Mario Robles-Báez, On Marx's Dialectic of The Genesis of The Money Form PDF

On Marx's Dialectic of the Genesis of the Money Form
Author(s): Mario L. Robles-Báez

Source: International Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 27, No. 3, Marx, Keynes, and
Money (Fall, 1997), pp. 35-64
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Int. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 27, no. 3, Fall 1997, pp. 35-64.
© 1998 M.E.Sharpe, Inc.
0891-1916 / $9.50 + 0.00.
Mario L. Robles-Báez
On Marx's Dialectic of the Genesis

of the Money Form
As is well known, Marx's presentation of the value form is one of t

most difficult parts of his critique of political economy and one of t
most clearly dialectical passages in Capital. Even today, Marx's d
lectic of the value form has not been treated adequately. Backhaus'
article "Zur Dialektik der Wertform" (1969) can be considered one o
the first works that has been influential among academic Marxists
drawing attention to the form of value. After Backhaus's article, mo
Marxists have begun to appreciate the importance of the role of for
determination in Marx's theory of value and therefore in his theory
the money form. Those Marxists who have developed some of th
theoretical research on the dialectic of the form of value include Arth
(1979, 1993), Zeleny (1980), Eldred and Hanlon (1981), Faus
(1983), Dussel (1985), Uchida (1988), Williams (1989), Smith (199
and Murray (1993). For all of them, Hegelian dialectical logic play
central role in Marx's construction of the money form. Consequent
reference to certain aspects of Hegel's Logic conduites a feature
their writings on this matter. The works of Arthur and Fausto hav
another characteristic as well: Their dialectical analysis is develop
together with a critique of interpretations in terms of formal logic.
Translation © 1998 M.E Sharpe. This paper is an enlarged and modified versi
of "Notas para una crítica a la interpretación de Carlo Benetti de las formas
valor de Marx," Economía: Teoría y Práctica 3 (September 1992). Translated b
the author.
The author is a professor in the Departamento de Producción Económica,
UAM-Xochimilco, Mexico.
55
36 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
his "Dialectic of the Value Form," Arthur develops the logic

value form as a critique of Stanley Moore's argument that the v
form relation is reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. In his M
Lógica and Política, Fausto responds to Benetti and Cartelier's no
of Merchands, salariat et capitalistes (1980), where they cri
Marx's construction of the general equivalent (Benetti and Carte
main critical arguments are reproduced in chapter 5 of Bene
Moneda y teoría del valor, 1990).
The present paper has a double objective: to develop further so
aspects of the logical argument on the genesis of the money form
Fausto presents in his response to Benetti and Cartelier's interpr
tion, and to present new aspects not treated in the works of all
authors mentioned above. Although the critical analysis will
rected mainly at Benetti and Cartelier's interpretation, some imp
aspects of Zeleny's and Eldred and Hanlon's views will be crit
In particular, the paper focuses on the specific logical relatio
connections through which Marx proceeds from the simple form
value to the money form. I will not treat the development of th
manent difference between value and use- value of commodities,
is actualized as an external opposition between commodity and m
it is here presupposed.
The objective and character of Marx's

analysis of the forms of value
First, let me briefly refer to the place Marx assigns to the analy
the money form within the logical structure of his theoretical wo
capital as the subject of the capitalist mode of production and to
relation ofthat structure to the structure of Hegel's Logic. In cha
of Capital, Marx presents the transition to the essence of capita
is, capital-in-general. Capital is defined there as value that va
itself, that is, value in process that maintains and increases itsel
alternatively assuming the forms of money and commodities. A
a process, value requires money as its general and independent for
existence "by means of which its identity may at any time be e
lished" (Marx, 1977, p. 152). Money as an independent form of e
tence of value is a simpler and more abstractly determinate cate
or form of being, than capital: Value as capital, Marx says, "is not
an independent expression of value as in money, but dynamic va
FALL 1997 37
which "is raised to a higher power than in money" (Marx

131). This implies that the development of capital must pres
Marx says, "the full development of the exchange- value of
ties and consequently its independent form of value as m
131). Marx thus links the movement from money to capital.
money provides a definitive (external) measure of the being
modities as values and, at the same time, establishes the s
mensurability of commodities as manifestations of social lab
is said by Marx in Theories of Surplus Value:
[I]n considering the existence of the commodity as money, it i

necessary to emphasise that in money commodities acquire a d
measure of their value - since all commodities express thei
the use-value of the same commodity - but that they all beco
festations of social, abstract, general labor; and as such they a
the same form, they all appear as the direct incarnation of so
and as such they all act as social labor, that is to say, they
directly exchanged for all other commodities in proportion to
their value. [Marx, 1972, p. 136]
The role Marx assigns to money in Capital parallels, to

extent, the one Hegel assigns to the moment of measure in th
of Being of his Logic, Moreover, since the section on m
Hegel's Logic, which includes a chapter on the becoming o
precedes the doctrine of essence, I would argue that Mar
Hegel's sequence of categories: The analysis of the money
value precedes the transition to the essence of capital in Capit
Furthermore, since money is the form in which all commo
compared with and measured against each other, the commo
quires money. The commodity is thus a simpler and more ab
determinate category than money, hence the analysis of the
must precede the analysis of the latter. Marx thus links comm
money. According to Marx's theory of the commodity, com
have two opposite determinations, or a double form: a use- va
that is, their physical or natural form, and a value form, tha
social form. Contrary to the "physical objectivity" of comm
use- values, the being of commodities as value is a "social obj
which they acquire only insofar as they ^re expressions or co
of the identical social substance - abstract labor - common to all of
them. The value of commodities, crystals of this social substance, is an
abstraction, but a social abstraction that belongs to the capitalist mo

of production. As a social abstraction, the value of commodities is a
essence that is truly actual only through the specific material form
its neccesary manifestation. As an essence, it cannot have an immed
ate appearance; it is, as Murray points out, "a being of reflection, a
essence in the dialectical sense, that is, the kind of being that must
appear as something other than itself (Murray, 1993, p. 51, emphas
added). A commodity cannot express its value in its own physic
form: "Turn and examine a single commodity, by itself, as we will, y
in so far as it remains an object of value, it seems impossible to gr
it" (Marx, 1977, p. 54). It is only through the social relation of com
modity to commodity that, according to Marx, the being of a comm
ity as value can manifest itself. Given that in this relation commodi
as values are identical, while as use-values they have different (phy
cal) forms, the dialectical relation of identity and difference of com
modities resolves in that any commodity only acquires a value form
different from its physical form, in the physical form of another co
modity. The universal commodity through which all other commod
ties express their values and which becomes their material independe
existence is, for Marx, the money-commodity, the money form of th
values. All this is what makes money necessary, and consequently Mar
analysis of the forms of value corresponds to this particular neccesity.
The genesis of the money form of value, or the development of th
expressions of value ending with the money form, is the subject
section 3 of chapter 1 of Capitali:
Here ... a task is set us, the performance of which has never yet even
been attempted by bourgeois economy, the task of tracing the genesi
of ... the money form, of developing the expressions of value implied
in the value-relation of commodities, from its simplest, almost im
perceptible outline, to the dazzling money form. By doing this we shal
at the same time, solve the riddle presented by money. [Marx, 1977,
54]
Is Marx's analysis of the process of genesis of the money form

historical or logical? Influenced by Engels, many Marxists have be-
lieved that the object of the first part of Capital is simple commodity
production as a historical stage before capitalism (see, for example,
Meek, 1973; Duménil and Levy, 1983, among others). They consider
that Marx's method in Capital is logical-historical. This is a misreading.
FALL 1997 39
Part I of Capital I provides not analysis of the prehistory of c

but an analysis of the immediate appearance of capitalist pro
The sequence of categories developed in Capital is, as Mar
"determined ... by their relation to one another in modern b
society, which is precisely the opposite ofthat which seems to
natural order or which corresponds to historical developmen
1973, p. 107). The logical-historical method is followed by
his materialist dialectical derivation of the money form o
"Marx's real interest is concentrated here on 'genesis' in
sense, on the inner connection; one could say: on the essen
historical process" (Zeleny, 1980, p. 52).
The money form of value is thus considered by Zeleny as a
sequence that mirrors its historically necessary process,
"which would not be completed if it were not accompani
second chapter by the derivation of money in the form
'historically' necessary sequence" (Zeleny, 1980, p. 52). A
some moments of Marx's analysis of the genesis of the money
value and the process of exchange have historical or temporal r
its general character and ultimate aim are not historical but l
historical is to a certain extent presupposed by the logical pres
On the other hand, Carlo Benetti argues that the subject m
section 3 of chapter 1 is "the analysis of the conditions or p
of generalized exchange in a society composed of private pro
and not the study of the origin of money" (Benetti, 1990, p.
translation). Benetti' s interpretation supposes, to a certain ex
the subject matter of the first part of Capital I is the theory of a
of simple commodity producers, and that, consequently, the a
the forms of value corresponds to the analysis of the logical-h
construction of generalized exchange in such a society. Howe
trary to the dialectical derivation of Zeleny 's method, Benetti
corresponds to that of formal logic. On the basis of a purely
analysis of exchange, Benetti rejects not only Marx's logical co
of the general equivalent, but also his theory of value. As will
below, Benetti's interpretation is a misreading of Marx's method.
Marx's analysis presents not the historical genesis of money
logical genesis (or the logical development of exchange val
with the constitution of money form as money). The histori
ences introduced by Marx in section 3 of chapter 1 and in cha
Exchange) of Capital I must be read as subordinate to a logica
sis. This means that the context of Marx's analysis is the "log
origin" of money, and therefore the logical prehistory of money, th
is, the process that embraces all of the forms of expression of valu
that precede the logical constitution of money as the universal form
expression of value. According to Marx's dialectical presentation, th
analysis of generalized exchange can only be done after the mon
form as money has been posited. This is why Marx's analysis of the
process of exchange in chapter 2 of Capital I is preceded by the ana
sis of the form of value, which is later supplemented by the analysis
the logical development (or the logical history) of the forms of mon
(which is the subject of chapter 3).
A final point to consider here is that, since the money form of val
is at the same time a commodity and the universality of commoditie
or the universal commodity in which all other commodities can
press their values, it must be understood as an entity that conta
within itself the individual and, at same time, the universal - that is,
is a concrete universal. As Marx refers to it metaphorically,
It is as if alongside and external to lions, tigers, rabbits, and all othe

actual animals, which form when grouped together the various kinds
species, subspecies, families, the animal, the individual incarnation of
the entire animal kingdom. Such a particular which contains with
itself all really present species of the same entity is a universal (like
animal, god, etc.). [Marx, 1976, p. 26]
Or, as he puts it also metaphorically in the Grundrisse, Money is

"the god among commodities" representing their "divine existen
while they represent its earthly form" (Marx, 1973, p. 221).
Marx's dialectic of the genesis of the money form of value as
concrete universal is developed through three moments: the moment
unity, the moment of plurality, and the moment of unity in pluralit
which correspond respectively to the simple form, the expanded for
and the general form of value. The sequence of these moments goes fr
the simplest and more abstract to the complex and less abstract expression
of the form of value. Let us present the analysis of each in turn.
Simple or accidental form of value (form I)
Marx begins his analysis with the moment of unity, which, as point
departure, is considered only as a simple unity, a unity in which plur
FALL 1997 41
ity is presupposed. This simple unity as the seed out of whi

money form is developed is considered by Marx as the simplest
relation between two commodities. This form is to a certain extent the
cell form or, in Hegelian terms, the in-itself of money. As Marx
pointed out:
The economists have hitherto overlooked the extremely simple point

that the form: 20 yards of linen = 1 coat is only the undeveloped basis
of 20 yards of linen = $2, and that therefore the simplest commodity
form, in which its value is not yet expressed as a relation to all other
commodities but only as something differentiated from the natural form
of the commodity itself contains the whole secret of the money form and
with it, in embryo, of all the bourgeois forms of the product of labor.
[Letter to Engels, June 22, 1867, in Marx and Engels, 1975, p. 177]
Thus, for Marx, the secret of the money form lies in the simplest
value relation between two commodities, which he represents as fol-
lows:
x commodity A = y commodity B, or
x commodity A is worthy commodity B,
which can be expressed more concretely as:
20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or
20 yards of linen are worth one coat,
where the "one" commodity A (linen) expressing its value in an

"other" commodity B (coat) has the relative value form and the "other"
commodity (B) which serves as material for the value-expression func-
tions as the equivalent of the "one" commodity (A), or has the equiva-
lent form. The value of commodity A is what has to be measured and
commodity B represents the measure. In this relation, commodity A
thus plays an active role, commodity B a passive role.
Howard Williams claims that Marx "draws on Hegel's notion of the
unity of opposites to explain more fully the relationship of the equiva-
lent and relative poles" (1989, p. 171). Indeed, the simple form of
value as a simple unity implies not only a unitary relationship between
the relative and equivalent value forms, but also an opposed one: "T
relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connecte
mutally dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of val
but, at the same time, are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extreme
i.e., poles of the same expression" (Marx, 1977, p. 55). This oppositio
is expressed in the three peculiarities Marx assigns to the equivalen
form: the use- value, the concrete labor, and the private labor belong
to the commodity, which functions as equivalent, becomes the form
manifestation of their respective opposite, the value, abstract labor, a
social labor belonging to the commodity occupying the relative form
Since the simple form of value is a relation between two commod
ties, it can be thought of as representing the analysis of an effecti
exchange. Does it represent an effective exchange? Marx's response
this question would be negative. However, there have been autho
who read it as an effective exchange, including some who have foun
reasons to reject Marx's theory of value. This is the case of Eldred a
Hanlon. They reject Marx's simple form of value as a value relat
for two reasons: On the one hand, because the exchange relation be
tween only two commodities does not correspond to the derivation
Marx's concept of value. "For ... the derivation of this concept relie
on the existence of universal exchange-relations" (Eldred and Hanlon
1981, p. 32). And, on the other hand, because the relation between tw
commodities "has little to do with practical relations in capitalist so
ety" (p. 32). Eldred and Hanlon situate Marx's analysis of the sim
form of value in the context of an effective exchange within capit
ism. For Marx, it neither refers to the analysis of an effective excha
(this is the subject matter of chapter 2 of Capital I) nor is it situat
historically or temporarily within capitalism. On the contrary, it is t
logical analysis of the simplest value-expression of a commodity
which is provided by the relation between two commodities, and wh
"contains the whole secret of the money form and with it, in embryo, of
all the bourgeois forms of the product of labor." It corresponds to t
point of departure of the logical analysis of the money form.
However, if the analysis of the simple form does not correspond t
the analysis of an effective exchange, what is analyzed when the si
ple form of value is analyzed? It is the expression of value. Howeve
since the money form has not yet been constituted at this logical st
of the analysis, it must be explained where the expression of va
appears in the simple form. This explanation may imply a contradicti
FALL 1997 43
because if it is true that the expression of value cannot appear

bly in a logical stage where the money form as a particular co
has not yet been posited, it is also true that the expression o
must appear in the objective relation between two commoditi
where does the expression of value appear? According to Faus
only possible answer to this question is that the expression of
"appears in the judgment - the expression of an expression -
modity A is worth y commodity B9 " (Fausto, 1983, p. 155). B
this not amount to treating this expression as a subjective on
answer to this question is negative, because as an expressi
objective relationship, the expression of an expression is not
tive. It is, in terms of language, the expression of an objective
the value relation between two commodities.
To what type of logical relation does the simple form of value
belong? In the first place, Marx says that the expression of value is not
a reflexive relation in terms of formal logic:
It is not possible to express the value of linen in linen. 20 yards of linen

= 20 yards of linen is not a expression of value. On the contrary, such
an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else than 20
yards of linen, a definitive quantity of the use- value linen. [Marx, 1977,
p. 55]
No commodity can express its own value in itself nor, therefore, can
stand in the position of equivalent to itself. The relation commodity A
= commodity A represents a mere tautology. On the other hand, the
expression of value is a reflexive relation in terms of Hegelian dialec-
tics: "one" commodity relates to an independent "other" commodity
that is the same as the "one" commodity; therefore the relation is a
relation of self-reflection. This is expressed by Marx as follows:
The value of the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively - i.e.,
in some other commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen
presupposes, therefore, the presence of some other - here the coat -
under the form of an equivalent. [Marx, 1977, p. 55]
Marx presents the opposite relation implied in the original equation

immediately after the above passage:
No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen

are worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of
linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. [1977, p. 55, emphasis

added]4
Here the roles of the commodities are reversed. The commodity that
previously played the relative form now becomes the equivalent form
and the commodity previously having the role of the equivalent form
now assumes the relative form. Carlo Benetti refers to this passage
when he affirms that Marx's analysis of the simple form of value
contains an ambiguity because Marx attributes to it "the property of
symmetry, according to which one or the other commodity can alterna-
tively perform the role of equivalent" (Benetti, 1990, p. 164, emphasis
added, my translation).
From the perspective of formal logic, this passage could mean that
the original relation, a = b (20 yards of linen = 1 coat), implies the
opposite one, b = a (1 coat = 20 yards of linen). This would indicates
that the simple form of value corresponds to a relation of implication,
the logical operation allowing us to pass from the first relation to the
second. If this were really the case, this would imply two things: on the
one hand, the sign "=," which Marx uses in both expressions, would
designate logical-mathematical equality, which is a particular case
among relations of equivalence, relations that are always symmetrical.
On the other hand, like any implication, it supposes that the truth of the
first term (a = b) is always followed by that of the second term (b = a).
Moreover, it must be pointed out that, in formal logic, implication is, in
general, the passage from an implicit determination to an explicit de-
termination.
However, to think of the simple form of value as a relation of
implication, as Benetti does, is a misundertanding of Marx's logic. For
Marx, the relation is not (analytically) symmetrical, nor is the logical
operation that allows one to pass from the first expression to the sec-
ond an implication. To explain this, let us refer to the passage that
follows the one quoted above:
But, in this case, I must reverse the equation in order to express the
value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that, the linen becomes
the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity cannot, there-
fore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both
forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive.
[Marx, 1977, pp. 55-56, emphasis added]
FALL 1997 45
In the German edition of "The Value Form," the following

follows the one above:
Let us consider transactions of exchange between linen-producer A

and coat producer B. Before they unite in their transactions, A says:
20 yards of linen are worth 2 coats (20 yards of linen = 2 coats), but
B says: 1 coat is worth 22 yards of linen (1 coat = 22 yards of linen).
Finally, after they have haggled for a long time, they come to agree-
ment. A says: 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, and B says: 1 coat
is worth 20 yards of linen. In this case, both linen and coat are
situated at the same time in the relative value form and in the equiv-
alent form. But, (note carefully!) the circumstance obtains for two
different persons and in two different value-expressions, which only
at the same time come into existence. As far as A is concerned, his
linen (we speak this way because the initiative has its origin in his
commodity, for him) is situated in the relative value form, and it is the
commodity of the other person (the coat), on the other hand, which is
situated in the equivalent form. // is the other way around from the
standpoint of B. The same commodity thus never - not even in this
case - possesses both forms at the same time in the same value-expres-
sion. [Marx, "The Value Form," pp. 10-11]
In the above passages, Marx indicates clearly that the inverse

expressions of value involved in the simple form of value corre-
spond to a relation of exclusion. In term of dialectics, a relation of
exclusion implies that the opposite expressions can be considered as
different relations of value, although they are manifested simulta-
neously. From this perspective, the relation of exclusion implies two
aspects that are different from that of formal logic: (1) it is possible
to pass from the first expression to the second without making false
the first one;5 and (2) the relation between both expressions is one of
opposition:
As far as content is concerned, both expressions:
1. 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat
2. One coat = 20 yards of linen or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen
are by no means different. Asfar as form is concerned, they are not only
different but opposed. ... If I turn expression 1 around, I obtain expres-
sion 2. The commodities change places, and straightaway the coat is
situated in the relative value form; and the linen, on the other hand, i
the equivalent form. Because they have changed their respective place
in the same value-expression, they have changed their value form
[Marx, "The Value Form," pp. 10-1 1]
These two aspects mean that, for Marx, the operation that takes
from the first expression to the second is not an implication (passa
from an implicit to an explicit determination), but a movement from
presupposed determination to a posited determination, or to the po
tion of a presupposed determination - the passage from an in-itself t
for-itself.6 This changes the truth value of that which was implici
When the first expression is reversed, the second expression, which
a presupposed determination - and therefore negated - in the first o
is posited, while the first expression is kept as a negated determinat
of the relation.
According to Fausto, all of this means "on the one hand, that the
order of the operation is not simply analytical (as one could say,
general, of implication and of formal operations), but, as Hegel wri
in the Logic (in respect to the grosso modo analogous passages) it is
the same time analytical and syntheticar (1983, pp. 156-157, empha-
sis added).7 This explains the possibility of preserving the first
pression as a negated determination when it is inverted and th
second one is posited, a relation that cannot be defined in stric
analytical terms. All this allows us to affirm that, like any relation
of inversion in dialectical terms, the simple value-relation is n
symmetrical.
In the analysis of the simple form of value, Fausto argues that Marx
includes another aspect that supports the idea that this form does not
have the property of symmetry. He refers to the role played by use-
value, or the material determination, within this form. As is well
known from Marx's theory of commodity, the use- value of any com-
modity functions as the material depository of its own value. But, in
the expression of value, x commodity A - y commodity 5, the use-
value of commodity B is transformed into or serves as material for
the value-expression of A, though it continues to be the material de-
pository of its own value. The nonsymmetry means here that the value
does not appear in the same form for each of the two commodities in
the expression of value: The value of commodity A is expressed in the
use-value of commodity B, qualitatively and quantitatively, while the
FALL 1997 47
value of B is also expressed but only qualitatively because it ser

mirror, as equivalent form, for another commodity.
On the basis of what was said above, we can conclude that
Marx, the simple form of value is not (analytically) symmetric
therefore its inversion does not suppose an implication in term
mal logic.
According to Marx, the deficiency of this form is evident: "it is a
mere germ, which must undergo a series of metamorphoses before it
can ripen into the price form" (Marx, 1977, p. 67). If the starting point
of the genesis of the money form is inadequate and, paraphrasing
Arthur, provides for conceptual movement because it has been ab-
stracted from the money form, the presentation is impelled to recon-
struct the money form precisely through negating the starting point.
However, that it is a mere germ does not mean that the starting point
is in no way money: It is the germ of money. It can be said that money
is and is not at this point of departure: It is there, but as the simple
equivalent form which, for the moment, is not the money form. Thus,
the proposition that expresses the simple form of value can be written
as "money is the simple equivalent." According to Fausto, this propo-
sition can be expressed by a judgment of the type "A (money) is B (the
simple equivalent)," which is the expression of a reflexive relation in
dialectical terms. In that judgment, the copula "is" expresses a reflex-
ive relation: "A 'is' B says that ,4 'passes' 'into' B, which means that ,4
is 'negated' (not suppressed) in 5" (Fausto, 1983, p. 158, my transla-
tion). It means that, in that proposition, the subject "money" is only a
presupposition which, as such, "passes" to its predicate, "the simple
equivalent" which is the only term posited there. Thus, the simple
equivalent form is not money because, as a predicate, it does not corre-
spond to the money subject as posited money.
The following metamorphoses of the value form correspond to the
more complete form which is presupposed in this simple form: "One"
commodity can express its own value not only in "one" "other" com-
modity but in "many" other different commodities.
Total or expanded form of value (form II)
The transition to the next stage in the dialectics of the constitution of

the money form of value is the moment of plurality, or in Hegel's dialecti-
cal terms: The being of "one" commodity as value has to exclude itself
and posit as "many other" commodities, the repulsion of the "one

therefore the position of "many." This moment is represented by
with the expanded form of value: A form in which the "one" com
ity expresses its identity as value in the use-value of "many o
commodities, each of them figuring as a single equivalent of the
of the "one" commodity. Or, as Marx puts it, the Form II "yield
most variegated mosaic of relative expressions for the value
same commodity" (Marx, 1976, p. 23). The particular series that
stitutes the expanded form of value of a commodity A is represen
Marx as follows:
= u commodity ß, or
= v commodity C, or
z commodity A = w commodity D, or
= x commodity E, or
= etc.
where the "one" commodity (A) expressing its value in the "many
other" commodities (2?, C, D, etc.) is situated in the expanded relative
value form and each one of the "many other" commodities (5, C, D9
etc.) which serves as material for the value expression functions as a
particular equivalent of the "one" commodity (A), or it is situated in a
particular equivalent form.
According to Marx, the expanded relative value form has three de-
fects: First, it is "incomplete because the series representing it is inter-
minable"; second, "it is a many-colored mosaic of disparate and
independent expressions of value"; and third, "if, as must be the case,
the relative value of each commodity in turn, becomes expressed in
this expanded form, we get for each of them a relative value form,
different in every case, and consisting of an interminable series of
expressions of value" (1977, p. 69, emphasis added). These defects of
the expanded relative form of value are reflected in the corresponding
equivalent: "we have, on the whole, nothing but fragmentary equiva-
lent forms, each excluding the others" (1977, p. 70, emphasis added).
The two first defects represent "insufficiencies" of value form II: It
is neither a single and unified nor a closed form of appearance of
value. However, the third defect could have important consequences
for the transition to the general value form, depending on how the
relation of the "interminable series of expressions of value" of all com-
modities is understood. Let us call this multiple relation the multiplication of
FALL 1997 49
Figure 1 The multiplication of the series of expressions

of value in a simultaneous form
the series of expressions of value. In general, there may be two types

of interpretations of this relation:
1 . A multiplication in which all of the series are presented simulta-

neously, or
2. A multiplication in which the different series are presented suc-
cessively, or better, in a separate form in which each excludes the
others.
To present both interpretations, we will refer to the relation between

three commodities with which Benetti illustrates this value form: "Let
Xa, Xb and Xc be the quantities of commodities a, b and c. The relation
'its relative value is expressed' is represented with [dotted arrows], and
with [solid arrows] the relation 'figures as equivalent' " (1990, p. 166,
my translation).
Figure 1 shows the case of multiplication of the series of expresions
of value of the three commodities in a simultaneous form. In terms of
formal logic, multiplication in a simultaneous form represents a rela-
tion of conjunction. As with any conjunction, it has the property of
symmetry among all the elements of the series.
Figure 2 shows the case of multiplication of the series of expres-
sions of value of the three commodities in a successive or separate
Figure 2 The multiplication of the series of expressions of value in a

successive or separate form
form. In terms of formal logic, multiplication in a separate form repre

sents a relation of exclusive disjunction, or alternation between the
different series. In term of dialectics, it represent a relation of exclu-
sion, in the sense that each element of the series excludes the others.
Seen purely from the formalist point of view, both interpretations of
the multiplication of the series imply that, as is evident, it is not poss
ble to derive, either directly or by reversing each of them, the existence
of a unique equivalent from any of them. However, we will try t
prove that, according to Marx's dialectics, the only way to understand
the multiplication of the series is the successive form because it is the
only form through which it is possible to derive the general equivalen
when the expanded form of value is dialectically inverted.
Carlo Benetti criticizes Marx's presentation of the expanded form of
value. One of his main criticisms is that the general equivalent canno
be derived from a formal inversion of the expanded form of value as,
he claims, Marx tries to derive it. This critique is based in an interpre
tation of Marx's presentation of the multiplication of the series o
expressions of value of the expanded form in a simultaneous form. Le
us briefly look at Benetti' s main arguments. First, Benetti believes tha
Marx's presentation of the expanded form
is obtained through the generalization of the simple form when more

than two commodities are considered. Each commodity now expresses
its relative value in the (n-') remaining commodities which constitute
its equivalents. Given that only particular equivalents exist, the ex-
changes are impossible. [1990, p. 164, emphasis added, my translation]
FALL 1997 51
To prove that the exchanges are impossible in Marx's Form

Benetti introduces to his critical analysis a particular situation of
tration in a context of generalized exchange, which, according to
is analogous to Marx's expanded form. After examining this parti
situation in which the exchange relations between three commod
are realized simultaneously, Benetti concludes that "it is not possi
have any exchange at prices expressed in terms of particular equ
lents, according to Marx's expression" (1990, p. 165, my translati
To show that Marx argues this himself, Benetti refers to the foll
passage of chapter 2 of Capital /, a chapter that (we note) corres
to the analysis of the exchange process:
To the owner of a commodity, every other commodity is, in regard

his own, a particular equivalent, and consequently his own commod
is the universal equivalent for all the others. But since this implie
every owner, there is, in fact, no commodity acting as universal eq
lent, and the relative value of commodities possesses no general fo
under which they can be equated as values and have the magnitude
their values compared. So far, therefore, they do not confront each o
as commodities, but only as products or use- values. [Marx, 1977, p.
From this, Benetti concludes that "[f]rom this incompatibility

tween the relative values of the same commodity, Marx infers w
reason the impossibility of the equivalent relation and the conse
nonnexistence of the relative value, and, therefore, of value itself
Given that the conditions of existence of relative values are not
realised, the total form is indeed not a value form" (Benetti, 1990, pp.
165-166).
I think that Benetti' s conclusions result from a misreading of
Marx's presentation. In the first place, considering the expanded form
as a generalization of the simple form, Benetti attributes to it, along
with the simple form of value, the property of symmetry.8 But, as was
shown above, Marx does not attribute the property of symmetry to the
simple form and therefore he does not extend this property to the
expanded form. Marx's expanded form is not a generalization of the
simple form in Benetti' s sense, but, as will be shown below, a general-
ization of the simple form as a relation of exclusion and therefore its
negation as the starting point of the money form.
Second, by extending the property of symmetry to the expanded
form in a context of generalized exchange, Benetti cannot understand
the multiplication of the series of expressions of value as a relation

conjunction, which supposes the simultaneity of the series.
Third, what Marx is saying in the statement to which Benetti refe
is that one cannot derive a commodity acting as universal equivalen
under which all the commodities can express their relative values in
unitary form, from the expanded form. This is a result of the defect
the expanded value form. Let us explain further. Marx argues th
when Form II is referred to the context of exchange - which is not
of a generalized exchange - the process of exchange appears to e
agent, on the one hand, as an individual process in which his ow
commodity functions as (subjective) general equivalent of every oth
commodity - that is, it is a "purchase," acquisition of a commod
from another whose use-value satisfies his own need (an individ
transaction); on the other hand, the process of exchange is a soc
process in which every other commodity functions as a particu
equivalent of his own - that is, it is a "sale," the realization of the va
of his commodity (a social transaction). This implies that the va
relation appears in an inverted form: On the one hand, the (subjectiv
general equivalent form appears to be inverted in relation to the obj
tive form; it is posited on the side in which the relative form is obj
tively situated. And, on the other hand, the relative form is posited
the side in which the (particular) equivalent form is objectively situ
ated. But since this is supposed to be true for every commodity own
as Marx says, "one and the same set of transactions cannot be simu
neously for all owners of commodities both exclusively private
exclusively social and general" (Marx, 1977, pp. 89-90, emphasi
added).9 Precisely because the two processes (the individual and
social) cannot be distributed among the agents of exchange, any com
modity can take the form of general equivalent. The impossibility
this polarization of the process among the agents can only correspo
to the logical stage of the expanded form. This polarization is o
achieved with the constitution of the universal equivalent (or mone
that is, when the agent with money buys (individual process) and t
agent who possesses commodities sells (social process).
Given this, Benetti is wrong to postulate the nonexistence of any
equivalent form because each commodity really permits its own own
to acquire the other commodities, no matter at what exchange valu
(not prices, as Benetti argues) this happens. Therefore, we cannot s
that there is no equivalent at all. Moreover, it must be remembered
FALL 1997 53
that, for Marx, the expanded value form corresponds to a stag

logical prehistory of the constitution of money, where money
yet exist as money, but where something like money already
Similar to the simple form, it exists there as a still inadequate
enal value form: as a particular equivalent and as a (subjective
equivalent. On the other hand, since the form of value emerg
the concept of value, the expanded value form as well as the
form correspond necessarily to different stages of the logica
tory of the constitution of value as an independent form of e
At the level of these stages, value is and is not there, that is
the determinations of value already exist there, but there is no
dent form of existence of value, neither as money form nor a
that is, as capital.10 In conclusion, it cannot be argued tha
expanded form is not a value form, or that the multiplicatio
series of expressions of value corresponds to a relation of conj
as Benetti would have it. I think that Benetti's misreading of
presentation of the expanded form is due to his attribution of
erty of symmetry to the value-relation of commodities and to
that relation from the formal perspective of generalized excha
precapitalist society of private producers.
Contrary to Benetti's interpretation of the expanded value f
relation of conjunction, Marx considers it as a relation of exclu
the one hand, it is precisely the emphasis given by Marx to th
of exclusion throughout all his texts that deal with it that allo
say that the value-relation that corresponds to the expanded f
relation of exclusion. First, the relative expressions of a serie
one another. This is shown by the emphasis given to the logic
nector (or) in the expressions:
20 yards of linen = one coat or = u coffee or = v tea or = x iron

wheat or = etc., etc. z commodity A - u commodity Bor-v comm
Corw commodity D or-x commodity E or- y commodity Fo
[Marx, 1976, p. 24]
The relation of exclusion among the relative expressions of

a series is also expressed in the exclusion of the equivalent valu
corresponding to them:
Since the natural form of each single commodity-type is at this

particular equivalent from alongside of countless other par
equivalent forms, there exist (in a word) only limited equivalent f

each of which excludes any other. [Marx, "The Value Form," p. 22] l
Second, the relation of exclusion in the multiplication of a

series of expression which correspond to all commodities is show
Marx through the separation of the series:
20 yards of linen = one coat or-u coffee or = v tea or = x iron or

wheat or = etc.
One coat = 20 yards of linen or-u coffee or = v tea or = x iron or = y

wheat or = etc.
u coffee = 20 yards of linen or = one coat or = v tea or = x iron or- y

wheat or = etc.
v tea = etc. [Marx, 1976, pp. 31-32]
In the above passage, Marx emphasizes the relation of exclusion by

the separation among the series and by the emphasis given to the
logical connector of the expressions within each of the series. This
means that Marx's expanded value form corresponds to a relation of
reciprocal exclusion in dialectical terms. As a relation of reciprocal
exclusion, the expanded value form can only be expressed in the multi-
plication of its series as separate ones, each excluding the others, and
not as simultaneous series. In terms of formal logic, this relation be-
tween the different series could correspond to a relation of exclusive
disjunction, but not to a relation of conjunction, as Benetti argues.
Considering that the expanded value form is composed, as Marx
says, by "the sum of the elementary relative expressions or equations
of the first kind" and their "corresponding inverted equations" (1977,
p. 70) and that, as argued above, each of the simple forms excludes and
therefore negates its corresponding inverted form, the relation of recip-
rocal exclusion implied in it can be easily seen by taking the case of
three commodities shown in the multiplication of the series as separate
forms of figure 2. In each "one" of the series, the value of "one"
commodity is expressed relatively in the "other two" commodities that
serve as its particular equivalents (for example, in the first series, the
value of commodity A is expressed in commodities B and C), while, in
each of the "other two" series, the "one" commodity functions as a
particular equivalent of each of the "other two" commodities express-
FALL Ì997 55
ing relatively their values (in the second series, commodity A

as particular equivalent of commodity 5, and, in the third
equivalent one of commodity Q. This means that the multi
the series of the expanded form as a whole contains in itse
relative forms and all the particular equivalent forms, takin
modities in turn, not within a simultaneous relation, but i
expressions, each excluding the others. The expanded form
thus presupposes or contains in itself the general form of v
commodity not as a relation of implication but as a relation of e
Third, Marx considers the expanded value form as a tr
phase: "the never-ending sequence of simple relative val
sions - which sequence forms at first a transitional phase in
opment of the value form" (Marx, 1976, p. 32). It is imp
consider the multiplication of the series as a transition t
general equivalent because if this multiplication was consid
alternative form of the general equivalent, the universality o
is lost. In effect, when each of the series of the expanded va
inverted, many general equivalents or a nonconsolidated gen
alent are obtained, but not a general equivalent. Marx says
itly in the passage that precedes the one above:
But each of these equations reflexively yields coat, coffee, te

universal equivalent and consequently yields value-expression
coffee, tea, etc. as universal relative forms of all other comm
is only in its opposition to other commodities that a commod
into the universal equivalent form; but every commodity turn
universal equivalent form in its opposition to all other comm
every commodity confronts all other commodities with its ow
form as universal equivalent form, the result is that all com
exclude themselves [from the universal equivalent form, a
fore]^2! from the socially valid displaying of their amounts
[Marx, 1976, p. 32]
Notice that, for Marx, the relation of reciprocal exclusion

the expanded form of value is also shown by, or is reflecte
reciprocal exclusion of all commodities from the universal
form. Thus, the expanded form of value must not be consi
alternative form of the constitution of the universal equival
but only as a transitional phase to its constitution. It is preci
all the deficiencies or defects of the expanded value form t
justifies the transition to the general form of value. Or, as Uchida pu

it, in Hegelian terms:
Each of the "many" other commodities is also one "one," and each has
been used for the expression of value of one commodity. There ar
"many ones." The more these many other commodities take on the role
of medium for the expression of value, the stronger their impulse to
express their own value. Each of the "many" also turns to "one," with
the same warrant to express its own value. . . . These mutual claims to
be the value-subject bring about the conversion of the second form t
the third. [ 1988, pp. 54-55]
Precisely because value has not yet acquired a unique and indepen-
dent form of existence in the expanded value form, there is the impu
to transcend it.
The general form of value (form III)

and the money form
The general form of value corresponds to the moment of unity

plurality of the form of value in which "[a]ll commodities now expre
their value (1) in an elementary [simple] form, because in a sing
commodity; (2) with unity, because in one and the same commodity
(Marx, 1977, p. 70, emphasis added). It is my belief that this momen
corresponds to that in which repulsion is considered as equal as attrac
tion in Hegel's discussion of Being-for-self:
But the many are one the same as another: each is One, or even one o
the Many; they are consequently one and the same. Or when we study
all that Repulsion involves, we see that as a negative attitude of many
Ones to one another, it is just as essentially a connective reference of
them to each other; and as those to which the One is related in its act o
repulsion are ones, it is in them thrown into relation with itself. The
repulsion therefore has an equal right to be called Attraction; and the
exclusive One, or Being-for-self, suppresses itself. The qualitative char-
acter, which in the One or unit has reached the extreme point of its
characterization, has thus passed over into determinateness (quality)
suppressed,113^ i.e., into Being as Quantity. [Hegel, 1991, p. 143]
This transition to the general form of value is presented by Marx

through the inversion of the expanded form of value:
FALL 1997 57
1 coat
10 lbs. of tea
40 lbs. of coffee
1 quarter of corns = 20 yards of linen
2 ounces of gold
1/2 ton of iron
xcom. A., etc.
However, if the inversion of the multiplication of the series of the

expanded value form is simply considered formally, it does not yield
the general value form in any of the two cases treated above. If, on the
one hand, it is considered as a simultaneous relation between the dif-
ferent series, the constitution of a universal equivalent is impossible to
achieve by reversing Form II. In effect, if the expanded value form as
presented in figure 1 is formally reversed, the same expanded value
form is obtained. It is on the basis of this fact that Benetti rejects
Marx's deduction of the universal equivalent as commodity: "If the
total form of value can not be reversed, then the universal equivalent
can not form part of the set of n commodities or, in Marx's terms, any
commodity can be excluded by means of the inversion of the total
form, in order to take the role of general equivalent" (Benetti, 1990, p.
167, my translation). Since, as was argued above, this interpretation
supposes that Marx considers that the value form has the property of
symmetry, no equivalent can be achieved because, as Castaingts argues,
"the general equivalent disappears from Form II because, in fact, it has
been eliminated since Form I" (Castaingts, 1991, p. 5, my translation).
If, on the other hand, it informally considered as a relation between
the separate series, the constitution of a universal equivalent is also
impossible to achieve by reversing each of the series of Form II. If
Form II as presented in figure 2 is formally reversed, many general
equivalents or a nonconsolidated general equivalent are obtained, or, in
Marx's words, "the result is that all commodities exclude themselves
[from the universal equivalent form]."
If, then, the universal equivalent cannot be achieved by any of the
two formal ways of reversion, how can it be achieved? The answer to
this question is: The universal equivalent cannot be obtained by ex-
cluding directly one of the series implied in the multiplication of the
series and reversing it, but only by the exclusion of "one" commodity made
by the "many other" commodities implied in the expanded form in which
each of the "many" commodities are immediately "one" commodity.
According to Marx, to achieve the universal equivalent it is neces-

sary that a single commodity become the generic form of equivalen
for all other commodities, that is, the value of the "many other" com
modities can be reciprocally reflected in "one" and the "same" com-
modity. This means that, as such an general entity, the universal for
of equivalent must be considered as an entity that contains, at the sam
time, the universal and the individual, that is, it must be a concrete
universal. Or, in other words, the universal equivalent must be an individ-
ual commodity extracted from the universal world of commodities that, a
the same time, becomes the general or universal commodity.
Marx presents the transition to the general form of value by mean
of the inversion of the expressions of the expanded value form corre
sponding to a given commodity: He presents the case of the commo
ity linen. As argued above, this inversion can be justified at least fo
two related reasons: On the one hand, the inverse general form exis
in-itself in the expanded form:
Thus if we reverse the sequence 20 yards of linen = I coat, or = 1

pounds of tea or = etc. - that is, if we express the converse relationship
which is in itself implicitly contained already in the sequence - we ob
tain [the general value form]. [Marx, "The Value Form," p. 22]
On the other hand, the general equivalent form is subjectively foun

in the expanded relative value form:
Meanwhile the mere difference of form between Form II and Form II

already reveals something peculiar, which does not make a difference
between Forms I and II. Namely, in the expanded value form (Form II)
a commodity excludes all other in order to express its own value in
them. This shutting-out can be a purely subjective process-, for example, a
process of the linen-possessor who estimates the value of his own com-
modity in many other commodities. [Marx, 'The Value Form," p. 25]
If the expanded value form contains in-itself the general value for
and subjectively the universal equivalent where the relative expande
form is objectively situated, it would appear to be sufficient by positi
objectively - by means of the inversion - the subjective equivalent pr
supposed in the relative expanded value form to obtain the universa
equivalent. Although the universal equivalent is presupposed an
therefore negated in the relative expanded value form of a given com
modity - for example, the linen - the inversion is not sufficient to obtain
FALL 1997 59
objectively the universal equivalent. It requires in addition, as M

says in the above passage, that this commodity has been exclude
equivalent by all other commodities. Marx says this explicitly in
following passage:
[A] commodity is situated in the universal equivalent form (Form

only because and insofar as it is itself excluded as equivalent b
other commodities. The excluding is in this case an objective proc
independent of the excluded commodity. In the historical develop
of the commodity form, the universal equivalent form may inhe
turn now in this commodity, now in that. But a commodity never
functions as universal equivalent except insofar as its excluding (a
hence its equivalent form) is the result of an objective social proc
[Marx, "The Value Form," p. 25]
In this passage, Marx indicates that, in order for "one" comm

to take the form of the universal equivalent, it must be the result, n
a subjective process, but rather of an objective social process th
which the "many" commodities exclude one of them as un
equivalent or make it the material in which they uniformly exp
their value, consequently excluding it from taking the relative
This is a process through which the "many other" commodities
exclude themselves from taking the equivalent form, and so ado
unified relative form of value.
Since, according to Marx, the development of the equivalent fo
the passive pole - is only the expression and result of the develop
of the relative form - the active pole - the force of the being o
"many" commodities as values, and therefore of value itself, to a
a general and independent form of existence means that the "m
commodities must exclude and thus posit "one" of them as the m
adequate for the expression of their value, as their universal equiv
Through this process, the being of the "many" commodities as
and therefore of value itself, is posited as a concrete universal.
Hegelian terms, the attraction that was presupposed in the repuls
the "many" commodities of the expanded form is posited throu
mediation of their repulsion.
All this implies that the general form of value is not only
supposed and therefore negated in the multiplication of the ser
the expanded form of value, but also appears as the inverted fo
one of the series. Marx presents the transition to the general fo
the inversion of one of the series of the expanded form, and it can be
seen, as Marx sees it, as a transitional phase in the development of the
value form to a general and independent form of existence, whereby
social labor becomes universal abstract labor. The universal equivalent
form can thus be deduced neither by considering its deduction from a
generalized commodity exchange process without money, as Benetti
tries to do, nor from the external difficulties that the concrete develop
ment of this process encounters, as those who follow the logical-histor
ical method do:
Economists usually reason that the emergence of money is due to exter-

nal difficulties which the expansion of barter encounters, but they forget
that these difficulties arise from the evolution of exchange-value and
hence from that of social labor as universal labor. [Marx, 1971, pp.
50-51]
Finally, it must be observed that with the inversion does not only
each of expressions of the relation change its position and its function,
but the logical connector also changes: The "or" that joins the expres-
sions of the expanded form is transformed into an "and" which joins
the expression of the general value form:
At the same time, they are qualitatively compared or manifested for one
another as determined value-magnitudes. For example, 10 pounds of tea
= 20 yards of linen and 40 pounds of coffee = 20 yards of linen. [Marx,
"The Value Form," p. 23]
This means that, when the expanded value form is inverted into the
general value form, the relation of exclusion of the latter is trans-
formed into a relation of reciprocity in which all commodities express
reciprocally their value in one and the same material of the excluded
commodity.
The transition to the money form has to be explained by reference to
the role played by matter or the material determination within the value
form. From the simple value form on, Marx refers to the use-value or
natural form of the commodity as material for the expression of value
within the value-relation between commodities. Since the "many"
commodities make the natural form of "one" particular kind of com-
modity the material in which they uniformly express their value, the
specific material qualities of the use value of this particular kind of
FALL 1997 61
commodity to which the equivalent form is socially fused are

nants for its exclusion as universal equivalent. The material qua
commodities such as divisibility, nonperishability, easily man
ity, and so on, make them strong candidates for the universa
lent. However, the natural qualities do not make them equ
social properties are not given by nature. To explain how a
commodity, for example, gold, became the excluded commodi
therefore took on the form of the universal equivalent an
quently became the money commodity as soon as it monopoli
position in the expression of value for the world of commodi
necessary to refer to the historical process, a process that can
treated here.
The above analysis of Marx's form of value indicates, on
hand, that the universal equivalent cannot be subjectively defin
abstract standard of price, which must be postulated as initial
the theory of value, as Benetti argues; and that, on the other
money cannot be considered as a noncommodity, but absolute
as Eldred and Hanlon argue.
Notes
1. "The difficult thing to grasp here is that, although the possibility of deter-
minate measure is grounded if value is of essence of the commodity, this essence
itself is actualized only in the development of the process of commensuration
itself. It is that very process of commensuration that posits commodities as value
masses in the first place. The actuality of value and its expression or measure
develop together at the same time" (Arthur, 1993, p. 78).
2. For an excellent critical analysis of the content and history of the interpre-
tation of Marx's method as a logical-historical one, see Arthur (1997). In "Marx:
Sobre el Concepto de Capital" (Robles-Báez, 1997), I develop the argument that
the object of the first part of Capital I is not "simple commodity production" as a
historical stage that precedes capitalism, but the analysis of the immediate appear-
ance of capitalism.
3. "Marx begins the anlysis with the 'simple, isolated or accidental form of
value.' What is this beginning based on? The value relation of the commodity to
any other kind of commodity, according to Marx, is ''obviously the simplest
value-relation.' What is the logical character of 'obviously,* of evidence? It has
not purely logical character, as if it were derived from nonderivative, presupposed
logical and ontological axioms. It possesses ... a logical-historical character"
(Zeleny, 1980, p. 48).
4. The same passage is found in "The Form of Value," which was published
as an appendix to the German edition of 1867. It was published in Spanish as an
appendix to El Capital, tomo I/vol. 3, Siglo XXI, México, 1977.
5. This does not refer to another of the alternatives of the judgment of implication
the accomplishment of the second term (b = a) together with the nonaccomplish
ment of the first term (a = b). However, it could refer, to a certain extent, to t
inverse relation between the judgment of implication and the judgment of inver
implication: "When a judgment of implication is inverted, the judgment of inver
implication is obtained and vice versa. However, although the logical relation
equivalent, the meaning of the mutually inverse implicated judgments is differen
because this relation in not symmetricar (De Gortari, 1983, p. 225, my transl
tion).
6. In the passage from Form II to Form III, Marx writes explicitly that the
inverse form exists in-itself in the original form: "Thus if we reverse the sequence
20 yards of linen = I coat, or = 10 pounds of tea or = etc. - that is, if we express
the converse relationship which is in itself implicitly contained already in the
sequence - then we obtain the universal value form" (Marx, "The Value Form,"
p. 22).
7. On this relation between analysis and synthesis, Hegel writes: The
method of absolute cognition is to this extent analytical. That it finds the further
determination of its initial universal simply and solely in that universal, is the
absolute objectivity of the Notion, of which objectivity the method is the cer-
tainty. But the method is no less synthetic, since its subject matter, determined
immediately as a simple universal, by virtue of the determinateness which it
possesses in its very immediacy and universality, exhibits itself as an other. This
relation of differentiated elements which the subject matter thus is within itself, is
however no longer the same thing as is meant by synthesis infinite cognition; the
mere fact of the subject matter's no less analytical determination in general, that
the relation is relation within Notion, completely distinguishes it from the latter
synthesis.
"This is no less synthetic than analytical moment of the judgment by which the
universal of the beginning of its own accord determines itself as the other itself is
to be named the dialectical moment" (Hegel, 1993, pp. 83O-S3 1).
8. "The same occurs, obviously, for the simple form if, as by Marx, the
property of symmetry is attributed to [the expanded form]" (1990, p. 166, my
translation).
9. All this is explicitly said by Marx in the following passage:
Every owner of a commodity wishes to part with it in exchange only for
those commodities whose use-value satisfies some want of his. Looked
at in this way, exchange is for him simple a private transaction. On the
other hand, he desires to realise the value of his commodity, to convert it
into any other suitable commodity of equal value, irrespective of
whether his own commodity has or has not any use-value for the owner
of the other. From this point of view, exchange is for him a social
transaction of a general character. But one and the same set of transac-
tions cannot be simultaneously for all owners of commodities both ex-
clusively private and exclusively social and general. [Marx, 1977, pp.
89-90, emphasis added]
1 0. Because of space, it is not possible to explain this here. For a discussion
on this matter, see Robles-Báez, 1997.
FALL 1997 63
1 1 . This is also said by Marx in Capital I: "Since the bodily form o

single commodity is one particular equivalent form amongst numberless
we have, on the whole, nothing but fragmentary equivalent forms, each ex
the others" (Marx, 1977, pp. 69-70).
12. This part of the text does not appear in the English edition. It app
the Spanish edition; see Marx, 1977, p. 1006.
13. To translate Aufhebung as suppression does not express correctl
meaning Hegel gives it as negation-preservation.
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On Marx's Dialectic of the Genesis of the Money Form

Author(s): Mario L. Robles-Báez

On Marx's Dialectic of the Genesis

As is well known, Marx's presentation of the value form is one of t

his "Dialectic of the Value Form," Arthur develops the logic

The objective and character of Marx's

which "is raised to a higher power than in money" (Marx

[I]n considering the existence of the commodity as money, it i

The role Marx assigns to money in Capital parallels, to

abstraction, but a social abstraction that belongs to the capitalist mo

Is Marx's analysis of the process of genesis of the money form

Part I of Capital I provides not analysis of the prehistory of c

It is as if alongside and external to lions, tigers, rabbits, and all othe

Or, as he puts it also metaphorically in the Grundrisse, Money is

Simple or accidental form of value (form I)

ity is presupposed. This simple unity as the seed out of whi

The economists have hitherto overlooked the extremely simple point

x commodity A is worthy commodity B,

which can be expressed more concretely as:

20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or

20 yards of linen are worth one coat,

where the "one" commodity A (linen) expressing its value in an

because if it is true that the expression of value cannot appear

It is not possible to express the value of linen in linen. 20 yards of linen

Marx presents the opposite relation implied in the original equation

No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen

linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. [1977, p. 55, emphasis

In the German edition of "The Value Form," the following

Let us consider transactions of exchange between linen-producer A

In the above passages, Marx indicates clearly that the inverse

As far as content is concerned, both expressions:

1. 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat

2. One coat = 20 yards of linen or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen

value of B is also expressed but only qualitatively because it ser

Total or expanded form of value (form II)

The transition to the next stage in the dialectics of the constitution of

and posit as "many other" commodities, the repulsion of the "one

Figure 1 The multiplication of the series of expressions

the series of expressions of value. In general, there may be two types

1 . A multiplication in which all of the series are presented simulta-

To present both interpretations, we will refer to the relation between

Figure 2 The multiplication of the series of expressions of value in a

form. In terms of formal logic, multiplication in a separate form repre

is obtained through the generalization of the simple form when more

To prove that the exchanges are impossible in Marx's Form

To the owner of a commodity, every other commodity is, in regard

From this, Benetti concludes that "[f]rom this incompatibility

the multiplication of the series of expressions of value as a relation

that, for Marx, the expanded value form corresponds to a stag

20 yards of linen = one coat or = u coffee or = v tea or = x iron

The relation of exclusion among the relative expressions of

Since the natural form of each single commodity-type is at this

equivalent forms, there exist (in a word) only limited equivalent f

Second, the relation of exclusion in the multiplication of a

20 yards of linen = one coat or-u coffee or = v tea or = x iron or

One coat = 20 yards of linen or-u coffee or = v tea or = x iron or = y

u coffee = 20 yards of linen or = one coat or = v tea or = x iron or- y

v tea = etc. [Marx, 1976, pp. 31-32]

In the above passage, Marx emphasizes the relation of exclusion by

ing relatively their values (in the second series, commodity A

But each of these equations reflexively yields coat, coffee, te

Notice that, for Marx, the relation of reciprocal exclusion

justifies the transition to the general form of value. Or, as Uchida pu