Vrue 08 01

Aktuelle Neuerscheinung Verfassung und
Recht in Übersee VRÜ

Law and politics in Africa | Asia | Latin America
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit Herausgegeben von Aus dem Inhalt:

im Rechtsvergleich Brun-Otto Bryde Abhandlungen
Drittes deutsch-taiwanesisches Kolloquium Brun-Otto Bryde
vom 02.- 03. Oktober 2006 an der Georg-August- Philip Kunig
Constitutional Law in „old“ and „new“ Law and
Universität Göttingen Karl-Andreas Hernekamp Development
Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Werner Heun und
em. Prof. Dr. Christian Starck Francois Venter
durch die Globalization of Constitutional Law through
2008, 246 S., geb., 59,– €, ISBN 978-3-8329-3082-0
(Studien und Materialien zur Verfassungsgerichts- Hamburger Gesellschaft comparative Constitution-making
barkeit, Bd. 102)
für Völkerrecht und Jo Eric Khushal Murkens
Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts:
Auswärtige Politik e. V. Reflections on the Originalists’ Objections
In dem vorliegenden Band geht es um Auslegung und Fortbildung der Verfassung und des Verfas- Jutta Limbach
sungsprozessrechts als Voraussetzungen der Sicherungsfunktion der Verfassungsgerichte. Haupt- Globalization of Constitutional Law through
themen sind die Sicherung der horizontalen und vertikalen Gewaltenteilung sowie der Grundrechte; Interaction of Judges
darüber hinaus wird der Grundrechtschutz durch Individualverfassungsbeschwerde gegen gerichtli- Javier A. Couso
che Urteile ausführlich erörtert. The Globalization of Latin American
Verfassungsgerichte sind gebunden an verfassungsrechtlich oder gesetzlich festgelegte Antragsbe- Constitutional Law
1
fugnisse in besonderen Verfahrensarten. In diesem Rahmen kommt es im Laufe der Zeit im Wege der Manuel José Cepeda
Rechtsfortbildung zur Begründung neuer prozessualer Rechtsfiguren, die rechtsvergleichend in den
2008
The Internationalization of Constitutional Law:
Blick genommen werden. Das Entscheidende für die Stabilisierungswirkung der Verfassungsgerichte A note on the Colombian Case
ist schließlich die Bindungswirkung ihrer Entscheidungen. Der Band endet mit vergleichenden Be-
trachtungen über die politischen Wirkungen der verfassungsgerichtlichen Entscheidungen. 41. Jahrgang
Berichte
Seite 1 – 126
Anna Chadidscha Schuhmann
ISSN 0506-7286 L’Association des Cours Constitutionnelles
ayant en Partage l’Usage du Français (ACCPUF) –
VRÜ
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service de l‘État de droit
1
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VRÜ
Begründet von Prof. Dr. Herbert Krüger (†)
Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Brun-Otto Bryde, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Prof. Dr. Philip
1 2008
41. Jahrgang
Seite 1 – 126
Kunig, Freie Universität Berlin, Dr. Karl-Andreas Hernekamp, Universität Hamburg

im Institut für Internationale Angelegenheiten der Universität Hamburg
durch die Hamburger Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht und Auswärtige Politik e.V.
in Verbindung mit den Regional-Instituten des German Institute of Global and Aerea-
Studies – GIGA – (Institut für Afrika-Studien, Institut für Asien-Studien, Institut für Latein
amerika-Studien, Institut für Nahost-Studien), alle Hamburg
Beirat: Prof. Dr. Costa R. Mahalu, Rom/Dar es Salaam, Prof. Dr. Peter Malanczuk, Hong-
kong, Prof. Dr. Albrecht v. Gleich, Hamburg, sowie die Leitungen der beteiligten Hamburger
Regionalinstitute des GIGA
Schriftleitung: Dr. Karl-Andreas Hernekamp, E-mail: karl.hernekamp@jura.uni-hamburg.de
Inhalt
Editorial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Abstracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Abhandlungen / Articles
Brun-Otto Bryde
Constitutional Law in „old“ and „new“ Law and Development �� 10
Francois Venter
Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making �� 16
Jo Eric Khushal Murkens

Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on
the Originalists’ Objections �� 32
Jutta Limbach
Globalization of Constitutional Law through Interaction of Judges �� 51
Javier A. Couso
The Globalization of Latin American Constitutional Law�� 56
Manuel José Cepeda

The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A note on the Colombian Case �� 61
Berichte / Reports
Anna Chadidscha Schuhmann
L’Association des Cours Constitutionnelles ayant en Partage l’Usage du
Français (ACCPUF) – Coopération des Cours et Francophonie au service
de l‘État de droit �� 78
Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews

Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed.)
Interpreting Constitutions. A Comparative Study (O. Lepsius) �� 83
Werner Meng / Ulrich Magnus / Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte / Thomas Cottier /

Peter-Tobias Stoll / Astrid Epiney
Das internationale Recht im Nord-Süd-Verhältnis (M. Kotzur) �� 86
Mathias Reimann / Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.)

The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Chr. Schönberger) �� 90
Christoph Antons / Volkmar Gessner (eds.)

Globalisation and Resistance (N. Petersen)�� 94
Stefanie Agerer
Das Recht des Koran (P. Scholz)�� 99
Andrea Kramer
Dezentralisierung in der Wasserversorgung in Peru, Bolivien und Ekuador
(J.-Chr. Pielow) �� 102
Simon Chesterman / Chea Lehnardt (eds.)

From Mercenaries to Market. The Rise and Regulation of
Private Military Companies (D. Heck) �� 106
Bibliographie / Bibliography �� 113

3
EDITORIAL
"Verfassung und Recht in Übersee" startet mit dem vorliegenden Heft in den Jubiläums-
jahrgang 2008. Das ist ein Grund zum Innehalten. Kaum ein anderes Projekt mit ähnlichem
Themenschwerpunkt kann eine vergleichbare Kontinuität vorweisen. Die Gründung der
Zeitschrift 1968 fiel in eine besonders optimistische Phase der Entwicklungsforschung, die
indes bald endete. Auch "Verfassung und Recht in Übersee" hat die wechselnden Kon-
junkturen in der Entwicklungs- und Transformationsforschung gespürt. Dass die vor 40
Jahren verbreitete Hoffnung auf die schnelle Durchsetzung westlicher Staatsmodelle in der
"Dritten" Welt sich nicht verwirklichte, hatte auch Auswirkungen auf den Gegenstand
dieser Zeitschrift. Die Verfassungsvergleichung, ursprünglich gedacht als Zentrum des
Projekts, erwies sich in einer Welt von Militärregimes und Diktaturen häufig als frustrie-
rend. Das Interesse von Geldgebern, Universitäten und Institutionen an den überseeischen
Kontinenten ließ spürbar nach. Das belastete die internationale "law and development"-
Forschung und traf auch VRÜ. Andere Themen boten einen fruchtbaren Ausgleich. Dabei
konnte die Zeitschrift sich nicht, wie von ihrem Begründer Herbert Krüger einmal ange-
dacht, stützen auf ein eigenständiges Institut mit mehreren hauptamtlichen Referenten zur
Beobachtung der überseeischen Verfassungsentwicklung. Stattdessen musste die Zeitschrift
im Nebenamt betrieben werden. Finanzieller Sorgen war sie freilich enthoben durch flan-
kierende Subventionen zunächst aus dem Privatvermögen des Gründers, nach dessen Tod
1989 durch die von seiner Tochter Gabriele Krüger 1991 gegründete "Herbert-Krüger-
Stiftung für Überseeische Verfassungsvergleichung". Wissenschaftlich ging es ständig
aufwärts: Von den Anfängen mit einem sehr überschaubaren Autorenkreis in der winzigen
Gruppe deutscher Juristen, die sich für Entwicklungen außerhalb des europäisch-atlanti-
schen Raums interessierten, bis zu einem internationalen, polyglotten Netzwerk. Zum 70.
Geburtstag Herbert Krügers dokumentierte dies ein Heft, das ausschließlich nicht-deutsche
Autoren versammelte (1975/3). Inzwischen ist – dank der neuen Bewegung hin zu verfas-
sungsstaatlichen Strukturen auf der ganzen Welt – die Überseeische Verfassungsverglei-
chung in der juristischen Wissenschaft angekommen. Vor allem international nahm im
letzten Jahrzehnt das Interesse an der weltweiten Verfassungsentwicklung ständig zu. Die
Beiträge insbesondere aus den Entwicklungskontinenten zeigen sich immer vielfältiger und
selbstbewusster. Ein weltweiter Dialog über Verfassungsfragen gewinnt so deutlich an
Statur. Auch in Deutschland wächst der Kreis derer, die sich mit zunehmender Professio-
nalität der Erforschung von Verfassungsstrukturen und Entwicklungsrecht widmen. So
kann die Zeitschrift wieder stärker auf ihr ursprüngliches Metier, die Verfassungsverglei-
chung zurückkommen. Ihren breiten Zugriff auf Recht und Politik der überseeischen Kon-
tinente und deren internationale Beziehungen gibt sie damit keineswegs auf.
Im Sinne dieser Entwicklung konzentriert sich das erste Heft des Jubiläumsjahrgangs
2008 auf das Thema "Globalization of Constitutional Law". Verfassungsrecht hat sich zum
internationalen Fach entwickelt, das auch international behandelt werden muss. Diese
4 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)
Erkenntnis setzt sich immer mehr durch, wie hochkarätige Veranstaltungen zu diesem
Thema belegen: 2007 beschäftigten sich gleich mehrere Konferenzen mit der Globalisie-
rung oder der Internationalisierung von Verfassungsrecht. So war "Globalization of
Constitutional Law" Gegenstand der einzigen Plenarveranstaltung auf der großen Law and
Society – Tagung in Berlin. Sie ist hier mit den Beiträgen von Bryde, Couso, Limbach und
Venter dokumentiert. Ebenso hatte der VII. Weltkongress der International Association of
Constitutional Law in Athen ein Plenum über "Internationalization of Constitutional Law".
Ihm widmet sich der Beitrag von Cepeda. Verfassungsrecht ist Gegenstand eines interna-
tionalen Dialogs geworden. Daran seit 1968 zu arbeiten, ist nicht nur Grund, stolz zu sein,
sondern verpflichtet auch für die Zukunft.
Zeitgleich präsentiert VRÜ sich in neuem Gewand. Das Layout, zuletzt geändert 1980,
verdiente eine Auffrischung. Künftig lässt sich der Inhalt von außen her mit einem Blick
erfassen, was Neugier wecken und zur Lektüre anregen mag.
Zum Schluss ein Wort besonderen Dankes all denen, die seit Anbeginn ihren Beitrag
geleistet haben, dass unsere Zeitschrift nun in ihr fünftes Jahrzehnt aufbrechen kann.
Hamburg / Gießen / Berlin / Baden-Baden

im Herbst 2007
Herausgeber, Redaktion und Verlag

_______________________________
With this issue, "Verfassung und Recht in Übersee" starts into its 41st year. This is a reason
for celebration. There are few projects with a similar thematic focus which can look back
on a comparable history. When the journal was founded in 1968, development studies were
in an optimistic mood; however, this ended soon and "Verfassung und Recht in Übersee",
too, shared in the ups and downs of this field. The realisation that the hope for rapid diffu-
sion of constitutionalism throughout the world had remained unfulfilled has also guided
this journal in new directions. In a world of military regimes and dictatorships comparative
constitutional law – which was to be the central interest of the journal – often remained a
thankless labour. Fortunately, other topics remained to be explored in “law and politics
abroad”. The diminishing interest of universities and funding institutions in developing
areas studies was also felt by this journal, which would hardly have survived as a commer-
cial enterprise. Luckily, the journal could rely on financial support from the founder
Herbert Krüger and, after his death in 1989, from the "Herbert-Krüger-Stiftung für über-
seeische Verfassungsvergleichung" founded 1991 by his daughter, Gabriele Krüger. Aca-
demically, however, the journal proved a success story. Starting with a small number of
authors from the tiny group of German lawyers interested in legal development outside the
European-Atlantic area, it managed to win an international set of contributors. In the last
years, comparative constitutional law has gained a new significance especially due to the
Editorial 5
progress of constitutionalism worldwide. The constitutionalist dialogue between North and

South has become stronger and more substantial. This also holds for Germany, where the
group of scholars in comparative constitutional law and law and development has grown
more numerous and more professional; a development that allows us to focus again on its
original purpose – comparative constitutional law of Africa, Asia and Latin America –
without neglecting development law, politics, and international relations of these areas.
As a reflection of this development the first issue of the 41st year is a special issue
entitled "Globalization of Constitutional Law". It is increasingly recognized that constitu-
tional law today is an international subject, which has to be discussed internationally. Evi-
dence of this is the increasing number of conferences devoted to this subject. In 2007,
"Globalization of Constitutional Law" was the subject of a plenary of the Law and Society
meeting in Berlin (here documented by the contributions of Bryde, Couso, Limbach and
Venter), and similarly there was a plenary of the VIIth World Congress of the International
Association of Constitutional Law in Athens on "Internationalization of Constitutional
Law" from which the contribution of Cepeda has been taken.
Constitutional law has become the subject of a world-wide dialogue and we are proud
to have been an active part of this growing endeavour since 1968.
We have used this occasion to give a new look to the journal's layout which was last
modified in 1980. This will, we hope, whet readers' curiosity even more, by allowing them
to identify each issue's contents straight from the cover.
Last but not least we wish to express our special gratitude to all those who have, from
the first beginnings, helped to sustain our publication now entering its fifth decade.
Hamburg / Gießen / Berlin / Baden-Baden

autumn 2007
Editors, editorial committee and publisher

6
ABSTRACTS
Constitutional Law in "old" and "new" Law and Development
By Brun-Otto Bryde, Giessen / Karlsruhe
The internationalization of constitutional law is a very exciting development; however, it

should be discussed in the light of the law and development movement's critique of the
wisdom of legal transfers. The expectations of modernization theory with respect to the
transfer of constitutionalism through colonial imposition proved wrong for the same
reasons, which were developed in the self-critique of the law and development movement:
they were naïve and they were ethnocentric. In light of these experiences, the current
developments raise two questions: Firstly, whether the international diffusion of constitu-
tionalism in the last decades will be more successful and secondly, whether socio-legal
scholarship will confront the subject more maturely this time. While we again can detect
attempts of one-sided insistence on foreign models and reliance on the untested reception
of such models, there are differences to the “old” situation, which allow a more optimistic
evaluation of the globalization of constitutional law today. The process is much more inde-
pendent and self-sustaining, which implies that comparisons with colonial imposition
would be inappropriate. In addition, the process is much more internationalized. Constitu-
tional law has become an international subject with a worldwide infrastructure of scholars,
academic societies, and journals. While "old" law and development theory should teach us
to be aware of power relationships and the sociological problems of legal transfers, it would
be uncritical to confer those old critiques wholesale and to overlook the much more partici-
patory and egalitarian aspects of the new constitutionalism, especially owed to the devel-
opment of international human rights law.
Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making
By Francois Venter, Potchefstroom
The ebb and flow of constitutional ideas since the late 18th Century have resulted in a
globally shared vocabulary of constitutional structures, rights, principles and values. This
convergence of constitutional language has increased steadily through the various waves of
constitution-making the world has seen since the late 18th Century.
Constitutional law evolved, and still operates on the assumption that the state is sover-
eign and that it exists for the benefit and protection of its "nation".
Constitutional rights language in recently drafted constitutions tends toward similarity,
although the actual meaning of similar terms may vary in different jurisdictions.
Abstracts 7
The mechanism of prescribing a set of binding principles to the authors of a new consti-
tution has been employed successfully in a few cases. These principles of constitution-
making essentially reflect what might be described as the essence of contemporary consti-
tutionalism.
A foundational Leitmotiv for constitution-making is to be found in the notion of global
values, the most pre-eminent of which is human dignity. An exact definition of dignity is
elusive, but it is gaining ascendency in the 21st Century thinking on the moral foundations
of constitutionalism and therefore of written constitutions and their interpretation.
Global constitutionalism is not leading the world in the direction of the drafting of
constitutions that are all the same. Comparative constitution-making has however become
an essential characteristic of the process of drafting (and revision) of constitutions.
Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on the Originalists’

Objections
By Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, London
The controversy surrounding the judicial use of comparative constitutional law is not new.
However, the debate has recently been reignited by a number of US Supreme Court justices
who have spoken out on the use of non-US law in the Court. Scalia opposes, and Breyer
favours, references to ‘foreign law’. Their comments, made both within and outside of the
Court, has led to a reaction by scholars. Arguably the debate is US-specific as it resembles
the different views regarding constitutional interpretation, namely whether the Constitu-
tion’s original, or rather its current, meaning is determinative. Yet the debate also raises
broader issues of constitutional theory and politics: formal vs substantive legitimacy,
globalisation of the courts, judicial sleight of hand, the cultural foundations of constitu-
tional law, and the citation of non-primary sources of law in litigation. The present article
explores these issues. It rejects radical approaches (either against or in favour of compara-
tive constitutional law) and instead argues for a more modest process which both identifies
the national specificity of law and grasps the mediating potential of law as a self-reflexive
discourse.
The Globalization of Latin American Constitutional Law
By Javier A. Couso, Santiago de Chile
Over the last few decades, the world has experienced a remarkable process of globalization
of law – in particular, constitutional law – due to the emergence of what amounts to a
human rights-based constitutional ius cogens. This body of global legal rules has led to the
increasing homogeneity of constitutional law around the world, because it is deemed as
mandatory. The globalization of constitutional law has not been confined to consolidated
democracies, but it has also reach transitional ones, such as those of Latin America. In this
region, the acceptance of the new constitutional ius cogens has involved a revolutionary
transformation of the content and uses of constitutional law. According to the new para-
digm, constitutions involve not just rules but – more importantly – fundamental principles
of public law drawn from international human rights law. Furthermore, the new paradigm
includes a new conception of the role of high courts, which encourages them to assertively
adjudicate the constitution.
Globalization of Constitutional Law through Interaction of Judges
By Jutta Limbach, Berlin / Munich
During the last decades governments, lawmakers and judges have been faced with a
multitude of challenges transcending national borders. These challenges call for effective
ways of enforcing already existing structures of international co-operation and of creating
novel approaches, such as the creation of networks between decision-makers on an interna-
tional level. Thus recent years have seen the emergence of a proliferation of international
gatherings of judges. Networks may connect international institutions and their national
interlocutors in a vertical way with a view of enforcing international standards. In this
respect the European Court of Human Rights dedicated the conference at the occasion of
the opening of the judicial year 2005 to a dialogue between judges of different national and
European courts and facilitated a vertical dialogue between an international court and its
national counterparts in order to respond to the questions raised throughout Europe in
terms of the application and interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights.
Moreover networks may connect national bodies and their foreign counterparts in a hori-
zontal way, aiming at the exchange of information and mutual support, as it does for
instance the Conference of European Constitutional Courts that enables constitutional
judges to entertain personal contacts and to exchange know-how and experience. Although
often lacking of coercive power, the impact of these networks using “soft powers” should
not be underestimated. Based on mutual respect and appreciation, an intensive and open
dialogue on fundamental issues of constitutional law as well as on methods of interpreta-
tion facilitates the exchange of information from a broad comparative perspective in order
to meet the demands of a globalized world.
The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A Note on the Colombian Case
By Manuel José Cepeda, Bogotà
This note describes the relevance of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law (IHL) for constitutional adjudication in Colombia by the Consti-
tutional Court. As elements of the so-called “constitutionality block”, IHRL and IHL have
Abstracts 9
played an important role in the Colombian constitutional order, which becomes manifest in
several material functions: (1) the definition of the scope of constitutional rights, (2) the
identification of specific non-enumerated rights, (3) the identification of special needs and
basic standards of protection, (4) the identification of minimum standards of protection, (5)
the identification of specific prohibitions that protect rights, (6) the provision of criteria for
reviewing decrees that declare states of emergency, (7) the provision of grounds for the
constitutional enforcement of social rights, and (8) the national projection and enforcement
of preventive measures adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Each one of
these functions is illustrated in this note with representative judgments by the Constitu-
tional Court, in order to conclude that IHRL and IHL have borne a significant impact upon
decisions concerning both the preservation and public order and the protection of rights in
diverse contexts and settings, causing a very high material incidence upon the domestic
legal system.
10
ABHANDLUNGEN / ARTICLES
Constitutional Law in "old" and "new" Law and Development

*
By Brun-Otto Bryde, Giessen / Karlsruhe
For an internationalist constitutional lawyer who has always deplored the parochialism of
1
traditional constitutional law scholarship, the internationalization of constitutional law is a
very exciting and welcome development. As a member of the German Federal Constitu-
2
tional Court I am an active participant in this process. As the liaison officer of our court
3
with the Venice Commission I regularly get queries from other courts on our experience
with specific questions and answer them as well as I can, but never without a slight
misgiving because I am also a critical law and society scholar. My introduction to this field
came more than 30 years ago when I was a law and modernization fellow at Yale, and this
4
was the time when the law and development movement had overcome its naïve beginnings
5
and had become critical. At the centre of this critique were doubts about the wisdom of
legal transfers.
In the 1960s the decolonization process had already resulted in a certain kind of inter-
nationalization of constitutional law avant la lettre. We did not call it that way: we called it
6
– positively – modernization or – negatively – colonialism. The colonial powers intro-
*
Prof. Dr. jur., holds chair of public law and political science at Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen;
Member of the Federal Constitutional Court, Karlsruhe since 2001; 1992 – 1998 President of the
German Association for the Sociology of Law. E-mail: Brun.O.Bryde@recht.uni-giessen.de
1
B.-O. Bryde, The Internationalization of Constitutional Law in: T. Groß (ed.), Legal Scholarship
in International and Comparative Law, 2003, p. 191 ff.
2
B.-O. Bryde, The Constitutional Judge and the International Constitutionalist Dialogue, Tulane
Law Review 80 (2005) p. 203 ff.
3
J. Jeffrey, The Venice Commission: Disseminating Democracy through Law, Public Law 2001, p.
675 ff.
4
On the history of the law and development movement see J. Merryman, Comparative Law and
Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Move-
ment, American Journal of Comparative Law (AJCL) 25 (1977), p. 457 ff.; B.-O. Bryde, Die Rolle
des Rechts im Entwicklungsprozeß, in: B.-O. Bryde / F. Kübler (Hrsg.), Die Rolle des Rechts im
Entwicklungsprozeß, Frankfurt/M. 1986, p. 9 ff.; Burg, Law and Development: A Review of the
Literature and a Critique of "scholars in self-estrangement" AJCL 25 (1977) p. 492 ff; Gardner,
Legal Imperialism – American lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America, 1980.
5
Seminal: D. Trubek/M. Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, Wisconsin Law Rev. 1974, p.
1062 ff.; cf. Fn 4 for further references.
6
The modernization paradigm informed also the beginning of our journal: H. Krüger, Das Pro-
gramm, Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) vol. 1 (1968), p. 3 ff., cf. also B.-O. Bryde,
Überseeische Verfassungsvergleichung nach 30 Jahren, VRÜ 30 (1997), p. 452 ff.
Bryde, Constitutional Law in "old" and "new" Law and Development 11
duced their constitutional models, which resulted in very similar if not identical constitu-
7
tions of either the French 5th Republic model or the Westminster model, all over the
8
world. This heritage has influence until today. In the "old" law and development discus-
9
sion this colonial imposition was often conceptualized as modernization. The new consti-
tutions were supposed to lead backward societies towards economic development and con-
10
stitutionalist democracy.
This first transfer of constitutionalism was not very successful. Ten years after inde-
pendence most newly independent states in Africa were either military regimes or one-
11
party-systems of which only few (e.g. Tanzania and Kenya) allowed a certain amount of
12
participation within the framework of "democratic one-party-systems". Similarly, in Asia
only few countries retained their independence respective postwar constitution, here too
military regimes and authoritarian dictatorships took over in many places. The expectations
of modernization theory proved wrong for the same reasons that were developed in the self-
critique of the law and development movement: they were naïve because they overesti-
mated the reformist zeal of ruling elites, and they were ethnocentric because they saw the
own respective model of the foreign adviser as the best road to development without due
regard to the conditions of the receiving country (or even other models in other parts of the
13
world).
In the last decades we have experienced a renewed process of democratization and
constitution-making. This process started with the disappearance of the last right-wing
dictatorships in Southern Europe, was followed by the breakdown of communism in
Eastern Europe and has become a world-wide phenomenon most remarkably in Latin
America but also in Africa and Asia. While setbacks are common the overall process is
significant.
7
E. Kliesch, Der Einfluß des französischen Verfassungsdenkens auf Afrikanische Staaten, Beihefte
zu VRÜ, Nr. 1 (1976).
8
For Africa cf. B.-O. Bryde, the Politics and Sociology of African Legal Development, 1976, p.
23 ff.
9
S. Burmann/Harrell-Bond, The Imposition of Law, 1979.
10
In his classification of constitutions according to their relation to the power process („normative,
nominalist, semantic") Karl Loewenstein reserved one of the categories („nominalist“) for this
case: „nominalist“ he calls constitutions still ineffective but supported by the honest wish of those
in power to make them effective.K. Loewenstein, Verfassungslehre, 2. ed. Tübingen, 1969, p. 151
ff. For a critique B.-O. Bryde, Verfassungsentwicklung, Baden-Baden, 1982, p. 28 Fn. 4; a more
differentiated analysis of Loewenstein’s theory in relation to constitutions in developing countries
(containing some valid criticism of my own attempt at categorizing constitutions) can be found in:
M. Neves, Symbolische Konstitutionalisierung, 1998, p. 90 ff.
11
For a survey cf. B.-O. Bryde, (Fn 8) p. 23 ff.
12
H. Rogge, Die Verfassung des afrikanischen Einparteienstaates, 1974.
13
Cf. References in Fn 3, 4 and L. Nader, Promise or Plunder? A Past and Future Look at Law and
Development, Global Jurist 7 (2007) 2, p. 1 ff.
The open question remains whether the international diffusion of constitutionalism has
a better chance this time. This is not just a political question, but also a question for law
and society scholarship. Will socio-legal scholarship confront the subject more maturely
this time, drawing on the experience of the old law and development movement or fall
again into the trap of naivety and ethnocentricity? Obviously, the protagonists of the old
law and development movement, including the most critical, have not given up hope but
14
are again engaged in the project.
There is a certain danger that the old mistakes are repeated. Like in the 1970s when the
15
ironical name of "legal missionaries" held more than a kernel of truth, we can again detect
a certain missionary zeal to distribute one's own model world-wide without due regard to
the problems of such transfers. "What works well at home" is expected to work in the new
16
democracies. In drafting new constitutions and reform-legislation we can again detect
attempts at one-sided insistence on foreign models and reliance on the untested reception of
such models. Fights between legal missionaries to sell their product and the influence of
17
international donors can all again be observed and criticised. This problem is reinforced
by the fact that like in the 1960s the development of the field runs the risk of having its
research strategies imposed by donors who pursue their own economic and political
agendas. The dependence from a neo-liberal paradigm might today even be stronger than in
the 1970s when alternatives to the commanding modernization paradigm were discussed
with much more force (a problem, however, that might be more relevant for other fields of
18
law, especially economic law than constitutional law). Like in "old" law and develop-
ment, public aid agencies and foundations exert a great influence. And similar to the late
19
1970s funding might dry up when research turns critical . The colonial legacy, too,
remains strong. The colonial heritage still circumscribes the alternatives for constitutional
drafting to a large extent: former British colonies will usually remain within the framework
of commonwealth constitutionalism and former French colonies regularly adapt the consti-
tution of the French 5th Republic to local conditions.
I think scholars should therefore carefully look at the old literature. However they need
not be discouraged because there are differences which allow a much more optimistic
14
D. Trubek, The "rule of law" in development assistance: past, present, and future, in: Bäuerle u.a.
(Hsg.), Haben wir wirklich Recht? Zum Verhältnis von Recht und Wirklichkeit, 2004, S. 33 ff
15
Gardner, (Fn.4) p. 282 ff; cf. also P. Carrington, Spreading America's Word. Stories of Its
Lawyer-Missionaries, New York, 2005.
16
M. Krygier, Parables of Hope and Disapointment, Eastern European Constitutional Review 11
(2002).
17
B.-O. Bryde, Die Erfahrungen der "Law and Development"-Diskussion und die Transformations-
forschung, in: Kirk u.a. (Hrsg), Genossenschaft und Kooperation in einer sich wandelnden Welt,
Fs. f. Münkner, 2000, p. 405 ff.
18
Cf. the examples criticised by Nader (Fn.13).
19
B.-O. Bryde (Fn. 4) p. 1 f.
evaluation of the globalization of constitutional law today – and ask for a much more
differentiated research program.
One important difference is that the process – despite all international influences – is
much more independent and self-sustaining. The move towards democratic constitutional-
ism in Eastern Europe, the defeat of the apartheid regime in South Africa and of military
regimes and autocracies all over the world were the result of genuine revolutions and
reform movements. While international influence and interference, possibly helpful in some
20
cases, probably counter-productive in others, cannot be overlooked, comparisons with
colonial imposition processes would be inappropriate. Connected to this fundamental
difference is the fact that the process is much more internationalized. There is no colonial
or neo-colonial transfer of a constitutional model from country A to country B. Even in
view of the colonial traditions just mentioned and even where constitutional drafting relies
on foreign models and sometimes is heavily influenced by foreign experts or international
organizations, it is purposefully comparative.
21
The South African case here is the outstanding example The choice of the constitu-
tional court model in a common law country, hardly thinkable some years ago, is a good
illustration for the influence of comparative constitutional law. It owes much to the experi-
22
ence of other countries that had to overcome a non-democratic past. Constitutional law is
23
no longer a parochial subject but has become an international one , with a much better –
and worldwide – infrastructure of scholars, academic societies and journals than in the past
when "comparative law" usually meant private comparative law. The technical infrastruc-
ture of globalization like the internet with global access to a wealth of foreign legal materi-
als make such a comparative approach much easier than in earlier decades. At the same
time they make it much more difficult to outside advisers to sell idealized versions of their
own systems since the actors in the receiving countries know the reality in the adviser's own
24
society
Thus, while "old" law and development theory should teach us to study these processes
critically and to be aware of power relationships and hierarchies, one-way-streets in recep-
tion processes, and the sociological problems of legal transfers, it would be uncritical to
import those old critiques wholesale and to overlook the much more participatory and
egalitarian aspects of the new constitutionalism.
20
For examples cf. Nader (Fn 13); cf. also the three case-studies in Philipp Dann / Zaid Al-Ali, The
Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant – Constitution-Making under External Influence in Iraq,
Sudan and East Timor, in: Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 10 (2006) p. 423 ff.
21
H. Klug, Constituting Democracy, 2000, p. 93 ff; Venter in this volume.
22
B.-O. Bryde, Constitutional Courts in Constitutional Transition, in: Van Loon/Van Aeken (eds) 60
maal recht en 1 maal wijn, Liber Amicorum Van Houtte 1999, p. 235 ff.
23
The cross-cultural impact of constitutional law scholarship has also become a subject for socio-
legal research cf Couso in this volume.
24
Nader (Fn 13).
An important new development which changes the process fundamentally is the influ-
ence of international human rights, and its international actors. Human rights are central to
the globalization of constitutional law. Most of the discussion about globalization or inter-
nationalization of constitutional law is actually about the globalization of human rights law
which has become a much more internationalized subject than, e.g. questions of state
organization. Human rights form an important link between a popular, non-hegemonic
constitutionalism of civil society and professional constitutionalism of courts, drafters and
academics. The mobilization of human rights for development from below had already
become an alternative in law and development studies at the time of the demise of the first
25
stage of law and development and therefore human rights form also a strong bridge
between "old" and "new" law and development.
The new wave of democratization, too, has been influenced and prepared by the inter-
national human rights discourse. Worldwide, human rights movements fought (and still
fight) for reforms in their respective countries by invoking international human-rights
documents that were signed by their governments and are binding on them under inter-
26
national law (even though they are not kept in practice). In the process of drafting new
constitutions there was heavy reliance on the international human rights conventions, which
has resulted in a worldwide process of reception of international human rights law into
27
national constitutions. The major distinction between different constitutional systems
today might be between old constitutions which were drafted before the major international
instruments were adopted and the vast majority of new constitutions drafted under the
influence of international human rights law. This development of a common international
human rights system transcends classical distinctions of comparative constitutional law
such as between common law and civil law, presidential and parliamentary systems, or
federal and unitary states.
This development is also the background for the globalization of case law. The recep-
tion of international human rights documents into national law has created very similar if
not identical wordings of catalogues of rights. This creates a sphere of common human
28
rights law in which precedents and doctrines travel freely.
The critical social scientist might question the egalitarian nature of this process.
Employing the instruments used for establishing academic hierarchies ("ranking") one
might empirically map lines of influence (citation indices) and to a certain extent – and
25
J.Paul / F. Diaz, Developing Law and Legal Resources for Alternative People-Centered Develop-
ment, in: B.-O. Bryde / F. Kübler (Hrsg.), Die Rolle des Rechts im Entwicklungsprozeß, Frank-
furt/M. 1986, p. 61 ff; B.-O. Bryde, Menschenrechte und Entwicklung in: Faber/Stein, Auf einem
Dritten Weg, Fs. für Helmut Ridder, 1989, p. 73 ff.; Ginther, Zivilgesellschaft und Entwicklung,
VRÜ 30 (1997), p. 137 ff.
26
Ginther ibidem.
27
For references cf. Bryde (Fn 1).
28
Cf. contributions in Markesinis / Fedke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law, 2006.
predictably – they are the old ones: new democracies of the periphery looking to old ones
of the centre. But my hypothesis would be that, again, the international-law dimension is
more important than post-colonial dependence structures. For the interpretation of consti-
tutional provisions that have been drafted on the basis of international documents, the
jurisprudence of international courts (and to a lesser extent other control agencies like the
UN Human Rights Committees) is the most important source. These international courts
appear to be a neglected field of socio-legal studies. We need more knowledge about their
internal functioning and they would make a perfect field of impact studies.
Perhaps more important for our subject is their influence of these international bodies
on the legal culture of the member countries. To take a simple formal point: the traditional
dichotomy between civil and common law in Europe, which traditionally had been a real
barrier to mutual understanding needs to be overcome if judges from both systems work
together in one court: they have to find a common language. This is true even linguistically
and has resulted in the invention of a new version of English which one might call Euro-
pean Legal English. It is very likely that the new African Court of Human Rights starting
with a brilliant group of lawyers from different African jurisdictions who traditionally
looked more to other common-law countries or to other francophone countries for inspira-
tion than to their immediate neighbours will have a similar effect.
Even apart from the special role of international courts I would maintain that the
respective influence of courts on other courts and of academic theory in other countries can
not be conceptualized as a simple transfer of power and money into legal influence. While
there is probably a holder of an American LLM on most benches of the highest national
courts this does not result in a special place for precedents of the American Supreme Court
in the international constitutionalist case law, where the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg
court appears to be much more important. I do not claim that the ideal of an egalitarian
29
constitutionalist dialogue has already been reached or can ever be reached in a world
marked by inequality. But soft skills like the ability to give one's judgments in a form that
makes them a recognizable part of an international human rights project become important,
and these skills are distributed much more equally throughout the world than money and
military power.
As judges we should work on this project, the task of critical scholarship is to control
us in this enterprise.
29
B.-O. Bryde, North and South in Comparative Constitutional Law: From Colonial Imposition
towards a Transnational constitutionalist Dialogue, in: W. Benedek u.a. (eds), Development and
Developing International and European Law, Essays in Honour of Konrad Ginther, 1999, p. 697
ff.
16
Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative

Constitution-making
By Francois Venter, Potchefstroom

∗
1. Introduction
Since the end of World War II, numerous new constitutions have been written and many
1
have been revised. Constitutional systems and ideas, and therefore also written constitu-
tions, have always tended to influence and be influenced by others. Thus e.g. the 18th Cen-
tury philosophical linkages between the constitutions of France and the United States are
indisputable, as are the influence in the 19th Century of the US Constitution on South
American countries such as Mexico and Argentina. In the era of colonialism many parts of
the world were infused with the constitutional notions of the colonial powers, especially
2
Britain and France, though frequently in adapted forms. The end of World War II marks
an important turning point in the history of constitution-making: the USA as primary victor
emerging after the war for all practical purposes wrote the Japanese Constitution of 1947
and was a significant presence behind the work of the Parlamentarischer Rat which
formulated the German Grundgesetz of 1949. After the war the scene was also set for the
acceleration of the process of decolonization, not only in the underdeveloped parts of
Africa, but also e.g. in the so-called British dominions of India, Canada and South Africa,
causing a rash of new constitutions to be produced. The most recent wave of constitution-
making was of course generated by the fall of the USSR, whereby the Soviet "empire" in
East and Central Europe disintegrated into multiple sovereign states and the logistical and
ideological grip of communism on the Third World was relieved.
The ebb and flow of constitutional ideas since the late 18th Century have resulted in a
globally shared vocabulary of constitutional structures, rights, principles and values. This
convergence has particularly become evident in the process of constitution-making and
revision. An interesting phenomenon in this regard is that the constitutions of many coun-
3
tries that are not considered to be constitutional states due to their express socialist or
∗ Professor of Law, North-west University, Potchefstroom, South Africa. E–Mail: Francois.Venter

