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WILLIAM J. PRIOR
ABSTRACT
Since Peter Geach coined the phrase in 1966 there has been much discussion
among scholars of the ÒSocratic fallacy.Ó No consensus presently exists on
whether Socrates commits the ÒSocratic fallacyÓ; almost all scholars agree, how-
ever, that the ÒSocratic fallacyÓ is a bad thing and that Socrates has good reason
to avoid it. I think that this consensus of scholars is mistaken. I think that what
Geach has labeled a fallacy is no fallacy at all, but a perfectly innocent conse-
quence of Platonic epistemology.
The ÒSocratic fallacyÓ arises from the ÒPriority of De nitionÓ principle (PD).
Plato is committed to (PD) in the Meno. The Meno also contains a famous dis-
cussion of the difference between episteme and doxa (97a ff.). If we understand
what Plato meant by episteme we can see that he must be committed to (PD);
but we can also see that (PD) has none of the harmful consequences Geach attrib-
utes to it.
GeachÕs view is indebted to WittgensteinÕs philosophy of language. (PD) is
implausible on this reading of the verb Òto know,Ó but not on PlatoÕs. Plato claims
that a demand for an explanation is appropriate wherever a claim to knowledge
is made. Plato links the concept of episteme explicitly with the concept of logos;
the connection between the terms may have been analytic.
It does not follow from the Platonic conception of knowledge, as Geach
argues, that it is Òno useÓ using examples to establish general de nitions. All that
follows is that one cannot know that an alleged example of a term T is a genuine
example until one has a general account of what it is to be T. Without the stronger
conclusion, Geach cannot establish that the ÒSocratic fallacyÓ is a fallacy.
I. Introduction
Since Peter Geach coined the phrase in 1966 there has been much dis-
cussion among scholars of the ÒSocratic fallacy.Ó According to Geach, this
fallacy consists of two propositions:
(A) that if you know that you are correctly predicating a given term
ÒTÓ you must Òknow what it is to be a T,Ó in the sense of being
able to give a general criterion for a thingÕs being T, and
(B) that it is no use to try and arrive at the meaning of ÒTÓ by giving
examples of things that are T.1
Geach believed that Ò(B) in fact follows from (A).Ó2 He believed that these
two propositions constitute a fallacy because they present an incorrect
view of knowledge:
We know heaps of things without being able to de ne the terms in which we
express our knowledge. Formal de nitions are only one way of elucidating terms;
a set of examples may in a given case be more useful than a formal de nition. 3
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid. I think that the general view of knowledge underlying GeachÕs position,
which I shall discuss further below, bears some resemblance to the view Protagoras
defends in the ÒGreat SpeechÓ (Protagoras 320c-328d), especially at 327e-328a, where
he indicates that every Greek has suf cient knowledge of the Greek language to be
able to teach it. I donÕt mean to suggest that ProtagorasÕs view and GeachÕs are iden-
tical, however, or that they have the same roots.
4
Richard Robinson, PlatoÕs Earlier Dialectic (Oxford 1953), 53.
5
Gregory Vlastos, ÒSocratesÕ Disavowal of Knowledge,Ó Philosophy 35 (1985), 23-
26, esp. nn. 54, 56 (which refers to 1, n. 1), 60, and 65.
6
For example, Gerasimos Santas, ÒThe Socratic Fallacy,Ó Journal of the History
of Philosophy 10 (1972), 127-141; Alexander Nehamas, ÒSocratic Intellectualism,Ó
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1986), 275-316
(cf. esp. 277-293); and John Beversluis, ÒDoes Socrates Commit the Socratic Fal-
lacy?,Ó American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987), 211-223.
PLATO AND THE ÒSOCRATIC FALLACYÓ 99
7
Vlastos, op. cit., 1-31 (cf. esp. 23-26); Paul Woodruff, ÒExpert Knowledge in the
Apology and Laches: What a General Needs to Know,Ó Proceedings of the Boston
Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1987), 79-115, and ÒPlatoÕs Early Theory
of Knowledge,Ó in Stephen Everson, ed., Epistemology (Cambridge 1990), 60-84; and
C.D.C. Reeve, Socrates in the Apology (Indianapolis 1989), 37-62.
8
Hugh H. Benson, ÒThe Priority of De nition and the Socratic Elenchus,Ó Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 8 (1990), 19-65.
9
James Lesher, ÒSocratesÕ Disavowal of Knowledge,Ó Journal of the History of
Philosophy 25 (1987), 275-288.
