ROLE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN

THE LIBERATION WAR OF

BANGLADESH

Term-Paper
Bangladesh and International Studies

Submitted to:
Md. Bellal Hossain
Associate Professor
University of Dhaka

Submitted By:
Md. Hasibur Rahman Khan
ID: 16241030
Section: B
Depatrment: Management Studies
 Liberation War of Bangladesh:
The Bangladesh War of Independence or the Bangladesh Liberation War refers to
an armed conflict between West Pakistan (now Pakistan) and East Pakistan (now
Bangladesh) that lasted for roughly nine months in 1971. The war resulted in
Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan.
Pakistan's partition from India in 1947 had arisen from the 'two-nation' thesis that
Muslims and Hindus in India were both 'nations' whose people could not live
together. Pakistan was the first modern-state founded solely on the basis of
religion, since although India had a Hindu majority its population, with Muslims,
Sikhs, Jains and Christians was multi-religious and its constitution was secular.
When East Bengal was included in the partition, many thought this mistaken
because of the cultural differences between Bengal and the peoples of what
became West Pakistan. When the West tried to impose Urdu as the official
language in the East, a linguistic-cultural opposition movement began.
Bangladesh would be founded on the basis of cultural and linguistic identity.
Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Buddhists and animists, united by a common
language and a common culture, struggled for their freedom. Few families were
unaffected by the war. Most lost relatives. Bengali have been conquered by others
but have not had a history of aggression. They have traded, written poetry, sung
songs and have developed a rich cultural tradition of which they are proud.
However, denied equal rights with West Pakistan and the right to form a
government even though the largest number of seats in Pakistan's Parliament were
held by East Pakistani members, they bravely asserted their right to self-
determination. The atrocities committed by Pakistani soldiers during this war are
regarded by some as genocide.
 Role of India in Liberation war of
Bangladesh:
It is an obvious fact that Pakistan has been a traditional enemy of India.
Consequently, it is not surprising that India took the opportunity of weakening
Pakistan by supporting the Bangladesh liberation movement. From the month of
September, the Indian army gradually started to participate directly in the
Liberation War. Initially the support was limited to indirect fire support (artillery
support) to Mukti Bahini units. From November, the Indian army was permitted to
conduct operations up to 10 miles inside Bangladesh territory. This was to clear
Pakistan army positions from the borders areas in preparation for the December
war.

Prior to the involvement of the Indian army, the BSF was primarily responsible to
provide support to Mukti Bahini units. They also assisted in the training of Multi
Bahini. However, Indian army was not involved in the initial stages.

The final war in December was primarily fought by the Indian army units. The
Mukti Bahini units were responsible to provide second tier support to the Indian
formations. Take, for example, Akhaura. It was the Indian army that led the main
attack. Our (Mukti Bahini) responsibility was to encircle the enemy so that they
could not escape of reinforced.
 India’s involvement in Bangladesh
Liberation War:
On 27 March 1971, the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, expressed full
support of her government to the Bangladeshi struggle for independence. The
Bangladesh-India border was opened to allow the Bangladeshi Refugees safe
shelter in India. The governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and
Tripura established refugee camps along the border. Exiled Bangladeshi army
officers and voluntary workers from India immediately started using these camps
for the recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas.
 The refugee problem
As the violence in East Pakistan escalated, an estimated 10 million refugees fled to
India, causing financial hardship and instability in the country. The United States, a
long and close ally of Pakistan, promised to ship arms and supplies to West
Pakistan.

Indira Gandhi launched a diplomatic offensive in the early autumn of 1971 touring
Europe, and was successful in getting both the United Kingdom and France to
break with the United States, and block any pro-Pakistan directives in the United
Nations Security Council. Gandhi’s greatest coup was on 9 August when she
signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union,
greatly shocking the United States, and decreasing the possibility that the People’s
Republic of China would become involved in the conflict. China, an ally of
Pakistan, had been providing moral support, but little military aid, and did not
advance troops to its border with India.

