A.M. No.
P-02-1651 August 4, 2003 accommodationist position is practical as it is a commonsensical way to deal with the
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant,
vs.
SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent.
Case Digest
FACTS : Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for
an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living
with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old.
Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed
the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Respondent Escritor testified
that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband
having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr.
without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a
member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower
and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious
beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is
nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and
they remain members in good standing in the congregation.
ISSUE : Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge
of "gross and immoral conduct.
HELD : The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are
anchored on a different reading of the "wall of separation." Separationist - This approach
erects an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state. Religious
institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state. Nor could
the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs placed on
believers. the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by the Court, showing
the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular society
Accommodationist - Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes that religion plays an
important role in the public life of the United States as shown by many traditional
government practices which An accommodationist holds that it is good public policy, and
sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious and deliberate
efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. On the other hand, the strict
neutrality adherent believes that it is good public policy, and also constitutionally
required, for the government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of
inhibiting religious exercise First, the accommodationist interpretation is most
consistent with the language of the First Amendment. Second, the accommodationist
position best achieves the purposes of the First Amendment. Third, the
accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to protect adherents of
minority religions from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which include
ignorance and indifference and overt hostility to the minority Fourth, the
various needs and beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic nation. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct
has different effects on the state’s interests: some effects may be immediate and short-
term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the
state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore
necessary In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious
freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her
employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one
hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the
other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion The second step is to ascertain
respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her
religious belief and practice and is not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration
only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much
less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against herIndeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the
compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the
proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To properly
settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it
comes within the scope of free exercise protection.
(No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of
religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental
rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of
human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract
or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the
case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage
or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only
amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a
distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in
mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the
state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption
to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.)
G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981
ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEÑA, NICETAS
DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners,
vs.
Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia,
Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen
GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO,
Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA
BALTAZAR, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay
council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image
of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. That
issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish priest or a
layman should have the custody of the image.
On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5,
"reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of
the feast day of Señ or San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia".
That resolution designated the members of nine committees who would take
charge of the 1976 festivity. lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of
San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's
projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through the selling of
tickets and cash donations " (Exh A or 6).
On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which
specified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman
Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the
caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in
his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of
the next feast day.
It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made
available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saint's feast
day (Exh. B or 7).
Resolutions Nos. 5 and 6 were submitted to a plebiscite and were duly ratified
by the barangay general assembly on March 26, 1976. Two hundred seventy-
two voters ratified the two resolutions (Exh. 2 and 5).
Funds were raised by means of solicitations0 and cash donations of the
barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With those
funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San Vicente
Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four hundred
pesos (Exh. F-l, 3 and 4).
On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic
church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint during
the mass for the fiesta.
A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio
Marilao Osmeñ a refused to return that image to the barangay council on the
pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used
for its acquisition.
Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon
during a mass, Father Osmeñ a allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the
barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed
image. That incident provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmeñ a in the city
court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation.
Father Osmeñ a retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso
with the city mayor's office and the Department of Local Government and
Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of
authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law.
Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of
Valencia. Because Father Osmeñ a did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to
have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution
No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the
hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmeñ a for the recovery
of the image (Exh. C or 8). On June 14, 1976, the barangay council passed
Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case
(Exh. D or 9).
The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father
Osmeñ a and Bishop Cipriano Urgel (Exh. F). After the barangay council had
posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmeñ a turned over the
image to the council (p. 10, Rollo). ln his answer to the complaint for replevin,
he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions (Exh. F-1).
Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan
Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed
against the barangay council and its members (excluding two members) a
complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the
annulment of the said resolutions (Civil Case No. 1680-0).
The lower court dismissed the complaint. lt upheld the validity of the
resolutions. The petitioners appealed under Republic Act No. 5440. The
petitioners contend that the barangay council was not duly constituted because
lsidoro M. Mañ ago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay, was not allowed
to participate in its sessions.
Barangays used to be known as citizens assemblies (Presidential Decrees Nos.
86 and 86-A). Presidential Decree No. 557, which took effect on September 21,
1974, 70 O.G. 8450-L, directed that all barrios should be known as barangays
and adopted the Revised Barrio Charter as the Barangay Charter.
Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are
situated. They are quasi-municipal corporations endowed with such powers" as
are provided by law "for the performance of particular government functions, to
be exercised by and through their respective barrio governments in conformity
with law" (Sec. 2, Revised Barrio Charter, R.A. No. 3590).
The barrio assembly consists of all persons who are residents of the barrio for
at least six months, eighteen years of age or over and Filipino citizens duly
registered in the list kept by the barrio secretary (Sec. 4, Ibid).
The barrio council, now barangay council, is composed of the barangay captain
and six councilmen (Sec. 7, Ibid). Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 684, which
took effect on April 15, 1975, provides that "the barangay youth chairman shall
be an ex-officio member of the barangay council", having the same powers and
functions as a barangay councilman.
In this case, Mañ ago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions
of the barangay council to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not able
to attend those sessions because he was working with a construction company
based at Ipil, Ormoc City (Par. 2[d] Exh. 1).
Mañ ago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render the
said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said resolutions were
passed.
The other contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the
constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution,
or government orphanage or leprosarium (Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2],
Article VIII, Constitution).
That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do not
directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor
appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or
clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money.
The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.
Manifestly puerile and flimsy is Petitioners argument that the barangay council
favored the Catholic religion by using the funds raised by solicitations and
donations for the purchase of the patron saint's wooden image and making the
image available to the Catholic church.
The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more evident by the fact
that counsel advanced that argument in behalf of the petitioner, Father Osmeñ a
the parish priest.
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the
barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the
religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was
the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the
church when the mass was celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a
patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of
the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be
branded as illegal.
As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its
celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves
the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden
image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A
more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in
a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to
borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.
The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits.
Petitioner Garces swore that the said resolutions favored the Catholic church. On
the other hand, petitioners Dagar and Edullantes swore that the resolutions
prejudiced the Catholics because they could see the image in the church only
once a year or during the fiesta (Exh. H and J).
We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom
of religion annd the use of public money to favor any sect or church are not
involved at all in this case even remotely or indirectly. lt is not a microcosmic
test case on those issues.
This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never
have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father
Osmeñ a had taken the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited from his
own parishioners for the purchase of another image of San Vicente Ferrer to be SO ORDERED.
installed in his church.
Fernando C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay concur.
council. Father Osmeñ a claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The Teehankee, J., concur in the result.
barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should Fernandez, J., Concepcion Jr. J., are on leave.
have custody thereof.  
If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic Separate Opinions
church. that action would not violate the Constitution because the image was
acquired with private funds and is its private property.  ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by I want to add these observations: the images of saints are not worshiped; they
enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12. are venerated. "Thou shall not have strange gods." A petty dispute on who
should have custody of the statue of San Vicente Ferrer should not have taken
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds up the time of the Supreme Court. There can be no doubt that the statue was
and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions bought with private funds raised by the barangay council which also decided
regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the who should have custody of it. How the cura parroco got it into his head that he
use of public money or property. should have custody of the statue defies logic. lt is not, therefore, suprising to
hear statements that religion has no relevance to current problems. Let there be
In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which affirmation action by the churches and less concern for inconsequential matters.
appropriated sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and the printing of
postage stamps with new designs. Under the law, the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Department Head and the President of the Philippines, issued in
1936 postage stamps to commemorate the celebration in Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the Catholic Church.
The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines.
The design of the stamps showed a map of the Philippines and nothing about
the Catholic Church. No religious purpose was intended.
Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the Philippine
Independent Church, sought to enjoin the sale of those commemorative postage
stamps.
It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an
event of a religious character, was not designed as a propaganda for the Catholic
Church. Aglipay's prohibition suit was dismissed.
The instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49 Phil.,
627 and 55 Phil. 307, where a religious brotherhood, La Archicofradia del
Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the purpose of raising funds to meet the
expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the Most Holy Sacrament and the
Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held accountable for the funds which it held as
trustee. 0
Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the
barangay resolutions, the lower court's judgment dismissing their amended
petition is affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 217453 July 19, 2017
DENMARK S. V ALMORES, Petitioner
vs.
DR. CRISTINA ACHACOSO, in her capacity as Dean of the College of Medicine, and
DR. GIOVANNI CABILDO, Faculty of the Mindanao State University, Respondents
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for mandamus1filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Petition), seeking the enforcement of Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
Memorandum2 dated November 15, 2010 (2010 CHED Memorandum). by herein
respondents Dr. Cristina Achacoso (Achacoso) and Dr. Giovanni Cabildo (Cabildo)
(collectively, "respondents"). Respondents are being sued in their respective capacities
as Dean and faculty member of the Mindanao State University (MSU)-College of
Medicine.3
Antecedent Facts
The facts culled from the records follow.
Petitioner Denmark S. Valmores (Valmores) is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist
Church,4 whose fundamental beliefs include the strict observance of the Sabbath as a
sacred day.5 As such, petitioner Valmores joins the faithful in worshipping and resting on
Saturday, the seventh day of the week, and refrains from non-religious undertakings
from sunset of Friday to sunset of Saturday.6
Prior to the instant controversy, petitioner Valmores was enrolled as a first-year student
at the MSU-College of Medicine for Academic Year 2014- 2015.7 To avoid potential
conflict between his academic schedule and his church's Saturday worship, petitioner
Valmores wrote a letter8 to respondent Achacoso, requesting that he be excused from
attending his classes in the event that a regular weekday session is rescheduled to a
Saturday. At the same time, petitioner Valmores expressed his willingness to make up for
any missed activity or session due to his absence.9
Between the months of June to August 2014, some of petitioner Valmores' classes and
examinations were moved from weekdays to Saturdays.10 In one instance, petitioner
Valmores was unable to take his Risto-Pathology laboratory examination held on
September 13, 2015, a Saturday.11 Respondent Cabildo was his professor for the said
subject.12 Despite his request for exemption, no accommodation was given by either of
the respondents. As a result, petitioner Valmores received a failing grade of 5 for that
particular module and was considered ineligible to retake the exam.13
Thereafter, several pastors and officers of the Seventh-day Adventist Church sent a
letter14 to respondent Achacoso, requesting for a possible audience with the members of
the MSU school board. In addition, the church, through Pastor Hanani P. Nietes, issued a
Certification15 dated September 15, 2014 in connection with petitioner Valmores'
request for exemption.
The Certification dated September 15, 2014 reads in part:
This is to certify that DENMARK S. V ALM ORES is a bona fide member of the Seventh-day
Adventist Church affiliated at Balongis, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City.
As Seventh-day Adventists, we uphold our observance of the Saturday Sabbath as a day
of worship and rest from labor, observing the sacredness of the Lord's day from sunset
Friday to sunset Saturday. We do away [with] secular activities like working in the office
or field/attending classes/participating/attending non-religious functions during
Saturday.
This certification is issued to support his request for exemption from all his Sabbath
(from sunset Friday to sunset Saturday) classes, exams, and other non-religious
activities.16
On September 19, 2014, petitioner Valmores again wrote a letter17 to respondent
Achacoso to seek reconsideration regarding his situation, reiterating his willingness to
take make-up classes or their equivalent in order to complete the requirements of his
course.
Despite the foregoing communications, petitioner Valmores' requests fell on deaf ears.18
Hence, aggrieved by respondents' lack of consideration, petitioner Valmores elevated the
matter before the CHED.19 In an Indorsement dated January 6, 2015, the CHED Regional
Office, Region X, through Mr. Roy Roque U. Agcopra, Chief Administrative Officer,
referred the matter directly to the President of MSU as well as respondent Achacoso and
requested that the office be advised of the action thus taken.20
In response, Dr. Macapado Abaton Muslim (Dr. Muslim), President of MSU, instructed
respondent Achacoso to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum.21 In doing so, Dr.
Muslim sent a copy of the said memorandum to respondent Achacoso with the following
marginal note in his own handwriting:
Urgent!
For: Dean Cristina Achacoso
College of Medicine
You are hereby enjoined to enforce this CHED memo re the case of MR. DENMARK S. V
ALM ORES.
Thanks.22
Despite the foregoing correspondence, petitioner Valmores' request still went unheeded.
Thus, in a Letter23 dated March 25, 2015, petitioner Valmores, this time through his
counsel on record, sought reconsideration from respondent Achacoso for the last time
and manifested his intention to resort to appropriate legal action should no action be
taken.
Notwithstanding the lapse of several months, no written or formal response was ever
given by respondent Achacoso.24
Hence, the present Petition.
Petitioner Valmores brings his cause before the Court based on his constitutional right to
freedom of religion, which he argues was violated by respondents when they refused to
enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum, as follows: (i) by refusing to excuse petitioner
Valmores from attending classes and taking examinations on Saturdays, and (ii) by
disallowing petitioner Valmores to take make-up examinations in order to comply with
the academic requirements of his course.25
Respondents, on the other hand, chiefly base their defense on the fact that MSU had other
students who were able to graduate from their College of Medicine despite being
members of the Seventh-day Adventist Church.26 On this claim, respondents argued that
petitioner Valmores' case was not "unique" as to merit exceptional treatment.27
Respondents likewise claimed that the Certification dated September 15, 2014 submitted
by petitioner Valmores was not the certification contemplated by the 2010 CHED
Memorandum and therefore there was no corresponding duty on their part to enforce
the same.28 Lastly, respondents posited that the changes in schedule were not
unreasonable as they were due to unexpected declarations of holidays as well as
unforeseen emergencies of the professors in their respective hospitals.29
Petitioner Valmores, in his Reply,30 reiterated his prayer for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus against respondents and prayed for the immediate resolution of the dispute.
Issue
The threshold issue is simple: whether mandamus lies to compel respondents to enforce
the 2010 CHED Memorandum in the case of petitioner Valmores.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Strict adherence to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts is not absolute
Before disposing of the substantial issue, although not raised by respondents in their
Comment, a procedural matter warrants discussion.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules, a petition for mandamus is directed against a tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person who unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled.31 If the petition relates to an act or
omission of a board, officer, or person, the same must be filed with the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as may be defined by the Court.32
In the case at bench, petitioner Valmores questions the acts of respondents in their
capacities as Dean and faculty member of MSU-College of Medicine. As such, by directly
filing the Petition with the Court instead of the proper regional trial court, as required by
the Rules, petitioner Valmores was m error.
Strict adherence to the judicial hierarchy of courts has been a longstanding policy of the
courts in determining the appropriate forum for initiatory actions.33 While this Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the inferior courts to issue corrective writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, a party's choice of forum is by no means absolute.34
Needless to say, however, such rule is not without exception. Recently, in Maza v.
Turla,35the Court emphasized that it possesses full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction over petitions filed directly with it for exceptionally
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues involved in the dispute.
Citing The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,36the Court held therein that a
direct resort is allowed in the following instances, inter alia: (i) when there are genuine
issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (ii) when
the questions involved are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; and (iii) when the circumstances
require an urgent resolution.
The above exceptions are all availing in this case.
The freedom of religion enjoys a preferred status among the rights conferred to each
citizen by our fundamental charter.37 In this case, no less than petitioner Valmores' right
to religious freedom is being threatened by respondents' failure to accommodate his
case.38 In this regard, when confronted with a potential infringement of fundamental
rights, the Court will not hesitate, as it now does, to overlook procedural lapses in order
to fulfill its foremost duty of satisfying the higher demands of substantial justice.
The Court is also aware of petitioner Valmores' plea for the expedient resolution of his
case, as he has yet to enroll in the MSU-College of Medicine and continue with his
studies.39 Plainly enough, to require petitioner Valmores to hold his education in
abeyance in the meantime that he is made to comply with the rule on hierarchy of courts
would be unduly burdensome. It is a known fact that education is a time-sensitive
endeavor, where premium is placed not only on its completion, but also on the timeliness
of its achievement. Inevitably, justice in this case must take the form of a prompt and
immediate disposition if complete relief is to be accorded.
