.. -~~p,¢'pn!;inu~~to:iiig}l.'}ig!J.t'~eee <;Jom.µi@ist, ·
tioi;i,0J1~·-prepared ~.istoi1tlg:ti,l~figua~, ip,clud- pr~p~~(i!I, .PI.iS~ta.ti'9~ .' .: . . .
..._·'
'

. ,,
'

, .Regr·aded .UNCLASSJFIED on
. · ·' ii!Aprli':toit .
by USAINSCOM.FOL'PA
Auth
.
para.4-102,
..~ . DOD .5200-lR
. . ..
.....

SECRET~

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 SECR.ET '\' B~st Copy Available

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FlQ1Wt1 U (UNOLA.SSIJl'.Il!JD). 011.lneu oommun«1 propi;g~CJ pu'blioaHon, (U),

60 SECRET. Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on

11 April 2012
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l<:Ys-l<-tQ - 1Ci~%f
1-r61 ~c:t-1&
 SECRET

Jd COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA EXPLOITATION OF CAPTIVE U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL (U)

(U) Communist propaganda exploitation of usual Communist propaganda against the U.S.
captured U.S. soldiers and defectors from U.S. Army and U.S. policies.
Forces continues today, in a vein simila.r to that (U) On 15 June 1962, a North Korl;lan front-
observed during the Korean War. Recent inci- line, loudspeaker broadcast aimed at the 8th EOK
dents in South Vietnam and Korea a.re pertinent Division reported in English and in Korean that
examples. North Korea. ba.d another U.S. Army "defector"
(U) In South Vietne.m, two U.S. Sergeants, who was identified as "John Nixon, a member of
both members of the 1st Battle Group (Special the ls ivision."
Forces) who were captured by the Viet Cong, were
said by the cla.nctestine Communist -Vietno.inese
"Liberation Radio" on 1 May 1962 to have been
released because of their "repentance. for bar-
barous aggressive activitfos." Subsequently
TASS the official Soviet news agency, amplified
the propaganda. in broadcasts on 8 a.nd 10 May.
(U) A. clerk-typist assigned to M.A.A.G, Viet-
nam, was kidnapped Oll; 24 December 1961 by the
Vietnall).ese Communists and released 6 months
later on 24 June 1962. While a. prisoner, he was
report~d by the "Libera.tion Radio" to have
written two let.ters criticizing the U.S. Forces in
b1
South Vietna.m a.nd U.S. policies in that country;
on 9 and 11 June 1962, the North Vietnamese radio
broadcast the texts, supposedly "at his. request."
(U) In Korea, the defection to North Korea
of
on 28 May 1962 a U.S. Army private has given
the Communists a potent propaganda tool. The
soldier, who has a record of dereliction of duty
and misconduct, walked across into North Korea (U) During the Korean War, such announce-
while on duty with U.S. Forces a.t the de-. menm were frequently repeated a.nd widely dis-
militarized zone. He has been quoted by North seminated, as is true of this latest propaganda.
Korean ra.dio in a. long statement praising the The occa.siono.l nature of recent Communist op•
North Korean people and condemning the "aggres- portunities for such propa.ganda. has not changed
sive policies" of the U.S. in South Korea.. First the method of its presentation or its purpose: to
announcement of his defection wa.s broadcast in create' confusion, frustration, and mistrust in U.S.
Korean to South Korea, a.nd in English to Asia.; ranks and among U.S. allies. Such incidents serve
as well as the domestic North Korean audience, on to re-emphasize that Communist propagandists
12 .Tune 1962·. On the same da.y, a report of the everywhere will continue to exploit by duresl.l, dis-
defection was included in a. frontline, loudspeaker tortion, and outright prevarication both U.S.
broadcast directed at the 28th ROK Division. military captives and deserters to Communist
Both announcements were embroidered with the control. ·

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by USArnSCOM FOIIPA Deolasslfled After 12 Years ·
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·tOS- I-JO- l~J

 SECRET

t"

62
SECRET
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
11 Anril 2012
by USAINSCOM FOIIP A
Auth Encl 5, para 1-d, DOO 5200-01-\
SECRET ~,,

SECURITY

Regraded UNCLASSIF'IED on
11 April 2012
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SECRET 63

l - " I ,r
 SECRET

(U) SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES (U)

(U) On 20 April 1962, the Assistant Chief of surveys, a duplication which results in .-waste in
Ste,:ff £0~ Intelligence (ACSI), Department of the terms of time, money, and personnel.
. Army, a.nd the Provost Marshal General (PMG) (U) It is believed that the agreement and its
concluded an agreement whioh delineates their re- addendum are self-explanatory. One point, how-
spective roles in the field of security. This agree- ever, may well be emphasized. A counterintelli-
ment, prepared jointly by representatives of gence survey is conducted as a service to assist com•
OAOSI, PMG, and the U.S. .Army Intelligence manders to determine the security mensures re-
Center (USAINTC) in the :form of a Memoran- quired to protect key installations from possible
dum of· UHclerstD.nding Witli .A.d.dendum, is sa:oota;ge·, ·espionage, subversion-, and unauthorized·
reproduced here (figs. 23 and 24) for general disclosure of classified information. The security
information. activities o:f the. Military Police Corps, Provost
(U) The agreement was considered necessary to ~farshals, and other staff officers or agencies sup-
clarify often conflicting definitions and interpre- plement rather than duplicate the functions of
tations of the term "physical security" which are Army Intelligsnce Corps units. A coordinated
.found in current Department of the Army pub- effort with all investigative elements using. their
lications and to assist commanders in eliminating · pa.rticular capabilities is seen as the best approach
duplication of effort in accomplishing security to the overall sea.urity problem in a command.

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
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64 · SECRET

LOS- HQ - {C/S '8)

r _ "· I / ,"
 SECRET
DEl'ARIMIJIT Of' fflZ "1IMY
WAININGTQN 110 0. C.

1. 'Ille ~ • of tlwl llmorai>d""' and /Jldellliua 1'I to d•rJ.ne ti>• anu

ot pr!&u7 1111,c...,.t w th• >.uutant Chief ot Stat! tor Intelllpuct and
Tho l'rovoat llar•bal CltAonl 1n the a.old ot •OOIU"lt.y &II<! 'to iJos'Dre • spirlt
ot •lo•• o.....i1neuon 011 all utters ot IOlnal !.ntu..t 111 s,,r,pon or aeculi,t,
'Within tho l l e p ~ or tho Aaf/• 8'1all action i...a011t1dored ....,... ar,r :ln
viw of the eontl.1~ dtlildt1- ...i intoi-pnt&tiono ot p~lll Haunt,
which an to 'be :roimd 111 current Dopt.ri.a&t; ol tbo Arwf p11blieat1on1, Amy
IntolJJ.&enco ml Prffoat IC&rflul thl4 oporat.l.o1"t viU ooolon1 to tll.l.a
llemorarcua.
2. tiie .KCSr, wiler' wporvis1on ·or-t11o·Ch1et•ot-•awr, -United-Statu
Goim-al 8tatt rupcna1h111tf tor pl.ula, polie1n and prooedllres
,U'III)', has t.lla
concoPlled Iii th OCNntorin~genco. Thooe a,peoto ot 1ecorl.tr 1n llbtch tlle
>.CSI ti.u prill&ry ,tart t.nw:-tst SJiffl.vo countorlntellleo,,c• uve1t1catio111,
aountooroopio111p 111d counto.-aallotac• op.,-,~on,, and otlic' countomtelli•
go1111a aatidUts, 1nclw11n& cooni •ri~alllgonc:t .,,,..,.,. am iupoot.iou and
tho P"'teoUH ot claeaitiod dttemio Wo-tlon, 1n IZl1 fOrL
J. TIie l'r.,,,o,t Manh&l General, \Ulder tho direct wptnioicn and. con-
trol ot tho o.puty Clliet ol stall to,- l"erso1111"1, to:noulatca, coordinates
and IUJ>OMH& the IXllllllt.l.9'1 of p4m, polici&I and pN>QtdQ'l'O& pt~g
to tho cr1ainal :ln•eatJ.1aUon, law enror,ua •nt an4 on.a. p...,.ot1t.ion upeoto
or oecunty, 11111 ..,,i. I.D aec1&ri.t11a related to preff!IUon ot .....,.tbori,14
ent.,., the OOIIWOl ot entr:r, ol.roulati.aa u,d ult ot aut.horued pen,onnol.
alld vehf.clao, ai,4 tho ontorc..,.,.t o! ·1aw am NiPllatiollll by .,..,.. ot
M!.U.MrY l'vlioo and oivUSon flard tan;ic11, pel1J,Oter bonier& u.i •PP"'••li
aroao, Otld protect£•• ligbt!.Jlg anl a1u,o 111~, p111 am bade• _,.~,
allll tbo ool>duot ot lU.litU7 l'vlica 1ct1d,tit1 111 l&v entorc•cnt and u..
Pl'ffRtion am 4etoot.1aa ot crs.io. lie hu otatt roopouibWtiJ" tar tbe
~ioal wacts ot ••our.I.'¥ 1otiiob 11ovo1,,. orilliaal bwdtlpti.011 oi,a'l'8tiou,
ClriM pnsv..nt1on ..,,..,qa,
IIUituY FoUce operotiona wl tlla coadllc\ or
~ to• est.abllab ti.. 11HCI tor, or to det •...uio Ula attoot1n111ee or
tao pbpi<:al uuvea ~a11t1.n.ad ai>Ofh
la, Cloe• eooporat.t.an liatweon ACSI am fl'Hl> oot.l.vitios at all ecbolona
1• a OOltual.ly l"OOopud 11tceaait7. T.._ upoota v~h an or 1111wal 'in-
t1nat will be ooordimte4 at the n.iar-t.. ot tlle A1IIIY 1.,,.1 botw.." tha
ACSI and TPl!OJ l.atel'lll.J.7, i,.tvoon r-cu,.. unit,, l.attll11enco 0Ctlc1r1
111><1 pro-rort IUNllal.s, llO&rds, acllool.t or OOlltol'IJ or Y1thlll cOliUrd 011.aMola,
u •pFOJ>riat•. Cl.Na coordination v1ll olao bo ottoct.e<l 'be\voal\ tbe US Am:,
Inw'Uigeno, loud lllh1cll tat•'bl.ithu rocilll;oloonts and .-,&lllatoo Ill,.., s:i--t-,
l"""1ns dmcu aad otber onU-11ltru1m a..-:1.cu 111 cmD>ocuoD with the
• at'eg,,&l,Unr ot claeaUl.od illt..,.tion am tho US .l"'1 111.lituy ~IJ.ct Board
wli4h ••~lish11 rO'llliNatllto ""'1 nalliatoo 11.IIIUu dtvi.oo, tor th• pwpon
ot dt~I iU.pl enu,, and pr... ntil>1 thort.
S• fi i8 auoocl that ..tion vUl 'be t.akan b,- tbt aganc1H cone~
to :lnoori,orat• :ln ptl"tiM~ puhlloaU-, pr'O'l1a1ons r.rlaoUflC tho oc11t•nt
and IIPU'i~ ot tld.t IIIAorlad... SWIil aotion vUl l>e t1lotD ai the tl-• ot
D....l ...-rl.1111 and l'ffUioD or seah r1plat1011.1 am p~lic&t.iona.
6. 4t.taohod Mdl!'dlm 1a iud• a pa:-t or t111a ~

ll'Ml
AddtndWII to KaGl'IUldull
ot ~11,hrat...Sin1, 3-1tr

Ft{ltlrs 138 (UNCLASSIFIED). Memor!lfldum of ftderata.n4tng of aeureo-v, 20 April J96S ( U).

Regraded UNCLASSIBIED on
11 April 2012 SECRET 65
by USAINSCOM FOIIPA
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( JSA-
C " " -L I/' -
 SECRET.. ,\

~ DEPARTMENT 01' THE ARMY

WASHINGTON Z,. D, C.

