1.

Director of Lands vs CA [GR No 102858 July 28, 1997]

FACTS:
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of a land title. During the pendency of the said petition, he died and his
heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the petition. The trial court dismissed the petition “for want of
jurisdiction”. However, it was found that the applicant had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject land since 1938. The
reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to a law. The
CA set aside the decision of the trial court. Thus, Petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory or directory.

HELD:
It is mandatory. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt
of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.
While such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, it
is held that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due process.

LATIN MAXIM:
6c – Verba legis non est recendendum

​Do not depart from the words of the statute

2. Pascual vs Pascual, et. Al. [GR No. 84240 March 25, 1992]
FACTS:
Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres
Pascual, who died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children.

ISSUE:
W/N Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which states that “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child”, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:
In Diaz v. IAC, this Court ruled that “Art. 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.” Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his
illegitimate children. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres
Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

LATIN MAXIM:
7b – Dura lex sed lex

​The law may be harsh but it is the law

3. People of the Philippines vs Mario Mapulong [GR No.L-22301 August 30, 1967]
FACTS:
Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor
of Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his appointment.
ISSUE:
W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms.
HELD:

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 No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would
not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the
accused must stand. The Court’s ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang.

LATIN MAXIM:
7a – Absoluta senténtia expositore non indiget
When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required

4. People vs Patricio Amigo [GR No. 116719 January 18, 1996]

FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite
the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed.
Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and
hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its
medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
ISSUE:
WON that the penalty or reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh and pleads for sympathy.
HELD:
The duty of court is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused.
LATIN MAXIM:
7b – Dura lex sed lex

​The law may be harsh but it is the law

5. Arnel Sagana vs Richard Francisco [G.R. No.161952, October 2, 2009]

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint, before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to recover damages alleging that on November 20, 1992, respondent with
intent to kill him and without justifiable reason, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh. On January 31, 1995, Process Server Manuel
Panlasigue attempted to personally serve summons at respondent’s address at No. 36 Sampaguita Street, Baesa Q.C., but was unsuccessful. In his
Servers Return, he stated that the occupant in that house refused to give his identity and that respondent is unknown at said residence. The Trial Court
also attempted to serve summons to the respondent’s office through registered mail, however, respondent failed to pick up summons. The case was
dismissed by the Trial Court on account of petitioner’s lack of interest to prosecute that he did not take action since the filing of the Servers Return.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, contended that he exerted efforts to locate the respondent, it was confirmed that respondent indeed
lived at No. 36 Sampaguita Street, Bausa, Q.C. Trial Court granted the Motion with a condition upon the service of summon on the respondent within
10 days from the receipt of the Order. On August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar tried to serve summons at respondent’s address but no avail.
In his handwritten annotation, he stated that respondent’s brother, Michael Francisco, told him that respondent no longer lived at the said address,
however, Iconar left a copy of the summons to Michael Francisco. Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Respondent in Default for failure off
respondent to file Answer despite the service of summons. Trial Court declared that the summons was validly served to respondent, declared that
respondent in default and allowed petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. Michael Francisco, through his lawyer filed a Manifestation and
Motion, he denied that he received the summons and hewas authorized to receive on behalf of his brother. He prayed his name to be stricken off the
records as having received the copy of summons. In his Affidavit of Merit, he asserted that he was 19 y/o, and respondent had left the house since
1993 andrespondent would only write or call them without informing his whereabouts. On the other hand, petitioner attached in his Rejoinder, the
Affidavit prepared by respondent dated December 23, 1992, where declared he was a resident of No. 36 Sampaguita St. Bausa Q.C. and the lawyer
who notarized the affidavit was the same lawyer who represented his brother. Trial Court denied the Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit, it
rendered a judgment in favor of the petitioner, ordered respondent to pay the damages. Respondent received the copy of the Trial Court’s Decision,
he then filed a Notice of Appeal to Court of Appeals. The appellate court directed the parties to file respective briefs, a copy of which was sent by
respondent at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Bausa, Q.C. Respondent prayed that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the person, despite the
irregularity of the substituted service of summons by the court Process Server and in awarding of damages to petitioner. Court of Appeals rendered
decision granting the Appeal of respondent and setting aside the decision of the trial court for the irregularity of the service of summons. Petitioner
filed Petition for Review on Certiorari to Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the substituted service of summons was validly made upon respondent through his brother.