Operation of the Mukti Bahini caused severe casualties to the Pakistani Army,
which was in control of all district headquarters. As the flow of refugees swelled to
a tide, the economic costs for India began to escalate. India began providing
support including weapons and training for the Mukti Bahini.
Indian military Intervention: December 3-
December 16:
By November, war seemed inevitable; a massive buildup of Indian forces on the
border with East Pakistan had begun. The Indian military waited for winter, when
the drier ground would make for easier operations and Himalayan passes would be
closed by snow, preventing any Chinese intervention. On 23 November, Yahya
Khan declared a state of emergency in all of Pakistan and told his people to prepare
for war.

On the evening of Sunday, 3 December, the Pakistani air force launched sorties on
eight airfields in north-western India. This attack was inspired by the Arab-Israeli
Six Day War and the success of the Israeli preemptive strike. At, 5:30 PM that day,
General Yahya Khan ordered the Pakistan Air Force to bomb Indian Forward
Airbases. Pakistan started flying sorties towards India within fifteen minutes of the
order. Pakistan launched attacks against eight Indian airfields on the Western front
including Agra which was 300 miles (480 km) from the border. These attacks
could only achieve partial success. Unlike the Israeli attack on Arab airbases in
1967 which involved a large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan flew no more than
50 planes to India. Indian runways were non-functional for several hours after the
attack. But these attacks gave India a good reason to launch an attack against
Pakistan. India started flying sorties to Pakistan by midnight. On the Eastern front,
the Indian Army joined forces with the Mukti Bahini to form the Mitro Bahini
(“Allied Forces”); the next day the Indian forces responded with a massive
coordinated air, sea, and land assault on the West Pakistani Army in East Pakistan.

Yahya Khan counter-attacked India in the West in an attempt to capture territory

which might have been used to bargain for territory they expected to lose in the
east. The land battle in the West was crucial for any hope of preserving a united
Pakistan. The Pakistan Army faced a crushing defeat at Battle of Longewala,
where a 2000-3000 strong assault force of the 51st Infantry Brigade of the
Pakistani Army- backed by the 22nd Armoured Regiment was kept on hold by the
Indian ‘A’ company of 120 odd soldiers of the 23rd Bn,Punjab Regiment.The
Indian Army quickly responded to the Pakistan Army’s movements in the west and
made some initial gains, including capturing around 5,500 square miles (14,000
km²) of Pakistan territory (land gained by India in Pakistani Kashmir and the
Pakistani Punjab sector were later ceded in the Shimla Agreement of 1972, as a
gesture of goodwill).
At sea, the Indian Navy proved its superiority by the success of Operation Trident,
the name given to the attack on Karachi’s port. It also resulted in the destruction of
2 Pakistani destroyers and a minesweeper, and was followed by the similar
Operation Python. The waters in the east were also secured by the Indian Navy.
The Indian Air Force conducted 4,000 sorties in the west while its counterpart, the
PAF put up little retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical
personnel. This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision
of the PAF High Command to cut its losses as it had already incurred huge losses
in the conflict. In the east, the small air contingent of Pakistan Air Force No. 14
Sqn was destroyed resulting in Indian air superiority in the east. The entire
campaign was a true blitzkrieg, exploiting weakness in the enemy’s positions and
bypassing opposition, resulting in a swift victory. Faced with insurmountable
losses, the Pakistani military capitulated in just under a fortnight. On December 16,
the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered. The next day India announced a
unilateral ceasefire, to which Pakistan agreed.

India wasn’t architect of Bangladesh:

 B. Raman, former deputy chief of India’s external intelligence agency, Research
and Analysis Wing, better known as RAW writes in his book ‘The Kaoboys of
RAW’:

‘India’s role was more of a facilitator than a creator. It was a war jointly won by India and the
people of East Pakistan’.

‘Without the desire and the will of the people of Bangladesh, there would have been no
Bangladesh. Their sacrifices for their cause were immense. How many were brutally killed by
the Pakistan Army!

‘How many Bengali intellectuals were massacred by the Pakistan Army and by terrorist
organizations such as Al Badr and Al Shams created by the ISI! It is their sacrifice which laid
the foundation for an independent Bangladesh.

