HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL
January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
COURT, BRANCH 19, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,[1] respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO SR., J.:
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite
notary commission more than twenty years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the
novel issue presented for resolution before this Court. The instant case arose when
in a verified Letter-Complaint dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck prayed for the
disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de
Oro City. The complainant alleged that prior to the respondents appointment as
RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated the notarial law, thus: Judge Santos, based
on ANNEX A, was not duly commissioned as notary public until January 9, 1984 but
still subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized documents to the
Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980 uncommissioned until the 9th of January
1984.
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986 to December 31st
1987 and January 6th 1988 to December 31st 1989 but the records fail to show any
entry at the Clerk of Court after December 31st 1985 until December 31st 1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the expiration of his
commission in December 1989.[2]
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order respondent:
1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all future public
service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.
4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any delaying tactics
from Judge Santos or any agency and or public servants involved in this
administrative case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this administrative case.
and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on the
premises.[3]
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-
Beja, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, which contained the following:
THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and available in this
office, the following data appear:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned notary public
in the following years:
a.
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony E. Santos
submitted his notarial reports in the ff. years:
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980
b. February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June 6, 1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of submission
e. November to December 1980-no entry
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of submission
h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986
l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial documents under the
name Atty. Anthony Santos after December 1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission issued to Atty. Anthony
Santos was on January 6, 1988 until December 31, 1989.[4]
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge categorically denied the
charges against him. He also submitted a certification[5] from Clerk of Court, Atty.
Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the commissioned
lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized
documents/notarial register. The respondent further averred as follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and
submitted by the respondent before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said
notarized documents and therefore not the proper party to raise the said issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled
Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and
Heinz Heck, for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the Presiding
Judge. The undersigned resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs.[6] Pursuant to
the report of the Office of the Court Administrator recommending the need to
resort to a full-blown investigation to determine the veracity of the parties
assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a)
treat the matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to
Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[7]
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002, the complainant
requested that the hearing be held at Cagayan de Oro City. Justice Cruz initially
denied the request but upon the complainants insistence, the matter was
forwarded to the Court, which favorably acted thereon in a Resolution dated July 8,
2002.[8] The complainant presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City before
retired Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.[9]
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz
made the following recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be found
guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by (a) notarizing documents without
commission; (b) tardiness in submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding
of his notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his commission; and
[ii] that for these infractions, he be suspended from the practice of law and barred
from being commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his present
commission, if any, be revoked.[10]
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not adduce evidence in
his defense, while the complainant presented documentary evidence to support the
charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was
commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of
the first certification. He merely alleged that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register. And, as already observed, he presented no evidence,
particularly on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983 (assuming he was
so commissioned) and submission of notarial reports and notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows that there were only two Record
Books available in the notarial section of the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de
Oro City); and that the (f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial Commission contains
items on the Name, Date Commission was issued and Expiration of Commission of
the notary public. First entry appearing was made on December 1982. If respondent
was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the first book would disclose so (at least,
for the years 1982 and 1983). However, he did not present said book. Neither did
he present a certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of Misamis Oriental, or
documents from his files showing that he was commissioned in 1980 to 1983.
Similarly, he did not submit a certificate of appointment for all those years. Under
Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be prepared and forwarded
by the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor General, together with the
oath of office of the notary public.[11]
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the evidence presented by the
complainant, that the respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983 without
being commissioned as a notary public therefor, considering that his earliest
commission of record was on January 9, 1984.[12]
The Procedural Issues
Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant complaint, a brief
backgrounder.
On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[13] to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are
lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action
of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the
discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned
as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on
the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both
respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. Before the Court
approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of
the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated separately. Thus,
pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases against erring justices of the CA and
the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government service may be
automatically treated as disbarment cases. The Resolution, which took effect on
October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the respondents
have not yet been required to comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing resolution, since the
respondent filed his Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001. The Procedure To Be
Followed In Disbarment Cases Involving
A Retired Judge For Acts Committed While He Was Still A Practicing Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired judge; (2) the
complainant prays for his disbarment; and (3) the acts constituting the ground for
disbarment were committed when the respondent was still a practicing lawyer,
before his appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not
for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with
notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor.

Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of
Attorneys provides:
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state
clearly, and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme
Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate
and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the
government service: Provided, however, That all charges against Justices of the
Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with
them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That charges filed
against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment to the Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court
for disposition and adjudication.[14]
The investigation may thereafter commence either before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), in accordance with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or
before the Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14, thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings initiated motu proprio by
the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires,
the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to
any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the
investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11 hereof,
save that the review of the report shall be conducted directly by the Supreme
Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated Investigator.
Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or
other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme
Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations together with
the record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the final action of
the Supreme Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is cognizable by the
Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may refer
the complaint for investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor
General, any officer of the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court will
thereafter base its final action.[15] Although the respondent has already retired
from the judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not
immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 6[16]of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court
itself, as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent is a justice of the Court of
Tax Appeals or the lower court, the complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court.
[17]
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not Preclude The Filing Thereafter
Of An Administrative Charge Against Him For Which He Shall Still Be Held
Answerable If Found Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service
does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of
the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over
members of the bench. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero:[18]
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent, had ceased in office
during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce
the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof.
A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of
his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and
faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty
proper and imposable under the situation.[19] However, recognizing the
proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases against
members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment, we issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-
SC[20] which took effect on November 3, 2003. It reads in part:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court Administrator,
an administrative complaint against any Justice of the Court of Appeals or
Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower courts filed in connection with a case in
court is shown to be clearly unfounded and baseless and intended to harass the
respondent, such a finding should be included in the report and recommendation of
the Office of the Court Administrator. If the recommendation is approved or
affirmed by the Court, the complainant may be required to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he may
further be required to show cause why he or she should not be administratively
sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of
a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year
before such filing and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the
respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the
case, the Office of the Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a
comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the
Court a report and recommendation not later than 30 days from receipt of the
comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of
compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six
(6) months from such date without prejudice to the release of the retirement
benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld, taking into
account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or
justice to be dismissed outright, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
complaint must have been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement
of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year
before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the
respondent.
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was received by
the Office of the Court Administrator on March 26, 2001.[21] The respondent
retired compulsorily from the service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002.
Likewise, the ground for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been
committed by the respondent did not occur a year before the respondents
separation from the service. Furthermore, and most importantly, the instant
complaint was not prima facie shown to be without merit and intended merely to
harass the respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not fall within the
ambit of the foregoing resolution.
A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His Appointment To The
Judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his
appointment to the judiciary.[22] In fact, even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as
it provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those
filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary.[23] It need not be shown that the
respondent continued the doing of the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that
the evidence on record supports the charge on the respondent, considering the
gravity of the offense. Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act
complained of must be continuing in order for the respondent judge to be
disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v. Salubre,[24] the respondent judge was charged
with violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for acts
committed while he was still a practicing lawyer. The respondent therein refused to
turn over the funds of his client despite demands, and persisted in his refusal even
after he was appointed as a judge. However, the Court also stated in this case that
the respondents subsequent appointment as a judge will not exculpate him from
taking responsibility for the consequences of his acts as an officer of the court.[25]
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,[26] we held that proof of prior immoral conduct
cannot be used as basis for administrative discipline against a judge if he is not
charged with immorality prior to his appointment. We ratiocinated, thus:
...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered
from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk
proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond information and redemption. A
lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to
know, that he must pay a high price for that honor - his private and official conduct
must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. ...[27]
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to prove the charges by
substantial evidence.[28] The complainant therein presented evidence pertaining to
the respondents previous indiscretion while still a practicing lawyer; no evidence
was, however, adduced to prove that the latter continued to engage in illicit acts
after being appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was exonerated in this
case because the complainant failed to present evidence that the indiscretion
continued even after the respondent was appointed to the judiciary. The practice of
law is so ultimately affected with public interest that it is both the right and duty of
the State to control and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. The
Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this Court.[29] The
Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power
over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a bounden duty as well. This
is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.[30]
Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore Constitutes
Malpractice, If Not The Crime Of Falsification Of Public Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.[31] Notarization
by a notary public converts a private document into a public one, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity
and due execution.[32] The requirements for the issuance of a commission as
notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality.[33] The Court has
characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite
commission therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice,
but also the crime of falsification of public documents.[34] For such reprehensible
conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of
law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such,
and even disbarment.[35]
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,[36] the Court had the occasion to state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at
a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be
subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such
commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically,
the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when
he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood,
which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.[37]
The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-
emphasized. No less than the public faith in the integrity of public documents is at
stake in every aspect of that function.[38]
The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported By The Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainants formal offer of evidence,
prompting the Investigating Justice to decide the case on the basis of the pleadings
filed.[39] Neither did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the
years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. The respondent
merely alleged in his answer that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register. Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice,
the respondent presented no evidence of his commission as notary public for the
years 1980 to 1983, as well as proof of submission of notarial reports and the
notarial register.[40] The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to
answer the charges and to controvert the evidence against him in a formal
investigation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he deny the charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him.[41] The respondents allegation that the complainant was not
a party in any of the documents so notarized, and as such was not prejudiced
thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation
of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor which include the statutory
grounds under Section 27, Rule 138[42] of the Revised Rules of Court. Any
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.
There can be no doubt as to the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the
proper authority acts and doings of public officers which citizens feel are
incompatible with the duties of the office and from which conduct the citizen or the
public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.[43]
An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed
with upon admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession. It is a
continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
ones mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because his
admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer.[44] The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to
admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.[45]
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own,
distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.[46] As we
held in the leading case of In re Almacen:[47]
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In a case involving a mere court employee[49] the Court
disregarded the Court Administrators recommendation that the charge for
immorality against the respondent be dismissed on the ground that the
complainants failed to adduce evidence that the respondents immoral conduct was
still ongoing. Aside from being found guilty of illicit conduct, the respondent was
also found guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her childrens certificates of live birth to
show that her paramour was the father. The complaint in this case was filed on
August 5, 1999, almost twenty years after the illicit affair ended.[50] The Court held
that administrative offenses do not prescribe.[51] Pursuant to the foregoing, there
can be no other conclusion than that an administrative complaint against an erring
lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four
years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by prescription. If the
rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the
very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private
complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer
for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well
as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the
time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing
the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor. He is hereby
arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
members of the bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the SO ORDERED.
Lawyers Oath. This should particularly apply in this case, considering the
seriousness of the matter involved - the respondents dishonesty and the sanctity of
notarial documents. Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint,
will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents
without the requisite authority therefor.

At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The Administrative Case Would Merely
Mitigate The Respondents Liability

Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not
a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess
the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty,
and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar.[52] By his
actuations, the respondent failed to live up to such standards;[53] he undermined
the confidence of the public on notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes. The respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[54] In
representing that he was possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he
was, in fact, not so authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.

The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar
him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.[55]
Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this case, considering that the
complaint against the respondent was filed twenty-four years after the commission
of the act complained of;[56] that there was no private offended party who came
forward and claimed to have been adversely affected by the documents so
notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the respondent is a retired judge
who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-earned retirement benefits.[57]
The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this case.
COBALT RESOURCES v. ATTY. RONALD AGUADO
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Cobalt Resources, Inc.
(CRI) against respondent Atty. Ronald C. Aguado (Atty. Aguado) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the lawyer's oath.
The Antecedents
In its Complaint,[1] CRI alleged that on March 5, 2010, a group of armed men, clad
in vests bearing the mark "PASG" and pretending to be agents of the Presidential
Anti-Smuggling Group (PASG), hi-jacked its delivery van which was then loaded with
cellular phones worth P1.3 million; that Dennis Balmaceda (Balmaceda), the driver
of the delivery van, and his companions were all forcibly taken away at gun point
and were dropped at the Country Hill and Golf Club; that Balmaceda called Antonio
Angeles (Angeles), the Security Director of CRI, who immediately reported the
incident to the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation Detection Unit
(PNP-CIDU); that with the use of Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) Tracking Device
installed in the cellular phones, Angeles and the PNP-CIDU tracked down the
location of the cellular phones to be in front of Pegasus Bar along Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City; that the PNP-CIDU, together with Angeles proceeded to Pegasus Bar
and found three (3) vehicles parked in front of the bar: (1) Toyota Fortuner with
Plate No. UNO-68 owned by Atty. Aguado, (2) Chevrolet Optra with Plate No. ZDW-
764 and (3) a motorcycle with Plate No. NK-1180; that when the PNP-CIDU
approached the vehicles, Anthony Palmes (Palmes) ran but he was chased by the
police officers and was arrested; that Atty. Aguado who was then standing in the
reception area of Pegasus Bar was not arrested as none of the police officers knew,
at that time, of his participation in the crime; that the PNP-CIDU searched the
vehicles and found the cellular phones, the Identification Card (ID) showing Atty.
Aguado as Legal Consultant of the PASG, the Mission Order identifying Atty. Aguado
as the Assistant Team Leader, and a vest bearing the mark PASG. CRI further
averred that the men who hijacked its delivery van used the fake mission order
when it flagged down the delivery van; that the mission order identified Atty.
Aguado as the assistant team leader and authorized the armed men to seize CRTs
cellular phones; that the PASG issued a certification stating that the mission order
was fake; that Atty. Aguado carried an ID bearing his picture and name which
showed that he was a PASG legal consultant; and that this ID was likewise fake as
evidenced by a certification issued by the PASG. Based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay,
[2] dated September 8, 2010, executed by Palmes, CRI concluded that it was Atty.
Aguado who prepared the fake mission order and masterminded the crime as he
was the one who conceived it and laid down the nitty-gritty details of its execution;
and that it was; he who recruited the armed men who actually executed the
hijacking.
Eventually, two separate Informations for Robbery[3] and Caraapping[4] were filed
against Atty. Aguado and several others. The IBP directed Atty. Aguado to submit
his answer but, despite several extensions, he failed to do so.
The IBP then set the case for mandatory conference. In his Conference Brief,[5]
Atty. Aguado denied the allegations. He averred that "on March 5, 2010, at about
11:00 to 12:00 in the afternoon,"[6] his Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 was
carnapped along Scout Mandarin while in the custody of his driver; that he reported
the incident to the police authorities; that on March 7, 2010, he was awakened by
relatives informing him that his name was on the front page of several tabloids in a
story connecting him to the alleged hijacking; and that he was indicted in the case
because of the ID found hanging in his carnapped vehicle. In its Report and
Recommendation,[7] dated May 3, 2011, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) found Atty. Aguado liable for unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful
conduct in falsifying the ID and mission order showing him as the Legal Consultant
and the Assistant Team Leader, respectively, of the PASG. The IBP-CBD
recommended that he be suspended for two (2) years. It, however, deferred the
issue of Atty. Aguado's purported participation in the alleged hijacking incident as
the issue pertained to a judicial function.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report
of the CBD, as follows: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that
Respondent committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct by
falsifying the ID and Mission Order, Atty. Ronaldo Aguado is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years.[8]
Not satisfied, CRI filed a motion for reconsideration[9] praying that the May 3, 2011
report of the IBP-CBD be set aside and that a new resolution ordering the
disbarment of Atty. Aguado be issued. CRI claimed that Atty. Aguado deserved the
ultimate penalty of disbarment as the falsification of public documents was
sufficiently established and, as the CBD knew, he masterminded the hijacking using
his profession to commit the crime.
On July 25, 2013, Atty. Aguado also filed a motion for reconsideration[10] of the
March 20, 2013 Resolution praying that it be set aside and a new one be issued
dismissing the complaint. He averred that the charges of usurpation of authority
and falsification filed against him had been dismissed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City; that he could not be presumed to be the author of the
falsification because he was never in possession of the falsified ID and mission
order; and that he never used, took advantage or profit therefrom. Atty. Aguado