@nwu.ac.za
1
Gavin W Anderson, Constitutional Rights after Globalization (Oxford 2005), 4 note 4 lists 40
instances as a "representative sample of countries which have undergone major constitutional
reform over the past 25/30 years."
2
Thomas M. Franck / Arun K. Thiruvengadam "International Law an Constitution-Making" 2003
Chinese Journal of International Law 467, 500-504 for a compact overview.
3
Article 1(1) of the Chinese constitution of 2004 e.g. provides "The People's Republic of China is a
socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the
alliance of workers and peasants", while in article 33(3) it is provided that "The State respects and
preserves human rights."
Venter, Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making 17
4
religious character, also, at least partially, employ the language of familiar to constitution-
alism.
National constitution-making continues to be an internal affair of the sovereign state,
but every new constitution is written on paper watermarked by a globalized conceptions of
constitutionalism.
2. Constitutional Structures
2.1 Sovereignty
Constitutional law evolved, and still operates on the assumption that the state is sovereign
and that it exists for the benefit and protection of its nation and the associated legal system.
The key references for this assumption continue to be the famous opening words of the US
Constitution of 1789 "We the People …" and the French constitutional principle of
5
"government of the people, by the people, for the people". Recent reflections of this
assumption are to be found in e.g. the 2003 draft constitution of Afghanistan "We the
people of Afghanistan" and article 2(1) of the Albanian Constitution of 1998 which pro-
vides that "sovereignty in the Republic of Albania belongs to the people."
If one considers the escalating tendency of the incursion of the global market (as per-
haps the primary driver of globalization) on the freedom of choice of the contemporary
state's policy making in many fields, the credibility of the constitutional affirmations of
national sovereignty tend to suffer under the onslaught of globalization. However, the
nation state and its sovereignty is far from becoming irrelevant, especially if one takes into
account the fact that the degree of constitutional globalization is most frequently expressed
6
in terms of its limitation of state sovereignty. Another aspect of the changes that the nation
state as a phenomenon is undergoing, is the increasing pluralization of state populations
brought about by demographic mobility, rendering it less convincing to refer to the popula-
tion of a state as a "nation" in the ethnological or anthropological sense of the word.
Another challenge to the sovereignty of the nation state is emerging due to a changing
perception of the individual. It would appear that fundamental rights, especially as they are
proclaimed and protected in international law, are perceived by many as the foundation
upon which individual human "sovereignty" has been established globally. This also con-
4
Article 2 of the Constitution of Bahrain of 2002 provides "The religion of the State is Islam. The
Islamic Shari'a is a principal source for legislation", while article 18 states that "People are equal
in human dignity, and citizens are equal before the law in public rights and duties. There shall be
no discrimination among them on the basis of sex, origin, language, religion or creed."
5
Article 2 of the current Constitution of the Vth Republic of 1958.
6
Cf. e.g. John D Snethen, "The Evolution of Sovereignty and Citizenship in Western Europe:
Implications for Migration and Globalization" 2000-2001 (Vol 8) Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies 223, at 224-225.
stitutes a concrete challenge to what is may be referred to as the Westphalian notion of the
7
sovereignty of the state.
This challenge is no mere academic construction, as is demonstrated by the following
statement made in 1999 by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in an article in The
8
Economist :
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined … States are now widely
understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa …
[while] individual sovereignty – by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each
individual, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and subsequent international
treaties – has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual
rights.
2.2 Separation of powers

Contemporary constitution-making is consistently respectful of the desirability to spread
governmental authority horizontally among the three branches of government. This is
almost always implied in the structure of constitutions, and is frequently expressly stated as
9
a constitutional principle. Partly, but not only due to the imprecision of the doctrine, the
7
Doyle/Gardner, 3-4: "The foundation of the current state system – and a key feature of interna-
tional relations since the seventeenth century Treaty of Westphalia – is the notion that state enjoy
sovereign equality: no state has the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of another state; this is
preserved as Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. However, many scholars agree that by granting rights
to individuals, the conception of human rights limits state sovereignty – human rights abuses
within state borders, even perpetrated by a government against its own people, are no longer
matters solely within the purview of domestic affairs. Many noted experts agree with former Sec-
retary-General Annan that a state's legitimacy is tied to proper treatment of its citizens and an
offending state can no longer hide behind a mantle of sovereignty alone. This issue – the nature of
the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty – lies at the core of many contempo-
rary debates in the field: the cultural relativity of rights, international humanitarian intervention,
human rights abuses as underlying causes of conflict, and how to address past abuses in post-con-
flict peacebuilding."
Also Cottier/Wüger, 242: "Das Verfassungsrecht steht in der Tradition des Nationalstaates. Es hat
sich im Gefolge des Westfälischen Friedens von 1648 über Jahrhunderte entwickelt. Materiell
kann es dahin beschrieben werden, dass es grundlegende Rechtsverhältnisse in Bezug auf ein Ter-
ritorium bestimmt. Es wurde als nationalstaatliche Verfassung auch zur Verfassung im formellen
Sinn. Das Recht selbst konzentrierte sich generell auf die Regelung so definierter Verhältnisse und
verlor die frühere Universalität des römischen Rechts."
8
The Economist 18 September 1999, referred to and quoted by Michael W. Doyle and Anne-Marie
Gardner in their introductory chapter of Jean-Marc Coicaud / Michael W. Doyle / Anne-Marie
Gardner (eds), The Globalization of Human Rights (United Nations University Press, 2003) n 2.
9
Thus e.g. article 50 of the Indian Constitution of 1950 provides that "The State shall take steps to
separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State" and the Turkish Con-
stitution of 1982 affirms in its preamble "[t]he principle of the separation of powers, which does
not imply an order of precedence among the organs of State but refers solely to the exercising of
effects of granting specific powers to the various branches is not always predictable. The
tendency to shift constitutional emphasis from state power to the social responsibility of the
10
state is particularly evident in the escalating debate on the constitutional protection of
11
social and economic rights. Be that as it may, on the frontline of the advance of enforce-
able socio-economic rights, the balance of powers between especially the judiciary on the
one hand and the legislative and executive authorities on the other comes directly in the
12
line of fire.
2.3 Constitutional adjudication

Whereas the US Supreme Court in 1803 established its jurisdiction of judicial review in
Marbury v Madison on the basis of its interpretation of the Constitution and precedents in
English law, the authority of courts to adjudicate all actions in terms of a supreme constitu-
tion has become the norm in contemporary constitutions. There are of course various
models of constitutional adjudication and the nature of the courts or other bodies to which
the jurisdiction is entrusted also varies, but contemporary states without it are the exception
13
rather than the rule.
Considerable scepticism about the justification of judicial review, founded upon the
14
construction of the "counter-majoritarian dilemma" continues. Nevertheless, in the consti-
tution-writing of our era the American example, inclusive of and despite the counter-
majoritarian difficulty, has provided foundational guidance. Thus e.g. section 81 of the
Japanese Constitution of 1947 explicitly empowers the Supreme Court "to determine the
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act", a power which is exercised
certain State powers and discharging duties, which are limited to cooperation and division of
functions, and which accepts the supremacy of the Constitution and the law."
10
This naturally also has its implications for the doctrine of the separation of powers. The vehicle
for this shift is the supremacy of the Constitution: in South African jurisprudence on the enforce-
ment of socio-economic rights (e.g. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5)
SA 721 (CC) paras [38] and [99]), the values underlying the supreme Constitution, as it is inter-
preted by the judiciary, override considerations of governmental preferences for the budgetary
distribution of available resources, arguments of the anti-majoritarian difficulty and limited
bureaucratic capacity.
11
Cf. e.g. Ruth Gavison, "On the relationships between civil and political rights, and social and
economic rights" in Jean-Marc Coicaud / Michael W. Doyle / Anne-Marie Gardner (eds), The
Globalization of Human Rights, United Nations University Press, 2003, 23-55.
12
This is demonstrated in more detail in: F. Venter, "The Politics of Constitutional Adjudication"
2005 ZaöRV (65) 129, at 155-163.
13
Cf. e.g. http://www.concourts.net/tab/introen.html (consulted on 4 July 2007).
14
Cf. e.g. DE Livel / PA Haddon / DE Roberts / RL Weaver, Constitutional Law – Cases, History
and Dialogues, 1996, 9: "Criticism of the judiciary is especially intense when it strikes down
legislation on grounds that it conflicts with a right or liberty not actually enumerated by the Con-
stitution."
15
with reticence, but nevertheless exercised. The German Grundgesetz of 1949 requires
federal legislation in article 94(2) to "specify the cases in which its [the Federal Constitu-
16
tional Court's] decisions have the force of law", and the relevant legislation renders the
decisions of the Court binding on all "constitutional organs as well as on all courts and
17
authorities." The South African Constitution of 1996 is construed on clear assumptions as
to the status of the Constitution and its enforcement: in section 2 the supremacy of the
Constitution is established and it is provided that "law or conduct inconsistent with it is
invalid"; the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal are endowed with jurisdiction on
constitutional matters (sections 168 and 169), but in terms of section 167(5) "The Consti-
tutional Court makes the final decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or
conduct of the President is constitutional . . ." Judicial constitutional review therefore
appears to have been accepted towards the end of the twentieth century to be an inherent
characteristic of the constitutional state.
There is also the view that in constitution-making, elites feeling threatened, support a
powerful role of the judiciary as a means of preserving privileged positions in complex
societies, and that "the global trend toward juristocracy is part of a broader process,
whereby political and economic elites, while they profess support for democracy, attempt to
18
insulate policymaking from the vicissitudes of democratic politics."
It does however seem unlikely that the mechanism of judicial review would survive and
flourish in constitutional democracies all around the globe if the shadows of elitism and
counter-democracy undermined the emergent sovereignty of the individual. Constitutional
judgments are naturally always open to criticism, either from the perspective of individual
interests, governmental goals or internationally supported doctrine. In the current circum-
stances of vastly enhanced means and speed of communication, the exercise of judicial
review in any single instance is normally almost instantly accessible to anyone interested in
the subject. Although it provides no guarantee, it can in itself not but have the effect of
dampening any tendencies of judicial adventurism running counter to the global constitu-
tional ethos.
The judicial development of constitutional law through the authoritative interpretation
of the Constitution is the inevitable implication of review jurisdiction. In fact, it may even
15
F. Venter, Constitutional Comparison – Japan, Germany, Canada and South Africa as Constitu-
tional States, 2000, 87-90, and more recently, Koji Tonami, "Die Entwicklung der Verfassungsge-
richtsbarkeit und die Probleme der richterlichen Prüfungsbefugnis über die Verfassungsmäßigkeit
in Japan" in: Christian Starck (ed), Fortschritte der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Welt – Teil
I, 2004, 37-41, 15 ff.
16
Article 31(1) of the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz.
17
Venter, (note 15), 90-94.
18
Ran Hirschl, "The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism", 2004 Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies 71, 73 and "The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Con-
stitutionalisation: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions", 2000 Law & Society Inquiry
91.
be a constitution-making tool in the sense that the actual meaning and impact of constitu-
tional provisions are brought to life through jurisprudence. Thus, e.g. it was left to the
South African Constitutional Court to determine, in the absence of explicit constitutional
regulation of the point, that the Constitution prohibited the imposition of the death penalty
19
and corporal punishment, thereby actually "completing" the constitution-making process.
This does not occur only when a constitution is new, but almost every ground-breaking
interpretative judgment of an apex court on the constitution has this effect. Some examples
20
are the German Maastricht Urteil , the House of Lords' recent judgement in the Al-Skeini
21 22
case, and the Indian Supreme Court's judgment in the Minerva Mills case.
2.4 Decentralization / deconcentration

Apart from the horizontal distribution of government authority, it has become a truism of
constitution-making that the vertical distribution of authority is a desirable structural
mechanism by which the undemocratic concentration of power may be avoided. The term
"federalism" immediately comes to mind. However, the term has lost its usefulness as a
means of distinguishing clearly between the structural composition of different states based
only on the terminology used to describe the form of state: it is quite conceivable that a
specific formal federation will show a less effective or extensive vertical distribution of
authority than another non-federal state in which government authority is well distributed
23
vertically to multiple organs of government.
19
S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC).
20
Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 12 October 1993, BVerfGE 89, 155 in which the
position of German sovereignty relative to the European Community was addressed inter alia. For
a penetrating discussion of the continued effects of the judgment in Europe, see Julio Baquero
Cruz, The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement, European University
Institute, Florence – Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Working Paper 2007/13,
published on the internet at http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/07_13.pdf (downloaded on 21
July 2007).
21
Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26 (found on the internet on 13 July
2007 at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldjudgmt/jd070613/skeini-1.htm in
which the Law Lords ruled that Iraqi civilians arrested and detained by British soldiers in Iraq
could rely on the protection of the Human Rights Act. Para 8 of the judgment reads: "The HRA is
a statute enacted by Parliament. Where an issue arises as to its meaning, it must be construed.
This is a task which only a UK court can perform. The court in Strasbourg is the ultimate
authority on interpretation of the European Convention, but it cannot rule on the interpretation of
a domestic statute."
22
Minerva Mills v. Union of India 1980 AIR 1789 1981 SCR (1) 206 1980 SCC (3) 625 in which
its doctrine that Parliament was not empowered by the Constitution to alter "the basic structure of
the Constitution" was re-established in the face of government opposition.
23
Cf Schneider, Föderale Verfassungspolitik für eine Europäische Union,1996, 45 at 48: Classic
constitutional theory purported to divide all states into one of two contrasted types, the unitary and
the federal, depending on whether sovereignty was undivided or shared between levels of govern-
ment. In the post-war years this dichotomy has been broken by the appearance in Western Europe
It would appear that, in contemporary constitution-writing, the need for decentraliza-

tion or deconcentration is more prominent than for the creation of federal states out of
previously autonomous or sovereign entities. More frequently there is a need for the
accommodation of regional, ethnic or other interests within a single state, or simply for the
prevention of a concentration of power at national level. Of this, the complexities of the
24
Russian Federation may be considered an example. Nevertheless, a structured and
balanced constitutional allocation of authority to national and local, and frequently also
regional centres of power tends to be the norm. Although globalized constitution-making
has not reached a point where a composite form of state can be seen as a universal struc-
tural standard, indications are that contemporary constitutionalism strongly favours decen-
tralization. The most prominent example is France, traditionally the primary example of the
unitary European state, which has over the recent decades embarked on a process of decen-
25
tralization of state authority in favour of regional and municipal government.
3. Rights
A Charter, Bill or Declaration of Rights as part of, or contiguous to newly made constitu-
tions has become the norm for constitution makers. Whereas this generally has the effect of
the spread of fundamental rights doctrine, there are also cases of constitutional systems
being strange bedfellows of rights provisions in the constitution. In socialist constitutions
26
rights are e.g. directly associated with duties or heavily qualified by the authority of the
27
state and in the constitutions of Islamic states the protection of religious freedom stands
28
in stark contrast to the explicit exclusive state promotion of Islam.
of an intermediate type, the regional state, in which ultimate sovereignty rests with the centre (as
in a unitary state) but the Constitution also recognises regional communities and accords them an
inviolable status and a range of exclusive powers which are constitutionally entrenched (as in
federalism).
24
Cf. e.g. Cameron Ross, in: Mike Bowker / Cameron Ross (eds), Russia after the Cold War, 2000,
Chapter 4, at 99: " … it is clear that Russian federalism is in deep crisis. There would appear to be
almost as many kinds of federal relations as there are subjects of the federation. … the greatest
threat to the federation does not come in the main from ethnic separatists, but from the reicher
regions which seek ever more economic and legal autonomy."
25
Cf. e.g. Alistair Cole, "Decentralization in France: Central Steering, Capacity Building and Iden-
tity Construction" 2006, 4, French Politics 31-57.
26
Thus e.g. the right to work is granted in the same provision in which the duty to work is imposed
on citizens in the constitutions of Vietnam (2001, article 55(1)) and China (1982, article 42). It is
however interesting to note that the preamble to the French Constitution of 1946 also stated that
"Each person has the duty to work and the right to employment."
27
Article 13(2) of the Chinese Constitution of 1982 provides "The State, in accordance with law,
protects the rights of citizens to private property and to its inheritance." In contrast thereto, article
6(2) provides: "The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of China is
socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people
and collective ownership by the working people. The system of socialist public ownership super-
Various authors ascribe the increasing internationalization of constitutional law primar-

29
ily to the effect that human rights doctrine has on constitutional practice. The adoption of
the mechanism of constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights is not only evident in
countries where profound constitutional transformations occur, but also in established
democracies that had gone without modern charters of rights, the prime example of course
being the adoption in 1998 of the British Human Rights Act. Against this background
30
Anderson draws the inference that
[t]he argument that rights constitutionalism has gone global is further supported by the
growing use of comparative sources, leading to a more 'cosmopolitan' approach to con-
stitutional adjudication. In its strongest version, it is said that we are witnessing the
emergence of universal principles of constitutional law guiding the formation and exe-
cution of public policy.
In a thorough comparative study of the impact of international law on constitution-making,
31
Franck and Thiruvengadam found that the relevance of the incorporation of the ever-
expanding body of international law into national law by means of constitutional provision,
has become inescapable, and that -
If there is one substantive area where most states have shown great willingness to be
open to principles of international law, it has been in the area of human rights.
sedes the system of exploitation of man by man; it applies the principle of 'from each according to
his ability, to each according to his work'."
28
The Constitution of Pakistan of 1973 e.g provides in Part I article 2: "Islam shall be the State
religion of Pakistan." This bland statement is put into context in an Annex named "The Objectives
Resolution" which opens with the words: "Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to
Allah Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan, through
its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust." In Part II, arti-
cle 20 provides: "Subject to law, public order and morality:- (a) every citizen shall have the right
to profess, practise and propagate his religion; and (b) every religious denomination and every sect
thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions."
29
Brun-Otto Bryde, "The Constitutional Judge and the International Constitutionalist Dialogue"
2005 (80:203), Tulane Law Review 203, 208: "If constitutional law is no longer a parochial sub-
ject, but has become an international one, the main reason is the development of international
human rights law." Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann provides a particularly penetrating exposition of this
process in his contribution "Morality, Human Rights and International Economic Law: Towards
Cosmopolitan Market Integration Law" in: H.-D. Assmann / R. Sethe (eds), Recht und Ethos im
Zeitalter der Globalisierung, 2004, 53-86. At 58 he writes: "Justice is becoming a matter of uni-
versal and 'inalienable' human rights, democratic governance and positive national and interna-
tional constitutional law in order to empower and protect individual and democratic self-develop-
ment across frontiers."
30
Gavin W. Anderson, Constitutional Rights after Globalization, 2005, 5.
31
Thomas M. Franck / Arun K. Thiruvengadam, "International Law an Constitution-Making" 2003
Chinese Journal of International Law 467, 469-470 and 518.
The natural law philosophy underpinning human rights doctrine promotes the notion that
the documentation of fundamental rights in a constitution is merely an incidental applica-
tion to the political community whose constitution it is, without derogating from the uni-
32
versal currency of the rights. From such a position, it is but a short leap towards the
acceptance of the predominance of international human rights law over national norms. It is
obvious from the divergent conceptions of human rights in the world that global acceptance
of such predominance of international human rights has not yet been achieved. No consen-
33
sus exists e.g. among Muslim scholars on the acceptability of human rights doctrine, nor
has the accusation from oriental scources that the West is attempting to enforce its human
34
rights values on the East approached closure. Nevertheless, constitutional rights language
in recently drafted constitutions tends toward similarity, although the interpretation of
35
similar terms may vary in different jurisdictions.
Since the adoption of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural
36
Rights, social and economic (or socio-economic) rights as constitutionally entrenched,
justiciable and enforceable fundamental rights have been established in some Latin Ameri-
can jurisdictions and in India and South Africa. Their global recognition as such is however
far from complete. Progress in this direction is however evident from the discussions at the
United Nations on the adoption of an optional protocol to the CESCR, in terms of which
32
Francis Cheneval, "Constitutionalizing Multilateral Democratic Integration" in: Philippe Mastro-
nardi / Denis Taubert (eds.), Staats- und Verfassungstheorie im Spannungsfeld der Disziplinen –
ARSP Beiheft Nr. 105 30, 31 e.g. writes: "Human and civil rights as well as a system of justice
based on universal validity claims are a source of cosmopolitan transcendence. State constitutions
only realize fundamental rights for a particular community of citizens or people residing on a par-
ticular territory. They are incomplete with regard to their own claims because they are the founda-
tional document of a particular political community but transcend the political singularity by
reference to the normative fiction of a moral, legal, and ultimately political community of man-
kind. Constitutions found a specific political entity but legitimate it with universal principles that
imply a cosmopolitan transcendence towards an ever more universal realization of human ideals."
33
Cf e.g. Ahmad S. Moussalli, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights,
2001, whose 28 page introduction contests various other Muslim authors’ points of view in this
regard.
34
Cf Tatsuo Inoue, "Human Rights and Asian Values" in: Jean-Marc Coicaud / Michael W. Doyle /
Anne-Marie Gardner (eds), The Globalization of Human Rights, 2003, Chapter 4.
35
An example is the meaning given to "equality" by the South African Constitutional Court. J
Moseneke in Minister of Finance and others v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) e.g. stated (at
para [30]): "… our constitutional understanding of equality includes … 'remedial or restitutionary
equality'. Such measures are not in themselves a deviation from, or invasive of, the right to equal-
ity guaranteed by the Constitution. They are not 'reverse discrimination' or 'positive discrimina-
tion' ... They are integral to the reach of our equality protection. In other words, the provisions of s
9(1) and s 9(2) are complementary; both contribute to the constitutional goal of achieving equality
to ensure 'full and equal enjoyment of all rights'. A disjunctive or oppositional reading of the two
subsections would frustrate the foundational equality objective of the Constitution and its broader
social justice imperatives."
36
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966, and in force since 1976.
elements of international justiciability may become possible. For present purposes it is

significant that the jurisprudence on socio-economic rights and their enforceability against
the state is expanding, thus increasing the likelihood that drafters of constitutions may be
influenced to follow suit.
It is significant that the constitutionalization of socio-economic rights has progressed
further in constitutional states with populations characterized by large numbers of poor and
underprivileged people. The obvious reason for this is that the state is under such circum-
stances called upon more urgently to address the social discrepancies and to provide for the
protection and promotion of the vulnerable components of society. In the more affluent
states, the emphasis seems to be more on the provision of social security than on uplift-
ment. Acceptance of socio-economic rights as subjectively enforceable and justiciable
rights still seems to be remote in the European context. At best they are recognized as legal
principles that courts may apply in the adjudication of legal norms that are inconsistent
37
with them.
4. Principles
Constitution-making is doubtlessly a process guided by the foundational thinking of the
bearers of the pouvoir constituant. This was particularly clear from the powerful influences
that political philosophy exerted on the 18th Century American and French Revolutions and
the constitutional documents to which they gave birth. In more recent constitution-making
processes, the mechanism of prescribing a set of binding principles of constitutionalism to
the authors of the new constitution has been employed in a few cases.
At the end of World War II in 1945, the former German Reich found itself occupied
and administered by the military commanders of the four Allied Powers, the United States
of America, Britain, France and the USSR. After it became clear at a Four Power Confer-
ence in London in 1947 that the eastern part of Germany occupied by the USSR could not
for the foreseeable future be included in the constitutional reconstruction of Germany, the
three western Allies instructed the eleven West-German Länder governments in 1948 to
have a national constitution-writing body draw up a new constitution conforming to the
requirements of democracy, federalism and guaranteed individual rights. In less than eight
months the text of the new Grundgesetz was formulated and adopted by the Parlamenta-
rischer Rat in May 1949, whereafter it was approved by the three military governors and
submitted to the various Landtage for approval. Under the circumstances it may be asked
whether the Parlamentarischer Rat exercised the pouvoir constituant and if so, how it
could be bound by the instructions of the Allied Powers. It is worth noting that the allied
powers, Britain, the United States and France, that set the framework of principles for the
37
Cf. e.g. Laurent Pech, "Socio-economic rights jurisprudence in France" in: Malcolm Langford
(ed) Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence – Emerging Trends in Comparative and International
Law, Forthcoming, [found on the Internet on 14 July 2007 at http://papers.ssrn.com/SSRNonline
images/SSRN_dow_over.gif] para 28.
new constitution, are the prime representatives of the historic emergence of modern con-
stitutionalism.
38
Some 34 years later a set of 8 constitutional principles for the adoption of an inde-
pendence constitution for Namibia was sponsored, again by the United States, the United
Kingdom and France, but also by Canada and Western Germany. All parties interested in
the writing of the independence constitution agreed to those 8 principles in 1982. Eventu-
ally the Principles were translated by a constituent assembly into a well-formulated modern
constitution which came into operation in 1990.
In South Africa a two-phased constitution-making process was followed: the first Con-
stitution was one negotiated word-for-word and formally adopted by the parliament as it
was still constituted under the previous dispensation. This 1993 Constitution authorized the
production of a "final" constitution in accordance with an unamendable set of 34 Constitu-
tional Principles clothed with foundational authority in that the "final constitution" had to
be certified by the Constitutional Court as being in compliance in all respects with the
Principles. This eventually led to the adoption of the 1996 Constitution, but only after the
39
Constitutional Court had, in a wide-ranging judgment, referred the first draft back for the
38
Principles for a Constitution for an Independent Namibia
1. Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign, and democratic state.
2. The Constitution will be the supreme law of the State. It may be amended only by a designated
process involving the legislature and/or votes cast in a popular referendum.
3. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government. It will
provide for a system of governance with three branches; an elected executive branch which will be
responsible to the legislative branch; a legislative branch to be elected by universal and equal
suffrage which will be responsible for the passage of all laws; and an independent judicial branch
which will be responsible for the interpretation of the Constitution and for ensuring its supremacy
and the authority of the law. The executive and legislative branches will be constituted by periodic
and genuine elections which will be held by secret vote.
4. The electoral system will be consistent with the principles in A.1 above.
5. there will be a declaration of fundamental rights, which will include the rights to life, personal
liberty and freedom of movement; to freedom of conscience; to freedom of expression, including
freedom of speech and a free press; to freedom of assembly and association, including political
parties and trade unions; to due process and equality before the law; to protection from arbitrary
depravation of private property or deprivation of private property without just compensation; and
to freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. The declaration of rights will be
consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Aggrieved individu-
als will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights.
6. It will be forbidden to create criminal offenses with retrospective effect or to provide for
increased penalties with retrospective effect.
7. Provisions will be made for the balanced structure of the public service, the police service and
defence services and for equal access by all to recruitment of these services. The fair administra-
tion of personnel policy in relation to these services will be assured by appropriate independent
bodies.
8. Provisions will be made for the establishment of elected council for local and/or regional
administration.
39
In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC).
purposes of adapting it to conform to the Principles. This process differed from the exam-
ples of Germany and Namibia in that the binding Constitutional Principles were not exter-
nally imposed, but autochthonously negotiated and quite comprehensive. Some of the
Principles were couched in equivocal and generalised terms while others were crisp and
concise. The Principles required inter alia the following elements to be contained in the
"final" constitution:
• a democratic system of government, including multi-party democracy, regular elec-

tions and universal adult suffrage;
• the separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with
appropriate checks and balances;
• the structuring of government in three tiers, involving democratic representation at
each level;
• an independent and impartial judiciary with the jurisdiction to safeguard and
enforce the Constitution;
• supremacy of the Constitution, also binding all organs of state;
• special procedures involving special majorities required for the amendment of the
Constitution;
• universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, protected by
entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution;
• equality of all before the law and an equitable legal process;
• open and accountable public administration, and
• formal legislative procedures.
These principles of constitution-making essentially reflect what might be described as the

essence of contemporary constitutionalism, or of the predominant notion of a well-ordered
state, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, or sometimes also (less acurately) referred to as "the rule of law".
Although all three examples of the predetermination of principles for constitution-
writing led to generally highly acclaimed constitutional documents, it cannot be concluded
that such an approach will guarantee success. After all, constitutions are written for specific
circumstances and formulated by bodies uniquely responsible for distinctive situations –
and the product and its effects can never be immutable indefinitely. Constitutional law is
dynamic, even in cases where constitutional texts remain static for long periods of time.
However, the formulation of an objective framework of principles as a guide for constitu-
tion-making has proven itself to be an effective approach. It will also tend to promote the
incorporation of globally endorsed elements of constitutionalism.
5. Foundational values
If the principles of the constitutional state have achieved or are achieving the status of
universal guidelines for constitution-making, one may justifiably enquire if there is a foun-
dational Leitmotiv or set of guiding standards for constitution-making in our time. The
notion of global values presents itself as the obvious candidate. In contemporary constitu-
tions the values upon which the state is said to be founded, are frequently expounded in
express terms. Often preambles are used for this purpose, but also other provisions in the
40 41
document. A few randomly selected examples are Brazil, the Czech Republic,
42 43 44
Finland, Namibia and Paraguay. The values expressly enumerated in these examples
include liberty, development, equality, justice, human dignity, peace and the enshrinement
of fundamental rights. The enumerated constitutional values found in these constitutions
are wide-ranging, but one that has emerged as the pre-eminent, often even unwritten value
underlying constitutions, is human dignity.
The legal ethos not only of states, but of the global community is also frequently
expressed in terms of human dignity. The first paragraph of the preamble of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 e.g. states that:
… recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world …
and article 5 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights of 1981 provides:
Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human
being and to the recognition of his legal status.
In the cases of the German Grundgesetz and the South African Constitution of 1996, sub-
stantive foundational provisions elevated constitutional values, and particularly human
dignity, to a level of key importance.
The German Grundgesetz isolates, and therefore emphasizes, human dignity as funda-
mental constitutional value by providing in article 1(1): "Human dignity is inviolable. To
respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority." In article 1(2)GG human rights,
peace and justice are also acknowledged, clearly in support of and not in competition with
40
In the preamble of the Constitution of 1988 " … social and individual rights, liberty, security, well
being, development, equality and justice" are recognized as "supreme values of a fraternal. plural-
ist and unprejudiced society".
41
The preamble of the Czech Constitution expresses the resolve "to build, protect and develop the
Czech Republic in the spirit of the inviolable values of human dignity and freedom."
42
Section 1(2) of the Finnish Constitution of 1999 provides that: "the constitution shall guarantee
the inviolability of human dignity and the freedom and rights of the individual and promote
justice in society."
43
The preamble of the Namibian Constitution of 1990 opens with the words: "Whereas recognition
of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is
indispensable for freedom, justice and peace."
44
The preamble of the Constitution of Paraguay of 1992 recognizes "human dignity for the purpose
of ensuring freedom, equality and justice."
human dignity. It is furthermore established law that the fundamental rights of the GG are
45
all vehicles of values.
According to the quoted statement of the BVerfG in Kalkar I, the duty of the organs of
the state to exercise their authority in a manner that will ensure that fundamental rights are
respected, is founded upon the express constitutional injunction that they should respect
and protect human dignity. This clearly demonstrates the centrality of human dignity as
constitutional value in German constitutional law. The philosophical roots of the high
constitutional regard in which human dignity is held, must no doubt be ascribed to the
46
Christian foundations upon which Western civilization was built. These Christian roots of
the recognition of human dignity is not presented in legal doctrine as a moral or religious
argument for the state's conduct to be measured against Christian standards, but Christian-
ity is merely recognized as the factual historical origin of the concept. Secularized human-
istic, Marxist, existentialist and behaviouristic and other approaches to human dignity
naturally exist, each with a different, though related, philosophical emphasis. One should
therefore not expect that the constitutional recognition and elevation of human dignity
45
A free translation of a dictum in the "Kalkar I" judgment BVerfGE 49,89 at 141-142 reads as
follows:
“… According to consistent jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court the protection
provided by the fundamental rights does not only contain subjective defensive rights of the indi-
vidual against public authority, but they simultaneously constitute constitutional value judgments
of objective law that apply to all reaches of the legal order providing guidelines for the legislature,
executive and the judiciary. The clearest expression of this is to be found in the second sentence
of article 1(1) GG in terms of which it is the duty of all government authority to respect and pro-
tect human dignity. Constitutional obligations of protection may thus be engendered whereby it is
directed that legal arrangements must be designed in such a manner that the danger of impinge-
ment of fundamental rights is also contained …”
In their commentary “Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland“, 4th ed. (1997) 16-17
Jarrass/Pieroth point out that various terms have been used to indicate this value-determining
aspect of the fundamental rights, viz. objektiv-rechtliche Wertentscheidungen, objektive Normen,
Prinzipien and the institutionelle Gehalt of the fundamental rights.
46
Cf. e.g. Christian Starck in: von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck, Das Bonner Grundgesetz 4th. ed.(1999),
vol. I, 34-36 and Josef Isensee, "Menschenwürde: die säkulare Gesellschaft auf der Suche nach
dem Absoluten", Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, vol. 131(2006), Vol. 2, 173, 199-209. These
authors separately show how human dignity, which is now dealt with as the moral foundation,
kind of "civil religion" of the secularized society, originates in the biblical teaching that man was
created in the image of God, and that there is a personal relationship between God and man which
is manifested in the immortality of the soul. The notions of guilt and redemption require the
acknowledgement of individual freedom, which also leads to the construction of equality and
fraternity on the basis of the assumption that all people were equally created in the image of God.
Thus the self-determination of the individual must be founded in the worth of every person.
People are therefore constrained to recognize not only their own dignity, but also to acknowledge
the equal dignity of others. The state is required to provide legal recognition of human dignity and
to respect and protect it.
would ensure the emergence of a monolithic notion of human dignity. Its exact meaning
47
can not be universally defined.
In the South African case, human dignity is mentioned as the first of a range of consti-
48
tutional values.
The wording of section 10 of the 1996 Constitution, under the heading "human dignity"
gives expression to the supposition that human dignity is not in need of being created con-
situtionally, but that it exists independently of the law. It reads: "Everyone has inherent
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected." The purport of the
phrase is that human dignity is an inalienable, inborn characteristic of each individual
person.
Dogmatically the recognition of human dignity is therefore not dependent upon its
incorporation in a constitution. In the recent South African constitutional jurisprudence,
much reliance was placed on comparative foreign judgments, e.g. those of the US Supreme
49
Court, to affirm this position. The Court found further confirmation in the jurisprudence
47
Cf. e.g. Egan v Canada (1995) 29 CRR (2d) 79 at 106: "Dignity [is] a notoriously elusive concept
… It needs precision and elaboration."
48
Section 1 of the South African Constitution provides as follows:
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values:
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and free-
doms.
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party
system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.
Various other provisions of the 1996 Constitution are worded with express or implied reference to
section 1. Thus section 143(2) expressly requires provincial constitutions to "comply with the
values in section 1"; section 7(1) states that the Bill of Rights "affirms the democratic values of
human dignity, equality and freedom"; the very important section 36(1) provides: "The rights in
the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom …", and the equally important interpretation clause in section 39(1) pro-
vides: " When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum — (a) must promote the
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and free-
dom."
Although section 1 is indeed foundational, it is not the only provision in the Constitution which
introduces values. Thus section 195 introduces "basic values and principles governing public
administration," by prescribing in subsection (1) that "[p]ublic administration must be governed
by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution" and then adding a compre-
hensive additional list of "principles". Furthermore Chapter 3 of the Constitution is devoted in full
to introduce and regulate the notion of "co-operative government" which might be described as a
set of structural constitutional values intended to determine inter-governmental relations, i.e.
between and among the national, provincial and local spheres of government.
49
E.g. para [58] of the Makwanyane judgment, referring to Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
See also S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) par [37] and [38].
50 51
of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Canadian Supreme Court and the Hun-
52
garian Constitutional Court. The approach followed by the bench indicates an assumption
that human dignity is the universal value which is foundational to a constitutional state and
its characteristic protection of fundamental rights.
In the context of the phenomenon of the "migration of constitutional ideas", Mayo
Moran maintains that in jurisdictions such as Canada, the United Kingdom and South
Africa, due to the influential authority of constitutional values, "courts and commentators
draw on a transnational judicial and academic conversation in order to forge responses
within domestic constitutional orders." She demonstrates this with reference to the "estop-
pel-like effect" that the values underlying and expressed in constitutionally entrenched
rights have in those jurisdictions (in contrast to the United States) by the radiation of the
53
values into the field of rights in private relationships, e.g. libel law. This is an interesting
field of investigation which is opened up widely by the effects of the globalization of
constitutional law. It can also be expected to influence future constitution-making, at least
as a conceptual development which needs consideration regarding the formulation of provi-
sions concerning the scope of fundamental rights.
6. Conclusion
Do the strong indications that the drafting of constitutions in this century has inevitably
become a comparative exercise due to the global tendency towards common constitutional
vocabulary, principles and values lead one to the conclusion that future constitutions may
simply become replicas of each other? Such an inference is not justified. Globalised con-
stitutionalism would have to become a powerful supra-national regime to have such an
effect, which would really mean the replacement of constitutional law with pervasive inter-
national legal norms. What stands between internationalism and constitutionalism as we
know it, is the element of state sovereignty as cornerstone both of international law and
constitutional law. Constitutions designed for unique situations may be expected to be
produced for as long as state sovereignty retains its foundational importance. Nevertheless,
comparative constitution-making has become an essential characteristic of the process of
the drafting (and revision) of legitimate contemporary constitutions.
50
In par [59] BVerfGE 45,187 was quoted.
51
In par [60] et seq reference is made to the judgment in Kindler v Canada (1992) 6 CRR (2d) 193
SC.
52
In par [83] reference is made to the Hungarian Court's Decision No. 23/1990 (X.31.).
53
Mayo Moran, "Inimical to constitutional values: complex migrations of constitutional rights" in:
Sujit Choudry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge UP 2006, 233.
32
Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on

the Originalists’ Objections
By Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, London