In a related matter, the Rules also require the exhaustion of other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law before a petition for mandamus is
filed.40 In this case, petitioner Valmores had exerted all efforts to obtain relief from
respondents, as clearly evidenced by the letters and other communications on record.
Likewise, after respondents' repeated failure to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum,
petitioner Valmores elevated the matter before the CHED, which in turn directly
indorsed the matter to the President of MSU. Thus, prior to resorting to the instant
Petition, the Court finds that petitioner Valmores had satisfactorily complied with the
requirement of availing himself of other remedies under Rule 65.
On these premises, the Court finds sufficient bases to relax the foregoing procedural
rules in the broader interest of justice.
The freedom of religion vis-a-vis the
2010 CHED Memorandum
Religion as a social institution is deeply rooted in every culture; it predates laws and
survives civilizations. In the Philippines, the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions were
crafted in full acknowledgment of the contributions of religion to the country through the
enactment of various benevolent provisions.41 In its present incarnation, our
fundamental law, by "imploring the aid of Almighty God," makes manifest the State's
respect and recognition of the collective spirituality of the Filipino.42 Such recognition is
embodied in Section 5, Article III of the Constitution:
SEC. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
In Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos,43the Court discussed the two-fold nature of the free-
exercise clause enshrined in the cited provision:
[T]he constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act.
The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have
appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the
power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly
infringe on the protected freedom.
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in
order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may
protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community,
before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity
and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State is
likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of
public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.44
In a nutshell, the Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while the
freedom to act based on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary to
protect the rights of others and in the interest of public welfare.45
Today, religion has transcended mere rubric and has permeated into every sphere of
human undertaking. As a result, religious freedom, to a limited extent, has come under
the regulatory power of the State.
In 2010, the CHED institutionalized the :framework for operationalizing Section 5, Article
Ill of the 1987 Constitution vis-a-vis the academic freedom of higher education
institutions (HEis ), pursuant to its statutory power to formulate policies, priorities, and
programs on higher education in both public and private HEIs.46
In the 2010 CHED Memorandum, the CHED laid down guidelines for the exemption of
teachers, personnel, and students from participating in school or related activities due to
compliance with religious obligations, as follows:
FOR: ALL CHED REGIONAL OFFICE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE
SUBJECT: REMEDIAL WORK FOR TEACHERS, PERSONNEL AND STUDENTS TO BE
EXCUSED DUE TO COMPLIANCE WITH RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS
DATE : November 15, 2010
xxxx
Our fundamental Law explicitly provides under Section 5 of the Bill of Rights that "The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed." In this regard, the Commission is obligated to
ensure that all higher education institutions render proper respect and compliance to
this constitutional right, while at the same time acknowledging the exercise of their
academic freedom also guaranteed under the Constitution.
The Commission therefore clarifies that in implementing the aforementioned policy,
[higher education institutions] shall be enjoined to: (1) excuse students from
attendance/participation in school or related activities if such schedule conflicts with the
exercise of their religious obligations, and (2) allow faculty, personnel and staff to forego
attendance during academic and related work and activities scheduled on days which
would conflict with the exercise of their religious freedom. Instead, the affected students,
faculty, personnel and staff may be allowed to do remedial work to compensate for
absences, within the bounds of school rules and regulations without their grades being
affected, or with no diminution in their salaries or leave credits or performance
evaluation/assessment, provided they submit a certification or proof of
attendance/participation duly signed by their pastor, priest, minister or religious leader
for periods of absence from classes, work or school activities.
For your guidance and strict compliance.47
Transposing the foregoing to this case, petitioner Valmores beseeches the Court to direct
respondents to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum, thus allowing him to continue
taking up his medical studies at MSU.
The enforcement of the 2010 CHED
Memorandum is compellable by writ of mandamus
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty by a tribunal,
board, officer, or person.48 Case law requires that the petitioner should have a right to
the thing demanded and that it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to
perform the act required; such duty need not be absolutely expressed, so long as it is
clear.49 In this regard, a duty is considered ministerial where an officer is required to
perform an act not requiring the exercise of official discretion or judgment in a given
state of facts.50 Conversely, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary.51
MSU is an HEI created by legislative charter under Republic Act No. 1387, as amended,
and was established "to better implement the policy of the Government in the
intensification of the education of the Filipino youth, especially among the Muslims and
others belonging to the national minorities."52 Thus, respondents herein, as faculty
members of MSU, fall under the policy-making authority of the CHED and therefore
bound to observe the issuances promulgated by the latter.
The crux of the dispute therefore lies in the interpretation of the 2010 CHED
Memorandum, the contents of which are again reproduced below for closer scrutiny:
SUBJECT: REMEDIAL WORK FOR TEACHERS, PERSONNEL AND STUDENTS TO BE
EXCUSED DUE TO COMPLIANCE WITH RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS
xxxx
Our fundamental Law explicitly provides under Section 5 of the Bill of Rights that "The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed." In this regard, the Commission is obligated to
ensure that all higher education institutions render proper respect and compliance to
this constitutional right, while at the same time acknowledging the exercise of their
academic freedom also guaranteed under the Constitution.
The Commission therefore clarifies that in implementing the aforementioned policy,
[higher education institutions] shall be enjoined to: (1) excuse students from
attendance/participation in school or related activities if such schedule conflicts with the
exercise of their religious obligations, and (2) allow faculty, personnel and staff to forego
attendance during academic and related work and activities scheduled on days which
would conflict with the exercise of their religious freedom. Instead, the affected students,
faculty, personnel and staff may be allowed to do remedial work to compensate for
absences, within the bounds of school rules and regulations without their grades being
affected, or with no diminution in their salaries or leave credits or performance
evaluation/assessment, provided they submit a certification or proof of
attendance/participation duly signed by their pastor, priest, minister or religious leader
for periods of absence from classes, work or school activities.
For your guidance and strict compliance.53 (Emphasis supplied)
Analyzed, the following are derived:
(i) HEIs are enjoined to excuse students from attending or participating in school or
related activities, if such schedule conflicts with the students' exercise of their
religious obligations;
(ii) to compensate for absences, students may be allowed to do remedial work, which
in turn should be within the bounds of school rules and regulations and without
affecting their grades; and
(iii)to be entitled to exemption, affected students must submit a certification of
attendance duly signed by their respective minister.
At once, a plain reading of the memorandum reveals the ministerial nature of the duty
imposed upon HEIs. Its policy is crystal clear: a student's religious obligations takes
precedence over his academic responsibilities, consonant with the constitutional
guarantee of free exercise and enjoyment of religious worship. Accordingly, the CHED
imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to exempt students, as well as faculty members, from
academic activities in case such activities interfere with their religious obligations.
Although the said memorandum contains the phrase "within the bounds of school rules
and regulations," the same relates only to the requirement of remedial work, which,
based on the language used, is merely optional on the part of the HEI. Neither can such
phrase be said to have conferred discretion as the use of the words "shall be enjoined"
and "strict compliance" denote a mandatory duty on the part of the HEI to excuse its
students upon submission of the certification prescribed in the same memorandum.
Clearly, under the 2010 CHED Memorandum, HEIs do not possess absolute discretion to
grant or deny requests for exemption of affected students. Instead, the memorandum
only imposes minimum standards should HEIs decide to require remedial work, i.e., that
the same is within the bounds of school rules and regulations and that the grades of the
students will not be affected.
To evade liability, respondents, without delving into the specifics, made the blanket
assertion that the Certification dated September 15, 2014 submitted by petitioner
Valmores was improper:
8. That the Petitioner did submit a certification of his church that he is baptized as
Seventh day Adventist which is clearly not the intention by the CHED memorandum
(sic).54
Against such deficient claim, petitioner Valmores argues that the said certification issued
by Pastor Hanani P. Nietes on behalf of the Seventh-day Adventist Church was sufficient
to satisfy the requirement in the 2010 CHED Memorandum.55The Court agrees.
As a condition for exemption, the 2010 CHED Memorandum simply requires the
submission of "a certification or proof of attendance/participation duly signed by their
pastor, priest, minister or religious leader for periods of absence from classes, work or
school activities."56 Again, the salient portions of the Certification dated September 15,
2014 reads:
As Seventh-day Adventists, we uphold our observance of the Saturday Sabbath as a day
of worship and rest from labor, observing the sacredness of the Lord's day from sunset
Friday to sunset Saturday. We do away with secular activities like working in the office
or field/attending classes/participating/attending non-religious functions during
Saturday.
This certification is issued to support his request for exemption from all his Sabbath
(from sunset Friday to sunset Saturday) classes, exams, and other non-religious
activities.57 (Emphasis in the original omitted; emphasis supplied)
The cited certification needs little or no interpretation: petitioner Valmores, as a bona
fide member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, is expected to miss "all his Sabbath x x
x classes [and] exams" due to his observance of the Sabbath day as a day of worship.
There is nothing in the 2010 CHED Memorandum that prohibits the certification from
being issued before the period of absence from class. Even then, the Certification dated
September 15, 2014 is broad enough to cover both past and future Sabbath days for
which petitioner Valmores would be absent.
It is likewise well to note that respondents, by placing the sufficiency of the Certification
dated September 15, 2014 in issue, in effect admitted the ministerial nature of the duty
imposed upon HEIs. By raising such defense, respondents admitted to the existence of a
concomitant duty to exempt and that such duty on their part would have been called for
had petitioner Valmores submitted a correct certification.
Significantly, respondents never even asserted, much less mentioned, their right to
academic freedom in any of their submissions before the Court. Neither was there any
resistance to exempt petitioner Valmores from the CHED Regional Office, Region X, or Dr.
Muslim, the President of MSU, grounded on MSU's institutional independence. In fact,
that Dr. Muslim explicitly ordered respondent Achacoso to enforce the 2010 CHED
Memorandum58 further underscores the ministerial nature of the duty of HEIs to
exempt affected students.
Thus, to recapitulate, once the required certification or proof is submitted, the concerned
HEI is enjoined to exempt the affected student from attending or participating in school-
related activities if such activities are in conflict with their religious obligations. As to
whether HEIs will require remedial work or not, the Court finds the same to be already
within their discretion, so long as the remedial work required is within the bounds of
school rules and regulations and that the same will not affect the grades of the concerned
students.
For these reasons, the Court finds that respondents were duty bound to enforce the 2010
CHED Memorandum insofar as it requires the exemption of petitioner Valmores from
academic responsibilities that conflict with the schedule of his Saturday worship. Their
failure to do so is therefore correctible by mandamus.
Respondents violated Petitioner
Valmores' right to freedom of religion
The importance of education cannot be overstated. The Court has, on many occasions,
ruled that institutions of higher learning are bound to afford its students a fair
opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue, barring any violation of school
rules by the students concerned.59 In erudite fashion, the Court, in Regino v. Pangasinan
Colleges of Science and Technology,60 discussed:
Education is not a measurable commodity. It is not possible to determine who is "better
educated" than another. Nevertheless, a student's grades are an accepted approximation
of what would otherwise be an intangible product of countless hours of study. The
importance of grades cannot be discounted in a setting where education is generally the
gate pass to employment opportunities and better life; such grades are often the means
by which a prospective employer measures whether a job applicant has acquired the
necessary tools or skills for a particular profession or trade.
Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set
academic standards, completion of academic requirements and observance of school
rules and regulations, the school would reward them by recognizing their "completion"
of the course enrolled in.61
In the landmark case of Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu,62 the
Court gave weight to the religious convictions of students who were members of
Jehovah's Witnesses that refused to participate in their school's flag ceremony. Therein,
the Court held that the expulsion of the affected students based on their religious beliefs
would run against the State's duty to protect and promote the right of all its citizens to
quality education and to make such education accessible to all:
We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag,
singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which
admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of
the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued
with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national
heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24 ). After all, what the petitioners seek
only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where
they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and
learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training
for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human
rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral
and spiritual values["] (Sec. 3 [2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula.
Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very
situation that this court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through
the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs,
will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities.
xxxx
Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they
are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to
receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education x x x and to make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1,
Art. XIV).
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72- 75, we upheld the
exemption of members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop
agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the teaching of
their church not to join any labor group:
"x x x It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the
land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be
granted unless some 'compelling state interests' intervenes." (Sherbert vs. Bemer, 374
U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 970, 83 S. Ct. 1790.)"
We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with
regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs,
however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. x x x If they quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct
may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the
State has a right (and duty) to prevent" (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).63
While in some cases the Court has sustained government regulation of religious rights,
the Court fails to see in the present case how public order and safety will be served by
the denial of petitioner Valmores' request for exemption. Neither is there any showing
that petitioner Valmores' absence from Saturday classes would be injurious to the rights
of others. Precisely, the 2010 CHED Memorandum was issued to address such conflicts
and prescribes the action to be taken by HEIs should such circumstance arise.
What is certain, as gathered from the foregoing, is that respondents' concerted refusal to
accommodate petitioner Valmores rests mainly on extralegal grounds, which cannot, by
no stretch of legal verbiage, defeat the latter's constitutionally-enshrined rights. That
petitioner Valmores is being made by respondents to choose between honoring his
religious obligations and finishing his education is a patent infringement of his religious
freedoms. As the final bulwark of fundamental rights, this Court will not allow such
violation to perpetuate any further.
Conclusion

Here, in seeking relief, petitioner Valmores argues that he is bound by his religious
convictions to refrain from all secular activities on Saturdays, a day that is deemed holy
by his church.
On the other hand, respondents' refusal to excuse petitioner Valmores from Saturday
classes and examinations fundamentally rests only on the fact that there were other
Seventh-day Adventists who had successfully completed their studies at the MSU-College
of Medicine.64 Respondents, in their Comment, stated thus:
14. That there are many successful doctors who are members of the Seventh day
Adventist and surely they have sacrificed before they succeeded in their calling as many
Filipinos who shone in their respective fields of study.
15. That we ask ourselves, is the case of Mr. Valmores unique in (sic) its own? Certainly it
is not because we have had students who are member (sic) of the Seventh-Day Adventist
and our College did not have a problem with them. x x x65
Every person is free to tread the far territories of their conscience, no matter where they
may lead - for the freedom to believe and act on one's own convictions and the
protection of such freedom extends to all people, from the theistic to the godless. The
State must, as a matter of duty rather than consequence, guarantee that such pursuit
remains unfettered.
As representatives of the State, educational institutions are bound to safeguard the
religious freedom of their students. Thus, to such end, our schools carry the
responsibility to restrict its own academic liberties, should they collide with
constitutionally preferred rights.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents Dr. Cristina Achacoso and Dr.
Giovanni Cabildo are DIRECTED to enforce the Commission on Higher Education
Memorandum dated November 15, 2010 in the case of petitioner Denmark S. Valmores.
SO ORDERED.

Without more, respondents' bare arguments crumble against constitutional standards.

As discussed above, the Bill of Rights guarantees citizens the freedom to act on their  
individual beliefs and proscribes government intervention unless necessary to protect its
citizens from injury or when public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience requires it.66
Thus, as faculty members of the MSU-College of Medicine, respondents herein were duty-
bound to protect and preserve petitioner Valmores' religious freedom.

Even worse, respondents suggest that the "sacrifices" of other students of the common
faith justified their refusal to give petitioner Valmores exceptional treatment. This is non-
sequitur. Respondents brush aside petitioner Valmores' religious beliefs as if it were
subject of compromise; one man's convictions and another man's transgressions are
theirs alone to bear. That other fellow believers have chosen to violate their creed is
irrelevant to the case at hand, for in religious discipline, adherence is always the general
rule, and compromise, the exception.
G.R. No. 95770 December 29, 1995
ROEL EBRALINAG, EMILY EBRALINAG, represented by their parents, MR. & MRS.
LEONARDO EBRALINAG, JUSTINIANA TANTOG, represented by her father, AMOS
TANTOG, JEMIL OYAO & JOEL OYAO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
ELIEZER OYAO, JANETH DIAMOS & JEREMIAS DIAMOS, represented by parents MR.