asserted that this case should, at the very least, be suspended pending the
resolution of the robbery and carnapping charges against him.
In a Resolution,[11] dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied
both motions and affirmed its March 20, 2013 Resolution.
Pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, CRI filed a petition for
review[12] before the Court. CRI was firm in its stand that Atty. Aguado be meted
out the penalty of disbarment for his falsification of a PASG mission order and ID
and for his involvement in the hijacking of the CIR delivery van and its cargo.
Similarly, Atty. Aguado filed a petition for review insisting on his innocence and
praying for the dismissal of the complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition of CRI.
It must be emphasized that a disbarment proceeding, being administrative in
nature, is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer and
they may proceed independently of each other.[13] A finding of guilt in the criminal
case does not necessarily mean a finding of liability in the administrative case.[14]
In the same way, the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence against an accused, who is also a respondent in an administrative case,
does not necessarily exculpate him administratively because the quantum of
evidence required is different. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required.[15] "In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers,
the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant."[16] Preponderance of evidence means
"evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which
is offered in opposition thereto."[17] Clearly, Atty. Aguado committed the act
complained of as it was established that he was in possession of a falsified ID
showing him as a legal consultant of the PASG and mission order identifying him as
the Assistant Team Leader of the anti-smuggling operation. Although Atty. Aguado
claimed in his Conference Brief that he was indicted merely on the basis of an ID
found hanging in his carnapped Toyota Fortuner,[18] his counsel, Atty. Letecia
Amon (Atty. Amon), during the mandatory conference held on February 25, 2011,
acknowledged that the ID and mission order were found in the Toyota Fortuner
owned by Atty. Aguado, thus:
ATTY. HARON:
Is she willing to admit that respondent is the same person referred to in the document called mission order marked as Annex "F" issued by
the PASG.
ATTY. AMON:
I have no exact knowledge on that, Your Honor.
ATTY. HARON:
I'm showing counsel for respondent with a copy of a mission order marked as Annex "F"....
COMM. CACHAPERO:
Machine copy.
ATTY. HARON:
This is the copy.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
Take a look, is that a machine copy?
ATTY. HARON:
Yes, Your Honor. Annex "F" states that Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is the assistant team leader of the team by mission order.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
He is only asking, the respondent is the one who owns that document. He is not yet asking whether that document is authentic or not.
ATTY. AMON:
Yes, Your Honor, as written here.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
Yes, he is the one.
ATTY. HARON:
Would the respondent also like to admit that the identification card and the mission order were found inside his Toyota Fortuner, Plate No.
UNO-68.
ATTY. AMON:
Of which he is the owner, yes.
ATTY. HARON:
Admitted also, Your Honor.
ATTY. HARON:
Would the respondent also like to admit the certifications Annexes "G" and "H" issued by the PASG are genuine and duly executed. I'm
showing counsel copies of the certifications, Your Honor, marked as Annexes "G" and "H" which bears the seal of that office, Your Honor.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
What is your proposal Atty. Haron?
x x x.[19] [Emphasis supplied]
Moreover, the Sinumpaang Salaysay[20] of Palmes explicitly described Atty. Aguado's participation in the crime as follows:
xxx
2. Alam ko kung sinu-sino ang mga taong kasama sa pagplano at pagsasagawa ng nasabing
'hijacking'. Bagamat may partisipasyon ako sa krimen, hindi ko alam na ang gagawing paghuli
sa mga nasabing cellphone ay labag sa batas dahil ako ay pinaniwala na ang gagawin naming
paghuli sa mga cellphone ng Cobalt ay isang lehitimong operasyon ng PASG.
3. Bago pa man naganap ang nasabing hijacking ay dati akong empleyado ng Cobalt na
nakatalaga sa Delivery Section/Pull Out Service. Ngunit hindi nagtagal ay nag-resign ako.
4. Noong ikalawang lingo ng Pebrero, nilapitan ako ni Jaime "James" Abedes at sinabi sa akin
ng kung pwede ay i-monitor ko daw ang ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt at ako ay bibgyan niya
ng "budget" upang ang kanyang grupo ay makapagsagawa ng 'seizure operations.'
5. Noong una ay nag-alangan akong sumangayon sa mungkahi ni James ngunit ako ay
pinapanatag niya na lahat ng dokumento at papeles ay kumpleto. Sabi pa ni James, "Si Atty.
Aguado ang magbibigay ng complete documents at Mission Order dahil naka-direkta siya sa
PASG Malacanang para ma-flag down ang delivery van".
6. Ako ay naniwala sa kanyang sinabi dahil sa pagbanggit niya na may kasama kaming
abogado. Dahil dito ay pumayag ako sa mungkahi ni James.
7. Kinabukasan ay nagkita kami ni James sa Caltex Pioneer corner Shaw Boulevard. Nalaman
ko kay James na may hawak siyang Security Guard doon. Pinakilala niya ako kay Eliseo De
Rosas alias Nonoy na isa ring tauhan ni James. Siya ay may gamit na Honda na motorsiklo na
kulay berde na may plakang 1180 NK. Noong araw din na iyon ay nagtungo kami sa Brixton
Street upang i-monitor ang warehouse ng Cobalt dahil may warehouse ang Cobalt sa Brixton
Street.
8. Pagkatapos naming pumunta sa Brixton Street ay nagtungo naman kami sa P. Tuazon
Street kung saan may mga clients ang Cobalt, at doon naming nakita ang delivery van na
Mitsubishi L-300 ng Cobalt.
9. Sinimulan namin ni Nonoy ang pagmonitor ng ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt. Sa aming
ginawang pag-monitor ay napansin naming madalas magpakarga ng gas ang nasabing
delivery van sa Petron Station sa Ortigas Avenue corner B. Serrano Street. Isang lingo kaming
nag-monitor ni Nonoy sa ruta ng Cobalt. Ipinaalam naming kay James ang nakakalap naming
impormasyon. Noong natiyak naming ang ruta ng delivery van ay nagpaschedule si James ng
'meeting' kay Atty. Aguado.
10. Ika-22 ng Pebrero 2010 alas-6 ng gabi sa McDonald's Quezon Avenue ay nag meeting
kami. Ang mga kasama sa meeting ay si James, Atty. Aguado, Joe Almonte, at Nonoy. Noong
kami ay nandoon ay lumipat ng lamesa si Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte at sila ay
nagusap.
11. Pagkatapos ng usapan nila ay pumunta sa amin si James at sinabi sa amin kung ano ang
kanilang napagusapan. Sinabi sa amin ni James na mag-iisue daw ng Mission Order si Atty.
Aguado. Si Atty. Aguado na rin daw ang magbubuo ng grupo ng mga lalake upang i-flag down
ang delivery van ng Cobalt.
12. Noong ika-25 ng Pebrero 2010 alas 7 ng gabi, ay muli kaming nagkita nila James, Nonoy at
Joe Almonte sa McDonald's Quezon Avenue. Pagsapit ng alas-8 ng gabi ay tumawag si Atty.
Aguado na nasa Starbucks Cafe sa Tomas Morato Avenue daw siya naka-puwesto. Kaya't
kaming apat ay sumunod sa Starbucks. Pagdating naming sa Starbucks ay nandoon nga si
Atty. Aguado at may kasama siyang isang pulis.
13. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis sila Atty. Aguado at James sakay ng Toyota Fortuner na may
plakang UNO-68. Sinabi sa amin ni James na sila ay magsasagawa ng "ocular" ng lugar kung
saan gagawin ang pag-flag down ng delivery van. Nang sila ay magbalik, kami ay sinabihan na
gagawin namin ang operasyon sa umaga ng kinabukasan (ika-26 ng Pebrero, Biernes).
Ayon pa sa kanila, ako raw ay pupuwesto sa Petron Station sa may Boni Serrano corner
Ortigas Avenue ng alas-8 ng umaga upang doon abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van.
Samantalang, ang mga taong magsasagawa ng pag flag down (pawang mga tao ni Atty.
Aguado) ay pupuwesto na rin sa may Benitez Street. Kapag nakita ko na raw ang delivery van
ay agad akong tumawag kay James upang ipagbigay alam ang pagdaan nito at i-alert ang mga
nasabing mga lalake, pagkatapos ay tumungo raw ako sa Benitez Street upang siguraduhin na
tama ang delivery van na ipa-flag-down. Pagkatapos ng meeting ng gabi na iyon ay isa-isa na
kaming nagsi-uwian.
14. Kaya't kinabukasan, ika-26 ng Pebrero, alas-8 ng umaga ay nagtungo ako sa nasabing
Petron Station. Ngunit tumawag si James na hindi raw matutuloy ang operation dahil kulang
sa tao si Atty. Aguado.
15. Kami (ako, Joe Almonte at Nonoy) ay muling pinulong ni James sa McDonald's Quezon
Avenue noong ika-i ng Marso alas-7 ng gabi. Bandang alas-8 ng gabi ay dumating na rin si
Atty. Aguado. Sila Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte [ay] nag-usap sa labas ng Smoking
Area samantalang kami ni Nonoy ay nanatili sa loob.
16. Nang matapos ang usapan ay sinabi sa amin ni James na nag-set ulit ng operation si Atty.
Aguado kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, Martes, ngunit hintayin daw naming ang feedback mula
kay Atty. Aguado dahil kelangan daw ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado.
17. Muli akong nagtungo kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, alas- 8 ng umaga, ngunit maya-maya
lamang ay tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na hindi na naman daw tuloy ang
operation dahil hindi nakakuha ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado. Sa puntong ito ay
sinabi ko na kay James na sana sigurado ang mga papeles ni Atty. Aguado dahil ayaw ko ng
illegal na trabaho. Sinabi naman sa akin ni James na kumpleto naman daw ang mga papeles
at legal ang gagawing operation.
18. Ika-4 ng Marso 2010, ay tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na tuloy na daw
ang operation kinabukasan (ika- 5 ng Marso). Sinabi rin niya sa akin na alas-8 ng umaga ay
kailangan daw na naka-puwesto na ako sa Petron Station.
19. Kaya noong ika-5 ng Marso 2010, alas-8 ng umaga, ako ay pumuwesto na sa Petron
Gasoline Station sa Boni Serrano corner Ortigas Avenue sakay ng isang motorsiklo. Bandang
alas-8:3O ng umaga ay dumating naman si James sakay ng isang Chevrolet na may plakang
ZDW 764 at may kasama pa siya na pinakilala sa aking "Larry." Bandang alas-9 ng umaga ay
dumating ang Toyota Fortuner ni Atty. Aguado. Nakita ko na sakay ng nasabing Toyota
Fortuner si Atty. Aguado at Joe Almonte. Hindi sila bumaba bagkus ay nagpakarga lamang ito
ng gasolina sa nasabing Petron Station. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis na rin sila. Sumunod namang
umalis si James at Larry sakay ng Chevrolet.
20. Bandang alas-9:3O ng umaga, nakita ko na dumating ang delivery van ng Cobalt sa Petron
upang ito ay magpakarga ng gasolina. Tumawag ako kay James gamit ang aking cellphone at
sinabi ko, "Nandito na ang delivery van na white, may plakang NKQ 734." Sumagot si James,
"ok nakapuwesto na kami. Andito na kami sa area"
21. Agad akong umalis patungo sa Benitez Street upang abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van
upang ma-flag down ito. Gamit ang aking motorsiklo, ako ay dali-daling nagtungo sa Benitez
Street. Pagdating ko doon ay nakita ko ang nasabing Chevrolet ni James at isang L-300 van na
kulay blue-green na may plakang DFN-733. Nadatnan ko rin ang tatlong lalake na pawang
armado at nakasuot ng tsalekong may tatak na PASG at nag-aabang sa gilid ng daan.
Mayroon din akong napansin na nakasakay sa loob ng nasabing blue-green na L-300 van
ngunit hindi ko na nabilang ang dami nila.
22. Ako ay pumunta sa Chevrolet (driver side), at binuksan naman ni James ang bintana nito.
Sinabi ko ulit sa kanya na parating na ang delivery van. Sumagot siya, "Sige. Timbrehan mo
lang sila pag malapit na. Hintayin mo relay kung saan ka susunod." Pagkatapos noon ay
umalis na sila.
23. Pagkaalis nila, kami at nang tatlong nasabing lalake ay nag-abang sa pagdaan ng delivery
van. Nang makita ko itong paparating, agad kong sinabi "approaching na. yang puti, yang
puti." Pagkatapos noon ay agad pinara ng isa sa mga nasabing lalakeng nakasumbrero ang
delivery van. Sumenyas ito sa driver ng delivery van na itabi ito sa gilid. Pilit binuksan ng
tatlong lalake ang magkabilang pintuan ng delivery van at nang mabuksan ang mga nasabing
pintuan ay agad hinila palabas ang tatlo nitong pahinante at agad silang pinosasan.
xxxx
From the foregoing, it can be clearly deduced that Atty. Aguado had participation in
the crime as charged in the complaint, from the planning stage up to its execution.
These falsified documents found in his possession, as certified found in his
possession, as certified as evidenced by the PASG, were used to facilitate the
commission of the crime. The well-settled rule is that "in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the
forger and therefore guilty of falsification."[21] Atty. Aguado failed to rebut the
allegations. Other than the police blotter showing that he reported the carnapping
of his vehicle, Atty. Aguado presented no other convincing evidence to support his
denial of the crime. He also failed to show any ill motive on the part of Palmes in
testifying against him whom he claimed to have met only in February 2010.
Moreover, his story of the carnapping of his Fortuner cannot be given credence
considering his inconsistent statements on the matter. In this regard, the Court
quotes a portion of the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Oliver
Cachapero. Thus: He, too, blabbered about the supposed carnapping of his Fortuner
car on the same day the hijacking was staged by supposed PASG personnel
suggesting that he was a victim and not a perpetrator. However, his allegations in
this regard is put in serious doubt. In the QC PD alarm sheet, Respondent reported
that the carnapping took place at 2:30 of March 5, 2010 while in his sworn
statement, he claimed that his car was carnapped at 4:31 p.m. the precise time the
supposed carnapping was staged is too vital that Respondent could not have
overlooked the same in his narration of facts in his counter-affidavit or in his
statement before the police authorities expecially because he supposedly reported
the incident on the very same day it happened. But as correctly observed by the
Complainant, even if the report on the time of the carnapping incident would have
been properly made, the hijacking took place much earlier and therefore the same
does not negate the commission of the crime by the Respondent. Also, the
reporting did not prove the fact of carnapping especially where, as in this case, no
eyewitness account was presented, no suspect apprehended, and no criminal case
was filed.[22]
The Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) explicitly mandates:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar is a privilege laden with
conditions,[23] and granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and
moral qualifications required of lawyers as instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice.[24] As officers of the courts and keepers of the public's
faith, lawyers are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and so
mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.[25]
They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also this high standard
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[26] Atty, Aguado has committed acts
that showed he was unfit and unable to faithfully discharge his bounden duties as a
member of the legal profession. Because he failed to live up to the exacting
standards demanded of him, he proved himself unworthy of the privilege to
practice law. As vanguards of our legal system, lawyers, are expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal professor and to refrain from any act or
omission which might diminish the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the integrity of the legal profession.[27]
In several cases, the Court, after finding the lawyer guilty of gross dishonesty,
imposed the supreme penalty of disbarment for engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful acts by falsifying documents. In Brennisen v. Atty. Contawi,[28] the
Court disbarred the lawyer when he falsified a special power of attorney so he could
mortgage and sell his client's property. In Embido v. Atty. Pe, Jr.,[29] the penalty of
disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who authored the falsification of an
inexistent court decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is DISBARRED for gross misconduct and

violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his
name is ordered STRICKEN OFF the roll of attorneys.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be made
part of his personal records; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
LAURENCE D. PUNLA AND MARILYN SANTOS VS. ATTY. ELEONOR MARAVILLA-ONA
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The present administrative case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by
complainants Laurence D. Punla and Marilyn Santos against respondent Atty.
Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, charging the latter with violation of the lawyer's oath, for
neglecting her clients' interests.
Factual Background
The facts, as culled from the disbarment complaint, are summarized in the Report
and Recommendation[2] of Investigating Commissioner Ricardo M. Espina viz.:
In a complaint-affidavit filed on 15 January 2013, complainants alleged that they got
to know respondent lawyer sometime in January 2012 when they requested her to
notarize a Deed of Sale; that subsequently, they broached the idea to respondent
that they intend (sic) to file two (2) annulment cases and they wanted respondent
to represent them; that respondent committed to finish the two (2) annulment
cases within six (6) months from full payment; that the agreed lawyer's fee for the
two annulment cases is P350,000.00; that the P350,000.00 was paid in full by
complainants, as follows: P100,000.00 on 27 January 2012 as evidenced by
respondent's Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 55749 of even date (Annex "A");
P150,000.00 on 28 January 2012 as evidenced by respondent's Official Receipt
(O.R.) No. 56509 of even date (Annex "B"); P50,000.00 on 14 March 2012 personally
handed to respondent lawyer and evidenced by respondent's handwritten
acknowledgement receipt of same date (Annex "C"); and, P50,000.00 on 15 March
2012 deposited to respondent's Metrobank account no. 495-3-49509141-5 (Annex
"D").
On the commitment of respondent that she will (sic) finish the cases in six (6)
months, complainants followed up their cases in September 2012 or about 6
months from their last payment in March 2012. They were ignored by respondent.
On 25 September 2012, complainants sent a letter (Annex "E") to respondent
demanding that the P3 50,000.00 they paid her be refunded in full within five (5)
days from receipt of the letter. In a Certification dated 07 November 2012 (Annex
"F"), the Philpost of Dasmariñas, Cavite, attested that complainants' letter was
received by respondent on 01 October 2012. No refund was made by respondent.
[3] In an Order[4] dated January 25, 2013, the IBP directed respondent to file her
Answer within 15 days. No answer was filed. A Mandatory Conference/Hearing was
set on December 4, 2013[5] but respondent did not appear, so it was reset to
January 22, 2014.[6] However, respondent again failed to attend the mandatory
conference/hearing as scheduled. Hence, in an Order[7] dated January 22, 2014,
the mandatory conference was terminated and both parties were directed to
submit their verified position papers.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
The Investigating Commissioner was of the opinion that respondent is guilty of
violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:[8]
There is clear violation of Canons 17 and 18, Canons of Professional Responsibility.
These canons, quoted hereunder, [state]:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Of particular concern is Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to always keep the client informed of the
developments in his case and to respond whenever the client requests for
information. Respondent has miserably failed to comply with this Canon.[9]
In addition, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found that respondent has been
charged with several infractions. Thus:
Moreover, verification conducted by this Office shows that this is not the first time
that respondent lawyer has been administratively charged before this Office. As
shown in the table below, respondent is involved in the following active cases:
(NUMEROUS)
Clearly, respondent lawyer has been a serial violator of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility as shown in the thirteen (13) pending cases filed against her. Add to
that the present case and that places the total pending administrative cases against
respondent at fourteen (14). That these 14 cases were filed on different dates and
by various individuals is substantial proof that respondent has the propensity to
violate her lawyer's oath - and has not changed in her professional dealing with the
public.[10] Consequently, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be disbarred and ordered to pay complainants the amount of
P350,000.00 with legal interest until fully paid.[11]
Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XXI-2015-156[12] dated February 20,
2015, resolved to adopt the findings of the Investigating Commissioner as well as
the recommended penalty of disbarment.
The issue in this case is whether respondent should be disbarred.
Our Ruling
The Court resolves to adopt the findings of fact of the IBP but must, however,
modify the penalty imposed in view of respondent's previous disbarment.
Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court provides the penalties of disbarment and
suspension as follows: Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. Here, there is no question as to
respondent's guilt. It is clear from the records thatrespondentviolatedher lawyer's
oath and codeofconduct when she withheld from complainants the amount of
P350,000.00 given to her, despite her failure to render the necessary legal services,
and after complainants demanded its return. It cannot be stressed enough that
once a lawyer takes up the cause of a client, that lawyer is duty-bound to serve the
latter with competence and zeal, especially when he/she accepts it for a fee. The
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed upon him/her.[13] Moreover, a lawyer's failure to return upon
demand the monies he/she holds for his/her client gives rise to the presumption
that he/she has appropriated the said monies for his/her own use, to the prejudice
and in violation of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her client.[14] What is more,
this Court cannot overlook the reality that several cases had been filed against
respondent, as pointed out by the IBP. In fact, one such case eventually led to the
disbarment of respondent. In Suarez v. Maravilla-Ona,[15] the Court meted out the
ultimate penalty of disbarment and held that the misconduct of respondent was
aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing her to
file an answer and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. This
constitutes blatant disrespect towards the IBP and amounts to conduct unbecoming
a lawyer.
In the same case, the Court took note of the past disbarment complaints that had
been filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona viz.:
x x x In A.C. No. 10107 entitled Beatrice C. Yatco, represented by her Attorney-In-
Fact, Marivic Yatco v. Atty. Eleanor Maravilla-Ona, the complainant filed a
disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for issuing several worthless checks as
rental payments for the complainant's property and for refusing to vacate the said
property, thus forcing the latter to file an ejectment case against Atty. Maravilla-
Ona. The IBP required Atty. Maravilla-Ona to file her Answer, but she failed to do
so. Neither did she make an appearance during the scheduled mandatory
conference. In its Resolution dated February 13, 2013, the IBP found Atty.
Maravilla-Ona guilty of serious misconducty and for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code. The Court later adopted and approved the IBP's findings in its Resolution
of September 15, 2014, and suspended Atty. Maravilla-Ona from the practice of law
for a period of one year.
In yet another disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona, docketed as A.C. No.
10944[,] and entitled Norma M. Gutierrez v. Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, the
complainant therein alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Maravilla-Ona
and gave her the amount of P80,000.00 for the filing of a case in court. However,
Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to file the case, prompting the complainant to withdraw
from the engagement and to demand the return of the amount she paid. Atty.
Maravilla-Ona returned P15,000.00[,] and executed a promissory note to pay the
remaining P65,000.00. However, despite several demands, Atty. Maravilla-Ona
failed to refund completely the complainant's money. Thus, a complaint for
disbarment was filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for grave misconduct, gross
negligence and incompetence. But again, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to file her
Answer and [to] appear in the mandatory conference before the IBP. The IBP found
that Atty. Maravilla-Ona violated Canon 16, Rule 16.03 of the Code [of Professional
Responsibility] and recommended her suspension for a period of five (5) years,
considering her previous infractions. The Court, however, reduced Atty. Maravilla-
Ona's penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely. She was also ordered to return the complainant's money.
Clearly, Atty. Maravilla-Ona exhibits the habit of violating her oath as a lawyer and
the Code [of Professional Responsibility], as well as defying the processes of the IBP.
The Court cannot allow her blatant disregard of the Code [of Professional
Responsibility] and her sworn duty as a member of the Bar to continue. She had
been warned that a similar violation [would] merit a more severe penalty, and yet,
her reprehensible conduct has, again, brought embarrassment and dishonor to the
legal profession.[16]
Back to the case at bar: While indeed respondent's condemnable acts ought to
merit the penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar her anew, for in this jurisdiction
we do not impose double disbarment.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ADOPTS the findings of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and FINDS respondent ATTY. ELEONOR MARAVILLA-ONA GUILTY of gross
and continuing violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and accordingly
FINED P40,000.00. Respondent is also ORDERED to PAY complainants the amount of
P350,000.00, with 12% interest from the date of demand until June 30, 2013 and
6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.[17] This is without prejudice to
the complainants' filing of the appropriate criminal case, if they so desire.
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall
append the same to the personal record of respondent; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, which shall circulate the
same to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
ORTIGAS PLAZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is
sworn to respect the law and legal processes, and any violation thereof merits
condign disciplinary action against the lawyer. The present complaint asks for the
disbarment of Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak for his participation in the forcible intrusion
into the complainant's property.
Antecedents
Complainant Ortigas Plaza Development Corporation owned the parcel of land
located in Ortigas Avenue Extension, Pasig City and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. PT-126797 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal (property). The complainant
alleges that at around 11:00 a.m. of November 29, 2012, Atty. Tumulak,
accompanied by uniformed guards of the Nationwide Security Agency, Inc.,
unlawfully entered and took control of the entrance and exit of the property. It
appears that prior to the incident, Atty. Tumulak had furnished several documents
to the complainant, including the deed of assignment executed by one Henry F.
Rodriguez as the administrator of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes R.
Rodriguez designating Atty. Tumulak as an assignee.[1] The documents furnished by
Atty. Tumulak were all related to the intestate proceedings of the Estate of the late
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez docketed as S.P. No. IR-1110 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 34, in Iriga City (RTC), which involved the claim of the heirs of the
late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez to several parcels of land situated all over the
country, including the Provinces of Rizal, Quezon, and Bulacan, and Quezon City,
Caloocan City, Pasay City, Antipolo City, Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Marikina
City, Baguio City, Angeles City, San Fernando City and Tagaytay City.[2] The
complainant charges Atty. Tumulak with deceit, dishonesty and fraud for claiming
to have coordinated with the proper government agencies prior to the illegal and
forcible intrusion.[3] The complainant manifests that as a lawyer, Atty. Tumulak
ought to know that the claim of his principal in the property was barred by res
judicata due to the valid issuance of a Torrens title under its name. Accordingly, his
conduct constituted conduct unbecoming of a lawyer deserving of sanction.[4] In
his answer to the complaint,[5] Atty. Tumulak denies having been present when the
security guards of Nationwide Security Agency entered the complainant's property.
He insists that the allegations against him were pure hearsay because Ms. Montero,
the representative of the complainant, had no personal knowledge of the incident;
that the documents he had furnished to the complainant included records of the
intestate proceedings in the RTC involving the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez and Antonio Rodriguez; that he had no hand in procuring the documents;
that he did not himself enter the property; and that the entry into the property was
effected by the sheriff pursuant to a writ of execution.
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
After due hearing, IBP Commissioner of Bar Discipline Ricardo M. Espina submitted
his Report and Recommendation,[6] wherein he found Atty. Tumulak to have
violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Espina recommended the suspension of Atty. Tumulak from the
practice of law for two years. On October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XXII-2015-57 adopting the findings and recommendation of
Commissioner Espina[7] viz.:
RESOLUTION NO. XXII-2015-57 CIBD Case No. 13-3707: Ortigas Plaza Dev't Corp. vs.
Atty. Tumulak
RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of facts and recommended penalty of 2 years
su5pension of Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak by the Investigating Commissioner.
Issue: Did Atty. Tumulak violate Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he facilitated the implementation of the writ of
execution and the entry into the complainant's property?
Ruling of the Court
Atty. Tumulak deserves to be severely sanctioned for violating the Lawyer's Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Pertinent portions of Commissioner
Espina's Report and Recommendation, which adequately illustrated Atty. Tumulak' s
transgressions, are worth quoting verbatim, viz.:
We enumerate respondent lawyer's violation of the following rules/principles when
he led the forcible intrusion into OPDC office in Pasig City:
a) Atty. Tumulak knew, or ought to know, that property claims based on Spanish
title can no longer be cited as legitimate basis for ownership as of 16 February 1976
by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892;
b) Respondent lawyer, as a long-time practitioner (admitted to the Bar in 1971), is
presumed to know that the Supreme Court has promulgated a case specifically
addressing the fake titles arising from spurious "Deed of Assignment" of the
supposed Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. This is the 2005 case of
Evangelista, et al. vs. Santiago [G.R. No. 157447; April 29, 2005] where the same
modus as the one adopted by respondent lawyer, was used by an "assignee" in
claiming properties located in Paranque, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Cavitc, Batangas,
Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and
Rizal, allegedly as part of the Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez;
c) x x x x;
d) While respondent lawyer claims that the "deed of assignment" in his favor has a
consideration, unfortunately we did not see any agreed consideration in the
document. If there is no monetary consideration, it will be treated as a donation
with the corresponding payable taxes. Respondent lawyer's documents don't show
that taxes have been paid for the document to be legally binding
e) Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally but can only be questioned in a
principal action x x x. If respondent lawyer thinks that OPDC's title on the Pasig
property is questionable, he could have tiled an action to annul OPDC's title and not
bring in the cavalry, so to speak, in the form of uniformed security guards, to take
over the property; and
f) We find respondent's actions highly questionable and contrary to legal protocol;
(i) the court documents were issued by the RTC-Iriga City, Br. 94; (ii) it "affects" a
property located in Pasig City; (iii) respondent lawyer became the "assignee" of a
Pasig City property; (iv) no taxes were paid for the "assignment"; (v) assistance of
the Sheriff of Pasig was not enlisted by respondent, instead, he enlists the help of
the Sheriff of Manila; (vi) all that the Sheriff of Manila did was to deliver the RTC-
Iriga, Br. 34 court documents to complainant but with a twist; the Sheriff and
respondent lawyer were escorted by a phalanx of security guards; (vii) the
uniformed guards, obviously upon instruction, took over and/or controlled the
gates of OPDC offices with attendant force and intimidation. Respondent lawyer's
claimed innocence cannot prevail over these illegalities of which he, or his agents,
had a hand.
With the above highly questionable acts totally irreconcilable with a seasoned
practitioner like respondent lawyer, we find Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak liable for
violation of Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 and
1.02 thereof. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis) Commissioner Espina
correctly observed that the Court in the 2005 ruling in Evangelista v. Santiago[8]
had already enjoined the successors and heirs of the late Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership in land
registration proceedings, as follow: In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to
the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of the
same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-
interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by lsmael Favila in their favor,
attached to and an integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners
predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property on the Spanish
title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the
Subject Property on their possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the
same time, on the Spanish title granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession
since time immemorial carried the presumption that the land had never been part
of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish
conquest. If the Subject Property was already private property before the Spanish
conquest, then it would have been beyond the power of the Queen of Spain to
award or grant to anyone.
The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-
interest could be traced only as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez. Petitioners, having acquired portions of the Subject Property by
assignment, could acquire no better title to the said portions than their
predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can only be based on the same
Spanish title. Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from
invoking the Spanish title as basis of their ownership of the Subject Property. P.D.
No. 892 strengthens the Torrens system by discontinuing the system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring all lands recorded
under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title, unregistered lands. It
further provides that within six months from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish
titles or grants should apply for registration of their land under what is now P.D. No.
1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles
can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration
proceedings under the Torrens system. Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the
Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing ownership over real
property.
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in
their name covering the Subject Property. In the absence of an allegation in
petitioners' Complaint that petitioners predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D.
No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed to
comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were
already enjoined from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership of
the Subject Property in registration proceedings.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest title, but
only confirm and record title already created and vested. By virtue of P.D. No. 892,
the courts, in registration proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded
from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore dictates
that courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such
Spanish title in some other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of
cloud on or quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or registration. To
rule otherwise would open the doors to the circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give
rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would
never be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would definitely
undermine the Torrens system and cause confusion and instability in property
ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to eliminate. Moreover, in Santiago v. Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority,[10] the Court denied the petition of the successors of
the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by applying the principle of stare decisis, ruling
therein that the applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary
evidence were identical to those in the situation in Evangelista v. Santiago, thusly:
The present petition is substantially infirm as this Court had already expressed in
the case of Nemencio C. Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago, that the
Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, the Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos of
1891, has been divested of any evidentiary value to establish ownership over real
property. Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R.
Santiago anchor their right to recover possession of the subject real property on
claim of ownership by Victoria M. Rodriguez being the sole heir of the named
grantee, Hermogenes Rodriguez, in the Spanish title Titulo de Propriedad de
Torrenos.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must be denied by virtue of the
principle of stare decisis. Not only are the legal rights and relations of herein parties
substantially the same as those passed upon in the aforementioned 2005
Evangelista Case, but the facts, the applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial
and documentary evidence are identical such that a ruling in one case, under the
principle of stare decisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[11]
Finally, the 2011 ruling in Pascual v. Robles [12] affirmed the decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) setting aside the amended decision rendered in S.P. No. IR-1110 by
the RTC. This ruling should have alerted Atty. Tumulak from taking the actions giving
rise to the complaint against him inasmuch as he has admitted to have derived his
rights from the deed of assignment executed in his favor by Henry Rodriguez as the
administrator of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez pursuant to said
amended decision. Moreover, Atty. Tumulak is presumed as a lawyer to know the
developments in S.P. No. IR-1110 not only by virtue of his becoming an assignee of
the estate but also because of his being a lawyer with the constant responsibility of
keeping abreast of legal developments.[13] Atty. Tumulak cannot shield himself
from personal responsibility behind the deed of assignment. The deed was doubtful
on its face, as borne out by the text, to wit:
DEED OF ASSIGNMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS
This Deed of Assignment is made and executed by and between The INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
HERMOGENES R. RODRIGUEZ AND ANTONIO R. RODRIGUEZ, represented by HENRY F. RODRIGUEZ, of
legal age, widower, Filipino, x xx Judicial Heir and Court-Appointed Administrator by virtue of AMENDED
DECISION dated August 13, 19999 of Fifth Judicial Region, RTC Branch 34, lriga City in SPECS. PROCS. No.
IR-1110 which settled the issue of Heirship, Administratorship and Settled [sic] of the Estate of
Hem1ogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes Estate, hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNOR; -and-
EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, of legal age, widower x x x hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNEE: WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the ASSIGNOR is the Court-Appointed Administrator and one of the Judicial heirs of the
Intestate Estate of the late HERMOGENES and ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ y REYES Estate by virtue of
AMENDED DECISION dated Augsut 13, 1999 of Fifth Judicial Region, RTC Branch 34, Iriga City in SPECS.
PROCS. No. IR-1110 which settled the issue of Heirship, Administratorship and Settlement of the Estate
of Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes Estate, thereafter, petitions for certiorari tiled with the
SUPREME COURT assailing the aforesaid Amended Decision were DENIED and declared FINAL &
EXECUTORY in G.R. Nos. 140271, 140915, 168648, 142477 and 182645, affirming the same Amended
Decision; Whereas, the ASSIGNEE has secured the property and actual occupant/s over the same
property they arc presently occupying and initiating steps for recovery of the same parcel and has shown
exemplary loyalty and faithfulness to the ASSIGNOR and also consistently protected the rights and
interest of the Estate against intruder, impostor, usurpers and false claimant with spurious title/s over
the same property; NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing, the ASSIGNOR has
agreed to execute this DEED OF ASSIGNMENT and the ASSIGNEE, has accepted and both parties have
mutually agreed to the following terms and conditions herein stipulated;
A parcel of land situated in Ortigas Avenue corner Raymundo Avenue, Barangay Rosario, Pasig City,
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon, with containing an area of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGTH [sic] HUNDRED
AND NINE[TY] ONE SQUARE METERS (35,891) more or less technical description described below, to
1. That the ASSIGNEE shall shoulder all the expenses in the performance of the task as indicated x x x
above such as payment for the real taxes, titling, researching, liaising with government agencies, paying
lawyers involved in the litigation, and other incidental expenses relevant in the consummation of the
said transaction;
2. That the ASSIGNEE shall secure and facilities (sic] all documents from Land Registration Authority,
DENR-LMB, DENR-LMS, Register of Deeds and such other government agencies concerned for the
completion of titling process subject to the existing laws, rules and regulation in accordance to Land
Registration Act;
3. That the ASSIGNEE shall perform the task of relocation and verification[,] land survey, possessing,
fencing, guarding, surveying and or reviving plans, paying taxes, titling, selling, leasing, developing,
segregating and mortgaging;
4. That the ASSIGNEE shall be the AD-LITEM representative of the ASSIGNOR, before of [sic] any Court[,]
Administrative and Quasi-Judicial body and to bring suit, defend, in connection with the actions brought
for or against the ASSIGNOR of whatever nature and kind; and
5. That the ASSIGNEE shall report regularly to the ASSIGNOR per the above tasks and accomplishment.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their respective signatures on the date 22 March
2010 and place QUEZON CITY above written.[14] (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Atty. Tumulak cannot deny his personal participation in the unlawful and forcible
intrusion into the property just because the complainant did not establish his
physical presence thereat at the time. In fact, such physical participation was not
even necessary in order to properly implicate him in personal responsibility for the
intrusion after he admitted having furnished to the complainant the deed of
assignment and other documents as the source of his authority. Specifically, his
duties under the deed of assignment included "shoulder[ing] all the expenses in the
performance of [securing the property x x x and initiating steps for recovery of the
same parcel] x x x such as x x x or payment for the real taxes, titling, researching,
liaising with government agencies, paying lawyers involved in the litigation, and
other incidental expenses relevant in the consummation of the said transaction;"
and "possessing, fencing, [and] guarding" the property. It is notable in this
connection that Atty. Tumulak had been discharging his role as the assignee since
the time of the execution of the deed of assignment on March 22, 2010.
Considering that he had been in charge of doing all the actions necessary to enforce
the interest of his principal since March 22, 2010, and that the forcible intrusion
complained about occurred on November 29, 2012, or more than two years from
the execution of the deed of assignment, he is reasonably and ineluctably presumed
to have coordinated all the actions leading to the intrusion.
Finally, even assuming that the amended decision was valid and enforceable, Atty.
Tumulak could not legitimately resort to forcible intrusion to advance the interest
of the assignor. The more appropriate action for him would be to cause the
annulment of the complainant's title instead of forcibly entering the property with
the aid of armed security personnel. All told, Atty. Tumulak was guilty of
misconduct for circumventing existing laws and disregarding settled rulings in order
to commit injustice against the complainant. His conduct betrayed his Lawyer's
Oath "to support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of of the Philippines; and to all courts in the Philippines for their information and
the duly constituted authorities therein." He breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 guidance.
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
SO ORDERED.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02 -A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

To the best of his ability, every lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law,
and to avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. The lawyer's personal
deference to the law not only speaks of his or her commendable character but also
inspires in the public a becoming respect and obedience to the law.[15] The sworn
obligation of every lawyer under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility to respect the law and the legal processes is a continuing condition
for retaining membership in the Legal Profession. The lawyer must act and comport
himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the Legal Profession.[16] Members of the Bar are reminded, therefore,
that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than to seek
exceptions as loopholes.[17] A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or
who connives in violating the law commits an act that warrants disciplinary action
against him or her.[18] The suspension from the practice of law or disbarment of a
lawyer is justified if he or she proves unworthy of the trust and confidence imposed
by the Lawyer's Oath, or is otherwise found to be wanting in that honesty and
integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar in the performance of their
professional duties.[19] Although the Court imposed a six-month suspension from
the practice of law on erring lawyers found violating Canon l, Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
[20] we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to suspend Atty. Tumulak from the
practice of law for a period of two years. Such penalty was appropriate and condign
in relation to the misconduct he committed as well as to the prejudice he caused
the complainant.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EUGENIO S.

