Int. J. Indian Culture and Business Management, Vol. x, No.

x, xxxx 1

A survey of positive and negative aspects of the

Indian administrative bureaucratic system

Prem Lal Joshi*

Department of Accounting,
University of Bahrain,
Box 32038, Bahrain
E-mail: joshi@buss.uob.bh
*Corresponding author

Rajesh Kumar
Institute of Management Technology,
Dubai, UAE
E-mail: rajesh155_bk@rediffmail.com

Abstract: This online survey, based on a sample size of 340 responses, was
carried out to ascertain public perceptions of the positive and negative aspects
of the Indian administrative bureaucratic system (IAS). Only 13% of the
respondents were satisfied with the system. The most important positive aspect
with respect to the IAS system was the factor of decent living and working
conditions, and the most important negative aspect was the tendency to serve
their political masters rather than the general public. The most important
positive aspect of the lower level bureaucracy was the greater dependence on
the junior bureaucrats by their seniors, and the most critical negative aspect was
that lower level bureaucrats have no sense of wastage of public money. The
more the experience that respondents had with the system, the more negative
their perceptions of the system became. The Indian residents held much
stronger negative views about the IAS system than their non-resident Indian
(NRI) counterparts.

Keywords: India; bureaucracy; IAS system; positive; negative; constraints;

effectiveness; professionalism; lateral system; NRIs; non-resident Indians;
corruption; accountability; transparency; performance appraisal.

Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Joshi, P.L. and Kumar, R.
(xxxx) ‘A survey of positive and negative aspects of the Indian administrative
bureaucratic system’, Int. J. Indian Culture and Business Management, Vol. x,
No. x, pp.xx–xx.

Biographical notes: Prem Lal Joshi is a Senior Professor at the University of

Bahrain. He has taught in India, Kenya, Turkey and Bahrain. He has presented
papers in more than 33 international conferences and has published over 60
research papers in leading international and regional journals. He has also
conducted several researches in interdisciplinary areas. He has authored five
books. He is also the Editor-in-Chief of two international journals in
accounting. He is on the Editorial Board of several journals.

Rajesh Kumar is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the Institute of

Management Technology, Dubai. He has received his PhD from the Indian
Institute of Technology (IIT Kharagpur). His empirical research papers have

Copyright © 20xx Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.

2 Joshi and R. Kumar

appeared in several refereed journals like Afro Asian Journal of Finance and
Accounting, Journal of Applied Business and Economics, IIMA Vikalpa, IIMB
Management Review, IIMC Decision. He has authored two books including a
text book on Mergers and Acquisitions published by McGraw-Hill Higher
Education.

1 Introduction

A common explanation of bureaucracy is the ‘combined organisational structure,

procedures, protocols and set of regulations in place to manage activity in large
organisations’. It is the system of an administration wherein there is a specialisation of
functions, objective qualifications for office, action according to the adherence to fixed
rules and a hierarchy of authority and delegated power. However, it is believed that a
bureaucracy traditionally does not create policy but, rather, enacts it.
The Bureaucracy Encyclopaedia provides information on the development of early
civilisations of Mesopotamia, Egypt, China and India that were organised hierarchically,
thus forming the bureaucratic tradition of government. As early as the Han Dynasty (206
BCE–220 CE), Chinese bureaucracy was taking on the form of a merit-based, centralised
administrative apparatus of the state. Other early civilisations, including the Egyptians
and the Greeks, included active administrative arms. The middle ages saw the expansion
of ecclesiastic bureaucracy to implement policies and maintain the hierarchy of the
Catholic Church.
Later on, the German sociologist Max Weber saw the growth of bureaucracy in
industrial societies as an inevitable reflection of the underlying shift from traditional
authority to a rational and legal system of organisation and control. On the other hand,
during 1980s, the new model of public management was advocated that involved the use
of private sector innovation, resources and organisational ideas to improve the public
sector. For example, during the Clinton Administration (1992–2000), new public
management became prevalent throughout US bureaucracy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Public_administration).
During 1990s, digital era governance model came into existence that focused on
themes of reintegrating government responsibilities, digitalisation, etc. (e.g. see Dunleavy
et al., 2006). Another public service model also came into existence termed New Public
Governance with features of centralisation of power, an increased number, role and
influence of partisan – political staff under the assumption that the public service is
promiscuously partisan for the government of the day (e.g. see Osborne and
Gaebler, 1993).
Contemporary researchers have highlighted the problems of bureaucracy, such as its
inflexibility and rigid adherence to rules, etc. The complex task of managing and
coordinating public services is vulnerable to corruption, inefficiency and inflexibility. For
example, amid global economic troubles, corruption has been on rise. Transparency
International’s latest corruption index shows that 75 of 180 countries surveyed scored
below 3 on a 10 point scale of governmental honesty. Corruption is a fixture in countries
like Egypt, India, Indonesia, Morocco and Pakistan, where 60% of executives surveyed
reported having been solicited for a bribe.
 A survey of positive and negative aspects 3

Similarly, the 2009 Global Corruption Barometer by Transparency International has

rated the political parties and civil services as the most corrupt institutions in the world.
The survey points out that the biggest frustration for potential investors in India is the
bureaucracy. As per the World Bank, it can take on an average 30 days to start a new
business, 45 days to register a property, 224 days to obtain the necessary licences and
permits to build a warehouse and 10 years to revolve a bankruptcy.1
Since the Indian bureaucratic system has been labelled with the above features,
therefore this study focuses on investigating the positive and negative aspects of Indian
administrative bureaucratic system.

2 Literature review

In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ discussion of historical materialism, the historical
origin of bureaucracy is to be found in four sources: religion, the formation of the state,
commerce and technology. In their theory, bureaucracy rarely creates new wealth by
itself, but rather controls, coordinates and governs the production, distribution and
consumption of wealth.
According to Max Weber, the attributes of modern bureaucracy include its
impersonality, concentration of the means of administration, a levelling effect on social
and economic differences and implementation of a system of authority that is practically
indestructible. Weber’s analysis concerns:
• the historical and administrative reasons for the process of bureaucratisation
(especially in the Western civilisation)
• the impact of the rule of law upon the functioning of bureaucratic organisations
• the typical personal orientations and occupational positions of bureaucratic officials
as a status group
• the most important attributes and consequences of bureaucracy in the modern world.
Weber also stated that real bureaucracy will be less optimal and effective than his ideal
model. Each of Weber’s seven principles can degenerate.
• competences can be unclear and used contrary to the spirit of the law; sometimes a
decision itself may be considered more important than its effect
• nepotism, corruption, political infighting and other degenerations can counter the
rule of impersonality, and can create a recruitment and promotion system based not
on meritocracy but rather on oligarchy.
Weber, who did pioneering work related to bureaucracy, firmly believed in the
superiority of bureaucracy to any other organisational form. He suggested that
bureaucracy and formalisation were the best methods of creating and maintaining a viable
political structure independent of its leadership. He is also well known for his critical
study of the bureaucratisation of society, the rational ways in which formal social
organisations apply the ideal characteristics of a bureaucracy. It was Weber who began
the studies of bureaucracy and whose works led to the popularisation of this term.
4 Joshi and R. Kumar