~
ADDENDUM
TO
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDOO
SECURITY
,-

Physical securi~ is understood to be a distinct type of security

as ditterentiated. from docw,ient and inforJ11ation security and i'roM
personnel seourl.t;r as discussed in paragraphs 199 through 202, FH .30-17.
The use of the ~bstituted terminology, 11 criminal investigation,
law entoroement and. crilne prevention aspects ot security", in lieu ot
the term 11physioal securityn in de:scri'b.i.ng the interests and respons1-
b1lities of TPMl is not to be construed. as changing or modifying, or
as constituting a basis for future change or modification of his
responsibilities for physical security as stated in paragraph 40, .AR l0-5.
The prilllary eta!:f' interest of ACSI in counterintelligence surveys,,
which·may assess·oounterintelligenoe effectiveness of physical security
plans and procedures, 1s not understood to include primary- stat! intel'est
in ph:,sical security surveys a.a described and defined in FM 19-20 and
FM 19-.30. Tel'lldnology, "surveys to establish the need for, or to·
determine the effectiveness ot those physical measures identit'ied aboven,
is understood to describe and re!er to physical security survey-s as
discussed in detail in FM 19-20 and ffl 19-30.

~~
Major General, OS
~- Major General, USA
ACo!S !or Intelligence The Provost Marshal General

Ftgure !4 (UNOLASSIFIED). 4aacnaum to memorandum of underata.n,Ung on ,ecre<>v, !O April 1862 (U).

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
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l cY;;- f-1 Q - I q -s~I

~ 4,-.+.--//_
 i
SECRET ' \ ~

fEJ SECURITY VIOIATIONS ARE' BAD HABITS CU)

b1

b1
(U) One must remember that the only known
enemy es iona.~ is that which has failed.
{PT

b1

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL on SECRET

11 April 2012 Downgraded at 12-Year Intervals:
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 !J2' VIOLATIONS REPORTED BY STATION (U}

b1
1f21' VIOLATIONS REPORTED SY YEAR (U)

UL). Vfoiatton, (U).

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6BC~ SECRET 11 Aprll 2012 :
by USA.INS COM FOI/P A ;
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,.,
_j;,u/)EyL~
()&~ L()c ·3 $/t:r,9 _ __
I • ,
 ~
SECRET ...,

b1
Fi(l'UrB S6 (QO)'!FIJ.llSUTIXL). Oategor11 of per,onri,l involved in ucurit11 vil>latioru (U),

b1 b1
(klf

F ~ B'l ( ~ ) . Tvp,a of lliolation11 (U)

SECRET 69

~ Regraded CONFIDENTIAL on

by uJJN~fficft~1 2
Aµth Encl 5, para 1-d, DOD 5200-01-Vl

,Z-1 70 }~-t-lQ -t Q '&JI

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D Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are

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purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their
decision.

D Other:

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Page(s) 71
IAGPA-CSF Form 6-R
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 ~
SECRET •,\
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SECRET 71
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~ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the

following exemption(s):

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release.

D Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to

you and/or the subject of your request.

D Information originated with another government agency. It has been

referred to them for review and direct response to you.

D Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are

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purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their
decision.

D Other:

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 SECRET-~ ·

ESPIONAGE BRIEFS

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SECRET 75

c,i75 LQs+!Q~- t$<iJ__

A.(, ';f fl ~
 SECRET

~ West Germany (U)

b1
(U) AF9entina (U)
.(U) On 14 June 1962, it wns announced tho.tir--b6----,I a naturalized
Argentine citizen born in Aussig, Czechoslovakia., andl bo la
naturaliz~d Argentine citizen born in Berlin, ~rma.ny, had been arrested by
Argentine security authorities for espionage .activities on behalf of the Soviet
Bloc. I be Iis the former head of a pro-Communist organization devoted
to the expansion of Argentine trade with the Communist Bloc. Initial infor-
mation indicates tha~ be lwere associated with other former
German nationals now residing in Brazil and Cu9a. who are allegedly engaged
in intelligence activities. .According to .Argentine intelligence, radio trans-
mitters, cipher materials, photographic and micro.filming equipment, and other.
appara.tus were seized in the homes of the two men.

¢ California (U}

~\

.lRrl
b1
SECRET
Excluded from Automatic Ragradlng1
76. DOD Dir, 5200.1 DDoes Not Apply Regraded CONFIDENTIAL on
11 April 2012
c~ by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
------.--- Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-lR
ti;()EX ~--
-..&..L@B D_cJ_c._3_-_ _ _ 3_~
______ IDS- 1-1 Q - Lo/5f{__ _
C"-,... -:1 l I 4
 U Iceland (Ul
. (U) In May 1062, I~and expelled Czechoslbvaktra.de envoy, Vle.scimil V.
Stochl, charging that he had attempted to persuade 11,n Icelandic civilian pilot
to collect inform!_ttion concerning U.S. military aircraft based at Keflavik,
Iceland. The Icelandic Justice Ministry stated that the civilian pilot, Sigurdur
Ola.f~on, employed at the U.S. base, had complained to the Czechoslovak
Embassy about faults in a twin-engine aircraft be had purchased from Czecho-
slovakia. in 1954. The Ministry ea.id ·Ola.fsson quoted Stochl as saying that
Czechoslovakia. would give him a. new plane in exchange for information about
the American planes at Kefla.vik.

ffl" Mexico (U)

b1
I

b1

77

:I'/UQEx C
~ :3 _ _ _ql-j +-+77------=£()5::;_.....,_'._j_~~G);__.--!:,_l9.:...:~=-----
 SECRET
By Order of the Secretary of the Army :

EARLE G. WHEELER,
G61't81'aZ, United StatfJ8 Army,
Officia,l: OMef of Staff,
J.C. LAMBERT,
Major General,, Umted States A.rm,.11,
Tlu A.djutant General.

Distribution:
Active Af'm1/:
USo!A (1) AMO Det No. l (Ord) (5) Br Svc Sch (1)
ASA (MP&RF) (1) tTSCONA.RO (8) NWO (1)
A:SA (I&li)" "(t)· -OS· Kal-Oomd. (10).. except 104.F (!)
ASA (RD) (l) USAR.J (1) USM!. (2)
USA.SA (IS) USA.ROA.RIB (15) USA Cold Wea & Mt Sch (l)
ORD (1) USAREUR (94) USA Mal Comd (1)
OLL (1) USARYIS (20) USA. Avn Oen (l)
OARROTO (1) ARADCOM (8) USA. SpWor Cen (1)
OOA (1) ARADCOM Rgn (2) Engr Oen (1)
TJAG (1) LOOCOMD (1) QM Intel Agcy (1)
CofF (1) ZI Armies (50) except Ord Intel Agcy (1)
CMH (1) Second USA. (70) Med Info & Intel Agcy (1)
TAG (1) Third USA. (85) Sig Intel Agcy (1)
TBG (1) Fourth USA (40) 0ml Intel A(cy (1)
Sixth USA ( 85)
TPMG (1) Trane Intel Agcy (;I.)
E'USA (2)
CofT (1)
MDW (G) AMS (1)
TIO (1) US.AR.EUR Intel Sch (3)
XVIll Abu Oorpa (8)
DOSPER. (S) 101st Abu Div (2} US Forces Japan ·(10)
A.OSI (146) USA Obt Dev Eii:per Oen (1) Iceland Det Force (1)
DOSOPS (8) USA. Aggreuor Oen (1} Mil Man (1)
DOSLOG (B) Svc Oollege (2) euept Mli.G (1)
AMO (6) USAOOSO (1) ARMA. (1)
NG: None.
TJSAB: None.
For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR S2HO.

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
, 78 SECRET 11 Anrll 2012
by USAINSCOM FOI/P A
Auth Encl 5, para 1-d, DOD 5200-01-Vl

lJSA
 ... ·'· 't.;.,:·' ,·.:.···
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;
4•641 (Rev, 7-14-60) · ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
UNITED STATES L....,-..-~MENT HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-29-2011 BY 60324 UC BATiJ/SABiUJS

{
Memorandum ;x,
~
~)

TO <XXX~XXX)'• vvvC-f~,
--~~-.vvvv, · DATE:

.il ~N 2 5 19631 b6
b7C
FROM

suBJEcT: 'j/1111v 1(/At 5 q_llA'<-1~ , ry,,, ,,;;•· (~~''.'.' .~: , ·: -~ 1:

l?C'II(1 ~ (

c,v --;:,""':!., -:•'/. ,'i.,__ .5ua:ft;;: , u ~:I!.::... -2.'!,;_ rr,-_, ;,,;,,:rl' _: '.- : ~- -\-f ~3
. -yr1o.fLP"1
The attached • • Z/_. {!. VV'I,.,,,.
f-~ has been
received in the Records Branch, ap priately initialed, and in-
dicated for fil.e. By µse of instant transmittal memorandum, all
necessary recording and indexing will be accomplished. It is to
be noted this fonn is for internal use only within the Records
B:r;-anch, principally by the Routing Unit where bu1ky mate.rial not
·accompanied by memorandum is usually received.

The enclosure, if bulky and not usually filed With other

pap.ers in file, may be detached but this action should be clearly
noted under the word ''Enclosure."

Enclosure
/tJ.S-:- 1r~,-1-
-OT
NRECORDED
- -
5 JUN 25 1963

1"'1
rf}Jll

~ .rJ'F"O C)n \ '- l lc_po

. ' , r(\
~o-6"9- e, Dd~ t--{ 79
 ,, .' ·~

SEeRET

HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE

US ARMY (U)

1S MARCH 1963

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

Regraded UNCLASSJFlED on
11 Arpil 2012
by USAINSCOM FOIIP A
Auth para 4·.102, DOD 5200-lR
'' . - - -1-'-•
-----
11,11 ..tertal - I • oltoctt• 1M Nlllanlll Def._ ol tl,e
UiollN S-•lthl• ti..-... el .., 1.,-i,e IIM, TTlf• 11, U.S.C.,
s.c,..., m .. "'• t h e ~ . , 11..i• 11oa o1 .,1,1c1, ,. . .,, _
to - • .-..,1n,1 ...,_ 111 ,..,,..., .... b)' law.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGEN~1
. WASHINGTON 25, O.C.
SECRET
if-lt/~,#-
bte,,, ~ .
. • EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REG~
f>f
DOD DIR 5200. 10 DOES NOT L. 'J

0
usA J--NG~{ /&d-- l?~--8(/C/;~--:y: / ~ ck(lp '
 (U) INTRODUCTION (U)
(U) The United States Army, as a con--
sequence of ttsworld-widemisslon and dis-
position In defense of the nation and of our
alltes, has been and ts a main target of es-
pionage and subversive operations directed
by the TntelltgeAce, counterintelligence,
and psychologtcal warfare services of the
• Sino-Soviet bloc countries. Instances tn
which these hostl le services ·have sought
to subvert Army personne 1or enmesh them
" t n espionage are numerous and frequent.
There are no indications that these hosttle
operations against the Army wt 11 decrease;
to the contrary, they may become more
frequent. To defend against them, it ls of
urgent Importance that all Arrrrt personnel,
mllrtary and ctvlllan alrke, be aware of
the nature and techniques of hostile espio-
nage and subversion. It ts the purpose of
this booklet to contribute to such an aware-
ness by presenttng a review of Communist
directed espionage and subversion against
the United States Army in recent years.
(U) The review is in three parts. Part
I I llustrafes the emphasis bloc intelligence
services place on the detection of charac-
ter weaknesses, Indiscretions, and evi-
dences of emotional fnstabllity on the part
of Army pertonnel, all of which may be
used to lnvolve them ln espionage opera-
tions. It also shows the manner in which
these hostlle services exploit blood-ties
between residents of Communist countries
and ml!mbers of the Arrrry, its clvi ltan em-
ployees, and Its local foreign employees
In overseas commands. Summaries of
actual cases are presented to clearly show
the manner in which our enemies bait their
snare with money, alcohol, and sex, or
resort to the use of threats and other forms
of mental duress to bend their victims to
their wf 11.
(U) Part 11 discusses the use of tech-
SEERET
811
SEeRET
nlcal equipment by hostile intelllgence
services. In recent yean their technicians
developed a formidablearrayof taoist~ aid
them In the clandestine collection of infor-
motion and to entrap the unwary. The mod-
em Communist espionage agent has at his
disposal and ts trained to use a varietyof
devices which enable him to covertly mon-
itor telephone conversations and to listen
in on private conversations in closed rooms,
restaurants, hotels, and offices. He is also
able to take surreptitious photographs of
persons, places, and things. The sec.urfty
pl'Oblemi po·se-d··bythese devices·have· lnw
creased greatly since the developmentof
mlnlaturb:ed electronic and mechnical
compcnents; they may now be carried tn-
consprc:uously on the person or easily con-
cealed in or outside of rooms and butldings
in such a fashion as to defy detection.
(U) Part 111 reviews the use of propa-
gcnda by hostile intelligence and psycho-
loglcal warfare agencies to undermine the
morale and loyaltyof American servicemen,
to estrange United States Forces from their
alltes, and to fncftethepcpulacaof friend-
l·y foreign nations against the presenceof
American soldiers. Examples of propaganda
to achieve each of these Communist aims
are cited In order that similar propaganda
of this nature, wherever it may appear,
may be readtly recognf~ed for what it is by
Anny personnel.
(U) It is intended that this booklet be
given the widest possible distribution con-
sistent with Its security, cl~ssiff cation In
order that It may achieve its purpose.
Much of the information contained herein
has been prepared for use in Implementing
those provisions of AR 381-12, Subversion
and Espionage Directed Against the US
Army (Short title: SAEDA), dated 8
September 1961, whfch require that all
i Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
11 Aniil 2012
by USAINS~OM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-lR
L?3
military personnel and clvllian employees
of the Army be given an orientation on
methods used by foreign lntellfgence ser-
vices to gather fnformatfon pertafnf ng to
US Army Jnstal lotions, aetlvttles, and
personnel. Where security classlffcatfon
precludes direct use of some portions of
the materfal f n the preparation of Indoc-
trination lectures, such material may be
used as background Information for ln-
structon possessing adequate security
clearance.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

