Political Crusades:

Evaluating the role of sectarianism in the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts.

Name: Stuart Bryan

SID: 311183018

Subject: Divided Societies

Lecturer: Diarmuid Maguire

Word count: 5463 (excluding references)

In the shifting nexus of conflict that has engulfed large swathes of the Middle East, the

tendency to identify an overarching causality is both enticing and problematic. Contemporary

discourse in both the media and academia tend to focus on the sectarian nature of the

violence, arguing that the transnational violence signifies yet another chapter in the Sunni/

Shia schism that has raged, and will ostensibly continue to rage, for millennia.1 This

primordial sectarian framework suggests that such differences are immutable, and that the

peaceful coexistence of actors within a state is impossible and will inevitably result in

conflict. Admittedly, this tendency to view the middle east conflict through a sectarian lens is

understandable. Sectarianism has been a fundamental characteristic of regional upheaval for

centuries, playing out in both violent domestic conflicts and the current Middle Eastern ‘Cold

War’ between Wahabi Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran fighting proxy wars across the region for a

greater share of political influence. But this exclusive focus on sectarianism as the cause of

conflict distorts the analytical focus, warping the capacity to formulate appropriate policy

responses that may ameliorate crises. For not only does it downplay the complex array and

interplay of factors that instigate conflict, a purely sectarian lens ignores the agency of

political actors and states who seek to shape and mobilise identities against each other for

strategic gain. Religious identity may well be immutable and fundamental, as primordialism

holds, but sectarian conflict can nonetheless be manufactured.

1 Examples can be found across literature published since the Arab Spring protests in 2011, which seems to have
brought on a renaissance of primordialist understanding of sectarianism in the Middle East. See, for example,
Geneive Abdo, The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Sunni-Shi’a Divide, Analysis
no. 29, Saban Center at the Brooking Institution, April 2013 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/
2013/04/sunni-shia-divide-abdo>. A pertinent example of the media emphasis is Max Fischer, “Why Sunnis and
Shiites are Fighting, Explained in Two Minutes,” Washington Post, 22 January 2014, <http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/01/22/why-sunnis-and-shias-are-fighting-explained-in-
two-minutes/>.
This essay will attempt to distill the role of sectarianism from two respective case studies into

its constituent parts. Firstly, it will examine the underlying socio-economic and political

factors that lead to the outbreak of conflict - before examining how the conflicts were

reframed by state and non-state actors alike. It will argue that Syria and Yemen represent two

different points along a linear continuum of conflict in the Middle East, with the Syrian civil

war having transformed from a political revolt against Bashar Al-Assad’s Ba’ath party -

grounded in political, social and economic grievances that culminated in the March 2011

uprising - to a religious conflict framed as such for strategic gain. The Yemeni conflict is

more complex. For sectarianism has traditionally played a comparatively minor role in

Yemen’s contemporary conflicts, it’s 2011 Arab Spring protests deriving from widespread

dissatisfaction with former President Abdullah Saleh’s authoritarian rule, a stagnant economy

and high associated levels of unemployment. In the aftermath of the September 2014

invasion of Sana’a by Houthi rebels from the north, commentators were quick to gloss the

conflict as sectarian tensions between the Zaydi Shia Houthis and the primarily Sunni Islah

party that dominates the country's political system2 - ignoring the domestic grievances that

lay at the heart of the uprising. Instead, it will be seen that Yemen’s descent into civil war has

been catalysed by the spread of a proxy struggle for influence between Saudi Arabia and Iran,

one that threatens to divide the country along sectarian lines. In considering the two case

studies, one question in particular warrants special consideration - how are sect identities

mobilised to violence?

2 Immediately after the Houthi insurgency there were many noted Yemen scholars who raised fears of sectarian
violence. Especially influential was Peter Salisbury, cited elsewhere in this peace, who later retracted many of
the concerns of ethnic-violence raised in this Financial times article. Peter Salisbury, Houthi Shia rebels threaten
Yemen’s transition to democracy, Financial Times, August 19, 2014, 14.
It is important here to delineate the limitations of this analysis. The breadth of this subject is

expansive, yet for reasons of scope this essay will focus on the processes by which conflicts

in Yemen and Syria are reshaped by political actors. Drawing on contemporary debate, this

essay will argue that the role of sectarianism in these case studies can be explained through

the dual application of ethno-symbolist theory and instrumentalist conception of political

manoeuvring by state actors.