TUMULAK guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Canon 1, and Rules 1.01 and
1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for a period of TWO(2) YEARS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, with the
STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to the respondent's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar
A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014 ERLINDA FOSTER v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of
respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1)
year for ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to
complainant. From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), received a complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster
(complainant) against respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful”3
acts as a lawyer. In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file
his Answer within 15 days from receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so and
complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011,
the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory
conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or
five (5) days before the scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified
Answer.6During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband
appeared. She submitted a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of which
were furnished the respondent. The Investigating Commissioner7 indicated that the
said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was
a need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for
resolution based on the documents on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory
conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the morning or after
the proceeding was terminated. On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her
Reply to respondent’s Answer. On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of
the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case
Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay
complainant and her husband the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively,
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid,
plus cost of suit.10
Complainant’s Position
From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in
connection with her legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered
into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their discussion,
complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate
case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent
P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.11 On
September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in
relation to the legal problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in
her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the
repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent being her
lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory note13
evidenced the loan. In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra
Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a lot she had previously purchased.
She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a
case for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent
requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as
filing fee.14 When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high
value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and accommodations in Manila,
for the service of the summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant
confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled
Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to
P22,410.00 per trial court records.15 During a conversation with the Registrar of
Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the one who notarized
the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this,
respondent merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to handle
complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with
the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the documents
issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the
deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the
method of payment which was not the point of contention in the case; and 4] the
very anomalies she complained of were not mentioned. Respondent, however,
assured her that those matters could be brought up during the hearings. On April
23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to
him the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or
emergency.”16 Complainant obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of
P22,000.00. On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and
demanded the sum of P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange
for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but
she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt,17
stating that “it is understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after
favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November 2, 2010, respondent
insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next
hearing of the case, because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance. Yet
again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00. On
September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified
by respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when
she personally checked the status of the case with the court. She went to the office
of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy
of the order of dismissal. On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant
and gave her a copy of the motion for reconsideration. On January 15, 2011,
complainant went to see respondent and requested him to prepare a reply to the
comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include
additional facts because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the
documents unless these were amended; and to make the additional averment that
the defendant was using false documents. On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver
delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message from him that the
matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the
same, however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so included.
On the same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s directive
for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a
present. Complainant was also told that oral arguments on the case had been set
the following month.19On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the
services of respondent as her counsel and wrote him a letter of termination,20 after
her friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had been
acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant
wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from her
less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.
Respondent’s Position
In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been
engaged in the practice of law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP
Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the
Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was
not paid his notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for
complainant for which he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee
and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent
averred that it was complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered
the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The
transaction was declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about its
payment. As regards the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees,
respondent claimed that the said amount was suggested by the complainant herself
who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the case.
He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their
hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the
same vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having
received P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied having told her that the case
would be discussed with the judge who would rule in their favor at the very next
hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the possibility that the
other party would befriend the judge. He never said that he would personally
present a bottle of wine to the judge. Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s
comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past. Respondent saw
nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that another
counsel was assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of
the nature of her cause of action and the consequences of the suit, complainant
was aware of the applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of
counterclaim, respondent demanded just compensation for the services he had
rendered in other cases for the complainant.
Reply of Complainant
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making
reference to the receipts in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted
the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also emphasized that
respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him. While
respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government
of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several documents involving
Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra
Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to
respondent was never considered as “no loan.” On June 26, 2012, complainant
furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated June 20,
2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable
cause against respondent for estafa.23
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner
found respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year. In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the
IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the recommendation of
suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to
complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee
amounting to P127,590.00. Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on
January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for reconsideration.25 Complainant
filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging
respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding
order for his arrest had been issued.26
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for
reconsideration but modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law
by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise
ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant
amounting to P127,590.00. No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Court’s Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with respect to respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR.
The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on
representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s
conduct is “not confined to the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer
may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”27
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct,
both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled
complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than
the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of
the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In
other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and
dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth,
the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who
suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly
improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation,
would propose such amount that would further burden her financial resources.
Assuming that the complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant
amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should
not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be
knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose
to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good
faith expected of all members of the legal profession. Moreover, the “fiduciary
nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client.”28 Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the
purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand
the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he
has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him
by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.29 It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out,
he received various amounts from complainant but he could not account for all of
them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by
complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged
filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the presumption that he
has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by, the client.30 When a lawyer receives money from the client
for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the
lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to the client.31 Somewhat showing a propensity to
demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client, respondent displayed
a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as
“representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case,
in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing
that he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently
demanded and received the other half of the amount at the time the case had
already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct
that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding
a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a
positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act
of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the
entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe
their utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way
should a lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the image of judges, lest the
public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous
doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given
gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the
said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondent’s
actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts. As it turned out,
complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture,
respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his
client of the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire with the
court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in
his duty to his client.
Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records
reveal that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that
“[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.” In his
private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of
considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and
borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her
to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or
emergency” but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions
were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was
never questioned by respondent. These acts were committed by respondent in his
private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were
indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence
reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses
raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions
provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Respondent’s
assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality of complainant
and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his inappropriate behavior.
The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter
failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair
dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to
complainant. Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure
to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for
the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected
to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society,
to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
obligations.32 Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or
“misconduct,” the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but also
covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his
profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be
found guilty of misconduct on both scores. With respect to respondent’s alleged
representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to modify the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant
presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party,
Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should
ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the
standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the
client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer
of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of
the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests.”33
Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must
decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of the
prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a
written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to
hold respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of
complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services
in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having
notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in
complainant’s case. While the Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint
in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract, and that
only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged,
the Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was made exists.
The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to
the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear
admission of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed document.
Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire document or the intention of
the parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in
action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he was involved in
the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial
fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such
indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close
dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no record of any written
consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the
relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree,
but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has
the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with
undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession
suffers.”34
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office
as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of
the legal profession as embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice of law is “a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those
who are qualified and who possess good moral character.”36 The appropriate
penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.37
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath;
(6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful
appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred
or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor,
or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a
lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three (3) months recommended
by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and
omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling
indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
 of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.”44
in dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for
undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross
judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby
than the penalty of disbarment.38 DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the complainant,
Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from
complainant in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to
private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on all courts.
liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the SO ORDERED.
court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern
of the Court is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings
have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose
against each other. To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his
right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly with the Court.
Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the
quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance
of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”40
In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence,
which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable.41 Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive
period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a
rule, imprescriptible.42 Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to
return the amount of P127,590.00 representing the balance of the filing fees he
received from complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyer-client
relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which
respondent received from complainant, as representation expenses for the
handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the
judge. These were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant.
While respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of
the judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the
same as it was borne out of their professional relationship. As to his other
obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable for the personal loans he
contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against him. All told,
in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view Cesar O. Sta. Ana, et al. Vs. Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes; A.C. No. 6980; August 30,
of preserving the purity of the legal profession.”43 The Court likewise aims to 2017
ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by “purging the profession RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.***:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainants against Atty. Antonio Jose
F. Cortes (respondent) against whom they imputed deceit and falsification of public
documents in the sale of two parcels of property located at Bo. Lantic, Carmona,
Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-1069335 and T-
1069336; and in the donation of66 pieces of property by Atty. Cesar Casal (Atty.
Casal) and his wife, Pilar P. Casal (Pilar).
Factual Antecedents
In a sworn letter dated August 4, 2005, complainants alleged that respondent was
left ith the care and maintenance of several properties either owned or under the
administration of Atty. Casal since the latter’s death; that respondent abused his
authority, as such administrator, and engineered the sale or transfer of the said
properties, specifically the two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-1069335 and
T-1069336, which were owned originally by their (complainants’) ancestors; that on
May 19, 2004, respondent, in connivance with Cesar Inis (Inis) and A Casal’s alleged
adopted daughter, Gloria Casal Cledera (Gloria), and her husband, Hugh Cledera
(the spouses Cledera), sold the abovementioned parcels of land to the Property
Company of Friends, Inc. (PCFI).[1]
Complainants further averred that as the said properties were originally in the
names of Inis, Ruben Loyola (Loyola), Angela Lacdan (Lacdan) and Cesar Veloso
Casal (Veloso), these persons, in conspiracy with respondent, caused to be executed
a Special Power of Attorney[2] (SPA) dated May 4, 2004, under which Loyola,
Lacdan and Veloso purportedly authorized their co-owner Inis to sell the said
properties; that this SPA was, however, forged or falsified, because Loyola was
already dead on August 15, 1994, whereas Lacdan died on August 31, 2001, and at
the time of the execution of the SPA in Catmona, Cavite, Veloso was in fact in
Tacloban City; and that indeed, as a consequence of respondent’s wrongdoing,
criminal cases for Estata through Falsification of Public Document were filed against
respondent and the spouses Cledera.[3]
Complainants moreover claimed that respondent notarized 12 falsified Deeds of
Donation, dated September 17 and 18, 2003, and supposedly executed in Carmona,
Cavite, under which it was made to appear that Atty. Casal purportedly donated 66
pieces of property to Gloria; that they (complainants) caused to be
verified/examined Atty. Casal’s “superimposed” signatures on these deeds of
donation by the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI); and that in its Disposition Forms, the NBI concluded that “the
signatures appearing on the said questioned documents are mere xerox copies
which do not truly and clearly reflect the minute details of the writing strokes and
other aspects relative to the preparation of the questioned signatures.”[4]
In his answer, respondent asserted that all the criminal complaints against him had
been dismissed, and the criminal information/s instituted therefor had been
withdrawn by the Department of Justice (DOJ), hence, he had been exonerated of
all the charges against him. Respondent adverted to the Resolution of Regional
State Prosecutor Ernesto C. Mendoza, which in part declared –
x x x the signatures of Cesar E. Casal appearing on the said questioned documents
are mere xerox copies which do not truly and clearly reflect the minute details of
the writing strokes and other aspects relative to the preparation of the questioned
signatures.
Nowhere in this report was there a categorical statement that the document was
falsified or the signatures were forged. x x x[5]
In a Resolution[6] dated November 27, 2006, the Court resolved to refer this
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
The Investigating Commissioner summarized the charges against respondent as
follows:
(a)
First, [r]espondent was involved in the preparation of the Loyola SPA, which was
used to sell the [s)ubject [p]roperties to PCFI, despite the fact that two (2) of the
alleged signatories therein were already dead at the time the Loyola SPA was
executed;
(b)
Second, [r]espondent prepared and notarized 12 Deeds of Donation, which [appear]
to be spurious because the signatures of Atty. Casal thereon were only
superimposed;
(c)
Third, [r]espondent notarized the 12 Deeds of Donation in Quezon City, within his
territorial jurisdiction as a notary public x x x despite the fact that Atty. Casal signed
the same in x x x Cavite, or outside his jurisdiction as a notary public;
(d)
Fourth, [r]espondent caused the preparation of the Casal SPA, which appears to be
spurious because the signature of Atty. Casal thereon was only superimposed; and
(e)
Fifth, [r]espondent knowingly used the spurious Casal SPA and executed a Deed of
Sale in favor of PCFI involving other properties.[7]
After due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner submitted a Report[8] dated
May 14, 2010, finding respondent not only guilty of dishonesty and deceitful
conduct, but also guilty of having violated hls oath as a notary public.
In finding respondent guilty of using a falsified document, the Investigating
Commissioner noted that although there was no direct evidence that it was
respondent himself who prepared or drafted the SPA, there was evidence
nonetheless that respondent did actively participate, or take part, in the offer and
sale of the properties to the PCFI; and that since the execution of the forged or
falsified SPA is a crucial or critical component of the eventual consummation of the
sale to PCFI, respondent could not be heard to say that he had no knowledge of the
use of a falsified document.[9]
As regards the 12 Deeds of Donation allegedly executed by Atty. Casal, the
Investigating Commissioner lent more credence to the unbiased or impartial report
of the NBI’s finding that the signatures of Atty. Casal were per se mere xerox copies;
and that moreover, respondent had violated Section 240[10] of the Revised
Administrative Code, when he caused to be acknowledged the Deeds of Donation in
his law office in Quezon City, despite the fact that these were supposedly signed
and executed by Atty. Casal in Cavite. The Investigating Commissioner opined that
respondent “ought to have known that since he was outside his territorial
jurisdiction as a notary public, he could not have performed the acts of a notary
public at the time of the signing of the 12 Deeds of Donation, including the taking of
oath of the parties.”[11]
The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:
1. ATTY. ANTONIO JOSE F. CORTES be suspended from the practice of law for a
period ranging from six (6) months to two (2) years with a STERN WARNING that
repetition of the same or similar acts or conduct shall be dealt with more severely;
and
2. ATTY. ANTONIO JOSE F. CORTES be barred from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two (2) years, and in the event that he is presently
commissioned as notary public, that his commission be immediately revoked and
suspended for such period.[12]
In its Resolution[13] dated May 10, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the
recommended penalty to a one-year suspension from the practice of law, with
revocation of respondent’s notarial license, plus a two-year disqualification from
reappointment as notary public. The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part ofthis Resolution as
Annex “A”, and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent’s violation of
the Notarial Law, Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year and his Notarial Commission immediately REVOKED
presently commissioned. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as
Notary Publicfor two (2) years.
No motions for reconsideration having been filed by any of the parties, the case is
before us for fmal resolution.
Our Ruling
Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal
system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [It is only in living up to the
very high standards and tenets of the legal profession that] the people’s faith and
confidence in the judicial system can be ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined –
whether in their professional or in their private capacity – for any conduct that is
wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.[14]
In the instant case, respondent acted with deceit when he used the falsified
documents to effect the transfer of properties owned or administered by the late
Atty. Casal. In a letter[15] sent by Atty. Florante O. Villegas, counsel for the PCFI, to
the spouses Cledera, the former explicitly stated that respondent did have a hand in
the negotiation leading to the sale of the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-1069335
and T-1069336. In clarifying that it only entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale
because of the “offer and representation that spouses Cesar and Pilar Casal are the
true owners of the subject parcels of land,”[16] the PCFI, through its legal counsel,
declared:
We understand that you, together with Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes, offered to sell
the said parcels ofland to our client, and that on September 17, 2003, an agreement
of Purchase and Sale was executed between Spouses Cesar E. Casal and Pilar P.
Casal (represented by Atty. Cortes as their attorney-in-fact) and our client.[17]
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Mr. Guillermo C. Choa, President of the PCFI, narrated in his affidavit[18]
the events leading to another sale likewise involving properties coowned by Atty.
Casal through the use of the spurious SPA, to wit:
3) That sometime in August 2003, Sps. Hugh Cledera and Gloria Casal Cledera and
Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes offered to me for sale several parcels of land owned by
Cesar E. Casal (father of Gloria Casal Cledera) including Lot 5, Psu 10120 and Lot 6,
Psu 101205 containing an area of 39,670 square meters and 47,638 square meters,
more or less, located at Bo. Lantic, Carmona, Cavite which was then registered in
the name of Eduardo Gan, et al. under TCT No. T-79153 of the Register of Deeds fur
the Province of Cavite.
4) That Sps. Hugh Cledera and Gloria Casal Cledera together with Atty. Cortes also
presented to me the following documents, to wit:
a)
TCT No. T-79153 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite.
b)
Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 15, 1990 executed by heirs of Eduardo B.
Gan, et al. in favor of Cesar E. Casal, Cesar Inis, Ruben Loyola and Angela Lacdan.
c)
Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 19, 1990 executed by Cesar Veloso Casal, et.
al. in favor ofSps. Cesar and Pilar Casal.
xxxx
6) That in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, it was agreed that the seller shall
register the several Deeds of Sale and deliver the titles over said properties to Pro-
friends (PCFI). In the above-mentioned Agreement of Purchase and Sale, Sps. Casal
were represented by their duly authorized attorney-in-fact, Atty. Antonio Jose F.
Cortes, of legal age, Filipino, with address at 2/F ELCO Bldg., 202 E. Rodriguez, Sr.,
Blvd., Quezon City. Present during negotiations for the terms and conditions to be
contained in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale aside from myself and Atty.Cortes
were Sps. Hugh and Gloria Cledera, the son-in-law and daughter, respectively of
Sps. Casal; x x x[19] (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, it cannot be denied that it was respondent who engineered the execution
of the 12 Deeds of Donation involving 66 pieces of Atty. Casal’s property.
Respondent was personally present dwing the alleged signing of the Deeds of
Donation in Cavite, which deeds he brought afterwards to his law office in Quezon
City, and notarized the same. Indeed, in his Affidavit, respondent stated:
11. When I presented the documents for signature of the donorsspouses, Cesar E.
Casal and Pilar P. Casal, the late Cesar E. Casal stamped the rubber facsimile of his
genuine signature in all the spaces provided in all copies of the Deeds of Donation.
At the same time and place, I also saw his wife Pilar P. Casal affixed [sic] her own
signature in the Deeds of Donation. Also present dming the signing occasion was
the donee herself, Dr. Gloria P. Casal, as well as, [sic] her husband, Dr. Hugh Cledera
who affixed their signatures in all the copies of the Deeds of Donation in my
presence.
12. Thereafter, I gathered and brought all the signed copies of the Deeds of
Donation to my office in Quezon City, and notarized them. Record shows that I
notarized them and entered the documents in my Notarial Registry on September
17 and 18, 2003.[20] (Emphasis supplied)
By using the falsified SPA and by knowingly notarizing documents outside of his
notarial commission’s jurisdiction, respondent was evidently bereft of basic
integrity which is an indispensable sine qua non of his ongoing membership, in good
standing, in the legal profession, and as a duly-commissioned notary public.
In actively participating in the offer and sale of property to PCFI, respondent was
guilty of deceit and dishonesty by leveraging on the use of a spurious Special Power
of Attorney
There can be no debate either as to the fact that respondent made use of a forged
or falsified SPA in his dealings with PCFI. As the lawyer who assisted in the sale of
the properties through the use of the falsified SPA in question, he ought to know
that the use of such falsified or forged SPA gives rise to grievous legal consequences
which must inevitably enmesh him professionally. As a member of the Bar in
apparent good legal standing, he effectively held himself out as a trustworthy agent
for the principals he was purportedly representing in the transaction/s in question.
Respondent’s act of notarizing a forged Deed of Donation outside of his jurisdiction
is a violation of his duties as a notary public, as well as a blatant falsification of
public document
This Court agrees with the fmdings of the IBP Board of Governors which upheld the
impartial report of the NBI and its findings that the signatures on the Deeds of
Donation were mere photocopies attached to the said Deeds.[21]Given the fact that
respondent admitted to having been with the late Atty. Casal at the time of the
execution of the Deed, it would not be far-fetched to say that the use of the said
mere photocopies was with his knowledge and consent. What is more, his act of
bringing the Deeds of Donation that were executed in Carmona, Cavite, to his law
office in Quezon City, and notarizing them there, not only violated Section 240 of
the Revised Administrative Code but “also [partook] of malpractice of law and
falsification.”[22]
Section 240 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly states:
Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. – The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province
shall be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the
City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority
to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.[23] (Emphasis supplied)

Needless to say, respondent cannot escape from the clutches of this provision.

The dismissal of the criminal complaints against respondent did not change the sui
generis character of disbarment proceedings

Respondent’s contention that the DOJ had resolved to withdraw the criminal
complaints filed against him and his co-accused, the spouses Cledera,[24] does not
persuade. The dismissal or withdrawal of the criminal complaints/ information/sat
the instance of the DOJ, is of no moment. As a member of the Bar, respondent
should know that administrative cases against lawyers are sui generis, or a class of
their own. “Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance.”[25] Disbarment cases are aimed at purging the legal
profession of individuals who obdurately scorn and despise the exalted standards of
the noble profession of law. It is within this Court’s power, as a check and balance
to its own system, to ensure undeviating integrity by members of the Bar both on
the professional and the personal level. It is only by maintaining this integrity and
this loyalty to the law, to the Courts of Justice and to their client and the public at
large, that lawyers are enabled to maintain the trust reposed upon them and to
deliver justice inside and outside the courtroom.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year and his Notarial Commission immediately REVOKED, if he is
presently commissioned. Furthermore, he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as
Notary Public for two (2) years, reckoned from the date of finality of this Resolution.