~i~ Brigadier General, USA

H
 HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE US ARMY (U)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I: ~ Soviet Bloc Espionage Techniques (U) Page

Introduction ••• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , •••• 1

"E asy Money II .••••••.•.•••••.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3
11
The Hostages" • • • • • . • • • • ••••••••••••• , ••••••••.•••••••.•• • • • • • • • 5
"False Colors" •••••••••••••.•.....•.••.•..•• , •••••• , ••..••••. ••••. 7
"The Decoy II •••..•.•..• , ••.••...••.....•......•.••..••..•••. , •.• 8
''Asking for Trouble''• ••••.•••••.•••.•••..•...•••••••••.••.•.•. ,.,. 11
"A loaded Handbag'' ••....•••...••.•.••..•.•.••.•...••• , •...••• , •• 12
''Mr. Mata· Harl 11 • • • • • • • • • • • , • • , • • •• , , • • • 1 1 • • • v. , • ~ •••••• .- •.••••••• 13.
"The 'Doctored' Photograh" •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 15

PART II: ~ Clandestine Listening and Photographic Devices (U)

A. General •• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• . ...... . 19

Telescopic Photography ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ... ....
" 21

B. Basic Counter-Measures Against Audio-Visual Surveillance Devices.. 24

C. Examples of Audio Surveillance by Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services:

USSR •••••••• , •••• , •••••.••••••••••• ,........................ 30

Bulgaria......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Cxechoslovakia................... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
East Germany. . . • • • • . • • • • • . • . . . • • . • • . . . • . • • . • • . . • • . . . . . • • • . . • 33
Hu r,gary, •••••••• , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 33
Poland • •••••••••••••• , ••••••••••••••••••••••••• -. • • • • • • • • • • • • 36
Rumania •••••• ,, ••••• , •••••••••••• , ••• , .................. ,.... 42
Yugoslavia •••.•••.. , •.. , .... ; . . • . . • • . • • • • . . . • • • • • • • . . • . . . • • • . 44

PART Ill: (5) Subversive Activities Directed Against US Army (U)

Instances of Subversion and Propaganda •••••••••••••••••••••••.•••

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
11 April 2012
by USAINSCOM FOI/P A
Auth para 4-102, DOD :5200-lR

iii
83 /CoS
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
11 Aplil 2012
by USAINSCOM FOI/P A
PART I
. Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-lR ~ SOVIET BLOC ESPIONAGE TECHNIQUES {U)
(U) The Soviet espionage network.,
augmented by those ~f the Satellite coun-
tries, Is by far the largest in the world.
Its operational bases are located In virtual-
ly every country on the globe. Thousands
of Communist bloc agents in the guise of
diplomatt c personnel, ml lltary attaches,
commerclal representatives, artists, tech-
nicians, tourists, emigres, etcetera, carry
on clandestine intelligence operations
from these bases. Some are located in
Sovlet/Satelltte ernbasshas, consulates, or
the residences associated with the~ diplo-
matic lnstallatfons; otheis operate under
the cloak of press and travel agencies or
trade delegations; stJ II othen Illegally In-
filtrate non-Communist countries to pose
a:s loyal citizens whlle covertly engaged
In espfonage.
(U) The United States Army, whl.ch
together with its sister services represents
the mi IJtary power of Communlsm'sprlnclp-
al Free World antagonist, ts a prime target
of this Soviet bloc espionage network. Its
operatives seek informatron concerning the
Army's strength, disposition, training,
equipment, communications, plans, re-
search and development, weapons, any-
thing which mfght ald Communfst forces
In the event of hostllrtles.
(U) Never before In Its peacetime his-
tory hc;ss the Unfted States had occasion to
deploy so many troops In so many foreign
lands as It has In the post World War II
period. To the Communist bloc fntelll-
gence services, these hundreds of thou-.
sr.mds of American servicemen and their
dependents stationed throughout the world
represent an Inexhaustible number of pc-
tentla I sources for the Information they
seek. Fully appreciative of this vast po-
SEC:RET
~toeo
SEC:RET
tenttal, the Sfno-SO\llet bloc countries are
conducting an unceasing clandestine effort
to subvert and recruit US Army personnel
in order to exploit them for tntelllgence
collection purposes.
(U) The methods employedare divene
and Ingenious, and more frequently than
not of a sordid nature. In attempting to
recruit their "targets11 , Communfst agents
will not heslstate at the vilest of means to
achieve their purpose. T-hey· ·are .fully
aware that any Instances oF fmmoral,
Illegal, or indiscreet conduct of US per-
sonnel assigned abioad are a valuable
lever ln their hands. Penonal habits,
traits of character, mannerisms, and as-
sociations are scrutlnb.:ed to determine any
irregularltie• of conduct. Information Is
sought regarding personal Interests, asso-
cratea., and relatives residing In countries
under Communist control; partfcu lar atten-
tion ls given to any evidence of black
market or other Illegal transactfons, in-
debtedness or other flnanclal difAculttes,
f lllcft or abnormal sexual activities, and
excessive drinking.
(U)" In -determining how best to effect
recruitment of his tafget, the foreign ln-
telllgence agent considers no piece of In-
formation Insignificant or Irrelevant. Any
evidence of misconduct is exploited to the
utmost. And If there is no evidence, tt may
be contrived. Entrapment ls a common tech-
nique. Hostrle intelligence services wlll
frequently arrange situations which Invite
llllcft relatfons between US personnel and
foreign natlon<:ils of the opposite sex who
are their readily avaflable tools. ~lalms
of pregnancy or alleged abortions which
may arfse from such situations are used .to
further entangle the entrapped lndlvtdual.
(See Fig. 1)
1
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Figure I. (UNCLASSIFIED--FOR OFFICIAL USE Ot~L'f) Confessed Informants of hostile

lntelllgence services who were companions of U.S. military person'lel (U).