Though the pertinent historical context of each state will be canvassed in relation to how

underlying ethnic tensions have been ‘reawakened’ - it is not the intent of this piece to engage

in a comprehensive overview of the ethnic or political history of either. Religious identity,

civil conflict and middle eastern geopolitics are vast, complicated fields in contemporary

debate - by examining the underlying causes to these conflicts, then the mechanisms by

which sectarianism has been introduced, it will be seen that the role of religion in driving

conflict is far more complicated than the essentialist presuppositions proffered by primordial

theory. Though it is not a discourse analysis, underpinning this argument is an attempt to

redress the popular framing of these conflicts as simply ‘sectarian.’ Moreover, though this

piece does compare the nature of sectarianism in both conflicts - it will deliberately illustrate

the points of difference between the two. To engage in a broadstroke comparison of the two

risks truncating the studies to highlight commonalities where none exist. The two case

studies, instead, seek to illustrate the nuance in how sectarian identity is mobilised. For in

order to attain a nuanced understanding of the complex interplay of factors in these conflicts,

there is a need to move beyond the primordial gloss of ‘sectarianism’ as a framework that, in

one word, embodies the driving cause of conflict in the Middle East. This article, then, serves
as an investigation - a litmus test of sorts - to evaluate the claims that a primordial conception

of sectarianism drives the conflicts in Syria and Yemen.

On March 15 2011, a small group of protesters congregated in Daraa, a town in Syria’s

southwest, to protest against President Bashar al-Assad regime's failure to combat the

systemic environmental and economic crises facing the country. Rather than attempting to

reach out to the protesters, Assad systematically crushed public dissent through his much

maligned secret police - the Shahiba. The crackdown backfired, with protest groups

mobilising in tandem across the country - growing exponentially in response to the amount of

force used.3

From the outset, sectarianism has been the favoured label used by policymakers and

journalists alike to describe the causes of the Syrian conflict, with a 2012 UN Commission of

Inquiry report arguing "as battles between government forces and anti-government armed

groups approach the end of their second year...the conflict must be seen as overtly sectarian."4

A subliminal presupposition in this sectarianism argument is that these conflicts are

primordial and thus beyond political solutions. This reasoning is, prima facie, compelling.

However, though it is tempting to label the conflict as another inevitable manifestation of the

3 F. Gregory Gause’s article Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War provides a detailed overview
of the emerging role sectarianism has played in conflicts through the Middle East since the Arab Spring protests
and, more importantly, the limits of a sectarian framework to understand the complicated proxyl struggle for
influence across the region. His piece deeply informed the content of this piece, especially in regards to Yemen -
where it was felt the proxy war was more pertinent to the introduction of sectarian discourse than in Syria,
where internal factors were predominant.
F. Gregory Gause III, Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War, (Brookings Doha Center, July
2007), 10.

4 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
the Syrian Arabic Republic establisheed pursuant to United Nations Human Rights Council Resolutions S-17/1,
19/22 and 21/26,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, December 2012, 4.
‘ancient hatreds’ between Sunnis and Shiites, to do so obviates the agency of the Assad

regime in mobilising ethno-religious identities. The conflict did indeed become sectarian, but

it did not begin so. Moreover, the factors that led to the mass mobilisation of the Syrian

population in March 2011 aligned closely with the range of economic, social and political

factors that prompted protests throughout the Arab world in the spring of 2011.5 To

understand this shift in the conflict requires first identifying the original factors that

mobilised the population against the regime. The prime factor, Polk argues, was the

devastating drought that ravaged Syria’s arable farming land between 2006-2011.6 Unlike

other states in the region that derive the majority of GDP from oil reserves, agriculture has

traditionally supplied 20% of Syria’s national income and employed 17% of the population.7

However, the Syria’s unusually high population density and relatively small proportion of

arable land results in only 0.25 hectares of agricultural land per person - a percentage that

heavily limited the capacity of citizens to generate wealth.8 The 2006 drought effectively

turned Syria into a dustbowl, lowering the water table and ultimately rendering only 13,500

square kilometers of land irrigable.9 By 2010 crop failures reached 75% in many areas, while

85% of livestock had died of thirst or hunger.10 Between 2-3 million of Syria’s 10 million

inhabitants were reduced to extreme poverty, hundreds of thousands abandoning rural towns

5 A comprehensive overview of the economic underpinnnings of the Arab Spring protests, from Tunisia to Egypt
informed this conclusion. See Adeel Malik and Bassem Awadallah, The Economics of the Arab Spring, CSAE
Working Paper WPS/2011-23, Center for The Study of African Economies, Oxford University Press, 2011.

6 William R. Polk, Understanding Syria: From Pre-Civil War to Post-Assad, The Atlantic Monthly, December
10 2013.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9Peter H. Gleick, 2014: Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria. Wea. Climate Soc., 6,
333.
10 Ibid.
and congregating in the urban centers of Homs, Aleppo and Damascus - drastically reducing

employment opportunities - as survival quickly emerged as a focal point of national debate.11

Systemic economic inequality, a familiar narrative throughout much of the Middle East,

inflamed public opposition to the regime - with the opulent lifestyles enjoyed by the ruling

elite standing in stark contrast to unemployment levels reaching 30% in 201112. The private

sector was dominated by large business conglomerates well connected to the regime13, and

Damascus, monopolising the profits of widespread corruption, did little to promote either

reform or competition.14 Inflation increased rapidly, quickly outpacing wage increases. The

regime’s response to the rapidly spiralling meltdown was feeble, Assad’s 10th ‘Five Year

Plan’ in 2006 to invigorate Syria’s industrial output - thus generating jobs and encouraging

greater levels of Foreign Direct Investment - failing spectacularly.15 Put together, this

confluence of economic factors created the basis from which popular support against the

regime widely held responsible could be mobilised. Indeed by March 2011, Syria had

become tinder ready to be set aflame.

