People vs. Vera., 65 Phil

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge ad interim of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
1.PROBATION ; AUTHORITY OF PROBATION COURT TO LOOK INTO CIRCUMSTANCES OF

OFFENSE; SUPERIOR AND INFERIOR COURTS; LEGAL RELATION AND ETHICAL STANDARD.—
Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation court hearing a probation case may
look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it
to reverse the findings and conclusions of the Supreme Court, either directly or indirectly,
especially where from its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs,
averments, and pleadings of the parties. As observed in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333,
337), and reiterated in subsequent cases," if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy
the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation,
and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious
realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated
judicial system of the nation.
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; THE PRESIDENT AND HIS VETO POWER; PRESIDENT'S VETO NOT
BINDING ON THE SUPREME COURT.—In vetoing a bill, the President may express the reasons
which he may deem proper, but his reasons are not binding upon the Supreme Court in the
determination of actual controversies submitted to it for determination. Whether or not the
Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed
within his cons titutional pow er of ve to
57
VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937
57
People vs. Vera.
but which happens- to be at the same time pending determination before the Supreme Court is
a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is
expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway the judgment of the court
one way or another and prevent it from taking what in its opinion is the proper course of action
to take in a given case.
3. ID.; INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.—If it is ever necessary to make any vehement

affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is that the judiciary is
independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government—
independent in the performance of its functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from
politics, indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of its sworn
duty as it sees it and understands it.
4. ID. ; WHEN CONSTITUTIONALITY MAY BE RAISED.—The constitutionality of an act of the

legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and
presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i. e., the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.
5. ID. ; ID. ; RESORT TO EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES; ADJUDICATED CASES.—The question

of the constitutionality of an Act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions.
Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the
remedies in the ordinary course of law, even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate.
Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922], 42 Phil., 818), the Supreme Court held that the
question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus
proceedings (see also 12 C. }., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer
([1927], 50 Phil., 259, affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277
U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an"
action of., quo warranto brought in the name of- the Government of the Philippines. It has also
been. held "that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas corpus
proceedings (12 C. 3., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are
authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the
challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an
application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is
necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards
prohibition and certiorari. (Yu
58
58
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Vera.
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs.
First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982;
1 L, R. A. [N. S.], 843, and cases cited.)
6.ID.; ; ID. ; ID. ; PROHIBITION ; RULE WHERE JURISDICTION is EXCLUSIVELY DERIVED FROM
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE.—The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing
out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of
preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested.
The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the writ of prohibition will not
lie where the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of
which is questioned, because in such cases the inferior court having jurisdiction may itself
determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and
consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without
resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction
exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition
from enforcing that statute.
7.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; LIMITED JURISDICTION IN PROBATION
CASES.—A Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited
jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the
Philippine Legislature.
8.ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONALITY MUST BE RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY; EXCEPTIONS.

—As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity,
so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may be raised at the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. But the general rule admits of exceptions.
Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting
the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. Thus, in. criminal cases, although there is
a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at
any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Even in civil cases, it has
been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for
the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a
decision of the case. And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by
an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below.
59
59
People vs. Vera.

9.ID.; ID.; PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST OF PARTY; RIGHT AND INTEREST OF THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES TO CHALLENGE CONSTITUTIONALITY.—The person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying
that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose
name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound
inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-
settled rule that 'the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
10.ID. ; ID. ; RELIANCE ON PROBATION ACT; BY FISCAL DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ESTOPPEL
AGAINST THE PEOPLE.—The mere fact that. the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon
in the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila
but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for
considering the People of the Philippines estopped from now assailing its validity. For courts
will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason
for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon
the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.
11.ID.; ID. ; WHEN DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY NECESSARY ; WAIVER IF CASE CAN

BE DECIDED ON OTHER POINTS.—While the court will meet the question with firmness, where
its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and a just respect for the legislature,
renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points. (Ex
parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No 11,558; 2 Brock., 447, Vide, also Hoover vs. Wood [1857],
9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is
necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case, as where the right of a party is
founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C. J., p. 782.)
12.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY.—The

Supreme Court will take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our
statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the
60
60

People vs. Vera.
courts; that many persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for
probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people will likely take
advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent M. C. U, has been at
large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All await the decision of this
court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant
case has assumed and to prevent muItiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand
that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved.
13.ID. ; THE JUDICIARY; ITS DUTY TO ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTION.—Under a doctrine

peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. The
Supreme .Court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section
10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the National Legislature invalid
because in conflict with the fundamental law. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the
Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to- the supreme law by setting
aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.
14.ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONALITY;

RATIONALE OF PRESUMPTION.—All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed
to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not
on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute
is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself." (U. S. vs. Ten Yu
[1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U. S. vs.
Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the
sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken
an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this
oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the
Constitution. Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect
the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief
Executive. It follows that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution
except in clear cases.
15.ID.; THE PARDONING POWER UNDER THE JONES LAW AND THE CON
61

61
People vs. Vera.
STITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.—Section 21 of the Jones Law, in force at the time of the
approval of Act No. 4221, vests in the Governor-Gerieral of the Philippines "the exclusive power
to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures." This power is now vested in the
President of the Philippines. The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution of the
Philippines differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been
omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be
granted any time after the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction. The
Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United
States, to pardon a person before the facts of his case were fully brought to light. The framers
of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions,
provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised "after conviction". So too, under the
new Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also
the rule generally followed in the United States.
16.ID. ; ID.; ROYAL PARDON UNDER ENGLISH LAW; POWER OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS.—The rule
in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment;
"but," says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is
not understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." The reason for the
distinction is obvious. In England, judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal
from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
Government" but extends to the whole punishment attached by law to the offense committed.
The House of Lords, on a conviction may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual
banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the offense committed,
together with removal from office and incapacity to hold office.
17.ID.; ID.; COMMUTATION AND AMNESTY UNDER THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION.—Our

Constitution makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to
impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may
deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the President under the Constitution but only with
the concurrence of the National Assembly.
18.ID. ; ID.; EXCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE PARDONING POWER.—The benign prerogative of

mercy reposed in the Executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative
restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer
62
62
People vs. Vera.
or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the

pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one, of the departments can exercise
any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the
constitution. (20 R. C. L., pp. 540, 541.) Where the pardoning power is conferred on the
executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can
neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the
proper exercise thereof (12 C. J., pp. 838, 839).
19.ID.; PROBATION; POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT A PROBATION LAW.—

The Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally enact a probation
law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. The legislative
power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the
legislature may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to
be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment, and whether it should be certain,
or indeterminate, or conditional. Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and
fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to
vest in the courts—particularly the trial courts—large discretion in imposing- the penalties
which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by
vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which
an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer.
20.ID. ; ID. ; PROBATION AND PARDON NOT COTERMINOUS; PROBATION DlSTINGUISHED FROM
REPRIEVE AND COMMUTATION.—Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the
same. They are actually distinct and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In
probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts.
Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is
placed on probation. The probationer, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody
—subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court, he may be rearrested upon
the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to
prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. Probation should also be
distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence.
63
63
People vs. Vera.
21.ID. ; ID.; ID. ; PROBATION NOT IN CONFLICT WITH PARDONING POW-ER.—The Probation Act
does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect
to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation
Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it
beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment.
22.ID.; DIVISION OF POWERS.—Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are
distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the
executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its authority
from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of the popular will. Each has
exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere.
23.ID. ; ID. ; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY; HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.—The