What India did under the leadership of Indira Gandhi was to make sure that their sacrifices
were not in vain.*

Role of China:
BOOKS or articles written on Bangladesh-China relations almost always mention
that China opposed our war of liberation. China, despite her revolutionary
rhetoric’s, and occasional verbosity about her opposition to US imperialism and
support to national liberation struggle, had been seriously busy in foregoing an
anti-Soviet entente. Having transgressed the limits of ideological conflict with the
Soviet Union, she had ultimately plunged into real politics and was in search of
areas of confrontation with, what she called, “social imperialism”
So china gave political support to US and China during the liberation war.
Authors who are more circumspect write that China did not support it. I have
noticed that most scholars and senior students of political science or international
relations believe that China opposed Bangladesh’s war of independence along with
the United States. Some Western scholars have written that India at the time even
felt threatened by a US-China-Pakistan axis. I will argue in this piece that seeing
China’s foreign policy behavior in this either/or terms or asking if China supported
our war of independence is oversimplifying both the issue of our liberation war and
China’s foreign policy behavior.
It is important for Bangladeshis to understand the whole thing adopting an
approach that takes into consideration the complexities involved. Developing a
better understanding has become more important because both Bangladesh and
China now want to have closer and stronger relations. It is also important for
Bangladeshis to develop a better analysis of Chinese reactions because China’s
relations with Bangladesh are seen by many Bangladeshis keeping its role during
the liberation war in mind. Analytically, this makes China look more hostile to
India than it has ever been; it also makes China look more like a Western player
playing by the rules of realist assumptions such as balancing internally and
externally and seeing Bangladesh in geostrategic terms — as a realist strategist
believing in ‘realpolitik’ assumptions would. Such assumptions about China are a
little problematic. The Chinese elites’ behavior towards independent Bangladesh
may not emanate from such assumptions.**
 Super Powers In Liberation War:
The two super powers that dominated a largely bipolar world until the early 1990s
played a significant role in the liberation war of Bangladesh. The part they played
in the sanguinary birth of Bangladesh was defined by the strategic shifts that
occurred in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. Since those times spectacular changes
in the international world order have transformed the world. The Soviet Union, one
of the super powers that had a positive role in the emergence of Bangladesh,
collapsed from within by 1992. The end of the Soviet Union also signified the
retreat of socialism in Europe and the end of the cold war in a bi-polar world.

In consequence, the other super power, the United States of America became a
virtual hyper power in a uni-polar world. Other remarkable developments also
marked the international scenario. Many developing nations emerged as regional
powers and are in the process of becoming great powers. Included in the list of
these rising powers are China, India, Brazil and South Africa. China is emerging as
the second largest economy in the world of our times, while India is also rapidly
developing as a significant power. The post cold war world is thus pregnant with
the possibility of becoming a multi-polar world replacing the present uni-polar
dispensation.

It may be difficult for the generations born after the 1990s to understand and
appreciate the international backdrop in which Bangladesh was born. The bi-polar
world in which the balance of terror was created by nuclear parity of the super
powers is also a thing of the past. It is not easy to understand how things were
during those times. Nevertheless, hindsight may contribute to a clearer
understanding of the dramatic emergence of Bangladesh in the context of relentless
competition and rivalry launched by the super powers.

During the 1960s apparently strong ties of comradeship between the Soviet Union
and China loosened. This ended the myth of a monolithic communist camp. By the
late '60s China on her own became a major actor on the international stage. On the
capitalist side, strains appeared in the anticommunist coalitions. Non-military,
especially economic issues came to the forefront. Conflict of interest increased
between the United States and its closest cold war allies, Western Europe and
Japan. As a result of all this the cold war coalitions on both sides gradually
weakened.

In a world where the challenge of secessionism was met by existing states and
international order with stern measures, any secessionist group would be faced
with virtually insurmountable obstacles. Nevertheless, in the case of Bangladesh
the attempt to secede from a repressive state was crowned with success.