Weber’s bureaucracy studies also led him to his analysis – correct, as it would turn
out, after Stalin’s takeover – that socialism in Russia would lead to over-
bureaucratisation rather than to the ‘withering away of the state’, as Karl Marx had
predicted would happen in communist society.2
The phenomenon of a catch-22 situation arises as bureaucracy creates more and more
rules and procedures, their complexity increases and coordination diminishes, facilitating
creation of contradictory and recursive rules, as described by the saying ‘the bureaucracy
is expanding to meet the needs of the expanding bureaucracy’.
There is a linkage between the transparency and probity of the political leaders as
well as the bureaucrats of a nation and its level of development. Thus, any effort aimed at
accelerating the pace of development in any country must take into consideration the
actors of the system.
Bureaucratic corruption is linked with the activities of bureaucrats. The concept has
undergone transformation from being the practice of buying favour from bureaucrats who
formulate and implement government’s economic and political policies to the violation of
public duty by bureaucrats or public officials. Various explanations have been given for
the widespread pervasiveness of bureaucratic corruption. One school of opinion suggests
that at times bureaucracy outgrows its organisational structure, and as such becomes
dehumanised and monolithic. This stage is characterised by undefined structure, lack of
social values and absence of rules and procedures. In this scenario, corruption is likely to
evolve, persist and spread. Bureaucratic corruption has the capacity to undermine
development.
Crozier (1964, p.3) examined bureaucracy as a form of organisation that evokes
“...the slowness, the ponderousness, the routine, the complication of procedures and the
maladapted responses of the bureaucratic organization to the needs which they should
satisfy”. He also stated that “...the bureaucratic system of organization is primarily
characterized by the existence of a series of relatively stable vicious circles that stem
from centralization and impersonality”.
The relationships between the legislatures, the interest groups, bureaucrats and the
general public all have an effect on each other. Without one of these pieces the entire
structure would completely change. The public votes in the legislatures and the interest
groups provide information, but the legislature and bureaucrats also have an effect on the
interest groups and the public. All parts of the system are codependent on each other.
The bureau-shaping model put forward by Dunleavy (1991) argues that rational
bureaucrats should only maximise the part of their budget that they spend on their own
agency’s operations or give to contractors or powerful interest groups (that are able to
organise a flow-back of benefits to senior officials). For instance, rational officials will
get no benefit from paying out larger welfare cheques to millions of poor people, because
the bureaucrats’ own utilities are not improved. Consequently, bureaucracies are expected
to significantly maximise budgets in areas like police forces and defence, but not in areas
like welfare spending.
Chowdhury’s (2006) model of rent-seeking bureaucracy captures the case of
administrative corruption, whereby public money is directly expropriated by public
servants in general. In particular, he highlights the impact of the low-level civil servants
whose rent-seeking behaviour pushes up the cost of production of public goods.
Table 1 provides a summary of prior literature review.
 A survey of positive and negative aspects 5

Table 1 Summary of selected studies

Study Major highlights of the study
Weber (1947) Weber suggests that bureaucracy and formalisation were the best methods
of creating and maintaining a viable political structure independent of its
leadership. His study gives general explanations regarding how
bureaucratic institutions should be designed, including the need for a
division of labour, career personnel with specialised training and
expertise and hierarchical formal organisational structures that do not
duplicate other administrative units
Derakhsahn and Fatehi This study suggests that rigidity of bureaucracy would be a substitute for
(1985) fragile leadership
Wilson (1987) This study argues for an administrative apparatus that is devoid of politics
and meddling
Kass (1990) A public steward must be committed to serving the public interest and
must avoid using professional authority for personal gain
Eisner (1992) and These studies emphasise the importance of professional expertise in
Khademian (1995) policy administration
Osborne and Gaebler The authors in their book suggest that in spite of inefficient bureaucracy,
(1993) government can tap the power of entrepreneurial process and the force of
free market
Mandel (1992) A Marxist theory of bureaucracy is suggested in reference to power and
money
Crewson (1997) This study shows higher levels of organisational commitment
Rainey (1997) Public employees are more likely to possess altruistic attitudes than
private employees
Brewer and Selden Those with high levels of public service motivation are more willing to
(1998) engage in whistle-blowing to protect the public interest
Crewson (1997), Frank Public employees place a higher value on intrinsic rewards like the
and Lewis (2004), importance of meaningful work and service to society, than on extrinsic
Houston (2000) and rewards like higher pay and promotion
Jurkiewicz et al. (1998)
Conway (2000) and Bureaucrats possess a higher sense of civic duty and more strongly
Blair and Garand (1995) support democratic values
Perry (2000) Public organisations, by virtue of their missions, provide individuals a
greater opportunity to engage in public service
Houston et al. (2001) The vast majority of respondents indicate that a commitment to serve the
people is at least ‘somewhat’ characteristic of government administrators.
About 31% of these respondents think that ‘hardly anyone’ or only ‘a
small number of people’ in the public service are involved in corruption.
Nearly the same amount (29.6%) view corruption to be widespread
(either ‘a lot of people’ or ‘almost everyone’). While government
administrators are generally perceived to be somewhat committed to
serve the public interest, corruption is thought to be fairly widespread
Rainey and Bozeman Public employees, particularly administrators, place a high degree of
(2000) and Goodsell value on public service, self-sacrifice, responsibility, ethics, integrity and
(2004) the worth of their mission to the public good
Meier and Krause Explained the modern advent of the scientific study of bureaucracy as
(2004) principle – agent theory
Olsen (2005) This study finds that bureaucratic organisation is part of a repertoire of
overlapping, supplementary and competing forms coexisting in
contemporary democracies, and so are market organisation and network
organisation
Höpfl (2006) This paper shows that hierarchy cannot be eliminated from complex
organisations, and bureaucracy can be retheorised to include any non-
contradictory attributes
6 Joshi and R. Kumar

Table 1 Summary of selected studies (continued)

Study Major highlights of the study

Houston (2006) and Public servants ‘receive internal satisfaction through making a contribution to
Perry (1996) society’ and are ‘characterised by an ethic built on benevolence, a life in
service to others and a desire to affect the community’
Perry (2007) Public professional life ‘needs to be restructured in ways that suffuse
technical competence with civic awareness and purpose
Kumar (2007) This paper concludes that in the Indian bureaucracy, no differential
hierarchical tendencies exist between younger employees who joined the
bureaucracy less than two years ago, and older employees who joined the
bureaucracy roughly 25 years ago. Employees in Indian bureaucracy
continue to be dependent on their superiors and continue to be conscious of
the status of their superiors
Petukhov (2007) This paper discusses a survey that focuses on public’s opinion about Russian
bureaucracy. The public has negative opinions about bureaucracy due to the
problems relating to its ineffectiveness and the prevalent corruption of the
economic and political elite. They see bureaucracy as one of the triads in the
ruling authority aside from the president and his government and the rich
businessmen. However, the public is not so worried about the ineffectiveness
of bureaucracy, but rather its total corruption that brings the country to higher
economic inequality
Reenock and Brian This study develops an information exchange theory that portrays the impact
(2008) of agency design choices on group-reported access as a function of the level
of design-induced political insulation and the quality of the information
offered by a given bureaucratic group
Feeney and DeHart This paper tests the relationship between different forms of bureaucratic
(2009) control (formalisation, red tape and centralisation) and reported employee
perceptions and behaviour in local governments. Different types of
bureaucratic control are related to distinct employee responses, and
sometimes these responses are the very behaviours that reinventionists seek
to trigger by reducing bureaucracy
Iocabuta and Baciu The bureaucrats of the public sector do not operate for free – there are such
(2009) things as lack of efficiency, poor management, bureaucratic inertia and
corruption. The paper also deals with issues related to anticorruption strategy
in Romania
Araujo and Joaquim It examines the influence of New Public Management ideas in Portuguese
(2009) administrative reform and discusses improvements in the way public services
are implementing change, using new managerial tools in Portugal: the
activity plan (AP) and the activity report (AR)
Winchell (2009) This article focuses on the different method to assess the opportunities and
barriers that will affect change in the federal government organisation in the
USA It has been suggested that the internal organisation needs to evaluate its
ability to absorb changes based on the content of its policy guidelines and
competencies of its employees
Persson and Neither bureaucracy nor NPM alone supplies the core values for e-
Goldkhul (2010) government as a practical management strategy. This paper concludes with a
dialectical structure, where bureaucracy is the thesis, NPM the antithesis and
e-government the practical synthesis
Farazmand (2010) This article addresses the relationship between bureaucracy and democracy,
bureaucratic politics and democratic politics. It is hypocrisy to speak of
functioning democracy without a balanced professional bureaucracy
Rosca and This article discusses the background of the organisational processes of
Moldovenau (2010) public administration, which is organisational culture and bureaucracy,
elements that tend to an entity
 A survey of positive and negative aspects 7