∗
In 1997 US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia asserted in Printz v. United States that
1
‘comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution. Since
2 3
then the matter has been debated by judges in and out of the courts as well as by scholars.
On 13 January 2005 the American University Washington College of Law hosted a public
debate between United States Supreme Court Justices Breyer and Scalia, which was chaired
by Professor Norman Dorsen, on the ‘Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Deci-
4
sions’. In the course of this debate, Scalia repeated his view that foreign law should not be
cited by domestic courts. The reference to, and utility of, foreign law is most clearly visible
on three levels: in relation to constitutional and statutory interpretation, in relation to the
drafting of a new constitution, and in relation to institutional design (i.e. the creation,
development and justification of state organs and constitutional practices that are efficient
5
as well as legitimate). According to Scalia, only the first exercise is problematic. There is
∗ Dr. jur., Lecturer in Law, Department of Law, London School of Economics. E–Mail:
j.e.murkens@lse.ac.uk
1
Printz v United States, 521 US 898 (1997), at 2377.
2
The case law is discussed below. For extrajudicial comments see Justice Stephen Breyer, Keynote
Address, in (2003) 97 American Society of International Law Proceedings 265; Justice Stephen
Breyer, Remarks at the Summit of World Bar Leaders, 10 November, 2001), http://www.supreme-
courts.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_11-10-01.html [visited 20 December 2007]; Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, Keynote Address, (2002) 96 American Society of International Law Proceedings
348.; Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Remarks to the Southern Center for International Studies (28
October 2003), http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor_transcript.pdf [visited 20 December
2007]; Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address, ‘Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts’
(2004) 98 American Society of International Law Proceedings 305.
3
A.L. Parrish, ‘Storm in a Teacup: the U.S. Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Law’, (2007) 2 Uni-
versity of Illinois Law Review 637-680 [for extensive scholarly references see FN 9]; J. Waldron,
‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’, (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 119-147; M.A.
Waters, ‘Justice Scalia on the Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: Unidirectional
Monologue or Co-Constitutive Dialogue?’, (2004) 12 Tulsa Journal of Comparative & Inter-
national Law, (Symposium Issue) 149. See also B. Markesinis / J. Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to
Foreign Law, Oxford, 2006.
4
Norman Dorsen, ‘The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer’, 3(4) International
Journal of Constitutional Law, 519-541 [henceforth ‘A Conversation’].
5
D. Franklin / M. Baun, Political Culture and Constitutionalism: A Comparative Approach, New
York, 1995, 222; L. Epstein and J. Knight, ‘Constitutional Borrowing and Nonborrowing’ (2003)
1(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 196-222, 197-8.
Murkens, Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on the Originalists’ Objections 33
6
consensus that foreign law is admissible in the interpretation of a Treaty; in devising a
7
constitution; and if it is old English law and helps to understand the meaning of the US
8
Constitution when it was adopted. Scalia, as the most outspoken representative of a formal
9
textualist, originalist, even Hamiltonian position, objects only to the judicial use of foreign
law in relation to constitutional and statutory interpretation.
The purpose of the present article is to identify the reasons for the originalists’ objec-
tions to judicial comparative engagement – which are never articulated at length – and then
to reveal their empirical incoherency and normative incongruity. The debate regarding the
judicial use of foreign law is not only relevant to the framework provided by US constitu-
tional law, but also raises issues of broader relevance to constitutional theory. Constitu-
tional democracy is characterised by ‘contradictory principles’ that are inherent to the
10 11
system, and whose significance is defined by, and changes over, time and space. It can
12
also be pointed out that due to its open texture, law is always susceptible to interpretation
and contestation. This is particularly true for constitutional law which not only tends to be
postulated in abstract and general terms but is also characterised by its close nexus to
national politics. The interpretation of constitutional law is thus always controversial,
contested, and contingent upon underlying political values.
The debate is evidence, moreover, of law’s reflexivity which ultimately is the promise
of comparative law. The contingent integrity of the legal order needs to be revealed by
developing a self-reflexive understanding of constitutional law by viewing it as ‘intercul-
13
tural dialogue and as contestation between interests’. Every constitutional system needs
to have a sense of its own sovereignty, the nature of its constitution, the importance of
fundamental rights, and the role of the state. The present article will conclude by arguing
6
A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 521.
7
Ibid, at 525; 538-9; although see critically P. Dann and Z. Al-Ali, ‘The Internationalized “Pouvoir
Constituant”: Constitution-Making under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor’,
(2006) 10 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 423–63.
8
See also K. Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, (2005) June-July, Policy Review at
34, n.2.
9
J.B. Staab, The Political Thought Of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Hamiltonian On The Supreme
Court, Lanham, 2006.
10
J. Habermas, “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?”,
(2001) 29(6) Political Theory 766-781.
11
R. Bellamy / V. Buffacch / D. Castiglione, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of
Europe, (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995), at 15.
12
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, at 128-136.
13
J. Shaw, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism in the European Union’ (1999) 6(4) Journal of European
Public Policy 579, at 596. See also J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of
Diversity, (Cambridge , 1995, at 30. See also J. Bast, The Constitutional Treaty as a Reflexive
Constitution, in P. Dann and M. Rynkowski (eds.), ‘The Constitutional Treaty as a Reflexive
Constitution’, in: The Unity of the European Constitution, Berlin, 2006.
that comparative constitutional law can contribute towards ‘a self-conscious discourse of

14
constitutionalism’ which is a necessary prerequisite for constitutional status.
I. The Originalists’ Objections

The first argument against using foreign law in the courts relates to the legitimacy of that
enterprise. The objection is based on classic sovereignty theory and a state-centred image of
national law which conceives law as a body of rules enforceable through adjudication, with
an emphasis on rule-orientation, professional (artificial) reasoning, and procedure. The
argument is straightforward. Foreign law is not recognised as a valid source of law by the
national legal system, and for that reason the legal system cannot cope with the migration
of constitutional ideas through a comparative approach to constitutional law. In practice,
this means that courts are not permitted to rely on foreign law in order to decide hard cases
and to fill gaps when national positive law is insufficient. If foreign law is not an authorita-
tive legal source for judges, then the legitimacy of the comparative method is thrown into
doubt. The legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on the judges’ interpretative methodo-
logy: courts must justify any recourse to non-state law. Can judges justify the recourse to
comparative law for the purposes of constitutional and statutory interpretation? Why should
15
US judge be bound by the dicta of a judge in Zimbabwe, Scalia asks rhetorically? The
answer to this question has implications for current conceptions of democracy and sover-
eignty, as well as for the sociology of law. A culturally-sensitive inquiry needs to ask
whether it is legitimate to ‘import’ foreign legal ideas into the national legal arena if it
means divorcing those ideas from the cultural context in which they originated.
The second argument relates to hermeneutics, or the correct interpretation of the Con-
stitution. It is important to differentiate between amending the Constitution and interpreting
the Constiution. According to Scalia, the only legitimate way to change the Constitution is
through the formal amendment process, and not through an active judiciary which (illegiti-
mately) changes the Constitution based on its own preferences and prejudices (which may
16
or may not include non-US law). The current divide with regard to constitutional inter-
pretation of the text is between ‘original meaning’ (the judge interprets statutes literally,
based on ‘the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended’), and
‘current meaning’ (the meaning of the US Constitution should be tailored to contemporary
14
N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317-359, at
343.
15
‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 528-9.
16
‘It’s not the job of the Constitution to change things by judicial decree; change is brought about
by democratic legislation’, Scalia in ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 535; See also A. Scalia, ‘The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’, (1989) 59 University of Chicago Law Review 1175, at 1179-81.
17
and changing social circumstances). Scalia argues that the Constitution has a meaning,
and the historical and constitutional role of judges has been to determine its meaning.
‘Now, my theory of what to do when interpreting the American Constitution is to try to
understand what it meant, what it was understood by the society to mean when it was
adopted. And I don't think it has changed since then. That approach used to be ortho-
doxy until about sixty years ago. Every judge would have told you that's what we do. If
you have that philosophy, obviously foreign law is irrelevant with one exception: old
English law—because phrases like "due process," and the "right of confrontation" were
taken from English law, and were understood to mean what they meant there. So the
reality is I use foreign law more than anybody on the Court. But it's all old English
18
law.’
Over time judicial interpretation will inevitably produce different accounts of that meaning,
but that observation alters neither the judges’ interpretative mandate not the original
meaning of the Constitution itself. Scalia views the Constitution as an anchor, as a source
of social stability: ‘…the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to prevent change, not to foster
19
change and have it written into the Constitution’. A Bill of Rights, therefore, expresses
social scepticism of any axiom that equates ‘evolving standards of decency’ with ‘the pro-
20
gress of a maturing society’. Instead, Scalia bemoans that ‘the American people have
been converted to belief in The Living Constitution, a “morphous” document that means,
21
from age to age, what it ought to mean’. Judicial activism based on abstract principles of
justice is not only illegitimate as ‘a form of corruption’ that debases the wisdom and virtue
22
inherent in the original meaning, but also has deleterious effects on sovereignty as it
thwarts the democratic will of the people.
The third reason against the judicial use of comparative material is political. It would
appear that it is not only in relation to strategic and foreign policy issues that ‘Americans
17
A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton, 1997, at 38; see also
A. Reed Amar, ‘The Supreme Court, 1999 Term–Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine,’
(2000) 114 Harvard Law Review 26.
18
‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 525.
19
Ibid. See also Scalia’s further comments at 536: ‘I have no problem with change. It’s just that I do
not regard the Constitution as being the instrument of change by letting judges read [foreign]
cases […]. That’s not the way we do things in a democracy. Persuade your fellow citizens and
repeal the laws. Why should the Supreme Court decide that question?’.
20
The famous phrase is Chief Justice Warren’s in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); criti-
cism by Scalia in: A Matter of Interpretation, above n. 17, at 40-41.
21
Scalia, Ibid. at 47.
22
Observation by D. Levin, ‘Federalists in the Attic: Original Intent, the Heritage Movement, and
Democratic Theory’, (2004) 29(1) Law and Social Inquiry 105-126, at 109.
23
are from Mars, and Europeans are from Venus’, but also in relation to democracy, justice
24
and human virtue. Scalia and Breyer portray the USA as the paragon of egalitarian excel-
lence , whereas comparator countries seem only just to have emerged from the dark ages.
Breyer notes that ‘[t]o an ever greater extent, foreign nations have become democratic; to
an ever greater extent they have embodied that protection in legal documents enforced
25
through judicial decision making’. Although Breyer suggests that US judges could learn
from their foreign couterparts, especially when faced with ‘difficult questions without
26
obvious answers’, Scalia states bluntly that the USA does not have the same moral and
legal framework as the rest of the world. ‘If you told the framers of the Constitution that
27
we’re to be just like Europe, they would have been appalled.’ The xenophobic tone is
28
evident in certain scholarly contributions as well as in the US media.
The fourth argument against comparative law is ideological. Alan Watson observes that
29
comparative law can be used for the purpose of corroborating a preconceived thesis.
Scalia’s fear is identical, namely that the invocation or rejection of comparative law is
determined by the political preferences of the court. In his dissenting opinion in Roper v.
30
Simmons Scalia stated: ‘to invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and
ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry’. The Justices were not
seeking ‘confirmation’ from international consensus, but were seeking to affirm their ‘own
notion of how the world ought to be, and their diktat that it shall be so henceforth in
31 32
America’. In Lawrence v Texas Scalia in his dissent accused the Supreme Court of
23
R. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, New York,
2003, 3.
24
See, e.g. J. Rubenfed, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, (2005) 79 New York University Law
Review 1971, at 1995-99.
25
26
Ibid.
27
‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 521. The deprecation of European legal systems by Breyer and
Scalia is in turn matched by Kübler who notes that the law of the USA is no longer a ‘mere
appendix or even the quantité négligeable of an exotic and peculiar development of English law,
but an exemplary illustration of a modern legal order’s tendency to grow and its ability to differ-
entiate’: F. Kübler, ‘Rechtsvergleichung als Grundlagendisziplin der Rechtswissenschaft’, Juris-
tenzeitung 1977, 113- 118, at 118.
28
See Parrish, ‘Storm in a Teacup’, above n. 3, see FN 53 for further references. See also D. Mil-
bank, ‘And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty’, Washington Post, 9 April 2005; Page A03:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38308-2005Apr8.html (visited 20 December
2007).
29
A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, (Athens and London: The
University of Georgia Press, 1974), at 12.
30
543 U.S. 551 (2005), at 21.
31
543 U.S. 551 (2005), at 23.
32
539 US 558 (2003), at 2495.
conveniently ‘ignoring […] the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on
sodomy’. And in conversation with Breyer he added: ‘When it agrees with what the justices
would like the case to say, we use the foreign law, and when it doesn’t agree, we don’t use
33
it’. Richard Posner wonders aloud whether the reason for Scalia’s objections are practical
rather than ideological: if the practical problem of accessing foreign legal judgements were
removed through adequate translations, might Scalia himself turn to comparative analysis
with a view to supporting his own views on homosexuality, abortion, capital punishment,
34
and the role of religion in public life?
The fifth argument is cultural. It is not appropriate to ‘import’ foreign legal ideas into
the national legal arena if it means divorcing those ideas from the cultural context in which
they originated. Using foreign law is difficult because judges have no insight into the ‘sur-
35
rounding jurisprudence’. From this perspective, the comparison of two or more constitu-
tional systems does not exhaust itself in the comparison of their positive constitutional
provisions, but needs to be premised on the political, historical, socio-cultural, and philo-
36
sophical foundations on which the constitutional law of the particular legal regime rests.
Not only can comparative law sometimes require sufficient knowledge of another language,
but it always requires a sound understanding of another culture; all the more so when con-
stitutional law is the object of comparison. Judges are not expert in foreign law and thus
37
lack the insight and information necessary for the formation of an opinion. These cultural
38
limitations have resulted in a degree of selectivity whenever the US Supreme Court has
consulted foreign law. The Court has referred to opinions from Commonwealth countries,
39
but not to East Asia, South American or Islamic courts.
33
34
R. Posner, ‘No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws’, (July/August 2004) Legal Affairs,
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp [visited 20
December 2007].
35
36
P. Legrand, ‘Public Law, Europeanisation, and Convergence: Can Comparativists Contribute?’ in
P. Beaumont / C. Lyons / N. Walker (eds), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law,
(Oxford: Hart, 2002); R. Wahl, Verfassungsstaat, Europäisierung, Internationalisierung (Frank-
furt: Suhrkamp, 2003), at 96.
37
‘…the judicial systems fo the rest of the world are immensely varied and most of their decisions
inaccessible, as a practical matter, to our monolingual judges and law clerks’: R. Posner, above n.
34.
38
See also W. Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and
Africa, 2nd ed, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 30: ‘Global legal debates on
human rights and religious law circle uncomfortably around the often unspoken but systematic
denial that anything useful could be learnt from non-Western socio-legal traditions’.
39
See question by Dorsen, ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 530.
The sixth argument relates to the dangers of manipulation. In the absence of a US

40
decision, citing a decision ‘by an intelligent man in Zimbabwe…looks lawyerly’. A
foreign legal source is better than none, and this kind of inventiveness invites manipulation.
To be clear, Scalia does not want to prevent judges from consulting foreign cases; he only
41
wants to prevent judges citing them. Waldron and Posner make similar observations.
Waldron notes that ‘reference to official judgments, whether local or foreign, helps rescue
42
judges from a feeling of intellectual nakedness’, whereas Posner describes the judicial
search for quotations in and citations of foreign as well as previous decisions as an effort
‘to further mystify the adjudicative process and disguise the political decisions that are the
43
core, though not the entirety, of the Supreme Court’s output’. This raises the broader
issue of what counsel is permitted to cite in court. Posner distinguishes between preceden-
44
tial and informational citations. Although he is sympathetic to Scalia’s broader claim that
the Supreme Court should never treat a foreign legal judgement as precedential authority,
45
or even as persuasive authority, Posner parts from Scalia’s company when he states that
46
‘anything can be cited as source of information bearing on an adjudication’.
II. Alternative Arguments

In response to Scalia and other critics of comparative law, there are various approaches that
could be developed with more rigour than Breyer’s utility approach (discussed below) or
47
The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, edited by Sujit Choudhry (henceforth MOCI),
which merely provides a desciptive counter-weight to Scalia’s normative objections. MOCI
is the outcome of an international conference at the University of Toronto in October 2004
that wanted to rebut Scalia’s doctrinal hostility to the use of foreign decisions in domestic
courts. However, the contributions to MOCI fail to analyse (rather than assume) the intrin-
sic value of comparative methodology as a judicial tool, and to address explicitly Scalia’s
40
41
‘I mean, go ahead and indulge your curiosity! Just don’t put it in your opinions!’, Scalia, ‘A
Conversation’, above n. 4, at 534.
42
J. Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’, above n. 3, at 138.
43
R. Posner, above n. 34.
44
Ibid.
45
Posner makes the same argument in relation to citing unpublished opinions as precedents (which
would increase the court’s workload without, according to Posner, leading to better decisions).
But the law has now changed. The new Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which took effect on 1 January 2007, allows federal courts to cite unpublished cases.
46
Ibid (emphasis added).
47
S. Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge: University Press, 2006. For
a review of this edited volume see J.E.K. Murkens, ‘Neither Parochial Nor Cosmopolitan – An
Appraisal of the Migration of Constitutional Ideas’, in (2008) 71(2) Modern Law Review 303-
319.
doctrinal objections to comparative analysis, namely that it is undemocratic. Although

48
Choudhry is aware that ‘courts must explain why comparative law should count’, MOCI
as a whole fails to offer its own justifications. MOCI is clearly trying to persuade the reader
that its own ‘educated, cosmopolitan sensibility’ is better than Scalia’s ‘narrow, inward-
49
looking, and illiterate parochialism’. But cosmopolitanism as a new Weltanschauung (as
50
Choudhry knows ) is insufficient justification for the judicial use of comparative law
method; all the more so because the link between comparative method and improved judi-
cial reasoning cannot be made. Having identified the originalists’ objections, the second
half of this article will be devoted to revealing their empirical incoherence and normative
incongruity.
1. Empirical incoherence
The controversy surrounding the judicial use of comparative constitutional law is not new.
51
It is frequently traced back to the 1958 decision of the Warren Court in Trop v. Dulles. In
52
that case the Supreme Court referred to the ‘civilized nations of the world’ in order to
determine the evolving standards of decency that should be used to evaluate which punish-
ments are unconstitutionally cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. In particular,
the Court referred to a United Nations’ survey of the laws of eighty-four states which
revealed ‘that only two countries, the Philippines and Turkey, impose denationalization as a
53 54
penalty for desertion.’ Since Coker v Georgia, and especially in the last 10 years,
Justices John Paul Stevens, Stephen Breyer, and Anthony Kennedy have looked to ‘the
55 56
climate of international opinion’ to support their views.
48
Choudhry above n 47, at 5.
49
Ibid, at 4.
50
Ibid.
51
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
52
Ibid, at 102.
53
Ibid, at 103.
54
433 U.S. 584 (1977): international practices regarding the death penalty for rape are relevant to
the Court’s ‘evolving standards’ analysis.
55
Ibid, at 596.
56
See in particular: Knight v. Florida and Moore v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 990 (1999), 995-97, per
Breyer J., dissenting, who cited judicial decisions from Jamaica, India, Zimbabwe, and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), at 316 per Stevens J. who
cites an amicus curiae brief submitted by the European Union and argues that ‘within the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved’; Rehnquist J. dissented as he failed to see ‘how the
views of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide any support for the
court's ultimate determination’ (at 325); Lawrence v. Texas 539 US 558 (2003), per Kennedy J.
who cites decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and strikes down the criminal prohi-
The attempt to discredit comparative judicial engagement ignores the extent to which
the USA and other jurisdictions already consult beyond their own borders. Although US
Supreme Court Justice O’Connor also dissented in Roper v. Simmons, she disagreed with
Scalia’s insularity: ‘over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently
referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards
57
of decency’. As regards other jurisdictions, Cheryl Saunders notes that ‘at the end of the
twentieth century, most constitutional systems are or were derivative in part, with the
possible exceptions of the ancestor systems of the United Kingdom, the United States and
58
France’. Major constitutional decisions are now discussed on a transnational basis from
the UK House of Lords to the South African Constitutional Court and the Supreme Courts
of India and Israel.
2. Normative incongruity
a) Legitimacy
More importantly, from a normative perspective the originalist objection is formalistic. It
adheres to the paradigm of one national legal system, with one legitimate law-maker, and
one coherent system of norms and legal reasoning. Hence, judicial references to foreign law
become functionally unnecessary (foreign law is not binding) and normatively illegitimate
(foreign law should have no bearing on judicial decisions). In other words, the democratic
nature of law-making procedures is a necessary as well as a sufficient condition for the
validity of law. An alternative conception views formal validity as a necessary but insuffi-
59
cient condition for law. Jürgen Habermas, for instance, emphasises the value of substan-
tive legitimacy: at the ‘posttraditional level of justification’ the making and enforcement of
laws must necessarily, and for the sake of legitimacy, ‘be rationally accepted by all citizens
60
in a discursive process of opinion- and will-formation’. Whereas originalism presupposes
a static will at the original moment of the US Constitution’s founding, Habermas treats
political preferences as ‘open to the exchange of arguments’ which can be ‘discoursively
61
changed’. Although Habermas’ discourse theory focuses on law-making procedure, its
extension to the court poses no immediate threat to the legitimacy of judicial reasoning: the
bition of homosexual sodomy in Texas; and Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551 (2005), where the
Court cites international opinion and finds that the juvenile death penalty is unconstitutional.
57
Ibid, per O’Connor J. (dissenting), at 18.
58
C. Saunders, ‘A Constitutional Culture in Transition’, in: Constitutional Cultures,Warsaw: Insti-
tute of Public Affairs, 2000, at 37.
59
See generally L.J. Wintgens, ‘Legislation as an Object of Study of Legal Theory: Legisprudence’
in L.J. Wintgens (ed), Legisprudence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation Oxford, Hart
Publishing, 2002, 27.
60
J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democ-
racy, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996, 135.
61
Ibid, at 181.
introduction of rational arguments from other jurisdictions in domestic judicial reasoning

would still need to be appraised according to its ‘internal rationality’ (the internal consis-
tency and coherence of the legal order) and ‘normative rationality’ (procedural and sub-
62
stantive legitimacy).
A further contrast to state-centredness is provided by legal pluralism. Boaventura de
Sousa Santos conceives law as ‘a constellation of different [i.e. plural and interrelated]
63
legalities’. Law does not precede political conflict but exists as a matter of communica-
tion between different legal areas, and is thus is in a constant state of flux. The intersection
64
of different legal orders is called ‘interlegality’ which extends the concept of legitimacy
beyond the boundaries of the nation state.
‘We live in a time of porous legality or of legal porosity, multiple networks of legal
orders forcing us to constant transitions and trespassings. Our legal life is constituted
by the intersection of different legal orders, that is, by interlegality. Interlegality is the
phenomenological counterpart of legal pluralism, and [that is why it is a] key concept
65
in a postmodern conception of law’.
Other commentators too conceive a heterarchical ordering of de-centralised legal systems
66
that exist independently of nation states. According to the heterarchical conception,
established legal orders (public international law, WTO, Community law) as well as new
67
phenomena such as transnational law (NGO’s, expert committees and agencies ) and
68
global law (such as the administration of domain names by ICANN ) are loosely linked up
in a multi-level state-transcending system of governance which challenges national law.
The new legal orders do not subscribe to a territorial pattern but to a functional pattern of
69
regulating diverse sectors, interests, products and values.
62
Adapted from K. Tuori, ‘Legislation Between Politics and Law’ in L.J. Wintgens (ed), Legispru-
dence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002, 105-7; see
generally K. Günther, Der Sinn für Angemessenheit, Frankfurt, 1988.
63
B. de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense – Law, Science and Politics in the Paradig-
matic Transition, London, Routledge, 1995, at 111.
64
Ibid, at 473.
65
B. de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: A Map of Misreading: Towards a Post-Modern Conception of Law’
(1997) 14 Journal of Law and Society 279, 298 [original emphasis].
66
E.g. G. Teubner, ‘”Global Bukowina”’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in G. Teubner
(Ed.), Global Law Without a State, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996.
67
See R.A. Higgott / G.R.D. Underhill / A. Bieler, Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global
System, London, Routledge, 2000.
68
See J. v. Bernstorff, ‘ICANN as a Global Governance Network: The Rise and Fall of a Govern-
ance Experiment’ in: C. Joerges / I.-J. Sand / G. Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance and
Constitutionalism, Oxford, Hart, 2004.
69
G. Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional’ in: C.
Joerges / I.-J. Sand / G. Teubner (eds), Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance, Oxford,
Hart, 2004.
A summary response to network theory is that networks are not self-legitimating orders
and do not enjoy an executive monopoly, and so cannot rival the sovereignty claim asserted
by the states. Networks are necessary emanations of a functionally differentiated society,
but the state is still the reference point of political and social development; it remains
accountable for processes which it can neither steer nor control. The point to make in rela-
tion to originalism is that discourse theory (Habermas), systems theory (Luhmann), net-
70
works (Teubner), legal pluralism (de Sousa Santos) constitutional pluralism, and cosmo-
71
politanism are theories that emphasise formal as well as substantive legitimacy, recognise
the need to adjust legal reasoning to the complexities of modern society, and challenge the
continued authority of classic sovereignty theory (which views the state as the enforcer of
law, the sole provider of constitutions and the embodiment of sovereignty) in which ‘other
72
law’ is at best ‘meaningless dicta’ and at worst ‘dangerous dicta’.
b) Hermeneutics
In order to identify and defend his constitutional interpretation, Scalia appeals to tradition,
original meaning, and historical authenticity which is validated by popular consent. By
treating the Constitution as a coherent product, rather than as the result of compromise,
73
Scalia is guilty of what Lawrence Tribe calls ‘hyper-integration’: the idea of a unique
founding moment is the originalist’s equivalent of the physicist’s big bang theory that fixed
74
in perpetuity the legal and social qualities of US constitutional jurisprudence. Whereas
75
Scalia appeals to history as the authority for a decision, the alternative appeal is to reason.
The rule of law and constitutionalism act as the rule of reason, and can offer a legal bench-
mark for the assessment of new discoveries. The purpose of constitutionalism, which is to
subject politics to higher norms of reason, is enhaced in its comparative form. To be sure,
76
the appeal to reason fills law with ‘uncertainty’: legal logic, clear rules, and a history
book do not always provide a satisfactory resolution. And it also gives judges broader
powers to interpret the constitution based on supposedly contemporary elitist values which
70
N. Walker, above n. 14.
71
U. Beck, ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies’ (2002) 19(1-2) Theory, Culture & Society
17-44; D. Held, ‘Principles of Cosmopolitan Order’ in G. Brock / H. Brighouse (eds), The Politi-
cal Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
72
Lawrence v. Texas 539 US 558 (2003), 2495 per Scalia, J. (dissenting).
73
L.H. Tribe / M. C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
1991, 24-30.
74
L.H. Tribe, ‘Comment’, in Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, above n. 18, at 87; J.A. Gardner,
The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account and Critique, (1991) 71 Boston University
Law Review, 1-45, 4.
75
P. Kahn, ‘Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key’, (2003) 101 Michigan Law Review
2677-2705, at 2685.
76
Breyer, in: ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 529.
are validated by abstract principles of justice (as opposed to supposedly traditional moral
norms which are validated by popular consent). It is easy to conclude that if judges are
given a broader (purposive) role in the interpretation of constitutional law, then compara-
tive analysis emerges as a natural adjunct to the process of constitutional and statutory
interpretation. Yet the two phenomena (judicial activism vs judicial use of comparative
law) raise separate legitimacy concerns that should not be conflated: it is quite possible for
a judge to adopt a dynamic and purposive interpretation of a statute whilst eschewing the
use of comparative law.
In this regard, Scalia’s outright rejection of foreign law, but complete acceptance of old
English law, is also noteworthy. Scalia offers no justification whatsoever for the normative
superiority of his originalist position, which can easily be rejected as an incoherent and
unpersuasive source of authority:
‘Why should we care more about the intent of the Founders – who are long-dead as
well as culturally removed from us – than about the understandings of contemporary
judges struggling with the same problems of governance of a modern welfare state in
77
countries with which we must build a just and efficient global order of law’?
c) Political
Instead of isolating the USA or any other country (or jurisdiction) from the rest of the
world in moral, political and legal terms, Breyer and O’Connor insist that foreign and
international law matter because of globalisation: ‘…foreign law today comprises part of
78
ordinary contract law or other business law’; and ‘no institution of government can afford
79
now to ignore the rest of the world’. According to Breyer, citing foreign decisions can be
justified for two reasons: because their citation does not raise a ‘technically legal’ issue, but
80
rather a ‘law-related human question’, and for reasons of utility and effectiveness:
‘…the foreign courts I have mentioned have considered roughly comparable questions
under roughly comparable legal standards. Each court has held or assumed that those
standards permit application of the death penalty itself. Consequently, I believe their
81
views are useful even though not binding’.
Scalia retorts that ‘if you don’t want [foreign law] to be authoritative, then what is the
82
criterion for citing it?’. Both Breyer and O’Connor rise to the challenge. Foreign deci-
77
Kahn, above n. 75, at 2678.
78
79
O’Connor, above n. 2. For the impact of globalisation on the judiciary see A.M. Slaughter, A New
World Order, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004, Chapter 2.
80
81
Knight v. Florida and Moore v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 990 (1999), 995-97, per Breyer J., dissenting.
82
sions are not authoritative, in the sense of being binding, but they may ‘constitute persua-
83
sive authority in American courts’, and as such, they may ‘cast an empirical light on the
84
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem’.
Another helpful conception is proposed by Mayo Moran does not conceive of legal
sources in strict hierarchical terms, but develops a more supple system in which constitu-
85
tional rights migrate. She draws a parallel between the ‘mandatory effect’ of international
and comparative law on domestic constitutional law, and the relationship between constitu-
tional law and the law governing private relations. In jurisdictions which deny the hori-
zontal effect of human rights, individual rights have nonetheless developed an ‘influential
86
authority’ which must be taken into account in decision-making and justification.
d) Ideological
How accurate is the charge that the invocation or rejection of comparative material is
87
determined by the political preferences of the court? Would an opponent of comparative
law reject foreign law out of hand if it supported her position? How much emphasis would
a supporter of comparative law place on the law of other jurisdictions if it undermined her
own position? These are not rhetorical questions – although the answers may be obvious to
Scalia. A constitutional practice in state X may be followed by state Y, but not necessarily.
A good judge will – on the basis of convincing legal argument and expected standards –
explain why the constitutional practice should converge, or why it should remain divergent.
However, the claim that comparative analysis merely masquerades as legal argument in
court to support a decision that the judges have already reached has also been made in
reverse of Scalia’s originalism which Cook describes as ‘no more than an artifice for
88
imposing [the judge’s] own political vision’. These claims, if true, discredit the authority
of legal reasoning and the integrity of the legal system as a whole. Alternatively, it may be
agreed that there is no value-neutral mechanism of constitutional interpretation and that the
83
O’Connor, above n. 2, at 350.
84
Printz v. United States, above n. 1, per Breyer J. dissenting. (Breyer mentions the federal systems
of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union to support his argument favouring state
implementation of federal law).
85
M. Moran, ‘Inimical to Constitutional Values: Complex Migrations of Constitutional Rights’, in
S. Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2006, at 233, 239.
86
See also A.-M. Slaughter, above n. 79, at 75-78.
87
See Roper above n. 56, per Scalia J. (dissenting), at 21: ‘To invoke alien law when it agrees with
one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry’. In
Lawrence Scalia accuses the Court of conveniently ‘ignoring […] the many countries that have
retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy’: Lawrence above n. 56, at 2495 per Scalia, J. (dissent-
ing).
88
A. E. Cook, ‘The Temptation and Fall of Original Understanding’, (1990) Duke Law Journal
1163, at 1164.
claims cancel each other out. Scalia’s basic normative claim that the Constitution should
only be amended after a formal legislative process, and not through ingenious judicial
activism, is offset empirically (originalism has never been strictly followed by the Court) as
well as normatively. Constitutional concepts (equality and liberty) and concerns (death
penalty, abortion) do not attract a meaning that can be fixed or frozen for all time for the
purposes of deriving original understanding.
e) Cultural
Aside from practical problems associated with language and accessibility, comparative law
is problematic epistemologically because it
i) presumes similarities in different legal systems,

ii) suppresses differences, and
89
iii) ignores the role of legal culture.
In order to identify its subject-matter, the comparative method has to assume the unity and
coherence of the public legal order. It has to treat both public law systems as comparable
when, in reality, constitutional law is contingent upon culture (politics, history etc) as well
as interpretation, both of which are incoherent and conflictual. The formalism of the com-
parative method tends to overlook the individual historical development and the internal
rationalities of the two countries, and to overstress the legal characteristics of that devel-
opment. The neglect of social sources results in superficial analysis of positive constitu-
90
tional law with neglible scholarly insights.
The complexities underlying comparative constitutional law do not prevent the cross-
cultural exchange of information. A degree of transnational harmonisation occurs infor-
mally, through global networks of social movements, professionals (which include lawyers,
91 92
judges and prosecutors) and institutions: ‘the networks of national constitutional courts
93
are explicitly focused on the provision and exchange of information and ideas’. Accord-
94
ing to Breyer law emerges from a ‘complex interactive democratic process’ that includes
all legal professionals and laypersons. He likens the process to a kind of transnational
89
P. Legrand, ‘Public Law, Europeanisation, and Convergence: Can Comparativists Contribute?’ in
P. Beaumont / C. Lyons / N. Walker (eds), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law,
Oxford, Hart, 2002.
90
R. Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society, Aldershot, 2006, Chapter 9.
91
Slaughter, ‘The Real New World Order’, (1997) 76(5) Foreign Affairs 183, 185.
92
Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191.
93
Slaughter, above n. 79, at 100.
94
‘A Conversation’ above n. 4, at 522.
95
‘conversation’ in which constitutional court judges are engaged with each other. This
96
type of conversation is reminiscent of Dworkin’s conversational interpretation and Acker-
97
man’s ‘ongoing dialogue amongst scholars, professionals, and the people at large…’. But
this conversation is emphatically transnational and is geared towards understanding the
members and practices of another social culture. These transnational conversations and
98
networks arguably even point towards the emergence of a new global civil society which,
in turn, transforms nationally-shaped cultures and societies. Some sociology and philoso-
phy scholars imagine a ‘cosmopolitan society’ which, they suggest, transforms the ‘moral
life-worlds’ of the people, i.e. their everyday consciousness and identities, through the
interconnectedness with other cultures. The consequence is that ‘a nation-based memory of
99
the past’ is gradually being replaced by a ‘a shared collective future’.
f) Manipulation
A final concern with the originialists’ position is that it openly invites intellectual dishon-
esty. Scalia does not object to judges consulting foreign law; he objects to judges citing
100
foreign law in judicial opinions. Both aspects are open to criticism. First, it can neither
be necessary nor acceptable for judges not to cite legal authority that filters into their opin-
ion. Common law judges are required to provide a written and detailed opinion which, inter
101
alia, cites, distinguishes or departs from precedent. What benefit can be derived from
artificially concealing the identity of a legal argument simply because it originates outside
102
the jurisdiction? Secondly, judges could also be positively encouraged to consult widely
before reaching a decision. Niklas Luhmann points out that, when faced with a legal prob-
lem, the legal system draws a distinction between self-reference and external reference.
Self-referentiality means that all operations and elements always refer to, and reproduce,
the system. The system is normatively closed: it excludes morality which is external to, and
95
Kahn, above n. 75, at 2679; see also R. Badinter / S. Breyer (eds), Judges in Contemporary
Democracy: An International Conversation, (New York: New York University Press, 2004); B.-O.
Bryde, ‘The Constitutional Judge and the International Constitutionalist Dialogue’, in 80 (1)
Tulane Law Review 203-220.
96
R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire London, 1986, Chapter 2.
97
B. Ackerman, We The People: Foundations, Cambridge, 1991, at 5.
98
B.K. Woodward, ‘Global Civil Society and International Law in Global Governance: Some Con-
temporary Issues’, (2006) 8(2/3) International Community Law Review 247-355; M. Wilkinson,
‘Civil Society and the Re-imagination of European Constitutionalism’ (2003) 9(4) European Law
Journal 451 – 472.
99
U. Beck, above n. 71, at 27.
100
101
Slaughter, above n. 79, at 75.
102
M. Tushnet, ‘When is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy
over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law’, (2006) 90 Minnesota Law Review 1275.
thus not binding on, the legal system. External referentiality, on the other hand, prevents
the system from standing still by cognitively opening it up to its environment from where it
is fed with new information. Although the legal system may not refer to external norms
(e.g. morality), it may (indeed it must) refer to external knowledge. The reference to (not
the transfer of) knowledge remains an internal operation: the external reference to informa-
tion allows the system to recognise a difference to its own condition. Viewed in this way,
comparative law can be treated as obiter dicta: a remark, observation, illustration, analogy
or argument that contributes to the substantive (not formal) validity of a court’s judgement.
Comparison as a process, be it of norms, of facts, or of facts and norms, is the staff of life
103
for lawyers. Kahn goes even further and counters that it would be efficient for a constitu-
tional court to make use of the research and reasoning of another court that had already
confronted the same or a similar set of constitutional issues. ‘Comparative materials, thus,
104
come to compete with precedents as a material source of legal reasoning’. In conse-
quence, the reflexive use of transnational and comparative law can be seen as a functional
requirement for, and an efficient manner of, legal reasoning in complex modern socie-
105
ties.
III. Conclusion
The originalists’ objections raise many additional issues. If comparative analysis is
inappropriate to the task of interpreting constitutional law, does that make references to
foreign law appropriate in relation to private law? Why is it acceptable to borrow from
other legal systems when a new constitution is written, but not when it is interpreted?
Finally, why is a historical legal approach legitimate (Scalia cites old English law), but not
a comparative legal approach, when their intellectual origins (both legal history and com-
parative law had to be reconceived due to the codifications of the 19th and early 20th centu-
106
ries) are identical. Scalia boasts that he uses ‘foreign law more than anybody on the
107
Court. But it’s all old English law’. This smacks of inconsistency and double-standards.
Scalia’s originalism only makes sense as ‘a self-justifying system of constitutional inter-
108
pretation’ whose sole purpose is ‘the rejection of contemporary liberal jurisprudence…’.
103
See A. Junker, ‘Rechtsvergleichung als Grundlagenfach’, Juristenzeitung 1994, 921-928, at 922.
The US Supreme Court not only cites primary authority, but also secondary authorities (from
scholarly treatises to legal dictionaries), and also non-legal material ranging from M*A*S*H* and
Sesame Street to popular music and poetry, and the classics (Plato, Aristotle, Shakespeare, Mon-
tesquieu): see Parrish, ’Storm in a Teacup’, above n. 3, at 655-6 [with references].
104
105
N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, Oxford, 2004, 157-8.
106
Junker, above n. 103, at 923.
107
‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 525; 527.
108
D. Levin, ‘Federalists in the Attic: Original Intent, the Heritage Movement, and Democratic
Theory’, above n. 22, at 109.
The big bang theory, which freezes the legal and social values of the Founding Fathers,
does not stand up to scrutiny in the real life world: ‘no research program can fetishize its
109
own past; rather it must remain open to new “discoveries” wherever they are made’.
Jeremy Waldron, arguing on the other end of the normative spectrum, suggests that
foreign law should be viewed as a latterday ius gentium, i.e. a ‘set of principles’ that repre-
110
sents ‘a sort of consensus among judges, jurists, and lawmakers around the world’.
Waldron draws an analogy with scientific problem-solving and asks the reader to imagine a
new disease or epidemic appearing within the country. In such a case scientists would
‘want to look abroad to see what scientific conclusions and strategies had emerged, had
been tested, and had been mutually validated in the public health practices of other
111
countries. We can think of citation to foreign law in Roper in the same way’.
In other words, in deciding the ethical, moral and constitutional aspects of who or what is
right or wrong, the Supreme Court should feel compelled to consult widely: ‘…to ignore
foreign solutions, or to refrain from attending to them because they are foreign, betokens
not just an objectionable parochialism, but an obtuseness as to the nature of the problems
112
we face’. The accumulation of authorities represents ‘a dense network of checking and
rechecking results, experimental duplication, credentialing, mutual elaboration, and build-
113
ing on one another’s work’.
Waldron’s approach too needs to be handled with care. Decisions on rights and justice
cannot be compared to consenus in the natural sciences. The philosophy of science
embraces theories of knowledge (epistemology) and of learning (methodology), as well as
114
the study of the principles of science (metaphysics), and thus operates with a different
115
logic than law. Although only few scientitists have genuine Eureka moments, legal
scholars do not generally develop hypotheses after a new discovery or an investigation
based on the scientific method (i.e. conducting research, identifying the problem, stating a
hypothesis, conducting project experimentation, and reaching a conclusion).
Furthermore, the analogy with natural sciences masks important differences particularly
with regard to constitutional law. Comparative constitutional law oscillates between ‘seek-
116
ing similarity’ and ‘appreciating difference’. Underlying comparative constitutional law
109
110
J. Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’, above n. 3, at 132.
111
Ibid. at 143.
112
Ibid, at 144.
113
Ibid, at 145.
114
J. Agassi, ‘The Philosophy of Science Today’, in: S.G. Shanker (ed), Routledge History of Philo-
sophy, Vol IX, London, 1996, Chapter 7.
115
K.R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London, 1992.
116
R. Cotterrell, above n. 90, at 148; see also N. Berman, ‘Aftershocks: Exoticization, Normaliza-
tion, and the Hermeneutic Compulsion’ (1997) Utah Law Review 281, at 282-4.
is a tension which gives comparative law the potential to broaden horizons but undermine
national culture. Waldron’s analogy with the natural sciences on the one hand, and ius
gentium on the other, ignores the role and power of national politics and the national con-
stitutional traditions. In other words, it does not recognise crucial constitutional differences
that exist between states, but sees only sameness. Moreover, the idea of sameness (i.e. a
genuine constitutional paradigm) is based on a false sense of homogeneity amongst West-
ern states. To be sure, there is basic consensus at the general level of human dignity and
pluralistic democracy, human rights, rule of law, proportionality, and tolerance. But beyond
that floor of agreement there exists great diversity in relation, say, to the constitutional
protection of free speech rights, social welfare rights, civil rights (e.g. the right to bear
arms), and capital punishment which ius gentium does not capture.
The purpose of this article was to contrast Scalia’s objections with alternative
approaches in contemporary constitutional discourse. The recourse to heavyweight consti-
tutional principles (sovereignty, majoritarianism, original meaning, formal legitimacy), and
seemingly serious extra-legal arguments (in using foreign law judges impose their own
ideology, divorce legal ideas from their cultural context, and manipulate or mystify the
adjudicative process), means that Scalia’s objections are easily criticised, but not so easily
replaced. This article endorses neither Scalia’s big bang theory nor Waldron’s analogy with
the natural sciences. Instead, the objective has been to ascribe a modest meaning to the
judicial use of comparative constitutional law. If the courts, or any other institution, wish to
engage in a process of comparative constitutional law, that process must identify the
national specificity of law and grasp the mediating potential of law as a self-reflexive dis-
course.
A reflexive orientation does not ask whether there are social problems to which the law
must be responsive. Instead it seeks to identify opportunity structures that allow legal
regulation to cope with social problems without, at the same time, irrevocably destroying
117
valued patterns of life.
Self-reflexion explains why the USA would not be bound by the dicta of a judge in
Zimbabwe, but would want to cite a European Court of Human Rights case on the decrimi-
nalisation of homosexuality. Michelman and Kahn argue that comparative analysis allows
118
US courts ‘to clarify our picture of ourselves’, and that it helps ‘us to understand who
119
we are’, without having to engage in constitutional borrowing. Comparative law is a
117
G. Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’, (1983) 17 Law and Society
Review 239–285, at 274.
118
F.I. Michelman, Reflection, (2004) 82 Texas Law Review 1737, at 1758-59.
119
120
reflexive process in order to understand law. Its purpose is not to import a final resolu-
121
tion or to contract out the judges’ duty to decide hard cases.
‘[Law] operates reflexively. The mode of expecting is not random, nor is it left to
simple social convenience. It is provided for in the legal system itself. In this way the
system controls itself at the level of second-order observations, which is a typical con-
dition for differentiation and operative closure […]. Law is not something that is simply
maintained with the help of powerful political support and then, more or less,
122
enforced.’
At one level, Scalia’s objections, and the objections to his objections, tell a familiar story
about the ‘contradictory principles’ of constitutional law. At another level, the entire judi-
cial and scholarly debate about the rights and wrongs of using foreign law in the courts has
missed out on law’s intrinsic reflexive dimension which comparative law can, and should,
nurture.
120
A. Junker, above n. 103, at 922.
121
D. Fontana, ‘Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law’, (2001) 49 UCLA Law Review 539,
at 558; J. Goldsworthy, ‘Questioning the Migration of Constitutional Ideas: Rights, Constitution-
alism, and the Limits of Convergence’, in S. Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional
Ideas, Cambridge, 2006, at 141.
122
N. Luhmann, above n. 105, at 157-8.
51
Globalization of Constitutional Law through