power to make laws—the legislative power—is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones
Law and in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution. The Philippine Legislature or
the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power
to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void,
on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have
originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through a misreading of
Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English
public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into
America as an enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an accepted
corollary of the principle of separation of powers.
24.ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE FORBIDDING DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY NOT INFLEXIBLE;
EXCEPTIONS.—The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not
absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial
practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
On quite the same principle, Congress is empowered to delegate legislative power to such
agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. Courts have also sustained the
delegation of legislative power to the people at large, though some authorities maintain that
this may not be done. Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution
itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of Article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that
"The National As-
64
64
People vs. Vera.
sembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, -to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and
wharfage dues." And section 16 of the Same article of the Constitution provides that "In times
of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out a declared national policy."
25.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TEST OF UNDUE DELEGATION ; DETAILS OF EXECUTION.—In testing whether a
statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so -that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the
legislature. In United States vs. Ang Tang Ho {[1922], 43 Phil., 1), the Supreme Court adhered to
the foregoing rule. The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent
matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or
promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature
is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which
the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated
to it.
26.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PROBATION ACT MAKES VIRTUAL SURRENDER OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO
PROVINCIAL BOARDS.—The Probation Act does not, by the 'force of any of its provisions, fix and
impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary
power. What is granted is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to
exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the
entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. If a provincial board does not wish
to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the
needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative
power to the provincial boards.
27.ID.; ID.; ID.; TRUE DlSTINCTION BETWEEN POWER TO MAKE LAW AND DlSCRETION AS. TO
ITS EXECUTION; ADJUDICATED CASES.—The true distinction is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
65
65
People vs. Vera.
can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852], 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See
also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 68.) To the same effect are decisions of the
Supreme Court in the Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan ([1917], 36 Phil.,
547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39 Phil., 660) ; and Cruz vs. Youngberg
([1931], 56 Phil., 234).
28.ID. ; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF A LAW; RELAXATION OF THE DOCTRINE.—

Laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or
the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 118, 170172; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat, 1;
6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the legisture may delegate a
power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such
a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the
existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental
process common to all branches of the government. Notwithstanding the apparent tendency to
relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising
from social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age, the orthodox
pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in
Professor Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States and is accepted.
29.ID.; ID.; ID.; OPERATION OF PROBATION ACT NOT CONTINGENT ON SPECIFIED FACTS OR
CONDITIONS; DlSCRETION VESTED IN PROVINCIAL BOARDS ARBITRARY.—The legislature has
not made the operation of the Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be
ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the law
upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and
unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any- fact, or await the
happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule—limited by no principle of
expediency announced by the legislature.. It may take into consideration certain facts or
conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give
any reason or have any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for
the salary of a. probation officer. This is a matter which rests entirely at its pleasure.
30.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; LOCAL OPTION LAWS ; EIGHT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERN
66
66
People vs. Vera.
MENT; SUSPENSION OF OPERATION OF A GENERAL LAW NOT COUNTENANCED.—The

legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other
localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in
many jurisdictions have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the
vote of the people. (6 R. C. L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely
local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under
different circumstances. Without denying the right of local self-government and the propriety
of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of
small communities to pass upon in matters of general legislation like that which treats of
criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be
vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221.
31.ID.; ID. ; ID. ; PROVINCIAL BOARDS EMPOWERED TO SUSPEND OPERATION OF PROBATION

ACT.—The statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the
operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested
with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation
officers they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should
take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality
empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular
provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by
appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done,
but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad
[1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)
32.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; LEGISLATIVE POLICY; EXECUTION THEREOF; CONSTITUTION BOTH A GRANT
AND LlMITATION OF POWER.—A great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not
only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and
execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet
imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government lives
because of the unexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of
powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these
representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the
instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by
67
67
People vs. Vera.
clear intendment, have that effect. But it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a
grant and a limitation. of power and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to
certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.
33.ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; CLASS LEGISLATION; CLASSIFICATION ON

REASONABLE BASIS.—" * * * nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand
departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions
thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and eminent
domain. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable
basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class.
34.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; RESULTANT INEQUALITY FROM UNWARRANTED DELEGATION; PROBATION
ACT PERMITS DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION.—In the case of Act No. 4221, the resultant
inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards. While inequality may result in the application of the law and in the
conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result.
But whatever may be the case, it is clear that section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation
in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure,
abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before courts
should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and
circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the
denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference
between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law
may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and
illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. In other words, statutes may be
adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying
the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional.
68
68
People vs. Vera.
35.ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT; GOVERNMENT OF LAWS; EQUALITY CLAUSE
NOT "A ROPE OF SAND".—Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in
force in one or several provinces and not be in force in the other provinces, but one province
may appropriate for the salary of a probation officer of a given year—and have probation
during that year—and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation
in subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which
delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation
which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to
make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand."
36.ID.; PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ; PRESUMPTION AGAINST MUTILATION OF STATUTE.—

In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the
courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a
statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the
constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process.
37.ID. ; SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT INSEPARABLE FROM REST OF ACT; PROBATION AND
PROBATION OFFICERS.—Section 11 of the Probation Act (No. 4221) is inseparably linked with
the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left is the
bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who
may be deserving of the intended beneficial results of that system. The clear policy of the law,
as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application
of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards.
If not one of the provinces—and this is the actual situation now—appropriates the necessary
fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There
can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer
without a probation system.
38.ID.; ID.; PROBATION ACT ANALYZED; SECTIONS 10 AND 11 OF ACT; RULE OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION.—The probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in
section 10 are clearly not those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces
under section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation officers referred
to in section 10 are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office known
as the Probation Office established in the Depart
69
69
People vs. Vera.
ment of Justice, under the supervision of a Chief Probation Officer, When the law provides that
"the probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the court; that "the probation
officer" shall supervise and visit the probationer; that the probationer shall report to the
"probation officer", shall allow "the probation officer" to visit him, shall truthfully answer any
reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his conduct or condition;
that the court shall notify "the probation officer" in writing of the period and terms of
probation, it means the probation officer who is in charge of a particular probationer in a
particular province. It never could have been the intention of the legislature, for instance, to
require a probationer in Batanes, to report to a probation officer in the City of Manila, or to
require a probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to
place him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct him concerning the conditions of
his probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned to him by law.
39.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WlSDOM AND PROPRIETY OF LEGISLATION; PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATION
AND JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.—That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as
many probation officers as there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course, possible.
But this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not on what the law is.
Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to
pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding
progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not
permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose
—not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.
40.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS; APPOINTMENT OF PROBATION OFFICERS BY

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JUDICIAL NOTICE.—The clear intention and policy of the law is not to
make the Insular Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to
make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto.
The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied,
among other things, for the salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These
probation officers are to receive such compensation as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until
such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act". It was not the intention of
the legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of probation officers in the
provinces or later on. to include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that
70
70
People vs. Vera.
the sum of P50,000, appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of
the administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can
hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the
provinces, We take judicial notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines, and
we do not think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for
the central office, there can be in. each province, as intended, a probation officer with a salary
not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this is correct, the contention that without section
11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the
Act, unless it is conceded that there can be a system of probation in the provinces without
probation officers.
41.ID. ; PROBATION AS DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PENOLOGY; PROBATION ACT AS

REPUGNANT TO FUNDAMENTAL LAW.—Probation as a development of modern penology is a
commendable system. Probation laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to
permit what modern criminologists call the "individualization of punishment", the adjustment
of the penalty to the character of 'the criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It
provides a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is
believed that, in many cases, convicts may be reformed and their development into hardened
criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids
imprisonment so long as the convict gives promise of reform. The welfare of society is its chief
end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while probation is
commendable as a system and' its implantation into the Philippines should be welcomed, the
law is set aside because of repugnancy to the fundamental law.
42.ID. ; CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS; RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DECISIONS OF

UNITED STATES COURTS; LOCAL CONDITIONS AND ENVIRONMENT.—The constitutional
relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United States and the dual
character of the American Government is a situation which does not obtain in the Philippines.
The situation of a state of the American Union or of the District of Columbia with reference to
the Federal Government of the United States is not the situation of a province with respect to
the Insular Government; the distinct federal and state judicial organizations of the United
States do not embrace the integrated judicial system of the Philippines; "General propositions
do not decide concrete cases" and "to keep pace with * * * new
71
71
People vs. Vera.
developments of times and circumstances", fundamental principles should be interpreted

having in view existing local conditions and environments.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition,

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Solicitor-General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. Vicente J.
Francisco, Feria & La O, Orense & Belmonte, and Gibbs & McDonough for respondent Cu
Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writs
of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may
review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled
"The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the
application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of
Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further
action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the
final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200).1 Petitioners
herein, the People of the Philippine Islands and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein
Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the
______________
1 35 Off. Gaz., 738. See also Resolutions of December 17, 1935.
72
72
People vs. Vera.

Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and G. R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is
the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard
the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal
case.
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in
tervening in the case as private prosecutor, After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of
Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume
of the testimony and the bulk of exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on
January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prisión
correccional to eight years of prisión mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action
to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the
court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years
and six months of prisión correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of
prisión mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects, Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a
motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on
December 17,1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The
defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. This court,
on November 24, 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file
a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case
to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application
73
73
People vs. Vera.
for probation filed by the herein. respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936,
before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine
Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is
innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he
would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro
Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation to the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same on June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of
Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5,
1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation
to' the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition
on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been
repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the
reason that its applicability is 'not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of
said Act No. 4221 endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or
otherwise in their respective provinces, The private prosecution also filed a supplementary
opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality of Act No. 4221, as
an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1,
Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution
except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act No. 4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a
finding that "las pruebas no han establecido de una manera concluyente la culpabilidad del
peticionario y que todos los hechos probados no son
74
74
People vs. Vera.
inconsistentes o incongruentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime for which he stands convicted
by this court in G, R, No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation for the reason
that:
" * * * Si este Juzgado concediera la probación solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia
social que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolución, que hacen al peticionario acreedor
"de la misma, una parte de la opinion pública, atizada por los recelos y las suspicacias, podría
levantarse indignada contra un sistema de probación que permite atisbar en los procedimientos
ordinarios de una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las decisiones ya
recaídas al traer a la superficie conclusiones enteramente diferentes, en menoscabo del interés
público que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto judicial."
On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the
resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. This
was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The
aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the
petition of counsel for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to
intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been
filed with the trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid
motion subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on
the ground that the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated at a banquet
given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the evening of July 30, 1937, and that he signed the
same "without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy to the person who
invited me (him)."
On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed
75
75
People vs. Vera.
a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this
court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in
obedience to said judgment.
On August 1, 1937, the private prosecution filed its- opposition to the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae aforementioned, asking that a date be set for the hearing of the same
and that, at all events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing
the same who were members of the legal staff of the several coun-sel for Mariano Cu Unjieng.
On August 10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties
including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 14,
1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his
motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici
curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for- the postponement
of the hearing of both motions. The respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion
for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene
as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave
to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on
August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary
legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of
First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for
delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the
courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to
make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a
temporary restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937.
76
76
People vs. Vera.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and
prohibition, herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of his jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng
under probation for the following reasons:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said Act of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply
only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to
chartered cities like the City of Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the
absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to include the City of
Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also true that Act No.
4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only to those provinces in
which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not be
applicable to it because it has not provided for the salary of a probation officer as required by
section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular Probation Office willing to act for
the City of Manila, said Probation Office provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being
different and distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application
for probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction
or in excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to
commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937,
denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that:
77
77
People vs. Vera.
(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the
granting or denying of applications for probation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on June
28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of Its rendition.
(3) No right of appeal exists in such cases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or
change the same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the
crime for which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only
presumptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this
court and a violation of the respondents's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became
Imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to
commit his co-respondent to jail.
Petitioners also aver that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing
for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime,
is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the
Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers
upon the provincial board of each province the absolute discretion to make said law operative
or otherwise in their respective provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and Improper
delegation to the provincial boards of. the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by
the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI)
in the National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives
78
78
People vs. Vera.
the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones
Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Courts of First Instance of the
different provinces without uniformity. In another supplementary petition dated September 14,
1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, in behalf of one of the petitioners, the People of the
Philippine Islands, concurs for the first time with the issues raised by the other petitioner
regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and in the oral argument held on October 6,
1937, further elaborated on the theory that probation is a f form of reprieve and therefore Act
No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons
and reprieves. On October 1, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he
contended that Act No. 4221 not only encroaches upon the pardoning power of the executive,
but also constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. On October 9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal
and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the People of the Philippine Islands, and by
counsel f or the other petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, one
sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and the other
contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were
presented. Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day,
October 9, 1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the. equal
protection of the laws and constitutes an unlawfull delegation of legislative power and, further,
that the whole Act is void; that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the
validity of its laws; that the private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and
may attack the probation law as unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the
constitutional question in prohibition proceedings.
Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and
memorandums, challenge
79
79
People vs. Vera.
each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the petitioners.
As special defenses, respondents allege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the
writ of certiorari or of prohibition.
(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners is the
very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and was still pending resolution
before the trial court when the present petition was filed with this court.
(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of judgment
before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same
under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First
Instance to decide the question as to whether or not execution will lie, this court nevertheless
cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First Instance has assumed jurisdiction over
the same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves.
(5) That the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial court of
"its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should not be tolerated
because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial court which court while sitting in
probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity."
(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question submitted
to and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action would not lie because the
resolution of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for although the Probation Law
does not specifically provide that an applicant for probation may appeal from a resolution of
the Court of First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdic
80
80
People vs. Vera.
tion that a final order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable to the superior
court.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng being appealable, the same had not yet become final and executory for the reason that
the said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial within the
requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was not able to resolve in view of
the restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.
(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution of the
trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his answer to the
motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the hearing of the said motion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not
appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ of
certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it believed that the
accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism because
the accused is a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular
exercise of jurisdiction by the--trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a
motion for reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial court could have an
opportunity to correct or cure the same.
(10) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is not appealable, the trial
court retains its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with
law and justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the
courts and may be exercised either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the
petition in the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondents
allege, said court
81
81
People vs. Vera.
cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the appeal would not be
availing because the doors of probation would be closed from the moment the accused
commences to serve his sentence (Act Not. 4221, sec. 1; U. S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed. [2d], 827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that
Act No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not
constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection
clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive.
In an additional memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the
view that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and contend, in
addition, that the private prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less
question the validity of Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are
estopped from questioning the validity of the Act; that the validity of the Act cannot be
attacked for the first time before this court; that prohibition is unavailable; and that, in any
event, section 11 of Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The last memorandum
for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was
admitted by resolution of this court and filed anew on November 5, 1937. This memorandum
elaborates on some of the points raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by
the petitioners.
In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we
noted that the court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying the said application assumed the task not only of
considering the merits of the application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant,
notwithstanding the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G. R. No. 41200.) Probation
implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation court hearing a probation case may look into
the
82
82
People vs. Vera.
circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the
findings and conclusions of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially where from its own
admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the
parties. As already observed by this.court in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and
reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the
privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and
judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious
realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated
judicial system of the nation.
After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and
the respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two
fundamental questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No.
4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not
said Act is constitutional. Consideration of these issues will involve a discussion of certain
incidental questions raised by the parties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is
necessary. It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not
be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised\and presented in
appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i. e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915],
30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C.L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary
actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where
the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and
83
83
People vs. Vera.
adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922], 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the
question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus
proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer
([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (1928), 277
U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an
action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines. It has also
been held that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas corpus
proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are
authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the
challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234) ; and even on an
application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is
necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards
prohibition and certiorari. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500;
70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A.
S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited). The case of Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad, supra, decided by this court twelve years ago was, like the present one, an original
action for certiorari and prohibition. The constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly known as
the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the constitutional
issue was met squarely by the respondents in a demurrer. A point was raised "relating to the
propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in prohibition."
This court decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held
that Act No. 2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States which reversed the judgment of this court and held that
the Act was invalid. (271 U. S.,
84
84
People vs. Vera.