The national cohesion of the March 2011 protests testifies to how deeply the grievances were

felt throughout the social fabric of the state. As a result, they were largely peaceful,

11More on the role of the drought and the flow on effect on the economy is written by F. De Châtel, The Role of
Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling the Triggers of the Revolution, Middle Eastern
Studies 50, no. 4 (2014): 521–535.

12 William Polk, Understanding Syria.

13 A detailedanalysis on the role of business conglomerates, especially the well publicised corrupt conduct of
Assad’s cousin Rami Makhlouf, in Syria before the civil war can be found here - Ivan Briscoe, Floor Jansen &
Rosan Smits, Stability and Economic Recovery After Assad: Key Steps for Syria’s Post Conflict Transition,
Clingendael: Netherlands Institute for International Relations, 2012, 22,34.

14 Anna Borshchevskaya, Sponsored Corruption and Neglected Reform in Syria, Middle East Quarterly, Middle
East Forum Summer 2010, 45.

15 Ibid., 47.
decentralised local movements with national goals, movements that initially transcended

ethno-religious lines on both sides. Political and economic motivation determined alliances

with either the regime or the Free Syrian Army (the name itself reflecting a nationalist

inclusive identity). Large swathes of the Sunni bureaucracy in Damascus aligned with

Assad’s Ba’ath party - while Alawites in poorer eastern locales were among the first to join

the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in April 2011. One of the early locus’ of conflict, the Sunni

majority Aleppo, was similarly divided along economic lines - the wealthier western districts

remaining peaceful, while protests and rebel bases emerged in the poorer eastern suburbs.

This is not to imply that sectarian tensions were not present in the genesis of the conflict, but

that they did not motivate the formation of allegiances.

Evidently, then, the 2011 uprisings did not originate because of conflictual religious

identities, but legitimate socio-economic and political grievances. The burden of

responsibility for this transformation must be placed primarily with the Assad regime, which

cynically invoked and stoked religious division. From March 2011, instead of engaging with

the discourse from the various protest movements and responding to critiques of political and

economic mismanagement, al-Assad used excessive violence against the peaceful opposition

movement to “provoke them into a war that his better armed military would probably win.”16

Philips argues that this took place in two phases, the first phase constituted reviving old fears

of sectarianism, characterising all opposition protesters as “sectarian islamists” with links to

Al-qaeda, utilising the military Shahiba to manipulate Alawi communities by fabricating false

reports of ethnic cleansing undertaken by Sunni members of the FSA.17 Anecdotal reports

16 Christopher Philips, Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria, Third World Quarterly, 36:2, 369.

17 Ibid, 370.
describe the infiltration of FSA protests by Shahiba members who distributed leaflets bearing

anti-alawi slogans, and Shahiba delivering sandbags to Alawite communities claiming that

Sunnis in neighbouring towns were “on the rampage.”18 Through this, the regime “locked the

fate of Syria’s minorities (and Sunni secularists into the fate of the regime, creating an ethnic

security dilemma and leaching away non-Sunni opposition support.”19 The second phase

constituted an explicit shift to overtone sectarian overtures from the regime and heralded the

introduction of external actors , especially after the territorial gains made by the FSA in early

2012. With significant gains made in north eastern provinces, encompassing the major cities

of Homs and Aleppo, the Assad regime began to solicit support from external actors with

clear sectarian agendas. Troops from Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militias joined the Syrian

army, strengthening the sectarian rhetoric amongst the opposition.20 The second phase

marked the pivot point from which the locus of conflict inexorably shifted to a sectarian

conflict. The FSA, hitherto displaying a remarkable unity of purpose that crossed religious

lines - became riven by internal religious schisms that bolstered recruitment to Salafi

extremists of Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State. The rise of Salafi extremism within the folds

of the Syrian opposition is well documented, one ICG report describing how “conditions

were favourable: religiously conservative Gulf Arabs [were willing] to provide funds which

bolstered the Salafis’ coffers and the legitimacy of their narrative.”21 The regime also bears

responsibility for the rise of Salafism in opposition ranks, having ultimately “acted to

18 David Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad, New York: Yale University Press, 2013, 75.

19 Christopher Philips, Sectarianism, 369.

20International Crisis Group (ICG), Lebanon’s Hizbollah turns eastward to Syria, Brussels: ICG, Middl East
Report N. 114, May 2014.