Interaction of Judges
By Jutta Limbach, Berlin / Munich∗
I. Creation of Networks between Decision-makers

During the last decades, governments, lawmakers and judges have been faced with a
multitude of challenges transcending national borders. Let me just mention three factors
contributing to this situation:
– The globalisation of trade: Whenever companies wish to export or invest abroad, law-
yers are called upon to examine the applicable rules.
– The development of an international and, in particular, European conception of Human
Rights: The application and interpretation of the European Convention of Human
Rights, which is binding on 47 European States, raise similar questions throughout
Europe.
– People's freedom of movement: The increased mobility within Europe and all over the
world necessitates the creation of a common set of rules on how to deal with complex
issues, for example concerning family law or the law of extradition.
These challenges call for effective ways of enforcing the already existing structures of
international co-operation and of creating novel approaches.
One of these approaches is the creation of networks between decision-makers on an
international level. Anne-Marie Slaughter describes the evolution of “a new world order”
through a multitude of more or less formal networks between law-makers, administrative
bodies and judges from different countries. They may connect national bodies and their
foreign counterparts in a horizontal way, aimed at the exchange of information and mutual
support, or they may connect international institutions and their national interlocutors in a
vertical way with a view of enforcing international standards. These networks are not
intended to replace, but to supplement the existing governmental structures. They are less
concerned with issues of hierarchy, but with means of improving co-operation on a trans-
national and supranational level. Instead of the classic instruments of coercion, they use the
“soft powers” of information, socialization, persuasion and discussion – they are “powerful
1
through attraction rather than coercion”.
∗ Prof. Dr. jur., President of the Goethe-Institut, 1972-1989 Professor at the law faculty of the Free
University, Berlin; 1989-1994 Member of the Berlin Government; 1994-2002 President of the
Federal Constitutional Court, Karlsruhe; con-founder of the German Association for the Sociology
of Law. E-mail: Galic@goethe.de
1
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A new world order, Princeton University Press 2004, pp. 5, 27.
II. Co-operation of Judges

Recent years have seen the emergence of a proliferation of international gatherings of
judges. Allow me to mention just three of them:
1. In 2004 the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Court of the European Union founded
their own network. This Network has the declared aim to give European Institutions an
opportunity to request the opinions of Supreme Courts and to bring them closer by encour-
aging discussion and the exchange of ideas. In the terms set out above, this association may
be described as a horizontal network which aims both at exchanging know-how at an inter-
nal level and at spreading information through external channels, in particular by corres-
ponding with European institutions. The members gather for colloquiums to discuss matters
of common interest. Last year's conference, for example, focused on issues relating to the
institution of Supreme Courts, such as budgetary questions, the methods of appointment of
judges and disciplinary proceedings against judges. The founding members have also set up
2
a website aimed at the constant exchange of information.
2. The European Court of Human Rights dedicated the conference at the occasion of
the opening of the judicial year 2005 to a dialogue between judges of different national and
European courts. The conference was aimed at further smoothing the co-operation between
the courts and thus to strengthen the impact of the European case-law on the decisions
taken by the national court. As the European Court of Human Rights functions as a last
instance in all question relating to the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on
Human Rights, this may be viewed as an example for a vertical dialogue between an inter-
national court and its national counterparts.
One of the main concerns put forward by the national courts during this conference was
the issue of subsidiarity, in particular the question if and to what extent the Strasbourg
Court was competent to control the application of the domestic law by the domestic courts.
While readily accepting the international court's supremacy regarding the interpretation of
the Convention, one of the guest speakers considered that the ”loss of sovereignty (is) less
readily accepted in … cases in which the European Court interprets the factual elements
necessary for the application of concepts of pure domestic law differently from the domes-
3
tic courts.”
3. Let me now draw your attention to a network of judges I am more thoroughly famil-
iar with, having had the benefit of participating in several of its events:
The emerged from a meeting held in Dubrovnik in 1972 between the Yugoslav, Italian,
Austrian and German Constitutional Courts. While the number of participants increased
over the following decades – the Conference currently counts 39 members from as many
2
www.rpsjue.org
3
Guy Canivet, National supreme courts and the European Convention on Human Rights: New role
or radical change in the domestic legal order? in: Dialogue between judges, European Court of
Human Rights, Council of Europe, 2005, p. 19 s., p. 30.
Limbach, Globalization of Constitutional Law through Interaction of Judges 53
European countries – the structures remained basically the same. It was not until 1999 that
the conference decided to give itself a statute. Notwithstanding, the conference remained a
rather informal gathering. The Conference of European Constitutional Courts does neither
have a legal status nor a permanent secretariat. It does not take any binding decisions other
than those related to the organisation of its conferences. In between its meetings, which
take place once every three years, it basically exists as an idea in the heads of the members
4
of the relevant Constitutional Courts .
The primary aim of the Conference, as set out in its statute, is “to promote the exchange
of information on the working methods and case-law of its member courts together with the
exchange of opinions on institutional, structural and operational issues as regards public –
law and constitutional jurisdiction”.
The topics to be discussed during the conference are chosen during a preparatory meet-
ing by the “Circle of Presidents” which comprises the Presidents of its member courts. For
the tenth conference, which took place in Budapest in 1996, to pick just one example, the
Circle of Presidents chose two topics: “Freedom of expression in the jurisprudence of
constitutional courts with special regard to regulations on the electronic media” and “Sepa-
ration of powers regarding the constitutional court's jurisdiction”.
These examples illustrate the two areas from which topics are generally chosen,
namely, the case-law on the application of individual constitutional rights on one hand and
the discussion of structural issues on the other. The topic relating to freedom of expression
was of a specific transnational interest, since media, in particular in their electronic version,
naturally do not stop at national borders.
In preparation of the meeting, the participating courts filled out questionnaires relating
to the two chosen topics. Members of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, being the hosts,
prepared two general reports which accumulated the information submitted by the members
and served as a basis for the ensuing discussions.
As such, the Conference of European Constitutional Courts does not have any coercive
power – and it does not strive to obtain it. It can be characterised as a horizontal informa-
tion network enabling constitutional judges to entertain personal contacts and to exchange
know-how and experience.
While these objectives might appear to be rather modest, the impact of the Conference
should not be underestimated. Its deliberations allow a very open and intensive dialogue on
fundamental issues of constitutional law and on methods of interpretation based on mutual
respect and appreciation. The different legal and cultural backgrounds of the participating
judges allow enlightening problems from a broad comparative perspective. The majority of
the participants being active constitutional judges, the fruits of these discussions are very
4
Karl-Georg Zierlein, Entwicklung und Möglichkeiten einer Union: Die Konferenz der Europäi-
schen Verfassungsgerichte, in: Festschrift für Wolfgang Zeidler, Berlin, New York 1987, p. 315 et
s. (p. 341).
5
likely to find their way into the case-law of their respective courts . I do admit that it may
be difficult to prove the effects of this “cross-fertilization” (Anne-Marie Slaughter), as
many constitutional courts remain reluctant expressly to cite the case-law of their interna-
tional counterparts. Nevertheless, the Conference of European Constitutional Courts
actively promotes the development of a common “language” of European constitutional
6
culture, or at least a grammar thereof, that is to say, its methods and standards.
III. Human Rights Protection in the Council of Europe Framework

Last but not least let me draw the attention to the human rights protection in the Council of
Europe framework. The European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of
Human Rights play an eminent role in safeguarding democratic values across Europe, as
well as in setting an example even beyond the borders of its member states. The Enlarge-
ment of the Council of Europe and the accession of the central and east European democra-
cies have contributed to stability in the whole Europe. The right of individual application is
the most distinctive feature of the control mechanism. The Court is the only international
court to which any individual, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals have
access for the purpose of enforcing their rights under the Convention. Beyond this individ-
ual supervision the Court has the constitutional mission to lay down common principles
and standards relating to human rights and to determine the minimum level of protection
which a state must observe.
The exponential increase in the number of individual applications is now seriously
threatening the survival of the machinery of the judicial protection of human rights. There
is a fundamental conflict between the size of the population who have access to the Court
and the Court’s responsibility as the final arbiter in human rights matters for so many
different states. No other international court is confronted with a workload of such magni-
tude while having at the same time such a demanding responsibility for setting the stan-
dards of conduct required to comply with the Convention. Because the system is in danger
of collapsing the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe set up a Group
of Wise Persons to consider the long-term effectiveness of the ECHR control mechanism.
This Group recommends measures to remedy this situation, but did not follow the idea of
giving the Court a discretionary power analogous to the certiorari procedure of the US
Supreme Court, because this authority would be alien to the philosophy of the European
human rights protection system. The right of individual application is a key component of
7
the control mechanism of the Convention.
5
Zierlein, op. cit., p. 335.
6
Lázló Sólyom, On the Co-operation of Constitutional Courts, General reports of the 10th Con-
ference of the European Constitutional Courts, Budapest 1996, p. 4.
7
Report of the Group of Wise Persons, Strasbourg 2006, p. 15 ff.
Limbach, Globalization of Constitutional Law through Interaction of Judges 55
The Group proposed besides other measures the establishment of a new filtering
mechanism. Here is not the place to give details to and to discuss the proposals. But in its
entirety the Report is characterized by the variety of its proposals. The recommendations of
the Report are addressed at many institutions, such as national courts, and at non-state
entities, such as professional organisations, and last but not least at the civil society which
plays a significant part in human rights protection, which is important to maintain and
expand. The multitude and the variety of the addressees demonstrate the difficulty of an
international institution as the European Court of Human Rights to establish a supporting
network in a globalized world.
56
The Globalization of Latin American Constitutional Law
By Javier A. Couso, Santiago de Chile

∗
I. Introduction
One of the most remarkable developments in the legal domain over the last few decades has
been the increasing globalization of constitutional law, the legal subject most intimately
linked to national identity. This trend is apparent not only in constitution-making, or in the
use of foreign jurisprudence by constitutional and supreme courts but, I submit, in the
emergence of what amounts to a kind of constitutional ius cogens. This body of global legal
rules – which is intimately linked to international human rights law – has led to the
increasing homogeneity of constitutional law around the world, because it is deemed
mandatory by a similarly global network of constitutional scholars and rights activists.
As international law scholars know well, ius cogens is a peremptory, unwritten norm
1
thought to be so fundamental that it invalidates other rules. A typical example of ius
cogens is the rule that slavery is unacceptable. This concept, which has evident links to
2
natural law thinking (Janis argues that it is a ‘modern form of natural law’), gained legiti-
macy after World War II, as a reaction of the abuses of Nazism, and I think it represents the
best way to conceptualize the type of human rights-based constitutional law that dominates
current constitutional thought worldwide.
As it happens in the domain of international law, the new constitutional ius cogens is
regarded as peremptory by its supporters. Indeed, given the high moral status it is deemed
to posses, those who adhere to it believe that national sovereignty should not be an obstacle
to the domestic implementation of the basic human rights recognized in the rich body of
instruments that have configurated the contours of international human rights law since the
3
mid twentieth century.
In what follows, I analyze the way in which this human rights-based constitutional ius
cogens – which I take to be the most important vehicle for the globalization of constitu-
tional law in our time – has penetrated Latin America’s constitutional law.
∗ Ph.D., M.A. Jurisprudence and Social Policy (Berkeley); Professor of Law, Universidad Diego
Portales (Chile); Member of the International Committee of the Law and Society Association.
E-mail: javier.couso@udp.cl
1
See Mark Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 1993, page 62.
2
Ibid, page 63.
3
See Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The socialization of international human rights norms
into domestic practices: introduction,” in Thomas Risse / Stephen Ropp / Kathryn Sikkink, The
Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change, 1999, pages 1-38.
Couso, The Globalization of Latin American Constitutional Law 57
II. Law and constitutionalism in Latin American history

Right after their independence – in the early nineteenth century – Latin American countries
were fairly open to foreign legal influence, including in the domain of constitutional law. In
fact, most of the new nation-states of the region look to a very different country (socially
and culturally), the United States, for inspiration when designing their constitutional archi-
tectures. This explains why all Latin American states adopted presidencialist regimes.
The initial openness to foreign influence in constitutional law exhibited by Latin Ame-
rican states would decline later, when constitutions came to play a crucial symbolic role in
building the nation. This, in a region of the world in which (as opposed to Europe) the state
preceded the nation.
While constitutional law was becoming nationalized, the opposite happened in the
domain of civil and criminal law, subjects which became open to foreign influence. An
example of the receptiveness exhibited by Latin American countries to foreign legal ideas
in civil law is the Civil Code that Andrés Bello drafted for Chile (1855), which borrowed
from an array of codes from overseas, such as the Code Napoleon, the Prussian Code, the
Sardinia Code and many others. The remarkable range of foreign legal sources from which
4
Bello got inspiration was openly acknowledged in the preamble of his code.
Another example of the denationalized status of civil law in Latin America was the
wholesale adoption of Bello’s code by a number of countries in the region, such as Colom-
bia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Venezuela, Honduras and Nicaragua, after it had been adopted
5
in Chile.
As indicated above, Latin America’s openness to foreign law was not confined to the
domain of civil law but it also reached criminal law. In this case, however, the foreign
influence did not occur at the moment of codification but later on, through the hegemony
achieved by German legal doctrine within Latin American legal academics and judges,
which gradually led to the jurisprudential transformation of the region’s criminal law.
How do we account for the fact that Latin American constitutional law became nation-
alized while that civil and criminal law were so receptive to foreign influences?
I think this was because civil and criminal law were regarded in Latin America as more
properly ‘legal’ subjects than constitutional law was, therefore as sites where a scientific
legal discourse could be articulated, which in turn made them more liable to be penetrated
by foreign scientific discourse (science has no nationality, as it were).
Contrasting with this understanding of civil and criminal law, until fairly recently con-
stitutional law was rarely considered ‘law’ in Latin America by legal practitioners and
academics. It was instead a way of constituting the nation, but not something expected to be
4
See “Mensaje del Ejecutivo al Congreso proponiendo la aprobación del Código Civil,” in: Codigo
Civil Edición Oficial, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1970, pages 5-19.
5
See Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, Los abogados de América Latina. Una introducción histórica,
Bogotá, 2004, page 120.
adjudicated by judges or theorized by legal academics. Given this context, it is not surpris-
ing that there was little space to create legal science around constitutional law, which in
turn meant that it was less liable to be influenced by foreign legal ideas.
In spite of the fact that constitutional law was not considered a proper legal subject
there was quite a lot of constitutional drafting during that time. The reason behind this
paradox is that every time there was a change in the political regime –due to the recurrence
of military coups succeeded by the reestablishment of civilian rule—the new authorities felt
compelled to enact a new constitution. This is what Brian Loveman had in mind when he
wrote that behind all the constitution-writing which has characterized Latin America over
the last two centuries there was very little constitutionalism, in the sense of an actual limi-
6
tation of political authority and a culture of respect for individual rights.
III. The transformation of Latin American constitutionalism

Loveman’s assessment of the role of constitutions in Latin America represents a fairly
accurate account of the situation until the 1970s. Indeed, up until then constitutions were
largely irrelevant to the daily life of the people of the region, rarely controlling govern-
mental abuses. But then something extraordinary happened: the emergence of what
amounts to a true constitutional revolution in the region, a revolution in both the content
and the uses of constitutional law which has elevated it to the top of the legal field.
According to the new constitutional paradigm, constitutions involve not just rules but –
more importantly – fundamental principles of public law drawn from international human
rights law. Furthermore, the constitution is now understood to be an instrument that ought
7
to be directly enforced by judges at both constitutional courts and the regular judiciary.
In my view, the two most important factors contributing to the transformation of Latin
American constitutional law into a real limit on political power and into a recognized legal
subject (liable of being influenced by global academic discourse), were first, the way in
which the wave of brutal military regimes that swept the region during the 1960s and 1970s
was processed by Latin American society and, second, the understanding that international
human rights law represents something like the constitutional ius cogens of our era, that is
to say, a body of norms and principles above national sovereignty. These two factors
opened the way to both the consolidation of constitutional law as the most important legal
subject of out time as well as to the transformation of its content in order to satisfy its com-
pliance with the demands of the standards of international human rights law.
Going to the first of the aforementioned factors –that is, the growing awareness of the
importance to limit power as a result of the tragic experience of the military dictatorships –,
6
See Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America,
Pittsburgh Press, 1994.
7
See Alan Angell, Rachel Sieder and Line Schjolden (eds.), The Judicialization of Politics in Latin
America, London, 2005.
Couso, The Globalization of Latin American Constitutional Law 59
of course Latin America had had many episodes of horror in its past (starting with the
genocidal Spanish treatment of indigenous peoples in the sixteenth century), but this time it
processed it in a more fruitful way, thanks to the global awareness created by human rights
discourse –which was itself made possible by the international human rights movement.
Due to this new context, for the first time in the region’s history the horrors were processed
in a way conducive to institutional change in the realm of constitutional law. In fact, we
cannot understand current constitutional law thinking in Latin America without this back-
ground.
With regard to the second element mentioned above, that is, the impact in Latin Ameri-
can of what I have labeled constitutional ius cogens, it suffices to say that its penetration in
the region has been so deep as to make it commonsensical in both the legal academy and in
the judiciary. As Stone Sweet has argued in relation to the rise of constitutional justice in
8
Europe, the new constitutional ius cogens encourages judges in Latin America to engage
in what amounts to a type of natural law adjudication, in stark contrast with the traditional
deference to legislated law so common in the region up until the 1970s.
A fairly illustrative example of the way in which the constitutional ius cogens has
penetrated the region is provided by a statement of a high official of the Ministry of Foreign
Relations of Chile, who, in the midst of the debate over the constitutionality of the treaty
ratifying the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Chile, declared that since it had been
considered constitutional in most countries of the world it should be so considered in Chile,
without mentioning that the text of the latter’s constitution was different from that of the
countries he was referring to! But textual elements were surely beside the point in the era of
constitutional ius cogens.
I have so far dealt with what I take to be the ‘macro factors’ contributing to the impact
of the new constitutional paradigm in Latin America. I will now briefly deal with some
‘micro factors’ which have also contributed to the penetration of human rights-based con-
stitutionalism in Latin America.
The transformation of constitutional discourse in this region has been supported by a
fairly active group of legal academics devoted to the cultivation of constitutional law and
theory, a set of professionals who combine their intellectual interest in the area with the
expectation of rising to the top of the state apparatus through their incorporation to mem-
bership in the courts in charge of constitutional adjudication.
8
Alec Stone-Sweet, commenting on the rise of what he labels ‘higher law constitutionalism’ in
Europe had this to say: “In Germany, Italy, and Spain, constitutional texts proclaim human rights
before they establish state institutions and before they distribute governmental functions. In
consequence of this fact, rights are considered by legal scholars and many judges to possess a
juridical existence that is prior to and independent of the state. Doctrine has it that rights are
invested with a kind of ‘supraconstitutional’ normativity that makes (at least some of) them
immune to change through constitutional revision (…) This is inherently a natural law position,
although natural law is rarely explicitly invoked.” See Alec Stone-Sweet, Governing with Judges.
Constitutional Politics in Europe, Oxford, 2000, page 95.
Another element that has contributed to the hegemony of the new constitutional doc-
trine in Latin America has been the global network of constitutional scholars and judges
9
who meet regularly to discuss about constitutional theory. The constitutional ius cogens I
have identified above is the common denominator of those meetings, since judges and
constitutional law scholars are reciprocally ignorant of the minutiae of each other’s consti-
tutions, but share a basic understanding of the basic core of human rights-based constitu-
tionalism.
To finish this brief list of the elements encouraging the spread of the new constitutional
ius cogens in Latin America it is important to mention the crucial role played by the Inter-
American human rights system (which includes the Inter-American Human Rights Com-
mission and Court). This body has been a focal point of articulation and dissemination of
the new constitutional ius cogens in Latin America through its jurisprudence, which is
widely commented regionally by a growing number of constitutional scholars who devoted
themselves to analyze its rulings.
IV. Conclusion
Over the last two decades or so, Latin American constitutional law has experienced a sea
change, due to the adoption of a human rights-based constitutional ius cogens accompanied
with a new conception of the role of high courts in a democracy. This new paradigm
encourages courts to assertively adjudicate the constitution even against legislated law. This
revolutionary change in constitutional theory has created quite a lot of excitement within
those who work in the field in the region, as well as in many social groups who now see the
courts as an important resource to advance their claims when they are disregarded by the
political system.
The high expectations placed in this new understanding of constitutional law should
not, however, make us overlook the risks associated to this new paradigm, which are appar-
ent from the record of the last two decades in the region, where assertive adjudication of
human rights-based constitutionalism against legislated law has often led to the destruction
of the independence of very courts which have used their power of judicial review of the
constitutionality of law.
At any rate, and in spite of the danger just noted, it is clear that as a result of the emer-
gence of the new constitutional ius cogens I have described in this paper, constitutional law
in Latin America has become more globalized than ever before.
9
The meetings of the International Association of Constitutional Law (IACL) represent the most
important of such forums.
61
The Internationalization of Constitutional Law:

A Note on the Colombian Case
By Manuel José Cepeda, Bogotà

∗
1. Introduction
The purpose of this note is that of describing the relevance of International Human Rights
Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) for constitutional adjudication,
entrusted in Colombia to the Constitutional Court. In order to illustrate the scope of the
internationalization of Constitutional Law in Colombia I shall sketch out some especially
important judgments in light of the functions played by International Law in the resolution
of the constitutional controversy. Needless to say I do not intend to present an exhaustive
panorama. I have preferred to present the Constitutional Court’s doctrine highlighting its
most significant aspects. In order to ensure the clarity of the message I want to convey, I
shall emphasize its essential features, overlooking subtleties and notes on the evolution of
Colombian Constitutional case-law which will surely be missed by those who know it in
detail.
For those who are not familiar with the Colombian case, the statements made in this
paper may sound surprising. However, it is necessary to underscore that in spite of the news
about violence that abound in the foreign mass media, there actually is another Colombia,
predominantly urban, in which the Rule of Law prevails. In fact, it is important to empha-
size that Colombia has a long, stable and uninterrupted tradition of judicial review, since
1886. The first decision striking down a congressional act was issued in July 1887. The
Supreme Court of Justice was the constitutional judge at the time and fulfilled its judicial
review functions for more than a century. In 1991, the constitutional adjudication functions
held by the Supreme Court were given to a newly created Constitutional Court. Since its
creation, the Constitutional Court has issued more than 13.500 judgments – on average,
around 850 annual judgments per year - out of which roughly 25% are adopted in exercise
of abstract judicial review of legislation, and the rest in exercise of concrete judicial review
of the preservation of human rights in specific cases. Abstract control is mainly triggered by
an actio popularis that was created in 1910. Concrete control is triggered by a strong,
informal and very fast kind of amparo, a special writ for the protection of fundamental
rights named acción de tutela created in 1991. Within these figures, approximately 23% of
abstract review judgments have struck down the corresponding legal provision, whereas
approximately 55% of concrete review judgments have protected the relevant fundamental
rights.
∗ LL.M.(Harvard); former Ambassador of Colombia to UNESCO and Switzerland, since 2001

Member of the Constitutional Court of Colombia, 2005/6 President of the Court. E-mail:
manueljcepeda@gmail.com
2. The notion of “constitutionality block”

IHRL and IHL have borne a significant impact upon constitutional adjudication. This
comes as the consequence of an express decision made by the 1991 Constituent Assembly,
in the sense of establishing articulation mechanisms between Constitutional Law and the
International rules that are binding upon the Colombian State. Indeed, different articles of
the 1991 Constitution make direct reference to IHRL and IHL, and these provisions have
been interpreted broadly by the Constitutional Court. Thus, Article 9 states that the State’s
foreign relations are based, inter alia, on the recognition of the principles of international
law accepted by Colombia; Article 93 states that the international treaties that recognize
human rights and forbid their limitation during states of emergency, duly ratified by
Colombia, “prevail in the internal order”, and that “the rights and duties established in this
Charter, shall be interpreted in accordance with the international human rights treaties
ratified by Colombia”. Article 44 holds that children shall enjoy the rights expressly
included in the international treaties ratified by Colombia. Moreover, Article 94 states that
the enunciation of rights and guarantees made in the text of the Constitution shall not be
understood as an exclusion or denial of other rights which are inherent to the human person
and are not included therein, and Article 214 provides that during states of emergency, the
rules of International Humanitarian Law must be complied with in every aspect.
These constitutional provisions have often been invoked and applied by the Constitu-
tional Court as sufficient grounds, in themselves, to incorporate the binding IHRL and IHL
provisions into its legal reasoning. But in addition, the application of IHRL and IHL has
been significantly reinforced by the jurisprudential notion of “constitutionality block”.
Indeed, since the early stages of its case-law, the Constitutional Court has held that the
constitutional judicial review of the legal provisions and situations subject to its scrutiny
must be carried out not only making reference to the actual text of the Constitution as a
parameter for review, but also to a set of norms and principles that have constitutional
hierarchy, even though they are not expressly included in the constitutional text, or which
at least have the nature of constitutionality parameters of necessary consideration, insofar as
the Constitution itself grants them special force through the above-referred reception
clauses included in articles 9, 93, 94, 44 and 214. These norms as principles are incorpo-
rated into the so-called “constitutionality block”, a French-inspired notion with rather
specific traits in the Colombian legal system. By way of this figure, all of the provisions
included in human rights treaties to which Colombia is a party, as well as the human rights
provisions with a customary nature and, as a sub-chapter thereof, all the principles and
rules of International Humanitarian Law, have become mandatory parameters for constitu-
tional review in our country. This does not mean, however, that the Court carries out a
“conventionality control” over the domestic legal provisions subject to its review; what it
does is to carry out constitutional review, incorporating IHRL and IHL as necessary prem-
ises of its reasoning, by mandate of the Constitution itself.
Cepeda, The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A Note on the Colombian Case 63
The constitutionality block includes international humanitarian norms of ius cogens.

The Constitutional Court has on different occasions recognized the imperative character of
these norms and their special force within the Colombian constitutional order. Thus the
Court held that
“the imperative character of humanitarian norms and their integration into the constitu-
tionality block implies that the Colombian State must adapt the norms of lesser hierar-
chy within its internal legal system to the contents of international humanitarian law, in
1
order to potentiate the material realization of those values.”
More recently the Court pointed out that the essential principles of International Humani-
tarian Law
“have the clear rank of rules of ius cogens, given that the international community as a
whole has recognized their peremptory and imperative nature, in the same way it has
recognized [the peremptory nature] of basic provisions such as the prohibition of geno-
cide, the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of torture or the prohibition of apart-
2
heid.”
It thereafter delved into the content of three of these basic principles –the principles of
distinction, precaution and humanitarian treatment – plying them as necessary guidelines to
determine whether the provisions of the criminal code under review were in accordance
with the constitutionality block. The Court also clarified in this last judgment that
“regardless of whether they are norms of ius cogens or not, all of the provisions of
International Humanitarian Law – both substantial and procedural, both conventional
and customary in origin or as general principles of law – are binding upon the Colom-
bian State as part of the constitutionality block. They are, consequently, a parameter of
necessary reference for the constitutional judge in carrying out abstract constitutional
judicial review.”
In interpreting the Constitutionality Block, the Court has followed a “harmonizing”
approach. Thus, in applying IHRL and IHL as parameters for constitutional review, the
Court has often had to refer to different applicable provisions with different degrees of
protection. When harmonization cannot be reached in the case, the Court has opted for the
most protective norm, based on the pro-dignity and pro-liberty interpretative principles.
3. The functions of IHRL and IHL in constitutional adjudication

IHRL and IHL, from their position as constitutive elements of the Constitutionality Block,
have played an important role in the Colombian constitutional order. This role becomes
manifest in several material functions, of which I shall highlight eight in this paper in order
to illustrate the impact of the internationalization of constitutional law.
1
Decision C-225 of 1995.
2
3.1 Definition of the scope of constitutional rights

IHRL and IHL are sources of interpretation of the scope and limitations of constitutional
rights. For example, the text of the American Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted
by the Inter-American jurisprudence, has been invoked in several judgments by the Con-
stitutional Court in order to determine the scope of fundamental rights. One of this cases
3
referred to victims’ rights. In the sphere of the rights of victims of crime, access to crimi-
nal justice had traditionally been construed as the possibility to report a crime and seek
compensation for the damages sustained. Following the evolution of IHRL and IHL, the
Constitutional Court held that access to justice comprises much more than that: the right to
justice, the right to truth and the right to reparation in integrum, as pointed out by several
international treaties, instruments and judicial decisions, in particular those adopted by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Thus the Court held that
“under International Law it has been considered insufficient for the effective protection
of human rights, to grant the victims and affected parties solely compensation for
damages, given that truth and justice are necessary in a society to prevent the situations
that generated serious human rights violations, and also because the recognition of the
intrinsic dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all human beings, requires
that the judicial resources designed by States be oriented towards a comprehensive
reparation of victims and affected parties, which comprises an economic compensation,
and access to justice to know the truth about the facts and to seek, through institutional
channels, the fair punishment of the perpetrators”;
and that
“in International Law, as in comparative law and in our constitutional order, the rights
of the victims and other persons affected by a criminal action enjoy a broad conception
– not restricted exclusively to economic reparation – founded upon their rights to be
treated with dignity, to participate in the decisions that affect them and to obtain effec-
tive judicial protection of the real enjoyment of their rights, inter alia, which requires
authorities to guide their actions towards the comprehensive re-establishment of their
rights whenever they have been violated by a crime. This is only possible if the victims
and persons affected by a crime are secured, at the least, their rights to truth, justice and
economic reparation of the damages sustained”.
Hence victims, on the grounds of the different decisions adopted by the Court based upon
IHRL and IHL, may now actively participate throughout the criminal process, in order to
duly exercise their rights to justice, to truth and to reparation in integrum.
3
Judgment C-228 of 2002.
3.2 Identification of specific non-enumerated rights.