& MRS. GODOFREDO DIAMOS, SARA OSTIA & JONATHAN OSTIA, represented by
their parents MR. & MRS. FAUSTO OSTIA, IRVIN SEQUINO & RENAN SEQUINO,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LYDIO SEQUINO, NAPTHALE TUNACAO
represented by his parents MR. & MRS. MANUEL TUNACAO PRECILA PINO
represented by her parents MR. & MRS. FELIPE PINO, MARICRIS ALFAR, RUWINA
ALFAR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. HERMINIGILDO ALFAR,
FREDESMINDA ALFAR & GUMERSINDO ALFAR, represented by their parents
ABDON ALFAR ALBERTO ALFAR & ARISTIO ALFAR, represented by their parents
MR. & MRS. GENEROSO ALFAR, MARTINO VILLAR, represented by their parents MR.
& MRS. GENARO VILLAR, PERGEBRIEL GUINITA & CHAREN GUINITA, represented
by their parents MR. & MRS. CESAR GUINITA, ALVIN DOOP represented by his
parents MR. & MRS. LEONIDES DOOP, RHILYN LAUDE represented by her parents
MR. & MRS. RENE LAUDE, LEOREMINDA MONARES represented by her parents MR.
& MRS. FLORENCIO MONARES, MERCY MONTECILLO, represented by her parents
MR. & MRS. MANUEL MONTECILLO, ROBERTO TANGAHA, represented by his parent
ILUMINADA TANGAHA, EVELYN MARIA & FLORA TANGAHA represented by their
parents MR. & MRS. ALBERTO TANGAHA, MAXIMO EBRALINAG represented by his
parents MR. & MRS. PAQUITO EBRALINAG, JUTA CUMON, GIDEON CUMON &
JONATHAN CUMON, represented by their father RAFAEL CUMON, EVIE LUMAKANG
and JUAN LUMAKANG, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LUMAKANG,
EMILIO SARSOZO & PAZ AMOR SARSOZO, & IGNA MARIE SARSOZO represented by
their parents MR. & MRS. VIRGILIO SARSOZO, MICHAEL JOSEPH & HENRY JOSEPH,
represented by parent ANNIE JOSEPH, EMERSON TABLASON & MASTERLOU
TABLASON, represented by their parents EMERLITO TABLASON, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, and MR. MANUEL F.
BIONGCOG, Cebu District Supervisor, respondents.
G.R. No. 95887 December 29, 1995
MAY AMOLO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. ISAIAS AMOLO, REDFORD
ALSADO, JOEBERT ALSADO, & RUDYARD ALSADO represented by their parents MR.
& MRS. ABELARDO ALSADO, NESIA ALSADO, REU ALSADO and LILIBETH ALSADO,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ROLANDO ALSADO, SUZETTE NAPOLES,
represented by her parents ISMAILITO NAPOLES and OPHELIA NAPOLES, JESICA
CARMELOTES, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. SERGIO CARMELOTES, BABY
JEAN MACAPAS, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. TORIBIO MACAPAS,
GERALDINE ALSADO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. JOEL ALSADO,
RAQUEL DEMOTOR, and LEAH DEMOTOR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
LEONARDO DEMOTOR, JURELL VILLA and MELONY VILLA, represented by their
parents MR. & MRS. JOVENIANO VILLA, JONELL HOPE MAHINAY, MARY GRACE
MAHINAY, and MAGDALENE MAHINAY, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
FELIX MAHINAY, JONALYN ANTIOLA and JERWIN ANTIOLA, represented by their
parents FELIPE ANTIOLA and ANECITA ANTIOLA, MARIA CONCEPCION CABUYAO,
represented by her parents WENIFREDO CABUYAO and ESTRELLITA CABUYAO,
NOEMI TURNO represented by her parents MANUEL TURNO and VEVENCIA TURNO,
SOLOMON PALATULON, SALMERO PALATULON and ROSALINA PALATULON,
represented by their parents MARTILLANO PALATULON and CARMILA
PALATULON, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, and ANTONIO A.
SANGUTAN, respondents.
R E SO L U T I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
The State moves for a reconsideration of our decision dated March 1, 1993 granting
private respondents' petition for certiorari and prohibition and annulling the expulsion
orders issued by the public respondents therein on the ground that the said decision
created an exemption in favor of the members of the religious sect, the Jehovah's
Witnesses, in violation of the "Establishment Clause" of the Constitution. The Solicitor
General, on behalf of the public respondent, furthermore contends that:
The accommodation by this Honorable Court to a demand for special treatment in
favor of a minority sect even on the basis of a claim of religious freedom may be
criticized as granting preference to the religious beliefs of said sect in violation of the
"non-establishment guarantee" provision of the Constitution. Surely, the decision of
the Court constitutes a special favor which immunizes religious believers such as
Jehovah's Witnesses to the law and the DECS rules and regulations by interposing the
claim that the conduct required by law and the rules and regulation (sic) are violative
of their religious beliefs. The decision therefore is susceptible to the very criticism
that the grant of exemption is a violation of the "non-establishment" provision of the
Constitution.
Furthermore, to grant an exemption to a specific religious minority poses a risk of
collision course with the "equal protection of the laws" clause in respect of the non-
exempt, and, in public schools, a collision course with the "non-establishment
guarantee."
Additionally the public respondent insists that this Court adopt a "neutral stance" by
reverting to its holding in Gerona declaring the flag as being devoid of any religious
significance. He stresses that the issue here is not curtailment of religious belief but
regulation of the exercise of religious belief. Finally, he maintains that the State's
interests in the case at bench are constitutional and legal obligations to implement the
law and the constitutional mandate to inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism
and to encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs, referring to the test
devised by the United States Supreme Court in U.S. vs. O'Brien.1
II
All the petitioners in the original case2 were minor school children, and members of the
sect, Jehovah's Witnesses (assisted by their parents) who were expelled from their
classes by various public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265
of July 11, 1955 and by Department Order No. 8, dated July 21, 1955 issued by the
Department of Education. Aimed primarily at private educational institutions which did
not observe the flag ceremony exercises, Republic Act No. 1265 penalizes all educational
institutions for failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony with public censure on
first offense and cancellation of the recognition or permit on second offense.
The implementing regulations issued by the Department of Education thereafter detailed
the manner of observance of the same. Immediately pursuant to these orders, school
officials in Masbate expelled children belonging to the sect of the Jehovah's Witnesses
from school for failing or refusing to comply with the flag ceremony requirement.
Sustaining these expulsion orders, this Court in the 1959 case of Gerona vs. Secretary of
Education3 held that:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of
national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which
it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of
church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any
religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious
ceremony. . . .
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious
ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect,
much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion
and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to
be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or
followers.
Upholding religious freedom as a fundamental right deserving the "highest priority and
amplest protection among human rights," this Court, in Ebralinag vs. Division
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu4 re-examined our over two decades-old decision in
Gerona and reversed expulsion orders made by the public respondents therein as
violative of both the free exercise of religion clause and the right of citizens to education
under the 1987 Constitution.5
From our decision of March 1, 1993, the public respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration on grounds hereinabove stated. After a careful study of the grounds
adduced in the government's Motion For Reconsideration of our original decision,
however, we find no cogent reason to disturb our earlier ruling.
The religious convictions and beliefs of the members of the religious sect, the Jehovah's
Witnesses are widely known and are equally widely disseminated in numerous books,
magazines, brochures and leaflets distributed by their members in their house to house
distribution efforts and in many public places. Their refusal to render obeisance to any
form or symbol which smacks of idolatry is based on their sincere belief in the biblical
injunction found in Exodus 20:4,5, against worshipping forms or idols other than God
himself. The basic assumption in their universal refusal to salute the flags of the
countries in which they are found is that such a salute constitutes an act of religious
devotion forbidden by God's law. This assumption, while "bizarre" to others is firmly
anchored in several biblical passages.6
And yet, while members of Jehovah's Witnesses, on the basis of religious convictions,
refuse to perform an act (or acts) which they consider proscribed by the Bible, they
contend that such refusal should not be taken to indicate disrespect for the symbols of
the country or evidence that they are wanting in patriotism and nationalism. They point
out that as citizens, they have an excellent record as law abiding members of society even
if they do not demonstrate their refusal to conform to the assailed orders by overt acts of
conformity. On the contrary, they aver that they show their respect through less
demonstrative methods manifesting their allegiance, by their simple obedience to the
country's laws,7 by not engaging in antigovernment activities of any kind,8 and by
paying their taxes and dues to society as self-sufficient members of the community.9
While they refuse to salute the flag, they are willing to stand quietly and peacefully at
attention, hands on their side, in order not to disrupt the ceremony or disturb those who
believe differently.10
The religious beliefs, practices and convictions of the members of the sect as a minority
are bound to be seen by others as odd and different and at divergence with the complex
requirements of contemporary societies, particularly those societies which require
certain practices as manifestations of loyalty and patriotic behavior. Against those who
believe that coerced loyalty and unity are mere shadows of patriotism, the tendency to
exact "a hydraulic insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards,"11 is seductive to
the bureaucratic mindset as a shortcut to patriotism.
No doubt, the State possesses what the Solicitor General describes as the responsibility
"to inculcate in the minds of the youth the values of patriotism and nationalism and to
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs." The teaching of these values
ranks at the very apex of education's "high responsibility" of shaping up the minds of the
youth in those principles which would mold them into responsible and productive
members of our society. However, the government's interest in molding the young into
patriotic and civic spirited citizens is "not totally free from a balancing process" 12 when
it intrudes into other fundamental rights such as those specifically protected by the Free
Exercise Clause, the constitutional right to education and the unassailable interest of
parents to guide the religious upbringing of their children in accordance with the dictates
of their conscience and their sincere religious beliefs.13 Recognizing these values, Justice
Carolina Grino-Aquino, the writer of the original opinion, underscored that a generation
of Filipinos which cuts its teeth on the Bill of Rights would find abhorrent the idea that
one may be compelled, on pain of expulsion, to salute the flag sing the national anthem
and recite the patriotic pledge during a flag ceremony.14 "This coercion of conscience
has no place in a free society".15
The State's contentions are therefore, unacceptable, for no less fundamental than the
right to take part is the right to stand apart.16 In the context of the instant case, the
freedom of religion enshrined in the Constitution should be seen as the rule, not the
exception. To view the constitutional guarantee in the manner suggested by the
petitioners would be to denigrate the status of a preferred freedom and to relegate it to
the level of an abstract principle devoid of any substance and meaning in the lives of
those for whom the protection is addressed. As to the contention that the exemption
accorded by our decision benefits a privileged few, it is enough to re-emphasize that "the
constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create
new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity."17 The essence of the free
exercise clause is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma.18 Moreover, the suggestion implicit in the
State's pleadings to the effect that the flag ceremony requirement would be equally and
evenly applied to all citizens regardless of sect or religion and does not thereby
discriminate against any particular sect or denomination escapes the fact that "[a]
regulation, neutral on its face, may in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion."19
III
The ostensible interest shown by petitioners in preserving the flag as the symbol of the
nation appears to be integrally related to petitioner's disagreement with the message
conveyed by the refusal of members of the Jehovah's Witness sect to salute the flag or
participate actively in flag ceremonies on religious grounds.20 Where the governmental
interest clearly appears to be unrelated to the suppression of an idea, a religious doctrine
or practice or an expression or form of expression, this Court will not find it difficult to
sustain a regulation. However, regulations involving this area are generally held against
the most exacting standards, and the zone of protection accorded by the Constitution
cannot be violated, except upon a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil which the state has a right to protect.21 Stated differently, in the case of a regulation
which appears to abridge a right to which the fundamental law accords high significance
it is the regulation, not the act (or refusal to act), which is the exception and which
requires the court's strictest scrutiny. In the case at bench, the government has not
shown that refusal to do the acts of conformity exacted by the assailed orders, which
respondents point out attained legislative cachet in the Administrative Code of 1987,
would pose a clear and present danger of a danger so serious and imminent, that it
would prompt legitimate State intervention.
In a case involving the Flag Protection Act of 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
"State's asserted interest in preserving the fag as a symbol of nationhood and national
unity was an interest related to the suppression of free expression . . . because the State's
concern with protecting the flag's symbolic meaning is implicated only when a person's
treatment of the flag communicates some message. 22 While the very concept of ordered
liberty precludes this Court from allowing every individual to subjectively define his own
standards on matters of conformity in which society, as a whole has important interests,
the records of the case and the long history of flag salute cases abundantly supports the
religious quality of the claims adduced by the members of the sect Jehovah's Witnesses.
Their treatment of flag as a religious symbol is well-founded and well-documented and is
based on grounds religious principle. The message conveyed by their refusal to
participate in the flag ceremony is religious, shared by the entire community of Jehovah's
Witnesses and is intimately related to their theocratic beliefs and convictions. The
subsequent expulsion of members of the sect on the basis of the regulations assailed in
the original petitions was therefore clearly directed against religious practice. It is
obvious that the assailed orders and memoranda would gravely endanger the free
exercise of the religious beliefs of the members of the sect and their minor children.
Furthermore, the view that the flag is not a religious but a neutral, secular symbol
expresses a majoritarian view intended to stifle the expression of
the belief that an act of saluting the flag might sometimes be — to some individuals — so
offensive as to be worth their giving up another constitutional right — the right to
education. Individuals or groups of individuals get from a symbol the meaning they put
to it.23 Compelling members of a religious sect to believe otherwise on the pain of
denying minor children the right to an education is a futile and unconscionable detour
towards instilling virtues of loyalty and patriotism which are best instilled and
communicated by painstaking and non-coercive methods. Coerced loyalties, after all,
only serve to inspire the opposite. The methods utilized to impose them breed
resentment and dissent. Those who attempt to coerce uniformity of sentiment soon find
out that the only path towards achieving unity is by way of suppressing dissent. 24 In the
end, such attempts only find the "unanimity of the graveyard."25
To the extent to which members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect assiduously pursue their
belief in the flag's religious symbolic meaning, the State cannot, without thereby
transgressing constitutionally protected boundaries, impose the contrary view on the
pretext of sustaining a policy designed to foster the supposedly far-reaching goal of
instilling patriotism among the youth. While conceding to the idea — adverted to by the
Solicitor General — that certain methods of religious expression may be prohibited 26 to
serve legitimate societal purposes, refusal to participate in the flag ceremony hardly
constitutes a form of religious expression so offensive and noxious as to prompt
legitimate State intervention. It is worth repeating that the absence of a demonstrable
danger of a kind which the State is empowered to protect militates against the extreme
disciplinary methods undertaken by school authorities in trying to enforce regulations
designed to compel attendance in flag ceremonies. Refusal of the children to participate
in the flag salute ceremony would not interfere with or deny the rights of other school
children to do so. It bears repeating that their absence from the ceremony hardly
constitutes a danger so grave and imminent as to warrant the state's intervention.
Finally, the respondents' insistence on the validity of the actions taken by the
government on the basis of their averment that "a government regulation of expressive
conduct is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government
(and) furthers an important and substantial government interest"27 misses the whole
point of the test devised by the United States Supreme Court in O'Brien, cited by
respondent, because the Court therein was emphatic in stating that "the government
interest (should be) unrelated to the suppression of free expression." We have already
stated that the interest in regulation in the case at bench was clearly related to the
suppression of an expression directly connected with the freedom of religion and that
respondents have not shown to our satisfaction that the restriction was prompted by a
compelling interest in public order which the state has a right to protect. Moreover, if we
were to refer (as respondents did by referring to the test in O'Brien) to the standards
devised by the US Supreme Court in determining the validity or extent of restrictive
regulations impinging on the freedoms of the mind, then the O'Brien standard is hardly
appropriate because the standard devised in O'Brien only applies if the State's regulation
is not related to communicative conduct. If a relationship exists, a more demanding
standard is applied.28
The responsibility of inculcating the values of patriotism, nationalism, good citizenship,
and moral uprightness is a responsibility shared by the State with parents and other
societal institutions such as religious sects and denominations. The manner in which
such values are demonstrated in a plural society occurs in ways so variable that
government cannot make claims to the exclusivity of its methods of inculcating
patriotism so all-encompassing in scope as to leave no room for appropriate parental or
religious influences. Provided that those influences do not pose a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil to society and its institutions, expressions of diverse beliefs,
no matter how upsetting they may seem to the majority, are the price we pay for the
freedoms we enjoy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153888             July 9, 2003
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., herein represented
by PROF. ABDULRAFIH H. SAYEDY, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the Office of the President of the
Philippines, herein represented by HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive
Secretary, and the OFFICE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS, herein represented by its
Executive Director, HABIB MUJAHAB HASHIM, respondents.