500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme Court,
though its Chief Justice, said:
"By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme
court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior
tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are
exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that court
that) the question of the validity of a criminal statute must usually be raised by a defendant in
the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson
Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192.) But in this case where a new act seriously affected
numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of
actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue of the act's validity
promptly before it and decide it in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The
court relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123; 52 Law. ed., 714; 13 L.
R. A. [N. S.], 932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Cas., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law.
ed., 131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson vs. New,
243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas., 1918A,
1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raised by demurrer to the petition, this is now
disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a decision on the merits. In view
of broad powers in prohibition granted to that court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the
desire of the parties."
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal
from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested.) (High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, p. 705.) The general rule, although there
85
85
People vs. Vera.
is a conflict in the cases, is that the Writ of prohibition will not lie where the inferior court has
jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is questioned, because in
such cases the inferior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of the
statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such
cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But
where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional
statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J.,
670; Ex parte Roundtree [1874], 51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs.
Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384; 84 A., 799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs.
Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec.,
669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derive their jurisdiction solely from Act
No. 4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused
persons after their conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence. It is
true that at common law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of a
sentence is recognized and, according to a number of state courts, including those of
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts
(Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156
Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions [1894], 141 N. Y., 288;
Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St, 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United States
([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas.
1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opinion that under the
common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and brushed aside
the contention as to inherent judicial power saying, through Chief Justice White:
86
86
People vs. Vera.
"Indiputably under our conctitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws
and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to
be conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently
possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely
exert their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power
here made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets Inherently
a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition urged upon the
distribution of powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that
indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative
and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing
the statute, elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial
authority,- and that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained
according' to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive department."
Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. Judge
of First Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), -decided by this court in 1915, also reached the
conclusion that the power to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases
is not inherent in the judicial function. "All are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of
statutory authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to grant.such suspensions."
(at p. 278.) Both petitioners and respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a
Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its
jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine
Legislature.
It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application
for prohibition
87
87
People vs. Vera.
where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by objection of
some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914],
260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional
issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before
the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O. Vera, however, acting
as judge of the court below, declined to pass upon the question on the ground that the private
prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said
question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C.
J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E.,
742, 743), as authority for the proposition that a court will not consider any attack made on the
constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his rights are
not affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may not motu proprio
take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare a
legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human
judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due
regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed.,
Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While,
therefore, the court a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it
refused to consider the question solely because it was not raised by a proper party.
Respondents herein reiterate this view. The argument is advanced that the private prosecution
has no personality to appear in the hearing of the application for probation of defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
hence the issue of constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court, Al-
88
88
People vs. Vera.
though, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the
constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the
decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court
depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of constitutionality will be
considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect
to be given the statute. (12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the
issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the
issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as
a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so
that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-
Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general
rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time
when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey
[1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of
authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the
proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has
been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for
the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a
decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S.
W., ,892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody
vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a
constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves
the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs.
89
89
People vs. Vera.
Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870,) As to the power of this court to consider the
constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn
again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the
hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private
prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here—a point we do
not now have to decide—we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented
by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the
present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of Its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No.
4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present
action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the
state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Springer ([1927], 50 Phil, 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands
[1928], 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature
unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In
Attorney General vs. Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich, 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State
of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right
of the respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the
respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of
contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of
the statute was
90
90
People vs. Vera.
itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.:
"* * * The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law
enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation
upon their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate answer.
The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is a
statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action
under it than if it had never been enacted. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its
behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow. * * * The legislature and the
respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such. constitutional questions. As was
remarked by Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a party affected by an
unconstitutional act of the legislature: 'The people have a deep and vested interest in
maintaining all the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of legislative powers.' (Allen vs.
Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)"
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was
brought by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state.
In disposing of the question whether or not the state may bring the action, 'the Supreme Court
of Kansas said:
"* * * The state is a proper party—indeed, the proper party—to bring this action. The state is
always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.
" 'lt has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded, and need not, as
an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City,
GO Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118]'). (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)
"Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-General,
or county attor-
91

91
People vs. Vera.
ney, may exercise his best judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the matter
determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60
Pac., 1068; 49 L. R. A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience to its terms (State vs. Dolley,
82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under its questionable
provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122)."
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197
S. W., 1006; State vs. S. H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La.,
597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of
Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 221 N. Y., 295; 116 N. E., 1020; Bush vs. State [1918], 187 Ind., 339;
119 N. E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana said:
"It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the
duty of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of the
argument, three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth
Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222) ; State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of
New Orleans (41 La. Ann., 156; 6 So., 592) ; and State ex rel. Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor
(47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a district attorney
to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds it in conflict with one which it is his duty to
enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was that the judge
should not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional, forbid the
district attorney to file a bill of information charging a person with a violation of the statute. In
other words, a judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the question
of constitutionality is tendered f or decision, and unless it must be decided in order to
determine the right of a party litigant. State ex rel.
92
92
People vs. Vera.

Nicholls, Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition merely that an officer on whom a
statute imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that
he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune
from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority
for the proposition merely that executive officers, e. g., the state auditor and state treasurer,
should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the
ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.
"It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to
support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes in
conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the two
statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is
compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional.
If it were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from constitutional limitations in
the enactment of criminal laws."
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that
the state may impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly
in the opposite direction. In f act, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the
rule as stated is sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor may it be invoked
by the City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the
principal reasons being that the validity of the Probation Act cannot be attacked for the first
time before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and,
not being authorized to enforce laws outside of the City of Manila, cannot challenge the validity
of the Act in its application outside said city. (Additional memorandum of respondents, October
23, 1937, pp. 8, 10, 17 and 23.)
93
93
People vs. Vera.
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon in the past and all that
time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has
been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the
Philippines estopped from now assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional
question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that
the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised
later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid
until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is
necessary to the resolution of the instant case. For, "* * * while the court will meet the
question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and a just
respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be
decided on other points." (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11,558; 2 Brock. 447. Vide,
also, Hoover vs. Wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a
constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case (12 C. J.,
p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454
[aff. 212 N. Y., 1; 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U. S., 272] ; Hesse vs.
Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co. vs.
Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the right of a party is? founded
solely on a statute, the validity of which is attacked. (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Central Glass Co. vs.
Niagara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N. E., 306).
There is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from
Act No. 4221 now being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, this court will
94
94
People vs. Vera.
also take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our -statute books
and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that many persons accused
and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are
already on probation; that more people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the
future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about
four years since his first conviction. All await the decision of this court on the constitutional
question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to
prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of
Act No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S.,
500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R. C. L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101
N. E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N. W., 209,
211; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 489; Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the
property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these
proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in
the interest of the public welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we have
determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide the
main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general
rule." Our ruling on this point was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A more
binding authority in support of the view we have taken can not be found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has
been properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the'
Constitution. This
95
95
People vs. Vera.
court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of
Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in
conflict with the fundamental law. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the
Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting
aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature
approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional Iimitations. The
responsibility of upholding the Constitution. .rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature
as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative
department of the government itself." (U. S. vs. Ten Yu, [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of
Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U. S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute
finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the
Legislature and. the Chief Executive have taken an oath. to support the Constitution and it must
be presumed that they have been true to this oath-and that in enacting and sanctioning a
particular law they, did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously
exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments
of the government. (6 R. G. L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which
bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective
Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set
aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain
to require a citation of authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention
to the fact that the President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the
constitutionality of the Probation Act,
96
96
People vs. Vera.
adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question was a foregone conclusion.
Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity and independence of this court. We
take notice of the fact that the President in his message dated September 1, 1937,
recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the Probation Act (No. 4221) ;
that this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the National Assembly repealing
the Probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed
by the President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken out from the
statute books of the Commonwealth a law * * * unfair and very likely unconstitutional."' It is
sufficient to observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the President
exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons which he may deem
proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination of
actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive should
express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad
constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time pending determination
in this court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever
opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment
one way or another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper course of
action to take in a given case. If it is ever necessary for us to make any vehement affirmance
during this formative period of our political history, it is that we are independent of the
Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government—independent in the
performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent
to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it
and as we understand it.
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act
encroaches
97
97
People vs. Vera.
upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power; and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in
force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests
in the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves
and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines.
(Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some
respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the
Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after
the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the
United States, Art. II, sec. 2; In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-General of the
Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a person
before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought
this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning
power can only be exercised "after conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the
pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally
followed in the United States (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2). The rule in
England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but,"
says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not
understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte Wells
[1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass., 323; 12 Am. Rep.,
699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St., 457; 23 Am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the
distinction is obvious. In England, judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal
from
98
98
People vs. Vera.
office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the whole
punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction
may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment,
depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office and
incapacity to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes specific
mention of "commutation" and of the power of the- executive to impose, in the pardons he
may grants such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper, Amnesty may
be granted by the President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the
National Assembly. We need not dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental
changes. It is sufficient for our purposes to state that the pardoning power has remained
essentially the same. The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the
Jones Law been impaired by the Probation Act?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive.
The exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else. " * * * The benign
prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any
legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or
authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the pardoning
power, since no person properly belonging to one of the departments can exercise any powers
appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution."
(20 R. C. L,, pp. 540, 541, and cases cited.) "* * * where the pardoning power is conferred on
the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature
can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate It elsewhere, nor interfere with or control
the proper exer-
99
99
People vs. Vera.
cise thereof, * * *." (12 C. J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then, confers any
pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and void. But does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentence was void. (Ex parte
United States [1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72;
Ann, Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the authorities,
expressed the opinion of the court that under the common law the power of the court was
limited to temporary suspension and that the right to suspend sentence absolutely and
permanently was vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary.
But, the right of Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the court
through its Chief Justice: " * * * and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the
imposition of penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such other means as
the legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to enable courts
to meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be
presented to them for judgment, recourse must be had to Congress whose legislative power on
the subject is in the very nature of things adequately complete." ('Quoted in Riggs vs. United
States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the National Probation Association and others
to agitate for the enactment by Congress of a federal probation law. Such action was finally
taken on March 4, 1925 (chap. 521, 43 Stat. at L. 1259, U. S. C. title 18, sec. 724). This was
followed by an appropriation to defray the salaries and expenses of a certain number of
probation officers chosen by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.)
In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U. S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep;., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the
Supreme Court
100
100