A second function of IHRL and IHL is that of providing sound criteria for the identification
of constitutional rights which are not expressly included within the actual text of the Con-
stitution. This was the case, for example, of the right to personal security, which is not
enunciated in the Constitution but was recognized and upheld by the Court in another well
4
known judgment.
In this case, the petitioners were the widow and orphaned infant child of a guerrilla
who had deserted, and consequently been killed by his former partners in arms. The plain-
tiffs had requested protection by the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, but it was refused,
given that the widow’s life had not been directly threatened, nor had her son’s. The Court,
however, held that the Ministry was bound to make an assessment of the real type of risks
faced by persons in situations that threatened their personal security, before denying the
request. The right to personal security, not enumerated in the Constitution, was recognized
by the Court on the grounds, inter alia, of its specific incorporation and protection in
human rights treaties duly ratified by Colombia, such as the American Convention on
Human Rights, expressly invoked by the Court, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant instruments.
In this sense, it should be emphasized that the Court not only made reference to these inter-
national treaties at the moment of identifying the very existence of the right to personal
security, but also transcended the general interpretation which has usually been given to the
content of this right by international jurisprudence and, on the grounds of other interna-
tional human rights instruments and comparative constitutional law, held that it included
additional elements that provided citizens with safeguards on a wholly new range of situa-
tions that threaten their security. The following explanation by the Court sums up this
interpretative process:
“the recognition and protection of the right to personal security are international obli-
gations of the Colombian state, and therefore, this right is incorporated into our legal
system by virtue of articles 93 and 94 of the Constitution. There are three international
instruments binding for Colombia which include the right to personal security in their
catalogue of fundamental guarantees: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948 (…), the American Convention on Human Rights (…) [and] the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (…). The existence of international commit-
ments for the State with regard to the right to personal security is, thus, clear; therefore,
the scope of this right in the Colombian constitutional order must be precisely deter-
mined, in light of the aforementioned instruments.
The Court notes, in the first place, that both the American Convention and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights include the right to personal security in
4
T-719 of 2003, the so called “personal security” case.
the same article that refers to personal liberty, and that the corresponding rules enunci-
ate aspects of due process, in particular the rules that must be observed to deprive a
person of her liberty. The Chamber also notes that some international tribunals, such as
the European Court of Human Rights, have interpreted the scope of a similar provision
on “security” in Article 5 of the European Convention, mainly in the ambit of restric-
tions upon personal liberty (…). Does this mean that the Constitutional Court is bound
to restrict the scope of the right to personal security to a right of defense from arbitrary
state actions against liberty? The answer could only be negative. First, for a logical
argument: even though the American Convention on Human Rights and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights enshrine the right to security in the same
article that regulates personal liberty, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which is equally binding, upholds it alongside life and liberty, without entering into
specific regulations about the situation of persons deprived of their liberty (…). On the
other hand, the security of certain special categories of persons or groups, in relation to
other different types of risks –even those that come from private persons, not from the
State-, has been recognized and specifically protected in other international instruments
approved by Colombia; thus, in the Resolution on the Elimination of All Forms of
Religious Intolerance, approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 1998,
States were called upon to secure, in particular, that no person within their jurisdiction
be deprived from her rights to life, liberty or security by reason of her religion or
beliefs; and the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination states, in article 5, that States Parties must eliminate all types of race-
based discrimination so as to secure, inter alia, the right to personal security and State
protection against violence or bodily injury (…)”.
The relevance of IHRL and IHL for the adoption of this decision, coupled with reference to
comparative law, is notorious. The Court thereafter ordered the security assessment
required by the petitioner, and clarified that should the risk posed upon the plaintiff so
require, authorities had to adopt the adequate protective measures.
3.3 Identification of special needs and basic standards of protection. The internally
displaced population case (Decision T-025 of 2004)
Colombia has the second largest population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the
world. The official measurement records near 2 million. An NGO and the Catholic Church
report nearly 4 million in a country of 42 million inhabitants.
By the end of 2003, over one thousand families composed of persons who had been
internally displaced by the armed conflict considered that their fundamental rights were
being disregarded by the State, even if guerrillas and paramilitary groups were mainly
responsible for their displacement, because of the authorities’ omission in protecting them.
The Constitutional Court, after gathering evidence on the situation of the roughly 3.5 mil-
lion persons who had been internally displaced in Colombia since 1985, concluded that in
general, they were actually living under conditions that amounted to an “unconstitutional
state of affairs”, partly because the basic standards of protection established in UN Guiding
Principles (1998) concerning IDPs were permanently and massively being disregarded by
several state agencies. Indeed, the Court made extensive recourse to the Guiding Principles,
which are in part a specification of pre-existing IHRL and IHL obligations binding for the
Colombian State – a point explicitly acknowledged by the Court when it stated that in the
face of IDPs special needs the Guiding Principles
“compile the provisions about internal displacement of International Human Rights
Law, International Humanitarian Law and –by analogy- International Refugee Law, and
5
contribute to the interpretation of the rules that form part of this protection system”.
Thereafter in this same judgment, the Court made reference to different specific Principles
at the moment of determining the constitutional fundamental rights that were threatened or
violated in situations of forced internal displacement, and the specific content acquired by
those rights as a consequence of IDPS’ exposure to such situations, with the corresponding
State obligations. The Court enumerated the following rights, citing the specific Guiding
Principles that were relevant for the interpretation of their scope once forced displacement
had taken place: life, freedom to choose one’s residence, free development of the personal-
ity, freedom of association and freedom of expression, family unity and family protection,
health, personal integrity, personal security, freedom of circulation, work and choice of
profession or occupation, food, education, dignified housing, peace, legal personality,
equality the rights of specially protected categories of persons – such as children, women
heads of household, persons with discapacities and elderly persons – and in general, eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights.
In addition, on the grounds of this enumeration and interpretation the Court concluded
that, given the multiplicity of constitutional rights affected by forced internal displacement,
displaced persons have an entitlement to urgent preferential State treatment. Immediately
thereafter, the Court expressly held that
“the scope of the measures that authorities are bound to adopt is determined in accor-
dance [with] three basic parameters (…) as follows: (i) the principle of favorability in
the interpretation of the provisions that protect the displaced population, (ii) the Guid-
ing Principles on Forced Internal Displacement, and (iii) the principle of prevalence of
substantial law in the context of a Social State grounded in the Rule of Law –Estado
6
Social de Derecho- (…)”.
Hence the Guiding Principles were held to be, not only key interpretative criteria to estab-
lish the scope of IDPs’ rights, but also guidelines in determining the scope of State authori-
5
Judgment T-025 of 2004.
6
See above Nr. 5
ties’ duties and obligations in relation to IDPs, and as a consequence of the systematic and
massive violation of their constitutional guarantees.
In this same judgment, the Court went further still and identified a set of minimum
fundamental rights of displaced persons which were to be satisfied under any circumstance
by the authorities. The Court explained in section 9 of the judgment that, given the limited
resources available to the Colombian State, it is materially impossible to satisfy the entire
set of IDPs’ constitutional rights, which makes it necessary for the authorities to establish
priority areas upon which they would focus their efforts so as to progressively advance in
the guarantee of their effective enjoyment, and eventually fulfill the complete series of
obligations that bind the authorities in this field; in the Court’s terms,
“given the current dimension of the problem of displacement in Colombia, as well as
the limited nature of the resources available to the State to comply with this goal, it
must be accepted that at the moment of designing and implementing a given public
policy for the protection of the displaced population, the competent authorities must
carry out a balancing exercise, and establish priority areas in which timely and effective
attention shall be provided to these persons. Therefore, it will not always be possible to
satisfy, in a simultaneous manner and to the maximum possible level, the positive obli-
gations imposed by all the constitutional rights of the entire displaced population, given
the material restrictions at hand and the real dimensions of the evolution of the phe-
7
nomenon of displacement”.
Nevertheless, the Court specifically warned that
“there exist certain minimum rights of the displaced population, which must be satisfied
under all circumstances by the authorities, given that the dignified subsistence of the
people in this situation depends on it.”
These minimum rights, or minimum mandatory levels of satisfaction of the State’s obliga-
tions towards IDPs, which include duties with a positive content that bind the authorities to
materially provide the necessary goods and services, were defined by the Court taking into
account the relevant international provisions, in particular their codification in the Guiding
Principles, as obligatory interpretative parameters.
On these grounds, the Court imparted several complex enforcement orders to protect
the rights of all IDPs -both civil and political rights, as well as social, economic and cul-
tural rights-, it required the government to present periodic reports on how the state of
unconstitutional affairs was being solved, and since then it has retained its competence to
follow up the implementation of its orders.
7
See above Nr. 5.
3.4 Identification of minimum standards of protection

A fourth function of IHRL and IHL is that of providing the grounds for determining the
minimum levels of protection that must be fulfilled by the national legal system; the
importance granted to IHRL and IHL in this sense has risen to a point where the Constitu-
tional Court prefers IHRL or IHL over any domestic provisions or judicial doctrines with
narrower or less favorable scopes of protection.
Thus, for example, the Court examined an unconstitutionality claim presented against
the provision of the Criminal Code that described the elements of the crime of forced dis-
8
appearance. The lawsuit was specifically directed against the expression in this article by
which forced disappearance would only be configured whenever the perpetrator belonged
to an illegal armed group. The Court struck this segment down, considering that it was
contrary to article 12 of the Constitution (which protects the right to personal integrity), as
interpreted in light of the Inter-American jurisprudence. In doing so, the Court broadened
the possible types of perpetrators of the crime of forced disappearance – an exceptional
move, given that the general jurisprudential doctrine holds that it is for the Legislator to
configure the scope of application of criminal law.
In this case, the Court cited two cases decided in 1989 by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights –the Velásquez Rodríguez and Godínez Cruz cases, in which a detailed
description of the crime of forced disappearance was made, pointing out that it is a crime
against humanity that violates many of the rights recognized in the Convention-, and it
emphasized that in the Godínez Cruz case, the Inter-American Court had clarified that on
principle,
“every violation of the rights recognized by the Convention, carried out by an act of
public power or of persons who act in exercise of the powers granted by their official
positions, is attributable to the State”.
Then the Constitutional Court cited the InterAmerican Convention on Forced Dissappear-
ance of Persons, which also defines the crime including within its scope the acts committed
by agents of the State, or by persons or groups of persons that act with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State. The Court concluded on these grounds that the Inter-
American criteria
“constitute the minimum standard of protection on the grounds of which States must
9
design their legislation”.
In the light of these conclusions, the Court then proceeded to analyze the conformity of the
legal provision under review with Colombia’s international obligations in this field –clari-
fying that the relevant international legal provisions are incorporated into the Constitution-
ality Block by mandate of Article 93 of the Constitution-, and it concluded that a complete
8
9
See above Nr. 5.
reading of the norm reveals that public officers are not excluded as possible perpetrators of
the crime of forced disappearance, which is
“in accordance with the minimum level of protection established in international
instruments that describe forced disappearance as a State crime”,
and therefore is in accordance with the Constitutional provisions; the expression under
review does disregard such international minimum, insofar as it excludes from the article’s
scope of application the cases of forced disappearance committed by private persons who
do not form part of any group, who form part of non-armed illegal groups, or of groups that
do not normally operate outside the Law. For the Court, this was tantamount to a violation
of article 12 of the Constitution, which
“establishes a protection which is broader than that provided by the international
instruments, according to which forced disappearance may only be committed by a
State agent, a political organization or a private person with the former’s authorization,
tolerance or acquiescence, from which it results that the constitutional guarantee is
broader than the one provided by international legislation”.
The Court pointed out that with this legal achievement, Colombia was placing itself in tune
with the Inter-American Court of Human Right’s doctrine by which
“States’ simple omission in preventing forced disappearance when it is committed by
private persons, or in controlling the irregular armed groups that carry out such acts,
implies that the relevant State has failed to comply with its obligation to prevent and
punish those responsible for such acts, thereby deserving the corresponding sanctions”.
Later the Court decided upon the constitutional complaint filed against the articles of the
Criminal Code that described the crimes of genocide, torture and torture against persons
10
protected by International Humanitarian Law. The plaintiff argued that the Legislator, in
introducing a requirement by which the underlying acts of genocide or torture had to be
“serious”, had restricted the level of protection granted to the victims of these crimes by the
Constitution and the international human rights treaties ratified by Colombia. The Court
upheld the expression “serious” in regards to the crime of genocide, but struck it down in
relation to the qualification of the physical or moral damages that had to be sustained by the
victims of torture.
In order to reach that conclusion, the Court began by recalling that in Colombia, the
favorability clause in the interpretation of human rights is applicable, given that it is con-
tained in Article 4 of the San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights, to which Colombia is a party; by virtue of this principle, the Court explained that
“whenever the Colombian constitutional and legal provisions provide a higher scope of
protection to the relevant fundamental right, they shall prevail over the text of interna-
10
tional treaties, in the same manner that in their interpretation, the least restrictive inter-
pretation for the application of the affected fundamental right shall be preferred”.
Then the Court, reiterating its prior doctrine on the constitutionality block, examined the
definitions of the crimes of genocide and torture established in international treaties.
Thereby it concluded, on the one hand, that the adjective “serious” formed part of all con-
ventional descriptions of the crime of genocide included in treaties binding upon Colombia
– in particular those contained in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (1951) and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court –, for
which reason it declared the corresponding expression adjusted to the Constitution, holding
that
“both in these international texts and in Article 101 [of the Criminal Code] in which the
expression under review is contained, reference is made to the serious nature of the
damages that have to be inflicted upon the members of a group in order to constitute
the crime of genocide”.
On the other hand, after examining the diverse international definitions of torture, the Court
noted that the American Convention on Human Rights, as opposed to other instruments,
does not include the adjective “serious” within its definition of torture; consequently, in
application of the pro homine interpretative principle –also developed by the Inter-Ameri-
can Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence-, the Court concluded that the international
definition which was decisive to review the constitutionality of the Colombian Criminal
Code was the one provided by the Inter-American Convention for the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Torture, preferring this latter definition over those included in other interna-
tional instruments, such as the UN Convention against Torture and the UN Declaration
Against Torture. In the Court’s words,
“in the present case and contrary to what was pointed out for the crime of genocide,
there is a clear contradiction between the text of articles 173 and 178 of the [Colombian
Criminal Code], which criminalize respectively the crimes of torture in protected
person and torture, and the Inter-American Convention for the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Torture, international instrument which, in accordance with Article 93 of the
Constitution and the pro homine principle, is the one that must be taken into account in
this case (…). Indeed, such international instrument, approved by Law 409 of 1997, not
only excludes the expression “serious” in order to define what must be understood by
torture…”
3.5 Identification of specific prohibitions that protect rights

In order to fight terrorism, Congress approved, among other measures of the so called
National Security Act, a provision by which civilians had the duty to collaborate with
authorities in the fight against this crime. By virtue of this law, in zones of conflict, civil-
ians’ obligations would be defined through executive orders. The Court struck down this
act of Congress, holding that such a type of involvement of civilians in armed conflict ran
contrary to the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians, which forms part
11
of IHL. Thus the Court derived from IHL a specific prohibition that protects rights.
In its reasoning, the Court made different types of reference to IHRL and IHL. In the
first place, it held that by virtue of the international obligations of the Colombian State, the
principle of prevalence of the general interest could not be interpreted in such a way as to
give preference to the interests of the majority and collective welfare when they clash with
a person’s constitutional rights; and it grounded this conclusion, inter alia, on the obliga-
tions posed by IHRL:
“the foregoing doctrine, far from being a conceptual novelty of this judgment, only
systematizes this Court’s jurisprudence about the relation between peaceful coexis-
tence, public order and constitutional rights, which is in turn based upon the very
notion of human rights, as it has been developed by international human rights law.
Indeed, in accordance with the international human rights instruments ratified by
Colombia, such as the American Convention or the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which form part of the constitutionality block (Art. 93 of the Constitu-
tion), States have the duty not only to respect but also to secure the human rights of all
the inhabitants of their territories. It is obvious that in furtherance of this duty to guar-
antee [human rights], the State is in the obligation of ensuring basic public order and
peaceful coexistence conditions, because lacking them, persons would be poorly suited
to truly enjoy their rights. Moreover, that State duty is so important that international
instruments themselves authorize State authorities, under situations of special gravity,
to declare a state of emergency and limit the force of certain human rights. Neverthe-
less, the State duty to secure peace and order does not enable the authorities to forget
their duty to respect and not violate human rights, and therefore all security policies are
framed within strict respect for the limits imposed by human rights. This is clearly
pointed out by the treaties that Colombia has ratified, which constitute a binding
parameter for the interpretation of constitutional rights (Art. 93 of the Constitution).”
The Court then proceeded to cite the relevant provisions of the ICCPR, the American Con-
vention, and different holdings by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that
grounded such conclusion.
Further ahead in the judgment, the Court clarified that in situations of armed conflict,
the basic human rights guarantees had to be respected alongside with the provisions of
International Humanitarian Law, by mandate of article 214 of the Constitution; and it
pointed out that
“humanitarian norms establish minimum limits for the protection of human rights in
situations of armed conflict. This means that the basic principles of International
Humanitarian Law (…) establish new limits for security and defense policies”.
11
National security law case (C- 251 of 2002).
In this order, the Court held that

“if International Humanitarian Law applies in Colombia, it is obvious that security and
defense strategies must respect the mandates of humanitarian law, such as the principles
of proportionality and distinction, inter alia. And these mandates have concrete conse-
quences. (…) Security and defense strategies can foresee a role for private individuals.
…This means then that the aforementioned defense and security strategies may not
impose such duties upon the civilian population, that they end up involving it in the
armed conflict, because this would not only affect the principle of distinction derived
from international humanitarian law, but it would also disregard the constitutional
mandate by which the tasks of protecting sovereignty and public order correspond to
the Armed Forces, and not to private persons”.
3.6 Criteria for reviewing decrees that declare states of constitutional emergency
Before the 1991 Constitution was adopted, the decision to declare a state of constitutional
emergency in order to reestablish public order -mainly the so-called “state of siege”-, was
considered a political matter. Therefore, the motives invoked by the Presidential decree to
declare such a state of emergency, were shielded from judicial review. After 1991, the
Court has reviewed the motives invoked by the President in adopting this decision. This
change of position was partly grounded upon two doctrines developed by the European
Court of Human Rights and then also applied by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, namely, the “margin of appreciation” and the “manifest error of appreciation” doc-
trines. Whenever the Court has found a manifest error in the appreciation of the gravity of
the disturbances invoked in the motivation of the corresponding decree, it has declared the
unconstitutionality of either part of the decree, or of the entire declaration of the state of
emergency. As a consequence, Presidents now resort vary rarely to states of exception,
marking a big transformation in the functioning of Colombian democratic institutions.
Therefore, it may be held that a sixth function of IHRL and IHL is that of providing
criteria to review the constitutionality of the declarations of states of emergency, as well as
of the measures adopted in the course of their duration.
In the last of those cases, the Court carried out the judicial review – in formal and
substantial terms – of Decree 1837 of that same year, by which the President of the Repub-
lic declared a “state of internal commotion” in the country in order to counter the terrorist
12
actions of illegal armed groups. The varied topics examined by the Court included that of
the limits established in the international instruments applicable to states of emergency.
With regard to the American Convention, for example, the Court highlighted the following
rules:
12
(i) the rule by which the restriction of those rights considered to be intangible during
states of emergency is only justified “hen the requirements established in interna-
tional instruments for declaring a state of emergency have been complied with”,
namely, a serious threat for the survival of the Nation;
(ii) the rule by which “the possibility of suspending rights and guarantees, established
in the Convention and the Covenant, does not have an absolute meaning because it
is solely restricted to the limitation of their full exercise” – a rule which was illus-
trated in its scope by reference to Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights, on “Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations”.
One other aspect of this judgment is noteworthy. The Court resorted to two notions devel-
oped by regional case-law, and even by European case-law, in the ambit of human rights, in
order to limit the scope of judicial review over the exercise of discretionary powers, in this
case, by the President of the Republic. The first notion is that of the “margin of apprecia-
tion”. The Court recognized that the Executive has a broad margin to appreciate, first, the
gravity of the facts that give rise to a disruption of public order, and second, the sufficiency
of the ordinary police means to address the causes of the disruption. Nonetheless, the Court
warned that such a margin is not unlimited. The second notion is that of “manifest error of
appreciation”, which sets a limit upon the aforementioned broad margin of appreciation, in
such a way that the cause invoked to justify the declaration of a state of emergency will
only be struck down as unconstitutional should the Court find a manifest error of apprecia-
tion. In addition, the Court made a clear difference between facts and the valuation of facts.
Both of these notions, which are related to appreciation, are located in the sphere of evalu-
ating facts. On the contrary, they are not pertinent when it comes to prove the existence of
facts. For these reasons, the Court declared that it was unconstitutional to invoke, as one of
the motives to declare a state of internal commotion, the following one: “the country with
the highest rates of violence ever recorded”. For the Court, this fact had not been proven. It
was a rhetorical statement, from which no arguments could be deduced to broaden the
scope of action of exceptional powers during the state of internal commotion declared by
the President.
3.7 A ground for the constitutional enforcement of social rights

A seventh function is that IHRL constitutes one of the foundations of the enforceability of
social rights in concrete cases. Thus, the Court has referred in many cases to the provisions
of the American Convention on Human Rights, and especially the San Salvador Protocol,
in order to substantiate the enforceability of social, economic or cultural rights in concrete
cases, by way of the acción de tutela.
For example the Court protected the rights of a blind woman in conditions of extreme
poverty who had been separated from her daughter by the family welfare authorities, with-
out having been given a chance to access rehabilitation programs or to prove her capacities
13
as household provider. After a careful analysis of the facts of the case, grounded upon
sound scientific assessments of the situation, the Court made reference to IHRL as the
foremost interpretative criterion in determining the rights of persons with discapacities,
such as the plaintiff. In this judgment the Court began by stating that international human
rights law is a “complete, indispensable and obligatory guide for the protection of the rights
of persons with discapacities”, and thereafter held that there are several international
instruments “in which the community of nations has stated its express will to protect with
special dutifulness the rights of persons with discapacity”, instruments which
“must serve as an indispensable guiding criterion for the national authorities at all
levels, in complying with their constitutional duties in the field of protection of the
rights of persons with discapacities”.
The Court then enumerated several international treaties and instruments which pose obli-
gations for the Colombian State in this field, and also recalled its prior judgments on the
applicability of IHRL to the interpretation of these rights, highlighting “the immense
importance gained by Colombia’s international commitments in order to materialize the
reinforced constitutional protection to which persons with discapacities are entitled”. It
consequently stated that it would carefully follow –as it did- the guidelines provided by the
“Uniform Rules on Equality of Opportunities for Persons with Discapacity”, approved by
the UN General Assembly, and after a detailed assessment of the remedy to be granted, the
Court ordered the creation of an inter-disciplinary professional team with representatives
from different public entities from the national and district level, in order to undertake a
rehabilitation process that could allow for the evaluation, within a reasonable term, of the
blind woman’s real capacity to provide for her daughter and allow her to grow up in a safe
and adequate environment.
3.8 National projection and enforcement of preventive measures adopted by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights
Finally, it is pertinent to point out a relatively recent development: the reception of Inter-
American precautionary measures to protect persons at risk in urgent and serious cases. In
such tutela decisions, the Constitutional Court has not only adopted the Inter-American
legal doctrine, but also the specific orders imparted as remedies to render them effective.
The leading case in this field was a judgment, in which the Court reviewed the accion
de tutela filed by the relatives of a human rights advocate who had been the victim of
forced disappearance, against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Inte-
14
rior. The plaintiffs had requested the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to
adopt the necessary measures to protect their fundamental right to life; and this body pres-
13
Decision T-397 of 2004.
14
T-558 of 2003.
ently ordered the Colombian State to implement the measures required to protect the lives,
integrity and dignity of the members of the family. Nonetheless, Colombian State agents
irrupted a few days later into the family’s home, and they tortured one of its members. Even
though the Inter-American commission had ordered the adoption of precautionary measures
on two opportunities, the authorities had ignored such decisions. The Constitutional Court
granted the tutela, and held that
“the tutela judge may issue an order directed at the public authority so that the latter
protects a fundamental right whose threat or violation justified the adoption of a pre-
cautionary measure by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights”.
15
This same line was followed by the Court later on. In this case –brought to the Court
collectively, and not individually-, some members of the San José de Apartadó Peace
Community had presented the acción de tutela against a National Army Brigade Com-
mander, arguing that their rights to life, personal integrity, security and others were being
placed at risk by the military authorities, who were involved in acts of violence and perse-
cution aimed at tarnishing their reputation or eliminating them. Prior to the presentation of
the tutela lawsuit, the plaintiffs had requested the protection of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, which ordered the adoption of certain precautionary measures aimed at
safeguarding their rights – measures that had not been executed by the national authorities.
The tutela was granted. The Court clarified that it would issue
“both the protective measures that correspond to the regional level, in accordance with
the requirements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the orders that
appertain to the tutela action brought to its decision”.
In other words, through the channel of the acción de tutela, the Court not only ordered the
adoption of the remedies required to preserve the fundamental rights invoked by the plain-
tiffs, but also imparted specific mandates to implement the precautionary measures which
had been ordered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
From these holdings, one should also underscore the facts that (a) the Court appropri-
ated itself of the precautionary measure to the point of transcribing its literal content; (b)
the Court transformed non-compliance with an Inter-American precautionary measure into
the legal grounds for possible contempt of court proceedings at the national level; and (c)
the Court specified which were the National authorities in charge of securing compliance
with the precautionary measure, raising their level to the Ministerial ambit.
4. Conclusion
IHRL and IHL have borne a significant impact upon decisions concerning both the preser-
vation and public order and the protection of rights in other contexts.
15
T-327 of 2004.
Although the 1991 Colombian Constitution contains a very generous bill of rights,
IHRL and IHL has been frequently incorporated in diverse types of settings, causing a very
high material incidence upon the domestic legal system. Considerations that would initially
have seemed to be closer to obiter dicta, have later come to be the clear foundations of the
ratio decidendi of several recent judgments. In addition, Inter-American parameters have
been decisive for the constitutional review of national legislation.
On the other hand, IHRL and IHL have been incorporated in very sensitive ambits of
constitutional review, and in relation to very controversial issues in the Colombian con-
texts. They have served to support the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court’s decisions.
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that in several of the more polemic decisions not
16
mentioned in this note, such as the euthanasia case and the personal drug consumption
17
case, IHRL and IHL did not play a significant function.
Moreover, this reception process forms part of a broader dialogue with other Courts
which are equally committed to the defense of human dignity, the construction of peace
through the Law and the preservation of democracy’s foundations.
16
C- 239 of 1997.
17
C-221 of 1994.
78
BERICHTE / REPORTS
L’Association des Cours Constitutionnelles ayant en Partage

l’Usage du Français (ACCPUF) – Coopération des Cours et
Francophonie au service de l'État de droit
*
Par Anna Chadidscha Schuhmann, Gießen
Nous voyons bien que le droit constitutionnel évolue. Il se trouve confronté à l'internatio-
nalisation du droit d’un côté, à l'intégration internationale avec ses nouvelles interdépen-
dances de l’autre. Les juridictions constitutionnelles subissent donc un nécessaire ajuste-
1
ment, voire reconfiguration , rendu inévitable, mais en même temps possible par la
mondialisation. Nous nous consacrons ici donc aux moyens auxquels nous pouvons recou-
rir afin de l’accompagner et d’y faire face. En effet, les développements récents ont claire-
ment indiqué la voie de coopération et d’interaction à divers niveaux.
Dans cette perspective, l’Association des Cours Constitutionnelles ayant en partage
l’Usage du Français (ACCPUF), s’est développée au sein de la francophonie. Créée en
1997 à l'initiative du Conseil constitutionnel français et soutenue par l'agence intergou-
2
vernementale de la francophonie afin de renforcer les liens entre les membres de l'espace
francophone, l'ACCPUF rassemble aujourd'hui plus de 40 Cours constitutionnelles et
3
institutions équivalentes issues d'Afrique, d'Europe, d'Amérique et d'Asie.
I. Raison d’être et objectifs

L'Association a pour but de favoriser l'approfondissement de l'État de droit par un
développement des relations entre les institutions qui, dans les pays ayant en partage l'usage
du français, quelles que soient leurs appellations, ont dans leurs attributions, compétence
pour régler en dernier ressort avec l'autorité de chose jugée, les litiges de conformité à la
4
Constitution. Le rôle important de l’idée de la francophonie et de sa manifestation sous la
*
Étudiante doctorante et collaboratrice scientifique à la chaire de droit constitutionnel et des
sciences politiques, Justus-Liebig-Universität, Gießen, Allemagne.
E-mail: chadidscha.schuhmann @recht.uni-giessen.de.
1
Cf., pour la justice africaine, Néji Baccouche, La justice comme nécessaire des libertés, in: Justice
et démocratie, Limoges 2002, p. 323.
2
Pour plus à propos de celle-ci, voir www.francophonie.org.
3
Voir www.accpuf.org.
4
Article 3 des statuts du 9 avril 1997, modifiés.
Schuhmann, ACCPUF – Coopération des Cours et Francophonie au service de l'État de droit 79
forme de l’ACCPUF se montre à la diversité des niveaux de développement et d'intégration

aux circuits d'échanges mondiaux des sociétés contemporaines.
L’ACCPUF se consacre, au delà de l’hétérogénéité, à l’existence d’un socle commun
sur lequel se sont bâties l’identité et les actions de l’Association. Lieu de rencontres et
5
d'échanges d'idées et d'expériences, elle réunit ses membres hétéroclites autour des valeurs
communes et le partage d’une langue. De cette façon, elle rassemble des juridictions consti-
tutionnelles de tradition longue ainsi que celles qu’on n‘a vu qu’émerger à partir des années
quatre-vingt dans le pays d’Afrique appartenant à l’espace francophone. La revendication
du mécanisme de contrôle de constitutionnalité étant l’enjeu central dans la construction
6
d’institutions démocratiques. Certes, les juges constitutionnels se voient aujourd’hui con-
frontés aux contentieux comparables. Leurs missions, soit de veiller au respect de la consti-
tutionnalité des lois, soit de rendre possible la tenue d’élections libres, fiables et transpa-
rentes, sont des missions essentielles qui requièrent compétence et sagesse, mais aussi,
nous en sommes conscients, du courage, tout particulièrement dans les pays en sortie de
7
crise, et dans ceux où les fondements de la démocratie sont encore insuffisants. Comment
les encourager? Quel rôle peuvent y jouer les associations de coopération, telles
l’ACCPUF? On sait bien que l’indépendance des juges dans les textes ou discours est une
étape importante mais cela ne saurait suffire pour mettre les juges à l’abri des pressions ou
8
de l’autocensure. En fait, ce sont des difficultés techniques et politiques qui ont entravé la
9
bonne marche d'une justice constitutionnelle dans les pays francophones d'Afrique noire.
L’ACCPUF se consacre à préserver et à consolider les liens de collégialité et de solidarité
existant entre ses membres, à nourrir ainsi des idéaux profonds, mettant la solidarité au
service de l'État de droit. A cet effet, elle vise à développer, entre les institutions membres
les échanges d'idées et d'expériences sur les questions qui leur sont soumises ou intéressent
leur organisation et leur fonctionnement.
II. Fonctionnement et actualité

L’Association est dirigée par une Assemblée générale, formée par les chefs de corps des
institutions membres, qui se réunit tous les trois ans, administrée et gérée par son Bureau,
qui comprend le président, trois vice-présidents et le trésorier, renouvelable à chaque
5
Cf. à titre illustratif la composition de son Bureau, ci-dessous note 10.
6
Ibrahima Diallo, À la recherche d’un modèle africain de Justice, Annuaire International de Justice
Constitutionnelle 20 (2004), p.100.
7
S.E. Abdou Diouf, Secrétaire général de la Francophonie, Allocution prononcée à l'occasion du
IVème Congrès de l’ACCPUF, p. 3, voir www.accpuf.org/images/pdf/publications/actes_des_
congres/c4/discours_sg-accpuf.pdf.
8
Serigne Diop, La justice du politique au Sénégal, in Afrique contemporaine, 156 (1990), p. 185.
9
Franck Moderne, L'évolution des juridictions constitutionnelles dans les Etats francophones et la
République malgache, in: Les institutions constitutionnelles d'Afrique Francophone et la
République malgache, 1979, p. 183 et suivantes.
Assemblée générale. Sa composition reflète équitablement la composition géographique de

10
l'Assemblée générale. Son Secrétariat général, qui comprend le secrétaire général et ses
collaborateurs, assiste le président et le Bureau de l'Association dans leurs tâches respec-
tives. Véritable point d'ancrage de l'association, le Secrétariat général de l'ACCPUF est
permanent. Il a son siège à Paris, au Conseil constitutionnel français. Désignés par les pré-
sidents des Cours, parmi leurs collaborateurs voire parmi les membres des Cours, les
correspondants nationaux constituent le relais entre l'Association et ses membres.
Un séminaire annuel autour d'un thème concret les réunit, comme récemment le 6ème
séminaire des correspondants nationaux que s'est tenu à Strasbourg, au Conseil de l'Europe,
les 28-29 et 30 novembre 2007 sur le thème de « communication et transparence au sein
des Cours constitutionnelles » et la formation à la base de données de jurisprudence
11
constitutionnelle (CODICES ).
Depuis le Congrès fondateur de l’ACCPUF, des rencontres régulières ont été organi-
sées avec le soutien de l’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie. Ils favorisent le
contact entre les membres des institutions et l'échange d'informations. Le Congrès théma-
tique se tient à la même époque que l'Assemblée générale triennale de l'ACCPUF. Après
avoir choisi d’axer les travaux du Congrès thématique en 1997 sur « le principe d’égalité »,
puis, en 2000, sur « l’accès au juge constitutionnel », en 2003 sur « la fraternité » et de
consacrer le dernier VIème congrès aux « compétences des Cours Constitutionnelles et
institutions équivalentes », le prochain congrès aura lieu en 2009.
Entre deux Assemblées générales, l'Association peut se réunir en Conférence de chefs
d'institution, sur proposition de son Bureau ou sur demande de la moitié des membres. La
prochaine Conférence, va se dérouler les 8-13 juillet à Libreville (Gabon) et traiter le thème
de la "proportionnalité dans la jurisprudence constitutionnelle". Tous les actes de Congrès
et des Conférences font l’objet d’une publication.
III. Action de coopération

1. En vue de la coopération juridique, l'ACCPUF s'attache à accroître et à publier les
ressources de droit comparé disponibles en matière de droit constitutionnel francophone,
afin d’encourager le juge qui doit trancher une question de droit nouvelle ou controversée
et de lui permettre d'asseoir plus fortement sa jurisprudence en se référant, le cas échéant, à
des solutions similaires prononcées par des Cours homologues.
Sa publication vaste passe d’un bulletin général, regroupant textes et données sur les
compétences et l'organisation des Cours membres, aux publications thématiques, synthèses
10
Lors de l'Assemblée générale triennale de 2006 a été élu comme suit: Présidence: Conseil consti-
tutionnel du Burkina Faso; 1ère Vice-Présidence: Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin; 2ème Vice-
Présidence: Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie; 3ème Vice-Présidence: Tribunal fédéral suisse;
Trésorier: Cour constitutionnelle du Gabon; Membres de droit: Cour suprême du Canada, Conseil
constitutionnel français.
11
Cf. ci-dessous.
Schuhmann, ACCPUF – Coopération des Cours et Francophonie au service de l'État de droit 81
des rencontres et des réponses aux questionnaires qui les ont accompagnées. Elles portent
autant sur des principes, tels que le principe d'égalité ou l'accès au juge constitutionnel que
sur des problèmes concrets, tel que la communication ou le rôle et le fonctionnement des
Cours en période électorale. L’ensemble des publications est rendu accessible par le site
Internet ACCPUF, crée en 1998, qui constitue une vitrine de l'activité des Cours constitu-
tionnelles francophones. Outre l'intégralité des textes constitutionnels, organiques et régle-
mentaires relatifs aux attributions et fonctionnement des institutions membres on y trouve
toute l'actualité de l'Association et des Cours membres. En complémentarité avec la Com-
12
mission de Venise, dont la base de données CODICES propose les textes et jurispru-
dences constitutionnelles indexées des pays membres du Conseil de l'Europe, l'ACCPUF a
développé sur son site Internet une base de données propre à l'espace géographique et
culturel de la francophonie. Cette coopération a pour but de nouer des relations étroites
avec l'espace européen afin que la solidarité et l'échange jurisprudentiel entre pays du Nord
et pays du Sud se renforcent. Facilitant l'accès des juges aux décisions des ses homologues,
cette base permet une meilleure diffusion de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle francophone
et également de poursuivre le processus d’intégration de la jurisprudence des Cours
constitutionnelles de l’ACCPUF
2. En outre, L'ACCPUF s'applique à développer des actions de coopération technique,
répondant à la diversité des besoins de chaque Cour. La communication des Cours et le
développement de méthodes de travail efficaces nécessitent des moyens adéquats. Cer-
taines, toutefois, ne sont à ce jour pas correctement équipées, ni connectées au réseau Inter-
net. Les actions de coopération technique visent ainsi à combler les déficits en ressources
documentaires entre les institutions membre du Nord et du Sud francophone par la forma-
tion et l'équipement informatique des derniers. Toute l’importance est accordée à la mise en
réseau des cours constitutionnelles par le développement d'un site Internet propre à chaque
institution membre.
Cette présentation ne peut pas prendre fin sans avoir souligné l’importance de l’ACCPUF
pour la recherche de la justice constitutionnelle, notamment de ses membres du Sud. Qui
s’intéresse par exemple à l’étude de l’organisation et du fonctionnement de ces institutions
de type nouveaux en Afrique noire francophone ne va trouver que quelques publications à
13
ce sujet et va sûrement recourir aux ressources offertes par l’ACCPUF.
Réunies autour de valeurs communes et du partage du français, les Cours membres de
l'ACCPUF sont résolues à renforcer les garanties juridictionnelles afin d’assurer un
meilleur respect des droits fondamentaux dans leur pays.
12
Voir www.codices.coe.int.
13
Il n’y a que peu de temps que les chercheurs commencent enfin à s’intéresser à ce sujet, à titre
d’exemples pour le Sénégal, voir Pape Mamour Sy, Le développement de la justice en Afrique
noire francophone: les exemples du Bénin, du Gabon et du Sénégal, Thèse de doctorat (inédite),
Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar 1998; Ibrahima Diallo, op. cit. note 6, p. 93; Mayacine
Diagne, La mutation de la justice constitutionnelle en Afrique: L’exemple du Conseil Constitu-
tionnel du Sénégal, Annuaire International de Justice Constitutionnelle 12 (1996), p. 99.
"La démocratie et l’État de droit sont le fruit d’une longue marche. Là ou ils existent,
leur maintien exige une vigilance des tous les acteurs, car ils ne sont jamais définitivement
garantis et sont toujours perfectibles. Là ou ils n’existent pas encore, encore ou pas
suffisamment, leur conquête ou leur renforcement implique courage, présérvance et
14
solidarité."
14
S.E. Abdou Diouf, op. cit. note 7, p. 7.
83
BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN / BOOK REVIEWS
Jeffrey Goldsworthy (Ed.)