Furnish a copy of this Resolution to the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall
append the same to the personal record of respondent; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, which shall circulate the
same to all courts in the country for their infonnation and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10553
FILIPINAS O. CELEDONIO, vs. ATTY. JAIME F. ESTRABILLO, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
For Our resolution is complainant Filipinas O. Celedonio's disbarment complaint1
against respondent Atty. Jaime F. Estrabillo, charging the latter with the violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 9, Rule 1.09, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Canon 15,
Rules 15.03 and 15.04, Canon 17, and Canon 19, Rule 19.01 and 19.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
The instant disbarment case stemmed from a criminal case of Estafa filed by Alfrito
D. Mah (Mah) against complainant's husband in 2006, the latter being accused of
embezzling a substantial amount from Mah's company. In the said case, respondent
was Mah's legal counsel.2 Complainant averred that she tried talking to Mr. Mah's
wife, being one of the sponsors in their wedding, to drop the criminal case against
her husband, but Mrs. Mah responded that the matter is already in the hands of
their lawyer. Thus, complainant and her husband met several times with the
respondent to negotiate the withdrawal of the criminal case. Respondent assured
the complainant and her husband that he will talk to his client for the possibility of
settling the case and delaying the prosecution thereof in the meantime.3 In the
process of negotiating, respondent advised the complainant and her husband to
execute a deed of sale over their house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 502969-R, which will be used as a collateral for the settlement of the
case. Respondent explained to them that the said deed of sale will merely be a
security while complainant and her husband are paying the embezzled money in
installments and he assured the spouses that the said deed of sale will not be
registered nor annotated in the title. The criminal case against complainant's
husband was then dismissed.4 Being the only one who shoulders the family
expenses, complainant, at some point, decided to sell the subject house and lot.5
However, on December 8, 2008, complainant received summons from the court
regarding a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) and temporary restraining order (TRO) filed by
Spouses Mah, subject of which was TCT No. 502969-R.6 Apparently, the deed of
sale that complainant and her husband executed as a security for the settlement of
the criminal case was dated May 5, 2008 and notarized by the respondent. The said
complaint averred that herein complainant and her husband have an obligation to
deliver the subject property to Spouses Mah. Complainant found out that the
respondent requested the Register of Deeds (RD) of Pampanga to register and
annotate the said deed of sale on the title on November 27, 2008.7 This prompted
the complainant to confront the respondent as this was contrary to what they have
agreed upon. The respondent merely advised complainant to again negotiate with
his client and assured her that he would back her up. However, complainant's
efforts to negotiate were again proven futile.8 In the meantime, complainant has a
deadline for the filing of a responsive pleading in the said civil case. Also, the
hearing for the application for issuance of a TRO was already scheduled. When the
complainant went back to the respondent for this matter, the respondent offered
to and indeed prepared a Motion for Extension of Time and Urgent Motion to
Postpone for the complainant dated December 22, 2008 and January 8, 2009,
respectively. Complainant alleged that it was respondent's secretary upon
respondent's instruction, who drafted the said motions and that she was required
to pay the corresponding fees therefor. In view of the said motion for
postponement, complainant did not appear in the January 9, 2009 hearing.9
It turned out, however, that the said hearing still proceeded. The respondent even
appeared therein and manifested that he filed a notice of lis pendens and adverse
claim with the RD of Pampanga. Complainant also found out that respondent filed a
Motion to Declare Defendants in Default in the said case dated February 4, 2009,
which was granted by the court on February 27, 2009. On March 31, 2009, a
decision was rendered in the said case in favor of respondent's clients. The decision
became final and executory and, thereafter, a writ of execution was issued.10
Realizing that respondent employed deceit and was double-dealing with her and
her husband to their prejudice, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint, praying for the respondent's disbarment.
In his Answer to the instant administrative complaint, 'respondent denied
complainant's accusations. Despite admitting that he told the complainant that he
would help her out in negotiating with his client, he averred that he never
compromised his relationship with the latter as counsel. Respondent explained that
he suggested a deed of second mortgage be made on the subject property, as the
same was still mortgaged with the bank, for the purpose of settling the criminal
case with his client. He admitted preparing such deed of second mortgage but the
same was not signed by his client as the latter preferred a deed of sale with a
promissory note. The complainant and her husband then executed the preferred
deed of sale. Consequently, Mr. Mah executed an affidavit of desistance relative to
the estafa case against complainant's husband.11 As to the civil case, respondent
averred that upon learning that the complainant was selling the subject property,
he filed an adverse claim on the said property to protect his client's rights.12
Respondent, further, denied that he was serving conflicting interests when he
instructed his secretary to draft the motions for extension of time and
postponement for the complainant. He averred that he informed his clients about it
and denied demanding payment therefor from the complainant.13
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline
Aside from respondent's act of instructing his secretary to prepare and file motions
for the complainant in the civil case filed by his client, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP)-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found no proof as to the other
allegations in the complaint imputing deceit and other violations of the CPR against
respondent.14 On May 22, 2012, the IBP-CBD recommended thus: WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Jaime E.
Estrabillo be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.15
Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-187, which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and for Respondent's violation
of Rule 15.03 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, it being not
intentional, Atty. Jaime E. Estrabillo is hereby REPRIMANDED.16 Both the
complainant and the respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration
(MR) of the above-quoted resolution.17
Acting on the said MRs, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-
116 on March 21, 2014, which reads: RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for
Reconsideration of Complainant and Respondent, there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission and they being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Further,
the Board RESOLVED to AFFIRM with modification, Resolution No. XX-2013-187
dated March 20, 2013 and accordingly ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner SUSPENDING Atty. Jaime E.
Estrabillo from the practice of law to [sic] six (6) months. 18 This Court is now called
to issue its verdict on the matter.
Issue: Should the respondent be administratively disciplined based on the
allegations in the complaint?
Our Ruling
We answer in the affirmative.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
Respondent admitted that he instructed his secretary to draft and file motions for
the complainant in the civil case filed by his client against the latter. Such act is a
clear violation of the above-stated 1ules. The respondent, however, explained that
it was merely a humanitarian act on his part in helping the complainant on the
matter, to give the latter an opportunity to settle their accountability to his client.19
Respondent insisted that there was no intention on his part to violate the trust
reposed upon him by his client. In fact, according to the respondent, it was his
client's interest that he had in mind when he prepared the motions as this would
extend the chance of getting a settlement with the complainant, which is the end
favored by his client.
Such explanation cannot, in any way, absolve him from liability. The rules are clear.
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with
the highest level of trust and confidence.20 The legal profession dictates that it is
not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a. lawyer to 'accord the highest degree of
fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client's interest.21 Thus, part or the
lawyer's duty in this regard is to avoid representing , conflicting interests.22
Jurisprudence is to the effect that a lawyer's act which invites suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of his duty already evinces
inconsistency of interests.23 In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires them to oppose.24
There is, thus, no denying that respondent's preparation and filing of motions on
behalf of the complainant, the adverse party in the case filed by him for his client,
conflicts his client's interest. Indeed, a motion for extension to file an answer would
not be favorable to his client's cause as the same would merely delay the judgment
sought by his client in filing the case. Moreso, the motion for postponement of the
TRO hearing would definitely run counter with the interest of his client as such
remedy was precisely sought, supposedly with urgency, to protect his client's right
over the subject property before complainant could proceed with the sale of the
same.
Moreover, Rule 15.03 above-cited expressly requires a written consent of all parties
concerned after full disclosure of the facts if ever, for whatever reason, a lawyer will
be involved in conflicting interests. Corollary to this, Rule 15 .04 of the CPR
substantially states that if a lawyer would act as a mediator, or a negotiator for that
matter, a written consent of all concerned is also required. Notably, there is no
record of any written consent from any of the parties involved in this case.
Considering the foregoing, We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent
violated Rule 15.03 and Canon 17 of the CPR.1âwphi1
In addition, this Court cannot shun the fact that due to respondent's acts,
complainant lost her day in court. Admittedly, the complainant cannot impute fault
entirely to the respondent for losing the opportunity to present her defense in the
civil case, as no prudent man will leave the fate of his or her case entirely to his or
her lawyer, much less to his or her opponent's lawyer. However, We also cannot
blame the complainant for relying upon the motions prepared by the respondent
for her, thinking that in view of the said motions, she was given more time file an
answer and more importantly, that there was no more hearing on the scheduled
date for her to attend. As it turned out, respondent even appeared on the date of
the hearing that was supposedly sought to be postponed. This is a clear case of an
unfair act on the part of the respondent. Respondent may not have an obligation to
apprise the complainant of the hearing as the latter is not his client, but his
knowledge of the motion for postponement, drafted by his secretary upon his
instruction, calls for his fair judgment as a defender of justice and officer of the
court, to inform the complainant that the hearing was not postponed. This exactly
demonstrates why dealing with conflicting interests in the legal profession is
prohibited - it is not only because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public
policy and good taste.25 As to the other matters raised in the complaint such as the
allegations that the respondent deceived the complainant to execute the subject
deed of sale, among others, We are one with the IBP-CBD that such imputations
were not suppo1ied by sufficient evidence to warrant consideration.
Anent the penalty, considering that this is respondent's first infraction, and that
there is no clear showing that his malpractice was deliberately done in bad faith or
with deceit, We hold that respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six
(6) months, as recommended by the IBP-CBD and adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors, is warranted.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to SUSPEND Atty. Jaime F. Estrabillo from the
practice 'of law for six (6) months to commence immediately from the receipt of
this Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts,
the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a
copy of this Decision to respondent's record as member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5161, August 25, 2015
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES
AS A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For resolution is the Petition1 filed by respondent Rolando S. Torres (respondent)
who seeks judicial clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
Records show that respondent was administratively charged by his sister-in-law,
complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali (complainant), for "presentation of false testimony;
participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of
complainant's signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross
misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery."2 The
particular charges are: According to the complainant, the respondent took
advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers and used his profession to
deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of
an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the following
acts or omissions:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the
perjury committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986,
wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses
Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false. He
presented that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the
title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to
Antel Holdings[,] Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received
by, Felicisima and Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the
forgery of complainant's signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that
time working as an overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified
document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property
in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification
was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was
received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re: Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the
Original Copy. and Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605
of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainant's sisters
Marcelina and Felicisima on 24, October 1995, the respondent made gross
misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina and
Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and
Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names. With the
reconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima
and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and
profited from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was
even received pending the reconstitution proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations
for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer through a
certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that
the order of reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that it
would be impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only
on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the
stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.3
In a Resolution4 dated April 14, 2004, the Court found merit in the complaint and,
thus, held respondent guilty of gross misconduct and of violating the lawyer's oath,
as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, resulting in
his disbarment from the practice of law:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty
of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer's oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from
the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.
Aggrieved, respondent filed on May 20, 2004 a Motion for Reconsideration6 of the
aforesaid Resolution, which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution7 dated
June 29, 2004. Unperturbed, he filed on September 15, 2004 a Motion for Leave to
File and Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration,8 which the Court denied for
lack of merit in the Resolution9 dated November 9, 2004, stating that "[n]o further
pleadings will be entertained." On January 26, 2006, respondent filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Lift Disbarment10 begging that compassion, mercy, and understanding
be bestowed upon him by the Court in that his disbarment be lifted. The same was,
however, expunged from the records in a Resolution11 dated June 13, 2006. Still
insistent, respondent wrote letters addressed to former Associate Justice Dante O.
Tinga12 and former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,13 reiterating his pleas for
compassion and mercy. However, these letters were similarly expunged from the
records in a Resolution14 dated September 5, 2006, considering the previous
directive that no further pleadings will be further entertained in this case. These
were followed by numerous submissions either seeking his reinstatement to the
bar15 or the reduction of his penalty of disbarment to suspension, 16 all of which
were either expunged from the records17 or denied18 by the Court. More than ten
(10) years from his disbarment, or on June 23, 2015, respondent filed the instant
Petition once more seeking judicial clemency from the Court to reinstate him in the
Roll of Attorneys.
The Court's Ruling
"Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a
special privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special
fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. The same reasoning
applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power
to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish
their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar.
Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a
disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the
general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as a matter
of justice."19redarclaw
"The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether
the Iawver has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great
extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The lawyer has to demonstrate and
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of
membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character
and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for
which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment,
and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement."20redarclaw
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency21 the Court laid down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
There 'must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should
not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent
members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding
of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to
a strong presumption of non-reformation. Sufficient time must have lapsed from
the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform. The age of the person
asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that
can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. There must be a
showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.22 (emphases and underscoring supplied) Applying the foregoing
standards to this case, the Court finds that the instant petition is not meritorious.
While more than ten (10) years had already passed since his disbarment on April 14,
2004, respondent's present petition has failed to show substantial proof of his
reformation as required in the first guideline above.
The principle which should hold true not only for judges but also for lawyers, being
officers of the court, is that judicial "[c]lemency, as an act of mercy removing any
disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in
the courts. Thus the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited.
Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are
indispensable."23redarclaw
In this case, the only ostensible proof of reformation that respondent has presented
is a Certification24 dated June 5, 2015 signed by Reverend Nelson D. Feranil,
Administrative Pastor of the Buenavista Evangelical Church in General Trias, Cavite,
which generally states that respondent, "before and after his disbarment," has been
"assisting the poor and indigent litigants in our community," and that "he has been
very active in spreading the [w]ords and gospel of the Almighty God[,] being an
active member of the Couples of Christ FFL." Aside from these bare statements, no
other proof was presented to specify the actual engagements or activities by which
respondent had rendered free legal services to indigents or had ministered to the
members of his community or church, hence, insufficient to demonstrate any form
of consistency in his supposed desire to reform.
The other testimonials which respondent submits, particularly that of Atty. Teofilo
Pugeda Jr., who stated that "[a]s a former law practitioner, [respondent] is humble,
simple, and respectful to fellow lawyers, Court Personnel, and the Presiding Judge,"
and that "[h]e used to give free legal advice and assisted indigent litigants in their
court cases,"25 and that of Atty. Manuel Medina, retired City Prosecutor of Cavite,
who stated that "[d]uring my years as Prosecutor x x x I always met him in the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City where I can say in all honesty and candor that he
was an exemplary officer of the court, punctual[,] and always prepared in handling
his court cases,"26 all relate to conduct or attributions prior to respondent's
disbarment; hence, these are incompetent evidence to prove his reformation which
connotes consistent improvement subsequent to his disbarment.
In similar vein, the testimonials attached to his previous Motion for
Reconsideration27 filed on May 20, 2004 which he now incorporates in support of
his present petition,28 is equally insufficient to conclude that he has already
reformed. This is because all these testimonials were executed in May 2004.29
Thus, they can only attest to respondent's conduct or attributions a mere month
removed from his disbarment on April 14, 2004.
More significantly, it should be discerned that the root cause of respondent's
disbarment was his fraudulent acts against his sister-in-law, the complainant herein.
However, no proof was presented to show that he had reconciled or even
attempted to reconcile with her so as to show remorse for his previous faults. The
dismissal of the criminal complaint against him for Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Documents, filed by complainant is no proof of remorse since the same was
based on lack of probable cause.30 Likewise, its dismissal,' could not prove that he
was actually innocent of the administrative charges against him, since the
parameters and considerations of an administrative case are evidently different
from that in a criminal case. As in this case, the lack of probable cause against
respondent as found by the prosecutor does not negate his administrative liability
already adjudged by this Court. That the prosecutor found that respondent "merely
rendered legal services to the Ting siblings"31 does not mean that he rendered the
same in accordance with the lawyer's oath and ethical canons.

To add, no other evidence was presented in his Petition to demonstrate his

potential for public service, or that he - now being 68 years of age32 - still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance
to redeem himself. Thus, the third and fourth guidelines were neither complied
with.

While the Court sympathizes with the predicaments of disbarred lawyers - may it be
financial or reputational in cause - it stands firm in its commitment to the public to
preserve the integrity and esteem of the Bar. As held in a previous case, "in
considering [a lawyer's] application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the
duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation
and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity."33 Ultimately, with
the above discussed guidelines not complied with, the Court has to be objective
and, therefore, denies the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4947. February 14, 2005]
ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
Before us is this verified Petition[1] filed by Rosa Yap-Paras praying for the
disbarment of her estranged husband Atty. Justo Paras on alleged acts of deceit,
malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as
a lawyer. On 18 January 1989, respondent filed his comment[2] to the Petition. In a
Resolution dated 10 February 1999,[3] the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The
background facts are summarized in a Report and Recommendation dated 13
January 2004[4] of Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, which Report reads in part, as follows: Complainant alleged that on
February 9, 1965 the children of Ledesma de Jesus Paras-Sumabong namely
Conegunda, Justo, Corazon, Carmen and Cataluna all surnamed Paras executed a
Special Power of Attorney prepared by the respondent to sell parcels of land
located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental giving authority to their mother to
sell the subject real properties previously registered in the name of the heirs of
Vicente Paras wherein respondent was one of the signatories therein.
Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis of said Special Power of
Attorney, Ledesma J. Paras-Sumabang executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Aurora Dy-Yap over the subject real property located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros
Oriental which was with the respondents full knowledge since he was residing at
the house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time and from that time, the Yap family had
been in possession of the subject real property up to the present. Complainant
alleged that sometime in June 1998 her attention was called to the fact that a free
patent title to the aforesaid property was issued in respondents name and upon
verification with the DENR, Bureau of Lands, Dumaguete City, complainant was able
to get copies of the documents for lot Nos. 660, 490 and 585 pertaining to the
Notice of Application for Free Patent dated April 2, 1985 signed by the respondent;
over the aforesaid lots previously sold by Ledesma de Jesus to Aurora D. Yap;
Quitclaim/Renunciation of Property Rights and Interest Over Real Property
executed by Ledesma de Jesus dated May 28, 1985; Letter of Application dated
April 2, 1985 signed by respondent under oath before Apolonio Tan authorized
officer to administer oath; Letter of Certification signed by Apolonio Tan dated June
4, 1985 and Order of Approval dated August 19, 1985 signed by District Land Officer
Teopisto L. Gallozo with a Free Patent No. 328 in the name of respondent Justo J.
Paras.
Complainant alleged that the aforementioned application was made by the
respondent without her knowledge and consent and those acts of deceit,
machinations and falsification of documents were deliberately willfully, and
maliciously committed by the respondent in violation of Art. 172 in relation to Art.
171 of the RPC; in betrayal of his oath as a lawyer and a transgression of the Canons
of Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously
obtained a free patent title over real properties which had been previously sold by
his own mother to Aurora D. Yap and now still under the control and possession of
complainants natural family, a fact respondent allegedly withheld from the Bureau
of Lands which he had full knowledge in successfully causing the release of a free
patent in his name and unjustly and unlawfully deprived the rightful owners of their
legitimate title to the said property in betrayal of the court to pervert the
administration of justice in gross violation of his oath of office.
In his Comment, respondent alleged that complainant was obviously not the owner
of the properties and considering that the properties were applied for free patent
titling during their marital union prior to its breakage, complainant was likewise a
communal owner thereof and as such was also complaining against herself.
Respondent alleged that later on, a great portion of the public lands classified as
forested zone in Matobato were declared and reclassified into public agricultural
lands, then publicly surveyed and parcelized by lots identified in the survey map
based on actual or known occupants; then the Bureau of Lands allegedly made a
public announcement that the lands were available for private ownership thru Free
Patent Application available only to native settlers or natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that none of the Yaps including complainant being native or
natural born Filipinos muchless Aurora D. Yap who in 1985 was said to be already an
American citizen; complainant and her family; the Yaps prevailed upon him to apply
for free patent over said questioned properties for the reason that respondent had
already occupied the properties; introduced improvements thereon; acted as
owner thereof; and could easily align his right to the property which had been
identified in the public survey as Heirs of Vicente Paras, otherwise the questioned
properties allegedly according to the Yaps will be applied for and awarded to other
qualified natural born Filipinos. Respondent alleged that Free Patent Application
was filed by him over the communal property of him and the complainant as well as
those purchased by him including the portion whose occupancy of a public land was
purchased by Aurora D. Yap from Ledesma Vda de Paras upon the prodding of the
Yaps for all of them were not qualified to apply for ownership of an agricultural
public land via free patent; none of them being a natural born Filipino or native
settler and were disqualified from a gratuitous grant of public land from the
government. Respondent alleged that the whole idea of giving to him and the
complainant the properties was hatched and executed by the Yaps, most
particularly Atty. Francisco D. Yap to circumvent the law and prevent the properties
from being given by the government to some other qualified persons. He allegedly
applied for issuance of free patent in good faith and thereafter took dominion and
control of the properties in the concept of a legitimate owner under authority of a
gratuitous grant of the government. Respondent alleged that complainant or any
member of her family much less American citizen Aurora Dy Yap had not made any
prior demand for the return of the questioned properties; nor filed a complaint
under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law; nor filed an administrative remedy
before the DENR for the cancellation and reversion/transfer of the Free Patent and
Title to them; nor brought any action in any civil court for either quieting of title, or
cancellation of free patent title or recovery of ownership or whatever. Respondent
alleged that even without such civil court determination on whether or not
complainant or her family were qualified to become grantee of a government
gratuitous grant of public agricultural land, if the Honorable Supreme Court will
decide that complainant, her mother, brothers and sisters were within the ambit of
the term natural born citizen or native citizens under the 1946 Constitution and to
them rightfully belong the ownership of the questioned titled public agricultural
lands; and that he can never be guilty of the Anti-Dummy Law consequent to such
cession, respondent alleged that he will gladly deliver and transfer title to them.
Respondent alleged that he sought and prayed for recovery of possession of all
conjugal/communal properties including the herein questioned properties for after
he left the conjugal home in 1988 possession of all these properties, real and
personal were until now with the complainant and her biological family.
Respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
Complainant subsequently filed a Reply[5] to respondents Comment, therein
refuting respondents claims that he was used as a dummy since complainant and
her siblings had previously acquired Free Patents in their names. Complainant
further alleged that respondent is morally unfit to continue to be an officer of the
court because of his falsely declaring under oath that he had been occupying the
subject real property since 1985 when in fact he did not and was never in
occupation/possession thereof. On 27 August 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline issued an Order[6] noting the filing of the last pleading and setting the
instant case for hearing. Several hearings[7] were conducted wherein complainant
presented all her witnesses together with their respective affidavits and supporting
documents[8], which were all subjected to cross-examination by the respondent.
Likewise, respondent presented his Counter-Affidavit[9] and supporting documents.
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded her Report and
made a recommendation, as follows: From the facts obtaining respondent
committed deceit and falsehood in having applied for free patent over lands owned
by another over which he had no actual physical possession being aware of the fact
that the same was previously transferred in the name of Aurora Yap; an act which
adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law in violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is immaterial as to who instituted the
complaint for as long as there was a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which partakes the nature of proper disciplinary action pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys.
Wherefore in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully recommends for
the suspension of Atty. Justo Paras from the practice of his law profession for a
period of three (3) months from receipt hereof. It is also hereby recommended that
the IBP Chapter wherein respondent Paras is a registered member be furnished a
copy of the Order and notified of the said suspension for proper enforcement. Via
Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated 27 February 2004,[10] the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the Report of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the
latters recommended penalty by recommending that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months for violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The case is now before us for confirmation. We
agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be sanctioned. We
find, however, that the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity
of the wrong perpetrated. The Court has always reminded that a lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession[11] as the bar should
always maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing among its members. By and large, a lawyer can do honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients.[12] To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the
legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence and trust
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.
[13] In Marcelo v. Javier[14], we held: It bears stressing that membership in the bar
is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to
practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard
has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an
attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or
disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the
purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a
person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public
and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the
attorney.
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his
duties as an attorney and counsellor which include the statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. These statutory grounds
are so broad as to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity. It is a settled rule that the enumeration of the statutory grounds
for disciplinary action is not exclusive and a lawyer may be disciplined on grounds
other than those specifically provided in the law. Generally a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and
good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or an unfit or
unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others in the
capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal
profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. Indeed, the practice
of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege.[15] One of those requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. And in the recent case of Bergonia v.
Merrera[16], we ruled: Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a
practitioners honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required
to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct
of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other
counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to
conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and
with fidelity to the courts and their clients. x x x In the instant case, it is clear to the
Court that respondent violated his lawyers oath as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society and to the
courts, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and to do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court. Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the
candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court in his acts
of applying for the issuance of a free patent over the properties in issue despite his
knowledge that the same had already been sold by his mother to complainants
sister. This fact, respondent even admitted in the comment that he filed before this
Court when he alleged that the said properties were public land under the Forestal
Zone when the mother of the respondent ceded to Aurora Yap some portions of
entire occupancy of the Parases[17]. Moreover, respondent committed deceit and
falsehood in his application for free patent over the said properties when he
manifested under oath that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of
the said lands despite the fact that these were continuously in the possession and
occupation of complainants family, as evidenced no less by respondents own
statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.
Anent his argument questioning the status of complainant and her family as natural
born citizens, this Court holds that the instant case is not the proper forum to
address such issue. Furthermore, as correctly held by the Investigating
Commissioner, [i]t is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as
there was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Likewise, any other
action which the parties may make against each other has no material bearing in
this case. For, it must be remembered that administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.
In line herewith, this Court in In re Almacen,[18] held:
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are
sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court
into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. xxx
The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case indubitably reveal respondents
failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the
lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning
sanction from this Court.
At this juncture, we take note that on 18 October 2000, in our Decision in A.C. No.
5333 formerly A.C. No. CBD-371, entitled Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty. Justo de Jesus
Paras, respondent was previously meted with suspension from the practice of law
for six (6) months on the charge of falsifying his wifes signature in bank documents
and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year from the practice of law on
the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family.
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of respondents
prior misdemeanors for which he was penalized with a six (6) month and one (1)
year suspension from the practice of law, his deplorable behavior in the present
case which grossly degrades the legal profession warrants the imposition of a much
graver penalty.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras guilty of committing a
falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year, with a WARNING that commission of the same or
similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance and likewise be entered in the record of respondent as
attorney.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10580 SPOUSES GERALDY AND LILIBETH VICTORY vs. ATTY. MARIAN JOS.
MERCADO,
DECISION
TIJAM, J.: This is a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado
for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
Sometime in 2009, Spouses Geraldy and Lilibeth Victory (Spouses Victory) were
enticed by respondent to enter into a financial transaction with her with a promise
of good monetary returns. As respondent is a lawyer and a person of reputation,
Spouses Victory entrusted their money to respondent to invest, manage, and
administer into some financial transactions that would earn good profit for the
parties.1 Respondent called and asked Geraldy Victory (Geraldy) whether he
wanted to invest his money. The respondent promised that for an investment of
PhP 400,000, she will give Geraldy PhP 600,000 in 30 days; and for PhP 500,000, she
will give Geraldy PhP 625,000.2 The investment transactions went well for the first
10 months. Spouses Victory received the agreed return of profit. Some of such
financial transactions were covered by Memoranda of Agreement.3
Later on, respondent became evasive in returning to Spouses Victory the money
that the latter were supposed to receive as part of the agreement. Respondent
failed to settle and account the money entrusted to her by Spouses Victory.4
Spouses Victory alleged that the outstanding obligation of respondent is PhP 5
Million plus interest or a total of PhP 8.3 Million.5 Spouses Victory filed a criminal
complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna.6 After the filing of said criminal case,
respondent met with Spouses Victory. Respondent proposed to reduce her
obligation from PhP 8.3 Million to PhP 7.5 Million in staggered payments, to which
Spouses Victory agreed. Respondent then issued three postdated checks in the
amount of PhP 300,000 each. However, said checks bounced.7 Report and
Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) found that respondent indeed lured Spouses Victory in entering into a series
of financial transactions with a promise of return of profit. Respondent, however,
failed to deliver such promise. On such premise, the IBP-CBD recommended
respondent's suspension, to wit: On the basis of the foregoing, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado be SUSPENDED for SIX
(6) MONTHS from the practice of law.8
Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors: On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-199, which reads: RESOLVED to ADOPT
and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A ", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violation of Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for evading the settlement of her financial
obligations to the complainants and for not bothering to appear in the investigation
of this case, Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado is hereby DISBARRED.9 (Emphasis
supplied)xxxxxxxxRespondent filed a motion for reconsideration,10 which was
denied in Resolution No. XXI-2014-158, to wit: RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of
the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out and taken into consideration. However, considering that
Respondent is currently settling her financial obligations to Complainants and very
apologetic and granting her good faith in her investment transaction with
Complainants, Resolution No. XX-2013-199 dated March 20, 2013 is hereby
AFFIRMED, with modification, and accordingly the penalty earlier imposed on Atty.
Marian Jo S. Mercado is hereby reduced to SUSPENSION from the practice of law
for one (1) year. 11 (Emphasis supplied)
Issue: Should the respondent be held administratively liable based on the
allegations in the pleadings of all parties on record?
Our Ruling: Emphatically, a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency
as well as honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients.12 Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 7 provides:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
Exercising its disciplinary authority over the members of the bar, this Court has
imposed the penalty of suspension or disbarment for any gross misconduct that a
lawyer committed, whether it is in his professional or in his private capacity. Good
character is an essential qualification for the admission to and continued practice of
law. Thus, any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating
unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action.13 In this case, it is without
dispute that respondent has an outstanding obligation with Spouses Victory, as the
latter's investments which they coursed through the respondent fell through. To
make matters worse, respondent issued several checks to settle her obligation;
unfortunately, said checks bounced. As a lawyer, respondent is expected to act with
the highest degree of integrity and fair dealing. She is expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing so that the people's faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
She must, at all times, faithfully perform her duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to her clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.14
It must be considered that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance
of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for
the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system.15 We cannot
exempt respondent from liability just because she encountered financial difficulties
in the course of her investment deals. Respondent even admitted that she
continued to do business despite such financial hardships; as such, her monetary
obligations with different investors accumulated at an alarming rate. In an attempt
to settle her obligations, respondent issued checks, which all bounced. To Our mind,
the actuations of respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of every
member of the bar. In this case, while respondent admitted her responsibility and
signified her intention of complying with the same, We cannot close our eyes to the
fact that respondent committed infractions. To uphold the integrity of the legal
profession, We deem it proper to uphold the findings as well as the sanction
imposed by the IBP Board of Governors. WHEREFORE, premises considered, We
resolve to SUSPEND Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado from the practice of law for one (1)
year to commence immediately from the receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The
Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Decision to
respondent's record as member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11482 JOCELYN IGNACIO vs. ATTY. DANIEL T. ALVIAR, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.: This is an administrative case filed by complainant Jocelyn Ignacio against
respondent Atty. Daniel T. Alviar for violation of Canon 11 , Rule 1.012 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for his alleged refusal to refund the amount of
acceptance fees; Canon 123, Rule 12.044 and Canon 185 Rule 18.036 for his alleged
failure to appear in the criminal case he is handling and to file any pleading therein.
The Facts
In March 2014, respondent was referred to complainant for purposes of handling
the case of complainant's son who was then apprehended and detained by the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in Quezon City. Respondent agreed to
represent complainant's son for a stipulated acceptance fee of PhPl00,000.
Respondent further represented that he could refer the matter to the Commission
on Human Rights to investigate the alleged illegal arrest made on complainant's
son.7
After the initial payments of PhP20,000 and PhP30,000 were given to respondent,
the latter visited complainant's son at the PDEA detention cell.8 There, respondent
conferred with complainant's son for some 20 minutes. After which, respondent
left.9 Respondent, through his secretary, secured from the Office of the Pasay City
Prosecutor plain copies of the case records. Respondent also verified twice from the
Hall of Justice if the case was already filed in court.10 It was at this time that
respondent asked, and was paid, the remaining balance of PhP50,000.
Subsequently, respondent filed his notice of appearance as counsel for
complainant's son.11 Sometime in April 2014, complainant informed respondent
that her son's arraignment was set on April 29, 2014. Respondent, however, replied
that he cannot attend said arraignment due to a previously scheduled hearing. He
committed to either find a way to attend the hearing or ask another lawyer-friend
to attend it for him. On April 26, 2014, complainant wrote a 1etter12 to respondent
informing the latter that she had decided to seek the intercession of another lawyer
owing to the fact that respondent cannot attend her son's scheduled arraignment.
Complainant then requested that respondent retain a portion of the PhP 100,000 to
fairly remunerate respondent for the preparatory legal service he rendered.
Respondent denies having received said letter.13 On the date of the arraignment,
neither respondent nor his promised alternate, appeared. When asked, respondent
replied that he forgot the date of arraignment.14 This incident prompted
complainant to write another letter15 dated May 6, 2014 to respondent, requesting
the latter to formally withdraw as counsel and emphasized that respondent's
withdrawal as counsel is necessary so that she and her son can hire another lawyer
to take his stead. In said letter, complainant also reiterated her request that a
portion of the PhPl00,000 be remitted to them after respondent deducts his
professional fees commensurate to the preparatory legal service he rendered.16
When respondent failed to take heed, complainant filed on June 16, 2014, the
instant administrative complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
At the proceedings therein, respondent failed to attend the initial mandatory
conferences and to file his responsive pleading, citing as reason therefor the
persistent threats to his life allegedly caused by a former client.17 Upon finally
submitting his Answer18 , respondent denied having neglected his duties to
complainant's son.
Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline
On January 21, 2016, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent liable for
negligence under Rule 18.03 of the CPR and recommended a penalty of six months
suspension from the practice of law. The Investigating Commissioner observed that
while respondent performed some tasks as lawyer for complainant's son, such do
not command a fee of PhPl00,000. It was also emphasized that respondent's failure
to attend the arraignment shows the latter's failure to handle the case with
diligence.19
As such, the Investigating Commissioner disposed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned recommends that
respondent be meted out with the penalty of suspension for six (6) months from
the practice of law and ordered to restitute the amount of One Hundred Thousand
(Phpl00,000) Pesos to the complainant. Respectfully Submitted.20
Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
On February 25, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXII-2016-
17821 lowering the recommended penalty to reprimand with stem warning, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT with modification the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner reducing the penalty to REPRJMAND WITH STERN WARNING.22
Pursuant to Rule 139-B, the records of the administrative case were transmitted by
the IBP to the Court for final action. Complainant further seeks a review23 of the
Resolution No. XXII-2016-178 dated February 25, 2016.
The Issue
The threshold issue to be resolved is whether respondent is guilty of negligence in
handling the case of complainant's son.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms the Resolution No. XXII-2016-178 dated February 25, 2016 of the
IBP Board of Governors, reducing the recommended penalty from six months to
reprimand with stem warning. However, on the undisputed factual finding that
respondent only performed preparatory legal services for complainant's son, he is
not entitled to the entire PhP 100,000 but only to fees determined on the basis of
quantum meruit, Section 24, Rule 138, and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the CPR and
that the remainder should be restituted to complainant. Acceptance of money from
a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the client's cause.24 Canon 1825 of the CPR mandates that once a lawyer
agrees to handle a case, it is the lawyer's duty to serve the client with competence
and diligence. In Voluntad-Ramirez v. Atty. Bautista26 , the Court citing Santiago v.
Fojas27 expounds: It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or
advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to
decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of [his] client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise
stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client,
save by the rules of the law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by
the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client
but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves
the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.28 We agree with the finding of the Investigating
Commissioner that respondent failed to competently and diligently attend to the
legal matter entrusted to him. It is undisputed that respondent came to see
complainant's son, his client, only once for about 20 minutes and no more
thereafter;29 it is likewise undisputed that respondent failed to attend the
scheduled arraignment despite the latter's commitment to either find a way to
attend, or send a collaborating counsel to do so;30 that he forgot the date of
arraignment is an equally dismal excuse. Equally revealing of respondent's
negligence was his nonchalant attitude towards complainant's request for a refund
of a portion of, not even the entire, PhPl00,000. In his Answer before the IBP,
respondent simply denied having received any of the letters sent by complainant.31
Respondent's claim that it was complainant who failed to talk to him and his
admission that he "forgot about complainant"32 reveal his rather casual and
lackadaisical treatment of the complainant and the legal matter entrusted to him. If
it were true that complainant already failed to communicate with him, the least
respondent could have done was to withdraw his appearance as counsel. But even
this measure, it appears, respondent failed to perform. His failure to take such
action speaks of his negligence. In administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence is required to warrant disciplinary sanctions. Substantial evidence is
consistently defined as relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.33 While the Court finds respondent guilty of
negligence, We cannot ascribe to him any unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct nor causing undue delay and impediment to the execution of a judgment
or misusing court processes. As such, and consistent with current jurisprudence, We
find the penalty of reprimand with stem warning commensurate to his offense.34
As regards the restitution of the acceptance fees, We find it necessary to first
distinguish between an attorney's fee and an acceptance fee as the former depends
on the nature and extent of the legal services rendered, while the other does not.
On one hand, attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary
concept.35 In its ordinary concept, attorney's fee refers to the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. While, in its
extraordinary concept, attorney's fee is awarded by the court to the successful
litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages.36 In the present
case, the Investigating Commissioner referred to the attorney's fee in its ordinary
concept. On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the
lawyer for mere acceptance of the case. The rationale for the fee is because once
the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the
opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. The opportunity
cost of mere acceptance is thus indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee.
However, since acceptance fee compensates the lawyer only for lost opportunity,
the same is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal services
rendered.37 In this case, respondent referred to the PhPl00,000 as his acceptance
fee while to the complainant, said amount answers for the legal services which
respondent was engaged to provide. Preceding from the fact that complainant
agreed to immediately pay, as she, in fact, immediately paid the sums of PhP20,000,
PhP30,000 and PhP50,000, said amounts undoubtedly pertain to respondent's
acceptance fee which is customarily paid by the client upon the lawyer's acceptance
of the case. Be that as it may, the Court had not shied from ordering a return of
acceptance fees in cases wherein the lawyer had been negligent in the handling of
his client's case. Thus, in Carino v. Atty. De Los Reyes,38 the respondent lawyer who
failed to file a complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor's office, returned the PhPl
0,000 acceptance fee paid to him and was admonished to be more careful in the
performance of his duty to his clients. Likewise, in Voluntad-Ramirez v. Baustista,39
the respondent lawyer was ordered to return the PhP14,000 acceptance fee
because he did nothing to advance his client's cause during the six-month period
that he was engaged as counsel. This being the case, the next query to be had is
how much of the acceptance fee should respondent restitute.1âwphi1 In this
regard, the principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may serve as a
basis for determining the reasonable amount of attorney's fees. Quantum meruit is
a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is
unjust for a person to retain benefit without working for it. Also, Section 24, Rule
138 should be observed in determining respondent's compensation, thus:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as
expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony
and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to
be unconscionable or unreasonable.

The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be

considered in assessing the proper amount of compensation that a lawyer should
receive.40 Canon 20, Rule 20.01 provides:
CANON 20 A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01. A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required; (b) The
novelty and difficulty of the question involved; (c) The importance of the subject
matter; (d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
Chapter to which he belongs; (g) The amount involved in the controversy and the
benefits resulting to the client from the service; (h) The contingency or certainty of
compensation;(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and (j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Here, respondent only conferred once with the complainant's son for 20 minutes,
filed his entry of appearance, obtained copies of the case records and inquired
twice as to the status of the case. For his efforts and for the particular
circumstances in this case, respondent should be allowed a reasonable
compensation of PhP3,000. The remainder, or PhP97,000 should be returned to the
complainant. WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Daniel T. Alviar LIABLE for violation of
Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby
REPRIMANDED with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely. Atty. Daniel T. Alviar is ordered to RESTITUTE to
complainant the amount of PhP97,000 out of the Phpl00,000 acceptance fee.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015; DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ v. ATTY. CATINDIG AND ATTY.
BAYDO
 DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar
O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo)
(respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends
since the mid-1960’s when they were both students at the University of the
Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths
of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig
started to court Dr. Perez. Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already
wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at
the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic
wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig
however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he
was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse
to marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law
School. Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a
divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would
eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime
in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican
Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce
decree was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their
marriage. Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of
Virginia in the United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child
whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic. Years later, Dr. Perez came to know
that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was
obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by
Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly
assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also
promised to legally adopt their son.7 Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty.
Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify his
marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the
consent of Gomez to the said petition.8 Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that
she received an anonymous letter9 in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s
scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love
letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In
the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry
her once his “impediment is removed.” Apparently, five months into their
relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until
such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13,
2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to
Gomez.11On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son;
he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty.
Baydo was frequently seen.12 In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court
directed the respondents to file their respective comments, which they separately
did on November 25, 2002.14Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he
married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that immediately after the
wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital
obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was
blessed with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated. Eventually, their
irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then
consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the
agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested
that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of property. She
likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic
for whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide them. Thus, on April 27,
1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney
addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic,
appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty.
Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the
Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed
a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984. Atty.
Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the
divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the
Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and
Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.18 Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr.
Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to Gomez
was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and
that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum
of legitimacy to their relationship.19 Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship
with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in October 2001 to
prevent any acrimony from developing. He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason
that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall
apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in
September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not
reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo
resigned from his firm in January 2001. For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she
had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began courting her
while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic
overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was
married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite being turned down,
Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his law
firm. On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice. On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an
Order24 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4,
2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties
manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the
pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit
their respective position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty.
Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 200325 and
October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October
24, 2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-
CBD issued a Report and Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment
of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed
out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his
previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal
conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating
Commissioner further opined that: In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from
the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig established a pattern of grossly
immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not
only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his
official and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s
bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely
caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head up
high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a
model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In
contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a
prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise
inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards
of the community.29 On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of
evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of
the alleged affair between the respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,30 which
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in
relying solely on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under
Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be
supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the
absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave
credence to Dr. Perez’ testimony. He also claimed that he had absolutely no
intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed the status of his
marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been
transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez. The IBP Board of Governors, in its
Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion for
reconsideration.
The Issue - The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross
immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the
circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.cralawred
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral
character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession,
but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the
absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. This must be so because “vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property,
reputation, his life, his all.”34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may
be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral
conduct. Thus: Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on
what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.”35 Immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply
immoral, conduct.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a
grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from
Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly
immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central
Methodist Church in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983,
Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously,
15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that
his first marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy
problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from
Gomez, dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree
from a court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the
same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he
moved heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away – a marriage that
has at least a semblance of legality. From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew
that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was
not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at
that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry
anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his
subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr.
Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social
propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on
marriage. It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig
married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous
marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez
in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into
the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. Moreover, assuming
arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that
their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal
strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to
Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to
the highest degree. Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite
the various legal actions he resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of
validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally
decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he
was then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate
lawyer employed by his firm. While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate
from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly
immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity
towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross
immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his
contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous
marriage to Gomez. “The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of
the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery
of the inviolable social institution of marriage.’”37 In various cases, the Court has
held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and
maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a child.38
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one
definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own
admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking
advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the
penalty of disbarment. The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels the
Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since
they are uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig SO ORDERED.
himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his
previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides
ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a
dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the
respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her
claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents
were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was
signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings

against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The
evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only
proves that the latter indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations
between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein.
Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote
Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is
indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to