3 Public perception of Indian bureaucracy

A study done by Transparency International in India in 2005 found that more than 50%
of the people had first-hand experience of paying a bribe or using influence to get a job
done in a public office.3 Transparency International estimates that Indian truckers pay
something in the neighbourhood of $5 billion annually in bribes to keep freight flowing.
The World Economic Forum’s India Competitiveness Review 2009 reports that
‘inadequate supply of infrastructure’ and ‘inefficient government bureaucracy’ account
for 40% of ‘the most problematic factors for doing business in India’ compared with 11%
for ‘corruption’. The survey by the Hong Kong-based Economic and Political Risk
Consultancy (PERC report, 2009) reported that Indian bureaucracy is the least efficient in
Asia. Further, the report stated that Indian bureaucracy is a power centre in its own right
at both the national and state levels, and its employees are extremely resistant to
reforms that affect them or the way they go about their duties. A survey of values carried
by the Management Centre of Human Values, IIM. Calcutta, in 1994 found that the
relationships among superiors and subordinates are worse in the civil service
(Bhattacharya, 2004).
The Right to Information Act (2005) and equivalent acts in the Indian states, which
require government officials to furnish information requested by citizens or face punitive
action, computerisation of services and various central and state government acts that
established vigilance commissions have considerably reduced corruption or at least have
opened up avenues to redress grievances. The 2006 report by Transparency International
puts India in 70th place and states that significant improvements have been made by India
in reducing corruption.
India is still one of the most difficult places for doing business, according to World
Bank’s ‘Doing Business Survey, 2010’, which places India at the rank of 133 out of 183
economies. The survey conducted by babusofindia.com in June 2010 reveals that the
perception about Indian bureaucrats as a force of stumbling block rather than facilitators
has not really changed much despite a number of initiatives being taken to make Indian
bureaucracy as effective as that of Singapore or Australia. About 33% of respondents
suggested that the system is worst while 32% opined that system is improving.
The Second Administrative Reforms Commission’s 12th report states that
bureaucracy in India is generally perceived to be ‘unresponsive, insensitive and corrupt’,
and a common complaint against it pertains to excessive red tape. The report further
states ‘the system often suffers from problems of excessive centralisation and policies,
and action plans are far removed from the needs of the citizens. This results in a
mismatch between what is required and what is being provided’. The end result is that
officers perceive themselves as dispensing favours to citizens rather than serving them,
and given the abject poverty and illiteracy, a culture of exaggerated deference to authority
has become the norm. Over the last decade, liberalisation has improved the climate for
investment in India, but it is often said that the biggest frustration for potential investors
in India is the bureaucracy.

4 Highlights of the study on the Indian bureaucratic system

The present Indian bureaucratic system is an arm of the government. It is technically

considered as a branch of the executive. However, the legislature also has some control
8 Joshi and R. Kumar

over its functioning. Administrative bureaucracy in India is the by-product of two major
sets of influences: British tradition of the past and the democratic welfare state of the
present. It represents the features of a legacy of the British era, a conservative steel
framework and a ‘touch me not’ attitude. As a result, the Indian bureaucratic system has
been often subjected to criticism that dysfunctionality has become the norm. However, it
is argued that the same system has stood the test of time and survived for the last 60
years. Under the same system, India has achieved the second highest economic growth
rate in the world, as of now.

4.1 Methodology
In order to ascertain the public thinking and gauge their assessment, a survey was carried
out to analyse the public perceptions of the positive and negative aspects of the Indian
administrative bureaucratic system using a set of scorecards designed to reflect some
strengths and weaknesses of the system. People from various walks of life, such as retired
persons, government servants, business owners, corporate executives, doctors, engineers,
social workers, journalists, academicians and students, took part in a three-month online
survey. This survey, perhaps the first of its kind, was conducted using a judgemental
sampling technique, because the population is infinite in such sampling. E-mails were
sent to about 2,500 individuals of IAS associations, teachers’ associations, medical
associations, retired officers’ associations, transparency associations, women’s
associations, journalists’ associations, government employees’ associations, engineers’
associations, NGOs, entrepreneur associations, MBA associations, management
associations, research associations, and NRIs associations/clubs in the Middle East, USA,
UK, Canada, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Kenya and South Africa, with a request to
participate. The objective, aim and intention of the survey were explained to them.
A total of 340 individuals responded to our online questionnaire, making a 13.6%
response rate. The format of the survey instrument and scorecards used in the
questionnaire was reviewed by several experts on the subject. The results were
statistically tested to understand significant differences in parameters. The research
instrument was put online in www.surveymethods.com.

4.2 Highlights of the findings

4.2.1 Composition of the sample
Of the respondents, 84% were resident Indian nationals and the rest were non-resident
Indians (NRIs) from 13 countries. One of the striking features of the survey is that, about
59% of the respondents belonged to the age group, above 50 years, who could better
recall their experiences with the system than their younger counterparts, and this
improved the validity of feedback from the survey.
People in the 20–30 age group constituted approximately 17% of the total
respondents. Retired persons constituted over 30% and government servants 9%. Over
63% of the respondents had postgraduate qualifications and 15% had terminal degrees
(PhDs).
About 93% of the survey respondents stated that they had dealt with the government
system for various services, e.g. passport, marriage certificate, death certificate, police
services and other miscellaneous services. About 46% of those respondents were not
satisfied with the services provided to them by the system, and more than 25% had bad
 A survey of positive and negative aspects 9

experiences with the system. Only 13.2% considered the system to be satisfactory.
Approximately 98% had an interest in the improvement of the Indian administrative
bureaucratic system.
The survey was divided into two parts: the IAS system (group A civil system) and the
lower-level bureaucratic system.

4.2.2 Findings about the IAS system (group A civil system)

Strengths and positive aspects: one of the highlights of the survey was that about 79% of
respondents believe that the IAS system has the power to take decisions that directly
affect people. Approximately 81% of the respondents felt that ‘there exist decent living
and working conditions for the IAS officers’. Similarly, over 72% of the respondents felt
that there is enough scope for promotion and new challenges for the profession. As high
as 67.4% of the participants in the survey believe that the system is still capable of
attracting good talent into the cadre through its strong recruitment process. Over 68%
state that there is an aura in the public about the service. These positive points generally
attract the best talent of the country into the IAS services.
Weaknesses and negative aspects: an overwhelming 93.5% of those surveyed were of the
opinion that, in the IAS system, ‘the tendency is to serve their political masters more than
the public’, which perhaps indicates that they are more the servants of politicians and less
the servants of the public. In the public perception, this sounds like some kind of unholy
nexus between the two, which may be susceptible to the misuse of the system, as the
bureaucrats may dutifully protect the interests of politicians. This finding really suggests
a need for policy makers and administrative reformers to take a close look at this issue.
Similarly, approximately 92% of the respondents were of the view that the ‘over-insured
job security has made the IAS officers indolent and supremely arrogant’. In spite of this,
the IAS officers are so entrenched that they advance smoothly to senior positions.
Furthermore, 89% of the respondents held the view that the ‘reward system is basically
skewed towards the corrupt officers who get prime postings while the honest officers
often get punishment transfers’. About 85% of the participants in the survey agreed that
the IAS system ‘encourages only generalists and not management specialists’. This
finding calls for the introduction of a lateral recruitment process into the system in order
to enhance professionalism and make it more efficient and effective. It is widely held that
there are three types of activity involved in the system:
1 transaction analysis
2 strategic analysis
3 strategic planning.
However, in order to enhance the latter two aspects, lateral entry into the system is
essential, particularly when recruiting officers into the technical departments of the
government.
Main constraints: it is often said that the IAS system is not designed to cope up with the
political, economic and social transformations taking place. The IAS officers have to
know the wishes of their political masters even if it is against the interest of the people.
Officers who protest are either transferred or have obstructions in their career growth.
Sankar (1997) argues that the IAS system is said to be based on a centralised concept
taken at the top percolate down through various levels to the grassroots. In this system,
10 Joshi and R. Kumar