People vs. Vera.
of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person sentenced to
imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no power
under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at
which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality
of the Probation Act was not considered but was assumed. The court traced the history of the
Act and, quoted from the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House
of Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, 2d Session) the following statement:
"Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised a
form of probation either by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state
probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States, 242 U. S., 27; 61
L. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court
denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentence. In the same opinion the court
pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation
powers in the future. * * *
"Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation legislation.
In 1917, a bill was favorably reported by the. Judiciary Committee and passed the House. In
1920, the Judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to the House, but it was
never reached for definite action.
"If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference
to its treatment of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the
states of the Union. At the present time every state has a probation law, and in all but twelve
states the law applies both to adult and juvenile offenders." (See, also, Johnson, Probation for
Juveniles and Adults [1928], Chap. I.)
The constitutionality of the federal probation law has
101
101
People vs. Vera.
been sustained by inferior federal courts. In Riggs vs. United States supra, the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:
"Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration
have been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the
constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no manner to encroach upon
the pardoning power of the President. This case will be f found to contain an able and
comprehensive review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to consider,
and to it and the authorities cited therein special reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d],
590, 594), as is also to a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Kriebel
vs. U. S., 10 F. [2d], 762), likewise construing the Probation Act."
We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal
language, pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws, that a
federal probation law was actually enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has
been assumed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently sustained by
the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States,
may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all
penal offenses. This conclusion is supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20
N. M., 542; L. R. A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province
of the Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a
minimum and maximum punishment." And in State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L, R. A.
[N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The legislative power to set
punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general
102
102
People vs. Vera.
assembly may confer on trial judges, if it fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be
imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain or
indeterminate or conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.)
Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their
violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts—
particularly the trial courts—large discretion in imposing the penalties which the law prescribes
in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the
courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict,
peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from
imposing a sentence merely because, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the
injury caused by the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts being
allowed in such. cases to submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as it may deem proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both
mitigating and aggravating circumstances are attendant in the commission of a, crime and the
law provides for a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such
circumstances to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, and to
apply the penalty according to the result of such compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal
Code; U. S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui [1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of
the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to determine, within the limits of each period, in
case the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the extent of the penalty according
to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the extent of
the evil produced by the crime. In the imposition of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any
amount within the limits established by law, considering not only the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, but more
103
103
People vs. Vera.
particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.) Article 68,
paragraph 1, of the same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be imposed" upon a
person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who has not acted without discernment, but
always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he has
committed. Article 69 of the same Code provides that in case of "incomplete self-defense", i. e.,
when the crime committed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases
mentioned in articles 11 and 12 of the Code, "the courts shall Impose the penalty in the period
which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of
exemption present or lacking." And. in case the commission of what are known as "impossible"
crimes, "the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the
offender," shall impose upon him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
(Art. 59, Revised Penal Code.)
Under our' Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is
deducted from the entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned
(art. 29) ; the death penalty is not imposed when the guilty person is more than seventy years
of age, or where upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members
thereof are not unanimous in their voting' as to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 3) ; the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within the
three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any
person over seventy years of age (art, 83) ; and when a convict shall become insane or an
imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, or while he is serving his sentence, the
execution of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the
104
104
People vs. Vera.
personal penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal
laws is more clearly demonstrated in various other- enactments, including the probation Act.
There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently
amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 10) and granting the
courts large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as amended
provides: "Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same." Certain classes of convicts are, by section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation
thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which
was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the
amendatory Act have become article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117
of the Philippine Legislature and recently reamended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, of the
National Assembly. Finally came the (Adult) Probation Act now in question. In this Act is again
manifested the intention of the legislature to "humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the
modification in particular cases of the penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension
of the execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after due hearing and after
investigation of the par-
105
105
People vs. Vera.
ticular circumstances of the offense, the criminal record, if any, of the convict, and his social
history. The Legislature has in reality decreed that in certain cases no punishment at all shall be
suffered by the convict as long as the conditions of probation are faithfully observed. If this be
so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes in conflict with the power of the Chief
Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the language of the Supreme Court
of New Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for the commission of a wrong,
while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under and within the limits of law as
announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and conduct of criminal causes,
with which the executive can have nothing to do," (Ex parte Bates, supra.) In Williams vs. State
([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia
probation statute against the contention that it attempted to delegate to the courts the
pardoning power lodged by the constitution in the governor of the state and observed that
"while the governor alone is vested with the power to pardon after final sentence has been
imposed by the courts, the power of the courts to impose any penalty which may be from time
to time prescribed by law and in such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned."
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it
unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a
sentence, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power of
the executive. (In re Webb [1895], 89 Wis.( 354; 27 L. R. A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N. W.,
177; 9 Am. Crim. Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182 Pac.,
927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 103; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1041;
132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 111., 287; 67 N. E., 23; 63 L.
R. A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim.
106
106
People vs. Vera.
Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N, S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162; Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361; 111
Pac., 291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30 S. E., 858;
State ex rel Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54
Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571; State vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S, W., 456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer vs.
Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5;
Murphy vs. State [1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 3. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912], 18
Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac., 392; Ex parte De
Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac.,
425; Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914], 88 Conn.,
50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise
[1913], 257 111., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind., 534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L.
R. A., 859; St. Hilarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882; People vs. Stickle (1909], 156
Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs. Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly
vs. District Court [1925], 73 Mont, 541; 237 Pac., 525; State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79
S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State ex rel Buckley vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl, 875;
State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl. 424; Ex parte Bates [1915], 20' N. M., 542; L.
R. A., 1916 A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions [1894], 141 N. Y.,
288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn
[1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106' N. Y. Supp., 928; People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406;
Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L.
R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781;
107
107
People vs. Vera.

