1.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs CA & TEODORO ABASTIDO

GR NO 102858, JULY 28, 1997

FACTS:
On December 8, 1986, private respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his land title over
648 sqm of land under PD No. 1529.
The trial court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction stating that the applicants failed to comply with the
provisions of Sec. 23 (1) of PD NO. 1529, requiring the applicants to publish the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, thus the court has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory or directory
in relation to Section 23 (1) of PD NO. 1529

Sec. 23 Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour
of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3)
posting.
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause notice of initial
hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have
an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern". Said notice shall also require all
persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the provision of the said law is mandatory. The law used the term shall in prescribing the
work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter’s receipt of the court order setting the time for initial
hearing. The word “shall” denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of the statute.
Furthermore, land proceeding is a proceeding in rem. (being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of
the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights or interests in the property) and an in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Thus the process must be strictly complied with.

PRINCIPLE:
Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation;
there is room only for application.

2. OLIVIA PASCUAL & HERMES PASCUAL vs ESPERANZA PASCUAL-BAUTISTA…. & JUDGE PADOLINA
GR NO. 84240 March 25, 1992

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari for the decision of the court of appeals denying their motion to
reiterate hereditary rights and the memorandum in support of motion to reiterate hereditary rights. They contend that they do
not fall within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code; that said provision can be interpreted to exclude recognized and
acknowledge natural children as their legitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were
under conception. Otherwise stated, they say that the term “illegitimate children as provided in article 992 must be strictly
construed to refer only to spurious children.

ARTICLE 992 OF THE CC

- “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;
nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural
children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz vs IAC where SC ruled that “article 992 of the civil code
provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and the relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
The interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in
statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
Clearly, the term “illegitimate” refers to both natural and spurious children. Thus, the petitioners being illegitimate
children of Eligio Pascual cannot represent the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent.
 The law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX)

3. PEOPLE VS MAPULONG
GR NO L-22301, AUGUST 30, 1967

FACTS:
The defendant Mario Mapa Mapulong was charged and convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition for having in his possession one homemade revolver without first having secured the necessary license or permit.
The accused defended that he is a duly appointed secret agent of the then Governor of Batangas and at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense, he had a confidential mission to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition

HELD:
Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code states that:
"it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition.”
Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code states:
“firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties."
The law is clear that there is no exemption for a secret agent in the mentioned provisions. Thus the accused being a
secret agent of a provincial governor is not exempt.

The first fundamental duty of the courts is to apply the law. “construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them”

4. PEOPLE VS PATRICIO AMIGO

GR NO 116719, JANUARY 18, 1996

FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged of the crime of murder punishable under Art 248 of the RPC with no modifying
circumstance present for stabbing one Benito Ng Say. The accused was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is
the medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum to death.
Accused-appellant argued that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of
reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the
offense was committed. He contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA No. 7659, death
penalty had been abolished. Hence, the penalty that should have been imposed upon the accused-appellant should be reclusion
temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not modification of the periods of penalties may be impliedly construed from Section 19(1) of Article III.
HELD:
No. Section 19(1) of Article III shows that there is nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of death
penalty. The provision only prohibits the imposition of death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

“the language while rather awkward, is still plain enough. It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that: if the language under
consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like

ISSUE:
Whether or not the supreme court can reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty of
murder
HELD:
Yes. The decisions of the court are not petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced.

The Supreme Court returned to its original interpretation and held that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the
periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only in so far as it prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty of Reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh
HELD:
Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of the courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of
sympathy or pity for the accused. DURA LEX SED LEX

5. SAGANA VS FRANCISCO
GR NO. 161952

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint, before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to recover damages alleging that on November 20, 1992,
respondent with intent to kill him and without justifiable reason, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh. However,
respondents actively attempted to frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to give their identity, rebuffing requests
to sign for or receive documents or eluding the officers of court.

Issue:
Whether the substituted service of summons was validly made upon respondent through his brother.

HELD:
Yes. The substituted service of summons was validly made upon respondent through his brother. Although, in general, the
statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully and that any substituted service other
than that authorized by Rules is considered ineffective. The Supreme Court ruled that strict application of the Rules is not
warranted to this case as it would clearly frustrate the spirit of laws as well as do injustice to the parties waiting almost 15 years
for resolution of this case