planning and development decisions are made at the top level by a few people with
unfamiliar with ground realities. Then, these make insensitive to aspirations, constraints
and needs of local people.
Over 90% of the survey respondents felt that political pressure is the major constraint of
the civil service system. Interestingly, 89% of the respondents also hold the view that
there is ‘no appreciation of the citizen’s viewpoint, and public relations are aimed at mere
propaganda rather than establishing rapport with the community’.

4.2.3 Lower-level bureaucratic system

Strengths and positive aspects: a vast majority of the participants (77%) believed that one
of the positive aspects with respect to the lower-level bureaucratic system is ‘excessive
dependence of senior officers on the junior level bureaucrats’. Approximately 62% of
those surveyed agreed that the lower-level bureaucratic system constitutes ‘an integrated
and inseparable part of the governing system’. Furthermore, 47.6% considered ‘proper
documentation and creating memory banks of decisions’ as one of the positive aspects of
the system.
Weaknesses and negative aspects: a vast majority (93%) of those surveyed felt that the
lower-level bureaucrats had ‘no sense of proper utilisation of public money, and the work
is not done in an efficient and timely manner’. This is a serious issue and a clear
indication of the existence of a cult for wasteful expenditure and non-existence of cost
consciousness in the system. Almost 92% of respondents also agreed that the lower
bureaucratic level in India is ‘insensitive and hostile in attitude while serving the poorest
sections of society’. Approximately 91% of the respondents also believed that the
‘system encourages a culture of connections (Vasta or Jaan Pehchaan culture)’.
Another key weakness of the lower bureaucracy highlighted by 91% of the respondents is
that ‘promotions are based on seniority rather than merit and there is a dearth of
performance-oriented motivations or even incentives’.
Main constraints: it is often said that the lower-level bureaucratic system suffers from
loss of initiative, corruption, arbitrary/blatant use of authority, while they are on field
duty and dealing directly with common men.
Similarly, it is also argued that political interference is often concerned with expediting
schemes of welfare and development and breaking rigidity of administration. Later on,
interference became more an aspect of power politics. Politicians wanted the help of
administrators to accede to the particularistic nature of articulation of citizen’s interest.
About 79% of the respondents cited ‘political intervention’ as one of the major
constraints with respect to the lower-level bureaucracy, and 70% cited ‘fewer
opportunities for professional growth’ as another.

5 Analysis and interpretations of survey-based public perceptions

Over 54% of the total respondents felt that the system is a complete failure. A reasonable
majority (54%) held the view that there can be an alternative to the present system and
only about 16% said ‘no’.
The respondents were concerned with the degree and extent of corruption prevailing
in the system. It was suggested that there should be an effective vigilance mechanism to
 A survey of positive and negative aspects 11

root out the practice of corruption. A strong judicial system is required to meet the
challenges. Promotions and transfers ought to be outside the powers and purview of
politicians. Transfers should take place invariably intra-ministry/department and not
inter-ministry/department.
Many of the respondents suggested that lateral entry into the system would bring in
more professionalism. It was suggested that lateral recruitment would strengthen the
system with specialists. Entry into the IAS should be lateral from all other Indian
services, including defence cadres, on merit through competition. Some even suggested
that civil service personnel should have an army training background before they are
inducted into the civil administration. This would instil a greater sense of discipline,
commitment, honesty and patriotism.
There were also suggestions for transparency in public dealings and incorporation of
public sentiments into the system.
Respondents also suggested the need for administrative reforms. There is an urgent
need to install, implement, monitor and institutionalise systems, with increased use and
due integration of technology to provide transparency, accountability and autonomy.
Respondents highlighted measures like right to information (RTI) implementation in this
context. The importance of e-governance was also emphasised by many respondents.
There were also suggestions to free the administration from the influence of politicians.
Some respondents suggested that selection, training, performance appraisal,
promotion and punitive measures should be brought under the purview of a special
authority at the centre and state levels. There were suggestions calling for clear criteria
for performance-based promotion, on the basis of merit and not seniority. Incentives must
be linked to performance. Some suggested that promotions should be based on
competitive exams and services based on contracts for every two years. Furthermore,
there should be scope for the public to raise disputes over the appraisal of the
performance of the civil servants, which should be settled by an independent body and
not by government departments.
There were also suggestions for the introduction of ethics committees into the system.
At the top level, a unified civil service is required. Some also highlighted the need for
stringent checks at lower levels of the system for better handling of corruption-related
issues. Other suggestions included zero tolerance towards political interference and a
two-tier pay structure. One widely held view that emerged was that, at the higher levels,
the need is for professionals rather than administrators.

6 Results of the statistical analysis

6.1 Analysis of the results for the IAS system

Tables 2 and 3 summarise the respondents’ views of the positive and negative aspects,
respectively, of the IAS system.
The descriptive statistical analysis reveals that the most important positive aspect
with respect to the IAS system, as perceived by the respondents, was the factor of decent
living and working conditions. The mean value was 4.03 with a standard deviation of
0.892. Another attractive factor of the system was the power to take decisions. The scope
for promotion and challenges and aura in public services were also significantly
important aspects, based on the analysis of the descriptive statistics.
12 Joshi and R. Kumar

Table 2 Positive aspects of the IAS system

Mean
Parameters N Range Min Max Statistic SE SD
Decent working and living conditions 340 4 1 5 4.03 0.048 0.892
Power to take decisions that can directly affect 340 4 1 5 4.01 0.057 1.057
people
Scope for promotion and new challenges 340 4 1 5 3.89 0.053 0.982
Aura in the public about service 340 4 1 5 3.71 0.057 1.04
Attracting good talent into the cadre through 340 4 1 5 3.67 0.064 1.177
strong recruitment process
At entry level, bulk of entrants come with lot of 340 4 1 5 3.55 0.058 1.078
idealism and wanting to do public good and take
up challenging work
Wide scope for knowledge enhancement, skill- 340 4 1 5 3.43 0.065 1.199
building and innovation
Despite a reservation policy, this system 340 4 1 5 3.12 0.064 1.17
encourages territorial and national integration
Feel-good factor that you are doing public service 340 4 1 5
High level of flexibility and diversity that sustains 340 4 1 5 3.10 0.06 1.11
an interest in the work