21International Crisis Group (ICG), Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition, Brussels: ICG, Middle
East Report N. 131, October 2012, ii.
corroborate a sectarian storyline to the extent that many opponents equated the struggle

against Assad with a jihad against the occupier.”22 External actors played a key role, with

many commentators highlighting the proxy support given by Saudi Arabia and Iran to the

rebels and Assad’s regime in Syria. However, though this is undoubtedly true - there is a

wealth of evidence pointing to the agency of external actors which vested interests in the

outcome of the Syrian conflict - it is important to frame the context of this mobilisation.23

That is, though Saudi Arabia, Iran and an array of gulf states did catalyse sectarian tensions

by providing material support to rebel groups, this happened only after the sectarian

divisions were drawn by Assad’s regime. As Gause argues, Assad “drove people to look to

sectarian identities and groups for the protection and material support that the state either

could or would not provide.”24 There is a clear linear progression here, Assad incited

sectarian tensions and the rebel groups looked to external allies for support in their domestic

political and military conflicts. As sectarianism defined their struggles, it was “natural that

they look to co-religionists for support.”25 The retreat of the state facilitated made it possible

for Iran, Saudi Arabia and other regional states to play an increasing role in the conflict.

Given the complexity of the role sectarianism has played in Syria’s evolving civil war, a

simple primordial framing belies the role of political agency in mobilising identity.

22 Ibid.

23 This article has deliberately refrained from engaging in a comprehensive discussion of the role of external
actors in the radicalisation of the Syrian conflict. Though there was considerable external involvement the role
of Assad’s regime was the prime source of mobilising sect identity - external actors came after sect had become
a salient feature of the conflict. For more on the role of external agents see Elyes Ghanmi, The Involvement of
Salafism/Wahhabism in the support and supply of arms to rebel groups around the world, Brussels, Directorate-
General for External Policies, European Parliament, June 2013, 9-17.

24 F. Gregory Gause, Beyond Sectarianism, 10.

25 Ibid.
Primordialism alone provides an insufficient explanation for how religious identity became

enmeshed within the Syrian conflict. That is not to say that these ties are imagined, or to

question the sincerity with which they are held. Rather, a middle ground, bridging the two

ends of the spectrum, is indicated. Fanar Haddad’s (in many regards informed by the work of

Anthony Smith) conception of ethno-symbolism is useful here. Haddad argues that

mobilisation of religious identities is predicated on a narrative (real or imagined) of conflict -

with modern political identities being “far more successful when they are based on older

ethnic ties bound by a myth-symbol complex.”26 Comparing the Syrian conflict to the

dynamics of Iraqi sectarian identity, he describes Sunni-Shia hostility as one “grounded in

history and constantly reinvented and passed down from generation to generation, lying

dormant, but ever ready to be reawakened and revised to suit the needs of a future crisis.”27

To understand the context of this reinvention it is necessary to briefly examine the history of

ethno-religious division in Syria. The narrative is a complex one, tinged with a veneer of

Syrian Arab nationalism by Bashar al-Assad and his father Hafez al-Assad. In broad terms,

throughout the contemporary history of the state, religious diversity has both been tolerated

and even encouraged through the framing of ‘Syrian Arab’ national identity to solicit support

from ethno-religious groups and consolidate power while simultaneously being manipulated

to consolidate power for the ruling Alawite minority at the expense of other religious groups.

26Fanar Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity, New York: Columbia University Press,
2011, 18.

27 Ibid., 20.
Since independence from France in 1946 when sect identities were first politicised28 to the

ascension of the Assad dynasty under Hafez in 1970 - the coalescence of religious and

national identity has emerged and reemerged - manipulated by the ruling elite to consolidate

political authority. The years after Assad’s ascent to power were paradoxical, sect was

“officially dismissed and inclusive Arab nationalism encouraged - while politicised sect

identities were simultaneously reproduced either by the regime or external enemies.29

Examples of the political elite mobilising ethno-religious identities peppered the history of

the Ba’ath regime, with the spectre of the ‘Syrian Arab’ invoked during periods of hostility

against Israel, military intervention into Lebanon and after the 1982 Muslim Brotherhood

uprising in Hama30. Under Hafez al-Assad, Sunni culture was integrated into society - with

Sunni islam taught in schools and Sunni elites coopted into government (facilitating the

veneer of consociational governance) while Sunni citizens were politically disempowered.31

While Sunni allies were handed key civilian government positions, both Hafez and Bashar al-

Assad’s regime were, in reality, dominated and run by the Alawite minority - effectively

marginalising the Sunni majority population.

Evidently, sect has been enmeshed into the political identity of the modern Syrian state.

However the underpinnings of the current conflict are complicated, a conflict emerging from

28 A detailed history of sectarianism in Syria extends beyond the remit of this discussion. However, sectarian
politics has consistently been manipulated by authority figures in the country to solidify personal authority. This
oscillated under the Assad’s from marginalisation and disenfranchisement of Sunni figures and disproportionate
representation of Alawis in key roles to the coopting of sunni and other minority roles

29 Christopher Philips, Sectarianism, 366.

30 Raphael Lefevre, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, London: Hurst, 2013, 23-25. Lefevre’s
work is a detailed description of the formation of a unified Sunni identity in Syria in which he argues that the
Assad’s must be held responsible for the mobilisation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 70’s that eventually
led to the 1982 uprising.

31 Ibid., 49.
political and socio-economic grievances rather than an inevitable conflict stemming from

religious identity. Commentators are wrong to truncate the conflict into the simplistic Sunni

& Shia paradigm. To adequately encapsulate the complexity of the conflict, a dual theoretical

lens is required. Abdo posits that tensions in Syria have been reawakened by the Assad

regime, providing a “mechanism to amplify sectarian conflict to guarantee his political

survival.”32 Droz Vincent, a modern constructivist, counters that sectarianism results from the

manipulations of the Assad dynasty rather than any sense of religious loyalty.33 Ultimately,

both arguments are meritorious - the sectarian element of the Syrian conflict does not derive

from primal conflictual difference (a conclusion that tends to a apathetic policy recourse) but

the concerted manipulation of religious identities.34 Sectarianism in Syria is grounded in

politics, a symbiotic relationship that underpins and defines the instrumentalist mobilisation

of identities.

A comparison between the role of sectarianism in the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts will not,

forcibly, be linear. This is not unexpected. The historical context, the relationship between

political and religious identity in both states are markedly different. However, there are key

points of similarity that may be drawn from both. Both civil conflicts stemmed from social,

political and economic grievances. In both conflicts, external actors were instrumental to the

mobilisation of sect identities. In the Syrian conflict, this occurred after the Assad regime had

begun to reframe the conflict along religious lines. In Yemen, the intervention of the Saudi

32 Geneive Abdo, The New Sectarianism, 2

33Philippe Droz-Vincent, State of Barbary (Take Two): From the Arab Spring to the Return of Violence in Syria,
Middle East Journal 68, no. 1, 2014, 40.

34 Elizabeth Hurd, Stop trying to make Syria’s war into a sectarian conflict, The Atlantic Monthly, March 15,
2013, Last Modified March 15 2013, Accessed at <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/
stop-trying-to-make-syrias-war-into-a-sectarian-conflict/274060/>
led coalition stemmed from the perception of Iranian control over the houthi rebels. In

essence, sectarian tension was thrust upon a domestic conflict in which “sectarian elements

have played a comparatively minor role.”35 For years, Yemen has held a relatively low profile

in the ongoing struggle for regional influence between Saudi Arabia and Iran - a proxy

conflict that plays out in weak or failing states, rather than through overt military

confrontations. Whereas in Syria primary responsibility lay with the Assad regime for

mobilising religious identity, in Yemen the conflict lies at an earlier point on a continuum of

religious conflict. This section will attempt to break down the Houthi insurgency into two

phases that demonstrate this shift. The origins of the Houthi uprising will be examined and

framed in reference to the socio-political grievances that underpinned the conflict before

examining how external actors have intervened in a state that has had very little

contemporary history of religious division.36 Conflict in Yemen is at a turning point - the

machinations of Saudi Arabia and Iran threatening, by framing the conflict in terms of Sunni

vs. Shia, to create a self-fulfilling prophecy of sectarian violence.37

The Houthis, a Zaydi Shia group based in the Saada governorate in northern Yemen, have

been engaged in a prolonged civil war with the government in Sana’a since 2004.38 It is an

insurgency that defies easy definition, since it’s inception in the early 1990’s the movement

has transformed from a student-based Zaydi religious revival movement to a formidable

35 Joel Gillin, The Yemen Conflict Isn’t a Sectarian War - Yet, New Republic, April 3, 2015.

36 Peter Salisbury, Is Yemen Becoming the Next Syria?, Foreign Policy, March 6, 2015, Last modified on March
6 2015, Accessed at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/06/is-yemen-becoming-the-next-syria/>

37 Gillin, Yemen.

38 International Crisis Group (ICG), Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb, Middle East Report No. 86, 2009,
3.
militia that has garnered considerable popular support across the country.39 Zaydism, a Shia

subsect that claims direct descendancy from Muhammad, has roots in the imamate that ruled

the northern regions of Yemen for centuries. During the Yemen Republic it was subject to

intense persecution from the regime, who sought to divide and distill the group’s influence in

the region. After the unification of North and South Yemen in 1990, President Saleh

continued to persecute the Zaydis, even as other religious minorities were permitted to

flourish. In response, under leader Hussein al-Houthi, the Zaydis militarised and focussed on

grassroots mobilisation of communities surrounding Sada’a to counter the armed forces under

Saleh’s command in Sana’a. In 2003, the Saleh regime's support of the invasion of Iraq gave

al-Houthi the capacity to widen his support base by appealing to the broader Yemeni

population - dissatisfied with the social and political dominance of the ruling islah party.

Saleh responded by brutally repressing the protests in Sadaa in 2004, with Hussein al-Houthi

killed in the process. The mantle of leadership subsequently taken up by his relatives, the

Houthis engaged in five more armed conflicts with the regime between 2004 - 2010. The

sustained insurgency transformed the movement from a Zaydi based protest against political

repression to a movement that embodied popular revolt against Saleh’s autocratic rule.

Here it is important to recognise the context in which the Houthi movement was able to

thrive, the popular discontent that led to the February 2011 protests that ultimately dislodged

President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Akin to other Arab Spring protests, the economic and political

narrative proves the most compelling for explaining the origins of the unrest. Yemen, the

poorest state in the Arab World, is not endowed with the oil resources of its’ wealthier

39Charles Schmitz, The Huthi Ascent to Power, Middle East Institute, September 2014, last modified
September 15 2014, accessed at <http://www.mei.edu/content/at/huthi-ascent-power.>
neighbours, with reserves “widely expected to be depleted by 2017.”40 A World Bank Report

published in 2012 estimated that in the lead up to the 2011 uprising unemployment had

almost doubled from the 2010 rate of 14.6 percent.41 Youth unemployment levels were

dramatically higher, estimated at 60% - a problem aggravated by the ‘youth bulge’ in the

state, with nearly half the population under the age of 15.42 Yemen’s economic and social

infrastructure was chronically underdeveloped, with “large parts of a vulnerable population

[not having] access to any form of basic services such as health and education, or a

functioning social safety net system.”43 Compounding this economic inequity, the perception

of corruption in Saleh’s regime was rife - with Yemen ranking 146th on the Transparency

International 2010 Corruption Perception index.44

In this context of widespread social, economic and political grievances with the regime, the

Houthi movement was able to capitalise upon the widespread dissatisfaction to garner

popular support.45 The Houthi leadership capitalised on this resentment in the 2011 protests

and were key players in the subsequent Gulf Cooperation Council agreement that handed

power over to a transitional government led by President Hadi. To date, however, the

transitional government has been spectacularly unsuccessful - hamstrung by the same

corruption, instability and economic stagnation that plagued the Saleh regime. Schmitz posits

40 Sarah Philips, Yemen: On The Brink, Carnegie Paper Series: Middle East Program, No. 107, 2010, 2.

41 World Bank Report, Facing the Hard Facts in Yemen, World Bank - Yemen Talking Points, 2012, 3.

42 Ibid. 2.

43 Ibid.

44 Transparency
International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, March 2010, Accessed at <https://
www.transparency.org/cpi2010/in_detail>

45 Charles Schmitz, Huthi.

that the “Houthi occupation of Sana’a was a continuation of the popular revolt that overthrew

Saleh in 2011… their move of Sana’a is an attempt to move even closer to the center of

power by presenting themselves as legitimate brokers of credible government.”46

To characterise the Houthi insurgency as a sectarian struggle is to misunderstand the recent

context of civil dissatisfaction in Yemen. For the conflict is based on local grievances, not

profound religious hatred. Yadav affirms this, arguing that “the main rhetorical theme [of the

Houthi movement] has been not a ‘culture war’ that would characterise a sectarian conflict

but to seek genuinely popular reforms sidelined by the transitional government.”47 The

movement is certainly “not aimed exclusively or even primarily at establishing a Zaydi

political order, re-instituting the kind of imamate that ruled Northern Yemen for hundreds of

years.”48 So, while religious ideology is not irrelevant to the Houthi movement or the Sunni

majority in Yemen, Yadav continues that it is critical to understand the relationship between

sectarian identity and “the meaning of sectarian concepts of good governance and opposition

to corruption, and question whether these are consistent with existing institutions and

governing practices by Yemen’s transitional government.”49 Put simply, the rhetoric of the

Houthi insurgency is one of nationalist inclusivity, not religious division. The 2011 uprisings

demonstrated that religious affiliation is superseded by the intrinsic desire for effective

governance and state accountability.

46 Charles Schmitz, Huthi.

47Stacey Philbrick Yadav, The limits of the ‘sectarian’ framing in Yemen, Washington Post, September 25, 2014,
10.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.
However, discourse concerning the current crisis in Yemen has shifted inexorably since the

occupation of Sana’a, a shift that must be understood through the intervention of the Saudi

led gulf coalition and the launch of Operation Decisive Storm and, more broadly, the proxy

struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran currently playing out across the Middle East. Though

the Saudi Arabia led coalition of nine gulf states involved in Operation Decisive Storm in

March 2015 was ostensibly justified “to defend the legitimate government of President

Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi,”50 Gause argues that “Riyadh’s involvement is driven by the

paranoia of Iran’s expanding influence in Saudi Arabia’s neighbour.”51 Salisbury affirms this,

describing how “diplomats in Riyadh, Washington and London [claim that] the Houthis are

backed by Tehran, as part of Iran’s efforts to expand its network of proxies across the region -

a line largely taken at face value by Western and regional media.”5253

Saudi Arabia’s historical involvement in Yemen is complicated, with shifting allegiances

belying the primordialist discourse that often permeates the narrative of this proxy war.

Indeed, support from Riyadh seems predicated primarily on pragmatism - evidenced by the

long term support Wahhabi Saudi Arabia provided to the Zaydi imamate in its campaign

50BBC World News, Saudi Arabia launches air strikes in Yemen, BBC Middle East Bureau, 26 March, 2015,
Last Modified 26 March 2015, Accessed at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32061632>

51 Gause, Beyond Sectarianism, 31.

52Peter Salisbury, Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War, Chatham House, Middle East and North Africa
Programme, February 2015, 2.

53 The literature concerning this Saudi Arabia/Iranian proxy war is expansive and it is beyond the remit of this
discussion to delve deeply into the geopolitical context. Peter Salisbury and F. Gregory Gause’s articles both
provide excellent starting points to examine way sectarianism is used as a tool in the regional struggle for
influence. Is important to recognise that while sectarianism is a vital tool, there is a fundamental difference
between understanding it as stemming from deeply held beliefs (as much contemporary discourse would
suggest) or used as a tool for political influence.
against Egyptian backed tribal groups and republican forces in the 1960’s.54 Indeed, Saudi

support for the Yemeni government is a relatively recent phenomenon - only in the early 21st

century Sana’a and Riyadh reconciling as the countries renegotiated border treaties, focussed

on combating religious extremism as well as Saudi Arabia emerging as a key player in the

formation of the transitional government in 2012.55 Saudi support of the regime is

undoubtedly based upon the desire for stability in the region, evidenced by the $4 billion cash

injections to Sana’a to keep the country afloat since the political transition in 2012 and the

military support given to former president Saleh in his military campaign against the Houthis

between 2004-2010.56

Iran’s involvement in Yemen is no less complicated, with it’s role in the ascendency of the

Houthi movement opaque. While western commentators have long accused Tehran and

Hezbollah of providing material support to the movement, the accuracy of these claims

remain unverified. Contradictory evidence abounds, with one New York Times article

reporting that US officials claimed arms shipments had been seized off the Yemeni coast with

their origins in Iran.57 Conversely, diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks in 2010

demarcated a notable skepticism from US officials in Sana’a of the extent that Iran was

backing the Houthi forces, believing the claims made by Saleh to be a ploy to receive more

aid from the United States.58 It is difficult to distinguish between the validity of the claims,

54Ginny Hill & Gerd Nonneman, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and
Regional Diplomacy, Chatham House, May 2011, 9.

55 Ibid.

56 Salisbury, Yemen, 10.

57Robert F. Worth, Yemen Seizes Sailboat Filled With Weapons, and U.S. Points to Iran, New York Times, 13
January 2013; http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/world/middleeast/29military.html.

58 Peter Salisbury, Yemen, 7.

many coming from ‘unnamed officials’ which are unable to be further corroborated. For

Tehran’s part, Ayatollah Khamenei has voiced qualified support for the Houthi cause -

stopping short of endorsing the takeover of Sana’a itself.59 Ultimately, though the evidence of

Iran’s involvement is circumspect at best - it does not negate the effect on the conflict in

Yemen. While the internal factors remain decisively grounded in local grievances, Gillin

argues that Houthi reliance on Iran could increase and “turn a largely domestic conflict into

another regional battleground...the Saudi-led intervention [acting as] the catalyst with the

potential to radically change Yemen’s ‘mild’ sectarianism.”60

How does sectarian identity factor into this proxy struggle for regional influence? What role,

if any, does sectarian identity play in this transformation? It is a common, but false, assertion

that this regional struggle for influence in Yemen fits into a Sunni versus Shia binary between

Saudi Arabia and Iran.61 History suggests that the role of religion is more complicated, with

distinct political overtones. Gause argues for an dual understanding that simultaneously

recognises how external actors invoke sectarian conflict as a pretence for intervention, but

that the basis for conflict itself is grounded in the desire for regional political influence.

“Conflict axes in the recent past”, he argues, “did not develop along Sunni-Shia lines.”62

Moreover, to accept an oversimplified Sunni versus Shia framing is to misunderstand the

motivations of the two major state actors in the regional contest for influence. It is simplistic

59 Peter Salisbury, Yemen, 7.

60 Joel Gillin, The Yemen Conflict Isn’t a Sectarian War - Yet.

61 A nuanced historical description of the rival Islamic sects and the intersection between religion and politics is
provided by the Council on Foreign Relations. See Council of Foreign Relations Report, The Sunni Shia Divide,
Council of Foreign Relations, 2014, Accessed at <http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-human-rights/sunni-
shia-divide/p33176#!/>

62 F. Gregory Gause, Beyond Sectarianism, 5.

to paint Saudi Arabia and Iran as sectarian actors, behaving with sectarian motives. Both are

obviously sectarian regimes, propounding very specific Sunni-Wahhabi (in the Saudi case)

and Shia (in the Iranian case) legitimacy arguments to bolster their rule. It is not unexpected,

then, that commentators ascribe sectarianism as the primary driver of foreign policy. But the

historical alliances of both states undermines this claim. Especially in Iran, where to be

locked in a sectarian frame would limit their potential regional allies - Khameini has sought

to cultivate ties with Hamas and Islamic Jihad.63 Riyadh meanwhile has not limited itself to

Sunni alliances, backing the Iraqiya party in the 2005 and 2010 Iraqi elections.64 It has also

distanced itself from what would seemingly be a natural ally in the Muslim Brotherhood,

while cultivating ties with the most secular of the rebel forces in Syria - the Free Syrian

Army.65 Sectarianism in the context of this ‘Cold War’, then, should be seen as a tool

deployed for strategic gain in the struggle for regional influence.

It is difficult to draw cogent comparisons between two states that, while bearing superficial

similarities in the progression from locally driven civil conflict to sectarian conflict, differ

dramatically in the manner in which mobilisation has taken place. This partially stems from a

temporal disparity - the Syrian conflict may now undoubtedly be categorised as a sectarian

conflict, while Yemen is still in the process of being drawn into a proxy war where

sectarianism is deployed as a political tool. In Yemen however, Abdo’s ‘reawakening’ of

tensions has been less successful, primarily because Yemen does not have a substantial

history of sectarian conflict. Nonetheless, the manipulation of sectarian identity by Tehran

63Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2009, 61-69, 171-73.

64 Michael Gordon, Meddling Neighbors Undercut Iraqi Stability, The New York Times, December 5, 2010.

65 F. Gregory Gause, Beyond Sectarianism, 6.

and Riyadh bears significant resemblance to the Syrian conflict, given that in both cases,

sectarian identity is an instrument, used by elites to achieve political ends.

What role does religious identity play in conflict in the Middle East? The escalation of

conflict in Syria and Yemen has led many commentators to place both within the binary of

the Sunni & Shia schism. Tensions between the two sects, they argue, have existed for

thousands of years - conflict an inevitable result of coexistence within states. But this line of

argument wilfully ignores the context of the conflicts and the complicated relationship

between sect, identity and politics in each state. This, however, is not to discount the role of

sectarianism as a driver of conflict - rather it seeks to shift the focus from an essentialist

presumption that identities are immutable and conflict-bound, to how these identities are

mobilised. For each case study reveals a distinct shift towards division along sectarian lines.

In Syria, this process occurred through the manipulation of religious minorities by a regime

who sought to reframe the conflict as religious to divide the opposition and mobilise ethno-

religious minority groups against rebel forces. In turn opposition forces, marginalised by the

state, were radicalised by a coalescence of factors - both internal and external - that has led to

the proliferation of competing rebel groups, from the moderate FSA to Salafi Jabhat al-Nusra

and Islamic state. In Yemen, the current conflict is the result of accumulated discontent with a

state apparatus that has perpetuated political, economic and social inequality since unification

in 1990. The Houthi movement, though mainly comprised of Zaydi Shiites, was able to

takeover the capital because of it’s capacity to mobilise public opposition against President

Saleh’s regime then the transitional government under President Hadi. Arguing that the

predominantly Sunni Islahis and the Shiite Houthis are engaged in conflict based on ‘ancient

hatreds’ ignores the contemporary history of the state, where Islahi and Houthi participated in
protests together against Saleh’s regime. As Yadav argues, “The Houthi’s march on Sanaa in

September cannot be easily glossed as ‘sectarian' just because they are Zaydi Shiites, and

most (though not all) Islahis are Sunnis. The existence of nominal difference is not by itself a

compelling causal story.”66 Complicating the narrative on both states is the role of external

actors who have sought to use state weakness to engage in a surrogate struggle for regional

influence. Though external actors were important in the secondary phase of transforming

Syria’s civil war to one based on sectarian division, in Yemen the strikes by the gulf coalition

threatens to reify a proxy sectarian struggle in a country with little significant history of

sectarian division. This essay has posited that Yemen lies earlier on the continuum of

sectarian conflict than Syria because, internally, religious identities are not yet mobilised.

Paradoxically, however, sectarianism does play a role in the broader conflict between Saudi

Arabia and Iran, which in turn has a flow on effect upon the states where the conflict plays

out. In order to understand this, there must be a more nuanced view on religion that

primordial assertions that it is wholly responsible for conflict in the Middle East. Instead

sectarianism should be viewed as an instrument, ideational rather than ideological, that “lies

on the surface of what is a deeper and long running conflict about regime legitimacy.”67 This

battle is taking place domestically and regionally, and to misinterpret it as an inevitable result

of ‘ancient hatreds’ limits the capacity to formulate effective policy responses. The

mobilisation of religious identity is a fundamentally unstable tool in the policy arsenal and, as

Peter Salisbury argues; “once the cycle has begun, it is very hard to bring it to an end.

66 Yadav, Yemen.
67 Jeff Colgan, How Sectarianism Shapes Yemen’s War, Washington Post, April 13, 2015.
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