State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L. R. A.
[N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. State [1854], 34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs.
State [1814], 180 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State. [1913], 70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618;
158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S. W., 573; King vs. State
[1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211;
54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va.,
802; 109 S. E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel Tingstad
vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206' Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to follow this
long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the legislature to
suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation however characterized. State
ex rel. Tingstad vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393), deserved
particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which provided for the suspension of
the execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and required that the
convicted person be placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer during the term of
such suspension, on such terms as the court may determine, was held constitutional and as not
giving the court a power in violation of the constitutional provision vesting the pardoning
power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide, also, Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122
Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually distinct
and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel Forsyth vs. Court of
Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep.,
675), the Court of Appeals of New York said:
"* * * The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as
understood when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different
108
108
People vs. Vera.
in their origin and nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was
always a part of the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the
judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it,
and all civil disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon
reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It
releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the
offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes the penalties and
disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parte Garland, 71 U, S., 4 Wall, 333; 18 Law ed., 366; U. S. vs.
Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall, 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law. ed., 442.)
"The framers of the federal and state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the principles
governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these instruments upon the
executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the words of the constitution
were used to express the authority formerly exercised by the English crown, or by its
representatives in the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How,, 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this
power was understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions to suspend
sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and pardons should
abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments,
that criminal courts had so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and different in their
nature and character, were still left separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the
executive, and .the other by the judicial department. We therefore conclude that a statute
which, in terms, authorizes -courts of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence in certain cases
after conviction,—a power inherent in such courts at common law, which was understood
when the
109
109
People vs. Vera.
constitution was adopted to be an ordinary judicial function, and which, ever since its adoption,
has been exercised by the courts, is a valid exercise of legislative power under the constitution.
It does not encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they have been
understood and practiced from the earliest times." (Quoted with approval in Director of Prisons
vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265, Carson, J., concurring, at pp. 294, 295.)
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts.
Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is
placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely
terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of
probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report,
and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions of
probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody—
subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon
the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to
prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.)
"The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far
from it. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in
substitution of the imprisonment and fine prescribed by the criminal laws, For this reason its
application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed
applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal
law, which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no
conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality
110
110
People vs. Vera.
of the Probation Act for this cause." (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d], 567, 569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the. sentence.
Snodgrass vs. State ([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W.; 16'2), is
relied upon most strongly by the petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the
power to grant pardons and reprieves, having been vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive
by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the courts by means of a
probation law authorizing the indefinite judicial suspension of sentence. We have examined
that case and found that although the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the
probation statute of the state in terms conferred on the district courts the power to grant
pardons to persons convicted of crime, it also distinguished between suspension of sentence on
the one hand, and reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court, through
Harper, J.:
"That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to
grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction
between a 'reprieve' and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the execution of
the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People,
1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words &
Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be held in conflict with the power confiding in the
Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a commutation is but to change the
punishment assessed to a less punishment."
In State ex rel Bottomly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the Supreme
Court of Montana had under consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state
enacted in 1913, now found in sections 12078-12086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court held
the law valid as not impinging upon the pardoning
111
111
People vs. Vera.
power of the executive. In a unanimous decision penned by Justice Holloway, the court said:
"* * * the terms 'pardon,' 'commutation,' and 'respite' each had a wellunderstood meaning at
the time our Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was intended to comprehend the
suspension of the execution of a judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 12078-12086.
A 'pardon' is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the
laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts
for a crime he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640) ; It is a
remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook
vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71).
'Commutation' is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for
the one originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.], 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs.
Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A 'reprieve' or 'respite' is the withholding of a
sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a postponement of
execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of execution
(Butler -us. State, 97 Ind., 373).
"Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section
12078 has been determined; but the same objections have been urged against parole statutes
which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the power of pardon is
granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to the numerous
cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558, reported in L. R. A.,
1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)"
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the
Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences,
remains as full and complete as if the Probation
112
112
People vs. Vera.
don the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his- rearrest and
imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)
2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive
and is not for that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as conrended, an undue
delegation of legislative power?
Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three
coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution
which, in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
The power to make laws—the legislative power—is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the
Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution (Art. VI, sec. 1,
Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not
escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority.
Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas
delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was
introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of
agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the
delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened principle of free
government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers.
(5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66'.) The classic statement of the rule is that of Locke,
namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody
else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.)
Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the fol
113
113
People vs. Vera.
lowing oft-quoted language: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any
other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority,
there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the
Constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high
prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the- responsibility by choosing other
agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom,
and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide
this sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with
approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine "on the ethical
principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed
by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the
matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra,
at p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and
inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the
central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh vs.
Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes [1855], 30
N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs shall be
managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authority; and hence while the
rule is also fundamental that the power. to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of
municipalities exercising local self government has never been held to trench upon that rule.
Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general
114
114
People vs. Vera.
legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribe local regulations,
according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases
of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick, supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is
empowered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of the United
States as it may select. A territory stands in the same relation to Congress as a municipality or
city to the state government. (United States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 742.; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195 U. S., 138; 24
Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also sustained the delegation
of legislative power to the people at large. Some authorities maintain that this may not be done
(12 C. J., pp. 841, ,842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N.
E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However, the question of whether or not a state has ceased to
be republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative and referendum has been held
not to be a judicial but a political question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223
U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has
been looked upon with favor by certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the
more conservative courts has been pretty well drawn. (Opinions of the Justices [1894], 160
Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A,. 113; Kiernan vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac.,
379; 112 Pac., ',02; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.)
Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14,
paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National
Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and
wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that "In times
of war or other
115
115
People vs. Vera.
national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out a declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine
whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the President could
be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever
doubt may have existed has been removed by the Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 is section 11 which reads as follows:
"This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which. the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officers shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be subject to the direction of the Probation Office." (Underscoring ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is

usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left
the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or
delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil.,
1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far
as it undertook to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation
fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See
and cf. Compañía General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil.,
136.) The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of
detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by
executive
116
116
People vs. Vera.