HELD:
The Petition for Review on Certiorari was granted, Court of Appeals decision was reversed and set aside, and the Trial Court decision was reinstated
and affirmed. Although, in general, the statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully and that any
substituted service other than that authorized by Rules is considered ineffective. The Supreme Court ruled that strict application of the Rules is not
warranted to this case as it would clearly frustrate the spirit of laws as well as do injustice to the parties waiting almost 15 years for resolution of this
case. The respondents actively attempt to frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to give their identity, rebuffing requests to sign for or
receive documents or eluding the officers of court. Respondent tried to avoid the service of summons, prompting the court to declare that sheriff must
be resourceful, but sheriffs cannot be faulted of the respondent themselves engage in deception to thwart the orderly administration of justice.

LATIN MAXIM:
7b – Dura lex sed lex

​The law may be harsh but it is the law

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 6. COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES, et. al. [G.R. No. 132527; July 29, 2005]

FACTS: This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres in his capacity as Executive Secretary from allowing other
private respondents to continue with the operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark
Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to declare RA 7227 as unconstitutional on the ground that it allowed only tax-free (and duty-
free) importation of raw materials, capital and equipment. Petitioners contend that the wording of RA 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives to
the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only thereby violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution. He also assailed the
constitutionality of EO 97-A for being violative of their right to equal protection. They asserted that private respondents operating inside the SSEZ
are not different from the retail establishments located outside. The respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of legal standing
and unreasonable delay in filing of the petition

ISSUE: WON there is a violation of equal protection clause.

HELD: NO. The phrase “tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment” was merely cited as an example of incentives that
may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius",
on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example.
The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of EO 97-A cannot be, likewise, sustained. The guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation based which was based on reasonable classification. A classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial
distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same
class. Applying the foregoing test to the present case, the Court finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. There is a substantial
distinctions lying between the establishments inside and outside the zone.
LATIN MAXIM:
30a – Expressio unius est exclusion alterius
The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others

7. JUANITO R. RIMANDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) AND NORMA O. MAGNO [G.R. No. 176364]

FACTS On July 13, 2001, herein private respondent lodged a Complaint with the COMELEC, Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Santa
Cruz Laguna, accusing Jacinto Carag, Jonry Enaya and herein petitioner Juanito R. Rimando of violating Section 2, paragraph (e) and Section 3,
paragraph (d) of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 in relation to Section 261, paragraph (s) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 32 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7166.
Petitioner denied the allegation in his counter-affidavit. In a Resolution dated October 8, 2001, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Santa Cruz,
Laguna, dismissed private respondent’s complaint against petitioner, private respondent then appealed to COMELEC. On May 6, 2002, the
COMELEC En Banc rendered a Resolution affirming the dismissal of the complaint against security guards but directing its Law Department to file
the proper information against petitioner Juanito Rimando for violation of Article XXII, Section 261, paragraph (s) of the Omnibus Election Code. 37

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by COMELEC En Banc in its Resolution dated January 30, 2004. Private
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration for the aforementioned resolution which was granted by the COMELEC on October 11, 2005.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the October 11, 2005 Resolution but was denied by COMELEC.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to reverse and set 1) Resolution promulgated on October 11, 2005 and 2) Resolution promulgated on January 5, 2007.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or without or in excess of jurisdiction in disregarding the time-honored
doctrine of “nullum crimen [sine poena], nulla poena sine lege.”

HELD:
Under Section 261 (s) of the Omnibus Election Code, the punishable act is the bearing of arms outside the immediate vicinity of one’s place of work
during the election period and not the failure of the head or responsible officer of the security agency to obtain prior written COMELEC approval.
In any event, there is likewise nothing in R.A. 7166 that expressly penalizes the mere failure to secure written authority from the COMELEC as
required in Section 32 thereof. Such failure to secure an authorization must still be accompanied by other operative acts, such as the bearing, carrying

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 or transporting of firearms in public places during the election period. All told, petitioner should be absolved of any criminal liability, consistent with
the doctrine of nullum crimen [sine peona], nulla poena sine lege - there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. Thus, the Court finds that
respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Resolutions. WHEREFORE, The Resolutions of the
COMELEC En Banc issued on October 11, 2005 and January 5, 2007 in Election Case No. 01-130 are hereby reversed and set aside.

LATIN MAXIM:
47 - Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine lege
There is no crime without a penalty, and there is no penalty without a law.

8. RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT [G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987]

FACTS: Executive Order No. 626-A (E. O. 626-A) prohibits the inter-provincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. Any
carabao or carabeef transported in violation of E.O. 626-A shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the governmentt, to be distributed to
charitable institutions as Chairman of National Meat Inspection may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabao.
On January 13, 1984, Restituto Ynot transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the
police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A.

ISSUE: Is Executive Order No. 626-A constitutional.

HELD: No, Executive Order No. 626-A is not constitutional.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich
with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that
every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years
ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance,
would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive
presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify
omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of
the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently
pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his
return to the country he has fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the
public morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property
involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The
police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason
of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three
inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power,
which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically everything he
does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has
some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the
venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests
to the benefit of the greater number.
The Court finds that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is
not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated.
Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of
protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those
who are not afraid to assert them.
The Court declared Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
LATIN MAXIM:
40a - Salus populi est suprema lex
The voice of the people is the supreme law

9. REPUBLIC v. LACAP [G.R. No. 158253; March 2, 2007]

FACTS:
•Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed,with modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the
complaint for Specific Performance anddamages filed by Lacap against RP
•Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and twoother contractors were pre-qualified
•Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, andthereafter undertook the works and purchased materials and
labor in connection with
•On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and fountit 100% completed according to specs. Lacap

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 thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH
•DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds dueto Lacap’s license as contractor having expired
•Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that theContractors License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a
contract entered into by acontractor after expiry of license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract
•DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite
such recommendation, no paymentwas issued
•On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damagesagainst petitioner before the RTC.14
•On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed aMotion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
the complaint states no cause of actionand that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did notappeal to the COA
the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.
•Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, the RTC issued an Order dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to
Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.
•On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability
of the State
•Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to pay Lacap for the contract of the project, 12% interest from
demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
•CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%

ISSUE:
Whether or not a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects

HELD:
A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate him from corresponding fines thereof.
Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:“
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or
undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a
license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of
any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or
license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not
more than five thousand pesos.
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void
contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed
therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine
prescribed under the law.
LATIN MAXIM:
Verba legis
Plain-meaning rule.

10. LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [G. R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012]

FACTS:
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The
former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the
receivables from the lots already sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said water facility has been the only
source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to
the respondent Association demanding the removal of the over headwater tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB
ruling was in favor of the respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for water system/facility or open
space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board
of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an “open space” as defined in P. D. 1216.
HELD:
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an “open space.”
The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine whether the area falls under “other similar facilities and
amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities.
Ejusdem generis - states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically
mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community.
Therefore, the phrase “other similar facilities and amenities” should be interpreted in like manner. It is without a doubt that the facility was used
for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity, without which, survival in the community would be impossible
LATIN MAXIM:
29-Ejusdem generis
Of the same kind or specie

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 11. Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995]
FACTS:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the
private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s
dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”. Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private
respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation.
HELD:
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore
plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the
law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity.
LATIN MAXIM:
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus
Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish

12. Globe-Mackay v. NLRC and Salazar [G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992)]

FACTS:
Petitioner placed Respondent Salazar under preventive suspension because it appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an
air conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the company but failed to inform her employer. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal
suspension and for other damages. On appeal, the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of
Private Respondent but limited back wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent Salazar.
2. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal.
HELD:
The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages.
An exception to this is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations between the employer and the employee. The position of
Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that may be characterized as such. Moreover, Petitioner merely insinuated that since Respondent
Salazar had a special relationship with Saldivar, she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar’s questionable activities.

LATIN MAXIM:

6c – Verba legis non est recendendum

​Do not depart from the words of the statute.

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