The Caesarean birth of Bangladesh marked the success of the first armed separatist
struggle in the post colonial Third World. How then, precisely, the development of
the polycentric world still dominated by two super powers helped hasten the birth
of Bangladesh? The case of Bangladesh underscores the fact that not only regional
and inter-state rivalries, but intra-state ethno-linguistic, economic and political
conflict can also threaten to draw the super powers to the edge of war.

The role of Soviet Union

The Soviet Union was the first great power to deplore publicly the Pakistani
military crackdown on Bengalis. It was also the first major power to officially
recognize the State of Bangladesh, which it did within thirty eight days of its de
facto liberation from the Pakistani forces.

The response of the Soviet Union to the 1971 crisis in East Pakistan was
conditioned by the general Soviet policy with regard to Asia in the 1960s. It was a
policy of growing involvement, initially undertaken to contain America's influence
in Asia, but increasingly directed at stemming the diplomatic and military as well
as ideological advance of China which at that time was emerging as the Soviet
Union's principal rival in the Third World. The Soviet Union's desire to present its
credentials as an Asian power, its desire to counter potential American, Japanese or
Chinese backed schemes for alliances and alignments led to its launching in the
spring of 1969 a campaign for a system of collective security in Asia. This
campaign became the mainstay of the Soviet Union's diplomacy in Asia as events
and developments in the South Asian sub-continent were setting the stage for the
conflict in East Pakistan.
The Soviet Union's close tie with India was a vital factor in shaping the Soviet
response towards the East Pakistan crisis in 1971. An amiable working relationship
had prevailed between the two countries since the visit of Bulganin and
Khrushchev to New Delhi in December 1955. The Indo Soviet ties were further
strengthened in the wake of the 1962 Sino Indian border war. India's defeat in the
1962 clash and the worsening Sino Soviet relations eventually (mainly during 1969
1971) caused Moscow to attach more significance to its ties with India. As the
dominant power in the South Asian subcontinent, India could be built up as an
effective counterpoise to China and thus could provide help to Moscow to contain
Beijing militarily and diplomatically.

Another important factor behind the Soviet Union's response and rather close
involvement in the 1971 crisis in South Asia was the Soviet self image as “a Great
Power situated on two continents Europe and Asia” which, as the Soviet Foreign
Minister, Andrei Gromyko, speaking in the Supreme Soviet in June 1968, said, did
not “plead with anybody to be allowed to have their say in the solution of any
question involving the maintenance of international peace, concerning the freedom
and independence of the peoples ...”.

The relatively high priority given by the Soviet policy makers to Bangladesh crisis
in 1971 was the consequence of their perception of the contemporary world and
Asia and the proper Soviet role in both the world and Asian dimensions as a great
power. Moscow was concerned about maintaining the stability and security of its
ally, India. It wanted to ensure the position of India as the dominant power in
South Asia. Bangladesh might have been viewed by the leaders of the Soviet
Union as a “fringe responsibility to their Indian interests”, but in 1971 it was of
considerable importance to them as the first test case of their political and
diplomatic abilities in an emerging “triangular world”. The Sino American detente
had opened Moscow's eyes to the new and none too pleasant possibility of being
cornered and isolated. The apparent convergence of the Chinese and the American
policies and objectives with regard to the Bangladesh issue in 1971 increased the
Soviet fears in this respect and probably further hardened the Soviet resolve to
back Indian assistance to Bangladesh.
Thus behind all that happened in the sub-continent over the 1971 Bangladesh
struggle “was a power struggle between China and the Soviet Union and a strategic
conflict between Moscow and Washington”. In South Asia during December 1971
the Soviet Union seemed to have gained most from this three-cornered fight.

A Bangladesh freed from Pakistan, which was backed by both China and America,
was for the Soviet Union in 1971 a proof of the realism and immediate (though not
necessarily permanent) success of its global and Asian policies. The birth of
Bangladesh with India's support and sympathetic Soviet supervision did indeed
mark the emergence of the Soviet Union as “the military arsenal and political
defender of India with access for [Moscow's] rising naval power to the Indian
Ocean and a base of political and military operations on China's southern flank”.

Irrespective of the motives and gains of the Soviet Union in its involvement in the
Bangladesh war of liberation, its solid and unflinching support to the Bengali cause
was invaluable to the Bengali. During the penultimate days of Indo-Pak war over
Bangladesh, the Soviet veto in the UN Security Council against US backed
proposal for ceasefire paved the way for the Indo-Bangladesh allied forces to
march into Dhaka and secure the defeat and surrender of 90 thousand Pakistani
troops on the 16th December 1971. Soviet Union's positive role thus contributed
immensely to the historic triumph of Bangladesh.

The Role of the USA

Of the two super powers dominating the World in 1970s the USA played a more
complex and somewhat negative role in the 1971 war. Nevertheless, it should be
noted that the US society's response was one of positive support contradicting the
state's negative role. In the pluralist and open society of the US, influential and
articulate segments stood solidly behind the cause of Bangladesh.

The 1971 crisis in East Pakistan erupted at a time when the United States, under
President Nixon, was busy recasting its global and Asian policies to suit the needs
of the new international system which by 1970 “had become much more complex”.
“The Sino¬-Soviet misunderstanding had ripened into heated clashes, both
ideological and territorial. China had become a nuclear power ... and had found
itself at war with India in 1962. The American Cold War alliance system lay in
shambles and American power was deeply committed against a nationalist
communist force in Vietnam. Above all the USSR had attained nuclear weapon
destructive parity with the United States”.

During 1969 and 1970 President Nixon's Asian policy was dominated by a gradual
US disengagement with China. This process, which was virtually coterminous with
the “reinstatement ... of the Soviet Union as necessarily the main rival of the
United States, began under the so called 'Guam' or 'Nixon' doctrine; and by the
beginning of 1971 the United States and China were both ready to undertake its
complement the improvement of Sino American relations as a means of improving
the position of both states against their common rival”. This was the immediate
background of the highly controversial White House policy toward the East
Pakistan crisis in 1971 when the Nixon administration supported Pakistan, an old
ally of America and friend of China and opposed the democratically elected
representatives of East Pakistan (aided by India, which was in turn backed by the
Soviet Union) in their attempts to separate East Pakistan from its western part.

As the crisis developed the American response to it went through several

discernible phases.

The first phase of quiet non-involvement began on 25 March and lasted roughly
until 9 10 July 1971. During this phase the US posture was “neutral” and it
described the problem in East Bengal as Pakistan's “internal matter”.

The second phase started with the secret trip by President Nixon's National
Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, to China during 9 10 July 1971. This marked
the real beginnings of the Sino US detente and led indirectly to the formalization of
Indo Soviet alliance by a treaty in August. During this phase, which lasted until
September, the United States pursued diplomacy of restraint, counselling India to
desist from armed conflict with Pakistan and privately pressing Pakistan to thrash
out a 'political settlement' of the East Pakistan issue.

During the third phase, lasting from September until December 3, when the Indo
Pakistan war over Bangladesh broke out, the United States attempted to promote a
constructive political dialogue between the Pakistani military government and the
Bengali nationalist leaders in India, but in vain.
The fourth phase covered the period of the Indo Pak war. During the 14-day sub
continental war, the United States backed Pakistan and blamed India for the
escalation of hostilities and tried through the United Nations and other means to
bring about a ceasefire and “save West Pakistan” from possible Indian attempts to
destroy it militarily.

As noted earlier, throughout all these phases there was a great divergence between
the policy and attitude of the US administration and the American press, legislative
bodies, and academic community. For the most part these entities openly and
emphatically sided with the Bengali nationalists and supported the Indian role in
aiding and assisting them.

On 9th December “the CIA produced a report that Kissinger found alarming”. It
allegedly contained minutes of an Indian Cabinet discussion on launching a major
offensive against West Pakistan in order to modify the border of West Pakistan and
destroy the Pakistan army. Kissinger reportedly suggested tough action to deter
India. According to Anderson's later 'revelations', the President heeded Kissinger's
advice and ordered a task force of eight naval ships, led by the nuclear aircraft
carrier Enterprise, to sail into the Bay of Bengal in a 'show of force' aimed at India
and its ally, the Soviet Union.

Nixon and Kissinger also reportedly took measures to put pressure on the Soviet
Union to restrain India from attacking West Pakistan. When diplomatic contacts
and communications failed to elicit the desired response from Moscow, Kissinger
caused a 'pool report' to be circulated in the press that “if the Russians didn't begin
to exercise a restraining influence very soon, the entire US-Soviet relations might
be reexamined” and “a new look might have to be taken at the President's
summitry plans”.

On 16 December as the Pakistan army in the East surrendered to the “Allied Indo
Bangladesh Forces” and Bangladesh was liberated, India declared a unilateral
ceasefire on the West Pakistan front and President Yahya Khan accepted the offer.
Thus the hostilities ended and the US administration's fear with regard to Indian
invasion of West Pakistan did not materialize.
In the United Nations
On 4 December 1971 Kissinger reportedly told a White House strategy session:
“The exercise in the UN is likely to be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the
Soviets can be expected to veto. The UN itself will in all probability do little to
terminate the war ... Nothing will happen in the Security Council because of Soviet
vetoes. The whole thing is a farce”.

Nevertheless, the United States continued its efforts within the UN to achieve a
ceasefire without such delay as would put Pakistan into a disadvantageous
position. To this end, the US moved two draft resolutions on its own and an
additional one in cooperation with Japan. None of these made any substantial
reference to the need for a political settlement in East Pakistan. They simply
proposed an immediate Indo Pakistan ceasefire and withdrawal of troops.
Consequently they were vetoed by the Soviet Union which insisted that the
proposed ceasefire should be related to an acceptable political settlement of the
East Pakistan question.

The role of super powers in the war of liberation brought to bold relief the reality
of international politics during the early 1970s. Each of the two super powers
played its part in accordance with its own national, regional and global interests.

Bangladesh, as a part of Pakistan, was a geopolitical rarity with its own cogent
reasons for successful separation from a post colonial polity. In addition, it was a
land struggling for independence at a time when global politics was undergoing
strategic shifts. Involvement of the superpowers, positive or negative, resulted in
the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent and sovereign state.***

Role Of UN in the Liberation War

Though the United Nations condemned the human rights violations during and
following Operation Searchlight, it failed to defuse the situation politically before
the start of the war.
Following Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's declaration of independence in March 1971,
India undertook a world-wide campaign to drum up political, democratic and
humanitarian support for the people of Bangladesh for their liberation struggle.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi toured a large number of countries in a bid to create
awareness of the Pakistani atrocities against Bengalis. This effort was to prove
vital later during the war, in framing the world's context of the war and to justify
military action by India.[12] Also, following Pakistan's defeat, it ensured prompt
recognition of the newly independent state of Bangladesh.
Following India's entry into the war, Pakistan, fearing certain defeat, made urgent
appeals to the United Nations to intervene and force India to agree to a cease fire.
The UN Security Council assembled on 4 December 1971 to discuss the hostilities
in South Asia. After lengthy discussions on 7 December, the United States made a
resolution for "immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops". While supported
by the majority, the USSR vetoed the resolution twice. In light of the Pakistani
atrocities against Bengalis, the United Kingdom and France abstained on the
resolution.
On 12 December, with Pakistan facing imminent defeat, the United States
requested that the Security Council be reconvened. Pakistan's Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was rushed to New York City
to make the case for a resolution on the cease fire. The council continued
deliberations for four days. By the time proposals were finalized, Pakistan's forces
in the East had surrendered and the war had ended, making the measures merely
academic. Bhutto, frustrated by the failure of the resolution and the inaction of the
United Nations, ripped up his speech and left the council.
Most UN member nations were quick to recognize Bangladesh within months of
its independence.****

*http://www.genocidebangladesh.org/role-of-india/
**http://newagebd.net/107103/war-of-liberation-and-china/
***http://archive.thedailystar.net/suppliments/victory_day/2012/pg4.htm
****https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Bangladesh