Interpreting Constitutions. A Comparative Study
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, 365 S.; pbk, £ 19,99
ISBN 978-0-19-922647-4.
Unter der Herausgeberschaft von Jeffrey Goldsworthy berichten sechs renommierte Verfas-
sungsrechtler über die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation mit Blick auf die USA
(Mark Tushnet), Kanada (Peter Hogg), Australien (der Herausgeber selbst), Deutschland
(Donald Kommers), Indien (S.P. Sathe) sowie Südafrika (Heinz Klug). Den Band be-
schließt ein zusammenfassender Essay des Herausgebers. Die jeweils rund 50 Seiten star-
ken Länderberichte sind in sich selbst abgeschlossen und liefern eigenständige Abrisse zur
Verfassungsgeschichte der jeweiligen Länder. Der Leser wird jeweils in das Verfassungs-
recht der sechs behandelten Länder eingeführt; dabei liegt das Hauptaugenmerk auf der
historischen Entwicklung der Verfassungsordnung und den institutionellen Arrangements
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Stellung der Gerichts- bzw. Verfassungsgerichts-
barkeit (jeweils Beschreibung der Richterwahl und des Gerichtssystems im übrigen). Be-
deutung wird auch auf die sich im Laufe der Zeit verändernden Textgrundlagen, die jewei-
ligen Verfahren der Verfassungsänderung und dadurch möglicherweise ausgelöste Bindun-
gen für die Verfassungsinterpretation gelegt. Schon allein dadurch erhält der interessierte
Leser vorzügliche Überblicke über das Verfassungsrecht wichtiger, aber in der Verfas-
sungsvergleichung oft nur in zweiter Reihe stehender Länder wie Indien, Kanada oder
Australien. Deutlich wird der hierzulande gern übersehene evolutive Charakter des Verfas-
sungsrechts. Umgekehrt mag für deutsche Leser der materielle Charakter der Verfassungs-
ordnungen zu kurz kommen; der Schwerpunkt liegt bei einer institutionellen, gerichts-
zentrierten Behandlung der Verfassungen.
Die Auswahl gerade dieser sechs Länder scheint unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Ver-
gleichbarkeit für die Verfassungsinterpretation etwas Zufälliges zu haben. Primär wird sie
mit dem föderativen Staatsaufbau der Vergleichsländer gerechtfertigt, doch spielt die
Gliedstaatlichkeit bei der Analyse der Verfassungsinterpretation eine nur marginale Rolle
und erweist sich nicht als ein Kriterium, das spezifische Grundsätze der Verfassungsinter-
pretation aufdeckt, die gerade der Gliedstaatlichkeit geschuldet sind (vielleicht mit Aus-
nahme der Quebec-Frage). Man hat eher den Eindruck, als ob das Buch ein Beitrag zur
momentan vor allem in Großbritannien geführten Debatte um die Einführung der Verfas-
sungsgerichtsbarkeit sein soll. Jedenfalls eröffnet der Band britischen Diskursen einen
Zugang zur Tradition und Vielfalt der Verfassungsinterpretationen gerade auch in der
Rechtswelt des Commonwealth, das für Briten den nach wie vor wohl wichtigsten Refe-
renzrahmen darstellt. Als einziges civil law country stellt die Bundesrepublik in diesem
Kreis eine Ausnahme dar, was unter dem Gesichtspunkt verschiedener Interpretationsan-
sätze auch immer wieder thematisiert wird.
Auf die Beiträge kann hier nicht im Einzelnen eingegangen werden. Aus jeder Abhand-
lung gewinnt man viele hoch interessante Einsichten, wie die (Verfassungs-)Gerichtsbarkeit
mit strukturellen Problemen umgeht. So erklärt sich der Eklektizismus und Pragmatismus
der US-amerikanischen Verfassungsinterpretation aus dem Umstand des außerordentlich
schwierigen Amendment-Prozesses in den USA. Die kanadischen und australischen
Gerichte hielten sich eher zurück bei aktivistischer Verfassungsinterpretation, wofür die
britische Tradition der Parlamentssouveränität genauso verantwortlich sein mag wie das
(langjährige) Fehlen eines Grundrechtskatalogs. Am kreativsten und phasenweise auch am
selbstbewusstesten erscheint der indische Verfassungsgerichtshof. Trotz permanenter Ver-
fassungsänderungen sei es ihm durch zahlreiche (im einzelnen im Band gut dokumentierte)
Entscheidungen gelungen, die Verfassung mit Hilfe eines Maßstabs der „verfassungsrecht-
lichen Quintessenz“ zu stabilisieren; dieser Maßstab sei sogar auf das Verfahren der Ver-
fassungsänderung angewendet worden. Demgegenüber bleibt das Bild für Südafrika noch
undeutlich. Einzelnen Entscheidungen der letzten zehn Jahre wird man wohl noch keine
symptomatische Bedeutung für die Verfassungsauslegung zusprechen dürfen. In diesem
Vergleichskontext von Common Law-Rechtsordnungen wird dem Bundesverfassungsge-
richt eine besonders textgebundene, legalistische oder normativistische (im Kontext auch
zu lesen als unpolitische und schein-objektive) Interpretationsmethode attestiert, ohne dass
sie eine hinreichend flexible Auslegung des Grundgesetzes verhindert hätte. Als deutsche
Besonderheiten hervorgehoben werden die Bedeutung der wissenschaftlichen Literatur für
die Verfassungsinterpretation, aus dem Rechtsstaat folgende strukturelle Aspekte und die
objektiven, wertbezogenen Grundrechtslehren.
Der den Band zusammenfassende Essay des Herausgebers versucht, die zahlreichen
Einzelanalysen zu bündeln. Angesichts der unterschiedlichen Verfassungsrechtsordnungen
(common law-Rechtskreis/civil law; Grundrechtskataloge ja oder nein; Häufigkeit der
Verfassungsänderungen; jeweilige Stellung des Gerichts und der Verfahrensarten) kann das
auf wenigen Seiten naturgemäß schwerlich gelingen. Goldsworthy fasst die Ergebnisse auf
20 Seiten zusammen und versucht, die dargestellten Unterschiede eher mit strukturellen als
materiellen Kriterien zu erklären (Einfluss der juristischen Kultur und Sozialisation der
Juristen, des Verfahrens der Richterernennung und ihrer politischen Homogenität, des
Alters der Verfassungstexte und ihrer Änderbarkeit). Über spezifische Methoden der Ver-
fassungsinterpretation im eigentlichen Sinne geht es dabei jedoch nicht. Diese versucht er
mit Schablonen zu erfassen (positivism/normativism/originalism/non-originalism), die
angesichts der differenzierten Einzelbeobachtungen in den Länderberichten nicht zu über-
zeugen vermögen. Interessanter sind die punktuellen Vergleichbarkeiten jenseits der großen
Erklärungsmuster, etwa die unterschiedliche Relevanz von Präjudizien, wann welche aus-
ländischen Entscheidungen eine Rolle spielten und wie sich gerade unter den Common-
wealth-Ländern Ansätze eines „constitutional dialogue“ bildeten. In ihm spielen Entschei-
dungen des BVerfG aus sprachlichen Gründen so gut wie keine Rolle, während – erneut
Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 85
wohl aus Gründen des englischen Empfängerhorizonts – britische Entscheidungen mit US-
amerikanischen um die Vorbildhaftigkeit konkurrieren.
In vergleichender Hinsicht ist das Buch, abgesehen von den informativen länderspezifi-
schen und den punktuell vergleichenden Einsichten für deutsche Leser auch unter einem
weiteren Aspekt interessant: Es betont die institutionelle Stellung der Verfassungsgerichte
und ihre kompetentiellen Grenzen für die Verfassungsinterpretation. Es erläutert, wie Aus-
legungsfragen in einen (verfassungs-)politischen Prozess eingegliedert sind, diesen reflek-
tieren und anleiten, durch ihn andererseits aber auch wieder gebremst werden. Es schildert
die Verfassungsinterpretation als einen sehr viel politischeren Vorgang, als wir das in
Deutschland wahrzunehmen bereit sind. Der gliederungstechnische Fokus dürfte daher
besonders die momentanen Interessen britischer Leser treffen und mag der Intention ge-
schuldet sein, die Scheu vor einer entstehenden Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Großbritan-
nien abzubauen. Man kann das Buch daher auch als Werbung lesen, sich mit der vorbildli-
chen Entwicklung wichtiger Commonwealth-Länder zu beschäftigen. So wie einst England
diesen Ländern sein Rechtssystem schenkte, so soll der Anstoß nun umgekehrt werden, und
diesmal ist das Mutterland der Profiteur der verfassungsrechtlichen Errungenschaften.
Inhaltlich finden die Berichte jedenfalls eine Gemeinsamkeit in der Betonung der ge-
schichtlich wohlgeordneten, kontinuierlichen Entwicklung, im Nachweis national verhei-
ßungsvoller Traditionen, der institutionell regelmäßig glücklichen Einbettung in das Ge-
waltengefüge und der subkutanen These, dass die Parlamente durch die Verfassungsge-
richte nicht rigide beschränkt wurden, sondern als Erstinterpreten respektiert und in einem
dialogischen Sinne kontrolliert wurden. Das erklärt auch, warum materielle Maßstäbe der
Verfassungsinterpretation hinter den institutionellen Aspekten doch deutlich zurücktreten.
So bleibt etwa die Krise, die der U.S. Supreme Court vor dem Bürgerkrieg und zu Beginn
des New Deal durch eine substantielle Verfassungsinterpretation erlebte, klein geredet.
Auch tritt die Bedeutung, die materielle Abwägungsfragen für die Verfassungsauslegung
spielen nur am Rande zu Tage. Der Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz wird weder in seiner
zentralen materiellen Bedeutung für die deutsche Grundrechtsinterpretation noch als ein
sich international herausbildender Maßstab näher gewürdigt. Das Buch ist ein institutio-
nelles Plädoyer für die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und beseitigt eventuell bestehende
Ängste vor einer Richterherrschaft durch Verfassungsinterpretation.
Unerfreulich ist die schlechte drucktechnische Qualität aus Oxford, jedenfalls der
Paperback-Ausgabe, die sich schnell in Einzelseiten aufzulösen beginnt.
Oliver Lepsius, Bayreuth

Werner Meng / Ulrich Magnus / Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte / Thomas Cottier /

Peter-Tobias Stoll / Astrid Epiney
Das internationale Recht im Nord-Süd-Verhältnis
Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, Band 41
C. F. Müller Verlag, Heidelberg 2005, 436 S., EUR 98,00, ISBN 3-8114-5351-3
I. Spätestens mit dem Zusammenbruch der kommunistischen Staatenwelt Osteuropas

1989/90 und den daraus resultierenden weit reichenden Transformationsprozessen hat sich
das völkerrechtliche Koordinatensystem grundlegend verschoben. Die vormalige Bipolari-
tät zwischen den Supermächten USA und UdSSR ist in der komplex vernetzten Welt des
21. Jahrhunderts einer unübersichtlichen Multipolarität gewichen. Das erschwert einerseits
die Analyse der internationalen Beziehungen, die jenseits vertrauter Denkkategorien neuen
Konfliktkonstellationen gerecht werden muss, erleichtert andererseits aber den analytischen
Zugriff auf jene Verflechtungen und Antagonismen, die der Kalte Krieg allzu lange über-
deckt hatte. Dazu gehören gewiss das Nord-Süd-Verhältnis und all die entwicklungspoliti-
schen und entwicklungsvölkerrechtlichen Fragestellungen, die es immer neu aufwirft. Zu
denken ist in diesem Kontext etwa an die Milleniumserklärung der UN-Generalversamm-
lung, die G 8-Erklärung von Glenn Eagles (2005) oder jüngst den G 8-Gipfel in Heiligen-
damm (2007). Auf ihrer 28. Zweijahrestagung in Freiburg (2003) hatte sich denn auch die
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht des Themas angenommen und es Dank vorzüglicher
Referate facettenreich entfaltet.
Dass „Entwicklung“ in ihrer ganzen Bandbreite aus normativer Perspektive analysiert
wird, mag zunächst überraschen, scheint es bei der Thematik vorderhand doch um tatsäch-
lich Mögliches und politisch Gewolltes, nicht rechtlich Gesolltes zu gehen. Doch die Bilanz
der Entwicklungspolitik während der letzten 40 Jahre fällt mehr als ernüchternd aus. „Die
Schere zwischen Arm und Reich“, so M. Ruffert in einem Diskussionsbeitrag, „hat sich
geöffnet, die Probleme haben sich perpetuiert.“ Von der Verrechtlichung der Entwick-
lungspolitik wird daher ein Effizienzschub erwartet; rechtliche Ordnungsbildung soll leis-
ten, wovon „nachhaltige Entwicklung“ abhängt („good governance“ „capacity building“,
„nation“, „state“ and „constitution building“, demokratische Mindeststandards, rechtsstaat-
liche Mindestgarantien). Die Chancen und Grenzen rechtlicher Steuerungsfähigkeit auszu-
loten, das Ordnungsbildungspotential des Rechts in einer Welt jenseits des Staates kritisch
auszuschöpfen, ist somit das gemeinsame Leitmotiv, das die einzelnen Referate verklam-
mert. Im Titel des Einleitungsbeitrages von M. Meng findet dieses Ansinnen denn auch
programmatischen Ausdruck: „Völkerrecht als wirtschaftlicher Ordnungsfaktor und ent-
wicklungspolitisches Steuerungsinstrument“. Für das IPR fragt U. Magnus nach „Anwend-
barem Recht, Schutz und Freiheitsinteressen im Nord-Süd-Verhältnis“. Institutionell-
rechtlich angelegt ist die Untersuchung von S. Schlemmer-Schulte zur „Rolle der internati-
onalen Finanzinstitutionen im Nord-Süd-Konflikt“. Drei weitere Referate gelten Themen
des besonderen Völkerrechts, die freilich zugleich als Referenz für allgemeine Grundsatz-
fragenstellungen systembildend wirken: „Geistiges Eigentum, Handel und nachhaltige Ent-
wicklung. Erfahrungen und Perspektiven im Nord-Süd-Verhältnis“ (Th. Cottier), ferner

„Das internationale Recht im Nord-Süd-Verhältnis. Der Technologietransfer“ (P.-T. Stoll),
und schließlich „Umweltvölkerrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für Entwicklungsprojekte“
(A. Epiney).
Auch wenn zentrale Menschenrechtsfragen von den einzelnen Referenten intensiv
mitbehandelt werden, bleibt das Fehlen eines eigenständigen Vortrags zur menschenrecht-
lichen Dimension der Entwicklung ein Defizit (so auch R. Hofmann). Das gilt erst recht,
wenn der wiederholte Rekurs auf S. Huntingtons „Clash of Civilizations“ die Frage nach
Universalität und kultureller Partikularität der Menschenrechte evoziert, wenn überdies das
„Recht auf Entwicklung“ selbstverständlich thematisiert wird. Reizvoll wäre es gewiss auch
gewesen, die „soziale Gerechtigkeit“ als möglichen (neuen) Topos des Völkerrechts grund-
sätzlich zu behandeln, verbunden allerdings mit dem Risiko allzu abstrakter Theoriehöhe.
Letztlich erweist sich die größere Praxisnähe bei der Themenwahl als kluger Kunstgriff,
zumal Gerechtigkeitsbezüge oft implizit anklingen und Diskussionsanstöße liefern (so etwa
Ch. Tietje mit Blick auf J. Rawls und die „Gerechtigkeit als Fairness“).
II. Aus den inhaltsreichen, ein große Materialfülle verarbeitenden und durchweg „empi-
riesensiblen“ Referaten können hier nur höchst selektiv einige Akzente herausgegriffen
werden. Mit großem Recht betont Meng, anknüpfend etwa an die Grundlagenarbeiten von
E.U. Petersmann, die konstitutionelle Funktion des internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts.
Gerade aufgrund dieser konstitutionellen Dimension wirkt es als ordnungsbildender Faktor
auf internationaler Ebene, legitimatorisch rückgebunden an den nationalen (Verfassungs-)
Staat, diesen zugleich aber transzendierend. Indes darf nicht die Eigengesetzlichkeit der
Ökonomie übersehen werden, die sich rechtlicher Steuerungskraft entzieht. Armut und
Hunger in den Entwicklungsländern und die daraus resultierenden Gefahren von Krimina-
lität, Terrorismus und ungesteuerter Migration lassen sich nicht – jedenfalls nicht aus-
schließlich normativ – bewältigen. Und doch kann gerade das Recht einen Ordnungsrah-
men bereithalten, der den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Akteuren nicht nur den notwen-
digen Gestaltungsspielraum eröffnet, sondern sie auch an ihre gestalterische Verantwortung
erinnert, mitunter sogar zur gestalterischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit verpflichtet.
Internationale Regelungsregimes können auch dort steuernd eingreifen, wo nationale versa-
gen. Pointiert zugespitzt wagt Meng die Überlegung, „inwieweit das Völkerrecht eine
ausgleichende Kontrollfunktion als Ersatz für die unzureichende interne demokratische
Legitimation übernehmen kann“. Auch die entwicklungspolitische Verantwortung der
Zivilgesellschaft (Stichwort „Global Compact") wird eingeblendet, die prozedurale Dimen-
sion effektiver Streitbeilegungsmechanismen im Rahmen der WTO mitberücksichtigt. Es
darf nicht übersehen werden, dass gerade eindrucksvoll-komplex elaborierte Prozess-
mechanismen die am wenigsten entwickelten Länder mangels des nötigen „know how“
ausgrenzen.
An den letzten Punkt kann Magnus anknüpfen, wenn er fragt, wie das IPR mit solchen
Kapazitätsdefiziten umgehen sollte. Seine Kernthese lautet: Das IPR kann zum Interessen-
ausgleich im Nord-Süd-Gefälle durchaus einen kollisionsrechtlichen Beitrag leisten. Es hat
bei der Bildung eines globalen Rechtssystems strukturelle Asymmetrien zu berücksichtigen,

was nicht heißen muss, dass einer Anknüpfung an das Recht der weniger entwickelten
Länder – nur weil es ihnen vertrauter ist – als generelle Regelung der Vorzug zu geben
wäre. Die Anknüpfungsfrage stellt sich vielmehr in den konkreten Teilgebieten (Vertrags-
recht, Arbeitsrecht, Deliktsrecht, Sachenrecht, Wettbewerbsrecht, Immaterialgüterrecht,
Enteignungsrecht) gesondert. Das Steuerungsinstrument der sog. Eingriffsnormen bedarf
sehr vorsichtiger Behandlung. So kann etwa ein Zahlungsmoratorium wegen des Staatsnot-
standes eines hoch verschuldeten Staates – Argentinien mag ein gutes Beispiel geben – den
kurzfristigen Interessen des Entwicklungslandes dienen, langfristig aber kontraproduktiv
wirken, da es Investoren abschreckt und Zweifel an der Rechtssicherheit des Standorts
aufkommen lässt.
Schlemmer-Schulte vermag aus der Insider-Perspektive einer vormaligen Weltbank-
Mitarbeiterin die Rolle der internationalen Finanzinstitutionen differenziert zu beleuchten.
Ihr Referat geht, den aus der europäischen Verfassungslehre vertrauten Ansatz des „multi-
level constitutionalism“ reflektierend, ebenendifferenziert vor. Die Rolle der internationa-
len Finanzinstitutionen auf der Ebene der Entwicklungsländer und deren Rolle auf globaler
Ebene werden kontrastiert. Der internen, institutionellen Ebene entspricht nach außen eine
kooperative Ebene, wenn die internationalen Finanzinstitutionen mit anderen Entwick-
lungshilfe Leistenden zusammenarbeiten (bis hin zu sog. public-private-partnerships).
Schlemmer-Schulte zufolge ist der Internationale Währungsfonds, weit über seine ur-
sprünglich monetäre Zielsetzung hinaus, de facto zu einer Entwicklungshilfeorganisation
geworden. Paralleles kann Geltung auch für die Weltbank beanspruchen. Höchst informativ
werden schließlich der „Washington Consus“, rule-of-law- und good-governance-Pro-
gramme vorgestellt.
Aus der Fülle von für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit besonders signifikanten Berei-
chen stellt Cottier den des Geistigen Eigentums vor. Die Auswahl ist gut begründet, da das
Immaterialgüterrecht schon heute weitgehend internationalisiert ist. Mit dem TRIPS-
Abkommen verbunden bleibt ein nachhaltiger Paradigmenwechsel: Statt einer kontinuierli-
chen, schrittweisen Fortentwicklung des Schutzniveaus findet sich nun eine weithin aus-
differenzierte Rahmenordnung mit streng formalisierten Schutzstandards in materieller und
in verfahrensrechtlicher Hinsicht. Ein solches Regime kann den Interessen der Entwick-
lungsländer in hohem Maße zuwiderlaufen, gerade wenn im Bereich der Gesundheitspolitik
der Urheberschutz die Herstellung preiswerter Alternativpräparate zur Aids-Prävention
verhindert. Für Stoll ist der Technologietransfer ein rechtliches Konzept. Zu den auch für
das Entwicklungsvölkerrecht zentralen Kernbereichen gehörte die Internationalisierung der
Kernenergienutzung. Zahlreiche Überschneidungsfelder ergeben sich zwischen den Tech-
nologietransfer und dem Umweltvölkerrecht. Vor allem aber verweist der Technologie-
transfer auf die kooperative Dimension des Völkerrechts. Erforderlich wären Wettbewerbs-
regelungen, um die Gefahr eines „Missbrauchs der Verfügung über Technologien und die
damit verbundenen Rechte und Marktstellung zu verhindern“. Das Fehlen eines entspre-
chend effektiven Regelungsregimes gehört zu den großen Defiziten des Kooperationsvöl-
kerrechts. Dichter gewirkt sind die Regeln des Umweltvölkerrechts. Sie machen der
Durchführung von Entwicklungsprojekten mitunter sehr konkrete Vorgaben. Epiney stellte
die umweltvölkerrechtlichen Prinzipien und Verpflichtungen detailliert vor. Ein Schwer-
punkt ihrer Ausführungen gilt den Konsultationspflichten, der Umweltverträglichkeitsprü-
fung und möglichen Haftungsfolgen im Falle der Verletzung umweltrechtlicher Standards.
Ein wichtiges Sonderproblem stellt die angemessene Nutzung gemeinsamer natürlicher
Ressourcen dar. Die teilweise im Schrifttum angestellten Überlegungen, eine Koppelung
von Finanzierungszusagen an die Erfüllung von Umweltstandards könne zu einer Verlet-
zung des Interventionsverbotes führen, stoßen zu Recht auf Ablehnung.
III. Wie lassen sich die vorgestellten Stränge nun bündeln, Umwelt- und Wirtschafts-
völkerrecht, Technologietransfer und Finanzinstitutionen zusammenführen? Die gemein-
same menschenrechtliche Grundierung aller Teilthemen wurde schon eingangs betont, ihre
jeweilige Gerechtigkeitsorientierung hervorgehoben. Alle Teilbereiche verbinden die For-
derung nach einem materiellrechtlichen Ordnungsrahmen mit der nicht minder deutlichen
Forderung nach effektiver prozedurale Ausgestaltung. Dazu können wirtschaftswissen-
schaftliche Kontrollinstrumente wie „Monitoring“ und „Compliance“ (Cottier) ihren eige-
nen Beitrag leisten. Ein zentraler Grundsatz, der alle drei Themen ebenfalls wie in einem
Brennspiegel zusammenführt, blieb bislang noch unerwähnt: der Grundsatz der „nachhalti-
gen Entwicklung“, des „sustainable development“. Da wissenschaftlich schon intensiv
1
bearbeitet und monographisch aufbereitet lag es nahe, ihn nicht eigenständig zu einem
Referatsthema zu machen. Dennoch finden hier die drei wesentlichen Komponenten des
Entwicklungstopos zusammen: die umweltpolitische, die soziale und die wirtschaftliche
Dimension. Th. Marauhn spricht von einem Drei-Säulen-Modell. Anders formuliert,
könnte auch von einem integrativen Ansatz die Rede sein, den die Präambeln vieler völker-
rechtlicher Verträge ohnehin schon zum Versprechen geben, nicht zuletzt auch die Präam-
bel des WTO-Vertrages. Und auch das soziale Moment und das Ideal sozialer Gerechtigkeit
sind im Völkerrecht vielfach präsent: in den völkerrechtlichen Texten, in Theorieentwürfen
(etwa J Rawls), greifbar eher in Prinzipienstrukturen als in konkreten normativen Ver-
pflichtungen, eher im soft law als im hard law. Die Frage nach der Letztbegründung der
sozialen Gerechtigkeitsidee führt zurück auf die universelle Bedürfnisnatur des Menschen.
Von diesen Bedürfnissen ausgehend, muss völkerrechtliche Theoriebildung realistisch
bleiben, darf aber ein Stück weit Utopien wagen. Den innovativen Vorträgen, die vorlie-
gender Band vereinigt, ist beides weithin gelungen.
Markus Kotzur, Leipzig
1
Etwa G. Beaucamp, Das Konzept der zukunftsfähigen Entwicklung im Recht, 2002; A. Glaser,
Demokratie und nachhaltige Entwicklung, 2006.
Mathias Reimann / Reinhard Zimmermann (Hrsg.)

The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, 1456 p., £ 125,00, ISBN 978-0-19-929606-4
(hbk); 2008, 1456 p., £ 39,95, ISBN 978-0-19-9535 45-3 (pbk)
Seit den 1990er Jahren hat sich die wissenschaftliche Beschäftigung mit der Rechtsverglei-
chung verstärkt. Globalisierung und Europäisierung zeigen immer deutlicher die Notwen-
digkeit, fremde Rechtsordungen vertiefter kennen zu lernen und das eigene Recht durch
vergleichende Einordnung besser zu verstehen. Die bundesdeutsche Rechtswissenschaft
hinkt hier freilich häufig hinterher. Anders als im angelsächsischen Sprachraum, aber auch
anders als in Italien oder Frankreich, führt die Rechtsvergleichung hier oft noch ein Mauer-
blümchendasein. Es ist daher nicht ohne Ironie, dass das hier zu besprechende prächtige
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law gerade von zwei deutschen Wissenschaftlern
herausgegeben wird, von denen einer in den Vereinigten Staaten lehrt. Die Herausgeber
Mathias Reimann (Ann Arbor) und Reinhard Zimmermann (Hamburg/Regensburg) ver-
sammeln in diesem Band eine Fülle von Beiträgen, in denen die beachtliche Revitalisierung
der weltweiten rechtsvergleichenden Forschung eindrucksvoll zum Ausdruck kommt.
Das Handbuch gliedert sich in drei Teile: Der erste Teil versammelt Darstellungen zur
Entwicklung der Rechtsvergleichung in verschiedenen europäischen und außereuropäi-
schen Ländern (Frankreich, deutscher Sprachraum, Italien, Großbritannien, USA, Mittel-
und Osteuropa, Ostasien, Lateinamerika). Dabei kommen spezifische nationale Traditionen
– etwa die Rechtsvergleichung im Rahmen des Empire in Großbritannien – ebenso zum
Ausdruck wie heutige Debatten – etwa die aktuelle Diskussion um die Beachtlichkeit aus-
ländischer Gerichtsentscheidungen in der Rechtsprechung des US-amerikanischen Supreme
Court. Im zweiten, umfangreichsten Teil werden die verschiedensten methodischen Zu-
gänge zur Rechtsvergleichung in konzisen Essays vorgestellt, die von einer Bestandsauf-
nahme zur „funktionalen Methode“ über die Analyse von Rezeptionsprozessen bis hin zum
Verhältnis von Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsgeschichte reichen. Der dritte Teil behandelt
schließlich den Stand der Rechtsvergleichung für einzelne Rechtsgebiete vom Vertrags-
recht bis zum Strafrecht. Die Beiträge haben in der Regel einen Umfang von etwa dreißig
Druckseiten. Sie sind jeweils gut lesbar und erfüllen vollauf den Zweck, den Leser über den
Stand der Forschung zum jeweiligen Themenfeld zu orientieren; freilich dominieren in den
Nachweisen englischsprachige Publikationen deutlich.
Es ist nicht möglich, im Rahmen einer Rezension der beeindruckenden Fülle der hier
vorliegenden Beiträge nachzugehen oder gerecht zu werden. Es seien daher im Folgenden
einige Beiträge herausgegriffen, die sich mit Grundsatzfragen beschäftigen oder aus der
Perspektive des Öffentlichen Rechts besonders interessant sind. Ingeborg Schwenzer be-
richtet in einem dichten Artikel über die Entwicklung der deutschen bzw. deutschsprachi-
gen Rechtsvergleichung seit dem 19. Jahrhundert (S. 69 ff.). Dabei wird erneut deutlich,
einen wie tiefen Verlust für die Rechtsvergleichung die Vertreibung jüdischer Gelehrter
wie Ernst Rabel in der NS-Zeit bedeutet hat. Schwenzer beleuchtet auch kritisch den idea-
listischen Funktionalismus, wie ihn Konrad Zweigert im Nachkriegsdeutschland populari-

sierte, und äußerst sich mit Recht skeptisch zu der verbreiteten These, die verstärkte Aus-
landserfahrung heutiger Juristen fördere notwendigerweise auch die rechtsvergleichende
Reflexion. Wenn man nur einmal im Vergleich den entsprechenden Bericht über Italien von
Elisabetta Grande heranzieht, kann man sich des Eindrucks kaum erwehren, dass die
Rechtsvergleichung anderenorts auch heute noch deutlich lebendiger ist als hierzulande.
Naturgemäß wenden sich viele Beiträge den bis heute nicht ganz geklärten grundsätzli-
chen Methodenfragen der Rechtsvergleichung zu. So sehr Einigkeit darüber besteht, dass
Vergleichen die Herausarbeitung von Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschieden zwischen den
verglichenen Gegenständen bedeutet, so wenig ist man sich doch darüber einig, wie Aus-
wahl und Zuschnitt der Vergleichsobjekte erfolgen sollen, wie die entsprechenden tertia
comparationis zu bestimmen sind und welche allgemeineren Regeln sich aus solchen Ver-
gleichen entwickeln lassen. Dabei ist es von Vorteil, sich der entsprechenden Erfahrungen
in anderen, methodisch reflektierteren Disziplinen wie der vergleichenden Linguistik und
der vergleichenden Religions- und Geschichtswissenschaft zu versichern. Hier zeigt sich,
dass die Rechtsvergleichung üblicherweise besondere Probleme in der methodenbewussten
Erarbeitung des erforderlichen tertium comparationis hat. Juristen neigen dazu, die in der
jeweiligen Rechtsordnung verbreiteten Allgemeinbegriffe als quasinaturrechtliche Katego-
rien zu verwenden und damit auf eine von den jeweiligen Vergleichsrechtsordnungen in
gleicher Weise entfernte neutrale Terminologie allzu rasch zu verzichten (hierzu Nils Jan-
sen, "Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge". Damit wird verkannt, dass die
Erarbeitung und Weiterentwicklung der zugrunde gelegten Allgemeinbegriffe einen der
wichtigsten und schwierigsten Teile vergleichender Arbeit bildet. Ralf Michaels ("The
Functional Method of Comparative Law") bietet in diesem Zusammenhang eine eingehende
kritische Bestandsaufnahme zur so genannten „funktionalen Methode“ in der Tradition
Zweigerts. Mittels des schillernden Begriffs der „Funktion“ hat diese Tradition der (Privat-)
Rechtsvergleichung häufig eine gewissermaßen in der Natur der Sache liegende Gemein-
samkeit der Sachprobleme angenommen und eine "praesumptio similitudinis" behauptet;
von hier aus war es nur ein kleiner Schritt, der Rechtsvergleichung die Aufgabe zuzuwei-
sen, „beste“ Lösungen herauszuarbeiten und Rechtsvereinheitlichung vorzubereiten.
Michaels zeigt hingegen, dass der Funktionsbegriff im Rahmen der Vergleichung auch
stärker epistemologisch begriffen werden kann und nicht notwendig eine problematische
naturrechtliche Färbung aufweisen muss. So hebt er hervor, dass die konstruktive Zugrun-
delegung einer gemeinsamen Funktion die genauere Herausarbeitung von Unterschieden
möglicherweise überhaupt erst ermöglicht. Ein derartiger, methodisch reflektierter und
bescheidener Funktionalismus vermiede das Umschlagen der Vergleichung in wissen-
schaftlich nicht gedeckte normative Aussagen über „beste Lösungen“, wie sie im Rahmen
der traditionellen funktionalen Methode nicht selten waren.
Heute wird insgesamt wieder stärker die Grundsatzdebatte geführt, ob die Rechtsver-
gleichung sich mehr den Gemeinsamkeiten oder den Unterschieden zwischen den vergli-
chenen Rechtsordnungen zuwenden soll. Während die privatrechtliche Fachtradition der
Rechtsvergleichung nach wie vor eher auf die Herausarbeitung von Ähnlichkeiten setzt, hat
sich seit längerem eine grundsätzliche Gegenposition herausgebildet, die die unhintergeh-
bare Differenz zwischen den verschiedenen Rechtskulturen betont, insbesondere im Ver-
hältnis von civil law und common law; ihr radikalster Vertreter ist heute der in Paris leh-
rende Kanadier Pierre Legrand (in diese Richtung im vorliegenden Handbuch auch Roger
Cotterell, "Comparative Law and Legal Culture"). Gerhard Dannemann versucht in dieser
hitzigen Diskussion einen Mittelweg ("Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differ-
ences?"). Dannemann zeigt, dass die Ähnlichkeitstheoretiker sich häufig auf politisch und
kulturell weniger sensitive Bereiche des materiellen Privatrechts konzentrieren, während
die Differenztheoretiker größeres Interesse an den kulturellen und mentalen Tiefenschich-
ten der jeweiligen Rechtsordnung entwickeln. Die bloße Entgegensetzung von Identitäts-
und Differenzannahmen sei daher nicht weiterführend und laufe weitgehend leer. Vielmehr
komme es entscheidend darauf an, welche Ziele der Vergleich verfolge und welche Rechts-
ordnungen miteinander verglichen würden. Dannemann gibt freilich zu, dass Ziele und
Grundhaltungen des jeweiligen Rechtsvergleichers häufig korrelieren; wer Rechtsverein-
heitlichung vorbereiten möchte, wird zu Ähnlichkeitsannahmen tendieren, wer die wechsel-
seitigen Einflüsse zwischen Rechtsordnungen nach Möglichkeit begrenzen will, wird Diffe-
renzannahmen vorziehen. Die Schwierigkeit des Vergleichs liegt nach Dannemann aber in
jedem Fall gerade darin, Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zugleich in den Blick zu
nehmen. Wie zutreffend Dannemanns Annahme ist, dass gerade die Vergleichung eher
technisch-ökonomischer Gebiete des Privatrechts Ähnlichkeitsannahmen nahe legt, zeigt in
diesem Band e contrario der Beitrag von Harry D. Krause, der die Schwierigkeiten der
Vergleichung im Bereich des Familienrechts analysiert ("Comparative Family Law"). Nur
wenig thematisieren die Beiträge des Handbuchs im Rahmen der Grundsatzdiskussion über
Ähnlichkeits- und Differenzannahmen freilich das Problem der verschiedenen (Anwen-
dungs-)Kontexte von Rechtsvergleichung. Es bedeutet einen erheblichen Unterschied, ob
etwa ein Gericht sich in den Urteilsgründen auf ausländische Gerichtsentscheidungen
bezieht, Ministerialbürokratie und Parlament zur Vorbereitung von Reformen das Recht
anderer Staaten aufbereiten lassen oder aber ein Wissenschaftler aus reinem Erkenntnis-
interesse vergleicht. So liegt es etwa nahe, dass Rechtsvergleichung innerhalb von Integra-
tionsverbünden wie der Europäischen Union häufig mit dem Ziel betrieben wird, Gemein-
sames herauszufinden oder Vereinheitlichung vorzubereiten (dazu Reinhard Zimmermann,
"Comparative Law and the Europeanization of Private Law"). Ähnlichkeitsannahmen oder
die Suche nach einem „common core“– wie sie in der privatrechtlichen Tradition der
Rechtsvergleichung ohnehin meist überwogen haben –, sind hier bereits durch den Kontext
nahe gelegt. Sie sind aber deshalb auch aus einer nicht von vornherein anwendungsorien-
tierten wissenschaftlichen Perspektive um so problematischer. Die Intensität, mit der die
Debatte zwischen Identitäts- und Differenztheoretikern heute ausgetragen wird, steht
sicherlich in engem Zusammenhang mit der verstärkt empfundenen Globalisierung. Hora-
tia Muir Watt ("Globalization and Comparative Law") stellt dar, dass die Globalisierung
die Prämissen der traditionellen Rechtsvergleichung in vielfältiger Weise in Frage stellt.
Die Vorstellung nationalstaatlich geschlossener Rechtssysteme – die immer schon recht

fragwürdig war – wird nun endgültig brüchig; das gilt insbesondere für die in Kontinental-
europa überlieferte Tradition der Gegenüberstellung eines (vermeintlich) statisch-geschlos-
senen Zivilrechts und eines politisch-dynamischen Öffentlichen Rechts. Die Rechtsverglei-
chung wird so stärker in die rechtspolitischen Auseinandersetzungen um die weltweite
Weiterentwicklung des Rechts hineingezogen, in denen Muir Watt mit Pierre Legrand für
einen auf Differenz setzenden Respekt vor „dem Anderen“ eintritt.
Der dritte Teil des Buches, der sich einzelnen Rechtsgebieten zuwendet, ist hauptsäch-
lich dem Privatrecht gewidmet. Auffälligerweise fehlt sogar eine Bilanz zum Verhältnis
von Völkerrecht und Rechtsvergleichung. Aus dem Bereich des Öffentlichen Rechts finden
sich nur zwei Beiträge: Mark Tushnet widmet sich dem Verfassungsrecht ("Comparative
Constitutional Law"), John S. Bell dem Verwaltungsrecht ("Comparative Administrative
Law"). Beide sind bekannte Autoren, die schon in vielfältiger Weise zu diesen Fragen
publiziert haben. Tushnets Analyse der Verfassungsrechtsvergleichung ist stark auf die
Entwicklung der Diskussion in den USA konzentriert. Hier beobachtet er, dass eine stark
auf die Rechtsprechung konzentrierte Rechtskultur sich erst spät für die Vergleichung
öffnete. Neben der zunehmend bedeutsamen Rechtsprechung des deutschen Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts weist er eine Schlüsselrolle in diesem Prozess der Entwicklung in Mittel- und
Osteuropa nach 1989 zu, die das heutige Feld des vergleichenden Verfassungsrechts über-
haupt erst hervorgebracht habe. Er widmet sich dann verschiedenen Einzelproblemen,
wobei die vergleichende Analyse der unterschiedlichen Formen einer Verfassungskontrolle
durch Gerichte hervorsticht. Besonders lesenswert ist der Beitrag Bells zum Verwaltungs-
recht. Dieses gilt traditionell als ein Gebiet, auf dem die Vergleichung besonderen Schwie-
rigkeiten begegnet. Bell hebt aber mit Recht hervor, dass es bereits seit dem 19. Jahrhundert
(Gneist, Mohl) eine Tradition des verwaltungsrechtlichen Vergleichs gibt. Als Engländer
hebt er den „interessanten“ Umstand hervor, dass das erste Buch über das englische Ver-
1
waltungsrecht von einem Deutschen stammt. Als Besonderheit des Vergleichs im Verwal-
tungsrecht gegenüber dem Privatrecht betont Bell, Universalitätsannahmen seien hier von
vornherein fehl am Platze; es bedürfe vielmehr einer umfassenden Kontextualisierung im
Rahmen der jeweiligen nationalen Institutionen. Deshalb sei die typische Form der Ver-
gleichung auf diesem Gebiet auch häufig die monographische Behandlung eines anderen
Verwaltungsrechtssystems, das der Vergleicher in ihm aus der eigenen Rechtsordnung
vertrauten Begriffen analysiere. Die besten entsprechenden Arbeiten seien explizit verglei-
chend in der Art der Fragen, die sie an das andere System richteten, und der Erklärungen,
die sie für die jeweilige Entwicklung anböten. Vergleichende Arbeiten über mehr als ein
anderes Verwaltungsrechtssystem blieben dagegen häufig unbefriedigend: Entweder fehle
es dem jeweiligen Bearbeiter an der hinreichenden Vertrautheit mit den anderen Rechts-
ordnungen, oder aber es komme zu einer Ansammlung von Länderberichten in einem Auto-
1
Otto Koellreutter, Verwaltungsrecht und Verwaltungsrechtsprechung im modernen England: Eine
rechtsvergleichende Studie, 1912.
renkollektiv, wobei die Vergleichung weitgehend auf der Strecke bleibe. Anders als die
ältere britische Tradition (Dicey) betont Bell mit Selbstverständlichkeit die Vergleichbar-
keit zwischen kontinentalem und angelsächsischem Verwaltungsrecht. Dabei zeigt er, dass
es im Verwaltungsrecht stärker als in anderen Bereichen der Vergleichung um die genaue
Analyse der jeweiligen Institutionen geht, sei es in der Verwaltungsorganisation oder der
gerichtlichen Kontrolle des Verwaltungshandelns. Die Vergleichung erbringt für ihn ihre
besten Ergebnisse, wenn sie sich auf konkrete Einzelgebiete wie etwa die gerichtliche
Kontrolle, Haftungsfragen oder die Kommunalverwaltung konzentriert. Bell hebt dabei am
Beispiel der „rule of law“ hervor, wie unterschiedlich das Verständnis fundamentaler Be-
griffe in verschiedenen verwaltungsrechtlichen Traditionen sein kann.
Insgesamt liegt hier ein beeindruckendes Kompendium vor, das dem Leser den heuti-
gen Stand der Rechtsvergleichung in den avanciertesten methodischen Diskussionen wie
der Vielfalt einzelner Rechtsgebiete erschließt. Die Fülle der Literaturhinweise erlaubt es
ihm auch, einzelne Fragen vertiefend zu verfolgen. Wer auf einem bestimmten Gebiet
rechtsvergleichend arbeitet, wird durch das Handbuch in den Stand gesetzt, sich über
methodische Grundsatzfragen und mögliche Parallelprobleme in anderen Bereichen rasch
und zuverlässig zu informieren. Die durchgängig hohe Qualität der Beiträge macht dieses
Oxford Handbook zum unentbehrlichen Begleiter für jeden, der sich ernsthaft mit Fragen
der Rechtsvergleichung befassen möchte. Nietzsche hat das 19. Jahrhundert einmal das
„Zeitalter der Vergleichung“ genannt. Wenn man dieses Handbuch als Indikator nimmt,
dann wird wohl auch das 21. Jahrhundert so heißen dürfen, jedenfalls auf dem Gebiet des
Rechts.
Christoph Schönberger, Konstanz
Christoph Antons / Volkmar Gessner (Hrsg.)

Globalisation and Resistance
Law Reform in Asia since the Crisis
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007, pbk 328 S., £ 22,00, ISBN 1-84113-681-6
In der sozialwissenschaftlichen Literatur zur Entwicklungspolitik gilt Asien oft als Muster-
knabe. In anderen Regionen der (so genannten) Dritten Welt sind vielfach wirtschaftliche
Stagnation und mitunter gar Rückschritt zu beobachten; die Schere zwischen reich und arm
klafft immer weiter auseinander. Dagegen bilden Süd- und Ostasien die große Ausnahme.
Allein hier findet man eine signifikante Zahl von Staaten, die den nachhaltigen wirtschaftli-
chen Aufstieg vom Entwicklungs- zum Schwellenland oder gar zur Industrienation ge-
schafft haben. Dennoch ist in Europa und Nordamerika diese Region Gegenstand wissen-
schaftlicher Untersuchung seltener als beispielsweise Osteuropa oder Südamerika. Auf
diese Lücke zielen beiden Herausgeber Christoph Antons und Volkmar Gessner mit ihrem
Band zu den rechtlichen Reformen in Asien seit der Krise. Die Beiträge gehen zurück auf
einen Workshop des Internationalen Instituts für Rechtssoziologie im Frühjahr 2003 in
Oñati. Sie beschäftigen sich mit der Rolle des Rechts bei der wirtschaftlichen und gesell-
schaftlichen Entwicklung der Staaten vorwiegend in Ost- und Südostasien (social
engineering through law).
Der Band spannt einen weiten Bogen über verschiedene Rechtsgebiete. Der Schwer-
punkt liegt auf dem Verfassungsrecht und der Herausbildung rechtsstaatlicher und demo-
kratischer Strukturen. Es finden sich jedoch auch Beiträge zur Dezentralisierung der Ver-
waltung und zum Wirtschaftsrecht. Die Untersuchungen stehen insbesondere unter dem
Eindruck von zwei für die Region prägenden Ereignissen und Entwicklungen: zum einen
der Asienkrise von 1997 und zum anderen der Rechtsentwicklung nach den Anschlägen auf
die Twin Towers in New York am 11. September 2001.
Die beiden Herausgeber führen zu Beginn in die Thematik ein. Sie geben einen kurzen
und guten Überblick über den aktuellen Forschungsstand im Bereich Recht und Entwick-
lung sowie der sozialwissenschaftlichen Asienstudien. Im Anschluss spannen sie einen
einheitlichen Bogen über die unterschiedlichen Beiträge des Buches. Der Band ist in vier
Teile gegliedert und in seinem Aufbau klassisch. Der erste Teil enthält vier theoretische
Abhandlungen zur Rolle des Rechts bei der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, die den Rah-
men für die in den folgenden drei Teilen abgedruckten Fallstudien bilden sollen. Die Bei-
träge betrachten das Thema dabei aus einer soziologischen, einer anthropologischen, einer
geschichtlichen und einer vergleichenden Perspektive. Teil 2 bietet konkrete Fallstudien zu
Verfassungsrechtsreformen in Südostasien, Indien und China, Teil 3 widmet sich der De-
zentralisierung der Verwaltung, und Teil 4 beschäftigt sich mit wirtschaftsrechtlichen
Aspekten beschäftigt.
Unter dem Titel "Legalisations and the Varieties of Capitalism" betrachtet Volkmar
Gessner aus soziologischer Perspektive die Rolle des Rechts bei der Modernisierung. Ihre
Bedeutung werde oft überschätzt. Westliche Institutionen, wie die Weltbank und verschie-
dene nationale Entwicklungshilfeorganisationen, versuchten, die Staaten Ost- und Südost-
asiens bei der Etablierung rechtlicher Institutionen zu beraten. Dabei würde jedoch oft
übersehen, dass sich westliche Modelle nicht ohne weiteres auf asiatische Gesellschaften
übertragen ließen. Neben formalen gebe es in allen Staaten nämlich auch informale Institu-
tionen. Um die tatsächliche Rechtspraxis verstehen zu können, müsse man daher die sozia-
len und historischen Hintergründe einer Gesellschaft kennen – je komplexer eine Gesell-
schaft sei, desto weniger lasse sie sich allein durch formale Institutionen erklären. So
spielten etwa in chinesischen Geschäftsbeziehungen gegenseitiges Vertrauen und soziale
Bindungen eine große Rolle (guanxi). Bei seiner Diagnose unterscheidet Gessner mit Luh-
mann zwischen normativen und kognitiven Erwartungen. Normative Erwartungen blieben
erhalten, selbst wenn andere Akteure diese nicht erfüllten. Demgegenüber werden die
kognitiven Erwartungen an das Verhalten anderer Akteure angepasst. Eine Gesellschaft
brauche beide Elemente um gleichzeitig stabil und entwicklungsfähig zu sein. Gessner
warnt davor, zu viel Wert auf formale Institutionen zu legen, da dann die Gefahr der Infle-
xibilität und der Stagnation bei der Entwicklung bestehe.
Franz und Keebet von Benda-Beckmann beschreiben in ihrem Kapitel über "Transna-
tionalisation of Law, Globalisation and Legal Pluralism" die Pluralisierung des Rechts im
Prozess der Globalisierung aus einer rechtsanthropologischen Perspektive. Recht werde
nicht nur von unterschiedlichen Akteuren gesetzt, sondern wirke auch auf unterschiedli-
chen Ebenen. Auf der einen Seite sei ein Vereinheitlichungsprozess zu beobachten. Die
Autoren unterscheiden – neben dem klassischen Völkerrecht – drei Formen globalen
Rechts. Das transnationale Recht werde, wie die lex mercatoria, in bestimmten sektoriellen
Netzwerken geschaffen und angewandt. Das transnationalisierte Recht bewirke eine Ver-
einheitlichung nationaler Rechtssysteme zumindest in bestimmten Bereichen. Dazu gehör-
ten Modellgesetze, aber auch Strukturanpassungsprogramme internationaler Institutionen,
die auf eine Förderung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit oder eine Stärkung nationaler Institutionen
gerichtet sind. Das globalisierte Recht schließlich ähnele dem transnationalisierten in seiner
Wirkung, kenne jedoch keine Grenzen und umspanne den gesamten Globus. Auf der ande-
ren Seite komme es jedoch auch zu einem Prozess der Differenzierung. Das Studium des
nationalen Rechts allein sage oft wenig über die tatsächliche Rechtspraxis aus. Zum einen
könne das Recht innerhalb eines Staates regional stark differenziert sein. So gebe es etwa in
Indonesien teilweise nur Rahmengesetzgebung auf nationaler Ebene, die dann auf regiona-
ler und lokaler Ebene ausgefüllt werde. Teilweise gebe es für bestimmte gesellschaftliche
Bereiche auch eigenes Recht, so etwa im religiösen Bereich. Aufgrund dieser unterschiedli-
chen gegenläufigen Entwicklungen schlagen die Autoren vor, die gängige Unterscheidung
zwischen Mikro- und Makrostudien aufzugeben.
Christoph Antons verfolgt die Entwicklung des Rechts und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit in
Ost- und Südostasien aus historischer Perspektive ("Law Reform in the Developmental
States of East and Southeast Asia"). Während des kalten Krieges habe es in dieser Hinsicht
kaum Bewegung in den südostasiatischen Staaten gegeben. Einige Staaten, wie etwa Indo-
nesien, hätten an einer zu großen Pluralität von bereichsspezifischen oder regionalen
Rechtssystemen gelitten; in anderen Staaten habe es entwicklungsorientierte Diktaturen
gegeben mit dem Ziel, die Herausbildung von Rechtsstaatlichkeit zu verhindern. Mit dem
Zusammenbruch des hohen wirtschaftlichen Wachstums während der Asienkrise hätten
aber gerade diese Regime ihre Legitimität verloren, so dass bestimmte gesellschaftliche
Gruppen erfolgreich auf die Einführung demokratischer und rechtsstaatlicher Elemente
drängen konnten. Zudem gebe es nach dem Ende des kalten Krieges eine größere Konkur-
renz um Investoren auf dem Weltmarkt, da inzwischen auch ehemals kommunistische
Staaten zu interessanten Zielen für westliche Investoren geworden seien. Nach dem 11.
September bestehe zwar die Gefahr, dass, wie Antons meint, unter dem Druck der Bush-
Administration einige Staaten zu Law-and-Order-Regierungen zurückkehrten, alles in
allem sei aber die Zeit wohl nicht zurückzudrehen.
John Ohnesorge ("Politics, Ideology and Legal System Reform in Notheast Asia")
betrachtet den amerikanischen Einfluss auf die rechtlichen Reformen im Bereich des Ge-
sellschafts- und Verwaltungsrechts, bezogen auf Nordostasien. Er stützt sich dabei auf
Beispiele aus Japan, Südkorea und Taiwan. Die Reform-Agenden seien verwandt, da sie die
Macht der Bürokratie einschränken sollten – zum einen zugunsten von mehr Wirt-
schaftsfreiheit, zum anderen, um der Justiz mehr Einfluss zu verleihen. Er warnt jedoch vor
einer Amerikanisierung der Rechtssysteme, da rechtliche Institutionen immer durch die
lokale Praxis ausgestaltet werden und sie somit in einem anderen gesellschaftlichen Kon-
text andere Effekte zeitigen könnten als beabsichtigt. Im letzten Teil seines Beitrags geht
Ohnesorge auf zwei aktuelle Entwicklungen ein, die neoliberalen Tendenzen entgegenwir-
ken könnten. Zum einen sorge die Enron-Krise in den USA für strengere Standards im
Bereich des corporate governance. Um für amerikanischen Investoren interessant zu blei-
ben, werde diese Entwicklung in den nordostasiatischen Staaten wahrscheinlich nachvoll-
zogen. Auch der 11. September habe zu verstärkten Kontroll- und Überwachungsmecha-
nismen geführt. Gerade letzteres Beispiel zeige jedoch, dass eine Abkehr von einem extre-
men Neoliberalismus nicht unbedingt positiv zu bewerten sein müsse.
Der zweite Teil des Buches enthält Fallstudien zu verschiedenen Entwicklungen im
Verfassungsrecht Thailands, Malaysias, Indiens und Chinas. Dabei werden vor allem die
Demokratisierung dieser Staaten und die Herausbildung rechtsstaatlicher Strukturen in den
Blick genommen. Andrew Harding vergleicht in seinem Beitrag die Entwicklung des Ver-
fassungsrechts in Thailand und Malaysia, die sehr unterschiedlicher Natur sind. In Thailand
kam es 1997 nach der Asienkrise zu einer umfangreichen verfassungsrechtlichen Reform,
bei der durch ein ausgeklügeltes System von Checks and Balances versucht wurde, infor-
male Netzwerke und Korruption weitgehend in Schach zu halten und ein demokratisches
System zu etablieren. Der Militärputsch im September 2006 zeigt jedoch, dass dieser Weg
trotz zwischenzeitlich positiver Aussichten bisher nur bescheidenen Erfolg hatte. Malaysia
wählte einen anderen Weg, mit der Krise umzugehen. Der Staat, der seit 1981 von demsel-
ben Ministerpräsidenten regiert wurde, verschloss sich politischen Reformen und stimmte
gegen eine Intervention des IMF in der Asienkrise. Harding versucht mit diesen beiden
unterschiedlichen Fallstudien aufzuzeigen, dass es nicht den einen asiatischen Weg gibt,
sondern dieser viele Formen annehmen und auch in unterschiedliche Richtungen gehen
kann. Die globalisierungsbedingte Konvergenz des Rechts vor allem im Bereich Wirtschaft
gehe einher mit einer Divergenz in anderen Rechtsbereichen, insbesondere dem Verfas-
sungsrecht.
Oliver Mendelsohn beschäftigt sich in seinem Beitrag "Law, Terror and the Indian
Legal Order" mit der Verfassungsentwicklung in Indien – der ältesten Demokratie des
Kontinents. Er zeichnet dabei die aktuellen politischen Entwicklungen nach und versucht
die Stabilität der indischen Demokratie zu bewerten. Vor allem zwei Entwicklungen berei-
ten ihm dabei Sorge. Während Indien während der Regierungszeit der Kongresspartei
traditionell ein säkularer Staat war, habe sich diese Situation mit der Wahl der Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) zur Regierungspartei im Jahr 1998 radikal gewandelt. Die BJP habe sich
einer Weltsicht verschrieben, in der die hinduistische Religion und Lebensweise die zen-
trale Rolle spielten, während vor allem den Muslimen, die mit 130 Millionen Gläubigen
eine starke Minderheit bilden, nur eine marginale Rolle zukomme. Zum anderen habe die
BJP mit ihrer Anti-Terror-Gesetzgebung nach dem 11. September 2001 autoritäre Tenden-
zen in die indische Politik eingeführt, die an 1960er und 1970er Jahren anknüpften, in
denen demokratische Rechte häufig durch Ausnahmezustände außer Kraft gesetzt worden
seien. Mit der überraschenden Wahl der Kongresspartei zur stärksten Regierungspartei im
Jahr 2004 sei diesen Tendenzen zwar entgegengewirkt worden, doch sieht Mendelsohn die
Gefahr noch nicht gebannt. Ein möglicher Hüter der Demokratie könnte das Verfassungs-
gericht sein; es werde sich allein aber einem wachsenden Autoritarismus nicht entgegen-
stellen können.
Jianfu Chen ("Role/Rule of Law in China Reconsidered") untersucht die Entwicklung
der Rechtsstaatlichkeit (rule of law) in der Volksrepublik China. Das Rechtssystem habe
sich seit 1978 in hohem Tempo entwickelt; ein vollständiger Übergang vom Konzept rule
by law zum Konzept rule of law sei jedoch noch nicht zu verzeichnen: Trotz aller offiziel-
len rechtsstaatlichen Rhetorik gebe es noch beträchtliche Defizite, insbesondere beim Ge-
setzgebungsverfahren sowie bei der Gesetzesbindung und der Kontrolle der Regierung.
Chen hält die Ausbildung eines vollen rechtsstaatlichen Systems ohne Demokratisierung
nicht für möglich. Daher sei in China durch die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklun-
gen der letzten beiden Jahrzehnte zwar das Fundament für die Rechtsstaatlichkeit gelegt
worden. Die Herausbildung einer rule of law vollziehe sich indes in einem langen und
komplexen Prozess, der ohne eine politische Öffnung der kommunistischen Partei nicht
zum Erfolg führen könne.
Der dritte Teil des Buches befasst sich mit Reformen im Bereich der Verwaltung. Franz
und Keebet von Benda-Beckmann beschreiben in ihrem Beitrag "Between Global Forces
and Local Politics" die Dezentralisierung von Politik und Verwaltung in Indonesien. Insbe-
sondere internationale Finanzorganisationen, wie IMF und Weltbank sowie ausländische
Regierungsorganisationen wie GTZ oder USAID haben diesen Trend zur Dezentralisierung
angestoßen. Indonesien hat dabei an traditionelle lokale Strukturen angeknüpft, so dass sich
der Prozess in der Folge weitgehend verselbständigt hat. Die Reformen bestanden vor allem
darin, die Verantwortung lokaler Gemeinschaften zu stärken durch Übertragung signifi-
kanter Aufgaben. Die Autoren wagen eine erste Bewertung der Reformen: Positiv hätten
die Reformen die streng hierarchischen Strukturen des indonesischen Zentralstaats abge-
schwächt und das Interesse am ökonomischen Potential einzelner Städte gesteigert. Der
Zuwachs an Verantwortung habe der Bevölkerung zu mehr politischer Partizipation ver-
holfen. Allerdings hätten die Reformen auch Probleme sichtbar gemacht, die aus der Koor-
dination unterschiedlicher rechtlicher und moralischer Ordnungen, der staatlichen, der
lokalen und der religiösen, folgten. Die transnationalen Organisationen spielten in diesem
Prozess keine gestaltende Rolle, sondern dienten allenfalls als Alliierte, um die Strategien
lokaler Akteure zu legitimieren.
Im letzten Teil des Buches beschäftigen sich Terence Haliday und Bruce Carruthers
mit Strategien von Entwicklungsländern, sich gegen den Einfluss internationaler Finanz-
institutionen auf das eigene Wirtschaftsrecht zur Wehr zu setzen. Unter dem Titel "Foiling
the Financial Hegemons" beschreiben die Autoren Fallstudien zur Reform des Insolvenz-
rechts in Indonesien, Südkorea und China. Der Einfluss internationaler Akteure sei dabei
unterschiedlich stark gewesen. Indonesien und Südkorea hätten Reformen als Gegenleis-
tung für Kredite versprechen müssen. In China dagegen hätten Weltbank, IMF und auslän-
dische Geberorganisationen, wie die GTZ nur beratenden Einfluss. Haliday und Carruthers
beobachten dabei unterschiedliche Abwehrstrategien. Diese reichten von zeitlichen Verzö-
gerungen und der bloß formalen Umsetzung ohne Änderung der Praxis bis hin zur Beru-
fung auf kulturbedingte Ausnahmen, die Fragmentierung der Koalition der ausländischen
Institutionen und dem Einbau von Ausnahmen und Fluchtwegen in die Reformgesetze. Die
internationalen Akteure begegneten dabei einer Reihe von Problemen. Diese beträfen zum
einen ihre eigene Ausstattung mit Zeit und Ressourcen. Gravierender sei allerdings eine
andere Problematik: Von vielen westlichen Beratern und Wissenschaftlern werde oft über-
sehen, dass rechtliche Institutionen nicht ohne weiteres in andere kulturelle Zusammen-
hänge transplantiert werden könnten. Gerade ein Rechtsbereich wie das Insolvenzrecht mit
seinen enormen distributiven Implikationen wirke sich oft sehr stark auf die gesamte
Rechts- und Gesellschaftsordnung aus und könne daher in der Praxis Widerstände der
lokalen Eliten hervorrufen.
Mit "Globalization and Resistance" lenken die Herausgeber den Blick auf eine Region,
in der gegenwärtig die größte wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Dynamik herrschen
dürfte. Schon das macht es notwendig und dazu äußerst spannend, sich mit der Rechtsent-
wicklung dort zu befassen. Die Beiträge bieten vielfach interessante Einblicke und eröffnen
neue Perspektiven – auch oder sogar gerade für die, die keine vertiefte Kenntnis der Region
haben. Der Rezensent vermisst allerdings eine engere Verbindung zwischen Theorie und
Fallstudien. Auch wenn die beiden Herausgeber erkennbar bestrebt sind, den Band in den
aktuellen Forschungskontext einzubetten, wäre ein größerer Bezug beider Bereiche aufein-
ander wünschenswert gewesen. Sie werden nur durch das gemeinsame Oberthema ver-
klammert, stehen aber ansonsten weitgehend beziehungslos nebeneinander. Immerhin sind
die einzelnen Beiträge in so hohem Maße lesenswert, dass der Band ohne Einschränkungen
zur Lektüre empfohlen werden kann.
Niels Petersen, Bonn
Stefanie Agerer
Das Recht des Koran
Islamisches Strafrecht in der Gegenwart
VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, Saarbrücken 2006, 132 S., 49,00 EUR, ISBN: 3865504183
Die Geltung und Anwendung islamisch geprägten Strafrechts in der Gegenwart ist vor
allem wegen seiner drakonischen Strafen an Leib und Leben, seiner die patriarchalischen
Strukturen der islamischen Gesellschaften erhaltenden Ausrichtung sowie seiner offen-
sichtlichen Unvereinbarkeit mit dem abendländisch gewachsenen Verständnis von Men-
schenrechten und Rechtsstaatlichkeit ein öffentlich sehr emotional behandeltes Thema. Die
Arbeit verfolgt das berechtigte Anliegen, angesichts der Islamisierung des modernen Straf-
rechts seit den 70er Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts in mehreren islamischen Staaten, die
Entwicklung, Umsetzung und Anwendung des islamisch geprägten Strafrechts in Pakistan
und Saudi-Arabien nachzuzeichnen, und zwar unter Berücksichtigung der historischen
Grundlagen hinsichtlich des geltenden Rechts und seiner praktischen Anwendung. Auch
wenn die Arbeit ihrem Anspruch im Großen und Ganzen gerecht wird, so haftet ihr als
wesentliches Manko an, wegen völlig unzureichender Auswertung der einschlägigen wis-
senschaftlichen Literatur nicht auf der Höhe des gegenwärtigen Forschungsstandes zu sein.
Nach einer kurzen Einordnung des Themas in den Prozess der (Re-)Islamisierung des
Rechts in den islamisch geprägten Staaten und der Skizzierung des Inhalts und der Vorge-
hensweise der Arbeit widmet sich die Autorin in ihrem Hauptteil der „Scharia in Pakistan
und Saudi-Arabien“. Die anfänglichen Ausführungen zu Grundlagen und Entstehung sowie
Geschichte und Entwicklung der Scharia, die von der Systematik her besser in die Einlei-
tung gehört hätten, weisen aufgrund unzureichender Berücksichtigung des aktuellen For-
schungsstands einige in ihrer Plakativität zweifelhafte Wertungen (z. B. „unverfälschte
Anwendung der Scharia“ unter dem Propheten, volle Geltung der Scharia im Osmanischen
Reich), rechtliche Ungenauigkeiten (z. B. Zuordnung der Delikte zu den Rechtsansprüchen
Gottes und der Menschen) und überholte historische Einschätzungen (z. B. die völlige
Erstarrung der islamischen Rechtslehre) auf.
Hinsichtlich Pakistan skizziert die Autorin die rechtliche Entwicklung bis und die
Islamisierung unter Zia ul-Haq auf der Grundlage des vorhandenen Forschungsstandes,
wobei jedoch der Strafjustiz nur unzureichend Beachtung geschenkt wird. Die sich
anschließenden Ausführungen zur „Scharia im gegenwärtigen Strafrecht“ haben die gelten-
den Rechtsvorschriften des islamischen Strafrechts in Pakistan und ihre Anwendung in der
Praxis zum Gegenstand. Es entspricht dem bisherigen Forschungsstand, dass das islamische
Strafrecht zwar weitgehend eingeführt wurde, aber in der Praxis die Körperstrafen mit
Ausnahme der Auspeitschung nicht zur Anwendung gekommen sind. Darüber hinaus zeigt
die Autorin durch Auswertung auch des Internets neue Aspekte der Rechtsanwendung auf.
Leider wird sie dabei wissenschaftlichen Anforderungen, geschweige denn rechtswissen-
schaftlichen Ansprüchen, nicht gerecht. Weder werden Fundstellen der Gesetze angegeben
noch wird in hinreichendem Maße auf Normen der genannten Rechtsquellen zurückgegrif-
fen. Oft wird nicht deutlich, inwieweit eine geschilderte Rechtslage entsprechend normiert
ist oder auf richterlicher Rechtsfortbildung beruht (z. B. Schwangerschaft als Nachweis für
illegitimen Geschlechtsverkehr, Beweislast der Frau, dass die Schwangerschaft aus einer
Vergewaltigung resultiert). Der Autorin ist aber zugute zu halten, dass sie im Folgenden der
Entwicklung in den Provinzen und der Bedeutung der Stammesgerichtsbarkeit die jeweils
gebührende Aufmerksamkeit schenkt. Sie zeigt auf, mit welcher Laxheit die Zentralregie-
rung der starken Islamisierung insbesondere in der North West Frontier Province begegnet
und sie den Fortbestand einer eigentlich bereits abgeschafften, aber tatsächlich noch exis-
tierenden Stammesgerichtsbarkeit duldet. Insgesamt sieht die Autorin die zunehmende
Islamisierung vor allem auf provinzstaatlicher Seite zu Recht mit Sorge, vor allem hat sich
die Lage der Frauen wieder erheblich verschlechtert.
Im Kapitel über die Entwicklung der Scharia in Saudi-Arabien gibt die Autorin
überblicksmäßig den bisherigen Kenntnisstand über die Entstehung und Entwicklung des
saudischen Staates in Verbindung mit der wahhabitischen Lehre wieder. Der Zusammen-
führung der unterschiedlichen Rechtssysteme des Hedschas und des Nadschd, basierend auf
osmanischem Recht, traditionellem islamischem Recht und Stammesrecht der Beduinen,
kommt dabei besondere Bedeutung zu. Dementsprechend legt die Autorin auch Gewicht
auf die Gerichtsorganisation. Das Kapitel über die institutionellen Grundlagen ist den
Quellen des geltenden hanbalitischen Strafrechts und den Organen der Strafverfolgung
gewidmet. Zu Recht geht die Autorin ausführlich auf das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen
dem Königshaus und den Religionsgelehrten ein, die trotz der Kompetenzen des Herrschers
zum Erlass von Verordnungen und zur Ernennung der Richter jedenfalls die Rechtspre-
chung und Bildungsinstitutionen, wenn nicht auch die Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung,
weitgehend beherrschen. Die folgende Darstellung der Justizorgane krankt vielfach an
mangelnder juristischer Präzision sowie daran, dass die einschlägigen gerichtsverfassungs-
rechtlichen Vorschriften nicht zitiert werden. Das gilt auch für die Religionspolizei, die die
Autorin wegen ihrer weit reichenden Kompetenzen zur Züchtigung bei kleineren Vergehen
gegen die wahhabitischen Verhaltensregeln zu Recht mit behandelt.
Die sich anschließenden Ausführungen zur Rechtspraxis basieren weitgehend auf den
1 2
Forschungsergebnissen von Vogel und berücksichtigen wichtige Sekundärliteratur nicht.
Zur bereits bekannten Anwendung des materiellen islamischen Strafrechts in Saudi-Ara-
bien – Auspeitschungen, Amputationen und Hinrichtungen sind gängige Strafen – erfährt
man kaum etwas Neues. Zuweilen wird nicht hinreichend problematisiert, ob und inwieweit
eine Strafbarkeit noch der koranischen Strafbarkeit unterfällt oder der Auffangkategorie der
taczir-Strafbarkeit zuzuordnen ist (z.B. Blasphemie von Nichtmuslimen), deren rechtsstaat-
liche Problematik aber gesehen wird. Soweit einzelne Fälle zitiert werden, werfen diese
zumeist mehr Fragen auf, als die zur Verfügung stehenden Informationen Antworten zu
geben in der Lage sind. Interessanter sind hingegen die verfahrensrechtlichen Ausführun-
gen zur Strafverfolgung, die eine Diskrepanz zwischen den gesetzlichen Verfahrenssiche-
rungen und der Verfahrensweise in der Praxis erkennen lassen (z. B. Recht des Verhafteten
auf Mitteilung des Haftgrundes und Information von Angehörigen, Öffentlichkeit der
Gerichtsverhandlungen und schriftlichen Urteile, Recht auf anwaltliche Verteidigung).
Leider sind aber die Ausführungen vermutlich aufgrund der schlechten Informationslage
nur selektiv und oberflächlich; Normen des Criminal Procedure Code werden nur verein-
zelt zitiert.
1
Frank E. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System. Studies of Saudi Arabia, Köln 2000.
2
B. Seifert, Strafrecht in Saudi-Arabien, ZStW 111 (1999), 235 ff.
Die Studie endet mit einem Vergleich Pakistans mit Saudi-Arabien. Während Pakistan
britisch-rechtlich beeinflusst bereits seit seiner Gründung über ein stark differenziertes
Rechtssystem durchdrungen vom britischen Common Law verfügt, das dann unter General
Zia ul-Haq von oben her durch Erlass von Rechtsvorschriften islamisch-rechtlicher Prove-
nienz unter Fortgeltung der überkommenen Rechtskodices im Übrigen islamisiert wurde,
ist das saudische Rechtssystem mit der Geltung des ungeschriebenen islamischen Rechts
hanbalitischer Prägung durch den Siegeszug des Wahhabismus und der Vereinheitlichung
der unterschiedlichen Rechtssysteme auf der arabischen Halbinsel entstanden. Beide Staa-
ten unterscheiden sich vor allem in darin, dass in Saudi-Arabien die Anwendung der kora-
nischen Strafen und der Widervergeltung zum Alltag gehört, während in Pakistan diese
Strafen mit Ausnahme der Auspeitschung bisher nicht vollzogen wurden. Sind im Gottes-
staat Saudi-Arabien die Sachwalter des islamischen Rechts insbesondere die Rechtsgelehr-
ten, gegenüber denen der Staat eine eher mäßigende Rolle einnimmt, ist in Pakistan der
Staat die islamisierende Kraft, der sich gewichtige Teile der Zivilgesellschaft nach wie vor
widersetzen. Vor diesem Hintergrund sieht die Autorin für Pakistan zu Recht deutlich
günstigere Rahmenbedingungen für eine positive Entwicklung als in Saudi-Arabien, für das
eine Zivilgesellschaft erst im Entstehen begriffen ist.
Peter Scholz, Berlin
Andrea Kramer
Dezentralisierung in der Wasserversorgung in Peru, Bolivien und Ekuador
Ein Beitrag zur rechtsvergleichenden Methodik in der rechtswissenschaftlichen
Entwicklungsforschung
Beihefte zu „Verfassung und Recht in Übersee“, Heft 21
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006, 321 S., EUR 64,00, ISBN 978-3-8329-2124-8.
Die voranschreitende Verknappung lebenswichtiger Ressourcen – vorliegend: von Trink-

bzw. Siedlungswasser – ist längst als dringende Herausforderung nicht nur der nationalen
und internationalen Politik, sondern gerade auch für die juristische wie interdisziplinäre
1
Forschung erkannt worden. Wenn man sich wie hier erstmals in Deutschland dieser The-
matik mit exemplarischem Blick auf den südamerikanischen Kontinent annimmt, ist dies
verdienstvoll. Schließlich ist Wasserknappheit hierzulande gleichsam ein Fremdwort und
werden einschlägige Debatten eher unter sekundären wirtschafts-, gebühren- und umwelt-
rechtlichen Aspekten (Stichworte: Liberalisierung, Privatisierung und Private public part-
nership; umweltgerechte Trinkwassergewinnung und Abwasserentsorgung), kaum aber
1
Siehe zuletzt etwa die Beiträge in: J. Fernández Ruíz / J. Santiago Sánchez (Hrsg.), Régimen jurí-
dico del agua – Culturas y Sistemas Jurídicos Comparados, Mexiko (Univ. Nacional Autónoma de
México), 2007.
unter dem primären Gesichtspunkt einer quantitativ wie qualitativ angemessenen Allge-
meinversorgung geführt.
Die vorliegende, von Joachim Wolf am Bochumer Institut für Entwicklungsforschung
und Entwicklungspolitik (IEE) betreute Bochumer Dissertation von Andrea Kramer
schließt insofern eine bedeutsame Erkenntnislücke – und bewirkt zugleich weit mehr als
dies: Anhand eines wichtigen Referenzgebiets des Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrechts leistet die
Arbeit insbesondere einen Beitrag zur rechtswissenschaftlichen Methodik, konkret: zur
Rechtsvergleichung im öffentlichen Recht, und vermittelt wertvolle Impulse für die inter-
disziplinäre Entwicklungsforschung.
Die Schrift beginnt mit einer Bestandsaufnahme zur mitunter desaströsen Lage der
Siedlungswasserwirtschaft in Bolivien, Ekuador und Peru. In ländlichen Regionen dieser
Länder überschreite der Deckungsgrad der öffentlichen Versorgung mit Trinkwasser kaum
die 50 %-Marke. Zugleich sorgten voranschreitende Bau-, Agrar- und Industrieaktivitäten
für erhebliche Wasserverschmutzungen und Grundwassersenkungen und scheitere die
Problembewältigung insbesondere an unzureichenden Finanzressourcen. Allerdings stün-
den, unterstützt auch durch internationale Entwicklungsprogramme, allenthalben umfas-
sende Reformen des Wassersektors auf der politischen Agenda. Ihnen gehe es vor allem um
die massive Förderung privatwirtschaftlicher Beteiligungen, um den Einsatz neuartiger
Finanzierungsinstrumente und um eine spürbare Dezentralisierung der Verwaltungsverant-
wortung. Damit einher gingen ein grundlegender Wandel der Rolle des Staates in der Ver-
sorgungswirtschaft und damit auch des Staatsverständnisses.
Vor der Detailanalyse der angedeuteten Veränderungen in den betrachteten Ländern
wendet sich die Verfasserin zunächst der rechtsvergleichenden Methode zu. Betont wird
deren Mehrwert bei der Begleitung rechtspolitischer Reformprozesse. Freilich liege hier der
Teufel im Detail, wenn es, soll sich die Rechtsvergleichung nicht in bloßer Deskription
oder aber bezugsloser Theoriendebatte erschöpfen, darum gehe, daraus praktisch verwert-
bare Reformimpulse abzuleiten. Der (vorherrschende) „funktionale“ Ansatz der Rechtsver-
gleichung wird deshalb kritisch-konstruktiv zurechtgerückt: Ihm könne es keineswegs um
eine umfassende Prüfung der Wirksamkeit des jeweiligen nationalen Rechts bei der Prob-
lembewältigung gehen, schon weil dazu umfangreichere Kontextanalysen u.a. rechtssozio-
logischer Art erforderlich seien. Anempfohlen wird stattdessen eine methodische Reduk-
tion, die an die Stelle einer Wirksamkeitsanalyse einen instrumentalen Ansatz verfolgt:
Entscheidend seien die „Mittel und Wege zur Zielerreichung“ in den Blick zu nehmen und
die jeweiligen nationalrechtlichen Lösungen mittels Plausibilitätserwägungen einer kriti-
schen Beurteilung zu unterziehen. Abgerundet wird die Analyse durch Hinweise zur Da-
tengewinnung beim Rechtsvergleich speziell von Entwicklungsländern. Wegen der dort nur
schwer auffindbaren Rechtsnormen und kaum vorhandener Sekundärliteratur sei die
Heranziehung empirischer Methoden, aber auch „grauer“ Literatur geboten – eine Kärrner-
arbeit, von der die reichhaltigen Nachweise zu Interviews mit hochrangigen Gesprächspart-
nern „vor Ort“ und zu Verlautbarungen internationaler Organisationen (UNO, Weltbank
u.a.) beredtes Zeugnis ablegen.
Unter stringenter Befolgung des methodischen Ansatzes wendet sich die Arbeit im
Zweiten Teil der Einzelbetrachtung der Siedlungswasserversorgung in Peru, Bolivien und
Ekuador zu. Die exemplarische Auswahl gerade dieser Länder wird einleuchtend mit Blick
auf die dort zeitgleich verlaufenden Reform- und Dezentralisierugsprozesse in der Wasser-
versorgung begründet. Die umfassend angelegten Länderberichte sind nach einem einheitli-
chen Untersuchungsschema übersichtlich strukturiert: Nach näheren Erläuterungen zur
Entwicklung wie zu technischen, ökonomischen und administrativen Rahmenbedingungen
der Wasserwirtschaft werden zunächst die einschlägigen Rechtsnormen sowie die auf dem
Sektor tätigen maßgeblichen Akteure (getrennt nach wasserwirtschaftsrechtlicher Planung,
der eigentlichen Leistungserbringung und der staatlichen Regulierung) präsentiert. Einen
Prüfungsschwerpunkt bilden die unterschiedlichen Modalitäten der Leistungserbringung.
Das Augenmerk der Verf.’in gilt vor allem den normativen Vorgaben zur Kooperation mit
der Privatwirtschaft (etwa für Konzessions- und Betreibermodelle) wie auch für Public
public partnership (z.B. in kommunalen Zweckverbänden), deren befriedigende Umset-
zung in der Praxis häufig zu wünschen übrig lasse. Als ähnlich problematisch erweisen
sich, mit Blick auf sich stets stellende Fragen etwa der Instandhaltungsverantwortung, die
oftmals nur unzureichende Regelung der Eigentumsverhältnisse an den Versorgungsanla-
gen. Nicht anders verhält es sich mit den unterschiedlichen Mechanismen zur Finanzierung
der Wasserwirtschaft; zu besorgen seien hier eine unzureichende Ausgestaltung bzw. Kon-
trolle der Gebührenbemessung und -erhebung mit daraus folgenden Haushaltsproblemen in
den Gemeinden und deren Abhängigkeit von staatlichen, oftmals unzureichend koordinier-
ten Transferleistungen und Fonds-Lösungen. Abgerundet werden die Länderberichte durch
ausführliche Hinweise zur rechtlichen Sicherung der Trinkwasserqualität wie auch zu
vorhandenen Verbraucherrechten sowie zur Wassernutzung und zum Gewässerschutz.
Gewünscht hätte man sich freilich, auch angesichts aktueller Unsicherheiten hinsichtlich
der öffentlichen Daseinsvorsorge in Deutschland, noch weiterführende Hinweise zur
rechtsdogmatischen Positionierung der Wasserversorgung als eines traditionellen Servicio
Público zwischen „Staat“ und „Markt“ in den untersuchten Ländern. Schließlich weisen
diesbezügliche Untersuchungen in anderen lateinamerikanischen Staaten, auch wegen ihrer
kritischen Distanz gegenüber dem früher maßgeblichen Vorbild wie der französischen
2
Service Public-Doktrin, ein beachtliches Niveau auf.
Angesichts der detailreichen Bestandsaufnahme zum Instrumentenmix in den unter-
suchten Staaten wendet sich der Leser mit Interesse der eigentlichen rechtsvergleichenden
Analyse im Dritten Kapitel zu. Es bildet zugleich das Kernstück der Schrift, indem es die
zuvor entwickelten theoretischen Anforderungen an die vergleichende Methode im öffent-
lichen Recht mit den Feststellungen zur rechtsnormativen wie rechtspraktischen Lage der
Wasserwirtschaft in Bolivien, Peru und Ekuador schlüssig zusammenführt: Aufgrund des
2
Grundlegend zum argentinischen Recht der Versorgungswirtschaft insbes. J. Salomoni, Teoría
general de los servicios públicos, Buenos Aires 1999; speziell zur Entwicklung des chilenischen
Wasserwirtschaftsrechts: A. Vergara Blanco, Derecho de aguas, 2 Bde., Santiago de Chile 1998.
zuvor entwickelten Vergleichsmaßstabs (tertium comparationis) – des wasserwirtschaftli-

chen Zielkanons aus effizienter Allgemeinversorgung, hinreichender finanzieller Ressour-
cen zur Behebung von Versorgungsmängeln sowie verbraucher- und umweltschutzbezoge-
ner Belange – erfolgt zunächst eine kritische Gesamtschau der einzelstaatlichen Reforman-
sätze. Leiterkenntnisse bilden hier die Hinweise auf erhebliche Unzulänglichkeiten schon
bei der allgemeinen wie sektorbezogenen Gesetzgebung und sodann bei der rechtsprakti-
schen Umsetzung des vielfach inkohärent und nicht selten fehlerhaft oder widersprüchlich
gesetzten Rechts. Kritisch mag man darin auf den ersten Blick nicht mehr als „Binsenweis-
heiten“ zur Lage des Rechts und der Versorgungswirtschaft in Entwicklungsländern erbli-
cken. Der Vorzug der Schrift besteht freilich darin, dass konkrete rechtsnormative wie
rechtspraktische Hemmnisse und Defizite bei der Verfolgung der wasserwirtschaftlichen
Ziele in der Gegenüberstellung der Wasserrechtsregime gleich dreier Staaten präzise erar-
beitet werden. Wiederholt zur Sprache kommen insbesondere gravierende Unzulänglich-
keiten bei der kompetenz- und verfahrensrechtlichen Flankierung gesetzlicher Dezentrali-
sierungs-, Privatisierungs-, Finanzierungs- sowie Umwelt- und Verbraucherschutzvorga-
ben.
Im Übrigen lässt es die Autorin bei diesen Feststellungen nicht bewenden, sondern
spürt in einem zweiten Unterabschnitt gerade auch den Ursachen für die beachtlichen
Diskrepanzen zwischen wasserwirtschaftspolitischem Anspruch und der rechtstechnischen
Wirklichkeit nach. Aufgelistet sehen sich drängende Probleme einerseits im Rechtset-
zungsprozess (Stichworte: Missachtung der Normenhierarchie und Wechselwirkung mit
anderen Normen; Verstöße gegen Grundsätze der Normenklarheit und selbst der Logik;
mangelhafte Transparenz von Rechtsänderungen) und sodann im Zuge der Rechtsanwen-
dung; bemängelt werden in letztgenannter Hinsicht insbesondere fehlende Ausführungsvor-
schriften sowie Personal- bzw. Schulungsressourcen, aber auch korrupte Strukturen auf
administrativer wie judikativer Ebene und schließlich eine insgesamt mangelnde soziale
Akzeptanz des Rechts in Lateinamerika.
Insgesamt also eine gewiss schonungslose Analyse. Nur sie macht indes deutlich, wie
nachhaltige Verbesserungen der Wasserwirtschaft oder auch anderer Regelungssektoren in
Entwicklungsländern zu erreichen sind – und welchen praktischen Nutzen insoweit die
Rechtsvergleichung zu leisten vermag: Zentral gehe es darum, vorhandene Reformen her-
auszustellen bzw. neue Reformansätze zu entwickeln, mit denen die Qualität sowohl der
Rechtsetzung bzw. der rechtsetzenden Institutionen wie auch die Effizienz des Normen-
vollzugs zu steigern sind. Umgekehrt müssten Reformanstrengungen zur nachhaltigen
Lösung der Weltwasserkrise solange Stückwerk bleiben, wie nicht die tiefer liegenden
Mängel in der allgemeinen Rechtskultur der Einzelstaaten behoben werden. Die daraus
abzuleitenden und durchaus verallgemeinerungsfähigen Forderungen an die rechtswissen-
schaftliche Forschung wie an die Beratungstätigkeit in den Entwicklungsländern liegen
dann auf der Hand: Die Rechtswissenschaft (zumal in Deutschland) sei in Richtung einer
eigentlichen, d.h. ganzheitlichen „Entwicklungsforschung“ fortzuentwickeln, während die
Rechtsberatung von Entwicklungsländern zwingend auch auf Verbesserungen in der Recht-

setzung und Rechtsanwendung zu richten seien.
Für notwendige weitere Untersuchungen zum öffentlichen (Wirtschafts-) Recht in
Lateinamerika, aber auch in anderen Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern, ist die durch-
weg ansprechend geschriebene Arbeit von Andrea Kramer gewiss maßstabbildend. Ange-
sichts der sichtbar gemachten Bezüge zur politikwissenschaftlichen und rechtssoziologi-
schen Forschung (nebst Verwertung einschlägigen englischsprachigen Schrifttums vor
allem im methodenkritischen Teil) dürfte in ihr ferner ein wertvoller Beitrag zur interdis-
ziplinären wie internationalen Governance-Forschung zu sehen sein. Auch aus diesem
Grund wurde die Schrift mit dem Wissenschaftspreis der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher
Lateinamerikaforschung 2006 ausgezeichnet – aus Sicht der deutschen Lateinamerikafor-
schung handelt es sich allemal um einen großen Wurf.
Johann-Christian Pielow, Bochum
Simon Chesterman / Chia Lehnardt (Eds.)

From Mercenaries to Market. The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies
Oxford University Press, 2007, 308 S.,£ 60.00, ISBN 978-0-19-922848-5
Wenn private Militärfirmen hierzulande auch erst seit kurzem im Fokus des breiteren
öffentlichen Interesses stehen, hat sich das Phänomen der Ausgliederung militärischer
Aufgaben an transnational operierende Konzerne bereits in den Neunziger Jahren des letz-
ten Jahrhunderts herausgebildet, und der Markt boomt spätestens seit Beginn des jüngsten
Irak-Krieges. Der von Simon Chesterman und Chia Lehnardt herausgegebene Band, der im
Rahmen eines Forschungsprojekts am Institute for International Law and Justice der New
York University School of Law entstanden ist, bietet einen reichhaltigen Einblick in die
verschiedenen Facetten wissenschaftlicher Auseinandersetzung mit den Aktivitäten privater
Militärfirmen. Die Autorinnen und Autoren stammen größtenteils aus verschiedenen Uni-
versitäten und Forschungseinrichtungen, aber auch der Verband britischer Militärfirmen
(BAPSC, s.u. Kapitel 13) ist vertreten.
In vier Teilen – Bedenken, Herausforderungen, Normen, Märkte – wird das historisch
neue (bzw. wiederbelebte) Phänomen der Privatisierung legitimer Gewaltausübung aus
unterschiedlichen Perspektiven beleuchtet. Hierbei wird grundsätzliche Kritik unter rechtli-
chen und moralischen Gesichtspunkten ebenso geäußert wie generelle Akzeptanz der
Übertragung militärischer Aufgaben an private Unternehmen. Bei aller Mannigfaltigkeit der
vertretenen Standpunkte besteht unter den Autoren Einigkeit jedenfalls darüber, dass der
neu entstandene Wirtschaftszweig bestehen bleiben wird und eine Regulierung in höherem
Maße als bisher von Nöten ist.
Den ersten Teil (Concerns) eröffnet das Kapitel „Morality and regulation“ von Sarah
Percy, die zwei grundsätzliche Einwände gegen die Aktivitäten privater Militärfirmen
untersucht. Der erste bezieht sich auf die Motivation der Mitarbeiter (und – wenn auch
deutlich weniger – Mitarbeiterinnen) dieser Unternehmen, die sich mit dem Vorwurf kon-
frontiert sehen, aus rein finanziellen Interessen Menschen umzubringen; der zweite beklagt
die Gefährdung demokratischer Kontrolle von Gewaltanwendung bei deren Übertragung
auf Private. Percy legt dar, dass die Kritik zwar teilweise relativiert und auch zwischen
verschiedenen Konstellationen des Einsatzes privater Militärfirmen differenziert werden
muss, gewisse prinzipielle Bedenken aber bestehen bleiben. Auch zur Steigerung der
öffentlichen Akzeptanz müssten diese bei der Regulierung bedacht werden, z.B. wäre eine
klare Verbindung zwischen den Unternehmen und ihrem jeweiligen Sitzstaat wünschens-
wert. Letztlich dienten moralische Einwände auch zur ständigen Hinterfragung staatlicher
oder privatisierter Gewaltanwendung.
Kevin A. O´Brien befasst sich im zweiten Kapitel („What should and what should not
be regulated?“) mit der Typologie privater Militärfirmen. Nach Abgrenzung von sog. Söld-
nern und weiteren verwandten Phänomenen wird eine Unterteilung anhand der verschiede-
nen Tätigkeitsfelder privater Militärfirmen vorgenommen, wobei – anders als bei P. W.
1
Singers ansonsten ähnlicher „tip of the spear“-Typologie – nicht ein Unternehmen als
Ganzes betrachtet werden soll, sondern jeweils die unterschiedlichen Aktivitäten Gegens-
tand der Regulierung sind. Während im engeren Sinne militärische Operationen (wie z.B.
die Teilnahme an oder die Unterstützung von Kampfhandlungen, nachrichtendienstliche
Tätigkeiten sowie Friedenssicherung) streng reguliert und überwacht werden sowie jeweils
einer einzelfallspezifischen ministeriellen Lizenz bedürfen sollen, könnten die weiteren
Kategorien weniger entscheidender und gefährlicher Unterstützung und Sicherheitsge-
währleistung (military-support operations, defensive security operations, non-lethal security
operations) durch allgemeine Lizenzen reguliert werden. O´Brien entwickelt hierzu ein
differenziertes System und stellt die notwendigen Schritte für dessen Realisierung dar, kann
dabei aber die im ersten Kapitel erhobenen Bedenken, insbesondere hinsichtlich der feh-
lenden parlamentarischen Kontrolle, nicht ausräumen.
Mit der Einflussnahme privater Militärfirmen auf die staatliche Außen- und Sicher-
heitspolitik beschäftigt sich das dritte Kapitel, „Regulating the role of private military
companies in shaping security and politics“ von Anna Leander. Wegen zahlreicher Unter-
schiede zwischen öffentlichen Militärs und privaten Militärfirmen hält sie die bisherigen
institutionellen Mechanismen politischer Einflussnahme auf das Militär für ungeeignet zur
Regulierung der Einflussnahme Privater. Ein soziologischer Ansatz hierzu, der eine Kom-
patibilität der in der demokratischen Gesellschaft und unter privaten Militärfirmen vorhan-
denen Vorstellungen hinsichtlich dieser Einflussnahme anstreben würde, könnte sich des-
wegen disfunktional auswirken, weil eine Dominanz der Normen privater Sicherheits-
experten aufgrund der Dynamik des Marktes wahrscheinlicher sei. Auch wenn Leander
1
P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Ithaca/London,
2003, S. 91 ff. unterscheidet Military Provider Firms, Military Consultant Firms und Military
Support Firms anhand der Nähe ihrer Tätigkeiten zum Kampfgeschehen.
diesbezüglich keinen konkreten Vorschlag zur Regulierung macht, eröffnet ihr interdiszi-
plinärer Ansatz eine weitere Dimension der Auseinandersetzung mit der Rolle privater
Militärfirmen im nationalen und internationalen Machtgefüge, die bei Regulierungsversu-
chen zu berücksichtigen ist.
Im zweiten Teil des Buches (Challenges) werden Beispiele verschiedener Einsatzge-
biete privater Militärfirmen untersucht und jeweils damit verbundene Probleme aufgezeigt.
Angela McIntyre und Taya Weiss setzen sich im vierten Kapitel („Weak governments in
search of strength: Africa´s experience of mercenaries and private military companies“) mit
der Rolle privater Militärfirmen in schwachen Staaten auseinander, insbesondere am Bei-
spiel der Einsätze der südafrikanischen Firma Executive Outcomes in Angola (1993-1995)
und Sierra Leone (1995-1997). Diese verdeutlichen den – zumindest kurzfristigen – Nutzen
privater Militärfirmen bei der Wiederherstellung der Hoheitsgewalt legitimer Regierungen
(so auch der ehemalige Finanzminister Sierra Leones, James O. C. Jonah, in seinem Vor-
wort zum hier besprochenen Band), während die zugrunde liegenden Geschäftsverbindun-
gen zu Rohstofffirmen bedenklich sind. Gerade der Einsatz transnationaler Unternehmen
zum Schutz von Rohstoffvorkommen kann das Verhältnis des Staates zu seiner Bevölke-
rung in politischer und wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht stören und die innere Sicherheit gefährden.
McIntyre und Weiss stellen zusammenfassend fest, dass die Regulierung privater Militär-
firmen in schwachen Staaten andere und größere Probleme mit sich bringt als in stabilen
Demokratien, was letztere in ihren Regelungsansätzen berücksichtigen müssen.
Gegenstand der Untersuchung in David Isenbergs Kapitel „A government in search of
cover: Private military companies in Iraq“ sind die Probleme, die der massive Einsatz
privater Militärfirmen im Irak offenbart. Dass die weitgehende Privatisierung militärischer
Aufgaben grundsätzlich sinnvoll ist, wird in den Vereinigten Staaten kaum angezweifelt,
vielmehr geht es um die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen. Die Kontrolle über und die
Verantwortlichkeit für private Militärfirmen sind bisher nur lückenhaft durchsetzbar, insbe-
sondere hinsichtlich der Rules of Engagement liegt eine dichtere Regelung gerade auch im
Interesse der Unternehmen. Von staatlicher Seite hält Isenberg sowohl erhöhten Personal-
einsatz zur Kontrolle als auch konsequentere Verfolgung und Sanktionierung von Verstö-
ßen für notwendig. Diese Maßnahmen würden durch die damit intendierte steigende
Glaubwürdigkeit auch der Wirtschaft zugute kommen.
Im sechsten Kapitel, „Transitional states in search of support: Private military compa-
nies and security sector reform“ von Elke Krahmann, steht der Einsatz privater Militärfir-
men bei der Reform des Sicherheitssektors im Vordergrund. Diese beinhaltet die (Wieder-)
Herstellung effektiver Sicherheit unter demokratischer Kontrolle und erlangt Bedeutung
vor allem in Entwicklungsländern und in postautoritären und Post-Konflikt-Staaten, wobei
private Militärfirmen – diese Konstellationen werden unterschieden – sowohl von den
betroffenen Staaten selber als auch von dritten Geberstaaten beauftragt werden. Probleme
sieht Krahmann weniger im jeweiligen Verhalten der Unternehmen als in ihrer Natur als
private Akteure im eigentlich öffentlichen Sektor. Hierunter könnte sowohl die Effektivität
ihres Einsatzes leiden als auch die wichtigen internationalen Beziehungen zwischen staatli-
chen Armeen, weswegen Regulierung zwar teilweise Verbesserungen herbeiführen kann,

der Einsatz staatlicher Armeen aber langfristig vorzuziehen wäre.
Den dritten Teil (Norms) eröffnet Louise Doswald-Beck mit dem siebten Kapitel „Pri-
vate military companies under international humanitarian law“. Sie legt diesen viel beach-
teten Komplex sehr anschaulich dar durch präzise Untersuchung der verschiedenen Nor-
men des humanitären Völkerrechts und der ihnen jeweils zugrunde liegenden Konstellatio-
nen. Während die Merkmale der Söldnerdefinition des Art. 47 des Ersten Zusatzprotokolls
zu den Genfer Abkommen (ZP I) durch Beschäftigte privater Militärfirmen selten erfüllt
bzw. nachzuweisen sind, ist deren Kombattantenstatus im Sinne des Art. 43 ZP I umstritten
und stark vom Einzelfall abhängig. Daneben besteht die Möglichkeit, nach Art. 4 A Nr. 4
Genfer Abkommen III als Begleiter der Streitkräfte Kriegsgefangenenstatus zu erhalten,
dies freilich nur in internationalen und nicht in internen Konflikten. Der Schutz der Mitar-
beiter privater Militärfirmen vor Angriffen hängt maßgeblich von ihrer direkten Teilnahme
an Feindseligkeiten ab, einem weiteren außerordentlich umstrittenen Merkmal. Für die
wiederum anders geregelten nicht-internationalen Konflikte hält Doswald-Beck aufgrund
des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes Angriffe dann für rechtswidrig, wenn eine
Gefangennahme ebenso möglich wäre. Abschließend untersucht sie die Staatenverantwort-
lichkeit im Rahmen des humanitären Völkerrechts, insbesondere für die Unterrichtung der
eingesetzten Personen, sowie die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit bei Kriegsverbrechen
der Beteiligten. Letztere beinhaltet neben Beweisschwierigkeiten und fehlendem Durchset-
zungswillen der Staaten zusätzliche Probleme hinsichtlich der möglichen Befehlsgewalt
öffentlicher Militärs. Zur Klärung des Status der Angehörigen privater Militärfirmen unter
humanitärem Völkerrecht könnte vor allem deren Eingliederung in die Streitkräfte beitra-
gen.
Mitherausgeberin Chia Lehnardt untersucht im achten Kapitel „Private military compa-
nies and state responsibility“ die Staatenverantwortlichkeit für das Handeln privater Mili-
tärfirmen, wobei sich das Völkerrecht trotz seiner Staatenzentriertheit flexibel zeigt im
Hinblick auf diese neuen Akteure. Die Zurechnung privaten Handelns ist zum einen mög-
lich bei der Ausübung hoheitlicher Gewalt, deren Abgrenzung aber – bis auf einige Kern-
funktionen staatlichen Handelns wie die Beteiligung an Kampfhandlungen – Schwierig-
keiten bereitet. Zum anderen ist die Zurechnung aufgrund faktischer Verbindungen zum
Staat möglich, wobei die vom Internationalen Gerichtshof geforderte effektive Kontrolle
hierfür eine hohe Hürde darstellt. Lehnardt stellt fest, dass dieses Kriterium weniger streng
gehandhabt werden könnte, wenn der beauftragende Staat – anders als in den vom Interna-
tionalen Gerichtshof entschiedenen Fällen – gleichzeitig die Kontrolle über das Gebiet
ausübt, in dem der Einsatz stattfindet. Eine dritte, weniger entwickelte Zurechnungsmög-
lichkeit, die gerade bei Verneinung der notwendigen Kontrolle Bedeutung erlangt, bietet
die Verletzung der gebotenen Sorgfalt (due diligence) durch einen Staat – in Betracht
kommen hier neben dem beauftragenden auch der Einsatz- und der Sitzstaat. Insgesamt
findet im System der Staatenverantwortlichkeit die Beteiligung privater Militärfirmen an
der Entscheidung über die Gewaltausübung keine Berücksichtigung, was aber auch Aus-
druck der Erkenntnis ist, dass die Staaten die ihnen zugeteilte Verantwortung für die Be-
grenzung der Gewaltausübung selber wahrnehmen müssen.
Mit den Möglichkeiten innerstaatlicher Lizenzierung privater Militärfirmen am Beispiel
der USA und Südafrikas befasst sich Marina Caparinis Kapitel „Domestic regulation:
Licensing regimes for the export of military goods and services“. Beide Staaten sind sehr
darauf bedacht, dass die nationale Sicherheitspolitik nicht untergraben wird; in den USA
akzeptiert man die Übertragung militärischer Aufgaben auf private Militärfirmen generell
eher als in Südafrika. Beide Lizenzierungssysteme, die jeweils auf der Kriegswaffenexport-
kontrolle aufbauen, weisen jedoch erhebliche Lücken auf sowohl in der Dichte der Regulie-
rung als auch hinsichtlich der parlamentarischen Kontrolle und der Durchsetzbarkeit. Wäh-
rend in den USA aufgrund der besonderen Privatisierungsfreundlichkeit die Kooperation
mit den Unternehmen im Vordergrund steht, sind in Südafrika jüngst Gesetzesänderungen
2
verabschiedet worden , die den regulierten Bereich ausweiten und Ausdruck eines weiter-
hin eher antagonistischen Verhältnisses zwischen Staat und Militärfirmen sind. Für eine
effektive Regulierung hält Caparini unabhängig von den Gegebenheiten in dem jeweiligen
Staat vor allem erhöhte Transparenz, eine stärkere Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft und die Aus-
weitung der bisher minimalen parlamentarischen Kontrolle für erforderlich.
Im Fokus des vierten Teils des Buches (Markets) stehen der internationale Markt priva-
ter Militärdienstleistungen sowie seine Regulierung und zukünftige Entwicklung. Deborah
Avant untersucht im zehnten Kapitel „The emerging market for private military services
and the problems of regulation“ die mit der Privatisierung von Gewaltausübung verbunde-
nen Möglichkeiten und Herausforderungen und sieht vor allem die diffuse Kontrolle über
privatisierte Gewaltausübung als problematisch an. Die unterschiedlichen, oft nur kurzfris-
tig angelegten Interessen der verschiedenen Akteure sowie die fehlende Kooperation und
Überwachung sorgen für eine Entwicklung des Marktes allein anhand wirtschaftlicher
Gesichtspunkte. So hält Avant die Normentstehung auf dem Markt durch prägendes Ver-
halten der Auftraggeber für viel unwahrscheinlicher als durch Selbstregulierung der zur
Professionalisierung tendierenden Unternehmen.
Mit den Möglichkeiten der Einflussnahme auf private Militärfirmen beschäftigt sich
James Cockayne anhand der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie im
elften Kapitel „Make or buy? Principal-agent theory and the regulation of private military
companies“. Durch Untersuchung der verschiedenen Konstellationen des Einsatzes privater
Militärfirmen im Hinblick auf das jeweilige Verhältnis zwischen Prinzipal und Agent wer-
den verschiedene Regulierungsmöglichkeiten dargelegt. Probleme bereiten Schlupflöcher
in den bisherigen Regelungen, das häufige Vorhandensein mehrerer Prinzipale sowie die
Möglichkeit der Umkehr des Prinzipal-Agent-Verhältnisses, vor allem bei der Bereitstel-
lung und Bedienung von Waffensystemen durch private Unternehmen. Hinsichtlich der
2
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed
Conflict Act (No. 27 of 2006), GG 30477/2007-11-16 – Inkrafttreten wird noch bekannt gemacht,
vgl. http://www.lawlibrary.co.za/notice/updates/2007/issue_37.htm (08.01. 2008).
Regulierung setzt Cockayne große Hoffnung auf die private Rechtsdurchsetzung durch
Geschädigte im Einzelfall, verbunden mit internationaler Harmonisierung und Kooperation.
Insgesamt könnte der Einsatz privater Militärfirmen in bestimmten Konstellationen die
rechtsstaatliche Begrenzung der Gewaltausübung gefährden, aber auch eine Steigerung der
sozialen Verantwortung der Unternehmen schiene möglich, so dass neben der Gewaltaus-
übung auch deren Überwachung teilweise privatisiert wäre.
Im zwölften Kapitel („Contract as a tool for regulating private military companies“)
untersucht Laura A. Dickinson den Einsatz von Verträgen als Mittel der Regulierung. Sie
beschäftigt sich hierfür mit verschiedenen Einwänden gegen die Effektivität von Verträgen
und legt – meist unter Bezugnahme auf das Beispiel des Einsatzes privater Vernehmungs-
personen im Militärgefängnis Abu Ghraib – dar, dass dies für derzeitige Verträge zwar
zutrifft, es durch effizientere Verträge aber möglich wäre, öffentlich-rechtliche und völker-
rechtliche Normen in den privaten Sektor zu transportieren, wie es bei der Privatisierung
auf rein nationaler Ebene bereits üblich ist. Der Vertrag sei deswegen das wirksamste
Instrument, weil er stets an den jeweiligen Einzelfall angepasst werden könne. Bei der
Überwachung könnten vor allem internationale Nichtregierungsorganisationen eine bedeu-
tende Rolle spielen.
Andrew Bearpark und Sabrina Schulz von der British Association of Private Security
Companies legen im dreizehnten Kapitel („The future of the market“) Optionen für die
zukünftige Entwicklung und Regulierung privater Militärfirmen dar. Während staatliche
Maßnahmen auf internationaler und nationaler Ebene langfristig notwendig seien, sei
zunächst eine Selbstregulierung innerhalb der Wirtschaft zu erwarten, die wiederum zu
entsprechenden Gesetzen führen könne. Zur auch von Seiten der Unternehmen gewünsch-
ten Regulierung sei ein Zusammenwirken der verschiedenen Akteure erforderlich.
In ihrem abschließenden Fazit stellen die Herausgeber Simon Chesterman und Chia
Lehnardt fest, die tatsächliche Entwicklung privater Militärfirmen sei der wissenschaftli-
chen Aufarbeitung und theoretischen Einbettung voraus. Es fänden sich aber dennoch
anwendbare Regeln, die nur zu einem einheitlichen regulativen Rahmen zusammengefügt
werden müssten. Probleme bereiteten derzeit vor allem die mangelnde Transparenz, struk-
turelle Schwierigkeiten bei der Sanktionierung individuellen Handelns und fehlende
Durchsetzungsmechanismen für die vorhandenen Normen. Für die künftige Entwicklung
schlagen die Herausgeber vor, Vergleiche mit privaten Militärfirmen weniger bei den oft
genannten Söldnern zu suchen, sondern stattdessen bei transnationalen Rohstofffirmen, und
eine direkte Bindung an Menschenrechte herbeizuführen. Von der erwarteten Konsolidie-
rung der Wirtschaft nach Beendigung des Irak-Konflikts erhoffen sie sich eine durch
erhöhten Konkurrenzdruck veranlasste Professionalisierung, wenn auch weder Regulierung
noch der Markt alle Bedenken gegen die Privatisierung militärischer Gewalt beseitigen
könnten. Ohne ein ausbalanciertes Rechtsregime aber, so das plastische Schlusswort, würde
der Markt weiterhin nur durch „Bankrott und Tod“ reguliert.
Der Band zeigt deutlich das durch die Herausgeber im Fazit angesprochene „Patch-
work“ verschiedener vorhandener Regelungen und bei zukünftigen Regelungen zu beach-
tender Aspekte. Die Vielfalt der Ansätze bringt es mit sich, dass sich in den einzelnen
Kapiteln einige Überschneidungen und Widersprüche finden, sei es hinsichtlich der tat-
sächlichen Gegebenheiten oder ihrer typologischen oder rechtlichen Einordnung. Diese –
geringfügigen – Unstimmigkeiten sind aber im diskursiven Ansatz des Werkes angelegt und
mindern in keiner Weise den großen Wert des Bandes als Zusammenstellung beachtlicher
2
Erkenntnisse über das in dieser Intensität selten untersuchte Phänomen privater Militärfir-
men. Die Schwierigkeit wird darin bestehen, diese Erkenntnisse zu einem kohärenten
Regulierungsregime zusammenzufügen, wobei staatliche und nichtstaatliche sowie natio-
nale und internationale Akteure gleichermaßen gefordert sind. Gleichzeitig wirft der Band
weitergehende Fragen auf hinsichtlich der Verteilung und Kontrolle legitimer Gewaltaus-
übung in einem Völkerrechtssystem mit immer mehr und immer wichtigeren privaten
Akteuren.
Positiv zu erwähnen sind schließlich die ausführliche Bibliographie, das detaillierte
Sachverzeichnis sowie der eindrucksvolle Einband des Buches mit einem Ausschnitt aus
Picassos „Guernica“.
Daniel Heck, Berlin
2
Umfassend auch Thomas Jäger / Gerhard Kümmel (Eds.), Private Military and Security Compa-
nies. Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, Wiesbaden 2007.
113
BIBLIOGRAPHIE / BIBLIOGRAPHY
Die nachfolgende Literaturauswahl ist erstellt in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Informations-

zentrum des Leibniz-Instituts für Globale und Regionale Studien – GIGA – (bis 2005:
Deutsches Übersee-Institut – DÜI) Hamburg.*
The following selected bibliography has been compiled in cooperation with the information
centre of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies – GIGA – (former German Over-
seas Institute – DÜI) Hamburg.**
RECHT UND ENTWICKLUNG ALLGEMEIN / LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN

GENERAL
Bliss, Frank / Merten, Peter / Schmidt, Bettina (Hrsg.), Die Evaluierungspraxis deutscher Entwick-
lungsorganisationen. Ziele – Umsetzung – Herausforderungen, 2007, 224 S., ISBN 978-3-88156-
786-2.
Brunkhorst, Hauke / Voigt, Rüdiger (Hrsg.), Rechts-Staat. Staat, internationale Gemeinschaft und
Völkerrecht bei Hans Kelsen, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2008, 400 S. (Staatsver-
ständnisse, Bd. 16), ISBN 978-3-8329-2977-0.
Eberhard, Harald / Lachmayer, Konrad / Ribarov, Gregor / Thallinger, Gerhard (eds.), Perspectives
and Limits of Democracy. Proceedings of the 3rd Vienna Workshop on International Constitu-
tional Law. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2008, 170 S., (Schriften zum Internatio-
nalen und Vergleichenden Öffentlichen Recht, Band 4), ISBN 978-3-8329-3341-8.
Heun, Werner / Starck, Christian (Hrsg.), Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit im Rechtsvergleich. Drittes
deutsch-taiwanesisches Kolloquium vom 02.- 03. Oktober 2006 an der Georg-August-Universität
Göttingen. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 2008, 246 S. (Studien und Materialien zur
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, Bd. 102) ISBN 978-3-8329-3082-0.
Hufen, Friedhelm (Hrsg.) Verfassungen - Zwischen Recht und Politik. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag
für Hans-Peter Schneider. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 2008, 596 S., ISBN 978-3-
8329-2946-6.
Kreide, Regina, Globale Politik und Menschenrechte. Macht und Ohnmacht eines politischen Instru-
ments, Campus-Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 2008 (Campus Forschg, Bd. 929), 264 S., ISBN 978-3-
59338-597-6.
* Diese Bibliographie dient ausschließlich der Information. Die angegebenen Titel können von
VRÜ und GIGA nicht geliefert werden.
** This Bibliography serves information purposes only. Neither VRÜ nor GIGA can supply any of
the titles listed.
Tenscher, Jens / Viehrig, Henrike (Hrsg.), Politische Kommunikation in internationalen Beziehungen.

Studien zur politischen Kommunikation Bd. 2, 2007, 240 S., ISBN 978-3-8258-0279-0.
Thränhardt, Dietrich (Hrsg.), Entwicklung und Migration, Jahrbuch Migration - Yearbook Migration
2006/2007. Studien zu Migration und Minderheiten Bd. 14, 2008, 256 S., ISBN 978-3-8258-
9724-6.
World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development, by World Bank, 384 p. October 2007,
ISBN: 0-8213-6807-9.
AFRIKA / AFRICA
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avenir de la fonction.- Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007, 643 S. -ISBN 978-2-296-02398-7.
At the coalface: gender and local government in Southern Africa / ed. by Colleen Lowe Morna u.a.
with a foreword by Winnie Byanyima. Gender Links.- Johannesburg, 2007, 316 S. -ISBN 978-0-
620-38248-9.
Becher, Anika, Parteienverbote in Afrika: mehr Schein als Sein?.- Hamburg: GIGA German Institute
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Köppe, 2006, XXIII, 295 S. -ISBN 978-3-89645-621-2.
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state, in: African Affairs (Oxford). 106 (October 2007) 425, S. 557-586.
Breton, Jean-Marie, Le statut et la perception de juge de l'administration dans les Etats d'Afrique
Noire francophone, in: Recht in Afrika (Köln). 10 (2007) 1, S. 1-30.
Brown, Stephen / Kaiser, Paul J., Democratisations in Africa: attempts, hindrances and prospects, in:
Third World Quarterly (Egham). 28 (2007) 6, S. 1131-1149.
Cammack, Diana, The logic of African neopatrimonialism: what role for donors?, in: Development
Policy Review (Oxford). 25 (September 2007) 5, S. 599-614.
Clark, John F., National conferences and democratization in francophone Africa, aus: Multiparty
democracy and political change: constraints to democratization in Africa / ed. by John Mukum
Mbaku u.a. - Trenton/N.J. u.a.: Africa World Press, 2006, S. 97-122. -ISBN 1-8401-4379-7.
Erdmann, Gero, The cleavage model, ethnicity and voter alignment in Africa: conceptual and
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the cases of Kenya, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.- Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007,
85 S. -ISBN 978-91-7106-587-2.
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55 S. -ISBN 978-1-92021-601-6.
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crisis: a function of the globalisation of human rights, in: Africa Insight (Pretoria). 37 (April
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S. 463-480.
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Aktuelle Neuerscheinung Verfassung und

Recht in Übersee VRÜ

Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit Herausgegeben von Aus dem Inhalt:

Coopération des Cours et Francophonie au

Kunig, Freie Universität Berlin, Dr. Karl-Andreas Hernekamp, Universität Hamburg

Jo Eric Khushal Murkens

Manuel José Cepeda

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews

Werner Meng / Ulrich Magnus / Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte / Thomas Cottier /

Mathias Reimann / Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.)

Christoph Antons / Volkmar Gessner (eds.)

Simon Chesterman / Chea Lehnardt (eds.)

Bibliographie / Bibliography ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 113

Hamburg / Gießen / Berlin / Baden-Baden

Herausgeber, Redaktion und Verlag

progress of constitutionalism worldwide. The constitutionalist dialogue between North and

Hamburg / Gießen / Berlin / Baden-Baden

Editors, editorial committee and publisher

Constitutional Law in "old" and "new" Law and Development

By Brun-Otto Bryde, Giessen / Karlsruhe

The internationalization of constitutional law is a very exciting development; however, it

Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making

By Francois Venter, Potchefstroom

Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on the Originalists’

By Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, London

The Globalization of Latin American Constitutional Law

By Javier A. Couso, Santiago de Chile

Globalization of Constitutional Law through Interaction of Judges

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The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A Note on the Colombian Case

By Manuel José Cepeda, Bogotà

Constitutional Law in "old" and "new" Law and Development

Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative

By Francois Venter, Potchefstroom

∗ Professor of Law, North-west University, Potchefstroom, South Africa. E–Mail: Francois.Venter

2.2 Separation of powers

2.3 Constitutional adjudication

2.4 Decentralization / deconcentration

It would appear that, in contemporary constitution-writing, the need for decentraliza-

Various authors ascribe the increasing internationalization of constitutional law primar-

elements of international justiciability may become possible. For present purposes it is

• a democratic system of government, including multi-party democracy, regular elec-

These principles of constitution-making essentially reflect what might be described as the

Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on

By Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, London

that comparative constitutional law can contribute towards ‘a self-conscious discourse of

I. The Originalists’ Objections

The sixth argument relates to the dangers of manipulation. In the absence of a US

II. Alternative Arguments

doctrinal objections to comparative analysis, namely that it is undemocratic. Although

introduction of rational arguments from other jurisdictions in domestic judicial reasoning

i) presumes similarities in different legal systems,

Globalization of Constitutional Law through

By Jutta Limbach, Berlin / Munich∗

I. Creation of Networks between Decision-makers

II. Co-operation of Judges

III. Human Rights Protection in the Council of Europe Framework

The Globalization of Latin American Constitutional Law

By Javier A. Couso, Santiago de Chile

II. Law and constitutionalism in Latin American history

III. The transformation of Latin American constitutionalism

The Internationalization of Constitutional Law:

By Manuel José Cepeda, Bogotà

Bibliographie / Bibliography �� 113