officers and administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp. 177179.)
For the purposes of the Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative
bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective
provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules
governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are applicable
or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety
of cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at
variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or
-absence of a standard or rule of action—or the sufficiency thereof—in the statute, to aid the
delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is
sufficient; in others that it is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an
act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79
L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A. L. R., 947; People ex rel, Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co. [1936],
364 111., 406; 4 N. E. [2d], 847; 107 A. L. R., 1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L., title
"Constitutional Law", sec. 174.) In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards
in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall
apply in their respective provinces ? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any
and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force
of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the
exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice
Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission"
117
117
People vs. Vera.
which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act,
the legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to
the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to
determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the
provincial boards. If a provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all
that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation
officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our
minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs.
Clinton County Comrs. [1852] ; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction, sec. 68.) To the same effect are decisions of this court in Municipality of Cardona
vs. Municipality of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547) ; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro
([1919], 39 Phil., 660), and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases,
this court sustained the validity of a law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to
adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for the
legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands
to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third
case, it was held proper for the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend
or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the
118
118
People vs. Vera.
importation of foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the country
make this advisable or if disease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the
agriculture and livestock of the lands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference
of details of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and
regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own
decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U. S. vs. Molina [1914], 29
Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus
[1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro
[1919], 39 Phil., 660.)
It is contended, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves
the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies,
as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6
R. C. L., 116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs.
Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.
(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A., 112.)
The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing
essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the
taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government.
(Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; ln re Village of North Milwaukee [1896], 93 Wis., 616; 97
N. W., 1033; 33 L. R. A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N. W., 210; Field vs. Clark
[1892], 143 U. S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent
tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on
119
119
People vs. Vera.
account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern
industrial age (Petitioner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of
Parliaments", Foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun
Politics", in Harper's Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147, 152), the orthodox
pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in
Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States in the following language—
speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies: "The principle which
permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the
circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at
the time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the
legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it is its duty to
do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to
be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different or no action at all is to be taken. What
is thus left to the administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy
demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case' require to be done
according to the terms of the law by which he is governed." (Willoughby on the Constitution of
the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. III, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York ([1883], 109
U. S., 385; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a
declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of
the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may
designate." (See, also, 12 G. J., p. 864; State vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr
[1859], 13 Cal., 343, 358.) The legislature, then, may provide that a law shall take effect upon
the happening of future specified contingencies leaving to some other person or body the
power to determine when the specified contingency has
120
120
People vs. Vera.
arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the Probation Act
contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It
leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the
provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A
provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any
specified contingency. It is bound by no rule,—limited by no principle of expediency announced
by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may
not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason or have any
reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation
officer. This is a matter which rests entirely at Its pleasure. The fact that at some future time—
we cannot say when—the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of probation
officers and thus put the law into operation in the various provinces will not save the statute.
The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the will of the
provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the
ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than the legislature
itself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending
the operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdictions,
constitutions provide that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority.
Thus, section 28, article I of the Constitution of Texas provides that "No power of suspending
laws in this state shall be exercised except by the legislature"; and section 26, article I of the
Constitution of Indiana provides "That the operation of the laws shall never be suspended,
except by authority of the General Assembly." Yet, even provisions of this sort do not confer
absolute power of suspension upon the legislature. While it may be undoubted that the
legislature
121
121
People vs. Vera.
may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to
certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be
general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. In Holden vs. James
([1814], 11 Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was said:
"By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth,
it is declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never
to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such
particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that
declaration of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of
rights passed in the reign of William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an enumeration of the
oppressive acts of James II, tending to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and the
laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a power
of dispensing with and suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent of
parliament. The first article in the claim or declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that
the exercise of such power, by regal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the
tenth section of the same statute it is further declared and enacted, that 'No dispensation by
non obstante of or to any statute, or any part thereof, should be allowed; but the same should
be held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such statute.' There is an
implied reservation of authority in the parliament to exercise the power here mentioned;
because, according to the theory of the English Constitution, 'that absolute despotic power,
which must in all governments reside somewhere,' is intrusted to the parliament: 1 BI. Com.,
160.
"The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign and
absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to
them according to the constitution.
122
122
People vs. Vera.
It is obvious that the exercise of the power in question would be equally oppressive to the
subject, and subversive of his right to protection, 'according to standing" laws,' whether
exercised by one man or by a number of men. It cannot be supposed that the people when
adopting this general principle from the English bill of rights and inserting it in our constitution,
intended to bestow by implication on the general court one of the most odious and oppressive
prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of
civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one
citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like
circumstances; or that any one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from
which all others under like circumstances are exempted,"
To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog
liable to the owner of domestic animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a
knowledge of its vicious disposition, By a provision of the act, power was given to the board of
supervisors to determine whether or not during the current year their county should be
governed by the provisions of the act of which that section constituted a part. It was held that
the legislature could not confer that power. The court observed that it could no more confer
such a power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a county to abolish in such county
the days of grace on commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs.
Henneman [1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for the same
reason in State vs. Field ([1853], 17 Mo., 529; 59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute
formulating a road system contained a provision that "if the county court of any county should
be of opinion that the provisions of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their
discretion, suspend the operation of the same f or any specified length of time, and thereupon
the act should become inoperative in such county for
123
123
People vs. Vera.
the period specified in such order; and thereupon order the roads to be opened and kept in
good repair, under the laws theretofore in force." Said the court: "* * * this act, by its own
provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a former act, and yet it, is left to the county
court to say which act shall be in force in their county. The act does not submit the question to
the county court as an original question, to be decided by that tribunal, whether the act shall
commence its operation within the county; but it became by its own terms a law in every
county not excepted by name in the act. It did not, then, require the county court to do any act
in order to give it effect. But being the law in the county, and having by its provisions
superseded and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the county court is * *
* empowered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of the former act. When
the question is before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law shall be in
force, it is urged before us that the power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative
power, which under our constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body
of men in the state. In the present case, the question is not presented in the abstract, for the
county court of Saline county, after the act had been for several months in force in that county,
did by order suspend its operation; and during that suspension the offense was committed
which is the subject of the present indictment * * *." (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala.,
392; 32 S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to
other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts
in many jurisdictions have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to
the vote of the people. (6 R. C. L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects
purely local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed
under different circumstances. "They
124
124

People vs. Vera.
relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of cattle
in the highways, may be differently regarded in different localities, and they are sustained on
what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not embraced within the
ordinary powers of municipalities to make by-Iaws and ordinances, is nevertheless within the
class of public regulations, in respect to which it is proper that the local judgment should
control." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So that, while we do not deny
the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in
the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon, we believe
that in matters of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as
regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so
unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. True, the statute does not expressly state
that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular
provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the
necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion
to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their respective provinces,
the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of
the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial
boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is
not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E.
Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. 3., p. 786.)
It is conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the
expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution
thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People
vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular
125
125
People vs. Vera.
government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable
that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people and that
these representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language
of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment,
have that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 23; Schneckenburger vs.
Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1317.) But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a
grant and a limitation of power and one of these timehonored limitations is. that, subject to
certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation
of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and
void.
3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates, the provision of our Bill of Rights which
prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws (Art. III, sec. 1, subsec. 1,
Constitution of the Philippines.)
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand
departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions
thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and eminent
domain. The equal protection of the laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the
United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.
S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39
Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every
case can be formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184 U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is
prohibited. But classification on a
126
126
People vs. Vera.
reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. (Finely vs. California
[1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13; Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897],
165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40
Phil., 136.) The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
(Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N.
S.], 489; State vs. Cooley, 56 Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co. [1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55 Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas., 1912C,
160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough [1917], 242, U. 3., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law.
ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Greene [1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed.,
536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs. Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.)
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation
officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act
would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person
otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of
probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be
denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for
all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds
127
127
People vs. Vera.
for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no
inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and
every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that
hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to
avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province,
through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation
officer—which is the situation now—and, also, it' we accept the contention that, for the
purposes of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province and that
the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of a, probation
officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in
the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is
not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that section 11 of
the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or
allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal
protection of the law before courts should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on
that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of
Act No. 4221, permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account
bad. We see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which
permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet,
if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. (By
analogy, Chy Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law, ed., 550; Henderson vs. Mayor
[1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia [1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law ed., 676;
Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed., 567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U.
S., 703; 28
128
128
People vs. Vera.
Law. ed., 1145; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; Williams vs.
Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey vs. Alabama
[1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed., 191; Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs.
Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In other words,
statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation (General Oil Co.
vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat
Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If a law has the effect of denying
the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.
S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94
Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104; 36 A. S. R.,
948; 19 L. R. A,, 858.) Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in
one or several provinces and not be in force in the other provinces, but one province may
appropriate for the salary of a probation officer of a given year—and have probation during
that year—and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation in
subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation
implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is
intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the
guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis
[1897], 165 U. S., 150, 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)
Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United States
([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that there
was a denial of the equal protection of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman
vs. Lewis) decided
129
129
People vs. Vera.
in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the equality clause does not require
territorial uniformity,, It should be observed, however, that this case concerns the right to
preliminary investigations in criminal cases originally granted by General Orders No. 58. No
question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial of the equal protection of
the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of
the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in
the court of first instance of the City of Manila, the defendant * * * shall not be entitled as of
right to a preliminary examination in any case where the prosecuting attorney after a due
investigation of the facts * * * shall have presented an information. against him in proper form
* * *." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the decision indicates that the
investigation by the prosecuting attorney—although not in the form had in the provinces—was
considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of
the city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.
Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to a
situation where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state
from final judgments of any circuit court, except those in certain counties for which counties
the constitution establishes a separate court of appeals called the St. Louis Court of Appeals.
The provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution
that makes the apportionment of territorial jurisdiction.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because
it is also repugnant to the equal-protection clause of our Constitution. Section 11 of the
Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the next inquiry is
whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.
130
130
People vs. Vera.
"In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the
courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a
statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the
constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process." (Riccio
vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams vs.
Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U. S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L.
R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-established
rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language:
" * * * where part Of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order
to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they
could not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N.
E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss.,
739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute,
which carries out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass, 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void
provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in
a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642;
47 Sou., 969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs.
Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 111., 279, 300; 88 N. E.,
821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used
in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and
what remains must express the legislative will, independently of the void part, since
131
131
People vs. Vera.
the court has no power to legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N.
S., 839; Vide, also, U. S. vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust
Co. [1895], 158 U. S., 601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R. C. L., 121.)"
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salaries of probation
officers were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be
valid and may be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the suggestion but for the fact that
said section is, in our opinion, so inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with
the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of
any practical benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended
beneficial results of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful
examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely
upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the
salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals.
Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or
subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces—
and this is the actual situation now—appropriates the necessary fund for the salary of a
probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation
without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without a probation
system.
Section 2 of the Act provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer.
Every probation officer is given, as to the persons placed in probation under his care, the
powers of a police officer.' It is the
132
132
People vs. Vera.
duty of probation officers to see that the conditions which are imposed by the court upon the
probationer under his care are complied with. Among those conditions, the following are
enumerated in section 3 of the Act:
"That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;
"(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;
" (c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;
" (d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or
elsewhere;
"(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer
concerning his conduct or condition;
"(h) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly;
" (g) Shall remain or reside within a specified place or locality;
"(h) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses
caused by his offense;
"(i) Shall support his wife and children;
"(j) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and
"(k) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation,
promulgated in accordance with law."
The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of
probation. Under section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the submission of a report of
the probation officer and appropriate finding of the court that the probationer has complied
with the conditions of probation that probation may be definitely terminated and the
probationer finally discharged from supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is
non-compliance with said conditions, as reported by the probation officer, it may issue a
warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said probationer may be committed
133
133
People vs. Vera.