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council
of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) praying for the declaration of nullity of Executive
Order (EO) 46, s. 2001 and the prohibition of herein respondents Office of the
Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) from implementing the
subject EO.
Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under Department of Social
Welfare and Development License No. SB-01-085, is a non-governmental
organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to
Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic
organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the
Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) 1 and
The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to
issue halal2 certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions
petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food
and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.
Petitioner alleges that, on account of the actual need to certify food products as
halal and also due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in
1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an 3 and the Sunnah4 for
the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In
that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified
products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal
certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office
under Patent No. 4-2000-03664.
On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5
creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent
OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the
exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related
regulatory activities.
On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal'
Certification" was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general
circulation. In said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products
with its official halal certification since those without said certification had not
been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its
derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking
them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and
RA 4109.6 As a result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped
securing certifications from it.
Hence, this petition for prohibition.
Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on
the separation of Church and State.7 It is unconstitutional for the government to
formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said
scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully
and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product
becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer.
Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A
government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a
religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal.
Petitioner also maintains that the respondents violated Section 10, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that "(n)o law impairing the obligation of
contracts, shall be passed." After the subject EO was implemented, food
manufacturers with existing contracts with petitioner ceased to obtain
certifications from the latter.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the subject EO violates Sections 15 and 16 of
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution which respectively provide:
ROLE AND RIGHTS OF PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATIONS
Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people's
organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the
democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and
aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.
People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with
demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable
leadership, membership, and structure.
Sec. 16. The rights of the people and their organizations to effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate, the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.
According to petitioner, the subject EO was issued with utter haste and without
even consulting Muslim people's organizations like petitioner before it became
effective.
We grant the petition.
OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) "to ensure
the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with
due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions." 8 OMA deals
with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim
community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group.
Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State,
the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious
matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of
religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. 9
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good."10
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because
the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving
OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached
on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to
interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications,
the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
To justify EO 46's intrusion into the subject religious activity, the Solicitor
General argues that the freedom of religion is subservient to the police power of
the State. By delegating to OMA the authority to issue halal certifications, the
government allegedly seeks to protect and promote the muslim Filipinos' right
to health, and to instill health consciousness in them.
We disagree.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. 11 If
the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State
intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic
framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of
its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal
and religious activity.
In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to
deprive muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to
classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of muslim
Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power
to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim
Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and
ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food
products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly
labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious
freedom of muslims.
Section 48(4) of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives to the National Meat
Inspection Commission (NMIC) of the Department of Agriculture (DOA) the
power to inspect slaughtered animals intended for human consumption to
ensure the safety of the meat released in the market. Another law, RA 7394,
otherwise known as "The Consumer Act of 1992," gives to certain government
departments the duty to protect the interests of the consumer, promote his
general welfare and to establish standards of conduct for business and
industry.12 To this end, a food product, before its distribution to the market, is
required to secure the Philippine Standard Certification Mark after the
concerned department inspects and certifies its compliance with quality and
safety standards.13
One such government agency designated by RA 7394 is the Bureau of Food and
Drugs (BFD) of the Department of Health (DOH). Under Article 22 of said law,
BFD has the duty to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations fixing and
establishing a reasonable definition and standard of identity, a standard of
quality and a standard of fill of containers for food. The BFD also ensures that
food products released in the market are not adulterated.14
Furthermore, under Article 48 of RA 7394, the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) is tasked to protect the consumer against deceptive, unfair and
unconscionable sales acts or practices as defined in Article 50. 15 DTI also
enforces compulsory labeling and fair packaging to enable the consumer to
obtain accurate information as to the nature, quality and quantity of the
contents of consumer products and to facilitate his comparison of the value of
such products.16
With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and
check the quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger against the
health of muslim and non-muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. Of great help
are the provisions on labeling of food products (Articles 74 to 85) 17 of RA 7394.
In fact, through these labeling provisions, the State ably informs the consuming
public of the contents of food products released in the market. Stiff sanctions
are imposed on violators of said labeling requirements.
Through the laws on food safety and quality, therefore, the State indirectly aids
muslim consumers in differentiating food from non-food products. The NMIC
guarantees that the meat sold in the market has been thoroughly inspected and
fit for consumption. Meanwhile, BFD ensures that food products are properly
categorized and have passed safety and quality standards. Then, through the
labeling provisions enforced by the DTI, muslim consumers are adequately
apprised of the products that contain substances or ingredients that, according
to their Islamic beliefs, are not fit for human intake. These are the non-secular
steps put in place by the State to ensure that the muslim consumers' right to
health is protected. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar
organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food product
fit for muslim consumption.
We do not share respondents' apprehension that the absence of a central
administrative body to regulate halal certifications might give rise to schemers
who, for profit, will issue certifications for products that are not actually halal.
Aside from the fact that muslim consumers can actually verify through the
labels whether a product contains non-food substances, we believe that they are
discerning enough to know who the reliable and competent certifying
organizations in their community are. Before purchasing a product, they can
easily avert this perceived evil by a diligent inquiry on the reliability of the
concerned certifying organization.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, respondents are prohibited from
enforcing the same.
SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions
VITUG, J.:
I concur, with the understanding as so explained during the deliberations, that
the halal certification, which herein petitioner and other similar organizations
have been accredited to issue, is not taken as a compulsory requirement for
muslim food manufacturers to secure. Adequate safeguards being already in
place to ensure the safety of all food products, food manufacturers would thus
have the option, decided solely on the basis of marketing advantage, whether or
not to obtain the certification on their food products. In fine, the acquisition of
halal certificates should remain optional or only on a voluntary basis on the part
of manufacturers of muslim food products.

Puno, J ., concurs.
G.R. No. L-45459             March 13, 1937
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of
the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila
of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic
Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty,
requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to
the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the
respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage stamps for printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The
stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches.
The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were
actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The
further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy
in the instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial
functions. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to
restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50
C. J., 6580, its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction
may issue to . . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising
functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute
are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent
Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the
Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule,
therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to
courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to
prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his
authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs.
Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by
the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is
violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or
to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of
church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this
principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history
of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for
ocassions might arise when the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a
weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation of church and
state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty
of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in
President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied
in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It
is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom.
All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to
support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and
recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution
is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble
of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they
thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact,
certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted
exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344,
par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any
penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of
the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional
mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928,
Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and
Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that
their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but
punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are
considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133,
Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage
stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.
This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND
MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY
NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF
POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:
 SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made
immediately available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new
designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
 SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion
of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may
be deemed advantageous to the Government.
 SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not
revert to the Treasury.
 SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval. Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of
plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident
thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner
indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The
printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved
by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made
part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the
Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He
estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at
P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of
Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase
"advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It
does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for
the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however,
the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination.
The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it
appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of
the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to
advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials
concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to
give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public
Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3,
petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and
printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned,
contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an
inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937."
What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of
the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious
character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was
not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government
should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or
less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175
U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to
maintain inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to
infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the
scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of
our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may
lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious
sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and
scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has
been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of
Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made
use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case
of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment
and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to
justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional
inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC March 7, 2017
RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. V ALENCIANO, HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE
HALL OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
One of our fundamental differences lies in our chosen religion. Some put their faith in a god
different from ours, while some may not believe in a god at all. Nevertheless, despite the
inconveniences this difference may cause us, we must accept it unconditionally for only
upon acceptance of the fact that we are different from each other will we learn to respect
one another.
This controversy originated from a series of letters, written by Tony Q. Valenciano
(Valenciano) and addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno (Chief Justice Puno).
In his first Letter,1 dated January 6, 2009, Valenciano reported that the basement of the
Hall of Justice of Quezon City (QC) had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel,
complete with offertory table, images of Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric
organ, and a projector. He believed that such practice violated the constitutional
provision on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition
against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of a sect, church,
denomination, or any other system of religion.
Valenciano further averred that the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice showed that it tended to favor Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals of the choir
caused great disturbance to other employees; that the public could no longer use the
basement as resting place; that the employees and litigants of the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO), Branches 82 and 83 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Legal Library, Philippine
Mediation Center, and Records Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) could not
attend to their personal necessities such as going to the lavatories because they could not
traverse the basement between 12:00 o'clock noontime and 1: 15 o'clock in the
afternoon; that the court employees became hostile toward each other as they vied for
the right to read the epistle; and that the water supply in the entire building was cut off
during the mass because the generator was turned off to ensure silence.
In his 1st Indorsement,2 dated February 6, 2009, Chief Justice Puno referred Valenciano
's letter to then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) and Officer-in-Charge of the Office on
Halls of Justice, Antonio H. Dujua (DCA Dujua).
In turn, DCA Dujua, in his 1st Indorsement,3 dated February 11, 2009, referred the letter
to Executive Judge Teodoro A. Bay (Judge Bay) of the RTC and to Executive Judge Luis
Zenon Q. Maceren (Judge Maceren) of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) for their
respective comments.
In his March 6, 2009 Letter,4 addressed to DCA Dujua, Judge Maceren clarified that the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice was known as the prayer corner. He opined that the
use of the said area for holding masses did not violate the constitutional prohibition
against the use of public property for religious purposes because the religious character
of such use was merely incidental to a temporary use.
In his Memorandum,5 dated March 10, 2009, Judge Bay manifested that he was due to
compulsorily retire on April 29, 2009, and he was taking a leave of absence prior to such
date to concentrate in resolving cases submitted for decision before his sala and
requested that then Vice-Executive Judge Jaime N. Salazar (Judge Salazar) be assigned to
further investigate, study, and make recommendations on the matter raised by
Valenciana.
In the meantime, Judge Bay recommended that, pending the final resolution of the case,
daily masses be permitted to continue, provided that: (1) the mass be limited to thirty
(30) minutes; (2) no loud singing be allowed so as not to disturb others; and (3) the
inconveniences caused by the mass be addressed.
In his 1st Indorsement,6 dated May 27, 2009, Chief Justice Puno referred another letter
of Valenciano, dated May 13, 2009, to DCA Dujua for appropriate action, as he
complained that masses continued to be held at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice.
On March 23, 2010, Valenciano wrote another letter,7 praying that rules be promulgated
by the Court to put a stop to the holding of Catholic masses, or any other religious rituals,
at the QC Hall of Justice and in all other halls of justice in the country.
In its June 22, 2010 Resolution,8 the Court noted the March 23, 2010 letter of Valenciano
and referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
Thus, in its 1st Indorsement,9 dated September 6, 2010, the OCA, through then Assistant
Court Administrator (ACA) Jenny Lind R. AldecoaDelorino (now Deputy Court
Administrator), referred the letters of Valenciano to the incumbent RTC Executive Judge
Fernando T. Sagun, Jr. (Judge Sagun, Jr.) and incumbent MeTC Executive Judge Caridad M.
WalseLutero (Judge Lutero).
In his Letter-Comment,10 dated September 9, 2010, Judge Sagun, Jr. informed the Court
that his office had already implemented measures to address Valenciano's complaints.
He reported that masses were shortened to a little over thirty (30) minutes; that it was
only during special holy days of obligation when the celebration of mass went beyond
one (1) o'clock in the afternoon; that the pathways leading to the lavatories were open
and could be used without obstruction; that there was never an instance where the
actions of court personnel, who were vying to read the epistle during mass, caused back-
biting and irritation among themselves; that the water generator had been broken
beyond repair and decommissioned since December 2009; and that the court employees
prepared for the mass before the day officially started, so that the performance of their
official duties in court was not hampered.
In her letter,11 Judge Lutero reported that Catholic masses were being held only during
lunch breaks and did not disturb court proceedings; that the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice could still be used as waiting area for the public; that court personnel and the
public were never physically prevented from reaching the lavatories during mass as
there was a clear path from the public offices leading to the comfort rooms; that water
service interruptions were caused by maintenance problems and not because the water
pump was being shut off during mass; and that the elevators could not be used during
mass because elevator attendants took their lunch break from twelve (12) o'clock to one
(1) o'clock in the afternoon.
Judge Lutero opined that it is not the conduct of masses in public places which the
Constitution prohibited, but the passage of laws or the use of public funds for the
purpose of establishing a religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. She conveyed
the fact that no law or rule had been passed and that no public funds had been
appropriated or used to support the celebration of masses. She added that the holding of
Catholic masses did not mean that Catholics had better chances of obtaining favorable
resolutions from the court.
Accordingly, Judge Lutero recommended that the holding of masses at the basement of
the QC Hall of Justice be allowed to continue considering that it was not inimical to the
interests of the court employees and the public.
The OCA Report and Recommendation
In its Memorandum,12 dated August 7, 2014, the OCA believed that the practical
inconveniences cited by Valenciano were unfounded. It, thus, recommended that his
letter-complaints, dated January 6, 2009, May 13, 2009 and March 23, 2010, be
dismissed for lack of merit and that the RTC and MeTC Executive Judges of QC be
directed to closely regulate and monitor the holding of masses and other religious
practices within the premises of the QC Hall of Justice.1âwphi1
The OCA opined that the principle of separation of Church and State, particularly with
reference to the Establishment Clause, ought not to be interpreted according to the rigid
standards of separation; that the neutrality of the State on religion should be benevolent
because religion was an ingrained part of society and played an important role in it; and
that the State, therefore, instead of being belligerent (in the case of Strict Separation) or
being aloof (in the case of Strict Neutrality) towards religion should instead interact and
forbear.13
The OCA advanced the view that the standard of Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation
was espoused because the principal religion clauses in our Constitution were not limited
to the Establishment Clause, which created a wall between the Church and the State, but
was quickly followed by the declaration of the Free Exercise Clause, which protected the
right of the people to practice their religion. In effect, the standard of Benevolent
Neutrality/Accommodation balanced the interest of the State through the Establishment
Clause, and the interest and right of the individual to freely exercise his religion as
guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.14
The OCA observed that the present controversy did not involve a national or local law or
regulation in conflict with the Free Exercise Clause. On the contrary, Valenciano was
merely questioning the propriety of holding religious masses at the basement of the QC
Hall of Justice, which was nothing more than an issue of whether the said religious
practice could be accommodated or not. It ended up concluding that based on prevailing
jurisprudence, as well as the interpretations given to the religion clauses of the 1987
Constitution, there was nothing constitutionally abhorrent in allowing the continuation
of the masses.15
The OCA added that by allowing or accommodating the celebration of Catholic masses
within the premises of the QC Hall of Justice, the Court could not be said to have
established Roman Catholicism as an official religion or to have endorsed the said
religion, for the reason that it also allowed other religious denominations to practice
their religion within the courthouses.16
ISSUE
WHETHER THE HOLDING OF MASSES AT THE BASEMENT OF THE QUEZON CITY HALL
OF JUSTICE VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE AS WELL AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST
APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC MONEY OR PROPERTY FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANY SECT,
CHURCH, DENOMINATION, SECTARIAN INSTITUTION, OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA and denies the
prayer of Valenciano that the holding of religious rituals of any of the world's religions in
the QC Hall of Justice or any halls of justice all over the country be prohibited.
The Holding of Religious Rituals in the Halls of Justice
does not Amount to a Union of Church and State
As earlier stated, Valenciano is against the holding of religious rituals in the halls of
justice on the ground that it violates the constitutional provision on the separation of
Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public
money or property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of
religion. Indeed, Section 6, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.17
The Court once pronounced that "our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has
taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might
arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the
furtherance of their respective ends and aims."18
Justice Isagani Cruz expounded on this doctrine, viz.:
The rationale of the rule is summed up in the familiar saying, "Strong fences make good
neighbors." The idea is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and,
thus, avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the
limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. The demarcation line calls on the
entities to "render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the
things that are God's."19
This, notwithstanding, the State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have
some form of belief system, whether such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain
way of life, or even an outright rejection of religion. Our very own Constitution
recognizes the heterogeneity and religiosity of our people as reflected in lmbong v.
Ochoa,20 as follows:
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up
of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has
shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various
religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has
embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different
sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a
deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to Whom they called for guidance and
enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present
Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a
just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and
aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure
to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the
rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain
and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality
innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical
experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with
respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles
of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions
towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in
government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools. [Emphases
supplied]
In Aglipay v. Ruiz21 (Aglipay), the Court acknowledged how religion could serve as a
motivating force behind each person's actions:
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble
of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they
thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon
Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in
human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and
laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14,
subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. Ordinance appended
thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par [c], Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not prohibited
when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is
assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium xxx.
Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed
xxx. Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays
are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their
observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes
polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered
crimes against the fundamental laws of the state xxx.22 [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, the right to believe or not to believe has again been enshrined in Section 5, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 5. xxx. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. xxx.
Free Exercise Clause
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental
law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought
to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."23
"The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect - freedom to believe
and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."24 Justice Isagani A. Cruz
explained these two (2) concepts in this wise:
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He
may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none
at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being
that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul - in fact,
cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs
may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom
to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be
punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may
believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be
called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the
public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this
liberty may be, religious freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can
be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others.
It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State
and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can
be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if
such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the
purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: "The constitutional provision on religious freedom
terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil
immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma."25
Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and
State. In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other.
The State is aware of the existence of religious movements whose members believe in
the divinity of Jose Rizal. Yet, it does not implement measures to suppress the said
religious sects. Such inaction or indifference on the part of the State gives meaning to the
separation of Church and State, and at the same time, recognizes the religious freedom of
the members of these sects to worship their own Supreme Being.
As pointed out by Judge Lutero, "the Roman Catholics express their worship through the
holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free
exercise of their religion. Our Muslim brethren, who are government employees, are
allowed to worship their Allah even during office hours inside their own offices. The
Seventh Day Adventists are exempted from rendering Saturday duty because their
religion prohibits them from working on a Saturday. Even Christians have been allowed
to conduct their own bible studies in their own offices. All these have been allowed in
respect of the workers' right to the free exercise of their religion. xxx"26
Clearly, allowing the citizens to practice their religion is not equivalent to a fusion of
Church and State.
No Compelling State Interest
Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a
compelling state interest. To successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be
demonstrated that the masses in the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of
public services or affect the judges and employees in the performance of their official
functions. In Estrada v. Escritor,27 the Court expounded on the test as follows:
The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole
gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may
be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would
protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or
delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to
prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental .right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all
human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of
limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty,
thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of
interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not
appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the
fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden,
a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially
the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail
between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the
same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test
used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end,
the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state,
seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved.137
[Citations omitted] [Emphases supplied]
As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the masses were being conducted
only during noon breaks and were not disruptive of public services. The court
proceedings were not being distracted or interrupted and that the performance of the
judiciary employees were not being adversely affected. Moreover, no Civil Service rules
were being violated. As there has been no detrimental effect on the public service or
prejudice to the State, there is simply no state interest compelling enough to prohibit the
exercise of religious freedom in the halls of justice.
In fact, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) was more lenient or tolerant. On November
13, 1981, the CSC came out with Resolution No. 81-1277, which provided, among others,
that "during Friday, the Muslim pray day, Muslims are excused from work from 10:00
o'clock in the morning to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon." The Court struck this down 28 as
not sanctioned by the law. It wrote:
To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m.
to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would
mean a diminution of the prescribed government working hours. For then, they would be
rendering service twelve (12) hours less than that required by the civil service rules for
each month. Further, this would encourage other religious denominations to request for
similar treatment.
The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those
belonging to other religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the
public. Indeed, the exercise of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from
compliance with reasonable requirements of the law, including civil service laws.
Accommodation, Not Establishment of Religion
In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a
policy of accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some
governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for
the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be
shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the
State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.29
In Estrada v. Escritor,30 the Court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the
government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise
their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. As Justice Brennan
explained, the "government [may] take religion into account ... to exempt, when possible,
from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs
and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish."
[Emphases supplied]
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,31 the Court upheld the exemption of
members of Iglesia ni Cristo from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their
employer and a union, because it would violate the teaching of their church not to
affiliate with a labor organization.
In Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu,32 the petitioners, who were
members of the Jehovah 's Witnesses, refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthem,
and recite the patriotic pledge for it is their belief that those were acts of worship or
religious devotion, which they could not conscientiously give to anyone or anything
except God. The Court accommodated them and granted them an exemption from
observing the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs.
Further, several laws have been enacted to accommodate religion. The Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 has declared Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, and
Christmas Day as regular holidays. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9177 proclaimed the FIRST
Day of Shawwal, the tenth month of the Islamic Calendar, a national holiday for the
observance of Eidul Fitr (the end of Ramadan). R.A. No. 9849 declared the tenth day of
Zhu/ Hijja, the twelfth month of the Islamic Calendar, a national holiday for the
observance of Eidul Adha. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, expressly allows a Filipino Muslim to
have more than one (1) wife and exempts him from the crime of bigamy punishable
under Revised Penal Code (RPC). The same Code allows Muslims to have divorce.33
As to Muslims in government offices, Section 3 of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No.
322, provides:
Sec. 3. (a) During the fasting season on the month of Ramadan, all Muslim employees in
the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations, provinces,
cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall observe office hours from seven-
thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without
lunch break or coffee breaks, and that there shall be no diminution of salary or wages,
provided, that the employee who is not fasting is not entitled to the benefit of this
provision.
Pursuant thereto, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 81-1277, dated November 13,
1981, which reads in part:
2. During "Ramadan" the Fasting month (30 days) of the Muslims, the Civil Service
official time of 8 o'clock to 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock to 5 o'clock is hereby modified to 7:30
AM. to 3:30 P.M. without noon break and the difference of 2 hours is not counted as
undertime.
Following the decree, in Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts in Iligan
City (Re: Office Hours),34 the Court recognized that the observance of Ramadan as
integral to the Islamic faith and allowed Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold
flexible office hours from 7:30 o'clock in the morning to 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon
without any break during the period. This is a clear case of accommodation because
Section 5, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.0. No. 292, enjoins
all civil servants, of whatever religious denomination, to render public service of no less
than eight (8) hours a day or forty (40) hours a week.
Non-Establishment Clause
On the opposite side of the spectrum is the constitutional mandate that "no law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion,"35 otherwise known as the non-
establishment clause. Indeed, there is a thin line between accommodation and
establishment, which makes it even more imperative to understand each of these
concepts by placing them in the Filipino society's perspective.
The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and
State. It simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a
person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining
or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance; that
no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity or
institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or
practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any
religious organization or group and vice versa.36 Its minimal sense is that the state
cannot establish or sponsor an official religion.37
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do
with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause
the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they
cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the
State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion.38
Father Bernas further elaborated on this matter, as follows:
"In effect, what non-establishment calls for is government neutrality in religious matters.
Such government neutrality may be summarized in four general propositions: (1)
Government must not prefer one religion over another or religion over irreligion because
such preference would violate voluntarism and breed dissension; (2) Government funds
must not be applied to religious purposes because this too would violate voluntarism
and breed interfaith dissension; (3) Government action must not aid religion because
this too can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; [and] (4) Government
action must not result in excessive entanglement with religion because this too can
violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension."39
Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State. Accommodation, on the
other hand, is passive. In the former, the State becomes involved through the use of
government resources with the primary intention of setting up a state religion. In the
latter, the State, without being entangled, merely gives consideration to its citizens who
want to freely exercise their religion.
In a September 12, 2003 Memorandum for Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the Office of
the Chief Attorney recommended to deny, on constitutional grounds, the request of Rev.
Fr. Carlo M. Ilagan to hold a oneday vigil in honor of the Our Lady of Caysasay within the
premises of the Court. Such controversy must be distinguished from the present issue in
that with respect to the former, a Catholic priest was the one who requested for the vigil.
Moreover, in that case, the vigil would take one (1) whole working day; whereas in this
case, the masses are held at the initiative of Catholic employees and only during the
thirty-minute lunch break.
Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of Catholic masses at
the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely
accommodation. First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly
constitutive authorities expressly mandating that judiciary employees attend the
Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary employees attend the masses to
profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there on their own free will and
volition, without any coercion from the judges or administrative officers. Third, no
government funds are being spent because the lightings and airconditioning continue to
be operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has
neither been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently
appropriated for the exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has
not prejudiced other religions.
No Appropriation of Public Money or Property for the
Benefit of any Church
Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "No public money or
property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to
the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium."
The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a particular purpose."40 "Appropriate"
means "to prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or to designate or destine a
fund or property for a distinct use, or for the payment of a particular demand."41
Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous
in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be
made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with
which it is associated. This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or
restricted by the latter. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied
as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious
whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
whenever possible.42
Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be understood to mean that what is
prohibited is the use of public money or property for the sole purpose of benefiting or
supporting any church. The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the
appropriation is primarily intended for the furtherance of a particular church.
It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not inhibit the use
of public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is
merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in
general." Hence, a public street may be used for a religious procession even as it is
available for a civic parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not barred to a
religious rally if it may also be used for a political assemblage.43
In relation thereto, the phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the manner of
appropriation of public money or property, not as to whether a particular act involves a
direct or a mere incidental benefit to any church. Otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have placed it before "use, benefit or support" to describe the same.
Even the exception to the same provision bolsters this interpretation. The exception
contemplates a situation wherein public funds are paid to a priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher, or dignitary because they rendered service in the armed forces,
or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. That a priest
belongs to a particular church and the latter may have benefited from the money he
received is of no moment, for the purpose of the payment of public funds is merely to
compensate the priest for services rendered and for which other persons, who will
perform the same services will also be compensated in the same manner.
Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.44 As such,
the foregoing interpretation finds support in the
Establishment Clause, which is as clear as daylight in stating that what is proscribed is
the passage of any law which tends to establish a religion, not merely to accommodate
the free exercise thereof.
The Constitution even grants tax exemption to properties actually, directly and
exclusively devoted to religious purposes.45 Certainly, this benefits the religious sects
for a portion of what could have been collected for the benefit of the public is
surrendered in their favor.
In Manosca v. CA,46 a parcel of land located in Taguig was determined by the National
Historical Institute to be the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo.
The Republic then sought to expropriate the said property. The exercise of the power of
eminent domain was questioned on the ground that it would only benefit members of
Iglesia ni Cristo. The Court upheld the legality of the expropriation, viz.:
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains
to be merely incidental and secondary in nature.47 [Emphasis supplied]
Again, in Aglipay, the issuing and selling of postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-
third International Eucharistic Congress was assailed on the ground that it violated the
constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property for the
benefit of any church. In ruling that there was no such violation, the Court held:
It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if
any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in
its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if
the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere
incidental results not contemplated.48 [Emphasis supplied]
Here, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated, applied or employed for
the sole purpose of supporting the Roman Catholics.
Further, it has not been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel for the exclusive use of
its faithful contrary to the claim of Valenciana. Judge
Maceren reported that the basement is also being used as a public waiting area for most
of the day and a meeting place for different employee organizations. The use of the area
for holding masses is limited to lunch break period from twelve (12) o'clock to one (1)
o'clock in the afternoon. Further, Judge Sagun, Jr. related that masses run for just a little
over thirty (30) minutes. It is, therefore, clear that no undue religious bias is being
committed when the subject basement is allowed to be temporarily used by the Catholics
to celebrate mass, as the same area can be used by other groups of people and for other
purposes.49 Thus, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice has remained to be a public
property devoted for public use because the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere
incidental consequence of its primary purpose.
Conclusion
Directing the Executive Judges of the RTC and MeTC to regulate and closely monitor the
holding of masses and other religious practices within the courts does not promote
excessive collaboration between courts and various religions. On the contrary, this is
necessary to ensure that there would be no excessive entanglement.
To disallow the holding of religious rituals within halls of justice would set a dangerous
precedent and commence a domino effect. Strict separation, rather than benevolent
neutrality/accommodation, would be the norm. Thus, the establishment of Shari'a
courts, the National Commission for Muslim Filipinos, and the exception of Muslims from
the provisions of the RPC relative to the crime of bigamy would all be rendered nugatory
because of strict separation. The exception of members of Iglesia ni Cristo from joining a
union or the non-compulsion recognized in favor of members of the Jehovah's Witnesses
from doing certain gestures during the flag ceremony, will all go down the drain simply
because we insist on strict separation.
That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice may offend non-
Catholics is no reason to proscribe it. Our Constitution ensures and mandates an
unconditional tolerance, without regard to whether those who seek to profess their faith
belong to the majority or to the minority. It is emphatic in saying that "the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship shall be without discrimination or
preference." Otherwise, accommodation or tolerance would just be mere lip service.
One cannot espouse that the constitutional freedom of religion ensures tolerance, but, in
reality, refuses to practice what he preaches. One cannot ask for tolerance when he
refuses to do the same for others.
In fine, the Court denies the plea that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of
the QC Hall of Justice be prohibited because the said practice does not violate the
constitutional principle of separation of Church and State and the constitutional
prohibition against appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of a sect,
church, denomination, or any other system of religion.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:
1. NOTE the letter-complaints of Mr. Tony Q. Valenciano, dated January 6, 2009, May
13, 2009, and March 23, 2010;
2. NOTE the 1st Indorsement, dated September 21, 2010, by the Office on Halls of
Justice, containing photocopies and certified photocopies of previous actions made
relative to the complaint;
3. NOTE the Letter-Comment, dated September 9, 2010, of Quezon City Regional Trial
Court Executive Judge Fernando T. Sagun, Jr.;
4. NOTE the undated Letter-Comment of Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court
Executive Judge Caridad M. Walse-Lutero;
5. DENY the prayer of Tony Q. Valenciano to prohibit the holding of religious rituals in
the QC Hall of Justice and in all halls of justice in the country; and
6. DIRECT the Executive Judges of Quezon City to REGULATE and CLOSELY
MONITOR the holding of masses and other religious practices within the Quezon
City Hall of Justice by ensuring, among others, that:
(a) it does not disturb or interrupt court proceedings;
(b) it does not adversely affect and interrupt the delivery of public service; and
(c) it does not unduly inconvenience the public.
In no case shall a particular part of a public building be a permanent place for worship
for the benefit of any and all religious groups. There shall also be no permanent display
of religious icons in all halls of justice in the country. In case of religious rituals, religious
icons and images may be displayed but their presentation is limited only during the
celebration of such activities so as not to offend the sensibilities of members of other
religious denominations or the non-religious public. After any religious affair, the icons
and images shall be hidden or concealed from public view.
The disposition in this administrative matter shall apply to all halls of justice in the
country. Other churches, religious denominations or sects are entitled to the same rights,
privileges, and practices in every hall of justice. In other buildings not owned or
controlled by the Judiciary, the Executive Judges should coordinate and seek approval of
the building owners/administrators accommodating their courts.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171905               June 20, 2012
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC., PATRIZIO EZRA, GERONIMO V.
NAZARETH, RUPERTO MAYUGA, SR., ROBERT SCHAARE, HENRY CARIAT,
REYNALDO FERRENAL AND JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 83159 which affirmed the Securities and Exchange Commission2 (SEC)
Decision3 in SEC Case No. C-00194.
Petitioner United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCP) is a religious
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is a
national confederation of incorporated and unincorporated self-governing
Evangelical churches of different denominations, devised for fellowship, mutual
counsel and cooperation. It is the ecclesiastical successor of the Evangelical Church
of the Philippines, the Philippine Methodist Church and the United Evangelical
Church of the Philippines.4
Respondent Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI), formerly known as
Bradford Memorial Church, is likewise a religious corporation with a personality
separate and distinct from UCCP. It was organized at the turn of the 20th century
but it was incorporated only on 14 December 1979.
Respondents Patrizio Ezra, Geronimo Nazareth, Ruperto Mayuga, Sr., Robert
Schaare, Henry Cariat, Reynaldo Ferrenal and other John Does are members of
BUCCI.
The following historical background briefly summarizes the relationship between
UCCP and BUCCI, viz:
On May 25, 1948, The United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. was formally
organized. The five ancestor churches were the Methodist Episcopal Church, the
Presbyterian Church, the Church of Christ (Disciples) and the Congregational
Churches. These churches traced their lineage back to the early Christian Church.
Early on, at the turn of the century, the proponents of these churches came as
missionaries, spreading the faith as ardent offsprings of the Reformation. Aimed at
converting Roman Catholics, Buddhists, Hindus and spirit worshippers to the
Protestant faith, these missionaries had organized the Evangelical Union by 1901,
until it was superseded by a forerunner of the National Council of Churches in the
Philippines.
During th[o]se times, the precursor of Bradford Memorial Church, the Presbyterian
mission came to the Philippines. It was organized by the early missionaries of the
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. through its Board of Foreign Missions. In 1909, it
was alleged to have acquired real properties in the Philippines funded by one
Matilda R. L. Bradford from whom the congregation attributed its name, in
recognition of her efforts for the church.
While not all churches in the Evangelical Union were equally strong in their desire
for organic church union, such remained as a goal of the organization. In 1921, it
seemed that the plans for the union of the five churches were not to materialize, so
the movement widened its activities to include all the Presbyterian churches and the
Congregational bodies in the Philippines.
After considerable negotiations, four churches- the Presbyterian, the
Congregational, the United Brethren and the United Church of Manila were invited
and an assembly was held in Manila. On March 15, 1929, the basis of Union was
formally adopted and the United Evangelical Church came into being.
The new church grew in strength from year to year until the Second World War
when a division was created in the newly formed Evangelical Church in the
Philippines.
In 1946, immediately following the close of World War II, the Presbyterians and
Congregationalist Churches in the Visayas and Mindanao region under the Rev.
Leonardo Dia reconstituted the United Evangelical Church in the Philippines in
those areas. In view of this development, the Bradford Memorial Church transferred
its synodical connection to the newly reorganized United Evangelical Church in the
Philippines, and thereafter, carried the name BRADFORD Evangelical Church.
A few years after the war, it was thought wise not to push through with the church
union. However, on May 25, 1948, a total of 167 delegates from three church bodies
met at Ellinwood-Malate Church. They were the Evangelical Church, a federation of
evangelical churches operating in the Luzon area; the Philippine Methodist Church
(a split from the United Methodist-Episcopal Church) and the United Evangelical
Church in the Philipines, a federation of Presbyterian and Congregationalist
churches operating in the Visayas and Mindanao area. Each body reported that its
constituted divisions had voted to accept the basis of Union and to join the new
church. So on May 23-25, 1945, these three major churches convened, organized
and declared the new federation of evangelical churches.
Thus, the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. or UCCP was born from the
union of these three major churches. Finally, on April 12, 1949, the UCCP was
registered with the Commission.
Thus, by circumstance, the Bradford Evangelical Church transferred its synodical
connection to and became a constituent Church of the UCCP.
Through the years the UCCP underwent major changes. Per its Constitution
published in April of 1980, it was apportioned into several Conferences, delineated
according to geographical areas as determined by the General Assembly. Most of its
local congregations and conferences were also registered as separate entities for
greater autonomy such as the Cebu Conference Inc. and Bradford United Church of
Christ, Inc.
On December 14, 1979, Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) was
incorporated as a personality separate and distinct from UCCP. Registered under
SEC. Reg. No. 90225, its Articles of Incorporation declare Bradford United Church of
Christ as a Protestant Congregation. Among its original incorporators are herein
Respondents Patricio Ezra, Robert Schaare and Geronimo V. Nazareth. Furthermore,
Article 3 of its original articles of incorporation provides:
That its incorporation is not forbidden by competent authorities or by the
Constitution, rules, regulations or discipline of the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines and that of the Bradford United Church of Christ.5
UCCP has three (3) governing bodies namely: the General Assembly, the Conference
and the Local Church, each having distinct and separate duties and powers. As a
UCCP local church located in Cebu, BUCCI belonged to the Cebu Conference Inc.
(CCI) with whom it enjoyed peaceful co-existence until late 1989 when BUCCI
started construction of a fence that encroached upon the right-of way allocated by
UCCP for CCI and Visayas jurisdiction.6
UCCP General Assembly attempted to settle the dispute. On 7 April 1990, the Cebu
Conference Judicial Commission rendered a decision in favor of CCI.7 This
unfavorable decision triggered a series of events8 which further increased the
enmity between the parties and led to the formal break-up of BUCCI from UCCP.9
In a Church Council Resolution dated 21 June 1992, BUCCI disaffiliated from UCCP.
The effectivity of the disaffiliation was made to retroact to 16 September 1990 when
BUCCI severed its ties from CCI. This disaffiliation was duly ratified by BUCCI’s
members in a referendum held on 19 July 1992.10
Consequently, BUCCI filed its Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws which
provided for and effected its disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved the same on 2
July 1993.11
Thereafter, UCCP filed before SEC a complaint/protest for rejection/annulment of
Amended Articles and Incorporation and Injunction, docketed as SEC Case No. C-
00194. UCCP also prayed for the disallowance of the continued use of BUCCI as
corporate name.12
UCCP later on filed an Amended Complaint/Protest dated 8 March 1994,
abandoning the original Complaint/Protest.1âwphi1 The Amended
Complaint/Protest added BUCCI as one of the respondents; alleged that the separate
incorporation and registration of BUCCI is not allowed under the UCCP Constitution
and By-laws; and sought to enjoin BUCCI and the respondents from using the name
BUCCI, both in its Amended Articles of Incorporation and its dealings with the
public, and from using its properties.13
On 27 January 2004, the SEC en banc dismissed UCCP’s petition to declare as null
and void the amendments made to the Articles of Incorporation of BUCCI. SEC
summarized UCCP’s arguments into three main issues, as follow:
1. Whether or not the separation of [BUCCI] from [UCCP] is valid;
2. Whether or not the amendments to the Articles of Incorporation and By-
Laws of BUCCI made after it separated from UCCP are valid; [and]
3. Whether or not private respondents are entitled to the use of the name
"Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc."(BUCCI).14
SEC defended the right of BUCCI to disassociate itself from UCCP in recognition of its
constitutional freedom to associate and disassociate. SEC also pointed out that since
UCCP had used the fact of BUCCI’s disaffiliation to consolidate its claim over the
property subject of the unlawful detainer case against BUCCI before the RTC, UCCP
cannot now deny the validity of said disaffiliation. Moreover, SEC found that UCCP is
not the real party in interest to question the amendments made by BUCCI to its
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. Finally, SEC upheld the right of BUCCI to
continue using its corporate name.
UCCP filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 17 June 2005, the
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the SEC.
On 16 September 2005, UCCP filed a motion to drop BUCCI as respondent.15
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied on 21 February 2006,16 UCCP
filed the present appeal.
UCCP maintains that the issue on whether the disaffiliation of respondents is valid is
purely an ecclesiastical affair. It asserts that it has the sole power and authority to
declare and/or decide whether BUCCI or any of its local churches could disaffiliate
from it.17 UCCP likewise restates that individual respondents cannot validly effect
amendments to BUCCI’s Articles and By-Laws nor to continue the use of BUCCI’s
name after they have disaffiliated from UCCP. Moreover, UCCP asseverates that the
stringent requirements of the Corporation Code to effect amendments have not been
satisfied.18 UCCP also refutes the holding that BUCCI no longer forms part of UCCP
because the latter had filed several cases against the former. UCCP explains that the
above-mentioned cases had been filed against individual respondents, and not
against BUCCI; and the inclusion of BUCCI’s name in said cases were merely
circumstantial because at the time those cases were filed, individual respondents
were still acting and sabotaging the operation of BUCCI.19 Lastly, UCCP criticizes
SEC for its finding that UCCP has no legal personality to prosecute the case before it.
UCCP asserts that individual respondents were its former members and BUCCI, the
entity involved, is its member-local church.20
Respondents,21 on the other hand, counter that UCCP’s new theory—that the
determination of membership to UCCP is a purely ecclesiastical affair—is not and
cannot be allowed at this late stage of the proceedings.22 They maintain that the
Court of Appeals and SEC are correct in ruling that BUCCI had validly disaffiliated
from UCCP and is entitled to continue in the use of its name.23 As their third point,
respondents assert that the Court of Appeals and SEC’s finding that UCCP had no
legal personality to question the validity of the amendments to BUCCI’s Articles and
By-laws, is in accord with law and settled jurisprudence.24 Finally, they point out
that the petition should be dismissed outright for failure to comply with the
mandatory requirements of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.25
The Court denies the Petition.
The issue is not a purely ecclesiastical affair
Notably, UCCP invoked the jurisdiction of SEC when it submitted for resolution the
following issues:
1. Whether or not BUCCI is an organic component of UCCP subject to the latter’s
Constitution and By-laws;
2. Whether or not the referendum conducted by respondents on July and
November 1992 were valid;
3. Whether or not the supposed separation of BUCCI from UCCP is valid;
4. Whether or not the amendment of the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws
of BUCCI is valid;
5. Whether or not private respondents are entitled to the use of the name
"BUCCI"; and
6. Whether or not the use of the name "BUCCI" is confusingly similar with
UCCP.26
Before the Court of Appeals, UCCP cited the following as grounds for review:
I. The SEC committed serious reversible error in upholding as valid the
amendments to the constitution and by-laws of BUCCI when there was
absolutely no evidence proving that the strict requirements for amendments
provided (sic) for under the new Corporation Code were complied with;
II. The SEC committed serious reversible error in disregarding both testimonial
and documentary evidence of the petitioner proving that respondent did not
comply with the proper notice, deliberation of the issues and the 2/3 vote
requirement for validity of the amendments of its articles of incorporation;
III. The SEC committed serious reversible error in holding that petitioner UCCP
does not have the legal standing to question the amendments made to
BUCCI’s articles of incorporation and by-laws after the latter’s separation
from the petitioner. Petitioner’s legal standing to file the case had never been
the issue of the case from the time of its filing, during the pre-trial
conference, during the trial on the merits, and in the respective
memorandum filed by the parties in this case; and
IV. The SEC committed serious reversible error in upholding respondents’
continued use of the name BUCCI when in fact individual respondents by
their very own acts have expelled themselves from membership of the UCCP
and its local church the BUCCI.27
Failing to obtain favorable judgment from the SEC and the Court of Appeals, UCCP
now comes before the Court posing ostensibly a question of law, that the
determination of membership in UCCP is a purely ecclesiastical affair, which theory
strips SEC and the Court of Appeals of any authority to rule on the issues voluntarily
submitted to them by UCCP itself for resolution.
Basic is the rule that a party cannot be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of a court
to secure affirmative relief and later on renounce or repudiate the same after it fails
to obtain such relief.28 After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction
or power of the court. The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.29
The Court has likewise consistently rejected the pernicious practice of shifting to a
new theory on appeal in the hope of a favorable result. Fair play, justice and due
process require that as a rule new matters cannot be raised for the first time before
an appellate tribunal.30 Failure to assert issues and arguments "within a reasonable
time" warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it.31
In any event, the Court believes that the matter at hand is not purely an
ecclesiastical affair.
An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of the
church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful
laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of
excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership.32 Based
on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the
church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship
and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called
ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for
excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments
and other activities attached with religious significance.33
In the first place, relief from civil courts was sought when the incident of
disaffiliation occurred, in the face of UCCP’s assertions that it continues to recognize
BUCCI as one of its local churches and that it has the sole authority to determine the
validity of the disaffiliation.
Secondly, intertwined with the issue of the validity of the disaffiliation is the
question of whether BUCCI had the power under the law to effect disaffiliation such
that it should be given legal consequence and granted recognition.
UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees of primary franchises, are
subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A
provides that SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
corporations. Even with their religious nature, SEC may exercise jurisdiction over
them in matters that are legal and corporate.34
BUCCI, as a juridical entity separate and distinct from UCCP, possesses the freedom
to determine its steps.
UCCP’s statement in its memorandum- "[w]here else can petitioner seek protection
and relief x x x?"35 – is particularly telling. That UCCP sees the need to turn to a
body for relief is an admission that its authority over BUCCI is not absolute and is
actually more tenuous than alleged.
Thus, UCCP cannot rely on the Court’s ruling as restated in Long v. Basa,36 that "in
matters purely ecclesiastical, the decisions of the proper church tribunals are
conclusive upon the civil tribunals."37 If in the case at bar, even with its highest
executive official’s pronouncement that BUCCI is still recognized as its member-
church,38 UCCP could not compel BUCCI to go back to its fold, then the alleged
absolute ecclesiastical authority must not be there to begin with.
In fact, Long may be viewed as supportive of respondents’ case. Said case involved a
church’s sole prerogative and power to expel its individual members. Similarly, the
case at bar concerns BUCCI’s sole prerogative and power as a church to disconnect
ties with another entity. Such are decisions, that may have religious color and are
therefore ecclesiastical affairs, the Court must respect and cannot review. It is worth
mentioning that in Fonacier v. Court of Appeals,39 the Court held that the
amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and
abandonment of faith or abjuration, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form
of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to
the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership,
are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts.
Conversely, the Court owes but recognition to BUCCI’s decision as it concerns its
legal right as a religious corporation to disaffiliate from another religious
corporation via legitimate means—a secular matter well within the civil courts’
purview.
Respondents Validly Effected the Amendments
UCCP contends that respondents have severed their UCCP membership and
consequently, have lost their BUCCI membership. As such, they have neither the
power to bring about the amendments to BUCCI’s Articles of Incorporation nor right
to continue the usage of BUCCI’s name.
The Church Council Resolution dated 21 June 1992, duly ratified by BUCCI’s
members in a referendum, carried out BUCCI’s corporate act of disaffiliating from
UCCP. By virtue of this disaffiliation, BUCCI members, including respondents,
severed their ties from UCCP but maintained their membership with BUCCI. UCCP’s
contention that the severance of UCCP ties amounts to severance of ties to the local
church does not hold water.
Local church autonomy takes precedence in the UCCP polity. Section 4 of the 1974
UCCP Constitution provides:
SECTION 4. The autonomy of the local church or congregation in matters pertaining
to its life in its own particular community shall be respected, consistent with its
relation to the Conference, Jurisdiction, and General Assembly.
According to respondent, UCCP adopted a "congregationalist" system where a local
church has the right to govern itself by its own laws, rules and regulations for the
furtherance of its own general welfare and the freedom to practice its own faith and
polity of denominational origin.40 This "congregationalist" system was shown in the
Basis of Union, the Declaration of Union and UCCP’s Constitution and By-laws.
Article IV of the Basis of Union reads:
ARTICLE IV -- Church Practices and Worship: Congregations may follow their
customary practices and worship.41
Section 4, Article VI specifically outlines the duties and powers of the local church:
(a) Subject only to the general laws and regulations of the Church, every local church
or congregation, shall, with its pastor, be responsible for watching over its members,
keeping its life pure, ordering its worship, providing Christian education and
proclaiming the Gospel[;] (b) Call a Pastor[;] (c) Recommend candidates for the
ministry[;] (d) Elect delegates to the Annual Conference.42
Statement IV of Declaration of Union provides:
That by adoption of the name "UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES"
for this Church Union, no right, interest, or title in and to their respective names by
which the uniting Churches have been identified and known, has been nor is
surrendered, but all such rights are specifically reserved against the claims of all
persons, associations and organizations whatsoever.43
As a matter of fact, the present UCCP Constitution44 and By-laws continue to uphold
this tradition of respecting local church autonomy. The 2005 UCCP Amended
Constitution provides in Article II, Section 14:
Consistent with the heritage and commitment of the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines, the autonomy of the Local Church shall be respected. The scope of such
autonomy shall be defined in the By-Laws.
Section 28, Article III of the UCCP By-laws provides:
Section 28. Scope of Local Autonomy: The primary locus of mission is the Local
Church. Hence, the UCCP upholds the autonomy of the Local Church particularly as
to its right and power to conduct its ministry free from outside control, provided the
same is in line with the Constitution, By-Laws and statues of the Church, thereby
enabling the Local Church to become effective instrument in the ministry and
mission of the Church and ensuring its positive contribution to the unity and
strengthening of the whole Church. Specifically, autonomy of the Local Church
includes the authority to do the following:
a. To call and support its Pastor and other Church workers, keeping in mind the
basic policy of the Church to call to its ministry pastors and Church workers
belonging to the UCCP, subscribing to the UCCP Statement of Faith and
paying allegiance to the Constitution, By-Laws and statutes of the Church.
Pastors, ministers and workers of other churches affiliated with the National
Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) may be requested to serve in
the Local Church with the prior written permission of the General Assembly
or the National Council, through the General Secretary;
b. To administer, maintain, encumber or dispose of its personal or real
properties pursuant to a resolution of its Board of Trustees and approved by
its Church Council and, where real properties are involved, with the written
consent of the General Assembly or the National Council, through the General
Secretary;
c. To invite pastors, ministers, workers and lay leaders of other churches to
speak, preach or otherwise enter into fellowship with the Local Church, from
time to time, in consonance with Article II, Section 6, of the Constitution,
provided that the authority and integrity of the UCCP, as well as the unity of
the Local Church, shall never be impaired or compromised;
d. To nominate and elect its officers, in accordance with the Constitution and
By-Laws, and hold annual and such special meetings as it may deem
necessary and proper;
e. To admit qualified persons into the membership of the Local Church, help
ensure their nurture and spiritual development, and promote and develop
among them the idea of loving service, stewardship and missionary outreach;
f. To celebrate its worship services that are orderly and solemn, yet joyful and
meaningful, reflective of the faith and life of the Church and responsive to the
needs of the community in terms of witness, service and prophetic ministry;
g. To support the ministerial and lay formation program of the Church and
recruit, recommend and support candidates for the ministry;
h. To adopt its own budget and financial program and fulfill its obligations to
the wider bodies; and
i. To do all things as it may deem wise, necessary and proper, without
encroaching on the prerogatives of, and interfering with, the wider Church
bodies, ensuring at all times that its action contribute to the unity and
strengthening of the whole UCCP.
From the foregoing it can be gleaned that: UCCP’s control and authority over its local
churches is not full and supreme; membership of the local churches in the UCCP is
voluntary and not perpetual; local churches enjoy independence and autonomy and
may maintain or continue church-life with or without UCCP.
Thus, under the law and UCCP polity, BUCCI may validly bring about its disaffiliation
from UCCP through the amendment of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.
Significantly, SEC approved the amendments on 2 July 1993, which approval has in
its favor the presumption of regularity.45 Government officials are presumed to
have regularly performed their functions and strong evidence is necessary to rebut
this presumption.46 In the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, the
presumption must be upheld.47
More importantly, well-settled is the judicial dictum that factual findings of quasi-
judicial agencies, such as SEC, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect
but even finality. They are binding upon this Court which is not a trier of facts. Only
upon clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, or that such factual findings were
arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record will this Court step in
and proceed to make its own independent evaluation of the facts. No cogent reason
exists in the instant cases to deviate from this settled rule.48
Anent the continued use by respondents of BUCCI, the Court likewise sustains the
rulings of SEC and Court of Appeals. Pertinently, the Court of Appeals ruled as
follows:
As held in Philips Export B.V. vs. Court of Appeals [206 SCRA 457, 463], to fall within
the prohibition of the law, two requisites must be proven, to wit: (1) that the
complainant corporation acquired a prior right over the use of such corporate name;
and (2) the proposed name is either: (a) identical, or (b) deceptively or confusingly
similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other name already protected by
law; or (c) patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law.
The respondent BUCCI’s church history would show that it has a better right to use
its corporate name on the ground of priority of adoption. As thoroughly discussed
by the SEC in its assailed decision, the evolution of respondent BUCCI to what it is
today undoubtedly establishes that it had acquired the right to make use of its
corporate name.
As to whether or not BUCCI is confusingly or deceptively similar to UCCP, We find in
the negative. In determining the existence of confusing similarity in corporate
names, the test is whether the similarity is such as to mislead a person using
ordinary care and discrimination.49
Furthermore, Section 2, Article I of the UCCP Constitution50 states that, "All local
churches and church-owned entities shall bear prominently the name: United
Church of Christ in the Philippines." For this reason, BUCCI is evidently distinct from
UCCP and from all other UCCP local churches and church-owned entities.
SEC and Court of Appeals correctly ruled that UCCP has no locus standi to question
the amendments to BUCCI’s Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.
party to question the validity of the amendments of the latter’s Articles of
Incorporation and By-laws. While UCCP stands to be affected by the disaffiliation,
the same is admitted and accepted by UCCP’s polity by the very establishment of its
liberal structure.1âwphi1
Petition failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure
We highlight the fact that when UCCP filed the original complaint before the SEC,
only individual respondents were impleaded. UCCP then amended the complaint to
include BUCCI, only to drop it as respondent after the Court of Appeals promulgated
its Decision, purportedly to show that it was merely going after individual
respondents. We agree with respondents that failure to implead BUCCI as
respondent in the instant case constitutes a blatant disregard of Section 4(a), Rule
45 of the Rules of Court,54 but also renders the assailed decision final and executory
and all subsequent actions on the petition are void considering that BUCCI is an
indispensable party.55 We cannot countenance this disingenuous practice of
shifting to a new theory on appeal in the hope of obtaining a favorable result.56
Essentially, the three main issues raised by UCCP before the SEC and the Court of
Appeals57 are the very same issues presented for our resolution. Finding no serious
errors to warrant a reversal of the assailed Decision, We affirm.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17
June 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The doctrine of locus standi or the right of appearance in a court of justice has been
adequately discussed by this Court in a number of cases. The doctrine requires a
litigant to have a material interest in the outcome of a case. In private suits, locus
standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in interest," which is defined as "the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit."51

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.52

A suit may be dismissed if the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in
interest.53

After a review of the evidence on record, the SEC, which the Court of Appeals
affirmed, correctly ruled that UCCP, not being a member of BUCCI, is not the proper
G.R. No. 124382           August 16, 1999
PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fourth Division), CEBU
CITY, CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF THE SEVENTH-
DAY ADVENTISTS, ELDER HECTOR V. GAYARES, PASTORS REUBEN MORALDE,
OSCAR L. ALOLOR, WILLIAM U. DONATO, JOEL WALES, ELY SACAY, GIDEON
BUHAT, ISACHAR GARSULA, ELISEO DOBLE, PORFIRIO BALACY, DAVID
RODRIGO, LORETO MAYPA, MR. RUFO GASAPO, MR. EUFRONIO IBESATE, MRS.
TESSIE BALACY, MR. ZOSIMO KARA-AN, and MR. ELEUTERIO LOBITANA,
respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Subject of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
Resolution1 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (the
"NLRC"), rendered on 23 January 1996, in NLRC Case No. V-0120-93, entitled
"Pastor Dionisio V. Austria vs. Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of
Seventh Day Adventists, et al.," which dismissed the case for illegal dismissal filed by
the petitioner against private respondents for lack of jurisdiction.1âwphi1.nêt
Private Respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh-
Day Adventists (hereinafter referred to as the "SDA") is a religious corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine law and is represented in this case by the
other private respondents, officers of the SDA. Petitioner, on the other hand, was a
Pastor of the SDA until 31 October 1991, when his services were terminated.
The records show that petitioner Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the SDA for
twenty eight (28) years from 1963 to 1991. 2 He began his work with the SDA on 15
July 1963 as a literature evangelist, selling literature of the SDA over the island of
Negros. From then on, petitioner worked his way up the ladder and got promoted
several times. In January, 1968, petitioner became the Assistant Publishing Director
in the West Visayan Mission of the SDA. In July, 1972, he was elevated to the position
of Pastor in the West Visayan Mission covering the island of Panay, and the
provinces of Romblon and Guimaras. Petitioner held the same position up to 1988.
Finally, in 1989, petitioner was promoted as District Pastor of the Negros Mission of
the SDA and was assigned at Sagay, Balintawak and Toboso, Negros Occidental, with
twelve (12) churches under his jurisdiction. In January, 1991, petitioner was
transferred to Bacolod City. He held the position of district pastor until his services
were terminated on 31 October 1991.
On various occasions from August up to October, 1991, petitioner received several
communications3 from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission
asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and
offerings collected by his wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted
to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
In his written explanation dated 11 October 1991,4 petitioner reasoned out that he
should not be made accountable for the unremitted collections since it was private
respondents Pastor Gideon Buhat and Mr. Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his wife
to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that
time.
Thereafter, on 16 October 1991, at around 7:30 a.m., petitioner went to the office of
Pastor Buhat, the president of the Negros Mission. During said call, petitioner tried
to persuade Pastor Buhat to convene the Executive Committee for the purpose of
settling the dispute between him and the private respondent, Pastor David Rodrigo.
The dispute between Pastor Rodrigo and petitioner arose from an incident in which
petitioner assisted his friend, Danny Diamada, to collect from Pastor Rodrigo the
unpaid balance for the repair of the latter's motor vehicle which he failed to pay to
Diamada.5 Due to the assistance of petitioner in collecting Pastor Rodrigo's debt, the
latter harbored ill-feelings against petitioner. When news reached petitioner that
Pastor Rodrigo was about to file a complaint against him with the Negros Mission,
he immediately proceeded to the office of Pastor Buhat on the date abovementioned
and asked the latter to convene the Executive Committee. Pastor Buhat denied the
request of petitioner since some committee members were out of town and there
was no quorum. Thereafter, the two exchanged heated arguments. Petitioner then
left the office of Pastor Buhat. While on his way out, petitioner overheard Pastor
Buhat saying, "Pastor daw inisog na ina iya (Pador you are talking tough)." 6 Irked by
such remark, petitioner returned to the office of Pastor Buhat, and tried to overturn
the latter's table, though unsuccessfully, since it was heavy. Thereafter, petitioner
banged the attaché case of Pastor Buhat on the table, scattered the books in his
office, and threw the phone.7 Fortunately, private respondents Pastors Yonilo
Leopoldo and Claudio Montañ o were around and they pacified both Pastor Buhat
and petitioner.
On 17 October 1991, petitioner received a letter 8 inviting him and his wife to attend
the Executive Committee meeting at the Negros Mission Conference Room on 21
October 1991, at nine in the morning. To be discussed in the meeting were the non-
remittance of church collection and the events that transpired on 16 October 1991.
A fact-finding committee was created to investigate petitioner. For two (2) days,
from October 21 and 22, the fact-finding committee conducted an investigation of
petitioner. Sensing that the result of the investigation might be one-sided, petitioner
immediately wrote Pastor Rueben Moralde, president of the SDA and chairman of
the fact-finding committee, requesting that certain members of the fact-finding
committee be excluded in the investigation and resolution of the case. 9 Out of the six
(6) members requested to inhibit themselves from the investigation and decision-
making, only two (2) were actually excluded, namely: Pastor Buhat and Pastor
Rodrigo. Subsequently, on 29 October 1991, petitioner received a letter of
dismissal10 citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust,
serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an
offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as grounds
for the termination of his services.
Reacting against the adverse decision of the SDA, petitioner filed a complaint 11 on 14
November 1991, before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal against the SDA and
its officers and prayed for reinstatement with backwages and benefits, moral and
exemplary damages and other labor law benefits.
On 15 February 1993, Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideñ o rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondents CENTRAL PHILIPPINE
UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS
(CPUMCSDA) and its officers, respondents herein, are hereby ordered to
immediately reinstate complainant Pastor Dionisio Austria to his former
position as Pastor of Brgy. Taculing, Progreso and Banago, Bacolod City, without
loss of seniority and other rights and backwages in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS
(P115,830.00) without deductions and qualificatioons.
Respondent CPUMCSDA is further ordered to pay complainant the following:
A. 13th month pay — P 21,060.00
B. Allowance — P 4,770.83
C. Service Incentive Leave Pay — P 3,461.85
D. Moral Damages — P 50,000.00
E. Exemplary Damages — P 25,000.00
F. Attorney's Fee — P 22,012.27 SO ORDERED.12
The SDA, through its officers, appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the
National Labor Labor Relations Commission, Fourth Division, Cebu City. In a
decision, dated 26 August 1994, the NLRC vacated the findings of the Labor Arbiter.
The decretal portion of the NLRC decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby VACATED and a new one
ENTERED dismissing this case for want of merit.
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-named decision. On 18
July 1995, the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing its original decision. The
dispositive portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Our decision dated August 26, 1994 is
VACATED and the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated February 15, 1993 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.14
In view of the reversal of the original decision of the NLRC, the SDA filed a motion
for reconsideration of the above resolution. Notable in the motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondents is their invocation, for the first time on
appeal, that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
petitioner due to the constitutional provision on the separation of church and state
since the case allegedly involved an ecclesiastical affair to which the State cannot
interfere.
The NLRC, without ruling on the merits of the case, reversed itself once again,
sustained the argument posed by private respondents and, accordingly, dismissed
the complaint of petitioner. The dispositive portion of the NLRC resolution dated 23
January 1996, subject of the present petition, is as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration
is hereby granted. Accordingly, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.15
Hence, the recourse to this Court by petitioner.
After the filing of the petition, the Court ordered the Office of the Solicitor General
(the "OSG") to file its comment on behalf of public respondent NLRC. Interestingly,
the OSG filed a manifestation and motion in lieu of comment 16 setting forth its stand
that it cannot sustain the resolution of the NLRC. In its manifestation, the OSG
submits that the termination of petitioner from his employment may be questioned
before the NLRC as the same is secular in nature, not ecclesiastical. After the
submission of memoranda of all the parties, the case was submitted for decision.
The issues to be resolved in this petition are:
1) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the
complaint filed by petitioner against the SDA;
2) Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is an
ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation of church and state;
and
3) Whether or not such termination is valid.
The first two issues shall be resolved jointly, since they are related.
Private respondents contend that by virtue of the doctrine of separation of church
and state, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint filed by petitioner. Since the matter at bar allegedly involves the
discipline of a religious minister, it is to be considered a purely ecclesiastical affair
to which the State has no right to interfere.
The contention of private respondents deserves scant consideration. The principle
of separation of church and state finds no application in this case.
The rationale of the principle of the separation of church and state is summed up in
the familiar saying, "Strong fences make good-neighbors." 17 The idea advocated by
this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus
avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the
limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. 18 The demarcation line calls on the
entities to "render therefore unto Ceasar the things that are Ceasar's and unto God
the things that are God's."19 While the state is prohibited from interfering in purely
ecclesiastical affairs, the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular
matters.20
The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar
the State from taking cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is "one that
concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the
government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations
those deemed unworthy of membership.21 Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical
affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to
matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To
be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State
cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious
significance. The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the abovecited
examples. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister it
does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. Simply stated, what is
involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an
employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines of the church. In this case, petitioner was not ex-
communicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated
from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely
secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from
the religious congregation.
As pointed out by the OSG in its memorandum, the grounds invoked for petitioner's
dismissal, namely: misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of
trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and commission of an
offense against the person of his employer's duly authorized representative, are all
based on Article 282 of the Labor Code which enumerates the just causes for
termination of employment.22 By this alone, it is palpable that the reason for
petitioner's dismissal from the service is not religious in nature. Coupled with this is
the act of the SDA in furnishing NLRC with a copy of petitioner's letter of
termination. As aptly stated by the OSG, this again is an eloquent admission by
private respondents that NLRC has jurisdiction over the case. Aside from these, SDA
admitted in a certification23 issued by its officer, Mr. Ibesate, that petitioner has been
its employee for twenty-eight (28) years. SDA even registered petitioner with the
Social Security System (SSS) as its employee. As a matter of fact, the worker's
records of petitioner have been submitted by private respondents as part of their
exhibits. From all of these it is clear that when the SDA terminated the services of
petitioner, it was merely exercising its management prerogative to fire an employee
which it believes to be unfit for the job. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of the case and to determine whether
the SDA, as employer, rightfully exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an
employee. This is in consonance with the mandate of the Constitution to afford full
protection to labor.
Under the Labor Code, the provision which governs the dismissal of employees, is
comprehensive enough to include religious corporations, such as the SDA, in its
coverage. Article 278 of the Labor Code on post-employment states that "the
provisions of this Title shall apply to all establishments or undertakings, whether for
profit or not." Obviously, the cited article does not make any exception in favor of a
religious corporation. This is made more evident by the fact that the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, particularly, Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI on the
Termination of Employment and Retirement, categorically includes religious
institutions in the coverage of the law, to wit:
Sec. 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall apply to all establishments and undertakings,
whether operated for profit or not, including educational, medical, charitable
and religious institutions and organizations, in cases of regular employment with
the exception of the Government and its political subdivisions including
government-owned or controlled corporations.24
With this clear mandate, the SDA cannot hide behind the mantle of protection of the
doctrine of separation of church and state to avoid its responsibilities as an
employer under the Labor Code.
Finally, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, private respondents are estopped
from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. It is already
too late in the day for private respondents to question the jurisdiction of the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter since the SDA had fully participated in the trials and hearings
of the case from start to finish. The Court has already ruled that the active
participation of a party against whom the action war brought, coupled with his
failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the
action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later
on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction. 25 Thus, the active participation of
private respondents in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
mooted the question on jurisdiction.
The jurisdictional question now settled, we shall now proceed to determine whether
the dismissal of petitioner was valid.
At the outset, we note that as a general rule, findings of fact of administrative bodies
like the NLRC are binding upon this Court. A review of such findings is justified,
however, in instances when the findings of the NLRC differ from those of the labor
arbiter, as in this case.26 When the findings of NLRC do not agree with those of the
Labor Arbiter, this Court must of necessity review the records to determine which
findings should be preferred as more comfortable to the evidentiary facts. 27
We turn now to the crux of the matter. In termination cases, the settled rule is that
the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause rests
on the employer.28 Thus, private respondents must not merely rely on the
weaknesses of petitioner's evidence but must stand on the merits of their own
defense.
The issue being the legality of petitioner's dismissal, the same must be measured
against the requisites for a valid dismissal, namely: (a) the employee must be
afforded due process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself, and; (b) the dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Article 282 of
the Labor Code.29 Without the concurrence of this twin requirements, the
termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal. 30
Before the services of an employee can be validly terminated, Article 277 (b) of the
Labor Code and Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor
Code further require the employer to furnish the employee with two (2) written
notices, to wit: (a) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side; and, (b) a written notice of termination served on the
employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds
have been established to justify his termination.
The first notice, which may be considered as the proper charge, serves to apprise
the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. 31
The second notice on the other hand seeks to inform the employee of the employer's
decision to dismiss him. 32 This decision, however, must come only after the
employee is given a reasonable period from receipt of the first notice within which
to answer the charge and ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with
the assistance of a representative, if he so desires. 33 This is in consonance with the
express provision of the law on the protection to labor and the broader dictates of
procedural due process.34 Non-compliance therewith is fatal because these
requirements are conditions sine qua non before dismissal may be validly effected.35
Private respondent failed to substantially comply with the above requirements.
With regard to the first notice, the letter, 36 dated 17 October 1991, which notified
petitioner and his wife to attend the meeting on 21 October 1991, cannot be
construed as the written charge required by law. A perusal of the said letter reveals
that it never categorically stated the particular acts or omissions on which
petitioner's impending termination was grounded. In fact, the letter never even
mentioned that petitioner would be subject to investigation. The letter merely
mentioned that petitioner and his wife were invited to a meeting wherein what
would be discussed were the alleged unremitted church tithes and the events that
transpired on 16 October 1991. Thus, petitioner was surprised to find out that the
alleged meeting turned out to be an investigation. From the tenor of the letter, it
cannot be presumed that petitioner was actually on the verge of dismissal. The
alleged grounds for the dismissal of petitioner from the service were only revealed
to him when the actual letter of dismissal was finally issued. For this reason, it
cannot be said that petitioner was given enough opportunity to properly prepare for
his defense. While admittedly, private respondents complied with the second
requirement, the notice of termination, this does not cure the initial defect of lack of
the proper written charge required by law.
In the letter of termination, 37 dated 29 October 1991, private respondents
enumerated the following as grounds for the dismissal of petitioner, namely:
misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious
misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense
against the person of employer's duly authorized representative. Breach of trust and
misappropriation of denominational funds refer to the alleged failure of petitioner
to remit to the treasurer of the Negros Mission tithes, collections and offerings
amounting to P15,078.10 which were collected by his wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in
the churches under his jurisdiction. On the other hand, serious misconduct and
commission of an offense against the person of the employer's duly authorized
representative pertain to the 16 October 1991 incident wherein petitioner allegedly
committed an act of violence in the office of Pastor Gideon Buhat. The final ground
invoked by private respondents is gross and habitual neglect of duties allegedly
committed by petitioner.
We cannot sustain the validity of dismissal based on the ground of breach of trust.
Private respondents allege that they have lost their confidence in petitioner for his
failure, despite demands, to remit the tithes and offerings amounting to P15,078.10,
which were collected in his district. A careful study of the voluminous records of the
case reveals that there is simply no basis for the alleged loss of confidence and
breach of trust. Settled is the rule that under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, the
breach of trust must be willful. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally,
knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act
done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. 38 It must rest on
substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices or
suspicion; otherwise the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the
employer.39 It should be genuine and not simulated. 40 This ground has never been
intended to afford an occasion for abuse, because of its subjective nature. The
records show that there were only six (6) instances when petitioner personally
collected and received from the church treasurers the tithes, collections, and
donations for the church.41 The stenographic notes on the testimony of Naomi
Geniebla, the Negros Mission Church Auditor and a witness for private respondents,
show that Pastor Austria was able to remit all his collections to the treasurer of the
Negros Mission.42
Though private respondents were able to establish that petitioner collected and
received tithes and donations several times, they were notable to establish that
petitioner failed to remit the same to the Negros Mission, and that he pocketed the
amount and used it for his personal purpose. In fact, as admitted by their own
witness, Naomi Geniebla, petitioner remitted the amounts which he collected to the reasons, we believe that the minor infraction committed by petitioner does not
Negros Mission for which corresponding receipts were issued to him. Thus, the merit the ultimate penalty of dismissal.
allegations of private respondents that petitioner breached their trust have no leg to
stand on. The final ground alleged by private respondents in terminating petitioner, gross and
habitual neglect of duties, does not require an exhaustive discussion. Suffice it to say
In a vain attempt to support their claim of breach of trust, private respondents try to that all private respondents had were allegations but not proof. Aside from merely
pin on petitioner the alleged non-remittance of the tithes collected by his wife. This citing the said ground, private respondents failed to prove culpability on the part of
argument deserves little consideration. First of all, as proven by convincing and petitioner. In fact, the evidence on record shows otherwise. Petitioner's rise from
substantial evidence consisting of the testimonies of the witnesses for private the ranks disclose that he was actually a hard-worker. Private respondents'
respondents who are church treasurers, it was Mrs. Thelma Austria who actually evidence,47 which consisted of petitioner's Worker's Reports, revealed how
collected the tithes and donations from them, and, who failed to remit the same to petitioner travelled to different churches to attend to the faithful under his care.
the treasurer of the Negros Mission. The testimony of these church treasurers were Indeed, he labored hard for the SDA, but, in return, he was rewarded with a
corroborated and confirmed by Ms. Geniebla and Mr. Ibesate, officers of the SDA. dismissal from the service for a non-existent cause.
Hence, in the absence of conspiracy and collusion, which private respondents failed
to demonstrate, between petitioner and his wife, petitioner cannot be made In view of the foregoing, we sustain the finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner
accountable for the alleged infraction committed by his wife. After all, they still have was terminated from service without just or lawful cause. Having been illegally
separate and distinct personalities. For this reason, the Labor Arbiter found it dismissed, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss
difficult to see the basis for the alleged loss of confidence and breach of trust. The of seniority right48 and the payment of full backwages without any deduction
Court does not find any cogent reason, therefore, to digress from the findings of the corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. 46
Labor Arbiter which is fully supported by the evidence on record.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The challenged Resolution of
With respect to the grounds of serious misconduct and commission of an offense public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, rendered on 23 January
against the person of the employer's duly authorized representative, we find the 1996, is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 15
same unmeritorious and, as such, do not warrant petitioner's dismissal from the February 1993, is REINSTATED and hereby AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt
service.
SO ORDERED.
Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression
of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. 43
For misconduct to be considered serious it must be of such grave and aggravated
character and not merely trivial or unimportant. 44 Based on this standard, we
believe that the act of petitioner in banging the attaché case on the table, throwing
the telephone and scattering the books in the office of Pastor Buhat, although
improper, cannot be considered as grave enough to be considered as serious
misconduct. After all, as correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter, though petitioner
committed damage to property, he did not physically assault Pastor Buhat or any
other pastor present during the incident of 16 October 1991. In fact, the alleged
offense committed upon the person of the employer's representatives was never
really established or proven by private respondents. Hence, there is no basis for the
allegation that petitioner's act constituted serious misconduct or that the same was
an offense against the person of the employer's duly authorized representative. As
such, the cited actuation of petitioner does not justify the ultimate penalty of
dismissal from employment. While the Constitution does condone wrongdoing by
the employee, it nevertheless urges a moderation of the sanctions that may be
applied to him in light of the many disadvantages that weigh heavily on him like an
albatross on his neck.45 Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever
missteps may have been committed by the worker ought not be visited with a
consequence so severe such as dismissal from employment. 46 For the foregoing
G.R. No. L-68828 March 27, 1985
RELI GERMAN, RAMON PEDROSA, TIRSO SANTILLAN, JR., MA. LUISA ANDAL, NIEVA
MALINIS, RICARDO LAVIÑA, CESAR CORTES, DANILO REYES, JOSE REYES, JOSEFINA
MATE, LOURDES CALMA, MILDRED JUAN, OLIVE GUANZON, FERNANDO COCHICO,
SHERMAN CID, NAZARENO BENTULAN, ROSLINA DONAIRE, MARIO MARTINEZ,
BEATRIZ TEYLAN, ANGELINA LAPID, ROSEMARIE FLORES, DANIEL VAN SOTO,
EDGARDO MERCADER, NELLY AGUSTIN, MARILY MAGCALAS, DAVID CHAN,
ARSENIO SALANSANG, NELSON DE GUZMAN, MARCIANO ARANETA, CESAR
MENESES, DIONISIO RELLOSA, MARIO SANTIAGO, SEVERINO SANTOS, LEONORA
SANTOS, NIMFA DORONILLA, FLORENCE GUINTO, ROSALINA MANANSALA,
PERCIVAL OSTONAL, TOMMY MACARANAS, ROGER NICANDRO, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. SANTIAGO BARANGAN and MA. JOR ISABELO LARIOSA, respondents.
ESCOLIN, * J.:
Invoking their constitutional freedom to religious worship and locomotion, petitioners
seek the issuance of [1] a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow them to
enter and pray inside St. Jude Chapel located at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila; and [2] a writ of
injunction to enjoin respondents from preventing them from getting into and praying in
said church.
The facts to be considered are the following:
At about 5:00 in the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50
businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for
the ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the
Malacañ ang grounds located in the same street. Wearing the now familiar inscribed
yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised clenched fists 1 and
shouts of anti-government invectives. Along the way, however, they were barred by
respondent Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen.
Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was
located within the Malacañ ang security area. When petitioners' protestations and pleas
to allow them to get inside the church proved unavailing, they decided to leave. However,
because of the alleged warning given them by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar
attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the future would likewise be prevented,
petitioners took this present recourse.
Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass
at St. Jude church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the
Court that they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from
entering and worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that petitioners'
intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-
government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of the
President of the Republic. Respondents further lament petitioners' attempt to disguise
their true motive with a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.
Undoubtedly, the yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised clenched
fists, and chants of anti-government slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents
allegation. Thus, J.P. Fenix, commenting on the motive of petitioners' mass action of
October 2, 1984, wrote the following in his article entitled "Mission Impossible",
published in the October 12-18, 1984 issue of the "Mr. & Mrs." magazine:
They couldn't go through Mendiola Bridge, and so they dared to get even closer to the
heart of the matter. But as in Mendiola , the barbed wire barricades and the array of
sheet metal shields got in the way of the members of the August Twenty-One
Movement (ATOM) as they tried last October 2 to get to the pearly gates of power via
the St. Jude Chapel on Laurel St. St. Jude happens to be a neighbor of President
Marcos, his (sic) chapel being adjacent to Malacañ ang. ...
The foregoing cannot but cast serious doubts on the sincerity and good faith of
petitioners in invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship and
of locomotion. While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and
inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights
for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Article 19 of the Civil Code admonishes:
"Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties ...
observe honesty and good faith."
Even assuming that petitioners' claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid,
still respondents reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be characterized
as violative of the freedom of religious worship. Since 1972, when mobs of
demonstrators crashed through the Malacañ ang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the
use by the public of J.P. Laurel Street and the streets approaching it have been restricted.
While travel to and from the affected thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited,
passers-by have been subjected to courteous, unobtrusive security checks. The
reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it is considered
that the same is designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, as well as
other government officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with
Malacañ ang. The need to secure the safety of heads of state and other government
officials cannot be overemphasized. The threat to their lives and safety is constant, real
and felt throughout the world. Vivid illustrations of this grave and serious problem are
the gruesome assassinations, kidnappings and other acts of violence and terrorism that
have been perpetrated against heads of state and other public officers of foreign nations.
Said restriction is moreover intended to secure the several executive offices within the
Malacañ ang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. These offices
include communications facilities that link the central government to all places in the
land. Unquestionably, the restriction imposed is necessary to maintain the smooth
functioning of the executive branch of the government, which petitioners' mass action
would certainly disrupt.
Freedom of religious worship is guaranteed under Section 8, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, thus:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Elucidating on the meaning and scope of freedom of religion, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Cantwell v. Connecticut 2 said:
 The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double
aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to
adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may
choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise
of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces two concepts-freedom
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the
second cannot be.

In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or
choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate
the same into action. This curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this Court
in Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 3 thus:

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's
imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief,
limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange,
bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when
weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom
of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the
exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and
with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The government
steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners likewise invoke their freedom of locomotion under Section 5, Article IV of the
Constitution, which provides:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health.

Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street, the wisdom
and reasonableness of which have already been discussed, is allowed under the
fundamental law, the same having been established in the interest of national security.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Plana, De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concur in the result.
Alampay, J., took no part.