Table 3 Negative aspects of the IAS system

Mean
Parameters N Range Min Max Statistic SE SD
Tendency to serve more their political masters and 340 4 1 5 4.59 0.038 0.704
less the public
The over-insured job security leads IAS officers to 340 4 1 5 4.54 0.037 0.688
be permanent fixtures in the system, which was
originally intended to be a source of continuity
The reward system is skewed towards corrupt 340 4 1 5 4.45 0.046 0.852
officers who get prime postings while honest
officers are shunted off to other postings
The system encourages only generalists and not 340 4 1 5 4.33 0.047 0.861
specialists. Specialists and experts are essential for
rapid growth of the country
Encourages a rigid bureaucracy with an exclusive 340 4 1 5 4.29 0.043 .801
process of decision-making in an overly
centralised system
The system encourages slow implementation of 340 4 1 5 4.21 0.049 0.904
laws and decisions
Working under political pressure often leads to 340 4 1 5 4.20 0.047 0.870
decisions based on management by crisis
The system has immense care for minute details 340 4 1 5 4.14 0.055 1.022
and formalities, which often leads to excessive
delays unless corrupt methods may be used
The lack of concern for responsiveness, 340 4 1 5 4.08 0.052 0.950
commitment, awareness, accountability and
transparency, along with the lack of
professionalism and cost consciousness
Lack of genuine power to deal with staff who 340 4 1 5 3.70 0.065 1.202
delay files
 A survey of positive and negative aspects 13

The analysis reveals that the most important negative aspect of the IAS system as
perceived by the respondents was the tendency to serve more their political masters and
less the public. The mean value was 4.59 with a standard deviation of 0.704. The other
important parameters, which had mean values of 4.54, 4.45 and 4.33, respectively, were
1 the over-insured job security leads to IAS officers to be permanent fixtures
2 the reward system is skewed towards corrupt officers who get prime postings
3 the IAS system encourages only generalists and not specialists.
On a comparative basis, the mean values of the negative aspects were higher than those
of the positive aspects. The highest positive aspect parameters had mean values of 4.03
and 4.01 and the rest of them were below 4. The highest negative aspect parameters had
values of 4.59 and 4.54, with others having a value above 4 except for the last parameter.
This signifies the extreme opinions held by participants with regard to the negative
aspects of the IAS system.

6.2 Analysis of the results for the lower-level bureaucracy

Tables 4 and 5 summarise the respondents’ views of the positive and negative aspects,
respectively, of the lower-level bureaucracy.
Table 4 Positive aspects of the lower-level bureaucracy

Mean
Parameters N Range Min Max Statistic SE SD
Greater dependence on them by seniors 340 4 1 5 3.91 0.049 0.906
An integrated and inseparable arm of the 340 4 1 5 3.48 0.055 1.017
governing system
Knowledge preservation 340 4 1 5 3.20 0.051 0.944
Proper documentation and creating memory 340 4 1 5 3.20 0.058 1.064
banks of decisions
They are the handymen in explaining and 340 4 1 5 2.88 0.065 1.203
making the public aware of government rules
and procedures
Discipline both top down and bottom up 340 4 1 5 2.81 0.064 1.189
Faith in the system 340 4 1 5 2.76 0.059 1.08
Loyalty to the system 340 4 1 5 2.66 0.065 1.20
Exceptional skills in the case of emergency 340 4 1 5 2.60 0.062 1.149
Politeness (compared with IAS system) in 340 4 1 5 2.39 0.066 1.22
dealing with public as they are paid from public
money and more often they are first channel
who deal with public
14 Joshi and R. Kumar

Table 5 Negative aspects of lower-level bureaucracy

Mean
Parameters N Range Min Max Statistic SE SD
No sense of wastage of public money when 340 4 1 5 4.55 0.039 0.725
things are not done efficiently and in timely
manner
Lack of concern, less motivation, 340 4 1 5 4.48 0.041 0.750
insensitivity and even hostility in serving the
poorer sections of society
The system encourages a culture of 340 4 1 5 4.46 0.040 0.730
connections (vasta or jaan pehchaan culture)
rather than full compliance with rules
Promotions based on seniority rather than 340 4 1 5 4.41 0.041 0.749
merit and also lack of performance-oriented
incentives
Secrecy, cumbersome procedures and 340 4 1 5 4.40 0.039 0.728
unnecessary controls lead to incorrect
interpretation and misuse of rules
Extremely rigid and mechanical procedures, 340 4 1 5 4.39 0.041 0.750
which lead to obsession with rules rather than
concern for output
An abysmal record of serving the public 340 4 1 5 4.31 0.043 0.792
Lack of modernisation 340 4 1 5 4.03 0.049 0.904
No power to take any decision, which often 340 4 1 5 3.89 0.056 1.03
leads to low job satisfaction
Low salary compared with officials, which 340 4 1 5 3.47 0.067 1.23
also leads to low job satisfaction

The most important parameter that emerged with respect to positive aspects of the lower
bureaucracy was the greater dependence on the lower bureaucrats by their seniors. The
respondents also felt that lower bureaucrats are an integrated and inseparable arm of the
governing system.
The statistical comparison between the positive aspects of both higher and lower
bureaucracy reveals that the mean values were higher for the IAS system than for the
lower bureaucracy. The highest mean value for IAS system was 4.03, whereas for the
lower bureaucracy it was 3.91.
Respondents very strongly felt that lower bureaucrats had no sense of wastage of
public money. They are also insensitive to the concerns of the poorer sections of society.
In the case of lower bureaucracy also, the respondents had extreme views on the negative
aspects compared with the positive aspects.

6.3 Constraints on the system

Tables 6 and 7 summarise the respondents’ views of the constraints on the IAS system
and the lower-level bureaucracy, respectively.
 A survey of positive and negative aspects 15

Table 6 Constraints on the IAS system

Mean
Parameters N Range Min Max Statistic SE SD
There is no appreciation of the 340 4 1 5 4.39 0.041 0.750
citizen’s viewpoint and public
relations are aimed at propaganda
than establishing rapport with
community
Political pressure 340 4 1 5 4.39 0.046 0.847
Collective accountability 340 4 1 5 3.89 0.060 1.10
Frequent transfers 340 4 1 5 3.69 0.055 1.009
Budgetary constraints 340 4 1 5 3.03 0.066 1.218

Table 7 Constraints on the lower-level bureaucracy

Mean
Parameters N Range Min Max Statistic SE SD
Political intervention 340 4 1 5 4.13 0.054 0.992
Fewer rewards for good work 340 4 1 5 3.77 0.060 1.105
Fewer opportunities for 340 4 1 5 3.71 0.057 1.056
professional growth
Lack of coordination and 340 4 1 5 3.64 0.058 1.07
communication
Poor adaptability to cope with 340 4 1 5 3.59 0.061 1.118
change

The mean values for the five major constraints on the IAS system were higher than 3.
The parameter of ‘no appreciation of the citizen’s viewpoint’ was found to be the main
constraint, with a mean value of 4.39.
Political intervention and fewer rewards appeared as the major constraints on the
lower-level system with mean values of 4.13 and 3.77, respectively. Fewer opportunities
for professional growth were another constraint.