with or without bail. Upon arraignment and after an opportunity to be heard, the court may
revoke, continue or modify the probation, and if revoked, the court shall order the execution of
the sentence originally imposed. Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation officers: "It shall
be the duty of every probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation under his
supervision a statement of the period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct them
concerning the same; to keep informed concerning their conduct and condition; to aid and
encourage them by friendly advice and admonition, and by such other measures, not
inconsistent with the conditions imposed by the court as may seem most suitable, to bring
about improvement in their conduct and condition; to report in writing to the court having
jurisdiction over.said probationers at least once every two months concerning their conduct
and condition; to keep records of their work; to make such reports as are necessary- for the
information of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and to perform such other
duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation officer and as the court or judge
may direct. The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as parole officers for any
penal or reformatory institution for adults when so requested by the authorities thereof, and,
when designated by the Secretary of Justice, shall act as parole officer of persons released on
parole under Act Numbered Forty-one Hundred and Three, without any additional
compensation,"
It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers may be appointed in the
provinces under section 10 of the Act which provides as follows:
"There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and control,
a Probation Office under the direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by the
Governor-General with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary of four
thousand eight hundred pesos per annum. To carry out the purposes of this Act, there is hereby
appropriated out
134
134
People vs. Vera.
of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand
pesos to be disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is hereby authorized to appoint
probation officers and the administrative personnel of the probation office under civil service
regulations from among those who possess the qualifications, training and experience
prescribed by the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix the compensation of such probation
officers and administrative personnel until such positions shall have been included in the
Appropriation Act."
But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section
are clearly not those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under
section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula, singulis, that the probation officers referred to in
section 10 above-quoted are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central
office known as the Probation Office established in the Department of Justice, under the
supervision of a Chief Probation Officer. When the law provides that "the probation officer"
shall investigate and make reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4) ; that "the probation officer" shall
supervise and visit the probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d) ; that the probationer shall report to
the "probation officer" (sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow "the probation officer" to visit him (sec. 3,
par. d), shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer"
concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court shall notify "the probation
officer" in writing of the period and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the probation
officer who is in charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have
been the intention of the legislature, for instance, to require a probationer in Batanes, to report
to a probation officer in the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit
the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his
conduct, to instruct him concerning the
135
135
People vs. Vera.
conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned to him by law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there
are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course, possible. But this would be arguing on what
the law may be or should be and not on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry.
The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better
otherwise than it is. But much .as has been. said regarding progressive interpretation and
judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law
matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose—not even to save a statute
from the doom of invalidity.
Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular
Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces
defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000,
appropriated "to carry out-the purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for
the salaries of probation offi-cers in' the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to
receive such compensations as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have
been included in the Appropriation Act". It was not the intention of the legislature to empower
the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of probation officers in the provinces or later on to
include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000
appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of the administrative
personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can hardly be said to be
sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial
notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think it is
seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central office,
there can be in
136
136
People vs. Vera.
each provin ce, as intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial
fiscal. If this is correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is
complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in
our case there can be a system of probation in the provinces without probation officers.
Probation as a development of modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws

have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologists call the
"individualization of punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the
criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to
aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may be
reformed and their development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes
advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convict
gives promise of reform. (United States vs. Murray' [1925], 275 U. S., 347, 357, 358; 72 Law. ed.,
309; 312, 313; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The welfare of
society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But
while we believe that probation is commendable as a system and its implantation into the
Philippines should be welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside
because of repugnancy to our fundamental law.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented
by able counsel for both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We
have examined the cases brought to our attention, and others we have been able to reach in
the short time at our command for the study and deliberation of this case. In the examination
of the cases and in the analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt the
line of action which in our opinion, is' supported by better reasoned authorities and is more
conducive to
137
137
People vs. Vera.
the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) Realizing the conflict
of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases brought to our
attention, except where the point or the principle is settled directly or by clear implication by
the more authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. This line of
approach is justified because:
(a.) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United
States and the dual character of the American Government is a situation which does not obtain
in the Philippines;
(b) The. situation of a state of the American Union or of the District of Columbia with reference
to the Federal Government of the. United States is not the situation of a province with respect
to the Insular Government (Art, I, sec. 8, cl. 17, and 10th Amendments Constitution of the
United States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871);
(c) The distinct federal and state judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace the
integrated judicial system of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p.
1317) ;
(d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New
York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law, ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with
* * * new developments of times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co.
vs. Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX,
No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view
existing local conditions and environments.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
VILLA-REAL and ABAD SANTOS, JJ.:
We concur in the result. [People vs. Vera., 65 Phil. 56(1937)]

People vs. Vera., 65 Phil

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

People vs. Vera., 65 Phil

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING

1.PROBATION ; AUTHORITY OF PROBATION COURT TO LOOK INTO CIRCUMSTANCES OF

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937

People vs. Vera.

3. ID.; INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.—If it is ever necessary to make any vehement

4. ID. ; WHEN CONSTITUTIONALITY MAY BE RAISED.—The constitutionality of an act of the

5. ID. ; ID. ; RESORT TO EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES; ADJUDICATED CASES.—The question

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Vera.

8.ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONALITY MUST BE RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY; EXCEPTIONS.

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937

People vs. Vera.

11.ID.; ID. ; WHEN DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY NECESSARY ; WAIVER IF CASE CAN

12.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY.—The

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

13.ID. ; THE JUDICIARY; ITS DUTY TO ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTION.—Under a doctrine

14.ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONALITY;

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937

People vs. Vera.

17.ID.; ID.; COMMUTATION AND AMNESTY UNDER THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION.—Our

18.ID. ; ID.; EXCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE PARDONING POWER.—The benign prerogative of

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Vera.

or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the

19.ID.; PROBATION; POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT A PROBATION LAW.—

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937

People vs. Vera.

23.ID. ; ID. ; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY; HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.—The

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Vera.

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937

People vs. Vera.

28.ID. ; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF A LAW; RELAXATION OF THE DOCTRINE.—

30.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; LOCAL OPTION LAWS ; EIGHT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERN

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Vera.

MENT; SUSPENSION OF OPERATION OF A GENERAL LAW NOT COUNTENANCED.—The

31.ID.; ID. ; ID. ; PROVINCIAL BOARDS EMPOWERED TO SUSPEND OPERATION OF PROBATION

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937

People vs. Vera.

33.ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; CLASS LEGISLATION; CLASSIFICATION ON

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Vera.

36.ID.; PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ; PRESUMPTION AGAINST MUTILATION OF STATUTE.—

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937

People vs. Vera.

40.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS; APPOINTMENT OF PROBATION OFFICERS BY

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Vera.

41.ID. ; PROBATION AS DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PENOLOGY; PROBATION ACT AS

42.ID. ; CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS; RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DECISIONS OF

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937

People vs. Vera.

developments of times and circumstances", fundamental principles should be interpreted

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition,

Solicitor-General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.

No appearance for respondent Judge.

1 35 Off. Gaz., 738. See also Resolutions of December 17, 1935.

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Vera.

The instant proceedings have to do with the application

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937

People vs. Vera.

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED