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Moral judgment development across cultures:

Revisiting Kohlberg’s universality claims

Article in Developmental Review · December 2007

DOI: 10.1016/j.dr.2007.04.001

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Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

www.elsevier.com/locate/dr

Moral judgment development across

cultures: Revisiting Kohlberg’s universality claims
a,*
John C. Gibbs , Karen S. Basinger b, Rebecca L. Grime c,
John R. Snarey d
a
Psychology Department, The Ohio State University, 1835 Neil Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210, USA
b
College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Urbana University, 579 College Way, Urbana, OH 43078, USA
c
Psychology Department, Washington & Jefferson College, 60 South Lincoln Street, Washington, PA 15301, USA
d
Psychology Department, Emory University, 532 Kilgo Circle, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA

Received 26 November 2006; revised 26 April 2007

Available online 2 August 2007

Abstract

This article revisits Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental claims that stages of moral judgment,
facilitative processes of social perspective-taking, and moral values are commonly identifiable across
cultures. Snarey [Snarey, J. (1985). The cross-cultural universality of social-moral development: A
critical review of Kohlbergian research. Psychological Bulletin, 97, 202–232] examined Kohlberg’s
claims in a survey of 45 cross-cultural studies in 27 countries that used Kohlberg’s dilemma method
of stage assessment (the Moral Judgment Interview, MJI [Colby, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1987). The
measurement of moral judgment: Vol. 1. Theoretical foundations and research validation. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press]). Snarey’s review identified a basic stage trend but also the cultural
specificity of Kohlberg’s highest stages. As a remedy, Snarey proposed a culturally inclusive elabo-
ration of the highest stages. Another proposed model [Gibbs, J. C. (2003). Moral development and
reality: Beyond the theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage] argued for matu-
rity in the basic moral judgment stage trend. Gibbs’ revisionist model has been associated with an
alternative (dilemma-free) assessment method (the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form,
SRM-SF [Gibbs, J. C., Basinger, K. S., & Fuller, D. (1992). Moral maturity: Measuring the develop-
ment of sociomoral reflection. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum]). Snarey’s and Gibbs’s revisionist models are
compared and used as frameworks for interpreting not only the MJI findings but also newer SRM-
SF findings from 75 cross-cultural studies conducted in 23 countries. Despite continuing questions

*
Corresponding author. Fax: +1 614 292 4357.
E-mail address: gibbs.1@osu.edu (J.C. Gibbs).

0273-2297/$ - see front matter Ó 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.dr.2007.04.001
444 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

for research, multimethod convergence is found for common moral values, basic moral judgment
stage development, and related social perspective-taking across cultural groups.
Ó 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Kohlberg, Lawrence; Moral development; Moral values; Stages of moral judgment; Sociomoral
Reflection Measure—Short Form; Social perspective-taking; Social behavior; Cross-cultural research

Introduction

Children, as they become adolescents and adults, grow beyond the superficial in moral
judgment. This thesis is at first blush modest, yet upon consideration provokes questions
and controversy. Are some moral judgments really more superficial or less adequate than
others? Is growth toward increasingly mature moral judgment defined by basic qualitative
changes or stages? Does one stage follow another in some regular sequence? Does moral
judgment develop through social interaction, and with reference to common moral values?
Finally, and most important for this review: Is moral judgment development basically the
same across diverse cultural groups?
Perhaps no developmental psychologist has advanced the thesis of moral judgment
development across cultures more boldly and extensively than did Lawrence Kohlberg.
His ‘‘choice of topics’’ in the 1960s, namely, moral development, ‘‘made him something
of an ‘odd duck’ within American psychology. . . .No up-to-date social scientist,
acquainted with [the relativism of] psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and cultural anthropol-
ogy, used such words at all.’’ Yet the development of moral judgment ‘‘is, after all, a very
substantial aspect of human psychology’’ (Brown & Herrnstein, 1978, pp. 307). With his
challenge to moral relativism, advancement of a cognitive developmental approach to
morality, dilemma-based assessment method, six-stage model, and universality claims,
Kohlberg eventually became one of the most frequently cited names in the social and
behavioral sciences (Haggbloom et al., 2000). His stage theory of moral development con-
tinues to be represented in virtually every contemporary developmental psychology
textbook.
This article investigates moral judgment development across cultures. Our aim is to
revisit with a relatively new assessment method Kohlberg’s generic claim that, in principle,
there is a cross-cultural universality to the development of moral judgment as well as to
social perspective-taking processes and moral values. Although Kohlberg posited distinct
moral judgment stages that develop mainly through social interaction and perspective-tak-
ing, he began partly by identifying stable moral judgment trends that ‘‘reflect cognitive
development’’ (Kohlberg, 1964, p. 398).

A broad cognitive developmental approach

In the broadest sense, a cognitive developmental approach to morality would seem

unobjectionable. Is not growth beyond the superficial in moral understanding integral
to growth beyond the superficial in cognition generally? John Flavell and colleagues (Flav-
ell, Miller, & Miller, 2002; cf. Gibbs, 2003) have for many years emphasized that ‘‘both
social and nonsocial cognitive development tend to proceed from surface appearances’’
or ‘‘salient features of the here-and-now,’’ to ‘‘the construction of an inferred underlying
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 445

reality’’ (p. 181). In this holistic or ‘‘domain-general’’ tradition (Sokol & Chandler, 2004,
p. 160), Piaget (1932/1965), Kohlberg (1964, 1984), and other developmentalists interested
in morality have identified young children’s characteristic tendency to conflate morality
with salient here-and-now features of size, power, impressive appearances and outcomes,
or egocentric desires (e.g., a certain distribution of goods may be considered fair because
‘‘the biggest should get the most,’’ or because ‘‘I want it,’’ Damon, 1977, pp. 78–79). The
‘‘pull of the present’’ attenuates as children increasingly coordinate and ‘‘integrate over
time and events’’ in their social and nonsocial worlds (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 180).
Generally correlative to nonsocial cognitive development, then, is social cognitive
growth beyond the superficial (e.g., Walker, 1980). A mature interpersonal understanding
(of trust, mutuality, and other intangible bases of the right or good) tends to emerge and
differentiate from references to surface appearances or instrumental considerations. In
self-reports of social conflict, for example, an age trend toward more mature psychological
understanding and moral evaluation can be discerned. Preschoolers’ (relative to older chil-
dren’s and adolescents’) accounts of having been hurt or having hurt another person ‘‘lack
depth’’ and tend to be ‘‘utterly behavioral,’’ featuring simple acts of physical harm (e.g.,
‘‘Um, Jack hit me. And he also, he also kicked me’’) (Wainryb, Brehl, & Matwin, 2005,
p. 54). In contrast, older children and adolescents are increasingly likely to coordinate
or shift perspectives, to refer to subtle mental states or emotions such as intentions, and
to describe violations of trust (Wainryb et al., 2005, pp. 43–54; cf. Carpendale, 2000).
In this age trend, the key phrase of the quoted statement from Flavell and colleagues is
‘‘tend to proceed’’ (emphasis added). The superficiality of young children’s moral judg-
ment is a characteristic tendency of thought (Siegler, 1996a), not a strict incapacity. It
would be inaccurate to imply ‘‘that young children never make inferences about unper-
ceived states of affairs or that older children never base conclusions on superficial appear-
ances’’ (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 141). Indeed, appeals to authority or punishment scarcely
appear in preschoolers’ prosocial reasoning (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006); nor do
egocentric biases appear in their narratives of having hurt others (Wainryb et al., 2005;
but cf. Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006). Preschoolers may be remarkably sophisticated
in their understanding of the moral domain (see Moral judgment in childhood section).

Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental approach

Beyond the age-related cognitive trends, Kohlberg (1971, 1984) formulated a cognitive
developmental approach that delineated a distinct place for moral judgment, for facilita-
tive social interaction, and for clear stage sequence. These tenets of Kohlberg’s cognitive
developmental approach have empirical implications.
Moral development as a distinct, unitary domain of development. For Kohlberg, moral
judgment—consisting of reasons or justifications for decisions or values that pertain to
just or benevolent social action (e.g., Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; Gibbs, 2003)—is
not merely integral to social and nonsocial cognitive development, but rather is a distinct,
unitary domain with a parallel trajectory in its own right. As Kohlberg (1971) moved
beyond a broad cognitive developmental approach, he asserted that ‘‘moral development
is its own sequential process, rather than the reflection of cognitive development in a
slightly different content’’ (p. 187). In this respect, Kohlberg became more a domain-spe-
cific than a domain-general or ‘‘unity’’ theorist of moral justifications and values (but cf.
Sokol & Chandler, 2004). Although moral judgment development should relate to intelli-
446 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

gence and cognitive development, moral judgment should in any culture define its own dis-
tinct and homogeneous domain. An empirical implication—which we will review—is that
moral reasons or justifications should yield a single factor in factor analyses across cul-
tures. A final empirical implication to be reviewed is that the moral values to which the
justifications refer should be relevant to diverse cultures.
Social perspective-taking opportunities. Kohlberg argued that, although generic perspec-
tival coordination and working memory may be relevant to moral development, the per-
spective-taking process facilitating moral growth is distinctly social (Gibbs, 2003). Taking
and keeping in mind the perspectives of other persons is uniquely complex, not least
because the social ‘‘object’’ can be a subject, i.e., may take its own perspective as well as
the perspective of the perspective-taker (Damon, 1988; Flavell et al., 2002; Hoffman,
1981; Selman, 1980). Beyond Piaget’s (1932/1965) emphasis on peer interaction, Kohlberg
argued that opportunities to take the perspectives of other persons, roles, groups, and
institutions in society should stimulate moral reflection and development.
Of particular relevance to this review will be the consequent expectation that moral
judgment maturity should correlate with age, education, higher socioeconomic status,
urban (versus rural) settings, and community participation, insofar as these variables
index the affordance and accumulation of diverse social experiences and perspective-tak-
ing opportunities through social participation (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman,
1983). In this connection, we will be particularly interested in correlations of moral
judgment maturity with self-reported social perspective-taking opportunities and in
cross-cultural studies of moral judgment developmental delay among delinquents. An
intriguing alternative possibility (also consistent with such correlations) is that diverse
social experiences foster the development of more adequate psychological (e.g., repre-
sentational) understandings or ‘‘theories’’ of mind (one’s own and others’), which then
make possible the moral judgment gains (e.g., Lalonde & Chandler, 2002; Wainryb &
Brehl, 2006).
Stage and invariant sequence. Kohlberg anticipated that, with the proper discernment of
structure in content, a dominant pattern or framework would cohere in a person’s moral
judgment. Kohlberg based his expectation in Piagetian theory, although the extent to
which Piagetian theory claims concurrence in the emergence of a stage is controversial
(Brainerd, 1978, 1979; Carpendale, 2000; Chapman, 1988; Lourenco & Macado, 1996).
In any event, Kohlberg anticipated that (with proper criteria) a new ‘‘stage’’ would signify
not just a qualitatively new tendency of thought in a rough age trend, but a highly coher-
ent framework that would ‘‘hang together’’ as such in an individual’s moral judgment.
Once the stage structures were precisely identified, not only would moral judgment be uni-
tary, but each moral judgment stage would follow the next in a clearly invariant sequence.
Invariant sequence is a fundamental criterion of the stage construct in Piagetian theory, as
indicated in seminal critiques by Charles Brainerd (1978, 1979). Findings bearing upon
stage and invariant sequence are discussed in a subsequent section.

Revisiting Kohlberg’s universality claims

The testable implications of Kohlberg’s domain-specific cognitive developmental

approach to moral growth have attracted extensive research attention. This article will
review findings pertaining to these implications as part of a larger theoretical and empir-
ical revisiting of Kohlberg’s universality claims for moral development. In particular, this
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 447

article revisits Kohlberg’s universality claims for moral judgment stage development,
moral values, and social perspective-taking processes in the two-decade aftermath of a
landmark cross-cultural review of his work by John Snarey (1985). Was Kohlberg’s gen-
eric claim correct, that moral understanding grows in systematic ways beyond the super-
ficial across a diversity of cultural contexts? What of his universality claims for moral
values and for facilitative social perspective-taking processes? What issues remain unre-
solved or underexplored? Kohlberg’s universality claims will be revisited through a review
of 75 cross-cultural moral judgment studies using an assessment measure alternative to
Kohlberg’s (see Basinger, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1995; Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992).
Adequate consideration of Kohlberg’s universality claims requires some understanding
of their context. Accordingly, before we review the cross-cultural studies, we will devote
extensive attention to background considerations of Kohlberg’s work, the emergence of
revisionist models, and related methodological developments in the assessment of moral
judgment.

Revisionist models

Almost all individuals in all cultures use the same . . . basic moral categories, con-
cepts, principles, [and values], and . . . all individuals in all cultures go through the
same order or sequence of gross stages of development, though they vary in rate
and terminal point of development. . . .[given differential] opportunities for role-tak-
ing. (Kohlberg, 1971, pp. 176, 183)
As noted, Kohlberg emphatically advanced the thesis that moral judgment develops in
basically the same way across cultures. Beyond the broad point that morality relates to
cognitive development, Kohlberg’s domain-specific cognitive developmental approach
championed moral judgment (including moral values) as a distinct, unitary domain, and
moral judgment development as a socially facilitated sequence of stages. Kohlberg applied
his generic claim—that moral judgment in all cultures develops in the same order or
sequence—specifically to his six-stage model of moral judgment.
This section narrates the early history of Kohlberg’s evolving cognitive developmental
approach and stage model, including the problems that led to certain revisionist models.
His longitudinal and cross-cultural research yielded empirical support but also anomalies
and limitations. In response, Kohlberg made certain refinements and qualifications with
reference to his six-stage model. Among other responses were revisionist models proposed
by Snarey (1985; Snarey & Keljo, 1991) and Gibbs (1977, 1979, 2003). Gibbs’s model
entailed an alternative assessment method that has been used extensively in cross-cultural
research. This early history will provide the background needed for an informed review
of the cross-cultural empirical literature entailing use of this alternative assessment
method.

Background

In an autobiographical reflection on his intellectual career, Kohlberg provided the

background for the revisionist stage models (his own and others’) that were to emerge.
In a 1985 lecture in Japan, Kohlberg (1991/1985) recounted the history of his moral judg-
ment stages in the context of his ‘‘personal search for universal morality’’:
448 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

My views . . .were based on John Dewey’s philosophy of development and his writ-
ings concerning the impulsive, group-conforming, and reflective stages of moral
development. The first empirical work to pursue this direction was taken by the great
Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget, in 1932. . . .Using dilemmas created by philosophers
or novelists [in my 1958 dissertation], I was struck by the fact that adolescents had
distinctive patterns of thinking which were coherent and were their own, just as Pia-
get had seen distinctive patterns of thinking in younger children. In my dissertation I
tentatively characterized these patterns as qualitative stages and added three stages
to those formulated by Piaget.
When I completed my dissertation I was well aware that by describing [eighty-four]
American boys, aged ten to sixteen, I had not created a universal theory. The stages
had to meet criteria [such as invariant sequence] . . .The first step . . .was to follow up
my original subjects. . . .The longitudinal study has led to refinement and revision in
the description and scoring of the stages.. . .Coordinate with [this] follow-up study
was checking my doubts about whether the stages were really universal in non-Wes-
tern cultures. . . .The final stages have been found to be rare. (pp. 14–15)
Kohlberg’s empirical starting point in the late 1950’s, then, was the work of Jean Piaget.
Kohlberg (1964, 1984) saw in Piaget’s (1932/1965) classic Moral Judgment of the Child the
potential for establishing, by discerning structure in content, a universal moral develop-
ment model. Piaget had identified age trends, reflecting successive stages or phases of
moral judgment among children and youth, that might be standard across cultural groups,
social classes, genders, ethnic statuses, and cohorts. Could a distinct domain of structural
stages be identified? Insofar as each stage prepares the foundation for the next, established
stages would be sequential and progressively adequate,1 with the highest stage defining the
most mature or competent understanding. The stage sequence would be standard or uni-
form (the invariant sequence criterion), with neither skipping (foundational stages cannot
be bypassed) nor regression (competence once constructed cannot ordinarily be lost). Cul-
tural and other social factors would not alter the developmental sequence, although differ-
ential social perspective-taking opportunities might influence a given child’s rate of stage
development and whether that child progresses through the full range. The established
stage model of moral judgment development, then, would be standard or uniform across
diverse cultures.
To promote the cross-cultural applicability of Piaget’s developmental findings, Kohl-
berg revised and expanded on Piaget’s moral judgment work. Kohlberg’s early work
(Kohlberg, 1964) critically reviewed the various aspects of moral judgment studied by Pia-
get and identified as promising for an established stage model those qualitative age trends
that were stable across social or cultural contexts and reflected general cognitive develop-
ment. Like Piaget, Kohlberg clinically interviewed his participants, probing the reasons or
justifications for their decisions and evaluations of moral values. Whereas Piaget’s partic-
ipants had responded to pairs of contrasting stories, however, Kohlberg’s participants
responded to standardized hypothetical dilemmas, which Kohlberg argued would be more
likely to elicit spontaneous, authentic reasoning (see Table 1). Whereas Piaget studied boys
and girls aged 6–13, Kohlberg in his dissertation extended the age range to include 16-

1
Kohlberg (1971) advanced a philosophical argument for his moral judgment stages as prescriptive and
progressively adequate, in contrast to relativistic positions.
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500
Table 1
Three moral judgment assessment techniques
A story pair used by
Piaget (1932/1965)
A. A little boy who is called John is
in his room. He is called to dinner.
He goes into the dining room. But
behind the door there was a chair,
and on the chair there was a tray with
fifteen cups on it. John couldn’t have
known that there was all this behind
the door. He goes in, the door knocks
against the tray, bang go the fifteen
cups and they all get broken!
B. Once there was a little boy whose
name was Henry. One day when his
mother was out he tried to get some
jam out of the cupboard. He climbed
up on a chair and stretched out his
arm. But the jam was too high up
and he couldn’t reach it and have
any. But while he was trying to get
it he knocked over a cup. The cup fell
down and broke.
1. Are these children equally
naughty?
2. Which of the two is naughtier, and
why?
[Interviewers are advised to begin
by having the child repeat the stories.
The opening two questions become
‘‘the occasion for a conversation
more or less elaborate according to
the child’s reaction’’ (p.123).]
A moral dilemma used
by Kohlberg (1958)
In Europe, a woman was near death
from cancer. There was one drug
the doctors thought might save
her. A druggist in the same town
had discovered it, but he was charg-
ing ten times what the drug cost him
to make. The sick women’s hus-
band, Heinz, went to everyone he
knew to borrow the money, but he
could only get together half of what
it cost. The druggist refused to sell it
cheaper or let Heinz pay later. So
Heinz got desperate and broke into
the man’s store to steal the drug for
his wife. Should Heinz have done
that? Why or why not? (para-
phrased from Colby et al., 1983,
p.77)
The Heinz Dilemma is the first of
three dilemmas in Form A (the
Moral Judgment Interview [MJI]
has Forms A, B, and C).
Sample questions:
1. Should Heinz steal the drug?
Why or why not?
2. If Heinz doesn’t love his wife,
should he steal the drug for her?
Why or why not?
3. Suppose the person dying is not
his wife but a stranger. Should
Heinz steal the drug for the stran-
ger? Why or why not?
4. Is it important for people to do
everything they can to save
another’s life? Why or why not?
5. Should people try to do every-
thing they can to obey the law?
Why or why not?
Thinking in terms of society,
should people who break the law
be punished?
[Sample questions following a
dilemma concerning a father’s
promise to his son:]
Is it important to keep a promise?
Why or why not?
Is it important to keep a promise to
someone you don’t know well and
probably won’t see again?
Why or why not?
449
Social Reflection Questionnaire
(Gibbs et al., 1992)
1. Think about when you’ve made
a promise to a friend of yours. How
important is it for people to keep
promises, if they can, to friends?
Circle one: very important
important not important
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT
IMPORTANT
NOT IMPORTANT
(whichever one you circled)?
[The same format is used for the
remaining questions]
2. What about keeping a promise
to anyone? How important is it
for people to keep promises, if
they can, even to someone they
hardly know?
3. How about keeping a promise
to a child? How important is it
for a parent to keep promises, if
they can, to their children?
4. In general, how important is it
for people to tell the truth?
5. Think about when you’ve
helped your mother and father.
How important is it for children
to help their parents?
6. Let’s say a friend of yours
needs help and may even die,
and you’re the only person who
can save him or her. How impor-
tant is it for a person (without los-
ing his or her own life) to save the
life of a friend?
7. What about saving the life of
anyone? How important is it for a
person (without losing his or her
own life) to save the life of a
stranger?
8. How important is it for a per-
son to live even if that person
doesn’t want to?
9. How important is it for people
not to take things that belong to
other people?
10. How important is it for people
to obey the law?
11. How important is it for judges
to send people who break the law
to jail?
450 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

year-olds (although he initially studied only males). He subsequently supplemented his

longitudinal sample with cross-sectional samples of males and females. As he noted in
his 1985 recollection, Kohlberg ‘‘tentatively characterized’’ three distinctive patterns in
adolescents’ moral judgment as stages. He added them to the childhood phases already
formulated by Piaget to comprise a six-stage model with domain-specific and universalist
claims for moral development.
Kohlberg’s six-stage formulation drew particular inspiration from the writings of John
Dewey (Bergman, 2006; Gibbs, 2006a). As Kohlberg (1991/1985) also recalled, he based
the direction of his Piagetian empirical work on Dewey’s posited typology of impulsive,
group-conforming, and reflective levels of moral development (Dewey & Tufts, 1908).
Kohlberg (1969) termed these levels preconventional, conventional, and postconventional,
and assimilated his six stages to this framework. Nested within the preconventional level
of childhood were Stages 1 (‘‘punishment and obedience;’’ cf. Piaget’s ‘‘heteronomy’’) and
2 (‘‘pragmatic and instrumental;’’ cf. Piaget’s ‘‘reciprocity as a fact’’). Nested within the
conventional level (normally emergent by the adolescent years) were Stages 3 (interper-
sonal relationships; cf. Piaget’s ‘‘reciprocity as an ideal’’) and 4 (societal order). The post-
conventional level (initially defined as already evident in adolescence in some cases) was
seen as encompassing Stages 5 (social contract) and 6 (universal ethical principles). This
level is particularly interesting in its Deweyan linkage of reflection with maturity: Truly
mature moral judgment—universal principles, theories, or philosophies—is thought to
emerge as the individual moves beyond the group-conforming level to reflect upon the
conventions (norms, customs, rules) of one’s society or group.
Kohlberg and others subjected his six-stage cognitive developmental model to longitu-
dinal and cross-cultural scrutiny. After completing his dissertation in 1958, Kohlberg
along with colleagues conducted longitudinal research to investigate the invariant
sequence of the stages. In the 1960s, he also conducted several pilot cross-cultural studies
to investigate whether the stages and dilemma values ‘‘were really universal in non-Wes-
tern cultures’’ (see his recollection quoted above). The dilemma values (e.g., life, affiliation,
property, law, legal justice, contract, and truth) pertained to prescriptively just and
benevolent social action (cf. broader value typologies developed by Rokeach, 1973, and
Schwartz, 1994).
Kohlberg’s longitudinal study. Kohlberg’s longitudinal study (Colby et al., 1983) was
conducted from 1956 through 1976. The study consisted of follow-up interviews every
3–4 years with his original dissertation sample of American boys aged 10, 13, and 16 years.
Most of the original sample of 84 were interviewed at least three times (10 were inter-
viewed all six times), leaving a final longitudinal sample of 58 men. The interview instru-
ment, the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), featured Kohlberg’s moral dilemmas or
‘‘value conflicts’’ (p. 9). Associated probe questions (e.g., ‘‘Is it important for people to
do everything they can to save another’s life? Why or why not?’’) were used to assess par-
ticipants’ reasoning concerning the decision issues and values entailed in the dilemmas (as
illustrated by the Heinz dilemma from Form A of the MJI; see Table 1). The MJI dilemma
assessment method encompassed, in addition to the dilemma-based interview, a stage scor-
ing manual and scoring system.
Results from the Colby et al. (1983) USA longitudinal study generally supported
(despite an anomaly; see below) the empirically testable aspects of Kohlberg’s cognitive
developmental approach and stage model. Consistent with the tenet that moral judgment
relates to cognition were correlations between moral judgment maturity and intelligence
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 451

(IQ). That moral judgment is nonetheless a unitary domain in its own right was suggested
by findings of a single factor in factor analyses. That each stage is empirically coherent was
suggested by findings of low stage mixture (although these findings were later criticized as
an artifact of MJI scoring algorithms; see Krebs, Vermuelen, Carpendale, & Denton,
1991). Finally, consistent with the tenet that social participation figures importantly into
moral judgment development were correlations with age, socioeconomic status, and
education.
Yet the longitudinal results also initially yielded an anomaly: apparent regression in
moral judgment, i.e., a violation of invariant sequence. Approximately 20% of the lon-
gitudinal participants regressed from ostensibly principled moral judgment in late high
school to much lower scores by the second or third year of college (Kohlberg & Kra-
mer, 1969). This anomaly led, as Kohlberg recollected, ‘‘to refinement and revision in
the description and scoring of the stages’’ (see Table 2). These refinements were
designed to restore invariant sequence and in general ‘‘to construct a more adequate
assessment instrument’’ (Colby et al., 1983, p. 6). The refinements were effected with
seven longitudinal ‘‘construction cases,’’ then cross-validated with the remainder of
the sample. The final scoring system was termed MJI Standard Issue Scoring (Colby
et al., 1987).
The refinements did restore invariant sequence (cf. Walker, 1988), but they also gen-
erated ‘‘a fairly radical change in age norms’’ (Colby et al., 1983, p. 67). Of particular
relevance to subsequent revisionist models was the fact that the criteria especially for the
highest stages became ‘‘more stringent’’ (p. 67). Moral justifications of high school stu-
dents previously scored Stage 5 or 6 were reinterpreted as at the ‘‘member of society’’ or
conventional level, albeit with an intuitive or ‘‘Type B’’ understanding of interpersonal
or societal moral ideals (‘‘Type A’’ moral judgments were more embedded in interper-
sonal or societal conventions or social conformity). True Stage 5 and Stage 6 moral
judgments were reinterpreted as entailing ‘‘natural’’ (as distinct from professional) phi-
losophy (Kohlberg, 1973a) and as ‘‘defining a moral theory and justifying basic moral
terms or principles from a standpoint outside [or prior to] that of a member of a con-
stituted society’’ (Kohlberg, 1973b, p.192). The refined definition for Stage 6 ‘‘came from
the writings of a small elite sample, elite in the sense of its formal [ethical] philosophical
training and in the sense of its ability for and commitment to moral leadership’’ (Kohl-
berg, 1984, p. 270, emphasis added). Stages 5 and 6 were no longer seen before adult-
hood and became infrequent even among adults: 16% evidenced ‘‘at least the 4/5
transition’’ and very few evidenced mainly or wholly Stage 5. Stage 6 became so infre-
quent that it was omitted as a distinct stage from the scoring manual (possible Stage 6
responses were assimilated to Stage 5) (Colby et al., 1983, p. 69).
Even in the dissertation sample (Kohlberg, 1958), the postconventional stages had been
less than common; now they were rare. Intriguingly, the very refinements that restored
invariant sequence in the longitudinal data also diminished the prospect of support for
the full range of stages as universally evident. The highest stages were not simply ‘‘found’’
(as Kohlberg recollected) but more precisely were refined to be rare.
Kohlberg’s cross-cultural studies. In the 1960s, Kohlberg conducted small-scale studies
in semi-literate peasant villages of Mexico, Taiwan, and Turkey to assess the universality
of his evolving stage model (see Snarey, 1985). Despite the use of less stringent dilemma-
based scoring methods in these early studies, ‘‘Stages 5 and 6 [were] totally absent’’ in the
village data (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 383). Kohlberg had never claimed universality for the rate
452 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

or final level of his six stages, only for the invariance of their sequence during develop-
ment. Some developmental delay or less than full development might be expected, for
example, for individuals growing up in social environments that were less conducive to
social role participation, that is, afforded fewer opportunities for social-perspective-taking.
Progress even to the fourth stage required ‘‘enlarged’’ or expanded social perspective-tak-
ing in university or complex work settings (Edwards, 1978; Kohlberg, 1984, p. 428; Mason
& Gibbs, 1993a, 1993b).
Yet, as Kohlberg recollected, he had undertaken his own early cross-cultural studies
precisely to determine ‘‘whether the stages were really universal in non-Western cultures.’’
The total absence of the highest third of his stage typology in non-Western or peasant
village cultures, if confirmed, would represent a serious challenge. As Snarey (1985)
put it,
All types of cultural groups (e.g., Western versus non-Western, urban versus folk)
must demonstrate all levels of moral reasoning in Kohlberg’s model to establish
its universality. The failure to find a particular stage in all studies of a particular type
of cultural group could indicate that the stage is culture specific. (p. 204)

Kohlberg’s (moderately) revisionist model

This emergent challenge to stage universality from Kohlberg’s own longitudinal and
early cross-cultural research, reinforced by Snarey’s (1981, 1982, 1983, 1984) on-going
cross-cultural research reviews, prompted Kohlberg (1981, 1991/1985, 1986) to qualify
his universality stage claim (critiqued in Snarey’s 1985 published review; see below). In
effect, Kohlberg proposed his own (moderately) revisionist model. He acknowledged that
the post-conventional or principled level of Stages 5 and 6 is not universal across all cul-
tural groups—indeed, as noted, he even suspended Stage 6 from the scoring manual in part
because of its rarity—but defended this state of affairs. Kohlberg (1981) suggested that the
principled level is specific to cultures with sufficient ‘‘cognitive and social complexity’’ and
breadth of ‘‘social unit’’ (e.g., from tribe to nation) (p. 129). Socially ‘‘complex’’ cultures
afforded individuals the opportunity to participate ‘‘in the secondary institutions of law,
government, and perhaps, work’’ (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 77; cf. Edwards, 1975). As noted,
Kohlberg had always acknowledged in principle that the terminal point or final level
would vary as a function of the perspective-taking opportunities afforded by particular
social environments. Now he (Kohlberg, 1981) asked: Is not a culture less rich or
expanded in social perspective-taking in some sense a less complex culture? Of course,
‘‘a culture cannot be located at a single stage, and the individual’s moral stage cannot
be derived directly from his or her culture’s [modal] stage’’ (p. 129; cf. Wainryb, 2006).
Nonetheless, Kohlberg suggested that individuals in less ‘‘complex’’ cultures—such as,
perhaps, the semi-literate peasant villages he had studied—would generally not be
expected to reach the highest stages.
Kohlberg even speculated that his stage model corresponded ‘‘to a progression in cul-
tural history,’’ in terms of which village cultures were less evolved insofar as they were pre-
reflective:
My findings that the two highest stages are absent in preliterate or semiliterate village
culture also suggests a mild doctrine of social evolutionism, such as was elaborated in
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 453

the classic work by Hobhouse in 1906. . . .Principled thinking appeared first in

human history in the period 600–400 B.C., when universal human ideals and rational
criticism of customary morality developed in Greece, Palestine, India, and China.
(cf. Kohlberg, 1971; Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 128, 378, 383)
Despite his defense of principled moral reflection as a selective and culminative product
of human history, we will see that—especially following Snarey’s (1985) review—Kohlberg
(1986) considered expanding the principles of his highest stages.

Snarey’s review

Snarey’s (1985) review accepted in principle the viability of Kohlberg’s search for
universal morality as well as his cognitive developmental approach. In the main, Sna-
rey’s aim was to assess the evidence for or against the empirically testable assumptions
implied by Kohlberg’s universality claims. These claims, Snarey noted, implied that the
dilemma-based moral interview adequately captures universal moral concerns and val-
ues across cultures. Also implied was that the stage sequence would be upheld and
the full range of stages would be evident to some extent in every type of culture
(e.g., folk vs. urban; non-Western vs. Western). Finally, all instances of genuine moral
reasoning in all cultures should be classifiable in terms of Kohlberg’s stages or stage
transitions.
To assess the empirically testable implications of Kohlberg’s universality stage claim,
Snarey began by ascertaining and reporting the methodological details (regarding sample
size, translation, dilemma adaptation, interview procedures, and means and ranges of
scores; Gielen, 1991) of Kohlberg’s early small-scale cross-cultural studies. He included
that information within a comprehensive survey of 45 studies (conducted within 27 coun-
tries or regions) of Kohlberg’s moral judgment stage model. Snarey noted the particular
scoring method used in each study and placed greater weight upon studies that used the
relatively more recent method (Moral Judgment Interview [MJI] Standard Issue Scoring;
Colby et al., 1987). He also noted ways in which the moral dilemmas and questions were
adapted and translated for use in different cultures.
With regard to the universality of the conflicts and values of Kohlberg’s dilemma
method, Snarey noted that for studies in most of the non-English-speaking countries,
the dilemmas and questions (and sometimes the manual) had been translated into the
appropriate indigenous language. Many researchers also converted the dilemmas to
functionally equivalent situations (e.g., converting the famous Heinz dilemma to a sit-
uation in which a husband would need to steal food, not a drug, to save his dying
wife). Some researchers reported that respondents had little or no difficulty in under-
standing the dilemmas and questions. Most researchers, however, did not comment
on issues of translation or ecological applicability (but cf. Dien, 1982). Vine (1986)
cautioned:
Great care is needed in adapting an instrument so subtle as the MJI for valid use in
test-alien cultures. . . .It seems clear that translating and otherwise adapting dilem-
mas, interviewing, and scoring responses, must all be done by persons intimately
familiar with the cultures being tested. . . .Testing may fail to do justice to the sub-
jects’ actual competence in moral reasoning [if the dilemmas] do not tap [subjects’
predominant concerns]. (pp. 435–436)
454 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

Snarey recommended that ‘‘future researchers pay closer attention to’’ the question of
whether the dilemma method and associated moral values are broadly applicable (1985, p.
215). What little evidence that did exist did not contradict Kohlberg’s cross-cultural claim
for the moral values entailed in his method.
With respect to Kohlberg’s stage model, Snarey (1985) found partial support for Kohl-
berg’s cognitive developmental approach and universality claims. Stage 1 to Stage 4 were
in evidence virtually universally when one took into consideration the age range and
sample size of the population under study. Further, most cross-cultural studies reported
positive associations between moral judgment stage and age, urban (versus folk) status,
and upper (versus working) social class. Finally, the review found that ‘‘all folk [or village]
cultural groups failed to exhibit any [Stage 5] postconventional reasoning’’ (p. 226). Kohl-
berg interpreted these latter findings as simply supporting the cognitive developmental
expectation of a relationship between social perspective-taking experiences and moral
judgment development. Snarey, however, interpreted the findings as also indicating an
association between moral judgment maturity and social privilege. This association, as
well as the complete failure to find postconventional reasoning (as defined by Kohlberg)
in a particular type of cultural group, led Snarey to suggest a degree of cultural partiality.
Finally, the study’s report included examples of arguably postconventional or princi-
pled reasoning among judgments in cross-cultural interviews that Kohlberg’s scoring sys-
tem had relegated to an ‘‘unscorable’’ or wastebasket category. The cumulative weight of
these findings, for Snarey, implied a need for model revision.

Snarey’s revisionist model: A pluralist–inclusionist elaboration for Stage 5

Snarey (1985) did not agree with Kohlberg that cultural groups in which some mem-
bers used postconventional reasoning (Stage 5 or Stage 6) were necessarily more com-
plex or advanced cultures. Snarey objected to Kohlberg’s social evolutionism, pointing
to anthropological evidence that economically and technologically simple cultures can
be complex in many ways (e.g., in language and belief systems) and that members
of these cultures, even without the experience of higher education, can ‘‘reason about
their customs and norms rather than blindly conforming to them’’ (p. 227). Accord-
ingly, while a given society may differ in terms of the ‘‘proportion of its population
reasoning at the higher stages, every type of culture is capable of supporting higher
stage reasoning’’ (p. 228). The differences between Kohlberg and Snarey lay in the per-
ception of the postconventional stages. Where Kohlberg saw the summit of social evo-
lution, Snarey sees a particular philosophical tradition and, thus, a problem of
monocultural bias.
To remedy the problem, Snarey called for greater cultural breadth in Kohlberg’s stage
typology and scoring manual. The model proposed by Snarey is philosophically pluralistic
and culturally inclusive (see Table 2):
The stage definitions are incomplete, especially for Stage 5 [the highest stage
included in the scoring manual]. Although Kohlberg’s preconventional and con-
ventional stages are well based on empirical operative judgments rather than
on philosophical ethical systems, this is only weakly true of the postconventional
stages. Descriptions of higher stage reasoning are primarily based upon Kant,
Rawls, and other Western philosophers. Of course, a system of philosophy
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 455

Table 2
Moral judgment development across cultures: Three revisionist models
Revisionist Kohlberg’s refined stage Snarey’s pluralist– Gibbs’s two-phase model
model model inclusionist stage model
Revision Empirical suspension of Acceptance of Stage 6 Highest ‘‘stages’’ as part of
Stage 6a; Stage 5 as suspension; rejection of existential phase; existential
culturally specific social evolutionism; phase overlaps with standard
product of social elaboration of Stage 5 to phase of immature and
evolution include other cultural mature stages
philosophies
Implication for Assimilation of possible Elaboration of Stage 5 Redesigned manual for
assessment Stage 6 responses into justifications in scoring scoring immature and
method Stage 5 justifications in manual; provisional mature standard stages;
scoring manual; retention of dilemma method possible supplementation
retention of dilemma with moral philosophiesb;
method new assessment method
(non-dilemma)
Stage typology Three levels Three levels Two phases
Preconventional level: Preconventional level: Standard development phase
Stage 1. Punishment and Stage 1. Punishment and Immature level:
obedience obedience Stage 1. Centrations on
Stage 2. Instrumental Stage 2. Instrumental salient features such as size
purpose and exchange purpose and exchange or power
Conventional level: Conventional level: Stage 2. Pragmatic exchanges
Stage 3. Interpersonal Stage 3. Interpersonal accord or concrete moral reciprocity
accord and conformity and conformity Mature level:
Stage 4. Societal accord Stage 4. Societal accord and Stage 3. Mutualities or ideal
and system maintenance system maintenance moral reciprocity
Postconventional level: Postconventional level: Stage 4. Systems. Expansion
Stage 5 (and 6). Social Stage 5 (and 6). Principled of mutualities into complex
contract, universal moral judgment social systems
ethical principles encompassing a plurality of Existential development phase
conceptions of justice and Philosophical reflection on
care, including non-Western ethics, meaning of life
philosophical systems
a
Subsequently recast and partially reinstated as ideal philosophical endstate (Kohlberg et al., 1990).
b
Following from Snarey.

common to the entire world does not exist, and the integration of all existing sys-
tems is not feasible. Thus, it is not surprising that Kohlberg’s postconventional
stage descriptions are incomplete. The stage model and scoring manual, neverthe-
less, should draw examples of reasoning at the higher stages from a wider range
of cultural world views. . . .The cross-cultural elaboration of postconventional
principles could, I believe, reveal Stage 5 to be a more common empirical phe-
nomenon. (Snarey, 1985, pp. 228–229)
In support of his proposal, Snarey (1985; cf. 1995) noted a certain pattern among
instances in the cross-cultural research of genuine yet problematic moral judgment, that
is, ethical justifications not readily classifiable in terms of any of the Kohlbergian stages.
456 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

The Standard Issue Scoring system and manual had the greatest difficulty with the ‘‘col-
lective or communalistic principled reasoning’’ of village or communitarian cultures (p.
226; cf. Baek, 2002). As an example, Snarey cited the reasoning of a 50-year-old man from
a communitarian culture (India). To justify an evaluation favoring Heinz’s stealing the
drug to save the life even of a pet animal (an optional MJI question), the respondent
appealed to ‘‘the unity of all life’’:
The right use of the drug is to administer it to the needy. There is some difference, of
course—human life is more evolved and hence of greater importance in the scheme
of nature—but an animal’s life is not altogether bereft of importance. . . . Life is
known, understood and felt by everyone. It is [just] a matter of fact whether it is
manifest in man or animal. The basic unity of life and its importance cannot be
denied. . . . All of life, human or nonhuman, is divine, sacred, and a manifestation
of the Supreme reality. . . . Spiritual consciousness. . . . should propel one towards
recognising the unity of all life rather than selecting victims that are powerless. It
is only in very special conditions that life survives and evolves to the standards
known to us. (Vasudev, 1983, pp. 7–8, cited in Snarey, 1985, p. 223; cf. Vasudev
& Hummel, 1987, p. 115)
Had the manual included such examples of non-Western philosophies or worldviews
for postconventional reasoning, Snarey argues, postconventional or principled stage rea-
soning would have been seen to be more common.
Kohlberg was persuaded, at least generally, of this point by the mid-1980s. He acknowl-
edged that ‘‘general principles at Stage 6 may be one or several,’’ including not only ‘‘uni-
versal human care or agape’’ but also other principles such as ‘‘maximum quality of life’’
(Kohlberg, 1986, p. 497). Nonetheless, Snarey’s suggestion was not implemented by Kohl-
berg and colleagues. The Standard Issue Scoring Manual, already in press, was published
in 1987 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Colby et al., 1987) without Snarey’s proposed cross-cul-
tural elaborations for Stage 5.

Other responses

Kohlberg’s and Snarey’s were not, of course, the only possible responses to the long-
brewing problem of rarity and cultural specificity at the highest stages. Other responses
entailed proposals that went beyond the suspension of Stage 6 or the elaboration of
Stage 5. Some critics argued that, despite some cross-cultural commonalities, the attempt
to assess greater or less moral adequacy among individuals in and across various cul-
tures was untenable. For these theorists (in the main, cultural psychologists, e.g., Shwe-
der, 1984; Shweder et al., 2006; Simpson, 1974; cf. J. G. Miller, 2006), the very notion of
moral judgment development across cultures, of progressive moral adequacy in some
non-relative sense, was suspect. Carolyn Edwards’ (1975, 1985, 1986) response was sym-
pathetic to both relativistic and developmental positions. In developmental terms, she
referred to ‘‘the transition from tribal to civilized society’’ as entailing the differentiation
of social control functions into separate institutions and hence a need for ‘‘more com-
plex and differentiated’’ moral judgment such as Stage 4 (see below). She cautioned,
however, that ‘‘‘higher’ is not necessarily better.’’ Rather than endorsing social evolu-
tionism, Edwards emphasized a functionalist or anthropological perspective: Life tasks
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 457

in different kinds of environments entail different ‘‘cognitive requirements’’ for effective

functioning (1975, p. 525).

Gibbs’s revisionist model: Two phases of life-span moral judgment development

Gibbs’s (1977, 1979, 2003) response to the problem of non-universality of the highest
stages can be compared (and contrasted) with the above perspectives. Like Snarey, Gibbs
subscribes to a broad as well as (with qualifications) a domain-specific cognitive develop-
mental approach to morality. Gibbs’ perspective, however, is more univocally develop-
mental (vs. functionalist) than Edwards’ perspective and more revisionist than Snarey’s.
Indeed, Gibbs went beyond Snarey and even Edwards in proposing a more fundamental,
Piaget-based revamping of Kohlberg’s stage model.
Gibbs (2006b) argues that Kohlberg should not have retained Dewey’s three-level
typology, especially in light of the challenges to that typology from Kohlberg’s own
longitudinal and cross-cultural data. As Kohlberg recollected, his work was based
not only on Piaget’s research but also on Dewey’s writings concerning three develop-
mental levels. Although Piaget (1932/1965) in his Moral Judgment of the Child made
no reference to Dewey, Dewey’s linkage of reflection to maturity is not inconsistent
with Piaget’s emphasis on reflective abstraction as in the construction from pragmatic
or tit-for-tat (‘‘short-sighted justice’’) to ideal (‘‘do as you would be done by’’) moral
reciprocity:
The child’s concern with reciprocity leads [him or her] beyond . . . short-sighted jus-
tice. . . . The child begins by simply practicing reciprocity, in itself not so easy a thing
as one might think. Then, once one has grown accustomed to this form of equilib-
rium in his action, his behavior is altered from within, its form reacting, as it were,
upon its content. What is regarded as just is no longer merely reciprocal action, but
primarily behavior that admits of indefinitely sustained reciprocity. The motto ‘‘Do
as you would be done by,’’ thus comes to replace the conception of crude equality.
The child sets forgiveness above revenge, not out of weakness, but because ‘‘there is
no end’’ to revenge (a boy of 10). . . . In ethics, reciprocity implies a purification of
the deeper trend of conduct, guiding it . . . to . . . the more refined forms of justice.
(pp. 323–324)
Although Dewey’s association of reflection with maturity was helpful, his view of basic
moral judgment stage maturity in terms of philosophical reflection (in Gibbs’ view) was
not. According to Gibbs, Kohlberg’s longitudinal data fit Piaget’s empirical work much
better than it did Dewey’s three-level typology. Indeed, Gibbs argues that Kohlberg
should have discarded Dewey’s preconventional–conventional–postconventional typol-
ogy, not least because its emphasis on philosophical reflection encouraged a rarification
of the construct of basic moral judgment maturity. Recall that, in the service of restoring
invariant sequence, Kohlberg stretched the ‘‘conventional level’’ or ‘‘member of society’’
level to assimilate various ‘‘principled-sounding’’ (and formerly ‘‘Stage 5’’ or ‘‘Stage 6’’)
moral justifications such as ‘‘trust is the basis for relationships’’ for the importance of
keeping promises and ‘‘the value of human life is more important than society’s need
for law in this case’’ for the decision that Heinz should steal a drug or food to save his
wife’s life. After this downward assimilation, all that remained to represent the fifth stage
was theoretically and philosophically sophisticated discourse, classifiable by justifications
458 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

such as ‘‘the right to life supersedes or transcends the right to property’’ (Colby et al.,
1987, p. 53). As noted, such discourse was typically not seen until the adult years, if
ever.
To replace the Deweyan preconventional–conventional–postconventional typology,
Gibbs proposed a model of life-span moral judgment development consisting of overlap-
ping standard and existential phases (see Table 2). Gibbs’ emphasis was on the primary
phase of standard or invariant stages. Although moral judgment in both phases entails
growth beyond the superficial, development in the standard (mainly pre-adult) phase is
more uniform and relates more consistently to general cognitive development. Although
Gibbs largely shares Kohlberg’s specific cognitive developmental expectations concerning
the moral domain, social perspective-taking, and stage sequence, Gibbs argues that the
stage mixture seen elsewhere in cognitive development (Brainerd, 1978, 1979) is also evi-
dent in moral judgment development, clouding somewhat the picture of invariant
sequence (Gibbs, 2003). Despite this stage mixture, moral judgment in the standard phase
can generally be seen to progress with age from immature (Stage 1, centrations on or over-
attention to salient features; Stage 2, pragmatic or instrumental exchanges) to mature
(Stage 3, mutualities or ideal moral reciprocity; and Stage 4, social systems) levels (see
Table 2).
Within the mature level of standard stage development, Gibbs adopted Edwards’
(1975, 1986) argument that Kohlberg was right in principle, if not in specifics, to asso-
ciate moral judgment maturity with societal complexity. Stage 3 mutualities may rep-
resent moral judgment maturity sufficient for ‘‘the traditional and isolated peasant
village.’’ Although the village culture may be in certain respects complex and its mem-
bers reflective (as Snarey argued), such a face-to-face, familiar community may not
need the ‘‘formal and elaborate legal mechanisms’’ and standards required for dispute
resolution and social equilibrium in a more heterogeneous or pluralistic ‘‘complex soci-
ety such as a modern national state’’ (Edwards, 1975, p. 511, 525). For the latter soci-
eties, Edwards suggested, the mature level may entail reasoning at Stage 4 or higher (p.
511).
Despite the emphasis on standard development, moral maturity in the fullest sense in
Gibbs’ model is not only standard but also existential. Although Gibbs objected to Sna-
rey’s acceptance of Kohlberg’s stage designation of moral philosophical principles, he
agrees with Snarey that philosophical reflections or worldviews, e.g., the Indian adult’s
ethical and spiritual reflection cited earlier, are cross-culturally pervasive. Beyond thinking
about the deeper meaning of exchanges, ‘‘the mature thinker’’ in any culture ‘‘may think
about all manner of abstract ideas and ideals in such areas as morality, religion, and pol-
itics’’ (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 182), even about existential concerns such as the meaning of
life. Life-span moral judgment development across cultures should encompass existential
inquiry:

Contractarian and Kantian philosophies should be seen not as postconventional,

final stages in an invariant sequence but rather as products of hypothetical reflection
on normative ethics, stemming from the morality of one or another of the basic mor-
al judgment stages. Adults who contemplate their morality and formulate ethical
principles have not thereby constructed a new Piagetian stage. They have, however,
engaged in a developmental process of existential inquiry with personal relevance for
ethical living. (Gibbs, 2003, p. 7)
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 459

Snarey sees the diverse ethical formulations within Gibbs’s existential phase as stage-
relevant philosophical voices, many of which are missing from Kohlberg’s fifth stage.

An alternative (dilemma-free) assessment method

In the early history of Kohlbergian research as it culminated in certain theoretical issues

and revisionist models, a serious limitation can be noted: All of the moral judgment data
were obtained through a single research instrument, namely, Kohlberg’s dilemma-based
assessment method. As Snarey (1985) and others cautioned, the cross-cultural use of moral
dilemmas entails potential problems. More generally, the state of our methodology in the
social and behavioral sciences is such that the exclusive reliance on any single method is
often fraught with peril. Accordingly, a pervasive emphasis in contemporary psychological
research is on the use of multimethod strategies (Brewer & Hunter, 2006). Hence the need
to expand the research focus to consider cross-cultural studies of moral judgment develop-
ment that collectively entail the use of multiple assessment methods.
As noted, Snarey (1985) recommended that future researchers study more closely the
cross-cultural validity of the conflicts and values entailed in Kohlberg’s standard dilemma
interview, the MJI. If Kohlberg’s dilemma issues and values lack ecological validity for a
given culture, then even adapted standard dilemmas might not elicit respondents’ optimal
competence, or for that matter, that culture’s indigenous moral issues, judgments, and val-
ues. Dien (1982) argued that the Heinz dilemma in particular (whether drugs or food are at
stake) was inappropriate to the collectivist culture of a Chinese village (see also Boyes &
Walker, 1988). The alternative strategy of generating dilemmas idiosyncratic to a partic-
ular culture (e.g., White, 1983), although ‘‘admirable’’ in some respects, generates prob-
lems of nonstandardization (Snarey, 1985, p. 215).
Preempting the issue of whether to use adapted standard or non-standard indigenous
dilemmas is the strategy of not using dilemmas at all. The use of any reliable and valid alter-
native assessment method can potentially bolster or diminish conclusions regarding the uni-
versality of a given model of moral judgment development and values. Although a non-
dilemma assessment method may have its own limitations, they would differ at least in part
from those of the dilemma method. In the multimethod approach to the study of social phe-
nomena, ‘‘the weakness of any one method can be, at least to some extent, compensated for
by the strengths of another’’ (S. A. Miller, 2007, p. 113). Hence, ‘‘conclusions based upon a
convergence of evidence from different methods can be held with a greater certainty than can
conclusions based on one approach alone’’ (p. 113). In the present application of this point, a
conclusion concerning moral judgment development, values, and social processes across cul-
tures drawn from multiple methods (i.e., convergence from a multimethod extension) would
be more definitive than a conclusion drawn exclusively from a single method.
Besides the MJI, various related production and recognition measures have been devel-
oped and used in the United States and other countries (see Gibbs, Basinger, & Grime,
2003). Like the MJI, these measures involve the use of moral dilemmas. One example is
a group-administrable equivalent to the MJI, the Sociomoral Reflection Measure (e.g.,
Gibbs, Widaman, & Colby, 1982; Nillson, Crafoord, Hedengren, & Ekehammar, 1991).
Other examples include recognition and evaluation (or comprehension and preference)
measures such as the Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest, 1979; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, &
Thoma, 1999; Thoma, 2006), the Sociomoral Reflection Objective Measure (SROM;
e.g., DeHaan, Hanford, Kinlaw, Philler, & Snarey, 1997; Dominguez & Carbonell,
460 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

1993; Gibbs et al., 1984; Van IJzendoorn, 2001), the Sociomoral Reflection Objective
Measure-Short Form (SROM-SF; e.g., Basinger & Gibbs, 1987; Beem, Brugman, Host,
& Tavecchio, 2004; Bore, Munro, Kerridge, & Powis, 2005), the Moral Judgment Test
(e.g., Comunian & Gielen, 2006; Lind, 2005), and the Padua Moral Judgment Scale
(e.g., Comunian, 2004; Comunian, Sarada, & Morita, 2005).
Most prominent among these recognition/preference measures has been the DIT (see
especially Rest et al., 1999; Thoma, 2006). Reviews of 15 cross-cultural DIT studies have
shown that, across North American, European, and East Asian societies (with less clarity
for Arab and Caribbean societies), preference for postconventional, principled, or philo-
sophically reflective considerations increases with advancing age and education (Gielen
& Markoulis, 2001; Naito, Lin, & Gielen, 2001).
Given the availability of these cross-cultural reviews pertaining to the most prominent
recognition/preference measure (the DIT), this article focuses on the hitherto unreviewed
cross-cultural research literature pertaining to an alternative production measure. Recog-
nition and production measures entail differing strengths and weaknesses. For example,
whereas recognition measures permit greater ease of scoring, production measures permit
the possibility of discovering novel modes of reflection in various cultures. Among produc-
tion measures other than the MJI, the Sociomoral Reflection Measure—Short Form
(SRM-SF; Gibbs et al., 1992) has been used in at least 75 moral judgment studies in 23
countries (see below). In contrast to other assessment methods (recognition or produc-
tion), the SRM-SF is unique in that it does not entail the use of moral dilemmas, stories,
or other vignettes. Accordingly, research studies that use the SRM-SF may provide the
basis for an alternative examination, across methods and cultures, of moral judgment
development, values, and social processes. Description of the SRM-SF will provide an
explanatory context necessary for the research review to follow.

Description of the SRM-SF

Derived from the MJI and a related dilemma-based method (the Sociomoral Reflection
Method [SRM], Gibbs et al., 1982), the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form
(SRM-SF) is a dilemma-free production measure consisting of a questionnaire, scoring
manual, and self-training materials for achieving reliable, valid, and accurate stage scoring
(Gibbs et al., 1992; see studies under United States in Table 3). The SRM-SF questions
were written at a fourth-grade reading level and the questionnaire was designed for group
administration (with instructions to the administrator to check for protocol completion
and scorability). It has been group-administered to children as young as 8 or 9 (some
researchers have orally administered the questions to individual children as young as 5
or 6; Gibbs et al., 1992; Snarey & Keljo, 1994). The questionnaire contains 11 items that
elicit evaluations and justifications (see Table 1). Respondents evaluate the importance of
the main ‘‘issues, values, or institutions’’ that (according to Kohlberg) comprise the core of
morality and ‘‘are found in every society and culture,’’ such as contract, truth, affiliation,
life, property, law, and legal justice (cf. Kohlberg, 1984, pp. 189–190, 309; cf. Maccoby,
1980, pp. 297–299). In place of MJI dilemmas, concrete suggestions introduce the values
those dilemmas encompass (e.g., to introduce contract and truth, question 1: ‘‘Think
about when you’ve made a promise to a friend of yours;’’ to introduce affiliation and life,
question 6: ‘‘Let’s say a friend of yours needs help and may even die, and you’re the only
person who can save him or her’’). The suggestions lead into general moral evaluation
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 461

Table 3
Cross-cultural SRM-SF reliability and validity resultsa
Study Reliability Validity (concurrent, construct, discriminant)
Interrater Other
Armenia
Jeshmaridian and NR NR Moral judgment correlated with age; urban
Babakhanyan (2005) mean higher than rural
Australia
Putnins (1997) NR NR Victim Awareness intervention promoted
delinquents’ moral judgment
Stevenson et al. (2004) r = .93 NR Moral judgment higher and criminal
sentiments lower in nonoffender adults, but
no difference in criminal sentiments between
delayed and nondelayed offenders
Bahrain
Al-Falaij (1991) NR NR Non-delinquent moral judgment mean higher
than delinquent
Belgium
Day and Naedts (1995) r = .87–.97 NR Moral judgment higher per grade, age group
Bosnia
Garrod et al. (2004) NR NR Moral judgment higher in older groups; cross-
national comparison (Bosnia, USA)
Bulgaria
Vlassev (1998) r = .88 NR Moral judgment correlated with relationship
adjustment
Canada
Binfet (2004) r = .83 NR Sociomoral intervention promoted moral
judgment
Dibiase (2002) NR NR Sociomoral intervention promoted moral
judgment, social skills; moral judgment
correlated with social, anger management
skills
Krivel-Zacks (1995) r = .95 NR Sociomoral intervention promoted moral
judgment, social skills, conduct; moral
judgment correlated with prosocial behavior,
inversely with academic misconduct
Raynauld et al. (1999) r = .81 NR Sociomoral intervention promoted moral
judgment
China
Lee (2001) NR NR Non-delinquent mean higher than delinquent
mean; moral judgment higher per grade
England
Brusten (2003) r = .85 Factor analysis Non-delinquent mean higher than delinquent;
(one factor, moral judgment higher per age group
small secondary
factor)
Palmer and Begum r = .99 Cronbach’s Moral judgment did not correlate with
(2006) alpha = .87 provictim attitudes or self-reported aggression
among offenders
(continued on next page)
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Table 3 (continued)
Study Reliability Validity (concurrent, construct, discriminant)
Interrater Other
Palmer and Hollin NR NR Moral judgment correlated inversely with
(1996) delinquency for females
Palmer and Hollin NR NR Modal moral judgment correlated inversely
(1997) with maternal rejection
Palmer and Hollin NR NR Non-delinquent moral judgment mean higher
(1998) than delinquent
Palmer and Hollin r = .98 NR Moral judgment not correlated with social
(1999) skills
Palmer and Hollin NR NR Non-delinquent mean higher than delinquent;
(2000) moral judgment correlated with attribution of
prosocial intent in non-delinquents, inversely
with antisocial severity in delinquents
Palmer and Hollin NR NR Moral judgment correlated inversely with self-
(2001) reported delinquency, attachment; correlated
with SES and age
Tarry and Emler (2007) r = .97 NR Moral judgment correlated with age but not
self-reported delinquency
Germany
Krettenauer and Becker r = .82 Factor analysis Non-delinquents’ moral judgment mean
(2001) (one factor, small higher than delinquent; moral judgment
secondary factor); higher in older group, correlated inversely
Cronbach’s with right-wing extremist ideology
alpha = .73
Stadler et al. (2007) NR NR Non-conduct disordered participants’ moral
judgment higher than conduct-disordered
participants’ moral judgment; moral judgment
correlated with with inhibitory control
Ireland
Ferguson and Cairns r = .89 NR Moral judgment higher in older group, low-
(1996) violent neighborhood
Ferguson and Cairns r = .90 NR Moral judgment urban mean higher than
(2002) town
Ferguson et al. (1994) r = .90 Cronbach’s Concurrent validity (with SROM) r = .71;
alphas = .64–.79; moral judgment correlated with age
test–retest r = .91
Ferguson et al. (2001) r = .89 NR Cross-national comparison (Nigeria,
Northern Ireland)
Italy
Comunian and Gielen r = .82–.85 Cronbach’s Moral judgment (stage, Type) higher for older
(1995) alpha = .79, .80 group, community volunteers
Comunian and Gielen r = .89–.93 Cronbach’s Moral judgment (stage, Type) higher for older
(2000) alpha = .90 group, community volunteers
r = .90–.97 Cronbach’s Moral judgment (stage, Type) higher for non-
alpha = .88 drug abusers
Comunian and Gielen r = NR NR Moral judgment (stage, Type) gains
(2006) correlated with social perspective-taking;
sociomoral intervention promoted moral
judgment, social perspective-taking

Line missing
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Table 3 (continued)
Study Reliability Validity (concurrent, construct, discriminant)
Interrater Other
Gielen et al. (1994) r = .98 Cronbach’s Moral judgment (stage, Type) higher per
alpha = .86; grade, age group; cross-national comparison
test–retest r = .83 (Italy, USA)
Japan
Mizuno (1999) r = NR NR Cross-national comparison (Japan, USA)
Takaki (2001) r = .83 NR Moral judgment (stage, Type) higher per
grade, age group
Kenya
Wasanga (2004) r = .90 Cronbach’s Moral judgment higher per grade, age group;
alpha = .97 urban mean higher than rural
Malaysia
Chu (1999) n/ab NR Moral education promoted moral judgment;
moral judgment correlated with academic
achievement
Netherlands
Brugman and Aleva r = .84–.94 Cronbach’s Non-delinquent mean higher than delinquent;
(2004) alpha = .66 not correlated with social desirability
Brugman et al. (1999) r = .94 NR Concurrent validity (with SROM-SF) r = .43;
Moral judgment higher than school-related
practical reasoning;
Leenders and Brugman r = .81 NR Moral judgment correlated with age in
(2005) delinquents and non-delinquents; moral
judgment did not uniquely predict delinquent
behavior
Nas et al. (2005) r = .80 Cronbach’s Sociomoral intervention did not promote
alpha = .64 moral judgment; moral judgment correlated
with age and intelligence but not with low
cognitive distortion; not correlated with social
desirability
Nigeria
Ferguson et al. (2001) r = .89 NR Cross-national comparison (Nigeria,
Northern Ireland)
Russia
Hauer (2001) r = .88–.89 Cronbach’s Moral judgment higher per grade, age;
alpha = .69 correlated with Life Meaning Index

Saudi Arabia
Al-Ghamdi (1994) r = NR NR Moral judgment not correlated with ego level
Scotland
Ferguson and Cairns r = .90 NR Urban moral judgment mean higher than
(2002) town
Sweden
Larden et al. (2006) r = .82 NR Non-delinquents’ and females’ moral
judgment mean higher; moral judgment
correlated positively with empathy, negatively
with cognitive distortion
(continued on next page)
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Table 3 (continued)
Study Reliability Validity (concurrent, construct, discriminant)
Interrater Other
Taiwan
Chen and Hsieh (2001) r = .87 Cronbach’s Non-delinquent mean higher than delinquent;
alpha = .69 moral judgment correlated with academic
performance; not correlated with social
desirability
Lin, Q. Q. (1999) r = .80 NR Concurrent validity (with MJI) r = .78
Lin, W. Y. (1995) r = .84 Cronbach’s Concurrent validity (with DIT) r = .49;
alpha = .70; correlated with age; negatively correlated with
social desirability
Tang (2004) r = .92 Cronbach’s Moral judgment mean higher in older group
alpha = .77;
test–retest r = .43
United States
Barriga et al. (2001) r = .81 NR Moral judgment correlated inversely with
antisocial behavior, self-serving cognitive
distortions
Basinger et al. (1995) r = .94–.99 Factor analysis Concurrent validity (with MJI) r = .46; non-
(one factor); delinquent moral judgment mean higher than
Cronbach’s delinquent; moral judgment correlated with
alphas = .57–.93; age, SES, verbal intelligence; not correlated
test–retest with social desirability
r = .61–.88
Bock (2006) r = .88–.93 NR Moral judgment related to moral theme
comprehension, grade
Chang (2001) NR NR Nonpsychopathic mean higher among
offenders; moral judgment correlated
inversely with psychopathy
DeVargas (1999) NR NR Character education promoted moral
judgment
Garrod et al. (2004) NR NR Moral judgment mean higher in older group
Getty (1996) r = .81 NR Moral judgment higher for high goal-
orientation in girls
Greenberg (2002) r = .84 Cronbach’s Higher moral judgment related to less theft
alpha = .90 for companies with ethics programs
Greene (1997) NR NR Service learning did not promote moral
judgment,
Gregg et al. (1994) r = .88–.99 NR Non-delinquent mean higher than delinquent
mean
Grime (2005) r = .97 NR Verbal ability, friendship perspective-taking
predicted moral judgment
Hubbs-Tait et al. r = .96 NR Moral judgment correlated with positive
(2006) parenting attitudes, one psychosocial subscale
(ego identity) but not another (intimacy)
Humphries et al. 80–90% global NR Moral judgment higher per grade, correlated
(2000) agreement with communalism and empathy for boys
Krcmar and r = NR Cronbach’s Moral judgment correlated with disapproval
Valkenburg (1999) alpha = .66 of TV violence
Leeman et al. (1993) r = .92 NR Sociomoral intervention did not promote
moral judgment but moral judgment
correlated inversely with recidivism (12 mos.)

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Table 3 (continued)
Study Reliability Validity (concurrent, construct, discriminant)
Interrater Other
Mason and Gibbs r = .99 NR Moral judgment correlated with social
(1993a, 1993b) perspective-taking
McInerney (1995) r = .92 NR Moral judgment correlated inversely with
misconduct
Oliver, J. M. (2003) r = .81 Cronbach’s General moral judgment correlated with
alpha = .67 computer-use moral judgment, but the latter
less mature
Oliver, K. A. (1993) r = .96 NR Moral judgment correlated with closeness of
relationships
Peterson (2001) r = .84–.93 NR Moral judgment mean higher for
nonoffenders
Ritz (1996) NR NR Moral judgment higher per grade, correlated
inversely with misconduct
Rose (2005) r = .97 NR Moral judgment correlated with age,
planning, problem-solving skills but did not
differentiate ADHD children with income
controlled
Schonfeld et al. (2005) r = .98 NR Moral judgment higher for juveniles not
exposed prenatally to alcohol; moral
judgment did not uniquely predict delinquent
behavior; moral judgment correlated with
age, verbal intelligence, cognitive inhibition;
did not correlate with social desirability
Travis et al. (2004) r > .80c NR Moral judgment higher for adults with
Transcendental Meditation experience; moral
judgment correlated with inner orientation,
lower anxiety, emotional stability
Van IJzendoorn and NR NR Moral judgment type (B) higher in adults with
Zwart-Woudstra secure attachment representations
(1995)
Van Someren (2000) r = .97 NR Moral judgment correlated with age, GPA;
supplement proposed for scoring moral
reasoning with religious content
Woods and Jagers 60% exact NR Moral judgment correlated with
(2003) global communalism, caring affect, and spirituality
Note: NR indicates information not reported.
a
Sample sizes and participant descriptions provided in Tables 4 and 6.
b
Protocol stage scores based on multiple-choice selections.
c
Travis et al. (2004) reported that ‘‘the scorers met the requirements for reliability in scoring’’ (p. 413).

questions, e.g., ‘‘How important is it for a person (without losing his or her own life) to
save the life of a friend? Circle one: Very Important/Important/Not Important.’’ Respon-
dents then explain or justify their evaluation (see Table 1).
This briefer, non-dilemma strategy for assessing moral judgment and values may offer cer-
tain advantages relative to the dilemma-based MJI. Snarey and Keljo (1994) noted that the
lead-in statements serve to ‘‘stimulate reflective thought’’ (p. 184). Hart (1993) observed that
many of the more fruitful questions on the MJI are similar to those on the SRM-SF
and do not pertain to the specifics of the dilemmas at all. Consequently, the decision
to omit dilemmas from the SRM-SF appears to be wise. (p. 431)
466 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

Although omitting the dilemmas preempts issues of dilemma translation, potential

translation and relevance issues remain, of course, even with the briefer stimuli. Gibbs
et al. (1992) argued that using open statements rather than specific dilemmas promotes
ecological validity: As the lead-ins are considered, participants implicitly supply the appro-
priate situational content for keeping promises and other moral values in terms of the con-
texts of their daily lives and their culture’s meaning systems (J. G. Miller, 2006).
Respondents also bring to the task their psychological understanding of such social
actions (e.g., Brown & Herrnstein, 1978, pp. 336–338; Wainryb et al., 2005). Allowing
for the respondents’ context of interpretation through the reduction of ‘‘particular words,
facts, or information [as in a dilemma]’’ may promote more valid comparability of
response data across studies (Damon, 1977, pp. 57–58). As the importance of the associ-
ated values is evaluated, respondents are presumably stimulated to reflect and so are
primed to respond to the ‘‘why’’ questions that follow.
The cultural relevance of Kohlbergian moral values at least in the United States (where
most of the initial research concerning the SRM-SF was conducted) is suggested by the
fact that the values are typically evaluated as either important or very important. In
one USA study, at least 90% of both delinquents and nondelinquents evaluated most of
the values as either important or very important (Gregg, Gibbs, & Basinger, 1994; cf. Pal-
mer & Hollin, 1998). Another indicator that the values are relevant to many cultural
groups may be the low protocol attrition rate, as discussed later.
Moral judgment stage scoring pertains to participants’ justifications for the importance
of the values. Questions 1 through 4 elicit evaluations and justifications pertaining to con-
tract and truth; questions 5 and 6 to affiliation; questions 7 and 8 to life; questions 9 and 10
to property and law; and question 11 to legal justice (see Table 1). Protocol justifications
are matched with stage-indicative justifications (classified by stage aspect) in the SRM-SF
scoring manual. The highest stage rating is entered for each item, and the average stage
rating across the 11 items constitutes the overall protocol score (Gibbs et al., 1992). Pro-
tocol stage scores are sometimes reported in terms of global stage, which may involve
either a differentiation of major and minor stages, e.g., 3(2) or 2(3), resulting in a 10-point
scale, or a simpler transition designation, e.g., 2/3, resulting in a 7-point scale. Global
stage is derived from Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Score (SRMS), a continuous vari-
able ranging from 100 (a protocol yielding exclusively Stage 1 ratings; 126–174 = transi-
tion 1/2; 175–225 = Stage 2; etc.) to 400 (a protocol yielding exclusively Stage 4 ratings).
For SRM-SF protocols to be usable, stage ratings must be obtained for justification
responses to at least 7 of the 11 items. Group administrators of the SRM-SF are
instructed to check protocols as they are collected for completion and scorability (to
the extent feasible). A moral judgment can be defined as a justified or reasoned moral
decision or value concerning just and/or benevolent social action (see Gibbs, 2003; cf.
Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). Assuming the stage typology and scoring manual are
adequately universal, any genuine and reasonably clear justification or reasoning should
be scorable for stage or transition. The SRM-SF scoring manual describes categories of
spurious or pseudo-justifications (e.g., repeat evaluations, tautologies, fragments, ‘‘word
salads,’’ and comments). Even a genuine justification may be problematic or unscorable
if it is excessively ambiguous, defined in the scoring rules as matching at more than three
adjacent levels (e.g., transition 1/2 to Stage 3). Very young and/or marginally literate
participants are at risk for submitting unusable (incomplete and excessively ambiguous)
protocols.
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 467

Attrition rates are indirectly relevant to the universality question concerning moral values
and judgments. Attrition for SRM-SF protocols was generally under 10% (Basinger et al.,
1995). Although a given sample may have a high attrition rate for ordinary methodological
reasons (poor test administration, participant literacy problems, etc.), consistently high attri-
tion rates in samples from a given culture should be investigated. It is possible that an unus-
able protocol’s justifications are excessively vague or perfunctory because the values they
serve are not evaluated as important in that culture (the value evaluations typically are
not reported but should be checked where attrition rates are consistently high). Alternatively,
the justifications of an unusable protocol may not be ambiguous at all. Perhaps the protocol
moral judgments are adequately clear and genuine, but are ‘‘problematic’’ only because the
stage typology and scoring manual do not represent them.

Using the SRM-SF outside the United States

The SRM-SF has been used to measure moral judgment development in at least 752
research studies. This data base may enable us to revisit, two decades after Snarey’s
review, Kohlberg’s generic claim that cross-culturally general moral judgment stages, val-
ues, and social processes are identifiable, as well as his specific claim for his particular stage
model. SRM-SF instrumentation issues are less complex than those faced by Snarey. For
example, whereas Snarey had to identify and evaluate distinct MJI scoring systems among
the studies he reviewed, the SRM-SF entails a single scoring system (although several
researchers did make certain adaptations, described later).
Using the SRM-SF as part of a multimethod reexamination of Kohlberg’s universality
claims presupposes the adequacy of the SRM-SF data base as well as the SRM-SF itself.
The 2007 SRM-SF data base should be sufficiently large and diverse, and the SRM-SF
should evidence adequate translatability, reliability, attrition rates (approximately 10%
or lower), and validity in other countries.
Cultural diversity of the data base. A cross-cultural data base should be adequate in
terms of research volume as well as the diversity of cultures sampled. Snarey started his
1985 review by asking whether moral development research using the MJI dilemma method
had ‘‘been conducted in a sufficiently wide range of sociocultural settings to jeopardize ade-
quately the claim’’ of universality (p. 203). To assess the cultural diversity of his data base,
Snarey classified the studies by the criteria of whether the populations sampled were: (a)
Western or Westernized (vs. non-Western) and/or (b) urban (vs. tribal or village). Although
the preponderance of his MJI data sets were from urban or Westernized societies (e.g., Can-
ada, Germany, India), 10 of the 45 sampled populations were tribal or village and (argu-
ably) non-Western (e.g., Alaskan Eskimos, Guatemalan villagers, rural Kenyan villagers).
The present SRM-SF data base (75 studies in 23 countries) is comparable to Snarey’s
MJI data base (45 studies in 27 countries) in research volume, although slightly less diverse
in terms of variations in cultural complexity. Nevertheless, by Snarey’s criteria, the present
data base is still diverse. Although many of the SRM-SF samples are urban and Western-

2
The 2007 SRM-SF data base entails 75 substantive studies, but technically totals at least 78 studies. Two pairs
of studies (Mason & Gibbs, 1993a, 1993b; and Stevenson, Hall, & Innes, 2003, 2004) each share an identical
sample and hence are counted as only two studies. A study by Garmon, Basinger, Gregg, and Gibbs (1996) also
entailed secondary data analysis. Rutten et al. (in press) utilized the SRM-SF for construct validation purposes
but did not publish SRM-SF descriptive statistics.
468 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

ized, some are nonurban (rural communities in Armenia, Kenya, Nigeria), and others are
outside Western Europe and North America (namely, Armenia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, and
Russia in Eastern Europe; Sweden in Northwest Europe; China, Japan, Malaysia, and
Taiwan in Asia; Kenya and Nigeria in Africa; and Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in the Mid-
dle East). Hence, the range of sociocultural settings in the present data base is sufficiently
wide to allow a test of universality claims.
Additional comparisons are noteworthy. In terms of nationality, 9 countries are repre-
sented in both Snarey’s MJI data base and the present SRM-SF data base: Canada, China,
England, Germany, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, Taiwan, and USA. Represented in Snarey’s
but not the present review are 19 countries or cultural groups: Alaskan Eskimo, Bahamas,
Finland, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Mexico, New
Guinea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Puerto Rico, Thailand, Turkey, Yucatan, and Zambia.
Finally, the present data base includes 14 countries that were not part of the Snarey
review: Armenia, Australia, Bahrain, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, the Neth-
erlands, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Scotland, and Sweden.
An important caveat should be noted. Whereas 7 of the 45 studies reviewed by Snarey
were longitudinal (and the remainder cross-sectional), all of the 75 studies in the present
review are cross-sectional. One referent for the question of universal stages is invariant
sequence: Is the same order of stage succession evident in other cultures? As Snarey
(1985) explained—and as must be emphasized—this question is best addressed on the basis
of patterns seen in longitudinal studies of stage development. Hence, Snarey was in a stron-
ger position for investigating this aspect of the universal stage claim. Snarey also examined
possible irregularities among the cross-sectional studies (e.g., absence of an intermediate
stage in a range of stages) that would suggest invariant sequence violations such as stage
skipping. Snarey’s longitudinal and cross-sectional data were consistent with the claim of
standard consecutive sequence of stages, as are the cross-sectional data in the present survey.
Suitability for cross-cultural research. Cross-cultural suitability issues pertain to trans-
latability, reliability, and validity. Each of these criteria will be addressed below (another
criterion, protocol attrition, will be discussed in the next section).
Translatability. Because the SRM-SF questionnaire is briefer than the MJI interview (see
Table 1), translation (needed in many of the studies) was less demanding. The
questionnaire has been successfully translated into Arabic, Bahasa Malaysian, Bulgarian,
Chinese, Dutch, Eastern Armenian, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Kikamba,
Kiswahili, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, and Swedish. Researchers in Armenia, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Russia, and Taiwan used a back-translation procedure to ensure accuracy. In
Germany, Krettenauer and Becker (2001) chose to translate and administer only 8 of the
11 questionnaire items to streamline data collection (items 3, 5, and 8 were judged to be
non-essential). In Belgium (Day & Naedts, 1995), the Netherlands (Zwart-Woudstra,
Meijer, Fintelman, & Van IJzendoorn, 1993), and Taiwan (W.Y. Lin, 1995; Tang, 2004),
not only the questionnaire but also the scoring manual were translated (into French,
Dutch, and Chinese, respectively). Because Krettenauer and Becker (2001) found that a
number of his German respondents appealed in their justifications to stage-indicative folk
sayings, they supplemented the manual with these sayings (illustrated in Table 5).
Reliability. Cross-cultural researchers contributing to the present data base addressed
questions of instrument reliability. Snarey focused on reports of the MJI scoring system’s
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 469

interrater reliability, which were generally acceptable (interrater reliability was reported in
31 of the 47 studies comprising Snarey’s data base). Similarly, the interrater reliability
coefficients as reported in 53 of the 75 studies comprising the present data base were all at or
above .80 (the minimum acceptable; Basinger et al., 1995) (see Table 3). Ideally, interrater
reliability information would be available for all of the studies in the data bases; but at least
no systematic deviation from the general pattern of results is evident for the subset of studies
not reporting interrater reliability. Several researchers used teams of raters and reported a
range of interrater reliability results. Interrater reliability coefficient ranges reported in
Belgium (Day & Naedts, 1995), the Netherlands (Brugman & Aleva, 2004), Russia (Hauer,
2001), and the USA (Peterson, 2001) were somewhat lower (r = .84 to r = .97) but still
comparable to the range (r = .94 to r = .99) reported by Basinger et al. (1995) for a team of
undergraduate, graduate, and faculty raters.
A number of researchers also reported test–retest internal consistency reliability indices
such as Cronbach’s alpha (see Table 3). Magnitudes were comparable to those reported in
the USA (.57 to .67; .93 for total sample; Basinger et al., 1995) and ranged from .64 (in
Northern Ireland; Ferguson, McLernon, & Cairns, 1994) to .90 (in Italy; Comunian &
Gielen, 2000). In factor analyses, Basinger et al.’s (1995) USA finding of a single dominant
factor was replicated (but with a small secondary factor) in England (Brusten, 2003) and
Germany (Krettenauer & Becker, 2001). Test–retest reliability levels (using 2–3 week time
intervals) reported in Ireland and Italy were comparable to that reported by Basinger et al.
(r = .88), although a level reported in Taiwan (r = .70, Chen & Hsieh, 2001) was some-
what lower (see Table 3). Finally, several international studies conducted factor analyses.
Although factor analyses may also be considered relevant to questions of internal consis-
tency, such results have particular relevance to theoretical tenets of Kohlberg’s cognitive
developmental approach and so are noted in the next section.
Validity. Other findings among the cross-cultural studies pertained to questions of
concurrent, discriminant, and construct validity. The acceptable USA concurrent validity
of the SRM-SF with the MJI was corroborated in Ireland (with the SROM), the
Netherlands (marginally with the SROM-SF), and Taiwan (with the MJI and the DIT)
(see Table 3). Regarding discriminant validity, consistent with Basinger et al.’s (1995; cf.
Schonfeld et al., 2005) USA results, SRM-SF stage scores were found not to correlate
positively with social desirability measures in the Netherlands and Taiwan (see Table 3).
Cross-cultural results pertaining to the discrimination of delinquents’ moral judgment
as developmentally delayed bear substantively upon cognitive developmental claims for
the important role of social participation for development and so are reviewed in the next
section. Also reviewed in connection with social participation are construct validity results
pertaining to the relationship of moral judgment development to theoretical correlates
such as age, education, socioeconomic status, urban versus rural environment, and com-
munity volunteering; along with studies that directly investigated social perspective-taking
through self-report measures (e.g., Comunian & Gielen, 2006; Grime, 2005; Mason &
Gibbs, 1993a, 1993b).
Several ad hoc findings among the cross-cultural studies are relevant to construct valid-
ity. Moral judgment maturity as measured by the SRM-SF was found to correlate with
experiencing life as meaningful (Hauer, 2001), sense of spirituality (Woods & Jagers,
2003), attribution of prosocial intent (Palmer & Hollin, 2000), and positive parenting atti-
tudes (Hubbs-Tait et al., 2006). Particularly intriguing—and worthy of systematic
470 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

research—are findings of a relationship between moral judgment maturity and variables

pertaining to self-regulation, self-control, or ego strength (cognitive inhibition, Schonfeld,
Mattson, & Riley, 2005, and Stadler et al., 2007; emotional stability, Travis, Arenander, &
DuBois, 2004; planning and problem-solving skills, Rose, 2005; goal orientation for
females, Getty, 1996). Moral Type B was found to correlate with age and community vol-
unteering or related experiences (Comunian & Gielen, 2000, 2006).

Results and discussion

Given evidence for the adequacy of the SRM-SF and the 2007 SRM-SF data base, it
should be worthwhile to revisit with this alternative assessment method Kohlberg’s cogni-
tive developmental approach and universality claims. Some Kohlbergian cognitive devel-
opmental tenets have received cross-cultural attention only with this newer data base. One
such tenet is that moral judgment is a unitary and distinct factor in its own right. This
tenet was supported in USA factor analyses using the MJI (Colby et al., 1983; cf. Cortese,
1989) but was not addressed in cross-cultural MJI studies (Snarey, 1985). The USA finding
of a single factor loading for MJI justifications was replicated using the SRM-SF in the
USA (Basinger et al., 1995). In cross-cultural studies, the finding of a single dominant fac-
tor (but with a small secondary factor) was replicated in England (Brusten, 2003) and Ger-
many (Krettenauer & Becker, 2001).
Fortunately, most of the research questions posed by Kohlberg’s approach and claims
have been investigated with studies that collectively span the two methods. Do the prior
(MJI-based) and more recent (SRM-SF-based) results converge to yield a coherent picture
of moral development? This section presents and discusses the cross-cultural results, begin-
ning with the question of universal moral values.

Moral values across cultures

Kohlberg (1984) claimed that the conflicts and values entailed in his dilemma method
were universal. Because the SRM-SF method does not use moral dilemmas, findings using
the SRM-SF cannot address the question of applicability of the value conflicts depicted in
the MJI dilemmas and probe questions. The SRM-SF method does, however, require rat-
ings of the importance of the values entailed in those conflicts. Although Kohlberg (1984)
simply referred to those values as the ‘‘issues, values, or moral institutions found in every
culture’’ (p. 189), their universality is an empirical question. The SRM-SF values of con-
tract, truth, affiliation, life, property, law, and legal justice were derived from the dilemmas
and probe questions of the MJI. Respondent ratings of these values are obtained but not
ordinarily reported. Where they have been reported (by Palmer & Hollin, 1998, in Eng-
land; by Kohlberg, 1958, in Armenia; by Tang, 2004, in Taiwan; by Wasanga, 2004, in
Kenya), the findings generally replicate Gregg et al.’s (1994) USA finding of high (above
90% selecting ‘‘important’’ or ‘‘very important’’) valuation. The main exceptions occurred
for adolescent offenders and younger respondents, but even among these participants
lower percentages were found only for certain items, e.g., keeping a promise to someone
you hardly know.
Also relevant to evaluating value universality is attrition rate. As noted, high protocol
attrition rates in a study could indirectly reflect a number of factors, including low value
ratings by the respondents. Attrition rate was reported by some but not all of the research-
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 471

ers in the 2007 SRM-SF data base. In some cases, we were able to contact the researcher
and obtain this information. Ultimately, attrition rate information was obtained for 23 of
the 75 studies in the data base. Protocol attrition rates were acceptably low, i.e., around or
below 10%, in Armenia, Bosnia, Canada, England (most studies), Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Nigeria, Scotland, Taiwan, and most of the USA studies. Exceptions were attributed to
marginal literacy (Leenders & Brugman, 2005), insufficient time for protocol completion
(Getty, 1996; Hauer, personal communication, June 10, 2005), and use of an unorthodox,
across-item scoring procedure (Brusten, 2003). Most important for the present purpose,
none of the researchers linked cases of protocol attrition to low value ratings (or, for that
matter, to unclassifiably novel moral judgment).3
Our 2007 data base, then, permits us to visit anew Kohlberg’s universality claim con-
cerning moral values. Snarey noted some researchers’ comments that the Kohlbergian
value conflicts or (adapted) dilemmas seemed to be considered relevant by the respondents
in their sample, and the general absence of reports to the contrary (but cf. Dien, 1982).
Many researchers did not comment on the issue one way or the other. Our data are sim-
ilarly partial but also consistent with Kohlberg’s claim of value universality. Value ratings
where reported are high, and procotol attrition where reported is not attributed to low
value ratings. Although partial, the anecdotal and evaluation information that we do have
from researchers is consistent with the value universality claim. Given the incomplete nat-
ure of these data, more systematic attention should be accorded the question of value uni-
versality in future research (cf. Siddle-Walker & Snarey, 2004).

Moral judgment stage development across cultures

Kohlberg’s main universality claim pertained to basic moral judgment development.

Are stages of moral judgment commonly identifiable across different assessment methods
and diverse cultures?
Tables 4 and 6 summarize results of SRM-SF studies pertaining to the stage universal-
ity question. We present both an overview table (Table 4) and a table (Table 6) consisting
of stage means and ranges for specific age periods. In the latter table, the samples from the
various cultures are rank-ordered by mean stage (operationalized in terms of SRMS score
rather than global stage). Presentation of stage range was somewhat problematic given
that many of the studies reported standard deviations (SDs) or range of age subgroup
means but not the range of individual moral judgment scores. For the sake of uniformity,
we decided to define moral judgment range in terms of SD from the mean and global stage
level. The lower and upper boundaries of the moral judgment range were defined by the
global stage level of the SRMSs at 1 and +1 SDs, respectively. In the relatively few cases
where SDs were not available but subgroup means or individual scores were available, we
used those numbers for the range instead.
Basic moral judgment development across cultures can be described in terms of the gen-
eral age periods of childhood, adolescence, and the adult years. Our results stem from a
multimethod extension (Brewer & Hunter, 2006); that is, they represent commonalities
in the results from the differing methods used in the 1985 and the present data bases.

3
Van Someren (2000) suggested supplementation of the SRM-SF scoring manual to permit more adequate
assessment of moral justifications with religious content. Van Someren’s proposed ‘‘religiously sensitive’’ criteria
utilized the developmental stage framework of the existing scoring manual.
Table 4

472
Cross-cultural studies of moral judgment development using the SRM-SF
Study Sample n Age range (mean) Global stage Global stage
in years mean range
Armenia
Jeshmaridian and Babakhanyan Urban and rural students and adults 105 13–61 3 1/2–4a
(2005)
Australia

J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

Putnins (1997) Delinquents (one female) 38 14–18 (16.5) 2 1/2–2/3
Stevenson et al. (2004) Male and female adult offenders 99 (31.2) 3 3–3/4
University students 94 (26.9) 3/4 3–3/4
Bahrain
Al-Falaij (1991) Male high school students 30 17–18 (17.7) 3 3–3/4
Delinquents 30 14–19 (16.8) 2/3 2/3–3
Belgium
Day and Naedts (1995) Primary and secondary school students and adults 194 12–24 2/3 2–3b
Bosnia
Garrod et al. (2004) Urban primary school students 40 8–12 (10.0) 2 1/2–2/3
Bulgaria
Vlassev (1998) Adults in romantic relationshipsc 163c 19–73 (29.8) 3 3–3/4
Canada
Binfet (2004) Urban middle school students 49 10–13 (11.6) 2/3 NR
DiBiase (2002) Urban middle school students 45 10–12 (11.0) 2 NR
Krivel-Zacks (1995) Urban middle school students 47 10–13 (11.7) 2/3 NR
Raynauld et al. (1999) 5th and 6th grade students 53 10–13 (11.5) 2/3 2–2/3
China
Lee (2001) Non-delinquents 10 13–15 2/3 NR
Delinquents 10 13–15 2 NR
England
Brusten (2003) Female high school students 117 14–16 (15.1) 2/3 2/3–3
Male high school students 149 14–16 (15.5) 2/3 2–3
Delinquents 147 14–17 (15.9) 2 2–3
Palmer and Begum (2006) Delinquents and early adult offenders 59 18–21 (19.5) 2/3 2–2/3
Palmer and Hollin (1996) University students 64 18–25 (19.5) 3/4 3–3/4
Palmer and Hollin (1997) University students 65 18–27 (21.0) 3+d NRd
Palmer and Hollin (1998) Female high school and university students 210 13–22 (17.9) 3 2/2–3/4
Male high school and university students 122 13.22 (17.6) 3 2/3–3/4
Delinquents and early adult offenders 126 13–21 (17.4) 2/3 2–3
Palmer and Hollin (1999) Delinquents 42 13–17 (16.0) 2/3 2–3
Palmer and Hollin (2000) Male high school and university students 77 12–24 (17.4) 3 2/3–3
Delinquents and early adult offenders 97 13–21 (18.2) 2 2–2/3
Palmer and Hollin (2001) Middle and high school students 94 12–18 (15.7) 3 2/3–3

J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

Tarry and Emler (2007) Middle school students 789 12.15 (13.0) 2/3 2–3
Germany
Krettenauer and Becker (2001) High school students 309 14–16 (15.6) 2/3 2/2–3
Male high school offenders 39 14–17 (16.1) 2/3 2–3
Stadler et al. (2007) Children and adolescents without Conduct 13 9–15 (12.8) 2/3 2–3
Disorder (CD)
Children and adolescents with CD 13 9–15 (12.7) 2/3 2–2/3
Ireland
Ferguson and Cairns (1996) Primary school students 96 10–11 2 2–2/3
Secondary school students 325 14–15 3 2/3–3
Ferguson and Cairns (2002) Northern Ireland adolescents 219 14–15 2/3 2/3–3
Republic of Ireland adolescents 239 14–15 2/3 2/3–3
Ferguson et al. (1994) Primary school students (Study 1) 28 NR 2/3 2–2/3
Primary school students (Study 2) 84 10–11 2 NR
Secondary school students (Study 2) 85 14–15 2/3 NR
Primary and secondary school students (Study 3) 119 14–19 (16.0) 2/3 2/3–3
Ferguson et al. (2001) Northern Ireland primary school students 48 10–11 2 2–2/3
Italy
Comunian and Gielen (1995) Adolescent and adult volunteers 154 (25.8) 3/4 NR
Adolescent and adult non-volunteers 131 (25.5) 2/3 NR
Comunian and Gielen (2000) Adolescent volunteers 49 15–21 (17.9) 3 3–3/4
Adolescent non-volunteers 60 15–21 (17.5) 3 3
Male adults (non-drug abusers) 60 27–33 (29.2) 3/4 3–3/4
Male adults (drug abusers) 60 26–32 (30.1) 3 3–3/4
Comunian and Gielen (2006) Graduate students 120 22–26 (24.1) 3 3–3/4
Gielen et al. (1994) 6th grade through university students and adults 313 10–35 (18.5) 3 2–3/4b

473
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 474
Table 4 (continued)
Study Sample n Age range (mean) Global stage Global stage
in years mean range
Japan
Mizuno (1999) High school Japanese students 22 16–18 (17.1) 3 NR
Takaki (2001) 4th grade through university students 320 10–20 (15.7) 2/3 2–3/4
Kenya
Wasanga (2004) Primary and secondary school students 313 8–19 (14.2) 2 1/2–3/4a

J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

Malaysia
Chu (1999)e High school students of Chinese and Indian 600 16 (16) 3e 2–4e
ethnicity
Netherlands
Brugman and Aleva (2004) Non-delinquents 81 (15.1) 2/3 2–3
Delinquents 64 (16.5) 2/3 2–2/3
Brugman et al. (1999) Secondary school students 120 13–17 (NR) 2/3 2/3–3
Leenders and Brugman (2005) Secondary school students 216 12–17 (14.3) 2/3 2–2/3
Nas et al. (2005) Delinquents 108 12–21 (16.8) 2/3 2–2/3
Nigeria
Ferguson et al. (2002) Primary school students 37 10–11 2 1/2–2
Russia
Hauer (2001) High school students 419 (15.6) 3 3–3/4
Saudi Arabia
Al-Ghamdi (1994) Upper-division university students 60 20–26 3/4 3–4a
Scotland
Ferguson and Cairns (2002) Middle school students 157 14–15 2/3 2/3–3
Sweden
Larden et al. (2006) Non-delinquents 29 13–18 (15.5) 2/3 2/3–3
Female non-delinquents 29 13–18 (16.0) 2/3 2/3–3/4
Delinquents 29 13–18 (15.6) 2/3 2–2/3
Female delinquents 29 13–18 (16.2) 2/3 2–3
Taiwan
Chen and Hsieh (2001) Non-delinquents (gender NR) 67 14–18 NR NR
Delinquents (gender NR) 45 14–18 NR NR
Lin, Q. Q. (1999) Urban high school and university students 450 9–12 2 2–2/3
Lin, W. Y. (1995) Urban primary, high school, and university 326 9–22 (14.6) 3 NR
students
Tang (2004) Primary and secondary school students 91 11–15 2/3 2–3/4a
United States
Barriga et al. (2001) University students 181 16–19 (18.2) 3 3–3/4
Basinger et al. (1995) 4th grade through university students and adults 384 8–81 (20.6) 3 2–3/4b
Bock (2006) 4th to 8th grade students 211 10–18 (11.6) 2/3 2–2/3
Chang (2001) Male adult offenders (incarcerated) 90 18–24 (20.6) 3 2/3–3

J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

DeVargas (1999) 5th grade students 61 NR 2 2–2/3
Garrod et al. (2004) Primary school students 37 7–12 (9.4) 2 2–2/3
Getty (1996) Middle school students 276 11–14 (11.8) 2/3 2–3
Greenberg (2002) Male and female adults 270 (28.4) 3f NR
Greene (1997) University students 52 (25.4) NR NR
Gregg et al. (1994) Male high school students 86 13–19 (15.7) 2/3 2/3–3
Delinquents 89 13–18 (15.9) 2/3 2–2/3
Female high school students 77 13–19 (16.1) 3 2/3–3
Female delinquents 71 13–18 (16.6) 2/3 2–3
Grime (2005) Secondary school students 337 11–18 (13.9) 2/3 2/3–3
Hubbs-Tait et al. (2006) Head Start mothers 199 19–46 (29.1) 3 2/3–3/4
Humphries et al. (2000) 5th and 8th grade African–American students 90 (12.0) 2 1/2–2/3
Krcmar and Valkenburg (1999) Children 156 5–12 NR NR
Leeman et al. (1993) Male delinquents 57 15–18 (16.0) 2/3 2–3
Mason and Gibbs (1993a, 1993b) Freshmen and senior university students 153 17–39 (20.8) 3/4 3–3/4
McInerney (1995) 7th grade students 221 NR 2/3 2–2/3
Oliver, J. M. (2003) 7th and 8th grade students 146 12–14 2/3 NR
Oliver, K. A. (1993) University students 91 17–54 (26.6) 3/4 3–3/4
Peterson (2001) Male adult offenders (self-report) 29 (41.7) 3 2/3–3
University students 20 (34.5) 3/4 3/4–4
g
Ritz (1996) Middle school studentsg 258 12–15 (13.7) 2/3 2/3–3
Rose (2005) Children and adolescents without ADHD 31 10–18 2/3 2/3–3
Children and adolescents with ADHD 31 10–18 2/3 2–3
Schonfeld et al. (2005) Juveniles with prenatal alcohol exposure 27 10–18 (13.8) 2/3 2–2/3
Non-exposed juveniles 29 10–18 (13.2) 2/3 2–3
Travis et al. (2004) Adults without transcendental meditation (TM) 9 (39.7) NR 3
experience
Adults with TM experience 20 (44.5) NR 3/4

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J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500
Table 4 (continued)
Study Sample n Age range (mean) Global stage Global stage
in years mean range
Van IJzendoorn and Zwart-Woudstra University students 47 18–22 (19.5) 3/4 3–4a
(1995)
Van Someren (2000) 6th–12th grade students 180 12–19 (15.2) 2/3 2/3–3
Woods and Jagers (2003) 8th grade African–American students 50 13–14 (13.4) 2/3 NR
Notes: NR, information not reported. Students include males and females unless otherwise indicated. Delinquents, CD participants, and offenders are male unless
otherwise indicated. Stage scores are presented using the 7-point global scale. Global stage range is estimated on the basis of ±1 SD unless otherwise indicated.
a
Range based on individual protocol score (total sample SDs not provided).
b
Range based on age-graded subgroup means (total sample SDs not provided).
c
The instrument was translated into Bulgarian and administered in Bulgaria to 29 of the participants. The remaining participants were Canadians tested in
Canada. Results (not affected by nationality) were reported only for the entire sample.
d
SRM-SF means and SDs not reported. ‘‘All respondents had a global stage of 3 or above’’ (Palmer & Hollin, 1998, p. 195).
e
Protocol stage scores based on multiple-choice selections. Participants matched each of their SRM-SF item justification responses to a closest option provided in
the questionnaire.
f
67.4% ‘‘conventional, with the remaining participants classified as preconventional’’ (p. 992).
g
Included 62 students identified by school counselor as ‘‘having problems with behavior and emotions in the academic setting’’ (Ritz, 1996, p. 49).
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 477

Table 5
Examples of German extensions of the SRM-SF scoring manual
Original response (German) English translationa Value Stage: aspect
Vertrauen mißbrauchen You would abuse other Contract & truth 3: 1a
peoples’ trust
weil es zum Anstand gehört This is part of decent behavior Contract & truth 3: 3b
andere würden mir Vorwürfe Other people would blame you Contract & truth 2/3: 6a
machen
ein Mann ein Wort A man, a word Contract & truth Unscorable
weil sonst eine Klage wegen You will be accused if you Life 1/2: 1a
unterlassener Hilfeleistung don’t help
folgt
es ist selbstverständlich, ein It goes without saying to save Life, affiliation 3: 3d marginal
Leben zu retten other people’s life
jedes Leben zählt Each life counts Life, affiliation 3: 5 marginal
Lügen haben kurze Beine Lies have short legs Property & law 2: 6b
Ehrlich währt am längsten Honesty lasts longer than Property & law 3: 3c
anything else
Das gehört sich nicht It is not proper behavior Property & law 3: 3b marginal
a
Some responses are difficult to translate insofar as they are indigenous German expressions or proverbs.

Moral judgment in childhood. According to the developmental expectations of original

Piagetian as well as revisionist models (Table 2), much moral reasoning produced in late
childhood (approximately ages 9–11) is still characterized by pragmatic considerations or
quid pro quo exchanges that serve the individual (Stage 2). Kohlberg’s theory predicts as a
secondary tendency (declining from early childhood) appeals to salient features such as
size, power, immediate status, unilateral relations, physical damage, and punitive conse-
quences (Stage 1). Gibbs (2003) stressed that the level of moral judgment associated with
childhood is immature and superficial insofar as that which is moral in a mature sense
tends to be confused with the pragmatic and instrumental (Stage 2) or the physical or
momentary (Stage 1). Often not grasped in childhood are the mutualistic and other intan-
gible bases for relationships and society. In Kohlberg’s and Snarey’s models, this level is
termed preconventional.
The data bases support these developmental expectations. The 1985 MJI and 2007
SRM-SF studies of 9- to 11-year-olds both included the USA, where Stage 2 predominated
(207 MJI mean, 215 SRM-SF mean). Stage 2 also predominated among children in Turkey
(MJI) as well as Japan, Italy, and Ireland (SRM-SF). Stage 1 reasoning was more prom-
inent among village or lower class children in Turkey, Bahamas, or India (MJI), and in
Bosnia, Kenya, and Nigeria4 (SRM-SF). Stage 1 characterized the mean protocol reason-
ing in only one of the MJI samples (Tibetan village children in India) and in none of the
SRM-SF samples.

4
Ferguson, Willis, and Tilley (2001) attributed the Nigerian sample’s apparent developmental delay to external
authority responses scored as Stage 1.
478 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

Table 6
Cross-cultural samples in rank order by mean sociomoral reflection maturity score, grouped by age
Sample/age range (mean) in years n Global stage M
range
Middle adulthood (approx. 40–50 years old)
USA (Travis et al.), adults with transcendental meditation (TM) 20 NR 357
experience/(44.5)
USA (Basinger et al.), university parents/(50.1) 58 3/4 350
USA (Travis et al.), adults without TM experience/(39.7) 9 3 310
USA (Peterson), offenders/(41.7) 29 2/3–3 289
Young adulthood (approx. 20–35 years old)
USA (Peterson), university students/(34.5) 20 3/4–4 372
Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’95), adult volunteers/(33.9) 154 NR 359
USA (Van IJzendoorn & Zwart-Woudstra), 47 3–3/4 344
university students/18–22 (19.5)
Australia (Stevenson et al.), university students/(26.9) 94 3–3/4 340
USA (Oliver, K. A.), university students/17–54 (26.6) 91 3–3/4 337
USA (Mason & Gibbs), university students/17–39 (20.8) 153 3–3/4 335
Saudi Arabia, upper-division university students/20–26 (22.5) 60 3–4a 333
Italy (Gielen et al.), university students/(22.6) 133 NR 331
Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’00), male adults 60 3–3/4 330
(non-drug abusers)/27–33 (29.2)
England (Palmer & Hollin ’96), university students/18–25 (19.5) 64 3–3/4 327
Bulgaria, adults in romantic relationships/19–73 (29.8) 163 3–3/4 325
Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’06), graduate students/22–26 (24.2) 120 3–3/4 322
Belgium, university and vocational students/21–24 57 NR 311
Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’00), male adults (drug abusers)/26–32 (30.1) 60 3–3/4 309
Australia (Stevenson et al.), male and female offenders/(31.2) 99 3–3/4 307
Japan (Takaki), university students/(19.8) 80 2/3–3/4 300
USA (Hubbs-Tait et al.), Head Start mothers/19–46 (29.1) 199 2/3–3/4 300
Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’95), adult non-volunteers/(34.6) 63 NR 299
USA (Chang), male and female offenders/18–24 (20.1) 90 2/3–3 276
Italy (Gielen et al.), adults (8th grade max.)/(22.5) 38 NR 269
England (Palmer & Begum), young adult offenders/18–21 (19.5) 59 2–2/3 235
Late adolescence (approx. 16–19 years old)
Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’95), volunteers (16.) 70 NR 329
Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’00), volunteers/15–21 (17.9) 49 3–3/4 328
Japan (Mizuno), high school students/16–18 (17.1) 22 NR 320
Bahrain, male high school students/17–18 (17.7) 30 3–3/4 313
USA (Basinger et al.), university students/(19.2) 72 3–3/4 312
Russia, high school students/(15.6) 419 NR 311
USA (Barriga et al. ’01), university students/16–19 (18.2) 181 3–3/4 305
England (Palmer & Hollin ’98), female secondary and university 210 2/3–3/4 304
students/13–22 (17.9)
Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’00), non-volunteers/15–21 (17.5) 60 3 303
Italy (Gielen et al.), 10th graders/(15.4) 38 NR 298
USA (Basinger et al.), high school students/(17.3) 89 2/3–3 296
Belgium, secondary school students/18–20 37 NR 292
Sweden, female non-delinquents/13–18 (16.0) 29 2/3–3/4 291
Japan (Takaki), 11th graders/(16.8) 95 2/3–3 289
USA (Gregg et al.), female high school students/13–19 (16.1) 77 2/3–3 289
England (Palmer & Hollin ’98), male secondary and university 122 2/3–3/4 286
students/13–22 (17.6)
USA (Grime), high school students/15–17 (16.2) 77 2/3–3 285
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 479

Table 6 (continued)
Sample/age range (mean) in years n Global stage M
range
England (Palmer & Hollin ’01), middle and high school 94 2/3–3 281
students/12–18 (15.7)
Ireland (Ferguson et al. ’94, Study 3), secondary school 61 2/3–3 281
students/16–19 (17.3)
England (Palmer & Hollin ’00), male high school students/12–24 (17.4) 77 2/3–3 279
USA (Gregg et al.), male high school students/13–19 (15.7) 86 2/3 272
Sweden, non-delinquents/13–18 (15.6) 29 2/3–3 266
Germany (Stadler et al.), participants without CD (matched)/9–15 (12.8) 14 2–3 265
England (Brusten), male high school students/14–16 (15.5) 149 2–3 264
England (Brusten), female high school students/14–16 (15.1) 117 2/3–3 262
Germany (Krettenauer & Becker), high school students/14–16 (15.6) 309 2/3–3 261
Sweden, female delinquents/13–18 (16.0) 29 2–3 256
Bahrain, delinquents/14–19 (16.8) 30 2/3–3 254
USA (Gregg et al.), female delinquents/13–18 (16.6) 71 2–3 254
Kenya, high school students/17–19 94 2–3 250
England (Palmer & Hollin ’00)/delinquents/13–21 (18.2) 97 2–2/3 249
Netherlands (Brugman & Aleva), nondelinquents/(15.1) 81 2–3 249
Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’95), non-volunteers/(16.0) 131 NR 247
England (Palmer & Hollin ’98), delinquents/13–21 (17.4) 126 2–3 247
Belgium, secondary school students/15–17 52 NR 244
England (Palmer & Hollin ’99), delinquents/13–17 (16.0) 42 2–3 243
Germany (Krettenauer & Becker), delinquents/14–17 (15.6) 39 2–3 243
Netherlands (Nas et al.), delinquents/12–21 (16.8) 108 2–3 243
USA (Gregg et al.), delinquents/13–18 (15.9) 89 2–2/3 243
USA (Leeman et al.), delinquents/15–18 (16.0) 57 2–3 243
Netherlands (Brugman & Aleva), delinquents/(16.5) 64 2–2/3 241
Netherlands (Nas et al.), delinquents/12–21 (16.8) 108 2–2/3 241
Sweden, delinquents/13–18 (15.5) 29 2–2/3 228
Germany (Stadler et al.), participants with CD/9–15 (12.7) 13 2–2/3 226
England (Brusten), delinquents/14–17 (15.9) 147 2–2/3 223
Australia (Putnins), delinquents (1 female)/14–18 (16.5) 38 1/2–2/3 211
Early/middle adolescence (approx. 12–15 years)
Taiwan (Tang), 7th and 8th grade students/13–14 45 NR 292
Italy (Gielen et al.), 9th grade students/(14.4) 52 NR 291
Japan (Takaki), 6th grade students/(12.4) 46 2/3–3 279
Ireland (Ferguson & Cairns ’96), secondary school students/14–15 325 2/3–3 278
Taiwan (Tang), 5th and 6th grade students/11–12 45 NR 272
Ireland (Northern; Ferguson & Cairns ’02), adolescents/14–15 219 2/3–3 269
Ireland (Ferguson et al. ’94, Study 2), secondary school students/14–15 85 NR 269
Canada (Krivel-Zacks), 6th and 7th grade students/10–13 (11.7) 47 NR 268
USA (Ritz), middle school students (62 problem-referred)/12–15 (13.7) 258 2/3–3 268
Ireland (Republic of; Ferguson & Cairns ’02), adolescents/14–15 239 2/3–3 267
USA (Grime), middle school students/12–14 (13.2) 260 2/3–3 267
USA (Van Someren), 6th–12th grade students/12–19 (15.2) 180 2/3–3 265
Japan (Takaki), 8th grade students/(14.3) 62 2–3 264
USA (Basinger et al.), 8th grade students/(14.1) 74 2/3–3 260
Canada (Binfet), urban middle school students/10–13 (11.6) 49 NR 257
USA (Oliver, J. M.), 7th and 8th grade students/12–14 146 NR 256
Scotland, middle school students/14–15 157 2/3–3 255
USA (Schonfeld et al.), juveniles (no prenatal alcohol 29 2–3 255
exposure)/10–18 (13.2)
(continued on next page)
480 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

Table 6 (continued)
Sample/age range (mean) in years n Global stage M
range
China, non-delinquents/13–15 10 NR 251
USA (Woods & Jagers)/8th grade African–American students/13–14 (13.4) 50 2–3 245
England (Tarry & Emler), middle school students/12–15 (13.0) 789 2–3 242
USA (Getty), 6th graders/11–14 (11.8) 276 2–3 240
Netherlands (Leenders & Brugman), secondary school 216 2–2/3 237
students/12–17 (14.3)
USA (Basinger et al.), 6th graders/(12.1) 43 2–2/3 237
USA (Bock), 4th–8th grade students/10–18 (11.6) 211 2/3 235
Ireland (Ferguson et al. ’94, Study 3), primary school students/14–15 (14.7) 58 2–2/3 235
Canada (Raynauld et al.), at-risk 5th and 6th grade students/10–13 (11.5) 53 2–2/3 233
Bosnia, primary school students/11–12 (11.8) 23 2–2/3 230
Ireland (Ferguson et al. ’94, Study 1), primary school students/NR 28 2–2/3 230
USA (McInerny), 7th grade students/NR 221 2–2/3 228
USA (Schonfeld et al.), juveniles with prenatal alcohol 27 2–2/3 228
exposure/10–18 (13.8)
Belgium, primary school students/12–14 48 NR 223
USA (Humphries et al.), 5th and 8th grade African–American 90 1/2–2/3 207
students/(12.0)
Kenya, middle school students/14–16 67 1/2–2/3 191
Kenya, middle school students/11–13 83 1/2–2 185
China, delinquents/13–15 10 NR 182
Late childhood (approx. 9–11 years old)
USA (Garrod et al.), primary school students/11–12 (11.4) 17 2–2/3 243
Japan (Takaki), 4th graders/(10.3) 37 2–3 239
Taiwan (Lin, Q.Q.), primary school students/9–12 450 2–2/3 225
Ireland (Ferguson et al. ’94, Study 2), primary school students/10–11 84 NR 223
Italy (Gielen et al.), 6th graders/(11.2) 52 NR 223
Ireland (Northern; Ferguson et al. ’01), primary school students/10–11 48 2–2/3 222
Ireland (Ferguson & Cairns ’96), primary school students/10–11 96 2–2/3 221
USA (Basinger et al.), 4th graders/(10.1) 48 2–2/3 215
Canada (DiBiase), 5th graders/10–12 (11.0) 45 NR 209
USA (DeVargas), 5th grade students/NR 61 2–2/3 209b
USA (Garrod et al.), primary school students/7–9 (7.8) 20 1/2–2/3 196
Nigeria, primary school students/10–11 37 1/2–2 181
Kenya, primary school students/8–10 69 1/2–2 179
Bosnia, primary school students/7–9 (8.1) 18 1/2 164

Notes: NR indicates information (SDs, subgroup means, individual scores) not reported. Students include both
genders unless otherwise indicated. Delinquents or offenders are male unless otherwise specified. Stage scores are
presented using the 7–point global scale. Global stage range is estimated on the basis of ±1 SD (total sample SDs
provided in the majority of the studies unless otherwise indicated).
a
Range based on individual protocol score (total sample SDs not provided).
b
This mean should possibly be classified under Early/middle adolescence. Mean age of the primary school
students was not reported in the study.

Presumably, Stage 1 would dominate if moral judgment were to be assessed for children
younger than 9 or 10. Although the MJI, the SRM-SF, and other instruments in the Kohl-
bergian tradition are designed to allow investigation of moral judgment across a broad age
range, few are well-suited for research with young children. Decades ago, Damon (1977)
observed that Kohlberg’s dilemmas were ‘‘clearly foreign to the lives of children’’ (p. 39).
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 481

The SRM-SF questions are somewhat more relevant to the lives of children, because chil-
dren are familiar with keeping promises to friends, helping parents, not taking things that
belong to others, and so forth—although the SRM-SF, too, includes more advanced ques-
tions pertaining to values of life, law, and legal justice.
What if the SRM-SF were used with younger children? Would Stage 1 reasoning in fact
predominate? Although the SRM-SF questionnaire is not particularly suited for the world
of young children and its reading level is fourth-grade, it can be administered to a younger
child as an individual oral interview. Eight-year-olds (including a few seven- and nine-
year-olds) interviewed in the USA and Bosnia averaged Stage 2 and transition 1/2, respec-
tively (Garrod et al., 2004; see Tables 4 and 6). For children younger than eight years, only
incidental data are available. Snarey and Keljo (1994) reported that ‘‘a kindergarten stu-
dent we interviewed . . . gave scorable answers to 10 of the 11 questions with remarkable
ease’’ (p. 184), although they did not indicate the stage level of the kindergartener’s
answers. A 5-year-old boy interviewed by the first author (Gibbs) gave scorable answers
to 10 of the 11 questions. His SRMS was 145, represented in 10-point global stage terms
as 1(2), i.e., major Stage 1/minor Stage 2. To convey some sense of young children’s
responses to the SRM-SF, we present the interview:

1. [keeping promises to friends] Important. Question: Why is that important?

Answer: It would be nice [Stage 1: Aspect 4b], you should keep what you said.
2. [keeping promises to someone you hardly know] Don’t know. Not important. Q:
And why is that not important?
A: Because it’s just a promise, it’s not something big like a big thing [Stage 1: Aspect
2].
3. [parents keeping promises to children.] Very important. Q: So why is it very impor-
tant for parents to keep promises to children?
A: Because if they don’t, the children are not going to like the parents [Stage 2:
Aspect 6b].
4. [telling the truth] Very important. Q: And why is that very important?
A: Very, very important because [if you don’t], you are going to get in trouble [tran-
sition 1/2: Aspect 2c].
5. [children helping their parents] Very important. Q: Why is that very important?
A: Because maybe they are hurt. . . . they take care of you and if you don’t help them
and they die, you won’t have anyone to take care of you [Stage 2: Aspect 5b].
6. [saving the life of a friend] Very important. Q: And why is saving the life of a friend
very important?
A: Because you like him and you don’t want him to die [Stage 2: Aspect 4a].
7. [saving the life of a stranger.] Not important. Q: Why isn’t it important to save the
life of a stranger?
A: Because it’s a stranger, it’s not your friend [Stage 1: Aspect 2].
8. [to live even if that person doesn’t want to.] Not important Q: And why isn’t it
important for a person to live if that person doesn’t want to?
A: Because he doesn’t want to [marginal5 Stage 2; Aspect 4a].

5
This response merely follows the interviewer’s lead, and accordingly may reflect a momentary preference
(Stage 1; see Gibbs, 2003).
482 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

9. [people not to take things that belong to other people] Very important Q: And why is
that very important?
A: Because they get put in jail if they don’t [Stage 1: Aspect 5].
10. [people obeying the law] Very important. Q: So why is it very important for people to
obey the law?
A: Because it’s the law. Everybody should obey the law [unscorable].
11. [judges sending people who break the law to jail] Very important. Q: Why is it very
important for judges to do that?
A: Because the judge may get put in prison if they don’t obey the order. Someone
orders them to do that job [Stage 1: Aspects 5, 3].

With its appeals to simple needs or preferences, tangible features (a promise is not ‘‘big,
like a big thing’’), and one-way relations with punitive consequences (‘‘the judge may get
put in prison if they don’t obey the order [given by someone to put people who break the
law in jail]’’), this case is consistent with age trend expectations. It also raises a question as
to the meaning of the stage construct (beyond its use as a referent for qualitative change)
in the cognitive developmental approach (cf. Brainerd, 1978, 1979). The 5-year-old’s rea-
soning is in fact predominantly Stage 1, but not totally. Why not? If a stage is a structured
whole, as Kohlberg sought to establish and as suggested in some experimental research
(e.g., by Boom, Brugman, & van der Heijden, 2001), then should not a 5-year-old’s moral
reasoning be consistently Stage 1? It is possible that refinements in the MJI and SRM-SF
scoring manuals would render more consistent stage protocol ratings (it is certainly true
that the scoring manuals can be improved). It is also possible, however, that Kohlberg’s
aim to identify empirically coherent stage structures for Stage 1 and beyond was not
entirely successful. Precisely because of developmental variability even within a single
interview, Piaget (1965/1932) refrained from referring to his modes of moral judgment
as ‘‘stages,’’ recommending instead the concept of overlapping ‘‘phases’’ (p. 317). Damon
(1980) found in a 2-year longitudinal study that distributive justice stage development was
‘‘gradual, mixed, and uneven’’ (p. 1017). Siegler (1996a, 1996b; cf. Chapman, 1988; Colby
et al., 1983; Flavell et al., 2002; Rest, 1979) suggested that the stage construct can be sal-
vaged if stages were regarded merely as characteristic tendencies and if each new stage
were conceptualized not as a step but rather as a beginning new ‘‘wave’’ that overlaps pre-
vious waves in the waxings and wanings of developmental advance.
It is likely that generic standard measures such as the MJI or SRM-SF, although useful
for identifying broad, basic cross-cultural age trends, fall short of what is needed for more
intensive exploration of reasoning at particular age periods or in particular cultural con-
texts. Some of the child-oriented research (such as that generated by Selman’s [1980; cf.
2003] social perspective-taking stories) corroborate Kohlberg’s basic four stages. Aligning
‘‘tolerably well’’ with Kohlberg’s ‘‘general progression’’ (Lapsley, 2006, p. 53) are the
developmental levels suggested by data from Damon’s (1977) distributive justice tasks fea-
turing tangible goods such as bracelets or candy bars, and Eisenberg’s (e.g., Eisenberg,
1986; Eisenberg et al., 2006) child-friendly stories concerning prosocial behavior. Nonethe-
less, these research literatures also identify precocities in childhood moral reasoning not
suggested by Stage 1. The social domain research of Turiel and colleagues (e.g., Nucci,
2006; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2006a, 2006b; Turiel & Smetana, 1998) has identified an
apparent sophistication in young children’s understanding of moral as distinct from con-
ventional and personal matters (but cf. Fowler, 1998, 2007; Glassman & Zan, 1995; Lour-
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 483

enco, 2003; J. G. Miller, 2006; Rest et al., 1999). In general, however, ‘‘vulnerability to
salient features of the here-and-now’’ is broadly evident in young children’s social and
nonsocial cognition (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 181) and is evident as well as a characteristic
tendency (Siegler, 1996b) in young children’s moral reasoning (i.e., as Stage 1).
Moral judgment in adolescence. In the years from late childhood into early adolescence, a
crucial qualitative advance seems to take place in many young persons’ moral judgment. As
we have seen, this qualitative transition has been variously characterized as a shift from con-
crete to ideal moral reciprocity (Piaget), from preconventional-level Stage 2 instrumental
purpose to conventional-level, Stage 3 interpersonal accord (Kohlberg or Snarey), or from
immature-level Stage 2 pragmatic exchanges to mature-level Stage 3 mutualities and equities
(Piaget or Gibbs). Gibbs stresses that the emergence of mutualistic moral understanding,
although sometimes embedded in social conventions (Kohlberg’s Moral Type A), nonethe-
less represents a basic achievement of moral maturity in its own right for interpersonal rela-
tionships. It is an achievement that, given adequate social perspective-taking experiences
(Comunian & Gielen, 2006; Grime, 2005) and cognitive advances such as formal operations
(Moshman, 1998), should become clearly evident by early adolescence.
Again, our review corroborates this expectation. Stage 3 already makes an appearance
in the stage ranges of some late childhood samples, but generally gains prominence (some-
times even full-stage prominence) during early adolescence. In the 1985 MJI data base,
Stage 3 was prominent in the moral reasoning of young adolescents in the Kibbutz, Tai-
wan, and the USA (upper middle-class). In the 2007 SRM-SF data base as shown in Table
6, Stage 3 is prominent (as at least a major global stage, 3[2]) among early adolescents in
Canada, China, Ireland (Northern, Republic of), Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Scotland,
Taiwan, and in one USA study (Schonfeld et al., 2005).
By late adolescence, Stage 3 normally becomes the mean global moral judgment stage.
In the 1985 MJI data base, this was the case in India (upper middle class), Israel (upper-
middle class, Kibbutz working class), Taiwan, and USA. In the 2007 SRM-SF data base as
shown (Table 6), Stage 3 is the mean for older mainstream adolescents in Bahrain, Bel-
gium, England (Palmer & Hollin, 1998, 2000, 2001), Ireland, Italy (most samples), Japan,
Russia, Sweden, and the USA. The main exceptions are delinquent or adjudicated late
adolescents, discussed below.
Older adolescents (at least in national states) may also begin to extend their Stage 3
mutualistic understanding to grasp the importance of agreed-upon standards and institu-
tions for the common good. In a USA study of developmental transitions in the concept of
law, Adelson, Green, and O’Neil (1969) used semi-structured interviews based on a ‘‘desert
island’’ situation (‘‘Imagine that a thousand people move to an island in the Pacific, and
set about building a community de novo. They are confronted by the tasks of forming a
government and of developing laws and other modes of communal regulation,’’ p. 327) to
compare the understandings of early adolescents (ages 11–13) and late adolescents (ages
15–18). As with the MJI or SRM-SF moral judgment results, the preadolescents’ or early
adolescents’ reasoning concerning the purpose of laws tended to be more concrete and
pragmatic. For example, an 11-year-old responded: ‘‘Well, [they’d have laws] so everybody
won’t fight and they have certain laws so they won’t go around breaking windows and
stuff and getting away with it.’’ In contrast, reasoning in late adolescence tended to be
more abstract and ideal, e.g., an 18-year-old’s response: ‘‘Well, the main purpose [of the
laws] would be just to set up a standard of behavior for people, for society living together
so that they can live peacefully and in harmony with each other’’ (p. 328). With reference
484 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

to effects of the absence of law, older adolescents appealed not only to outer misconduct
but also to more subtle or intangible effects upon inner feelings and character (e.g., per-
sonal confusion, anomie, and a dwindling of moral sense and capacity).
This beginning movement from interpersonal to societal frames of reference in late ado-
lescence is represented theoretically in moral judgment models as movement from Stage 3
to Stage 4. In Kohlberg’s and Snarey’s models, this movement is from ‘‘interpersonal
accord and conformity’’ (Kohlbergian Stage 3) to ‘‘societal accord in system maintenance’’
(Kohlbergian Stage 4) within the conventional level. Gibbs recasts Stages 3 and Stage 4 as
already mature in their appreciation of the intangible bases of relationships and society.
The Stage 3 and Stage 4 reasoning may not be conformity- or maintenance-oriented when
the orientation is Type B or field-independent (Gibbs et al., 1986).
The data bases generally corroborate the cognitive developmental expectation for
moral judgment development in adolescence. In the MJI data base, although most late
adolescents’ reasoning was predominantly Stage 3, transition 3/4 made a strong secondary
showing (it was the mean stage for 66.5% of 18-year-olds in Taiwan). In the SRM-SF data
base, transition 3/4 marked at least the upper range of late adolescents’ moral judgment in
Bahrain, England (Palmer & Hollin, 1998), and Italy (community service volunteers).
Indeed, transition 3/4 was the mean moral judgment stage vicinity evidenced by the Italian
volunteer sample. The volunteers provided help through charitable Catholic institutions to
needy individuals such as Bosnian refugees as well as the elderly, ill, and/or handicapped
(Comunian & Gielen, 1995, 2000). That community service is associated with greater use
of transition 3/4 and Stage 4 is consistent with cognitive developmental hypotheses regard-
ing the developmental impact of such ‘‘enlarged’’ social perspective-taking opportunities
(Comunian & Gielen, 2006; Edwards, 1978, 1985, 1986; Kohlberg, 1984; cf. Hart, Atkins,
& Donnelly, 2006), as will be discussed below.
Moral judgment in adulthood. If Stage 3 gains in prominence during adolescence, the
same may be said for transition 3/4 or Stage 4 during the adult years. In the MJI data base,
transition 3/4 is the most frequent level used among adults in India (upper middle class),
Kibbutz, Taiwan, and USA, although it is not seen among adults in rural Kenya or Tur-
key. Stage 4 also makes a strong showing, and in fact is the modal stage in a USA upper
middle class sample. Stages 3 and 4 remain mixed in the SRM-SF data base, but transition
3/4 or Stage 4 defined the upper (+1 SD) range for 15 of the 19 adult samples where range
was reported (three exceptions were adult offender samples: Chang, 2001; Palmer &
Begum, 2006; and Peterson, 2001).
Higher education appears to be particularly important for moral judgment develop-
ment in the adult years, perhaps because of the opportunity it typically affords for
expanded social perspective-taking. The mean stage of adults in Italy having no more than
an 8th grade education was transition 2/3 (SRMS = 269) and of USA Head Start mothers
(23% of whom had not completed secondary school and only 4% of whom had attended or
completed college) was Stage 3 (SRMS = 300). In contrast, adult university students in
Australia, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the USA evidenced mean SRMS scores in the transi-
tion 3/4 range (university students in Japan and a mixed sample in Belgium were the only
exceptions). Mason and Gibbs (1993a, 1993b) as well as Comunian and Gielen (2006)
found that the extent of university students’ moral judgment maturity beyond Stage 3
was correlated with their agreement on social perspective-taking items such as ‘‘I have
encountered and become friends with other students or co-workers of different ethnic or
cultural backgrounds (for example, a student from another country),’’ ‘‘I have been
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 485

involved in a group or organization where it was necessary for me to deal with various
points of view,’’ and ‘‘I have learned just how culturally varied the world is since coming
to college’’ (cf. Edwards, 1975, 1978; Harkness, Edwards, & Super, 1981). Comunian and
Gielen (2006) found that a sociomoral intervention promoted both expanded social per-
spective-taking and moral judgment beyond Stage 3, but they did not investigate whether
social perspective-taking mediated the gains in moral judgment. Research is needed to
address this question.
As adolescents or adults in university or complex work settings increasingly experience
and seek to coordinate diverse viewpoints, they may not only increasingly appreciate the
need for agreed-upon standards (Stage 4), but may also move beyond Stage 4 to reflect
upon the customs and norms of their society, indeed, of morality or life itself. In Needle-
man’s (1982) overstatement, ‘‘man cannot live without philosophy’’ (p. 3). In ethics, meta-
ethical reflection may lead for a time to an ‘‘unbridled relativism’’ (Boyes & Chandler,
1992, p. 285) that Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) referred to as a transitional 4 1/2. In Kohl-
berg’s theory, adults (especially those with philosophical training) may achieve a postcon-
ventional or principled philosophical level of theoretical discourse on the bases for moral
values, a Stage 5 and perhaps a Stage 6. In Snarey’s pluralist–inclusionist stage model, this
level in the theory and scoring manual must be broadened beyond the Western traditions
of Kant or Rawls. In Gibbs’ two-phase model, this level pertains to a fundamentally new
phase of human development, an existential inquiry that reflects moral judgment maturity
in the fullest sense and transcends stages and stage scoring manuals (morally relevant exis-
tential reflection could be profitably included in the manual, albeit as examples of post-
standard quests for existential insight rather than as a stage).

Social perspective-taking across cultures

We have referred to cross-cultural evidence consistent with the emphasis in Kohlberg’s

cognitive development approach on social interaction, social participation, and, in partic-
ular, social perspective-taking opportunities as facilitative of moral judgment develop-
ment. Noted earlier were Italian studies (Comunian & Gielen, 1995, 2000, 2006) that
found relations between community service volunteering or related communitarian expe-
riences and greater use of transition 3/4 and Stage 4. USA (e.g., Colby et al., 1983) findings
relating moral judgment maturity to index variables such as age, education, socioeconomic
status, urban settings, and community service volunteering were corroborated in Snarey’s
cross-cultural MJI review as well as in the present data base (Table 3). For example, posi-
tive correlations with chronological age (indexing social experiential as well as matura-
tional variables; Rutter, 1989) were generally reported in studies where the samples
entailed a range of ages. The relationship of moral judgment stage with SES level was rep-
licated in an Armenian study (Jeshmaridian & Babakhanyan, 2005). Urban samples evi-
denced more mature moral judgment compared with rural samples in Armenia
(Jeshmaridian & Babakhanyan, 2005) as well as Ireland and Scotland (Ferguson & Cairns,
2002). Studies in Belgium, England, Italy, Japan,6 Kenya, Malaysia, Taiwan and USA

6
The reversal in SRMS means between the sixth and eighth grades in the Takaki (2001) study (see Table 6) was
not significant overall, but was significant for boys. Takaki speculated that ‘‘certain problems in Japanese
education’’ created an ‘‘antipathy’’ and temporary regression in morality among mid-adolescent Japanese boys
(p. 541).
486 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

comparing students at different educational levels all found significant differences favoring
higher education. Researchers in Canada (Krivel-Zacks, 1995), Malaysia (Chu, 1999), the
Netherlands (Brugman & Aleva, 2004), Taiwan (Chen & Hsieh, 2001) and USA (Van Som-
eren, 2000) reported positive correlations with academic achievement. It should also be
noted that moral judgment correlated with intelligence in the USA (Basinger et al., 1995;
Grime, 2005; Schonfeld et al., 2005) and the Netherlands (Nas, Brugman, & Koops, 2005).
Particularly helpful are studies that relate moral judgment maturity directly to self-
reports of social participation and perspective-taking. Studies (Comunian & Gielen,
2006; Mason & Gibbs, 1993a, 1993b) relating transition 3/4 and Stage 4 to self-reported
experiences of exposure to and interaction with culturally diverse individuals or groups
in university or complex work settings were described above. Grime (2005; cf. Sedikides,
1989) found that adolescents’ self-reported general and friendship perspective-taking cor-
related with their use of interpersonally mature (Stage 3) moral judgment even after con-
trolling for verbal intelligence.
Also relevant to the role of social perspective-taking is the investigation of groups that
might be expected to be developmentally delayed in moral judgment due to diminished
social perspective-taking opportunities. A number of researchers investigated whether
the SRM-SF discriminated delinquents or juvenile offenders from a non-offending com-
parison group (of equivalent chronological age in most studies, with verbal intelligence
and/or SES controlled in some studies). Moral judgment developmental delay among
delinquents relative to their comparison groups was evident in all countries where it
was studied, namely, Australia, Bahrain, China, England, Germany, the Netherlands,7
Sweden, Taiwan, and the USA (see Table 6; cf. Stams et al., 2006; see related discussion
below). A USA study (Leeman, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1993) found that delinquents higher in
moral judgment were less likely to recidivate at 12 months following release. Among adult
offenders, Chang (2001) found that moral judgment correlated inversely with psychopa-
thy. Inclusion of social perspective-taking measures would be helpful in future studies
of individuals evidencing various categories of antisocial behavior; particularly helpful
would be intervention studies in which the relationship of social perspective-taking gains
and other mediators to outcome variables is evaluated.
Some cross-cultural research yielded a mixed picture concerning areas of moral judg-
ment delay and facilitative social processes or outcomes. Adult offenders were less mature
overall (e.g., no substantial transition 3/4) in moral judgment (Palmer & Begum, 2006;
Peterson, 2001; Stevenson, Hall, & Innes, 2004), but were developmentally delayed (tran-
sition 2/3 or lower) mainly in the value areas of property, law, and legal justice (Peterson,
2001). These moral value areas make sense as the areas of delay that can be expected for
offenders. Adolescent offenders are delayed in these areas as well. Unlike adult offenders,
however, adolescent offenders are also delayed in most other areas (see Gregg et al., 1994;
Palmer & Hollin, 1998; Ritz, 1996). Moral judgment generally correlated inversely with
parent-, teacher-, or self-reported antisocial behavior in the USA (Barriga, Morrison,
Liau, & Gibbs, 2001; McInerney, 1995; Ritz, 1996; but cf. Schonfeld et al., 2005) and
Canada (Krivel-Zacks, 1995), but not consistently in England (Palmer & Hollin, 2000,
2001; cf. Brusten, Stams, & Gibbs, 2007; Emler & Tarry, 2007; Tarry & Emler, 2007),

7
The difference in the Brugman and Aleva (2004) study became non-significant when participants from ‘‘a high-
risk urban area’’ were added to the comparison group (p. 325).
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 487

and not in the Netherlands (Leenders & Brugman, 2005). Moral judgment inconsistently
related to antisocial attitudes, self-serving cognitive distortions, or anti-outgroup ideology:
inverse relationships were found in Germany (Krettenauer & Becker, 2001), Sweden (Lar-
den, Melin, Holst, & Langstrom, 2006), the USA (Barriga et al., 2001), and Australia
(among moral judgment delayed and nondelayed adult offenders relative to adult nonof-
fenders; Stevenson et al., 2004), but not in England (among adult offenders, Palmer &
Begum, 2006), or the Netherlands (Nas et al., 2005). Various sociomoral interventions
promoted moral judgment in Canada (Binfet, 2004; DiBiase, 2002; Krivel-Zacks, 1995;
Raynauld, Larivee, & Dionne, 1999), Italy (Comunian & Gielen, 2006), and Australia
(Putnins, 1997) but not consistently in the USA (DeVargas, 1999; but cf. Greene, 1997;
Leeman et al., 1993) or the Netherlands (Nas et al., 2005). Although moral judgment as
measured by the SRM-SF generally related to psychosocial maturity, friendship quality,
empathy, or relationship adjustment in Bulgaria (Vlassev, 1998), Sweden (Larden et al.,
2006), and the USA (Getty, 1996; Grime, 2005; Hubbs-Tait et al., 2006; Humphries, Par-
ker, & Jagers, 2000; and K. A. Oliver, 1993), the relation was not found in Bahrain (Al-
Falaij, 1991) or Saudi Arabia (Al-Ghamdi, 1994). Finally, moral judgment correlated with
social skills in some studies (DiBiase, 2002; Krivel-Zacks, 1995) but not in others (Leeman
et al., 1993; Nas et al., 2005; Palmer & Hollin, 1999).
Research is needed to investigate these relationships and account for the inconsisten-
cies. Meta-analyses of the effect size of the impact of sociomoral interventions upon moral
judgment development and conduct, for example, may be feasible as additional interven-
tion studies become available.
Gender differences. Differential social perspective-taking opportunities have been related
to the question of gender differences in moral judgment orientation and stage. Females
tend to use more care-related concerns in their moral justifications (Garmon et al.,
1996; Jaffe & Hyde, 2000). This finding is consistent with Gilligan’s (1982) claims for a
‘‘feminine voice’’ of responsible caring in moral judgment. Contradicting Gilligan’s claim
of a stage scoring bias against females, however, have been findings that early-adolescent
females reach Stage 3 as their dominant stage sooner than do early-adolescent males, even
with verbal intelligence controlled (Garmon et al., 1996; Silberman & Snarey, 1993;
Walker, 1984). This early-adolescent moral judgment precociousness favoring females
coincides with higher levels of general and friendship perspective-taking experiences,
which suggests that the Stage 3 moral judgment gain may be attributable to more extensive
opportunities to interrelate and reflect upon social perspectives (Grime, 2005).
It should be noted that gender differences in moral judgment stage, where they are found
at all in our cross-cultural data bases, tend to favor females, at least in the 2007 data base.
Many studies in both the 1985 and 2007 data bases included both genders in their samples
and investigated the question of gender differences. Consistent with previous studies, the
cross-cultural data support gender differences with reference to moral orientation more than
moral judgment stage. Replicating Garmon et al.’s (1996) and others’ studies in the USA (see
Jaffe & Hyde, 2000), Gielen, Comunian, and Antoni (1994) in Italy found that females use
more care-related concerns than do males in their moral justifications. In the 2007 SRM-
SF data base, a moral judgment stage difference favoring females (at least in early to mid ado-
lescence) was found in Armenia, Belgium, Canada (Raynauld et al., 1999), Germany, Japan
(Takaki, 2001), Sweden, and Malaysia—but not in Australia (Stevenson et al., 2004), Bosnia,
Kenya, Russia, Scotland (Ferguson & Cairns, 2002), or the Netherlands (Leenders & Brug-
man, 2005). Results were mixed in England (Palmer & Hollin, 1998; but cf. Brusten, 2003),
488 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

Italy (Comunian & Antoni, 1993; Comunian & Gielen, 1995; but cf. Comunian & Gielen,
2006), Taiwan (W. Y. Lin, 1995; but cf. Tang, 2004), and the USA (Bock, 2006; Ritz,
1996; Schonfeld et al., 2005; but cf. Garmon et al., 1996; Getty, 1996; Humphries et al.,
2000; J. M. Oliver, 2003). In the 1985 MJI data base, Snarey (1985; cf. Walker, 1984,
2006) found few gender stage differences in either direction. He reported that only 2 out of
14 MJI studies examining the question found a difference (one in Germany favoring females
in Stage 3 usage, another in England favoring males).

Conclusions

Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental approach and stage model were used in this review
to study, across different assessment methods, moral judgment development across cul-
tures. Kohlberg claimed that there is a universality to moral growth beyond the superficial
as well as to facilitating social perspective-taking processes and moral values. Identifying
that which is universal and basic in human development is of central importance for devel-
opmental psychology and beyond. In light of basic humanity and maturity, legitimate
issues of ethical principle can be distinguished from enmity attributable to ideological dif-
ferences or superficial differences of language, appearance, and custom (Spelke & New-
port, 1998).
This study reviewed Kohlberg’s universality claims with research that collectively used
MJI and SRM-SF moral judgment measures. Comprising Snarey’s (1985) MJI data base
were 45 studies conducted in 27 countries. Comprising the present SRM-SF data base are
75 studies conducted in 23 countries. Collective inclusion of the different (dilemma and
non-dilemma) methods made possible not only a replication (or non-replication) but,
more importantly, a multimethod extension (Brewer & Hunter, 2006) in the study of
the moral universality question. The 42 countries collectively surveyed in the reviews range
from Guatamala to Germany, from India to Italy, from New Guinea to Nigeria. Our col-
lective survey using the multimethod extension provided some consensus—more precisely,
some convergent evidence across methods—but also revealed some continuing controver-
sies and the need for further research (using both production and recognition measures)
regarding basic moral values, stages, and social processes.

Moral values

Although the question of the universality of values continues to need research attention,
persons around the world do seem to understand and appreciate values such as life, affil-
iation, contract or truth, and property or law, whether they encounter those values in a
dilemma (MJI) or are asked about them directly (SRM-SF). Otherwise the (adapted)
dilemmas would have provoked greater puzzlement and the values ratings greater protocol
attrition. Of course, the moral values studied in Kohlbergian assessment measures are not
necessarily exhaustive of the moral value domain; other moral values may be more rele-
vant in particular cultural contexts.

Moral judgment stages

Kohlberg’s main generic claim for moral universality was that moral judgment develops
in systematic ways across cultures. In the years from late childhood into early adolescence,
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 489

a qualitative shift from instrumental (Stage 2) to mutualistic (Stage 3) moral judgment was
robust enough to manifest across different methods of assessment and diverse cultures.
This shift has been characterized as a transition from concrete to ideal or ‘‘do as you
would be done by’’ moral reciprocity by Piaget (1932/1965), from the preconventional
to the conventional level by Kohlberg (1984) or Snarey (1985), and from the immature
to the mature level of standard development by Gibbs (2003). The shift typically occurs
somewhat earlier for females and much later (if at all) for delinquents, findings that
may relate to differential social perspective-taking opportunities (see below).
The transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3 lies at the heart of moral judgment development
and is evident, then, across cultures and methods. Less consensus and more controversy
tend to characterize the border regions of moral judgment stage development. In the lower
region, the moral judgment of early childhood is characterized not only by Stage 2 but also
to some extent by Stage 1, the stage of appeals to salient features of social life such as size,
power, appearances, and physical damage or punitive consequences. Stage 1 superficiality
does appear to be a characteristic tendency (Siegler, 1996b) of the moral judgment of
young children. Yet the Stage 1 characterization does not account for the precocities of
preschoolers’ sociomoral reasoning, as found through the extensive child-adapted research
of Damon, Eisenberg, Turiel, and others. Future research and theory must come to terms
with these contrasting aspects of moral judgment in early childhood.
Controversy also surrounds to some extent the upper border of the core stage trend.
Not particularly controversial is the observation that moral judgment expands in social
scope during late adolescence in many countries, according to both data bases. In stage
terms, this expansion can be characterized as a broadening of the intangible bases of moral
decisions and value to include the functional bases for a complex society (Stage 4). Cog-
nate research on the concept of law (Adelson et al., 1969) documented in a USA sample an
increasing appreciation in the late adolescent years of the need for agreed-upon standards
and institutions for the common good. This development is found especially among ado-
lescents or adults engaged in community service activities or in university or complex work
settings, perhaps reflecting the role of social perspective-taking opportunities (see below).
What of development beyond the fourth stage? Among the revisionists, Gibbs agrees
with Snarey on the importance of incorporating moral principles or philosophy into the
investigation of moral judgment maturity in the fullest sense. Gibbs (2003) argues, how-
ever, that philosophical or meta-ethical discourse should be interpreted not as a fifth stage
but rather as part of a profoundly reflective or existential phase of human development.
Isawa’s (2001) use of the Heinz dilemma to explore the greater emphasis among Japanese
(relative to American) adult respondents on ‘‘the connected aspect of human existence’’
(p. 79), for example, would be seen by Snarey as exploring the cultural elaboration of a
postconventional stage and by Gibbs as exploring (in the main) an existential insight. Fur-
ther refinement of the Snarey and Gibbs models may promote new research including
experimental hypothesis testing, and accordingly the accumulation of a greater preponder-
ance of evidence for one or the other of the models.

Social perspective-taking opportunities

A variety of evidence across the data bases is consistent with the cognitive developmen-
tal expectation that moral judgment stage development is facilitated by social perspective-
taking opportunities. Moral judgment maturity was found to correlate with putative
490 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

indices of extensiveness, breadth, and/or diversity of social experience (age, socioeconomic

status or social class, and education) in Kohlberg’s longitudinal study (Colby et al., 1983)
as well as in the cross-cultural data bases. The 1985 and 2007 data bases also found cor-
relations of moral judgment maturity with urbanization or urban (versus rural) settings.
The higher prevalence of transition 3/4 or Stage 4 moral judgment among late adolescents
or adults in volunteer community service or in university or complex work settings was
noted above.
Diminished social perspective-taking opportunities may be a factor helping to account
for the developmentally delayed moral judgment of juvenile delinquents or conduct-disor-
dered adolescents, many of whom have home backgrounds characterized by erratic disci-
pline, abuse, and neglect (Kazdin, 1995). Cross-cultural studies comparing the moral
judgment of delinquents and non-delinquents spanned eight countries (Bahrain, China,
England, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Taiwan, and USA) in the 2007 SRM-SF
data base. Strikingly, among 45 late adolescent samples in the data base, all 17 delinquent
samples were below average, indeed, were among the 20 lowest ranked in their age
bracket. Meta-analyses indicate that the developmental delay evident among late-adoles-
cent delinquents remains even after taking into account correlates and moderators such as
IQ, SES, and incarceration (Nelson, Smith, & Dodd, 1990; Stams et al., 2006).
Directly relevant to the posited facilitative role of social perspective-taking opportuni-
ties are studies (in the 2007 SRM-SF data base) that included self-report measures of social
participation and perspective-taking. Adolescents who reported more general and friend-
ship perspective-taking experiences were more mature in moral judgment even after verbal
intelligence was controlled for; such experiences may mediate the precocious advent of
Stage 3 among girls in late childhood or early adolescence. Social perspective-taking
may facilitate moral judgment development among older adolescents as well. That social
experiential processes are critical to the university contribution is suggested by correlations
between advanced moral judgment and agreement among college students with items such
as, ‘‘I have learned just how culturally varied the world is since coming to college’’ (Comu-
nian & Gielen, 2006; Mason & Gibbs, 1993a, 1993b).
Intriguingly, most of the above evidence is also consistent with the hypothesis that such
diverse social experiences foster the development of more adequate psychological under-
standings or ‘‘theories’’ of mind (one’s own and others’), and that it is the person’s theory
of mind that then undergirds the moral judgment gain (e.g., Wainryb & Brehl, 2006; Lal-
onde & Chandler, 2002). Developmental researchers and theorists are increasingly attend-
ing to issues and interfaces between the theory of mind and sociomoral developmental
literatures (Baird & Sokol, 2004). Future research should investigate and comparatively
evaluate social perspective-taking and theory of mind depictions of social developmental
process.

Moral judgment and social behavior

Personological and situational variables influence the relationship between moral judg-
ment and social behavior. Decades ago, Brown and Herrnstein (1978) proposed ‘‘that an
intervening variable is required’’ between moral judgment stage and social behavior,
namely, how the individual on the basis of that stage conceptualizes ‘‘the specific action
in context’’ (p. 336). Similarly, Blasi (1980) called for attention to how moral judgment
‘‘is applied to a concrete situation to invest it with moral meaning’’ (p. 40). Possible vari-
 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 491

ables that should continue to be studied include moral identity or moral self-relevance (the
degree to which morality is central to one’s sense of self; see, e.g., Gibbs, 2003), self-serving
cognitive distortions, e.g., blaming others (e.g., Barriga et al., 2001; cf. Tisak, Tisak, &
Goldstein, 2006), empathy (e.g.., Krevans & Gibbs, 1996; McCrady et al., in press), exec-
utive skills, social skills (which have not consistently related to moral judgment maturity),
and situational variables (e.g., Brugman & Aleva, 2004; Greenberg, 2002). Inclusion of
such variables in sociomoral intervention programs could promote the programs’ behav-
ioral effectiveness (e.g., DiBiase, Gibbs, & Potter, 2005).
Situational influences merit particular attention. The regressive effects on social behav-
ior of situational factors such as prison conditions has long been noted (Gibbs, 2006b).
Other situational or sociocultural factors supportive of the judgment–action relationship
should also be studied. Particularly intriguing was Greenberg’s (2002) experimental study
of developmental and situational influences on employee theft. In contrast to employees
evidencing immature or ‘‘preconventional’’ moral judgment, employees more mature in
moral judgment refrained from pilfering company funds—but only when the mature
employees were from companies with an ethics program in place. Greenberg concluded
that the relationship between mature moral judgment and responsible social behavior
requires salient social support.

Final Comment

Although Kohlberg died in 1987, and approaches to moral development have since pro-
liferated (e.g., Dawson & Gabrielian, 2003; Gibbs, 2006b; Haidt, 2003; Hoffman, 2000;
Krebs & Denton, 2005, 2006; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Shweder et al., 2006; Tappan,
2006; Turiel, 2006b), cognitive developmental research and theory continue to grow.
The areas of consensus indicate progress in the cognitive developmental contribution to
our understanding of moral judgment development and behavior across cultures; evi-
dently, moral development is not entirely relative to particular cultures and socialization
practices. Areas of controversy and inconsistency reflect continued vitality as well as the
opportunity for advances through systematic research. As Kohlberg recognized, beyond
the broad cognitive developmental approach of age-related trends, his specific stage model
and claim for moral judgment development across cultures require qualification and revi-
sion. Nonetheless, as Snarey (1985) concluded, ‘‘the significant shortcomings of Kohl-
berg’s work should not overshadow its remarkable achievements’’ (p. 229). Our review
bolsters the conclusion that Kohlberg was in principle correct regarding the universality
of basic moral judgment development, moral values, and related social perspective-taking
processes across cultures.

Acknowledgments

This article originated in a symposium paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Psychological Association (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2005, August).
We are grateful for the contributions of many people. We especially thank MaryLou Ar-
nold, Daan Brugman, Kate Brusten, Tan Bee Chu, Anne Colby, AnnaLaura Comunian,
Jane Cottrell, Ann-Marie DiBiase, James Day, Carolyn Edwards, Neil Ferguson, Andrew
Garrod, Jon Gibbs, Valerie Gibbs, Uwe Gielen, Helen Haste, Josie Hauer, Charles Hel-
wig, Jennifer Kuehn, Laura Hubbs-Tait, Ray Hummel, Samvel Jeshmaridian, Tobias
492 J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

Krettenauer, Roger Lamb, Wen Yao Lin, Ray Montemayor, Dave Moshman, Takashi
Naito, Emma Palmer, Allan Peterson, Kim Schonert-Reichl, Geert Jan Stams, Yuko Tak-
aki, Katy Tang, George Thompson, Marinus van IJzendoorn, Mike Vasey, Christine
Wasanga, Jerry Winer, and Katsuyuki Yamasaki.

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