6.4 Differences in the perceptions of respondents by profession

Table 8 shows the results of the analysis of how differences in profession affect
respondents’ perceptions of the IAS system and the lower-level bureaucracy. The
analysis is divided into positive aspects, negative aspects and constraints. The analysis
with respect to profession was carried out by segregating, the sample was segregated into
professional working group (G1) and retired group (G2). The symbols *, ** and ***
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, levels, respectively.
16 Joshi and R. Kumar

Table 8 Differences in the perceptions of respondents by profession

By profession
t–Test
G1 G2 (two tailed)
Statements mean mean df = 337
Positive aspects of IAS system
Attracting good talent into the cadre through strong recruitment process 3.62 3.68 −0.473
(IASP1)
Aura in the public about service (IASP2) 3.64 3.74 −0.853
Decent working and living conditions (IASP3) 4.20 3.96 (2.23)*
At entry level, bulk of entrants come with lot of idealism and wanting to 3.63 3.52 0.848
do public good and take up challenging work (IASP4)
High level of flexibility and diversity that sustains an interest in the 3.00 3.14 −1.08
work (IASP5)
Huge scope for knowledge enhancement, skill-building and innovation 3.38 3.46 −0.515
(IASP6)
Scope of promotion and new challenges (IASP7) 4.19 3.76 (3.69)***
Power to take decisions that can directly affect people (IASP8) 4.02 4.00 0.156
Despite a reservation policy, this system encourages territorial and 2.96 3.18 −1.59
national integration (IASP9)
Feel-good factor that you are doing public service (IASP10) 2.83 3.24 −(2.85)***
Negative aspects of IAS system
Lack of concern for responsiveness, commitment, awareness, 3.96 4.12 −1.438
accountability and transparency along with the lack of professionalism
and cost consciousness (IASN1)
Tendency to serve more their political masters and less the public 4.79 4.51 (3.506)***
(IASN2)
System has immense care for minute details and formalities, which often 4.29 4.06 (1.915)***
leads to excessive delays unless corrupt methods may be used (IASN3)
Lack of genuine power to deal with their staff who delay files (IASN4) 3.71 3.69 0.098
The reward system is skewed towards corrupt officers who get prime 4.65 4.36 (2.84)***
postings while honest officers are shunted away from prime postings
(IASN5)
The over-insured job security leads IAS officers to be permanent 4.83 4.43 (5.22)***
fixtures, which was originally intended to be a source of continuity for
the system (IASN6)
Encourages a rigid bureaucracy with an exclusive process of decision- 4.43 4.22 (2.24)**
making in an overly centralised system (IASN7)
Working under political pressure often leads to decisions based on 4.33 4.14 (1.84)*
management by crisis (IASN8)
System encourages only generalists and not specialists. Having 4.57 4.22 (3.43)***
specialists and experts is essential for rapid growth of the country
(IASN9)
System encourages slow implementation of laws and decisions 4.44 4.12 (3.04)***
(IASN10)
Positive aspects of lower-level bureaucracy
Knowledge preservation (LLBP1) 3.11 3.24 −1.14
Proper documentation and preparation of memory bank decisions 3.09 3.25 −1.27
(LLBP2)
Greater dependence on them by seniors (LLBP3) 3.92 3.91 0.095
Discipline both at top down and bottom up (LLBP4) 2.72 2.86 −1.06
Exceptional skills in the case of emergency (LLBP5) 2.45 2.66 −1.55
 A survey of positive and negative aspects 17

Table 8 Differences in the perceptions of respondents by profession (continued)

By profession
t–Test
G1 G2 (two tailed)
Statements mean mean df = 337
Faith in the system (LLBP6) 2.71 2.78 −0.587
An integrated and inseparable arm of the governing system (LLBP7) 3.47 3.48 −0.086
Politeness (compared with IAS system) in dealing with public as they, 2.17 2.48 −2.19
are paid from public money and more often they are first channel who
deal with public (LLBP8)
Loyalty to the system (LLBP9) 2.52 2.73 −1.48
They are the handymen in explaining and making the public aware of 2.77 2.92 −1.049
government rules and procedures (LLBP10)
Negative aspects of lower-level bureaucracy
An abysmal record of serving the public (LLBN1) 4.48 4.23 (2.67)***
Extremely rigid and mechanical procedures that lead to obsession with 4.54 4.32 (2.47)**
rules rather than concern for output (LLBN2)
Secrecy, cumbersome procedures and unnecessary controls are prone 4.54 4.34 (2.35)*
to incorrect interpretation and misuse of rules (LLBN3)
Lack of concern, poor motivation, insensitive and even hostile in 4.67 4.40 (3.07)***
serving the poorer sections of society (LLBN4)
The system encourages a culture of connections (vasta or jaan 4.63 4.38 (2.84)***
pehchaan culture) rather than full compliance with rules (LLBN5)
Promotions based on seniority rather than merit, and also lack of 4.47 4.39 0.927
performance-oriented incentives (LLBN6)
No power to take any decision, which often leads to low job 3.94 3.86 0.693
satisfaction (LLBN7)
Low salary compared with officials, which also leads to low job 3.30 3.54 −1.627
satisfaction (LLBN8)
Lack of modernisation (LLBN9) 4.06 4.01 0.470
No sense of wastage of public money when things are not done 4.72 4.48 (2.80)***
efficiently and in timely manner (LLBN10)
Constraints on the IAS system
There is no appreciation of the citizen’s viewpoint, and public 4.58 4.30 (3.13)***
relations are aimed at propaganda than establishing rapport with
community (IASC1)
Collective accountability (IASC2) 3.69 3.97 (2.16)**
Frequent transfers (IASC3) 3.54 3.75 −(1.74)*
Political pressure (IASC4) 4.43 4.37 0.598
Budgetary constraints (IASC5) 2.68 3.19 −(3.66)***
Constraints on the lower-level bureaucracy
Few opportunities for professional growth (LLBC1) 3.55 3.77 −(1.79)*
Political intervention (LLBC2) 4.02 4.17 −1.27
Adaptability to cope up with change (LLBC3) 3.39 3.68 −(2.15)**
Coordination and communication (LLBC4) 3.50 3.70 −1.54
Few rewards for good work (LLBC5) 3.59 3.85 −(2.02)**
*, **, ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
18 Joshi and R. Kumar

For positive viewpoints about the IAS system, the group mean of retired people was
higher than that of the professionals for six out of the 10 positive views. For the positive
variables IASP3, IASP4, IASP7 and IASP8, the group means were higher for the
professionals. Statistically significant difference was found for variable IASP3 at the 10%
level of significance. Variables IASP7 and IASP10 showed statistical significance at all
levels. Professionals believed more in the view that ‘there exists scope for promotion and
new challenges’ in the IAS system. However, the view on ‘feel-good factor’ of public
service was held more strongly by retired people. This may indicate the decreasing
attractiveness of the IAS system for the newer generation of professionals. Professionals
also more strongly held the view that ‘there exist decent living and working conditions’.
The analysis reveals that professionals held more extreme opinions than retired
people about the negative aspects of the IAS system. The group means of all the negative
variables were higher for the professional group, except for variable IASN1. Statistical
significance at all levels was found for variables IASN2, IASN3, IASN5, IASN6, IASN9
and IASN10.
Professionals more strongly held the view that the IAS system encourages loyalty
towards political masters rather than towards public service. They also had firmer
opinions that the system takes immense care over minute details and formalities. They
also more firmly believed that the reward system is skewed towards corrupt officers.
Professionals had more extreme views regarding other negative aspects related to over-
insured job security, rigid bureaucracy, encouragement of generalists and slow
implementation of laws and decisions.
With respect to positive aspects of lower-level bureaucracy, retired people held more
favourable opinions than professionals. The group means for positive aspects were higher
for the retired group in comparison with the professionals, except for the variable LLBP3.
However, none of the results was statistically significant.
With respect to the negative aspects of lower-level bureaucracy, professionals held
more extreme views than the other group. The group means were higher for professionals
for all the 10 negative aspects, with statistical significance for the first five variables and
the last variable (LLBN10). Professionals had more negative views with respect to
factors like ‘abysmal record of public service’, ‘extremely rigid and obsession with
rules’, ‘secrecy and cumbersome procedures’, ‘lack of concern towards poorer sections of
society’, etc. Professionals also widely held the view that the system encourages a culture
of connections and low-level bureaucrats have no sense of wastage of public money.
With respect to constraints on the IAS system, statistically significant differences of
opinion exist between professional and retired groups with respect to factors, such as
‘there is no appreciation of citizen’s viewpoint’, ‘collective accountability’ and ‘frequent
transfers and budgetary constraints’.
Similar differences were found with respect to the constraints on the lower-level
bureaucracy. Retired people felt more strongly that major constraints on the
lower-level bureaucracy are that there are fewer opportunities for professional growth
and less reward for good work. Professionals felt more strongly that the system is unable
to adapt to change.
 A survey of positive and negative aspects 19

6.5 Differences in the perceptions of respondents by age, residency and

qualifications
Table 9 collects together the significant statistical differences that emerged when the
results of the survey were analysed by the respondents’ age, residency and qualifications.
While Table 10 shows the overall assessment.
Table 9 Significant statistical differences in the perceptions of respondents by age, residency
and qualifications

By age By residency By qualifications

t-Test t-Test t-Test
G1 (two tailed) G1 G2 (two tailed) G1 G2 (two tailed)
Statements mean G2 mean df = 338 mean mean df = 334 mean mean df = 338
IASP1 3.61 3.89 −(1.8)*
IASP3 4.20 3.79 (4.32)***
IASP7 4.15 3.52 (6.09)*** 3.96 3.54 (2.91)***
IASP8 4.06 3.77 (1.86)*
IASP9 3.06 3.33 −(1.74)*
IASP10 2.92 3.38 −(3.48)***
IASN2 4.69 4.45 (3.13)*** 4.63 4.44 (1.74)*
IASN3 4.25 3.97 (2.5)**
IASN4 3.62 3.99 −(2.3)**
IASN5 4.55 4.30 (2.61)***
IASN6 4.70 4.32 (5.27)*** 4.58 4.37 (2.06)*
IASN7 4.44 4.07 (4.25)*** 4.33 4.02 (2.56)*
IASN8 4.28 4.09 (1.93)* 4.24 3.94 (2.29)**
IASN9 4.46 4.15 (3.30)*** 4.39 4.00 (3.04)***
IASN10 4.36 4.01 (3.62)*** 4.27 4.01 (2.15)**
LLBN1 4.45 4.11 (3.9)*** 4.35 4.08 (2.28)**
LLBN2 4.48 4.26 (2.62)*** 4.42 4.19 (1.97)*
LLBN3 4.51 4.25 (3.28)*** 4.44 4.23 (1.88)*
LLBN4 4.59 4.33 (3.21)*** 4.52 4.25 (2.4)**
LLBN5 4.56 4.32 (3.01)***
LLBN8 3.32 3.70 −(2.82)*** 3.39 3.92 −(2.9)***
LLBN9 3.95 4.13 −(1.74)*
LLBN10 4.65 4.40 (3.16)*** 4.60 4.31 (2.72)***
IASC1 4.52 4.20 (4.01)*** 4.42 4.21 (1.87)*
IASC2 3.74 4.09 −(2.95)***
IASC4 4.34 4.56 −(1.94)*
IASC5 2.80 3.35 −(4.20)*** 2.98 3.33 −(1.92)*
LLBC1 3.62 3.83 −(1.78)*
*, **, ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
20 Joshi and R. Kumar

Table 10 Overall assessment

G1 Mean G2 Mean t-test (two tailed) Df = 338

By residency Df = 334 3.53 3.42 0.649
By profession Df = 337 3.83 3.38 (3.48)***
By age 3.67 3.30 (3.072)***
By qualification 3.55 3.40 1.021
***denotes statistical significance at 1% level.

6.5.1 Analysis on the basis of age: perceptions about the IAS system
The age-wise analysis was based on the classification of age 50+ and the rest. The t-test
results were statistically significant at all levels for the positive aspects of IAS for the
variables IASP3, IASP7 and IASP10. But it has to be noted that the t-value for IASP10 is
statistically negative, with the group mean for age group of 50+ much lower than the rest.
This signifies the fact that the higher age group respondents, with much more experience,
are not very impressed by the ‘feel-good factor’ of doing the public service compared
with the rest. With respect to the negative aspects of the IAS system, except for IASN1
and IASN4, the variables were all statistically significant. Variables IASN2, IASN5,
IASN6, IASN7, IASN9 and IASN10 were statistically significant at all levels, IASN3
was significant at 5% and IASN8 was significant at 10%. The group mean for all the
negative aspects variable of the IAS system was higher for the respondents of the higher
age group. This indicates that the people in the higher age bracket, who have more
experience with the system, held more negative views about the IAS system compared
with the rest.

6.5.2 Analysis on the basis of age: perceptions about the lower-level

bureaucracy
Age-wise analysis reveals that there exists no significant statistical difference among
the respondents with respect to the positive aspects of the lower bureaucratic system. The
group means of the respondents aged 50+ were lower for variables LLBP4-P6 and
LLBP8-P10. This indicates their low level of opinion towards the lower bureaucracy
compared the rest.
These results suggest that the greater the experience with the system, the more
negative the perception that people develop towards it.
The analysis of the negative aspects of the lower bureaucratic system reveals that
there is a statistically significant difference between the higher and lower age groups.
Except for LLBN6 and LLBN7, all other negative viewpoints are statistically significant.
The mean of the higher age group was higher than that of the lower age group for all
variables except for LLBN8 and LLBN9. This again, signifies that the more experienced
people have a more negative opinion about the lower bureaucratic system compared with
the less-experienced people. The t-statistics for LLBN8 and LLBN9 are −2.82 and −1.74,
respectively, with statistical significance. This can be interpreted to mean that the low
salary level leads to low job satisfaction, which is a view more widely held by the lower
age group. Perhaps it reflects the sense of expectation of the younger people in the
 A survey of positive and negative aspects 21

competitive world. Moreover, the viewpoint of ‘lack of modernisation’ in lower

bureaucratic levels is most ‘agreed’ by the lower age group.
With respect to the constraints on the IAS system, viewpoints IASC1, IASC2 and
IASC5 were found to be statistically significant at all levels. The means of the higher age
group were found to be higher for IASC1 and lower for both IASC2 and IASC5. Hence
with respect to the perception that there is ‘no appreciation of citizen’s viewpoint’, the
higher age group had stronger views than the lower age group. The lower age group had
more positive skewness towards the constraints of collective accountability and
budgetary constraints.
The constraint ‘lack of professional opportunity for growth’ was statistically
significant for the lower-level bureaucracy, with the mean being higher for the lower age
group.

6.5.3 Analysis on the basis of residency

The respondents were classified into Indian residents and NRIs for the purpose of
analysis. Statistically significant results were found for positive variables of IASP7 and
IASP8. The means were higher for the Indian resident group compared with the NRI
group. Hence it can be stated that Indian residents held firmer beliefs that there is scope
for promotions and new challenges in the IAS system compared with the NRIs. Similarly,
Indian residents strongly held the view that the IAS system has the power to take
decisions that directly affect people.
With respect to the negative aspects of the IAS system, the mean for the Indian
residents was higher for all the statistically relevant variables compared with the NRI
group. Hence it can be highlighted that Indian residents held much stronger negative
views about the IAS system.
The variable ‘IAS encourages only generalists’ was statistically significant at all
levels. Indian residents held a stronger negative view about viewpoints like ‘over-insured
job leads IAS officers to be permanent fixtures of in the governing set-up’ and that ‘the
system encourages rigid bureaucracy in an overly centralised system’.
The negative perception towards lower bureaucratic levels held by Indian residents
was greater than that of the NRIs. The mean for all the statistically relevant negative
variables was higher for the Indian residents. Indian residents held stronger negative
views about aspects, such as ‘rigid obsession with rules’, ‘culture of connections’, etc.
However, NRIs strongly felt that the ‘low salary level of lower bureaucracy leads to job
dissatisfaction’.
With respect to constraints of the IAS system, the Indian residents felt more strongly
than the NRI group that there is ‘no appreciation of the citizen’s viewpoint’. However,
the viewpoint of the budgetary constraint on the IAS system was held more strongly by
NRIs than by the Indian residents.

6.5.4 Analysis on the basis of qualifications

This analysis was based on postgraduate (PG) and PhD qualifications versus the rest. For
the positive aspects of IAS system, statistically significant results were observed
for variables IASP1 and IASP9. For negative aspects, the variables of significance were
IASN4 and IASN10. The mean of the PG and above group was lower compared with the
22 Joshi and R. Kumar

rest of the group for the statistically significant positive variables. This highlights the fact
that higher the education level, the lower the level of satisfaction with the system.
The qualification-wise analysis results for the negative aspects of the IAS system
show that highly qualified people strongly hold the view that ‘there is no sense of
wastage of public money when things are not done efficiently’ compared with the less
educated group. However, the view that there is lack of genuine power to deal with staff
who delays files is more strongly held by the less-educated group.
None of the positive and negative aspects of the lower-level bureaucracy was found
to be statistically significant. The constraint ‘political pressure’ on the IAS system had
statistical significance at 10%, and this view is more widely held by the people with
lower educational qualification.

7 Conclusion

7.1 Summary
This online survey, based on a sample size of 340 responses, was carried out to ascertain
the public perceptions on the positive and negative aspects of the Indian administrative
bureaucratic system. The validity of the survey was enhanced by the fact that about 59%
of the respondents belonged to the age group above 50 years, who could better recall their
experiences with the system than their younger counterparts.
Only 13% of the respondents were satisfied with the system. With respect to positive
aspects of the IAS system, about 79% of respondents believed that the IAS system has
the power to take decisions that directly affect people. Approximately 81% of the
respondents felt that ‘there exist decent living and working conditions for the IAS
officers. An overwhelming 93.5% were of the opinion that, in the IAS system, ‘the
tendency is to serve their political masters more than the public’.
Approximately 89% of the respondents held the view that the ‘reward system is
basically skewed towards the corrupt officers, who get prime postings while the honest
officers often get punishment transfers’. About 85% of the respondents who took part in
the survey agreed that the IAS system ‘encourages only generalists and not management
specialists’. Over 90% felt that political pressure is the major constraint of the civil
service system.
About 77% believe that one of the positive aspects with respect to the lower-level
bureaucratic system is ‘excessive dependence of senior officers on the junior
level bureaucrats. A vast majority (93%) of those surveyed felt that the lower-level
bureaucrats had ‘no sense of proper utilisation of public money, and the work is not done
in an efficient and timely manner’. Another key weakness of the lower bureaucracy
highlighted by 91% of the respondents is that ‘promotions are based on seniority rather
than merit’. More than 70% cited that political intervention and fewer opportunities for
professional growth are major constraints in the lower bureaucratic system.
The descriptive statistical analysis reveals that the most important positive aspect
with respect to the IAS system as perceived by the respondents is the factor of decent
living and working conditions, and the most important negative aspect is the tendency to
serve more their political masters and less the public.
The most important parameter that emerged with respect to the positive aspects of the
lower bureaucracy is the greater dependence on the lower bureaucrats by the seniors.
 A survey of positive and negative aspects 23

With respect to negative aspects of the lower bureaucracy, respondents ranked the factor
‘lower bureaucrats had no sense of wastage of public money’ as the highest.
Statistical analysis was also carried out to gauge the differences in opinion among the
respondents on the basis of classification in terms of professional group, age, residency
status and qualifications. The analysis reveals that professionals held more extreme
opinions about the negative aspects of both the IAS system and the lower-level
bureaucracy than retired people. Statistically, significant differences of opinion exist
between professional and retired groups with respect to the constraints on both the IAS
and the lower bureaucratic system.
The study found that higher age group respondents with much more experience are
not impressed with the ‘feel-good factor’ of serving the public compared with the rest. In
terms of age analysis, it can be concluded that the more the experience people have with
the system, the more negative the perceptions they develop towards the system.
The analysis on the basis of residency reveals that Indian residents held much
stronger negative views about the IAS system than their NRI counterparts. The
qualification-wise analysis results for negative aspects of the IAS system show that
highly qualified people hold more strongly the view that ‘there is no sense of wastage of
public money when things are not done efficiently’ than the less-educated group.

7.2 Recommendations
Reforms ought to be the mantra for the revitalisation of the Indian bureaucratic system. It
is high time that a way was found out to break the vicious circle of inefficiency of the
system. It is a pathetic fact that only a minuscule minority of the bureaucrats are punished
or reprimanded for their misdemeanours or incompetence.
A plethora of committees have been set up for recommending measures to make
the bureaucracy accountable and deliver as per the national agenda. Unfortunately, the
suggestions never turn into reality. Innovative mechanisms like a state commission
independent of government for appointing bureaucrats could be implemented.
Technocrats and specialists need to be appointed at various levels of the bureaucratic
system. It is quite interesting to note that it is the technocrats/specialists who have
pioneered major reforms in India. The green revolution, major breakthroughs in the areas
of nuclear science, space, telecoms and economic reforms were piloted by technocrats
and specialists.
The performance of the public service system must be appraised, leadership and
teamwork improved and a culture of continuous improvement promoted. The values of
probity and political independence need to be combined with newer qualities of
leadership, excellence, openness, accountability, productivity and dynamism. The
excessive concern with procedures must be replaced by a focus on results. The concerns
of responsiveness, commitment, awareness and accountability espoused by the National
Training Policy document formulated by the Government of India for its bureaucracy are
in place. However, the challenge for academia is to produce case studies and innovative
training methodology, concentrating on human values instead of merely on skills.
There should be an effective vigilance mechanism to root out the practice of
corruption. Inefficiencies in bureaucracy can be resolved through the enabling power
of technology. Appropriate incentives for improved transparency and control of
corruption could be provided.
24 Joshi and R. Kumar

7.2.1 Establishment of a national academy of civil services

Lastly, there have been suggestions for the establishment of a national academy of civil
services (NACS). One of the respondents to the survey believes that those selected
through a preliminary selection process should be trained at such an academy for at least
two years, as follows:
• first six months training at the National Defence Academy (NDA) at Pune or by the
instructors from the NDA
• next three months, induction (rules, regulations, expectations of the government,
etc.)
• next six months, training in rural areas (at least four different places, one each from
northern, southern, western and eastern regions of the country)
• next four months, training in urban centres, including one metro, one tier-II city and
two district headquarters (with appropriate geographical spread)
• on-site training for four months, two months each at a central government ministry
and a state government ministry
• balance of one month being a cushion to take care of movement from one
centre/office to another and to meet other contingencies.

7.3 Limitations of the survey

We used a judgemental/convenient sampling as the population is infinite, therefore there
could be errors in representation of the respondents and it cannot be claimed that the
sampling was truly representative.
In view of the sensitiveness of the topic, it may be possible that some respondents
might have chosen to respond in a neutral range of the measures.
Another possible limitation of a questionnaire for this type of survey may be the
possible understanding of the scorecards used, and perhaps inconsistencies introduced by
that misunderstanding.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers and the editor for their thought-provoking
comments and suggestions in improving this paper. Special thanks are due to Prof.
Sharad Asthana, USA, Mr. Raghavan, India and others for their valuable suggestions in
the design of the questionnaire.

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 A survey of positive and negative aspects 27

Appendix

Model 1 Public perception of negativism towards IAS system (see online version for colours)

Model 2 Public perception of negativism towards lower-level bureaucracy (see online version for
colours)