2
T t--50~ K C FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
tm DC'Je--k/ ~&,~
 (U) Americans stationed tn Iron Cur-
tain countries are even more exposed to
hosttle lntelllgence operations; each tn-
divldual and his activities, both during and
after duty houn, ts subi ect from the moment
of hts arrlva I to a constant scNtlny and sur-
vel llance by police and securlty agencies
alded by an army of Informants. Moreover,
complete control of publlc communications
services, constNctlon work, and lnstalla-
tlon of uttlttles tn their own countries
assures theCommunlst lntelllgenca services
ample opportunity tQ Jn.1tgl! covert llsten-
lngandrecordtng devlceswhlch Invade the
prlwcy of off1 ces and homes. ·
(U) As a consequence of thelrunceas-
tna effort, the number of Soviet/Sate I Itta
attempts to recruit profitable 10urces of fn ..
formation from within US military forces,
wherever they may be stationed, fa on the
Increase. Unfortunately, a rash of recent
cases--bothpubltcl:z:ed and unpubllcf:z:ed-
ln which classified mflftary Information was
furnished to Soviet bloc agents by US mtll-
tary personnel and cfvilfan employees
testifies to the succeu and effectiveness of
hostlle lntellfgence methods.
(U) Mllttary and clvl Iran personnel
often Fall to recognize foreign lntelllgence
activities directed against them because
thsy: (1) minimize the Importance of thelr
,. own rank or duties to foreign lntelllgence
services; (2} fall to appreciate the ease
wtth which any bad personal habits, traits
of character, and associations can be used
against them for purposes of blackmail, In-
timidation, and embarrassment, and (3) fal I
to recognize or suspect questions posed by
foreign nationals In the coune of otherwise
_rnnocent conversation as de Itberate attempts
by hostlle lntelllgence to obtain valuable
i nformatf on.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
l ~8
(U) It Is, therefore, believed that us· .
Army commanden and thefr staffs wtll flnd
the following summarlesof actual case his-
tories useful, notonly In alertlngpenonnel
of their commands to the gravlty of the
security threat posed by hoatlle rnte lltgerice
but also to acquaint them with the means
bywhlchthey~n avoid or negate attempts
by hostl le Intel llgence operatives to re-
cruit or subvert them.• Each of the follow ..
t ng t nstances II lust rates a clf fferent approach
or comblnqtfon of approaches by ·bloc In-
telligence services to achieve their com-
mon goa·r.
"EASY MONEY"
(U-FOUO) Excessive· Indebtedness is
always a source of pressure on the debtor.
Communist intelllgence offlcers know this
well and are ever alert to manipulate this
pressure on potential ~urces of infor~ton
who are In ftnancfal dlff1culty. There are
known Instances where they have even in-
ftltratedtheiragents into banking and lencl-
rng inatttutions in order to obtal n the- names
of borrowers. In the following case, they
obtained their Information by other meani
and quickly put It to successful use. A US
Army soldier stationed abroad ( whom we
shall call Sergeant Brown) was their target.
(U-FOUO) Brown's difficulties began
when he tr1ed to support both his family,
which he had left In the United States, and
a mistress with whom he cohabited at hts
duty station. Agnella had been a barmaid,
but the American soldier's dollan mode it
unnecessary for her to continue working.
Brown's pay, however, was lnsufficfent to
cover the added expenses of this affair and
he began to borrow mc;,ney from other so 1-
diers In his unit. When he was unable to
promptly repay these loam, he soon found
3
U)S---- t-l ~ ~ A 5& ~t* l6
ttImpossible to borrow addJtJonal money
except at exhorbrtant rnterest rates.
(U-FOU0) Brown was soon deep rn
financial trouble. His mfstre. was preg-
nant and tn the process of berng evicted
from her apartment for fol lure to pay the
rent. In a note to Agnella, Brown wrote
hfs worrfes were compounded by the pos-
sfbtltty of his being separated from the
Army as an undesirable because of con-
trnued excessive debts. To improve the
flnancfal situation, Agnella looked for
work.
(U-FOUO) She frrsttrledto get a fob
at the bar where she had last worked.
There she spoke to an old customer, known
only as II Egon11 , who frequented the place.
She to Id him she was badly f n need of
money; he appeared aympathetf c and soon
assistedhertoa new job. Later, fn thank-
ful conversation, she confided In Egon
about her condition, her Army Friend, hrs
debts, and their need for money.
(U-FOUO) Agne I la never saw Egon
agdin, but shortly thereafter two men un-
known to her visited the bar where she was
working, Introduced themselves as Friends
of Egon, and fnvlted her to their table.
D-ur-ing- the- ens1:1lng,·conversation, Agnella
discussed her financial problems and one of
themensuggestedthe posslbtlity of a well-
paldclerlcal Jobwlth his 11 flrm. 11 Arrang!9-
ments were thereupon made for a further
meeting to discuss this possibility.
(U-FOUO} At this meeting, the man
suggested that they go elsewhere for the
dlscusston, hts chauffeur-driven car was
}ust outside. They drove to another res-
taurant where the man introduced himself as
Mr. Peters. He then told Agnella out-
right that he represented a certain Jntellr-
4
FOR OFFICIAL USE. ONLY
gence ggency and that her Job as a bar-
maid would give her an excellent opportu•
nity to observe people and pick up f nter-
esting information; would she be wllllng to
become an Informant? Agnella accepted.
(U-FOUO) Peters said he was primari-
ly lntel"e$ted in obtaining Information about
people who drank excessively or engaged
tn Jlllcft sexual affairs., Brown's name was
hardly mentioned, _although Agnella did ex..
plain that she and Brown had pressing debts
amount.Ing to $500. Peters asked for an
ltemfz:ed account, stating that this Indebt-
edness could be settled; it would be 11 ea1y11
to obtain the money If the couple could
furnish Information about US Army insta lla-
tiona, equipment, and personnel. Peters
ended the discussion by giving Agnellaa
telephone number and Instructions for their
next meetl ng.
(U ...FOUO) Agnella quickly informed
Brown of these events and persuaded him to
accept Peter's proposition. Brown imme-
diatelysetdownand turned over to Agnella
some notes on order of battle Information on
US units In the area. At the Jr next meeting,
Agnella gave Brown's notes to Peters. He
appeared satisfied with them and paid her
$75, stipulating, however, that thi$ ~o.e.y
was to be used to buy cfvflian clothfng for
Brown and that the Sergeant was to accom-
pany Agnella to the next rendezvous. When .
Agne Ila disclosed that Brown had recently
attended a demolttlon training school,
Peters promptly requested that Brown also ,.
obtain samples of explosives used at the
sehoolaswell as all available fteldmanuals
dealing wtth US Army weaponry.•
(U-FOUO) Brown's compltctty In this
espfonage operutlonwas exposed a few days
later by mere chance. When he had been
placed under restriction for being AWOL,
 Brown prepared several reports for Peten
which ha placed in a bundle of laundry
and gave to another soldier to deliver to
Agnella. This soldier, whose suspicions
had been aroused by some of Brown's re-
cent activitte1, opened the bundle and
discovered the rap0rt1. Brown and his
mistress were quickly arrested and soon
tried and convicted of espionage.
(U-FOUO) Investigation found no
evidence of Communist orientation or as-
sociates In Brown's past. Nor dtd it un-
cover any evidence which might have
raised doubts about his prior loyalty to the
United States. This soldier probably had
never had the ·remotest Idea that ons clay
he ml ght petray his country. What then Is
the lesson to be drawn from Brown's dis-.
grace? It is that Irresponsible conduct of
one's personal and financial affairs can
lead to sltuatlC:)ns which may Impair judge-
ment, Integrity, and loyalty, situations
only too quickly exploited by hostile ln-
telltgence agents who seek them out.
(U-FOU~ What primary espionage
technique appean In this case? It is the
use of a II spotter. 11 In Intelligence jargon,
a spotter lsan Intel llgence operative whose
principal function Is to determine the
Identity and circumstances of persons who
for one or more reasons may be considered
susceptlb le reqrultment targets. Spotters
ate often recruited from among those oc-
cupations whlch have frequ~mt opportunity
to learn some detalls of an lndtvldual's
personal affaln cmd conduct; barkeepers,
barmaids, waitresses, prostitutes, barflle1,
and taxi drt vers have been often used for
this purpcse.
(U-FOUe), Upon !earning information
about a person which may indfcc:1te his sus-
cepttbt llty, the spotter transmits it by var-
~oe, c_. . FBR BFFICIAL USE ·oNLY
_l_)S_A_ _ _ w_c_. ----=-L.f·_ _ _ _ _ ,_.:_____~___.....0-::__________~-~{~/-lQ-_ ~58r ~ fG:,
tovs means to an Intel llgence headquarters
where a dossier Is opened on the pctential
target. There, experienced intelltgence
officers review all known factors bearlng
on the target t n order to determine the poa-
sibl lity andbestavenueof approach. When
it appears that there ,fs some p0ssibl lityof
success, a'1 agent is ordered to make the
approach.
(U-FOU~ In Brown's case, Egon was
thespotter; the circumstances which he re-
ported were the Sergeant's extra-marital
affairwtthAgnella, the r~sultlng pregnancy,
and their desperate need for money. This
was enough to give the 11 9rHn light11 to
agent Peters who had no dlfflculty f n con-
vf nct ng Agnella, and she, In tum, Brown,
thathlsproposalwas a way outof their dif-
ficulties. But In cases where the target in-
dividua·I Js not under Immediate mental
duress and the prospects for success are. not
Immediate, his dossier will be maintained
in the files of the hostlle Intelligence ser-
vt ce fn view of the possibility that addt- .
ttonal fnfonnatlon may permit an approach
at a later date.
THE HOSTAGES
(U..:=OUO) There are thousands of
P.9rsonsassoclated with the Army who have
close relatives or friends residing In coun-
tries under Communist control. They In-
clude the alien enlistees, many of them
refugees from Communism who have since
qcquired citizenship, foreign born scientists
and technicians employed tn research <1nd
development for government agencies or ·
ml lltary contracton, lmmf grant clvtllan
employees of the Army In the United States,
local foreign employees of overseas com-
man.ds on the periphery of th• Communist
empire, and foreign born dependents of
servicemen. These people have chosen
5
freedom and, with rare exception, have
shown their loyalty to their adopted coun-
try. Nevertheless, they are often the tar-
gets of Communist espionage operations
wht ch seek to use the Ir re latIves and frl ends
who are stl 11 sub) ect to Communist contro Is
as hoatages to obtain their ends.
(U-FOUO) A soldier assigned to the
16th Fleld Hospital In West Germany be-
came Involved tn such an operationwhen
he visited his grandparents In Poland. He
had scarcely arrived when he waa summoned
to the local city hall, ostensibly for the
purpose of validating his travel documents.
There hewastaken to a private room where
he was questioned by two men who did not
Identify themselves. After a few prelimi-
nary remarks with regard to his mi 1-tt.ary
assignment, the men discussed the strained
relationship between the United States and
Poland, which they attributed to 'American
support of Weat Germany. The 10ldier was
then asked about USAREUR military units
and West Germon mf ssi lea sites. He was
also asked ff he would be wJIIJng to "work
for Poland" upon his retum to West Germany;
this, Itwas implied, would be to the bene-
fit of his grandparents whq might otherwise
suffer for his lack of cooperation. When
the soldier declined the offer, he was ad-
monbh-ed· not to Tev«rl -the approach if he
wanted to avoid endless interrogations by
Armrit:an security authorities.
(U-FOUO) Another case involved
Carlotta, an erstwhtle Rumanian national
who had married a member of the US Army
also stationed In Germany. Not long after
her marriage, she received her husband's
permlsston to visit her mother In Rumanla.
She made appltcatton forthe necessary visa
and wa1 directed to the Rumanian Consul-
ate in London. There, she was cordially
received by a consular official and, a~er
6
f DR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
l 7 89
fumi shl ng the necessary data, issued the re-
qui red papers. Before her departure, how-
ever, one of theofffcialswho had been ex-
ceptionally courteous to her Indicated that
he too contemplated traveling to Rumanla
soon and would be interested In meeting
her again.
(u...,-:ou~ Shortly thereafter, Carlotta
traveled to Bucharest. She had barely
arrived at her mother's home when she was
visited by the same -Rumanian official who
had been so courteous to herfn London. He
pretendedafrlendlyinterest in her and per-
suaded her to accept several dinner engage-
ments. During these meetings, Carlotta
soon perceived that the Rumanian's Interest
Wm other than friendship. He spoke at
length about the loyalty she owed her native
land and how much lt would serve the In-
terests of her family In Bucharest If she
would perform certain 11 harmless 11 favors for
the Rumanian Govemm~nt upon her return
to Germany. Although Carlotta polltely
declined, she did accept an address to
which she should write tf she happened to
change her mind.
(U-FeU9) Carlotta left Bucharest in
a troubled state. Despite the suave and
courteous treatment accorded her by the
offtclal-, she feared- -for the safet-y--of her
family in Bucharest should she refuse to CO•
operate with the Rumanian Government.
Upon arriving home, she immedtately told
her husband about the entire matter. He,
in turn, reported the circ'umstances to
Army lntelltgence.
(U-FOUO~ Arrff'/ lntelltgence officen
requested and obtained the cooperation of
Carlotta and her husband in an effort to
deteimlne the true nature of the Rumanian's
Interest. Carlotta dispatched a letter to
the Bucharest address, indicating her readi-
 ness to cooperate. She soon received in-
structions to meet another Rumanian re-
presentative at a given restaurant ln
Germany at a specified time.
(U-FOU~ This representative turned
outtobea member of an offtctal Rumanian
delegatlon ln West Gennany. He quickly
took Carlotta Into his confidence and ex-
plained- that, through her husband, she
could obtain certain US military info~-
tion that the Rumanian Government needed
In order to "protect Itself against Its
enemies. 11 It was now clear that Army ln-
te llt gence had to deal with a bona fide
Rumanian tntel1lgenceoperatlon. The man
was arrested and soon admitted that he was
in reality a Rumanian Intelligence agent.
He also confirmed that Carlotta had Imme-
diately become the target of this espionage
operation when she first applied for her
visa at the Rumanian Consulate In London.
(U-FOUO) It Is not only overwas that
such cases arise. lnJune 1961, the United
States demanded the recall of Miroslav
Nacvalac, a Czechoslovak delegate to the
United Nations. He was charged with
seeking information about the US Army
language Schoo I l n Monterey, Ca lifomia,
from an instructor at the school who co-
operated with United States authorities In
their investigation of the case.
(U-FOUO) In a seriesof meetlngswlth
the Instructor in California, Nacvalac
sought to obtain Information about the staff
of the language school, the Identities of
students, and thef r assignments after com..
pletlon of their language training. His
lever was the fact that the rnstructor's
ffancee wa1 stt 11 a rest dent of C:zechoslo-
vakia. Nacvalac fmplled that in exchange
For the Information he desired he could be
helpful in arranging an exit visa for her.
FOR OFFICIAL TISE ONLY
. [ J:SPr l7~
(U-FOUO~ In resp0nse to the US
charges, Nacvalac claimed that he had
never been in California and had nevermet
the Instructor. The State Departmentthere-
upon released photographs of Nacvalac to--
getherwith the Instructor at a meeting which
took place between the two men in iSan
Francisco on 14 November 1959. Nacva lac
subsequently left the United States.
(U-FO~ These are but three of many
similar cases. In each, the basic techniques
are similar. In the case of travel to Com-
munist countries, the Intelligence services
learn of the scheduled arrival of their tar-
get from their consulates or other diplomatic
installatlonswhich issue visas andentryper-
mtts and from their border contro I. units. In
other Instances, surveillanceof postal com-
munications gives them leads to ties between
their natlonals and .relatives and friends In
the West. And when the target has been
identified, he or she is contacted either
directly or by mat I and an effort is made to
solicit cooperation by threatening the well
being of relatives or friends living under
Communist control. Although there is
little or no evidence that these threats are
ever carrted out, the mere fact that they
are made by representatives of a society
In which such things are possible is enough
to lend them plausibtltty and give concern
to those to whom they are made. In ,these
cases, as in other hostile intelligence
approaches, the best solution for all con-
cerned is to report-the approach as quickly
as posstble to the appropriate US agency.
FALSE COLORS
(U-FOUO) Another variation tn :the
techniques used by Communist inte Iligence
services to recruH sources of Information
is the so-called "false-flag" approach.
The agent employing this approach mis-
7
repre~nts himself and his motrves to his
target. A case Involving this approach
was terminated In March 1961 with the
arrest of Harold Borger, an American
businessman, In Nuemberg, West Germany,
on charges of esplonag• against the US
Army.
(U-FOUO) Borger, who lived fn
Nuernberg and dea It in the tm~rt/ expart
trade, came to our attention when it be-
came known that ha had visited East Ger-
many and the Sovt et Un ton and, upan hil
return, had coupled open crrticlsm of'
Americanfort?len pallcy with praise for the
USSR. But his approach to an Army enlist-
ed man was not on that basis. Instead,
taking advantage of the fact that both he
and the soldier were of Jewish descent,
Borg,r dlscuaed Israel and the merits of
Zionism. When he Felt that 'rappart had
been established, Borger sat d that "Israel"
needed military Information and asked the
soldier to furnish him with the details of
USAREUR manewars, alert plans, and mis-
sile sites, as well as Army technical manu-
als and equipment. He said that he would
deliverthe information to a 11 Zioni1t 11 con-
tact t n Swinerland and that it might be
worth $600; he would also furnish the sol-
dier with a camera and a falH bottom
briefcase to facllitate acqubftion of the
materia·I.
(U-FOUO) After hii arrest, Borger
denied any Intent of espionage or any con-
tact with a foreign -fntelllgence service·.
He at first maintained that he had sought
mflftary information and materfa I only for
the purpose of afdfng him In makf ng ar-
rangements for the production of equipment
for sale to the Army. It was, however,
detennlned that he had been workfng for a
Communist intelligence service. He was
convf cted by a West German court on
8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_r;N [)£11-~
Doc 'j _ _ _ _ _lrin_~---
espionage charges and sentenced to two
and one-half years fmp-fsonment at hard
labor.
THE DECOY
{U-FOUO) A derivative definition of
decoy describes a person employed to invei-
gle another Into a pasltfon where he may
be trapped, robbed, or the ltke. Decoys in
one form or another are often used by hos-
ti le intelligence agencies. The following
case history i I lustrates qut one use of this
technique. It Involves a serviceman, re-
ferred to as Sergeant Smith f n this account,
whowasassignedto a sensftlve pasitlon with
the Army fn West Berlin. He was a c;on,cl-
entfous worker of more than average intel-
11 gence who was trapped by a Communist
decoy.
(U-FOUO} One evenf ng, Smfth and
a companion visited a West Berlin bar that
catered chiefly to US militqry personnel.
He had previously vlsfted the bar a number
of times and was well known to both the bar
personnel and clientele. During thfs visit,
Smith met an attractive German gl rl named
EIK1, whose smile Invited hfs attention. EIKI
clafmed·to be a ballet dancer who lfved tn
West Berlin; she looked the part and thfs
intr.igued .5.mit.h_. In qn effort to Impress
her, Smith told her where he worked. 1hey
danced several times and Smith then drove
her to a subway station where they parted
after arrangements had been made for a
date several days later. She obllgingly
Furnished Smith her home telephone number.
(U-FOUO) The date took place as
scheduled, with Smith picking the girl up
at the same subway stotfon at which he had
previously left her. The two had drinks at
a local bar, attended a Post movie 1 and
then returned to the same bar for more
drinks. At this point. Elsa proposed that
they attend the East Berlin opera on t~_elr
next date. Smith agreed and a date was
sat. Ha then drove EIsa to her subway
station where they parted.
(U-F-8Ue} Th• next day Smith made
arrangements for a pass to East Berltn, and
the following evening he droveto the opera
house where he was to meet Elsa. Contrary
to· USAREUR reg"'latlons, he wore civilian
·clothes. When Elsa did not appear Smith
cal led hert at- the telephone number
•
prevl-
ovsly furnished. She answered, saying
toot she had been delayed but wou Id be
there soon. Shortly thereafter, she arrived
-and saldthat hertic::keta for the State Opera
dtd not entitle them to good seats; conse-
quently, she planned to obtain tickets at
another theater. They drove to the other
theater where Elsa absented henelf for ap-
proximately 15 minutes, allegedly to ex-
change the tickets. She returned and the
two took their seats. During the perform•
ance, Elsa left twice for short periods, al-
legedly to check her coat and to go to a
nearby restaurant to make reservations.
Afterwards, Elsa and Smith went to the
restaurant where they ate dinner and drank
champagne and cognac. During this time,
Elsa again briefly absented henelf on two
occasions. They left the restaurant at mid-
night.
(U-FOUO) The two then drove to an
apartment in the. East Sector near Sta Un
Allee,· where one of Elsa's girl friends al-
1-egedly resided and where Elsa said she In-
tended to spend the ·night. She gave tne
n~cessary directions, and they parked ap-
proximately one and one-half blocks from
the house and walked the remaining dis-
tance. The apartment house door was usual Items of name, rank, service number,
opened by an elderly woman who took the unit, age, civilian background, schooling,
so Idler and his date into a ltvlng room etc. When Smith refused to talk, stating
FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY
l7~2
where a table was set in German fashion
with sand.vlches, hors d'oeuvres, and bot-
tles of champagne, wine, and cognac.
Elsa filled several glasses and offered them
to Smith. He admittedly drank at least two
glasses of ch:Jmpagna and cognac. Smith
made advances to Elsa, who had previously
intimated they would be permitted, but she
rebuffed him without explanation and sud-
denly-told him to leave. She accompanied
him part way to his car and then walked
back to the apartment. Not east ly put off,
Smith returned to the apartmeht and rang
the doorbell, wh!ch was answered by the
elderly woman; she told him to leave.
Smith beUeved that he heard the telephone
ring during the conversation.
{U-FOUO} He returned to the car and
drove to Staltn Allee, intending to return
to 'fl est Berltn via Brandenburger Gate.
Upon entering Staltn Allee he was stopped
by two East Gennan policemen and a plain
clothesman. The keys were Forcibly taken
from the automobile and he was accused of
drunken driving. Smith reacted correctly to
the situation and demanded that he be
placed in contact with a Sovtet officer.
A Soviet Malorarrlved 20 minutes later and
asked to see his tdenttflcation card. After
a cursory check of the papers, the Major,
and the plain clothesman escorted Smith to
the Soviet Compound in Berlln-Karlshorst.
He was taken to a room which appeared to
be an office where he was subiected to a
series of questions posed by tha Major and
the clvt Uan. Smith refused to talk to the
civilian, stating that he would speak only
with Soviet officers. The clvtllan counter-
ed by stating that ha wa, a Soviet officer.
(U-FOUO) The questions covered the
9
that he was required-only to give hia name,
rank, and sarvi C'3 number, the civf han, sud-
denly ceaaedtousethe 11 soft 11 approach and
told Smith that he was"drunk and In trou-
ble. 11 He was further advised that he waa
in 11 thatr11 (Soviet) control and it would be
to his advantage 19 cooperate. ·If he re-
fused to answer their questions, he would
be turned over to US authorttles who, ac-
cording to the civflfan Interrogator, dealt
harshly with personnel who were drunk and
dJsorderly and became fnvo lvedwrth author-
ttTes fn East BerlJn. At this pofnt the Inter-
rogation was taken over by another civilian
who used a friendly approach. Smith was
asked whether he had enioyed the theater
perfonnance, how long he had been In
Berltn, whether he 'liked the city, and
whether he would like a drlnJ<.
(U-FOUO) The interrogation was then
resumed by the first civtlian who used the
previous threatening tactics. Thfs procedure
was repeated several times during the course
of the interrogation, which lasted from
0100 to 0930 hours. Flnally, the civilians
threatened to take Smith to their superior
and told him this would be his last chance
to cooperate. This threat was not carried
out, but shor.tly b~fore the Interrogation
was terminated the first clvi llan threatened·
to turnSmfthover to the US authorities and
charge him with drunken driving and un-
speclfted traffic violations In East Berltn.
Whenthlsthreat fatledto elicit the desired
response, the ctvt-llan then offered Smith
payment for hts cooperation and stated that
thetransactlonwouldbe kept secret. Smith
refused the offer, and the interrogators ap-
parently. conceded their chances of making
a successful recruitment.
(U-FOUO) US authorities, ahottly
therea~er, received a telephone call from
the Soviet Kommandatura requesting that
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Smith be picked up In East Berlfn. The
tra115fer to US control was made without In-
cident, and Smith was allowed to take his
car with him. An interesting sidelight Is
that the car had been thoroughly searched
wfthout any effort made to conceal the
fact, although nothing had been removed
from the vehicle.
(U-FOUO) Smith's account of the
events that transpired during the time he
was under Soviet detention was confirmed
by f nvestlgatlve means. Except for provi d-
1ng lfmfted perso~ltty data on persons em-
ployed tn his office, Smith conducted him-
self In an exemplary fashlon whlle being
Interrogated. Th9 behavior which led to
hls detention was naive, but he did dtsplay
good iudgement In the sequence of events
followlng his arrest. Subsequent efforts to
locate EIsa met with negative resu Its; a check
ofW est Berl In records produced no evidence
that she resided f n the West Sector as she
clatmed. The telephone number Elsa furnished
Smith waa lfsted In an East Berlin Directory.
(U-FOUOl This case illustrates not
only the use of ~ decoy, Elsa, but also a
famlltar alternatlon of intimidation and in-
ducement fn an effort to recruit the target.
ln att ifk-e·lihood, Smith was. fl m s~ttec;i
and aaeued by a Soviet support agent--a
spotter-covering West Berlin ban and
looking for exploitable characterweakneuas
11
in American ioldlera. It was probably re-
ported that Smith had a sensitive aulgnment
and a habit of picking up unknown women ,.
In bars. The nature of hts assrgnment was
no doubt conffnned by other spotters and a
file on Smith establJshed at this step of the
operation. The next step was to confirm
information about his habits and ther, as-
sign QM attractive glrl the (ob of brf Agi_ng
him to East Berlin. After she had succeeded
in making contact with Smith and had per-
suacfed him to meet her In the East Sector,
the remainder of the operation was strictly
routlmt; It required only coo'rdlnatlon with
the police, arrangements for the apartment,
and the Immediate avallobtltty of Soviet
tnterrogaton to exploit the hapless target.
ASKING FOR TROUBLE
{U-FOUO) In the foregoing case his-
tory, a decoywas used to contrive a situa-
tion in which a soldier's tndtscretton led
to his being subiected to Intl midatton and
pressure by a foreign lntelllganca service.
But more often, as In the case of Sergeant
Brown's financial difftculties, foreign
agents attempt to exploit existing situa-
tions to their own advantage. In the fot-
lowlng case, ari American serviceman's
misconduct and Incredible naivete led ul-
timately to dtsloyalty, the compromise of
classified Information, and his disgrace.
(U-FOUO} Carter was assigned to a
duty station in an Iron Curtain country.
Although lfvlngwith his family at this sta-
tion, he entered Into an illicit love affair
with a local glrl employed as a maid at
his home. Despite the fact th:Jt his wife
discovered the affair and discharged the
maid, whom we shall call Ilona, Carter
continued to maintain the relationship at
a downtown apartment.
(U-FOUO~ ltwasnot long, af course,
before the affair came to th9 attention of
the intelltgence seJVlce of the counhy.
Th·e agenh assigned to the case further
learned that Ilona h::1d become pregnant
and ha·d undergone an rllegal abortton.
They contacted IIona and encountered little
dtffteulty In recruiting her for an lntellt-
gence operation to be mounted against
Carter. The cards were all on their side;
her alternative was a prison term for the
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ·
l ~Co
-illegal operation.
(U-FOUO) lnltially, Ilona's only
task was to report on everything she could
learn concerning Carter's penonal life,
activities, .Job, habits, and associates.
At the downtown apartment, the agents
lnstal led hidden microphone1 and a two-way
mirror, a glass which appeara to be a mirror
on the one sf de but which permits persons
on the other to watch and photograph every-
thing going on In the room which It faces.
(U-FOUQ Atthls stage, the c~se took
an unusual twist. Ilona, apparently prompt-
ed by remorse or gernJI ne affection for
Carter, told him of her recruitm-ent and the
hidden microphones and two-way mirror.
Cater', reaction was both stubbc;,m and
naive. He replied thQt he would continue
seeing her because he still loved her, was
concerned for her safety, believed the ob-
ject of the intelligence operation was mere-
ly to keep him under surveillance, and,
now that ha kneW of It, he could outwit the
agents. Whatever misgivings Ilona might
have entertalnedwere relegated to the back
of her mind by her infatuation with Carter
and the relattonshlp s:ontinued.
(U-FOUO~ Not longafterthlseplsode,
Ilona told Carter that she was again preg-
nant. After somedtscreet tnq~irles, a doc-
tor was found who was wtlling to perform
the second abortion. Then, shortly a~er
the operat1on, Carter arrived at the apart-
ment to ft~d two poltcemen and an lntellt-
genceagent awaiting him. They fmmedtate-
ly confronted htm with the evidence of his
misconduct and vlolatfon of the laws of
their country; ho-Never, they said he could
avoid exposure and prosecution by render-
Ing "certain services." After several hours
of threats, abuse, and detatls of their evi-
dence, Carter agreed to cooperate. He
11
I 05 ~ f-b r 1Qsar Jet.f-/4
later told US counterfntelltgence agents A LOADED HANDBAG
that he was so frightened at the time that
he would have done or safd anything Iust to (U-FOUO) Another case Illustrates
get a-Nay from hfs captors. the constant surveillance to whtch person-
nel stationed In Communist coun~ries are
(U-FOUO~ Carter's treasonable re .. sublected by hostile tntelltgence tn an
latfonshlp with the Iron Curtain country effort to detect any aspect of their con-
continued throughout the remainder of his duct which ma be ex lofted. It al-, -
tourandcame to llghtonly after Ilona liod
fled· to a free country arid confessed her
fnte'llrgenceactlvitre1 to authorities there. (b)(?)(E)
In the follow-up, Carter was taken Into
cuatody and confessed his complicity. He
admitted that followtng his coerced re-
cruitment. he had m-at 35 times wfth enemy
agents and had furnished thttm both clas-
sifted and unclassffted Information pertafn-
ing to US milrtary personnel andactfvities.
He also admltted th::it he was glven gener-
ous sums of money for his cooperation and
that prior to rotating to the United State1
he was instructed to apply for duty In
anotherforelgn country. Ilona's disclosures,
however, put an end to his treasonable
activitf es and to his mllttary career.

(U-FO.UO) The sordid tactics used &y

the Communist agents to entrap Carter and
b1
use his own misconductasa meansofblack-
mailfng him into committing treason were
not unusual. But another aspect of this
case was·also··o~·concem to Army-security
personnel. This was Carter'sfaflure to re-
port to his superlon Ilona's disclosure of
the enemy action berng conducted against
htm. Seldom clo the targets of a hostfle
Intelligence operation have such an oppor-
tunity. Ordtnarlly, thevlctim has no Ink-
ling of the trap being set for him untll It
is sprung. Had Carter reported Ilona's
disclosures promptJy, he might well have
spared himself the mental anguish and the
seriou1 coruequences that followed.

12
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[:gJ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the
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(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for

release.

D Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to

you and/or the subject of your request.

D Information originated with another government agency. It has been

referred to them for review and direct response to you.

D Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are

coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their
purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their
decision.

D Other:

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 96
IAGPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93
 (U-FOUO) Tha romance which ap-
peared harmless enough went along smooth-
ly until one day Paul announced that his
work required moving to West Berlin.
Nevertheless, the two lovers agreed to re-
main in close touch with one another by
mail and telephone. The relationship con•
tinued In this fashion for some tJme untl I

b1 Eleanor received a telephone call from

West Berlin from an lndtvfdual claiming to
be a friend of Paul's. The caller advised
Eleanor that Paul had been serfously in-
Jured and was hospltaU~ed In East Berlin.
Eleanorwasthoroughly shaken by this news
and decided to go to East ·Berltn to see
~i Pau I at once.

(U-FOtJO) At the hospital In East

BerUn, Eleanor was ushered to Paul's room
where she found htm lylng bandaged In bed.
At the end of the vfslt, Paul handed
Eleanor a package with a roll of film which
he asked her to deliver to the landlord of
· his West Berlin apartment. Eleanor took
the film when she left. But immediately
MR. MATA HARi upon leaving the hospital, she was accost..
ed by East German Pollce, who confiscated
(U-FOUO) It Is not only the malewho the package. Before taking her to head-
is the target of hostile lntelllgence agen- quarters, they permitted Eleanor to ut•
cies. There have been a number of cases Paul again for a moment, When she told
wherein unwary women have also Fallen hfm what hcid happened, Paul appeared to
into a snare· ·carefuHy -prepared..by·hostt-le· -be- greatly perturbed and stated that the
agents. The followlng summary describes incident would cause him a great deal of
one such case. trouble because he was worklngfor a West- "
ern intelltgence agency.
(U-FOUO) An American secretary,
referred to here as Eleanor, was employed (U-FOUO) Eleanor was then taken to
in the office of a US Government agency an East Berlfn poltce station and shortly
located In West Germany. One day at an thereafter turned over to a Soviet official.
American club, Eleanor met an attractive The latter explafned to her that she and
male, Paul N., who claimed to be a Paul were In great trouble becauso the
naturalf:a::ed US citizen. For Eleqnor, It ftlm found on her person contained pictures
wasa case of love at first sight and she and of various ftems of East German military
Paul began dating each other. equfpment. Turning a deaf ear to Eleanor's
protestations of Innocence, the Soviet
l4
 pofnted out the severe penalties that could
be applied to both of them as a consequence
of this matter. When it appeared that
Eleanor was sufficiently shaken by this in-
formation, the Soviet dropped his harsh
b1
attitude andadopted a softer tone. He told
Eleanor that h9would be willing to arrange
• for her and Paul's release if she would (U) Kelly was eventually rotated to
agree to obtain for him copies of coded US the United States, but after a few months
cables between her office In West Germany he·was returned to his former stat.ion. He
• and the United States. Eleanor agreed. meta girl, and after they had known each
Before leaving, however, she was reminded other for a while, she ,asked him to her
that Paul would suffer ff she failed to keep . apartment to meet another girl, listen to
her part of the bargain. some nfNI records and enjoy a drirk. He
and another man did visit the apartment
(U.-FOUO) Fortunately for herself as and, after drinking heavfly, Kelly took
well as her country, Eleanor suppressed her one of the girls i•nto the bedroom.
feelingsforPaul, went straight to her supe-
riors, and reported the entire affair. Short-
l
I
ly thereafter, she learned from US invest-
igators that she had been duped. The case
jnvesttgatfon disclosed .that. Paul was in
actua ltty a Soviet agent and the Soviet
official who had interrogated her was a
'known Soviet intelligence offlcer who only
a ff!ltN years earlier had been expelled from
the United States for. espionage activities. (e) I

THE 11 DOCTOR~D 11 PHOTOGRAPH

(U) The follow..fng case illustrates the

sordid lehgths •to which hostile eiplonage bl
services are prepared to go to pntrap their
.,, target. It Involved an Ainedcan who was·
.the victim of a plot that altowed Commy-
nist agents to blackmail him for a weak- ~
ness he didn't have.

,~ L.

~c
USA I)c)e-- L{
 posal to entice, compromise, or intimi-
date prospective targets. In the Kelly
case, i.t i1 apparent that, unknown to
himself, his every move was under obser-
vation. To accomplish such surverllance,
agents are assisted by a horde of domestl c
and public servantswho have been through-
ly indoctrinated to regard every foreigner
as a spy and to report a 11 movement of For-
eigners to the poltce. The regular police
in turn pass the lnformatJon on to the secret

b1 or security police for further exploltatlon.

(U-FOUO) Whether the -doctor and

the girls willingly took part in the Kelly
case conspiracy ls immaterial. The secret
police needed their cooperation; they had
no alternative. Enlisting 11 cooperatlonu of
any citixen in an intelligence operation,
however sordid, poses no problem in the
Communist countries. Open refusal to co-
operate might have very unpleasant con-
sequences for any citizen.

{e) I

b1
(U-FOUO~ The firat and most signif-
icant factor to be ca,sidered in this case
fs the·farmore favorable climate for Com-
munist espionage operations that exist be-
hind the Iron Curtain. In conducting es-
pionage operations against US personnel
stationed within or traveling through their
countries, Commun Ists have unlimited
facilities ahd oppartunities at their dis-
16

\.~l99
 Best Copy AvaiJab]e

'.
: I ' II

' -

't
.}

Fig\jre 3. (UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE 01-~L:Y) Confessed Informants of hostile

intelligence services who were companions.of.U.S. military personnel (U).
I
(
'

b1
f •' L- - ~ - - - - - - -_ _ __J
i
\
11

I
·1
f
I
{
I

17
_x--tJlOEvc_
U08 D:Je,j
 Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale
for the deletion of this page.

~ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the

following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for

release.

D Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to

you and/or the subject of your request.

D Information originated with another government agency. It has been

referred to them for review and direct response to you.

D Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are

coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their
purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their
decision.

D Other:

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 101-102
IAGPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93
.

Ftgure 4. (UNCLASSIFIED---FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLV) General view of test area

showing photographic targets ranging from 200 feet to lij miles (U).

TELESCOPIC PHOTOGRAPHY {U)

(U-FOUe) Figures 4 through 9 actual sh!e, It Is easily read. The model

show the capabllittes of telescopic cam- -Identification (Figure 6) on the front fen-
eras to clandestinely photograph docu- derof an automobt le (8) parked 1,500 feet
ments, material, and personnel with un .. away ts east ly dlscemfble. An Out ;,f
usual clarity, even at great distances. Bounds sign (Figure 7) on the golf course
Figure 4 depicts the general eye--vlew as ~ 3,000 feet CftNay stands out clearly.
seen from a second story window, of a In Figure -8, high magnification shows
parking area, an adlacent ml litary post, workmen repairing a street lamp in the
a golf course, and across an estuary, a publtc park (D), a mile and a half a,,ay.
public park. Using a telescopic lens, a This view ts beyond the capabl llty of the
close-up photograph was taken of a 2 11 x human eye. Figure 9 was shot at a dis-·
3¼" parking permit (Figure 5) fastened to tance of 1,500 feet and shows hON clearly
the windshield of an automobile (A) 200 printed matter can be photographed at
feet away. Reproduced at more than long distances.

21
FOR OFFICIAL HSE ONLY
l~ iCbL, H-u -1 q -s 8t ~o*r (
 Best copy Available

llllfO

~-1-t

Figure 5. (UNCLASSIFIED--FGR 9FFIGJ:ltcl-1::1Sf.8Nl¥) •A11--Parldn9 permft mc,unted on

automobile wlndshJeld photographed at 200 feet (U).

Figure 6. (UNClASSIFJED~-$QR OFFICIAb l:JSE 0Nb¥~ 11 8"--Model tdentfftcation name

on fender of automobile photographed at a distance of 1,500 feet (U).
22
FOR -OFFICIAL HSE -ONLI

104
 11
Figure 7. (UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL't) C11 -Golf Co"rse sign photo-
graphed at 3,000 feet (U).

f.igure 8. (UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) 11 D 11 --Matntenance truck

photographed at a distance of I~ ml les (U) •
23
.FOR OFFICIAL USE 9NLY
l ~ 1P5 ! D ~ -- I-{~- -,.l~ 'Sif(
 Best Copy Available

camera loaded wlth Infrared fflm and Infra-

red flash bulbs which he cannot detect. In
secure areas where ft wouldbe drfftcult for
a photographer to take· pfctures unobseaved,
It may be possible to set up camera equip-
ment which can be triggered by Infrared.
Any movement f n the area, therefore wou Id
automatrcally, and unwittingly, photograph
Itself.

Figure 9 {Ul'JCLASSIFIED) Man and news-

paper photographed ot a drstance of 500
yards. (U)
b1
= Ie lesccpt c leosea; Cameras equipped
with telescopic lenses have produced Iden~
tiflableplcturesofpenons two miles distant
from the camems. These same lenses can be
used to photograph cbcuments lying unpro-
tected on desk tops byagents situated out-
sf de the buJ ldJng In a position permittrng
llne-of-slghtobseavatfon throughawfndow.
(See Figures. 4 through 9).

= Infrared: Development of ftlm, sen- .

sFtlve to Infrared, has enhanced the abtllty
of foreign agents to take pictures surreptf-
tfously. Pictures can be taken at night by
lllumlnatlng an area with Infrared. If the
target person fs In a room In which there rs
a two-way mirror, his activities can be
photographed through the mirror by using a

24

/Ds--1--1Q ~ l 16fl 'i-e,t.fi 6

 who wl 11 one day cause a new war and
"force American boys to lay down their
lives In thelrinterests11 and by provocative
alluatons to alleged German ingratitude,
arrog,:ince, and unrellability. Following

b1
a lengthy recitation of alleged German
fai ltngs, the leaflet closed with an appeal
to servicemen to wrtte their Congressmen
and to the White House to protest West
German rearmament. S·lgnlficantly, wHh
respectto their origin, the leaflets didnot
protest Soviet arming of Communist East
German forces.

b1 {U) But in these publrcations a dif-

ferent tone Is noted. While they too
attack "Hitler's Generals" and contain a

. .• Der, Besatser a .Oita!• dlffes Probl•• hciben wit auf ......,. Alt schon llnpt gelhl.•
11
Figure 24. (U). Antt.:.U~ cartoon in March 1962 Issue qf Kaseme" magaxlne. (U)
47
Best Copy Available

I u~ ,as-Ha- 1q ss1 ~Ltl&,

 Best Copy Available

generous dose of anti-US and antf-NATO

propaganda, there is no mention of the
German Ingratitude, arrogance, and un-
rellabl lity so prominently alleged In the
"Fel-fow American" leaflets. No Indeed. '
rnstead, lt is the Amerf can serviceman who
Is pictured as unreliable and arrogant arid t
an immoral, roistering bully as well.
Figure 24 is a cartoon which appeared In
the March 1962 Issue of "Kaserne. 11 The
cartoon refers to a Soviet program for
"Ellmlnation of the Differences in the
Living Standards between Crttes and Rural
Areas" and shows the Communist version
of how American servicemen are allegedly
themselves implementlngsucha program in
the country town of Baumholder in West
Germany. Typically, the sorvfc:emen
pictured In the cartoon are referred toas
11
"Fhe Occupier", a term Itself calculated
to arouse German resentment, and pictured
as destructive, drunken rowdies who have
brought only the most dlstasteful elements Figure 23. (U) Propaganda intended to
of city life to the country town. The convince West German soldiers that US
caption reads: "Okay. We've already soldiers are unrelfable. (U)
solved the problem In our own way. 11
is the sad balance the American Army
(U) Ff gure 25 1-s a reproduction of an leadershfp was forced to .draw from the
article and Illustration which appeared in Korean war. u
the February 1962 Issue of" Soldatenfreund"
under the tit le "G 1--Kannst du kaempfen? 11 (U) In Asia, too, Communist pro-
or G 1,. Can you Elgbt? It re£ers. to an
11
paganda- -attempts- to defame- -and discredit
American pub"llshed book pertafoing to the American serviceman In the eyes of
the beh-:Jvior of Ametfcan prisoners lnthe allied troops. At Fl9ure.s26 and 27 are two
Korean .conflict and by innuenc;lo extends e-xamples of AsfQn Communist propaganda.
the misconduct of a few to the entire US They are North Korean leaflets which were
Army. To further dfstort the account and dropped from the air. over South Korea In ,
stress to the- West G.erman soldier the September 1962. Intended for the eyes of
alleged unreliability of his ally, the the South Korean soldfer, they seek to tum
Am1ttrliean so·I dier, the artfcle concludes hlmagalnst his Amerfcanallies by arousing
with 'the statement: 11 A collapse of dfs- feelings of resentment and hate. Figure26
cfpltne and morale, cowardice, lack of pictures a South Korean soldier on sentry
comaradeship, physical softening, andthe duty In foul weatherwhl le American officers
inability to adapt to battlefield situatlons are shown entertaJnlng themselves safely In
and to primitive Uvlng condltions--that thelrclubwlthanabundanceof food, drink,
48
 · ,..,, . ,Best Copy Available
1
~f.::·.,~ : , ,;-·,:..-.t. ,:;.~r• r;i(irf;~,~~~
~. •'-·•· .~. •• ,,,.,•~f • \:;ii~ I ~(ii" 0
.... ____ and femJntno companionship. The essence
r 1iji,,-ya~iw1 oF the caption ts- "whtle we work they

I r,t)1. ~~---..~-"'..~~ ploy ...

(U) Figure 27 .depJcts the 11 Ugly
American·" and distorts a series of actual
or alleged Incidents In which American
..,
servicemen have been Involved In South
Korea. Thb leaFlet is a graphic example
of the mariner in which the Communists. re-
peatedly dredge up i59lated, uncommon tn-
stancesof misconduct or accidents in which
American soldiers have been Infrequently
hwo·lved· and serva them up as typi-cal of
the behavior of all US service personnel.

{U) Anot~r leaflet in this series is

-shown at Figure 28. It pictures a group of
South Koreans carrying all of their port-
able possessions and travaltng down a
Figure 26. (U) North Korean propaganda Korean road. The text describes them as
11
re I hig~-ltvi_ng' American offf cen (U) refugees from the "Yankee invaden and

•· . !t-.· ·_ ....c.

i .,. ·_ : ·.
·..• • .
~-: . .

11
F.lgura27. (U) North Korean cartoon showing tbe "Ugly Amertcan In Korea. {U)
49

vs·~
 Best Copy Available
.,,.. .. ., ...
..............
•

I ~.x ;ij;cl..tl ~.. :i•lJl..!f./

~ -·- .t-__~~__...
_ -f~ .Aj=,) I«~ ...~., .a) 4tl-,l ~ 1,i1-i- -ff)~ ¾l'tt ~~l-s:t-~
I .. __ --------------=-~~L...,M ~:i -t~~-:._
Figure 28. {U) Communist leaflet urging South. Koreans to turn their guns on
Amerl cans. (U)

as the parents, wives, and children of
South Korean soldier, who are urgedto
turn the Ir guns on the Amert cans and res-
cue their suffering faml lies. The Commu-
nlst orlgfn of this sentfmentts evidenced
by Figure 29 which appeared in the col-
umns of the newspaper II Pravda, 11 a M.os
cfNI published official organ of the USSR.
It shows an Amerf can soldier on duty with
an American Mrlitary Assistance Group In
an Asian country and suggests that the
native soldier whom he ts training shouJd
turn his weapon on the American.
04

. ii -.:.....IICIIOll 1111-. OCIIUllllllOI uep.--iai .,_,., llllCDdffllP)'ean ....,.....IIC1f~

.
c - , ~ ori-... Callllrrw - - lllolDTJIIUft" IIJIOIII• -=- - • - •Q01IJI081nellelli

Figure 29. (U) Cartoon in Soviet newspaper "Pravda" with turn-your-gun-on-the-

Amerf can tht9me. (U)
50
TuO~-C
.,,,
lJSA.
___;;__ ______Tt;Llf:
_..;. .______~_ c:J\f12 l OS- HQ- lq587 $-edll
~"."'..----~---~---==---------
 (U} Figure 30 Is another example of
this theme. It Is a reproduction of a pro-
paganda leaflet prepared by the Communist
11
Vlet Cong" Insurgents in Vietnam which
was found In the vicinity ot an American
Air Base In South Vietnam in January
.., 1963. The scene shows marching Vietna-
mese led by an Individual carrying a
"Viet Cong" flag who is trampling overa
figure clothed as an American officer and
representing the American Military Assist-
ance Group In that country.
.of. -the soldier .and..the..result of his a.l.lege.d
(U) Another type of Communist hate
propaganda ls addressed not to allted
troops but to the local p0pulace In areas
where Amert can units are stationed through-
out the world. This propaganda seeks to
incite the local populace against the pre-
sence of American troops by sei:z.ing upon
every Incident in which an American
serviceman is involved and distorting or
magnifying the incident to somehow blame
all Americans For the Incident or picture
lt as typical of Americans. Every auto-
mobile accident, every street Incident,
every bar brawl, every shooting of an
unknown Intruder by an American sentry,
every unfortunate incident involving an
American soldier, no matter where the
fault lies, is depicted In Communist and
Communist-oriented newspapers and pub-
lications throughout the world as the fault
anogant, callous attitude toward the local
populace.
ce'> I

b1

• (U-FOUO) A recent example of this

type of Communist propaganda came to
light in September 1962 when USAREUR
forces were the target of a direct attack
mounted by the underground Communist
Party In the rural communities surrounding
an American training area. In May, a
minor water contamination had occurred
when USAREUR troops dug latrines in an
51
Best Copy Available

\ )'SA ;2/~133 I OS- -/--I G - tqs& /4-e.c. f /(

 area that furnished water to one of the
communities. This occurrance becam4t
known to the local press and public, but
contacts between Army representatives
and local authorities alleviated the worst
aspectsofthepubllc relations problem and
measures were tnltl~ted to _prevent a re-
petition of the happenlr,g. However,
when In September another USAREUR unit
again lna9Vertently dug latrlnes near the
publtc water supply, the Communists
promptly produced and distributed a leaf-
let which attacked the 11 deltberate" dis-
regard for th, rights and rnterest of the
civil populatlonexhlbltedby the 11 occupa-
tlon troops. 11 The leaflet fs shown at
Figure 31. It pl.ctures an occupied prlvy
la he led II Amis, 11 German slang for Ameri-
cans, directly connected to a household
cookpot. The leaflet is signed KPD, an
abbreviation for the illegal German Com-
munist Party.
(U-FOUO) lf1. Italy, when Army
authorities introduced use of the poly-
graph, the II lie detector, 11 in an effort to
halt a wave of thievery at Camp Darby,
the Communist preu vo¢1ferously protested
the use of this Investigative aid on Italian
employees at theCamp. Ina f9ur-column
arttcle publrshed In II l'Unita, 11 the leading
Communist newipapei', it was charged that
use of the machine on Italians was only d
smoke screen to dl'dW Qttentlon from the
fact that the Americans themselves were
the "biggest thieves. 11 (See Figure 32}.
(U) As we have seen, however, the
Communists do not always Identify them-
selves by their signature or by publrcatton
ln their newspapen and magazines c;:1• tht;t
source of theiro.wn propaganda. Frequent-
ly, In order to give their charges more
authenticity and to avoid the skepticism tf
not disbeltef which often attaches to pro-
52
FDR OFFICIAL USE ONIJ
~il13-.c.
____.:;:;...__ _ _ _ _yi.,_______:c2tU4 _ _ __!_lOS-:::::..:·=----HQ-= -
1:t)....;._c___.
111ft ..IUIIOelt lit la pll'P ft'Mr I
.... ~ - ·•.U. . . . '-'llnlillla , . . _ . . . . . . .
lrillmN...-U- l• CIPl..,.aA - r.-.. •• VS-
1---,.llllffa ff . . . . . . I
ZII • 11tl4n-.... lltd ~ !Sllll• ul U1 , _
. .,,,,, ...,,, ·- ..
... ·- .................. -
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•t• u. __.,... _. ,u :Jln llttsla .,..,....~ uto-
u.na, ........._, Ill ,a I04 - U. ll'lt....lur-.
.................. ,
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...... 11111 - - ~ - - ..-
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1\1 IUUill' 'Na 14-
Figure 31 • {U) Communist claim of US
11
deltberate 11 disregard for interests of the
German people. (U)
paganda openly attributed to Communist
sources, they Indulge tn fraud and forgery
of documents which purport to be of offl-
cial western origin.
·(l:J) In November 1962 ~ ·a seFi es- -of
forged letters were mat led to the mayors
of over 20West German communities in an
effort to disrupt German-Amert can re-lat Iems.
The letters, shown at Figure.33·were typed
on the stationary of the US Army Head-
quarters Area Command and signed by
Colonel Nathaniel R. Hoskot, Command'-
ing. Their text advised _the mayon that
their communities lay rn an area wht.ch was
soon to be the scene of a maj9r manewer.
In an Impertinent tone, the lett~r directed
that in the interests of public safety during
the supp0sed ma newer, West German
11581 kct-f(o
 Best Copy Available pelET
JflNIIWI 21 alacu IHI • Pq. I

f'.... .. ·-·· --·--- -xceac1.·aiio""aV~oiilttr~~• LlYOrnO.

I lovoratorl ilolionl di ~camp Darby,
sollopull alla ••ccl,lna dello ,rerila
L'inc:Mlo trattamento lnffitto clalle a~torltl U.S.A. - Castreld a llmlara una dlchlanzlone con la
quale alfCll'lllano di essenl sottopostl al trattamento volonlarlamente c percM sospettatf di furto "

'·t.
,.., ,.-,. .:..... ,',
~
. ·,

Figure 32. (U) Communist press attack on US Army use of lte-detector. (U)

civi Iians were to stay off the streets and

to stop all work In fields and forests.

(U-FOU8) Althoughsuch a command pagancla charge against the United States

had at one time existed under Colonel
Hoskot's command, it had been elf miliated
in an April 1958 reorganbation and
Colonel Hoskot had been long since re-
assigned. This propaganda plot was there-
fore quickly countered tn a prompt press
campaign which warned that other ·com-
munities might also receive these Com-
munist forgeries. However, had the Com-
munists not chosen a nonexistent head-
quarters in this instance, the confusion
might have been consfderable.
(U-FOU~ Another h:istance of Com-
munist black propaganda, but with an un-
usual twist, came to light in 1961. It ln-
vo lved a favored Communist co Id war pro-
and Americans stationed or traveling
abroad •. Newspapen Jn the Sovfet Bloc
regularly charge them with being spies
and Communist newspapers elsewhere iust
as regularly follow suit. One purpose of
such charges is the famf liar effort to dis-
credit the United States and Americans.Jn-
the eyes of the unsophlsti coted. But of
equal lmp0rtance to the Communist are the
related purposes of detracting attent-lon
from -the world-wide army of Communist
agents and tsolating the peoples of the
Communist empire from contact with. Ameri-
can travelers and offtclals.
b1

T
 Best Copy Available

HUDQUAITIII AUA COIU14ND

HIADQUAITllf • ' ' fllAUQUAITau •
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wo·•• _.., ,anaw lat
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la ·•• lla11, ·••• ••• h • II Ta1''•'• Ml ii••
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@ • ll· hiel' Ue •··•··•'l•l•• ll'ia1 ..e I • Sa~
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11,111•• •••'••••u.•11, ••••• .... •••••• ..... •••
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••rct••S "• •• ••t•'••••
8
® (Y):®

Figure 33. (U) Forged US documents intended to disrupt community relations. (U)

leading c~echoslovak newspaper, "Red (U) That morning al I maior c~echos-

Truth (Rude Pravo)" carried a three--co lumn, lovak dailies had front-page stories re-
front page story headltned "Directive for garding publication of the documents by
Espionage Activities of Military Attaches "Red Truth. 11 The C%echoslovak news
of the United States. 11 At first glance this aaency, CTK, carried a lengthy dispatch
looked like .iust another of many such describing the "Red Truth" publication on
artf cles. But there was a difference. At its English language European wire. The
the heart of the article were two classf ... fol lowing day, "Red Truth" and II People's
fted· -OACSI-,0-eparfment of ·the Army Defense (Obtana Lidu)-" were the orfly
letters containing guidance to Army Czechoslovak newspapers to mention the
Attaches for their ·relations with Soviet story, but by this time War!t:N1 1s II People's .
orbit officials, (See Figure 34). Backed Tr{bune (Trybuna Ludu) 11 and Sofia's
11
by photographs of the compromised SECRET People' a Army (Norodna Arm la)" had
letters, the story enlarged upon their picked up the article. It

translation with the usual Communist em-

broidery. 11 Red Truth" did not reveal how
or whe·re rt .had obtained the letters, ex-
cept to mention, cryptically: 11 The texts
of the secret directives have recently been
placed at our disposal. 11
b1
54
TIV Oe)z,c__ JECR[T
T)OC '-I d /t!p36 --------
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Page(s) 137
IAGPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93
 b1
(U) But the cbcuments were not men-
t.foned agal n In Prague newspapers. Ex-
cept for the stories mentfoned above, other
Sate Iltte newspapers made only slight men-
tion of them. Surprfslngly, the Russian
press Ignored it. Most western newspapers,
after receiving the CTK release, treated
b1
the story as another hoax or dismissed it
completely.

b1 ...

56
T
-=twez_c_ _
_ _J::c~')-=e--=-'={---+-_ _ ______,_,,a,'--'--'a~o 138 ~~----=[--=-Q;-=-----=K--=Q=----____,,_lq....;..._s.....;g;....,-"'S=--~-"'-cf:'-=--)_Co
 b1
V
II

La,!
... (£7 I

b1
(U) A third type of Communist pro-
paganda directed against the Army is some-
times gddressed to American servicemen
themselves in an effort to subvert their
(81 /
morale and resolve. Since 1961 when the
American garrison in West Berlin was re-
lnforcedasa result of another crisis in that
Cold War hot spot, the East Berlin Com-
munist radio has been broadcasting each
night at 2300 hours a special program In-
tended for personnel of the US Berlin Com-
• mand.
11
Styling itself the real Votce of
Information and Education, 11 the station
transmits a program of recorded popular
music and Features a sultry-foiced female
announcer and ma le commentators who
11
analy:,;:e 11 the situation in Berlin.

(U) Among frequent references to

home, mother, and sWeethearts, the pro-
gram emphasl::z:es the paradox of Amert cans
protecting Berlin when their fathers fought

JKRet 57
 the Germans on their way to Berlin in
1945. The language is reminiscent of the
"Fellow American" leaflet previously
shown. A typf ca I commentary w ht ch was
monitored on 5 December 1961 went as
follows;
11
(U) There was a day Tn 1945 when
American armor was stabbing up towards
BerlJn. Behind the armor, the tired foot
soldiers ofthe US Army were catching
hell' on the main road. One guy, a
corpora I, let us call him Billy Smathers,
•••. (worda indTstlnct) •••• the p0c:kets of
the SS with their burp guns. The damned
88 made the road to Betit n look ltke a
hellish fireworks dJsplay.
(U) "The Russian soldiers were catch-
ing the same kind of hel I moving toward
Berltn from the other direction. That was
. 16 years ago. The Russians made It, the
Americans made It, even old Corporal
Smathers made It.
(U) ''Well, today Corporal Smathers
rn on that same road, Helrnstedt/Berlln,
110 ml les. But ltsten to this: The guys
who are commanding Corporal Smathers--
incidentally he is a master sergeant now,
but his top commanders are the same....
{lnqlstlncfl ••• ;burp guni artd· ·88'1 1har-·· -~rt-,es In Berltn. It reads: "On the border
made Smathers think he was llvfng In hell
back there in 1945.
{U) 11 Now, do you think I am out of
my mind when I say the same Nazi com-
manders are commanding Master Sergeant
Smathers today? Wall, listen to this: US
forces In WestG-rmany are part of NATO
forces. Among top NATO dogs are Gene-
ra ls Heustnger, he planned all Hitler's ln-
vaslons; Speidel, he was badly whipped in
the Soviet Union but shot a lot of hostages
in France; Kammhuber, an old Na:::r:i man
58
d~~
from the begtnnlng1 Foertsch, Chief of
West German forces and a war criminal.
(U) "There are many more of these
birds, but they are top NATO men now,
and that puts those convoys from here to
Helmstedt under their command. They
particularlywant war. And now theythink
they can give old Adolf1 s ghost those old
territories he wanted: Poland, Czechos-
lovakia, the whole of Europe in fact. But
this time they will let Master Sergeant
Bi I ly Smathers and a few mi I Iron other
Americana do the dirty work for them."
·(U) Another Instance of this kind of
propaganda Ts pictured at Figure 35. It is
an Engltsh language article addressed to
the 11 Boy1 from USA 11 which appeared in
the 26 August 1961 i,qua of the East Berlln
newspaper, 11 BZ am Abend. II In the Insert
immediately to the right of the English
language text Is a German translation of
it. But, curiously enough, this specimen
confirms the duplrcfty of Communist pro-
paganda. Whereas the English text Is
addressed to Americans and defames West
Germany, the German language caption
Immediately below the photograph of the
US soldlen and equipment is intended for
German readers and slanders United States
at the intersection of Friedrlchstrasse and
Zlmmerstrasse, the Americans graphically
demonstrate that they will permit self-
determination by the German people only
as a farce under USA bayonet1. Ad•nauer
and Brandt dispute which of them first called
for Yankee tanks, which of them is the most
loyal menial of the USA. 11 Reference to
the two personalities is to theChancellor
of West Germany and to the mayor of. West
Berltn, respectively.
lOS~HQ ~ l95~ l ~eC'-t l 0
----~-------=-=:............-~-----
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..... . _-....................
.-=.=--~..=.:.··
==--c.~.:=.::r.--..
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.
....
..........--~.,--
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••• · .• · ,:,,- ,t • .c 1,;oi:m•ca 111 tbe U;A

J •• .- ~ 1 l ,..-
1
~, • ~ :• r. f.V1 t ,t ~r,y9' """• sep.ro&,..
1

tN- r·a:- ~"'I·., 1"•, ,• ~ , :.•.•r," 1 ta :, '"Jr t.C&~ t<'O lons 1 TI!•
• :-:i ·lit.-.· !• ...... . ·.~ , ··••: • ·., ..... !;1vt1- r•nltfl'S la op"
Figure 35. (U) American soldlen in Berlln 1•:.o:. •: •\ ..,. :.-l •, .,,,. •• ,. .1r.t,.. :aaone th• uotmue.
l\•"r- '\ •• :---:,•,r. t : . , • I" • · .l" '•"' ,..,.r,.~ u1 ~r.4 ~It tb•la:- d....S.a
s.landered In Red press. (U) tr-r u ·.• • ,... ·.~. t ~.• • :
;,_,. t•t,. • I I'., :••.:_.111'3 111 ,'llo!ll1>1erd llllli tllal' M~•
..rt-.,11,I ·~· ,[ • ' ~ -, •'l"T' ·- t .• ,......, alN'lllY nl'fl'l wt.• tlle
e:-1~ ....·, ::'•• .. ;.••• 1 ,r~ "' ,:· • "'l.Jlr!•.tf\1 1.:-Un. U a NAult aoat
(U) Another example of propaganda ot rh•,: ,,,.,.. l --ec ·Jr•.t •:1••: tr'>, t1.•{r jo\:11 w llwe ftlftN4
in"!"i••,•:•• l ,,&....:.
addressed tc American service personnel"' :~ !"
r••·• .:P h'i•
,,:,1~ ~vn r!'..,t i..-11r....s, a 11n111 u,..11• 4u• 10
;i,f' r~"I •.-,•,· 1, .. rn1c11:..t
wltk aott•!!UI or tll•
and of undoubted Communist origin ts i.ii~t:•\ 1:1. ·•.... re 1r tll• :-.••--r ar.4 nttaa.i poll~ •M.1111 l-94:,
t< 11:Y A::"l'l "f\r, i<'~•r-lc t llcw . . lmow tu.II U 40-•11
pictured at Figure• 36. Headed 11We Want
Th• caU -ip Qt ....~ • • • ue. 1IION. .i . . th• - of
Outl" and signed "Soldiers on Guardof 1al-li<'ru 111 ;.,:u.q att "1Yi4
ei:4 l"i-1\t =-clle4• :tlr.<M lq • -
at th• lack or r..itaa euapl••
•tall-
Truth," this leaflet was an attempt to en- r,,:o:•: 11~• 4Miriou
al ou.r pftnaaat.
r!t~ ;~ :.2l:.S9~•11:
tlle -11: or
large upan some scattered Instances of dis- 0aly IMl1' leedera .iu, i,• rab~ ill 111.lQlciJia ill Mtu o.r
,..~•rl:f 1.11• 1.r:.tut O'U' 41'ri1h• l -0.-y U4 11:M •
content evl denced by a few Army reservists H•:=••Ju1: ot ~:•r::rl •c-te H & D~ to ooo•tralla the
during the call-up of reserve units In :hit 11 tlle h•l,tit or polltaa&l •tapH1't7 or c...hM
;,2tieiaal !bl• ..itu 11.• 8141 UCIH 111. tM I O ~ u4 bis
~ - wllO tall• tlu' ChU otr t:h• IIIIPl'Kedt11U4 allil&q
October 1961, A number of these leaflets el<l,tc:HCUN• of OY'"I' ~-=
'o1Ui0D cloll.llN, Dllt th• I'••~·
bave nta94 thdl' voia•11 la clet•H ot ~• tnlll u• 1111iq
were scattered In the-vicinity of US mtU- erc.c•1n41

tary Installations and housing areas and m ~::_:!41~;~~!1i-=~ ~~o4:7..:t.!ft1~:.,;:--

~ ~'";j
mailed to the private quart:ers of Amari can 1:!::. ro~!1lo&ff:~•r.;r:.:1f11e,..b::1C'=:ee!!!•,:'t:J:.
,,ui,. ,11....
servicemen tn West Germany during the tiff -.n\ le• l:lv<', thcr.,.io oo o,bez- AU1ruu.,.1

summer of 1962. Stl l I others were mat led lt !!eno•dr• I tu, •1,:,-,~n' \ OIIJage tlle OOGl'I• at l.111 &I'll
111 Da:J be too atel t,oa(' ot oaaupMH ot the ark UT ... .i,, DOW,
n11p
overboarl cilll'i"f: th• flll'thooi:1ne: 4hO~Ol\lll
from Austria 6 Belgium, and Weit Germany
to servicemen and some service-connected
organi:z:atrons In the United States. Figure 36. (U) 'We Want Out" prapogan-
de leaflet. {U)
59

Best Copy Available

USA. I C~--HQ - tGS8:l (~e); I re

b1
(U) Not a word of these cf rcum-
stances in the Communist account. Instead
the Slno-So~let propaganda machines In-
variable attribute such defect tons to wdJs..
satisfaction with American policies and
62
conduct" on the part of "forward looklng11
persona who u prefer peacefu I Communbt
0bJectlve1 11 and ask for "asylum" In the
11
happy" Communist world. A. In Abshler1s
case, as welt as with· all Communist pro-
paganda, the truth Is Invariably something
else.
..,
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Page( s) 146-14 7
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1 Sep 93