ADOPT the recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality
and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in
the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial
courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of evidence.
A.C. No. 7136; JOSELANO GUEVARRA vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA
This Decision takes effect immediately. PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent)
for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers oath. In his
complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-fiancee Irene
Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to
Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from
January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls,
as well as messages some of which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at
Megamall. Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at
night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home
from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her
parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. In February or
March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On
the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the
conjugal house. On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday
celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and
friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue
immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled
off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
appliances. Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card
bearing the words I Love You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a
handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I
will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness
but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it
again? Or is it because theres a bigger plan for the two of us? I hope that you have
experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to
love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU! I will
love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to
the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more
importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together
again. Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of
us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and
in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO! BE MINE . . .
. AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE! I LOVE YOU
FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE!
[2]
Eternally yours, NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No.
71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April
2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends
saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert,
she was pregnant. In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE
YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading: 14. Respondent and Irene were even
FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions
together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple
attended the launch of the Wine All You Can promotion of French wines, held at the
Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported
in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21.
Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned:
Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala. A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.
[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting
their adulterous relationship supplied), respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the
matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the
general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne
Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants wife and his apparent
abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity,
making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a piece of paper. Morally
reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainants bride on the very day
of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her until we are together again, as
now they are.[6] (Underscoring supplied), respondent stated in his ANSWER as
follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint
regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral
depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason
being that Respondents relationship with Irene was not under scandalous
circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his
wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is
aware of Respondents special friendship with Irene.
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of
marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage
between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the
formality of the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the
laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the
foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).[9]
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the
laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit
love for the complainants wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his
own family, broke up the complainants marriage, commits adultery with his wife,
and degrades the legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint,
the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect
to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is neither
under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as
would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) To respondents ANSWER,
complainant filed a REPLY,[12] alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girls father. Complainant
attached to the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing
Irenes signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha
Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.
Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS[14] dated
January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having personal knowledge
of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainants Reply.[15] Respondent
moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by
complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint
for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon
City Prosecutors Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants Complaint-Affidavit and
REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.[16]
Respondents counsel did not cross-examine complainant.[17] After investigation,
IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against
respondent sufficiently proven. The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that
respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct (Underscoring supplied), and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code
reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of
merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading: RESOLUTION NO. XVII-
2006-06, CBD Case No. 02-936, Joselano C. Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.
Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the
DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in
the original) Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed
pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court. The petition is
impressed with merit. Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside
the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for
lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution
shows. Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of
complainant, that there is no evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As the
IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed: While it may be true that the love
letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. C) and the news item published in the Manila
Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is
carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainants wife, there are other
pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against
respondent. It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002,
respondent through counsel made the following statements to wit: Respondent
specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their
relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their
respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the
acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount
to grossly immoral conduct . These statements of respondent in his Answer are an
admission that there is indeed a special relationship between him and complainants
wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha
Louise Irene Moje (Annex H-1) sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child
Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainants wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of
the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with
Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored
that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha
Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous
relationship with Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal
Code as that committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse
with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her,
knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.[26]
(Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he
maintaining that it was low profile and known only to the immediate members of
their respective families. In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the
averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of
negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of
some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission
of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances
alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.[27] (Citations omitted; emphasis
and underscoring supplied) A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having
personal knowledge of Irenes daughter Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of
Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a lawyer, 38 years old as the
childs father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired information
on DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to
Irene in the certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage Certificate[29] shows
that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the
Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the
child. Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in his
January 29, 2003 Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared
that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the childs father
is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and a lawyer.[31]
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has
been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence
adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other
party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other[32] which is the quantum of
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer. Administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. of proof for these types of cases
differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is
all that is required.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship
with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court,
reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent
court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of
such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The judgment,
resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied), under scandalous circumstances.[34] The immediately-quoted Rule which
provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase grossly immoral
conduct, not under scandalous circumstances. Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a
woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods an element of
the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a
woman elsewhere.
Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on
the surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a relationship between
a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether
the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of
this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36] On the charge of immorality, respondent does not
deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet,
and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree. While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere
fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals
of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are
punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws.[37] And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did
contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative
case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP
Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair
with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely
low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior
renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges
which his license confers upon him.[39] (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission to
practice law which goes: I _________, having been permitted to continue in the
practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God.
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the
Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.[40]
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law. Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the
investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41] on
March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainants petition for nullity of his
(complainants) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant
filed against respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the
instant case, which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on
petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn. The
Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainants Motion
to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the
petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that notwithstanding
the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time
before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as
though no appeal has been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant) That the
marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio
is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared
null and void.[43] As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven
otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[44] In carrying on an
extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage
with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married,
he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his
unfitness to be a lawyer. As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review
before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed
his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had
already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In
reversing the City Prosecutors Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair
estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense
of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje
conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala,
and this she did when complainant confronted her about Ealas frequent phone calls
and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala
having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that
he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married
to another woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their conjugal
home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to
confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the
more apparent by Mojes subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New
Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had
exchange marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Ealas
vehicle and that of Mojes were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she
came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held
office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had
decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a
coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that
was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It
was both respondents love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out
there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby
hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents
is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the
information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful
and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainants
supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the SO ORDERED.
point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical
manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.[45]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de

oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants motion to
withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be
acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court,
the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law.
Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case[47] (Italics in the
original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on
January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral

conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Let a copy of this
Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. A.C. No. 6484, June 16, 2015; ADELITA B. LLUNAR, v. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT
And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and PER CURIAM: The present administrative case stemmed from the complaint-affidavit1 that
circulated to all courts. Adelita B. Llunar (complainant) filed against Atty. Romulo Ricafort (respondent) for gross and
This Decision takes effect immediately. inexcusable negligence and serious misconduct.

Antecedents: In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of Severina Bafiez,

hired the respondent to file a case against father and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for
the recovery of a parcel of land allegedly owned by the Banez family but was fraudulently
registered under the name of Ricardo and later was transferred to Ard. The property, which
Ard had mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Malilipot, Albay, was the subject of foreclosure
proceedings at the time the respondent was hired. The respondent received from the
complainant the following amounts: (a) P70,000.00 as partial payment of the redemption
price of the property; (b) P19,000.00 to cover the filing fees; and (c) P6,500.00 as attorney's
fees. Three years later, the complainant learned that no case involving the subject property
was ever filed by the respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legaspi City. Thus, the
complainant demanded that the respondent return to her the amount of P95,000.00. The
respondent refused to return the whole amount of P95,000.00 to the complainant. He
argued that a complaint2 for annulment of title against Ard Cervantes had actually been filed
in court, though not by him, but by another lawyer, Atty. Edgar M. Abitria. Thus, he was
willing to return only what was left of the P95,000.00 after deducting therefrom the
P50,000.00 that he paid to Atty. Abitria as acceptance fee for handling the case. The
complainant refused to recognize the complaint for annulment of title filed by Atty. Abitria
and claimed that she had no knowledge of Atty. Abitria's engagement as counsel. Besides,
the complaint was filed three (3) years late and the property could no longer be redeemed
from the bank. Also, the complainant discovered that the respondent had been suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law since May 29, 2002, pursuant to this Court's decision in
Administrative Case No. 5054,3 which the complainant suspected was the reason another
lawyer, and not the respondent, filed the complaint for annulment of title in court. In a
resolution4 dated February 2, 2005, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. In a report5 dated May 22,
2009, IBP Investigating Commissioner Cecilio C. Villanueva found the respondent to have
been grossly negligent in handling the complainant's case and to have gravely abused the
trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant, thereby, violating Canons 156 and
17,7 and Rules 1.01,8 16.03,9 18.03,10 and 18.0411 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Also, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have
erred in not informing his client that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of
law. Due to these infractions, Commissioner Villanueva recommended that the respondent
remain suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. In Resolution No. XIX-2011-224
dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors agreed with the Investigating
Commissioner's findings on the respondent's liability but modified the recommended penalty
from indefinite suspension to disbarment.12 It also ordered the respondent to return to the
complainant the amount of P95,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice. The respondent
moved for reconsideration. In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent argued that
his referral of the complainant's case to Atty. Abitria was actually with the complainant's
knowledge and consent; and that he paid Atty. Abitria P50,000.00 for accepting the case.
These facts were confirmed by Atty. Abitria in an affidavit14 dated November 17, 2004, but
were alleged to have been overlooked by Commissioner Villanueva in his report. The IBP
Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XX-2013-710 dated June 21, 2013, denied the
respondent's motion for reconsideration.
Our Ruling: We find the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings with his client
and in engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose
upon him the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT. The respondent in this case committed
several infractions making him liable for grave misconduct. First, the respondent did not
exert due diligence in handling the complainant's case. He failed to act promptly in
redeeming the complainant's property within the period of redemption. What is worse is the
delay of three years before a complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court.
The respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant's case and wasted precious time and
opportunity that were then readily available to recover the complainant's property. Under
these facts, the respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR), which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." Second, the respondent failed to
return, upon demand, the amounts given to him by the complainant for handling the latter's
case. On three separate occasions, the respondent received from the complainant the
amounts of P19,000.00, P70,000.00, and P6,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the
mortgaged property from the bank and filing the necessary civil case/s against Ard Cervantes.
The complainant approached the respondent several times thereafter to follow up on the
case/s to be filed supposedly by the respondent who, in turn, reassured her that actions on
her case had been taken. After the complainant discovered three years later that the
respondent had not filed any case in court, she demanded that the respondent return the
amount of P95,000.00, but her demand was left unheeded. The respondent later promised to
pay her, but until now, no payment of any amount has been made. These facts confirm that
the respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates every lawyer to "hold in trust
all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession"16 and to "account
for all money or property collected or received for or from the client."17 In addition, a
lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property he holds for his client gives rise
to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Third, the respondent
committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant that he was under
indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should have disclosed this
fact at the time he was approached by the complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR
states that "a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients." The respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a
member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant's case despite knowing that he could
not and should not practice law. Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law
despite the indefinite suspension imposed on him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the
offenses he committed. Based on the above facts alone, the penalty of suspension for five (5)
years from the practice of law would have been justified, but the respondent is not an
ordinary violator of the profession's ethical rules; he is a repeat violator of these rules. In
Nuñez v. Atty. Ricafort,19 we had adjudged the respondent liable for grave misconduct in
failing to turn over the proceeds of the sale of a property owned by his client and in issuing
bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution issued by the court in the case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 filed against him by his client. We then suspended him
indefinitely from the practice of law - a penalty short of disbarment. Under his current
liability - which is no different in character from his previous offense - we have no other way
but to proceed to decree his disbarment. He has become completely unworthy of
membership in our honorable profession. With respect to the amount to be returned to the
complainant, we agree with the IBP that the respondent should return the whole amount of
P95,000.00, without deductions, regardless of whether the engagement of Atty. Abitria as
counsel was with the complainant's knowledge and consent. In the first place, the hiring of
Atty. Abitria would not have been necessary had the respondent been honest and diligent in
handling the complainant's case from the start. The complainant should not be burdened
with the expense of hiring another lawyer to perform the services that the respondent was
hired to do, especially in this case where there was an inexcusable non-delivery of such
services. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law and his name REMOVED from the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately
upon his receipt of this Decision. Also, he is ORDERED to RETURN the amount of P95,000.00
to complainant Adelita B. Llunar, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision. Let a
copy of this Decision be attached to the respondent's personal record and furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. This Decision should likewise be
posted on the Supreme Court website for the information of the general public. SO
ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015; MABINI COLLEGES, INC., v. ATTY. JOSE D. PAJARILLO
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Before us is a verified complaint1 for disbarment against respondent
Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo for allegedly violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting
interests and Canon 15 of the same Code which enjoins a lawyer to observe candor,
fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with clients.

The salient facts of the case follow:
In 1995, the complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was
divided into two opposing factions. The first faction, called the Adeva Group, was
composed of Romulo M. Adeva, Lydia E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro, and Pilar I.
Andrade. The other faction, called the Lukban Group, was composed of Justo B. Lukban,
Luz I. Garcia, Alice I. Adeva, and Marcel N. Lukban. In 1996, the complainant appointed
the respondent as its corporate secretary with a total monthly compensation and
honorarium of P6,000. On March 29, 1999, the Adeva Group issued an unnumbered
Board Resolution which authorized Pilar I. Andrade, the Executive Vice President and
Treasurer of the complainant at that time, and Lydia E. Cacawa, the Vice President for
Administration and Finance, to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP),
Daet Branch, Camarines Norte in favor of the complainant. On May 12, 1999, the
Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan application because the Adeva
Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were allegedly not registered
as stockholders in the Stock and Transfer Book of the complainant, as members of the
Board of Trustees. The Lukban Group also alleged that the complainant was having
financial difficulties. On May 14, 1999, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the
latter of complainant's financial capacity to pay the loan. On July 13, 1999, RBP granted
the loan application in the amount of P200,000 which was secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage over the properties of the complainant. On September 27, 1999, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an Order which nullified the
appointment of Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano by the Adeva Group as members of
the Board of Trustees of the complainant. As a result, complainant sent a letter to RBP
to inform the latter of the SEC Order. On October 19, 1999, RBP sent a letter to the
complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order and informing the latter that the
SEC Order was referred to RBP's legal counsel, herein respondent. The complainant
alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter that it became aware that
respondent is also the legal counsel of RBP. On April 18, 2000, complainant and RBP
increased the loan to P400,000. On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the Real
Estate Mortgage. On May 28, 2002, complainant filed a complaint for Annulment of
Mortgage with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against RBP. Respondent entered his
appearance as counsel for RBP. On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the present
complaint for disbarment against the respondent for allegedly representing conflicting
interests and for failing to exhibit candor, fairness, and loyalty. Respondent raised three
defenses against the complaint for disbarment. First, respondent argued that Marcel N.
Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana Apuya cannot represent the
complainant in this disbarment case because they were not duly authorized by the
Board of Directors to file the complaint. Second, respondent claimed that he is not
covered by the prohibition on conflict of interest which applies only to the legal counsel
of complainant. Respondent argued that he merely served as the corporate secretary of
complainant and did not serve as its legal counsel. Third, respondent argued that there
was no conflict of interest when he represented RBP in the case for annulment of
mortgage because all the documents and information related to the loan transaction
between RBP and the complainant were public records. Thus, respondent claimed that
he could not have taken advantage of his position as the mere corporate secretary of
the complainant.
On February 14, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and
Recommendation2 finding respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for at least one
year. The Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent appeared for RBP in the
case for annulment of mortgage filed by his former client, the complainant herein. The
Investigating Commissioner cited cash vouchers3 from 1994 to 2001 showing that
respondent was paid by complainant for his retained legal services. According to the
Investigating Commissioner, these vouchers debunk respondent's claim that the
complainant merely appointed him as its corporate secretary. The Investigating
Commissioner also held that the personality of complainant's representatives to file this
administrative case is immaterial since proceedings for disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. On
June 21, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-7704
which affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and imposed a penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one year against respondent. On May 3, 2014,
the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-2905 which denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent. The issue in this case is whether
respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he entered his
appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by
complainant against RBP. We rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and Resolution Nos. XX-2013-770
and XXI-2014-290 of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, respondent represented
conflicting interests in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." This
rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on
totally unrelated cases.6 Based on the principles of public policy and good taste, this
prohibition on representing conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.7 In Maturan
v. Gonzales8 we further explained the rationale for the prohibition: The reason for the
prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action
as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded
with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client's secrets. A
lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the
profession will suffer by the loss thereof. Meanwhile, in Hornilla v. Salunat,9 we
explained the test to determine the existence of conflict of interest: There is conflict of
interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have
been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require
the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to
use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another
test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations wherein a lawyer would be
representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients.10 It also applies when the lawyer represents a client against a former client in a
controversy that is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous
litigation in which he appeared for the former client.11 This rule applies regardless of
the degree of adverse interests.12 What a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain
inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.13 A lawyer may only
be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that
is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation.14chanrobleslaw
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find that respondent represented
conflicting interests when he served as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of
mortgage filed by the complainant, respondent's former client, against RBP.
The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent was compensated by
complainant for his retained legal services is supported by the evidence on record, the
cash vouchers from 1994 to 2001. Clearly, complainant was respondent's former client.
And respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by his former client against
RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests since respondent
failed to show any written consent of all concerned (particularly the complainant) given
after a full disclosure of the facts representing conflicting interests.15chanrobleslaw
We also note that the respondent acted for the complainant's interest on the loan
transaction between RBP and the complainant when he sent a letter dated May 14,
1999 to RBP to assure the latter of the financial capacity of the complainant to pay the
loan. But as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted
against the interest of the complainant, his former client.
Contrary to the respondent's claim, it is of no moment that all the documents and
information in connection with the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant
were public records. In Hilado v. David,16 we laid down the following doctrinal
pronouncements:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client
from thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even
though during the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature was
revealed to the attorney by the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii,
553, Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly
represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation,
the court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his
former client during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to
represent the adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)
In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client, it
is unnecessary that the court ascertain in detail the extent to which the former client's
affairs might have a bearing on the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the
attorney's knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev.,
264.)
This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on
terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the
same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no
knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer from his client is
irrelevant in determining the existence of conflict of interest.
Finally, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that a complaint for disbarment is
imbued with public interest which allows for a liberal rule on legal standing. Under
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, "[proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio,
or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any
person." Thus, in the present case, we find that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr.,
and Ma. Pamela Rossana A. Apuya can institute the complaint for disbarment even
without authority from the Board of Directors of the complainant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2013-770 and Resolution No. XXI-
2014-290 of the IBP Board of Governors imposing a penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one year against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo are hereby
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
ERLINDA SISTUAL v. ATTY. ELIORDO OGENA
PER CURIAM:
In a Complaint,[1] dated June 1, 2006, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP),complainants Erlinda C. Sistual, Flordelisa[2] S. Leysa, Leonisa S. Espabo, and Arlan C.
Sistual (complainants) alleged that respondent Atty. Eliordo Ogena (Atty. Ogena), who was
the legal counsel of their late father, Manuel A. Sistual (Manuel), wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsified several documents which included, among others, a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA), Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate, Affidavit of Identification of Heirs, Deed of
Donation, and a Deed of Absolute Sale by making it appear that all the children of Manuel
and their mother, Erlinda Sistual (Erlinda), executed the documents; that as a result of the
falsification of the said documents, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 60467, registered in
the name of "Heirs of Martin Sistual, represented by Manuel Sistual,"[3] was cancelled and
was subdivided into several lots; and that these lots were sold to interested buyers.
In his Answer with Affirmative/Special Defenses and Motion to Dismiss,[4] Atty. Ogena
denied the allegations. He averred that in 1987, he was engaged by Manuel to represent the
heirs of Martin Sistual in a complaint for recovery of possession filed by Abid Mendal (Abid)
and Abundio Sistual (Abundio)[5] that Manuel was the representative of the Heirs of Martin
Sistual; that the heirs of Martin Sistual were able to obtain a favorable decision[6] in the said
case; that pursuant to the said decision, Lot 464 was awarded to the heirs of Martin Sistual
and TCT No. T-60467 was issued in their names; that when Manuel died on November 15,
1993, the heirs of Martin Sistual executed an SPA,[7] dated December 31, 1993, designating
Bienvenido Sistual (Bienvenido) as their attorney-in-fact; that Erlinda, the wife of Manuel,
manifested her desire to represent the heirs of Martin Sistual, so her two children, Isidro
Sistual and Flordelisa Sistual, also executed an SPA in her favor; that the heirs of Martin
Sistual opposed the appointment of Erlinda and executed another SPA,[8] dated October 5,
1995, in favor of Bienvenido; and that in the October 5, 1995 SPA, Atty. Ogena wrote the
names of complainants Erlinda and Flordeliza Sistual but they did not sign it.
As to the incident that led to the subdivision of TCT No. T-60467, Atty.Ogena explained that
Bienvenido, upon the prodding of the heirs of Martin Sistual with the exception of the
complainants, caused the subdivision of the property covered by TCT No. T-60467 into
several sub-lots identified as TCT Nos. 76078,[9] 76079,[10] 76080,[11] 76081,[12] 76082,[13]
76083,[14] 76084,[15] 76085,[16] and 76086,[17] and that the corresponding subdivision
plans and technical descriptions thereof were duly approved by the Regional Director,
Bureau of Lands, Davao City; and that the subdivided lots were in the names of all the heirs
of Martin Sistual including the complainants.
On September 7, 1996, the heirs of Dolores Sistual Tulay executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement[18] whereby the 1/7 share of their mother in the lot covered by TCT No. T-60467
was waived, repudiated and relinquished in favor of their father, Domingo Tulay; that the
heirs of Manuel Sistual also executed an Extrajudicial Settlement[19] waiving their 1/7 share
in the same property in favor of their mother, Erlinda.
On April 10 and 15, 1997, the heirs of Martin Sistual including complainants executed two
deeds of donation[20] in favor of Barangay Lamian conveying the lot covered by TCT Nos. T-
76083 and T-76086 to be used for its public market.
Atty. Ogena denied that the aforementioned documents were falsified as they were actually
executed and duly signed by all the parties therein; and that all the signatures of
complainants appearing in the aforementioned documents were identical; that the deeds of
donation were duly attested to by Barangay Captain Conrado Toledo and the barangay
kagawads;[21] and that the aforementioned documents did not in any way prejudiced the
complainants. The execution thereof did not defraud them or any of the heirs of Martin
Sistual as the issuance of the nine (9) new and separate titles in the names of all the heirs, as
co-owners, was beneficial and favorable to all of them. Finally, as to the Absolute Deed of
Sale,[22] dated July 18, 1989, executed by spouses Manuel and Erlinda in favor of Socorro
Langub, Atty. Ogena also denied that this was falsified as this was duly executed, signed and
subscribed by all the parties. Atty. Ogena submitted a copy of the said deed of sale[23] to
prove that it was duly executed and signed by Manuel and Erlinda, as the vendors; and
Socorro Langub, as the vendee.
In its Report and Recommendation,[24] the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) stated
that it is bereft of any jurisdiction to determine whether Atty. Ogena committed forgery in
the aforementioned documents. It, however, found several irregularities in the documents
notarized by Atty. Ogena. First, in the SPA, the signatures of Flordelisa Sistual and Isidro
Sistual were absent and the Community Tax Certificates (CTC) of the signatories namely:
Bernardina Sistual Anson, Jesusa Sistual Español, and Erlinda, were not indicated. In the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Manuel, although all the heirs signed, only the
CTC of Erlinda and Flordelisa were indicated. In the Affidavit of Identification of Heirs of
Martin Sistual, the CTC of Solfia S. Maribago was absent; and in the Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate of Deceased Dolores Sistual with Waiver of Hereditary Shares, only the CTC of
Domingo Tulay was indicated. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Ogena's notarial
commission be revoked and that he be permanently disqualified from reappointment as
Notary Public; and that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification
the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The IBP Board of Governors revoked Atty.
Ogena's commission as notary public and permanently disqualified him from reappointment
as Notary Public. It, however, deleted the penalty of suspension.[25]
On March 29, 2012, Atty. Ogena filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP.
In a Resolution, dated November 10, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration and affirmed with modification its earlier resolution, revoking Atty. Ogena's
notarial commission indefinitely.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty it imposed. To begin
with, complainants' allegation of forgery was not clearly substantiated and there was no
concrete proof that the complainants were prejudiced. They submitted a copy of the
affidavits[26] for falsification executed by Erlinda and Flordelisa, both subscribed before the
City of Prosecutor on February 20, 2006; Memoranda for Preliminary Investigation[27] issued
by Office of the City Prosecutor, Koronadal, South Cotabato; Letter,[28] Memorandum,[29]
and Order[30] issued by the Bureau of Lands, but these do not suffice to prove the allegation
of forgery and/or falsification.
Atty. Ogena, however, violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice specifically Rule IV,
Section 2(b), which provides:
Section 2. Prohibitions. - (a) x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
Doubtless, Atty. Ogena was negligent in the performance of his duty as a notary public. He
failed to require the personal presence of the signatories of the documents and proceeded to
notarize the aforementioned documents without the signatures of all the parties. Likewise,
Atty. Ogena failed to comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do -to
require the parties to present their residence certificates or any other document to prove
their identities. This Court, in Gonzales v. Atty. Ramos,[31] wrote:
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A
notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A notary public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties;
otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of the document would be undermined.
By notarizing the aforementioned documents, Atty. Ogena engaged in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.[32] His conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities
considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the
public accord to notarized documents.[33] His failure to perform his duty as a notary public
resulted not only in damaging complainants' rights but also in undermining the integrity of a
notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. Thus, Atty. Ogena should be
liable for such negligence, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

Pursuant to the pronouncement in Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice,[34] Atty.

Ogena should be suspended for two (2) years from the practice of law and forever barred
from becoming a notary public.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eliordo Ogena is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years and is BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Let copies of this decision be furnished all courts in the country and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. Let also a copy of this decision be appended
to the personal record of Atty. Eliordo Ogena in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10910; ANTERO M. SISON, JR., vs. ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO
DECISION
PERCURIAM: In his verified affidavit-complaint,1 dated September 17, 2012, filed before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (JBP-CBD),
complainant Atty. Antero M. Sison, Jr. (Atty. Sison), president of Marsman-Drysdale
Agribusiness Holdings Inc. (MDAHI), charged respondent Atty. Manuel Camacho (Atty.
Camacho) with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). He accused
Atty. Camacho of violating Rule 1.01, for dishonestly entering into a compromise
agreement without authorization, and Rule 16.01, for failure to render an accounting of
funds which were supposed to be paid as additional docket fees.
Complaint's Position
Atty. Sison alleged that Atty. Camacho was the counsel of MDAHI in an insurance claim
action against Paramount Life & General Insurance Corp. (Paramount Insurance),
docketed as Civil Case No. 05-655, before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch
139 (RTC). The initial insurance claim of MDAHI against Paramount Insurance was
P14,863,777.00. On March 4, 2011, Atty. Camacho met with Atty. Enrique Dimaano
(Atty. Dimaano), corporate secretary of MDAHI, and proposed to increase their claim to
P64,412,534. l 8 by taking into account the interests imposed. Atty. Camacho, however,
clarified that the increase in the claim would require additional docket fees in the
amount of Pl,288,260.00, as shown in his hand-written computation.2 MDAHI agreed
and granted the said amount to Atty. Dimaano which was evidenced by a Payment
Request/Order Form.3 On May 27, 2011, Atty. Dimaano gave the money for docket fees
to Atty. Camacho who promised to issue a receipt for the said amount, but never did.4
Atty. Sison later discovered that on May 26, 2011, the RTC had already rendered a
decision5 in favor of MDAHI granting its insurance claim plus interests in the amount of
approximately P65,000,000.00. On August 11, 2011, Atty. Camacho sent a letter6 to
MDAHI recommending a settlement with Paramount Insurance in Civil Case No. 05-655
in the amount of Pl5,000,000.00 allegedly to prevent a protracted appeal with the
appellate court. MDAHI refused the offer of compromise and did not indicate its
conforme on the letter of Atty. Camacho. Surprisingly, even without the written
conformity of MDAHI, Atty. Camacho filed the Satisfaction of Judgment,7 dated August
15, 2011, before the R TC stating that the parties had entered into a compromise
agreement. On August 18, 2011, Atty. Sison met with Atty. Camacho to clarify the events
that transpired.8 He asked Atty. Camacho whether he paid the amount of Pl,288,260.00
as additional dockets fees, and the latter replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of
court as the payment period had lapsed. Disappointed with the actions of Atty.
Camacho, Atty. Sison sent a letter,9 dated August 24, 2011, stating that he was alarmed
that the former would accept a disadvantageous compromise; that it was against
company policy to bribe any government official with respect to the Pl,288,260.00 given
to the clerk of court; and that MDAHI would only pay P200,000.00 to Atty. Camacho as
attorney's fees.
Respondent's Position
In his verified answer,10 dated October 30, 2012, Atty. Camacho denied all the
allegations against him. He stressed that he had the authority to enter into the
compromise agreement. Moreover, the alleged docket fees given to him by MDAHI
formed part of his attorney's fees. He further stated in his position paper11 that the
judgment debt was paid and accepted by MDAHI without any objection, as duly
evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt.12 Thus, there was no irregularity in the
compromise agreement. With respect to the amount handed to him, Atty. Camacho
averred that he filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Pay Attorney's Fee on September
13, 2011 before the RTC. The Court granted the said motion in its April 12, 2012 Order13
stating that the amount of Pl,288,260.00 was considered as part of his attorney's fees.
On July 6, 2012, the R TC issued an Order14 resolving the motion for reconsideration
filed by both parties in favor of Atty. Camacho. In the said order, the RTC opined that
only P300,000.00 was previously paid to Atty. Camacho15 as attorney's fees. Based on
the foregoing, Atty. Camacho asserted that the amount of Pl,288,260.00 which he
received, truly formed part of his unpaid attorney's fees. He stressed that the said RTC
order had attained finality and constituted res judicata on the present administrative
case. He added that MDAHI disregarded the RTC order as it filed an estafa case against
him concerning the amount ofl:ll,288,260.00.
Report and Recommendation
After the mandatory conference on January 24, 2013 and upon a thorough evaluation of
the evidence presented by the parties in their respective position papers, the IBP-CBD
submitted its Report and Recommendation,16 dated April 1, 2013 finding Atty. Camacho
to have violated the provisions of Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR and
recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) year suspension from the
practice of law against him. In its Resolution No. XX-2013-474,17 dated April 16, 2013,
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Board) adopted the said
report and recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Eldrid C. Antiquiera.
Aggrieved, Atty. Camacho filed a motion for reconsideration18 before the Board
reiterating that the compromise agreement was valid because MDAHI did not reject the
same and that the amount of Pl,288,260.00 formed part of his attorney's fees. In his
Comment/Opposition,19 Atty. Sison countered that Atty. Camacho never denied that he
filed the satisfaction of judgment without the written authority of MDAHI and that there
was ca pending estafa case against him before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
Branch 146, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13-1688, regarding the Pl,288,260.00 handed
to him. In its Resolution No. XXI-2014-532,20 dated August 10, 2014, the Board adopted
the report and recommendation21 of National Director Dominic C.M. Solis. The Board
partially granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed, without prejudice, the
charge regarding the failure to account for the money, because it was premature to act
on such issue due to the pending criminal case against the Atty. Camacho. Accordingly,
the penalty of one (1) year suspension imposed was lowered to six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law. Hence, the case was elevated to the Court.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds that Atty. Camacho violated Rules 1.01 and 16.01 of the CPR.
Entering into a compromise agreement without written authority of the client
Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and
integrity in all their dealings. Members of the Bar took their oath to conduct themselves
according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to their clients and to delay no man for money or malice. These mandates
apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly fiduciary
nature of their relationship.22 In the practice of law, lawyers constantly formulate
compromise agreements for the benefit of their clients. Article 1878 of the Civil Code
provides that " [ s ]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases: xxx (3)
To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from
a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription
already acquired xxx." In line with the fiduciary duty of the Members of the Bar, Section
23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifies a stringent requirement with respect to
compromise agreements, to wit: Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. -
Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation
thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's
litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.
In the case at bench, the R TC decision, dated May 26, 2011, awarded MDAHI
approximately P65,000,000.00. When Paramount Insurance offered a compromise
settlement in the amount of Pl5,000,000.00, it was clear as daylight that MDAHI never
consented to the said offer. As can be gleaned from Atty. Camacho's letter, MDAHI did
not sign the conforme regarding the compromise agreement.23
Glaringly, despite the lack of a written special authority, Atty. Camacho agreed to a
lower judgment award on behalf of his client and filed a satisfaction of judgment before
the R TC. The said pleading also failed to bear the conformity of his client.24 Although
MDAHI subsequently received the payment of P15M from Paramount Insurance, it does
not erase Atty. Camacho's transgression in reaching the compromise agreement without
the prior consent of his client. For entering into a compromise agreement without the
written authority of his client, Atty. Camacho violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which states
that " [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Members of the Bar must always conduct themselves in a way that promotes public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.25
Failing to account for the money of the client
Atty. Camacho was also charged with violation of Rule 16.01 of the CPR, which provides
for a lawyer's duty to "account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client." Here, Atty. Sison alleged that MDAHI gave Atty. Camacho the amount
of P 1,288,260.00 as payment of additional docket fees but the latter failed to apply the
same for its intended purpose. In contrast, Atty. Camacho invoked the July 6, 2012
Order of the RTC which declared the MDAHI allegation as unsubstantiated, and claimed
that the said amount formed part of his attorney's fees. The Board, on the other hand,
opined that it was still premature to decide such issue because there was a pending
estafa case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13-1688, filed by MDAHI against Atty.
Camacho involving the same amount of P 1,288,260.00. The Court is of the view that it
is not premature to rule on the charge against Atty. Camacho for his failure to account
for the money of his client. The pending case against him is criminal in nature. The issue
therein is whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of misappropriating the amount
of Pl,288,260.00 entrusted to him by his client. The present case, however, is
administrative in character, requiring only substantial evidence. It only entails a
determination of whether Atty. Camacho violated his solemn oath by failing to account
for the money of his client. Evidently, the adjudication of such issue in this
administrative case shall not, in any way, affect the separate criminal proceeding. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the
court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.1âwphi1 The only
concern of the Court is the determination of the respondent's administrative liability.
The findings in this case will have no material bearing on other judicial action which the
parties may choose to file against each other. While a lawyer's wrongful actuations may
give rise at the same time to criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities, each must be
determined in the appropriate case; and every case must be resolved in accordance
with the facts and the law applicable and the quantum of proof required in each.26
Delving into the substance of the allegation, the Court rules that Atty. Camacho indeed
violated Rule 16.01 of the CPR. When Atty. Camacho personally requested MDAHI for
additional docket fees, the latter obediently granted the amount of Pl ,288,260.00 to the
former. Certainly, it was understood that such amount was necessary for the payment
of supposed additional docket fees in Civil Case No. 05-655. Yet, when Atty. Sison
confronted Atty. Camacho regarding the said amount, the latter replied that he simply
gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed. Whether the said amount
was pocketed by him or improperly given to the clerk of court as a form of bribery, it
was unmistakably clear that Atty. Camacho did not apply the amount given to him by his
client for its intended legal purpose.
Atty. Camacho did not even deny making that request to MDAHI for additional docket
fees and receiving such amount from his client. Rather, he set up a defense that the said
amount formed part of his attorney's fees. Such defense, however, is grossly
contradictory to the established purpose of the Pl,288,260.00. In its Payment
Request/Order Form,27 it is plainly indicated therein that MDAHI released the said
amount only to be applied as payment for additional docket fees, and not for any other
purposes. Consequently, the lame excuse of Atty. Camacho is bereft of merit because it
constitutes a mere afterthought and a manifest disrespect to the legal profession. Atty.
Camacho is treading on a perilous path where the payment of his attorney's fees is more
important than his fiduciary and faithful duty of accounting the money of his client.
Well-settled is the rule that lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally appropriate their
clients' money for themselves by the mere fact that the clients owe them attorney's
fees.28 Moreover, Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to MDAHI from the moment
he received the said amount. In Tarog v. Ricafort,29 the Court held that ethical and
practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for a lawyer to issue
receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own records.
Pursuant to Rule 16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he is accountable for
the money entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring
accountability is by issuing and keeping receipts. Worse, on May 26, 2011, the RTC
already rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 05-655, adjudging MDAHI entitled to an
insurance claim in the amount of approximately P.65,000,000.00. From that date on,
there was no more need for additional docket fees. Apparently, still unaware of the
judgment, MDAHI subsequently released the money for additional docket fees to Atty.
Dimaano, who handed it to Atty. Camacho on May 27, 2011. Despite a decision having
been rendered, Atty. Camacho did not reject the said amount or return it to his client
upon receipt. Instead, he unilaterally withheld the said amount by capriciously invoking
the payment of his attorney's fees. The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the
counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
lawyer's failure, to return upon demand, the funds held by him on behalf of his client effective immediately.
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general Furthermore, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is ORDERED to return to Marsman-Drysdale
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal Agribusiness Holdings Inc. the money intended to pay for additional docket fees which
profession and deserves punishment.30 he received from the latter in the amount of P 1,288,260.00 within ninety (90) days from
the finality of this decision.
Administrative penalty
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered
an attorney, for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal into the records of respondent Atty. Manuel N. Camacho. Copies shall likewise be
profession as embodied in the CPR. The practice of law is a profession, a form of public furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator
trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who for circulation to all courts concerned.
possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.31 In Luna v. SO ORDERED.
Galarrita,32 the Court suspended the respondent lawyer for two (2) years because he
accepted a compromise agreement without valid authority and he failed to tum over
the payment to his client. In the case of Melendrez v. Decena,33 the lawyer therein was
disbarred because he entered into a compromise agreement without the special
authority of his client and he drafted deceptive and dishonest contracts. Similarly, in
Navarro v. Meneses III,34 another lawyer, who misappropriated the money entrusted to
him by his client which he failed and/or refused to account for despite repeated
demands, was disbarred because his lack of personal honesty and good moral character
rendered him unworthy of public confidence. In this case, Atty. Camacho entered into a
compromise agreement without the conformity of his client which is evidently against
the provisions of the CPR and the law. Moreover, he deliberately failed to account for
the money he received from his client, which was supposed to be paid as additional
docket fees. He even had the gall to impute that the money was illicitly given to an
officer of the court. The palpable indiscretions of Atty. Camacho shall not be
countenanced by the Court for these constitute as a blatant and deliberate desecration
of the fiduciary duty that a lawyer owes to his client.

The Court finds that Atty. Camacho's acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the
CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as
a member of the Bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of
the legal profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well as the
damage and prejudice they caused to his client, Atty. Camacho deserves the ultimate
penalty of disbarment.

Further, he must be ordered to return the amount of Pl,288,260.00 to MDAHI, which he

received in his professional capacity for payment of the purported additional docket
fees. Disciplinary proceedings revolve around the determination of the respondent-
lawyer's administrative liability, which must include those intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement.35

WHEREFORE, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For reasons above-stated, he is