10
See Beversluis, op. cit., 212, who describes the result of accepting GeachÕs
premises as Òa hopeless epistemic impasse,Ó Woodruff, who writes that Òthe trouble
with believing in priority of de nition is that it would paralyze inquiry if it were trueÓ
(ÒExpert Knowledge,Ó 91; Woodruff may only be interpreting Geach, not endorsing
his conclusion; however, he says Geach Òrepresents a fairly broad consensusÓ) and
Santas, op. cit., 129. Exceptions to this general rule are Terence Irwin, PlatoÕs Moral
Theory (Oxford 1977), 40-41, and Benson, op. cit.
100 WILLIAM J. PRIOR
elenctic dialogues, but not from the transitional dialogues, the dialogues
in which, according to a common account, Plato rst introduces his own
views through the character of Socrates. This strategy is one of isolation
and containment: it attempts to keep the Socratic dialogues free of the
philosophical assumptions that give rise to the Òfallacy.Ó It attempts to
remove the fallacy from the elenctic dialogues, and thus from Socratic
philosophy, only to in ict it upon Plato. It attempts to save Socrates from
an infection that Plato carries.
Now I have little sympathy with the project that underlies this strategy,
the project of isolating a Òpure SocraticÓ phase of thought within the early
dialogues that is free from epistemological and metaphysical assumptions,
whether or not that rst stage is taken to be a faithful record of the views
of the historical Socrates.11 But even if we accept the assumptions that
mark this project, it is hard to imagine a scenario that offers a convinc-
ing explanation of how Plato could have come to commit the ÒSocratic
fallacyÓ in some dialogues but not in others. If commission of the ÒSo-
cratic fallacyÓ is a blunder, how could Plato have carefully avoided com-
mitting this blunder in the early, elenctic dialogues (while asserting things
very much like it), only to embrace it in the transitional dialogues? Even
if his role in composing the early dialogues was more that of SocratesÕ
biographer than that of an original philosopher, is it reasonable to assume
that Plato simply recorded the views of Socrates without understanding
them? If Socrates avoided (PD) because he realized that its adoption
would have the disastrous epistemological consequences Geach claims it
has, is it reasonable to think that Plato did not realize this, and that, like
a fool, in the transitional dialogues he rushed in where his angel had pre-
viously feared to tread? Given what we know about PlatoÕs philosophical
abilities, this seems highly unlikely.
Now it seems clear that Plato is committed to (PD) in the Meno. Bevers-
luis distinguishes two forms or aspects of GeachÕs (A):
(A1) If you do not know the de nition of F, you cannot know that any-
thing is an F, and
(A2) If you do not know the de nition of F, you cannot know any-
thing about F (e.g. that F, say Justice, is Y, say bene cial).12
11
I nd the critique of this project found in Charles H. KahnÕs classic essay, ÒDid
Plato Write Socratic Dialogues?,Ó Classical Quarterly 31 (1981), 305-324, and later
works completely convincing, though I do not agree with his alternative account of
the relations among the dialogues or his chronological placement of the Gorgias.
12
Beversluis, op. cit., 211-212; cf. Benson, op. cit., 20, n. 2.
PLATO AND THE ÒSOCRATIC FALLACYÓ 101
13
Irwin has used the distinction between episteme and doxa, though without speci -
cally invoking the Meno passage, in developing his own answer to GeachÕs problem.
Irwin accepts the standard English translations of these terms as ÒknowledgeÓ and
ÒbeliefÓ; his solution is, in a nutshell, that Socrates denies he has knowledge but not
true belief. This solution is, of all the published responses to Geach I am aware of,
the closest to the one I propose below; unlike Irwin, however, I have serious reserva-
tions about the adequacy of the usual translations, and as will become clear below I
do not accept the claim that the alternative to Platonic episteme is a cognitive state
similar to what we would describe in English as true belief. Beversluis (op. cit., 217ff.)
discusses the Meno passage in the course of a critique of the Òtrue beliefÓ theory; his
discussion is an excellent example of the project of purifying the early dialogues from
the epistemology of middle Platonism. Since this paper concerns a dialogue in which
that epistemology emerges, his comments do not have a direct bearing on it.
102 WILLIAM J. PRIOR
14
I owe this formulation of the point to Hugh Benson.
104 WILLIAM J. PRIOR
15
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3d ed. (New York 1958), Part I,
para. 381, 117e.
16
I owe this point to Roslyn Weiss.
106 WILLIAM J. PRIOR
17
At Meno 81d Socrates states that, since all nature is akin, when one has recol-
lected a single item of knowledge one may eventually recollect everything else. At
Phaedo 101d he suggests that the hypothesis that there are Forms is to be justi ed by
appeal to higher hypotheses, and that one must continue to ascend the hypothetical
ladder until one reaches Òsomething adequate.Ó In the Republic (VI, 511c-d) it is made
clear that the unhypothetical rst principle that puts an end to the ascent is the Form
of the Good.
PLATO AND THE ÒSOCRATIC FALLACYÓ 107
must be able to give an account of what he knows (cf. Phaedo 76b), and
quite another to require complete knowledge, expressed in essential de-
nitions of a Form reached through the process of Recollection. But it
does not follow from the fact that the metaphysical and epistemological
elaboration Plato gives to the simple criterion may be unreasonable that
the criterion itself is; and it should be remembered that it is the simple
criterion, and not its metaphysical elaboration, that Geach objects to.
18
Gail Fine, ÒKnowledge and Belief in Republic V-VII,Ó in Stephen Everson, ed.,
Epistemology (Cambridge 1990), 106. For a detailed discussion of the relation between
episteme and logos, with many additional references to passages in the Platonic corpus,
see Jon Moline, PlatoÕs Theory of Understanding (Madison 1981), ch. 2, esp. 33-43.
108 WILLIAM J. PRIOR
This is not the place to discuss the propriety of this translation; I simply
note that the term on which Aristotle places these restrictions is the same
term that translators translate as ÒknowledgeÓ in Plato: episteme. Episteme
is the state with which GeachÕs principle (A) is concerned.
We are now in a position to understand what Plato meant to af rm
when he af rmed (A) or, more precisely, when he af rmed the more spe-
ci c statements that have led scholars to attribute (A) to him. Consider the
question from the Meno: Òhow can I know a property of something when
I donÕt even know what it is?Ó (71b) What this implies in context is that
Socrates does not believe that he can know whether virtue is teachable
without knowing what the nature of virtue is. I suggest that what this im-
plies is that Socrates thinks he can have no logos, no rational account of
the teachability of virtue without a logos of the nature of virtue. In general,
he can have no rational account of the properties of an object without
having a rational account of the nature of the object.
Is this a false view of the nature of knowledge? It certainly seems to
have been a feature of ancient essentialist epistemology that knowledge
of something begins (logically, not temporally) with knowledge of the
thingÕs essence, proceeds to knowledge of properties that follow neces-
sarily from the essence, and concludes with whatever accidental proper-
ties may be knowable. It does not seem to me to be a relevant objection
to this scheme to say that there is a perfectly good use of the English
word ÒknowÓ in which I can say ÒI know that the apple is redÓ without
being able to give an account of the nature of an apple; for if a rational
account is demanded that explains why this apple, or apples of this kind,
are red, then I think I canÕt know what that account would be without
knowing the nature of the apple.
Similarly, it does not seem to be a relevant objection to SocratesÕ claim
that he canÕt know whether virtue is teachable unless he knows what it is
that there is a perfectly good use of the English word ÒknowÓ in which I
can claim to know that virtue can be taught without being able to give an
account of the nature of virtue, namely that in which I say, ÒI know virtue
can be taught, for IÕve seen it done. X passed on his virtue to Y by teach-
ing; I donÕt know how he did it, but he did it nonetheless.Ó For again,
what Socrates is looking for is a rational account that explains how virtue
can be taught, and it seems reasonable to think that such an account
requires an account of what virtue is. It does not matter that there is a
sense of ÒknowÓ in English that dispenses with the rational account, for
that sense isnÕt the one Socrates has in mind. He is not waiting for infor-
mation about cases of successful teaching of virtue; rather, he is seeking
to understand how those instances could have taken place.
PLATO AND THE ÒSOCRATIC FALLACYÓ 109
19
This seems to be what Geach means when he suggests that the principle is
morally harmful because someone who proved unable after repeated attempts to
explain why swindling is unjust might come to doubt that it was unjust (372). It is
true that someone might come to that conclusion, but there is nothing in (A) to sug-
gest that he or she should. Note that Socrates, who sees more de nitions go down in
ames than anyone, never succumbs to such moral uncertainty.
20
As Woodruff notes, in ÒPlatoÕs Early Theory of Knowledge,Ó 65, ÒYou can
be quite certain in the ordinary way of any number of things, without being able to
give a Socratic de nition.Ó Note also AristotleÕs claim in Nicomachean Ethics VII.3,
1146b26-7 that ÒSome people have no doubts when they have an opinion, and think
they have exact knowledge.
110 WILLIAM J. PRIOR
frequently to develop, re ne, and critically assess de nitions. As Bevers-
luis notes,
the dialogues of search abound with passages in which he not only unproblem-
atically accepts examples of the virtue under discussion from interlocutors who
manifestly lack a de nition of it but heartily endorses examples as the primary
data from which the de nition is to be extracted.21
But Geach might respond, ÒSo much the worse for SocratesÕ practice. If
(B) follows from (A), Socrates is not entitled to make use of examples in
any of these ways.Ó To answer this challenge we must attempt to discover
whether (B) does indeed follow from (A). Before we investigate this ques-
tion, however, I want to note that, even if some general prohibition on the
use of examples did follow from (A) that would not mean that the search
for general criteria was pointless. A process such as recollection might put
one directly in touch with general criteria, bypassing examples entirely;
and if the metaphysics of recollection seems too extravagant to offer much
hope in this regard, there might be other less implausible methods of direct
apprehension of general semantic criteria.
Still, it seems intuitively obvious that the quest for general criteria is im-
measurably aided by the use of examples, so let us ask how the prohibi-
tion of the use of examples is supposed to follow from (A). Here is GeachÕs
argument:
If you can already give a general account of what ÒTÓ means, then you need no
examples to arrive at the meaning of ÒTÓ; if on the other hand you lack such a
general account, then, by assumption (A), you cannot know that any examples
of things that are T are genuine ones, for you do not know when you are pred-
icating ÒTÓ correctly.22
But is Geach right about this? (A) says that one cannot know that a term
ÒTÓ is correctly predicated unless one can give a general criterion for the
correct predication of ÒT.Ó When applied to examples, this means that one
cannot know that an alleged example of T is a genuine example until one
has a general account of what it is to be T. If Geach were to say only
this about examples, he would be quite correct. But he says more; he says
it is no use trying to reach a general criterion by the use of examples;
and it seems to me that this is not the case.
It is not necessary for me to know that an alleged example of a gen-
eral term T is a genuine example in order to use this example in my search
21
Beversluis, op. cit., 212. Cf. Santas, op. cit., 129-134.
22
Geach, op. cit., 371.
PLATO AND THE ÒSOCRATIC FALLACYÓ 111
not in conscious possession of it, and in that sense one cannot know that
the alleged example is a genuine one. As I also argued above, however,
the absence of an account need not lead to uncertainty about the fact
in question. In this case, the lack of an account of what makes something
a T need not produce a lack of con dence in alleged examples of T. It
certainly need not lead an investigator to doubt his or her ability even pro-
visionally to identify examples of T.
I think that, for GeachÕs objection to hold, and for (B) to follow from
(A), it would have to be the case that a lack of a general criterion for
what it is to be a T must produce in the investigator such a degree of con-
fusion that he or she is unable even tentatively to identify examples of T.
We have seen that this is not the case. Therefore, (B) does not follow
from (A). Plato may, without logical error, make use of examples in seek-
ing general de nitions of terms. It seems clear also that he may, without
logical error, follow another practice that he constantly employs in the
early dialogues: he may propose alleged examples as counterexamples to
de nitions proposed by his interlocutors.
The procedures by which Socrates attempts to discover general criteria
for the use of terms in the early dialogues are not purely inductive ones;
he does not simply attempt to assemble a suf cient sample of instances
of the term and then abstract from these examples a set of necessary and
suf cient conditions for the application of the term. Rather, examples are
used to stimulate rational re ection on the nature of the things denoted by
the terms in question. As the Doctrine of Recollection has it, examples
serve to remind us of the metaphysical originals from which they are de-
rived. Though the Platonic procedure differs from the more familiar induc-
tivist model familiar to students of philosophy of science, it is a procedure
in which examples play a legitimate role, or in fact, more than one legit-
imate role.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that the ÒSocratic fallacyÓ is not a fallacy. I
have argued that GeachÕs (A), which has come to be known as the Priority
of De nition principle (PD), is not part and parcel of a Òstyle of mistaken
thinkingÓ about knowledge and de nition but a speci c case of a general
Platonic principle of epistemology: the principle that episteme requires a
logos. The fact that this principle emerges explicitly for the rst time in
a transitional dialogue, the Meno, means that we ought to be suitably cau-
tious about attributing it to Socrates in the early dialogues. On the other
PLATO AND THE ÒSOCRATIC FALLACYÓ 113
hand, I have also argued that PlatoÕs acceptance of (A) does not commit
him to (B), so that the consequences Geach feared do not arise. Thus,
there is no reason not to use (PD), as Benson has argued, as a unifying
principle behind many speci c Socratic remarks in the early dialogues
about what we can know, and under what conditions we can know it.23
23
I thank Hugh Benson and Elizabeth Radcliffe for their comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.