VII.

Paternity and Filiations;

A. Legitimate Children;
a) Presumption of legitimacy
1. Liyao vs Tanhoti-Liyao, GR No. 138961, 3/7/2002

G.R. No. 138961               March 7, 2002

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner,

vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA
CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4, 1999 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 45394 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
1 

(RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate
(spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L.
Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as
a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional rights as such and
to pay the costs of the suit.

On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil
Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition
as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao" against herein respondents, Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. The complaint
2 

was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner "was in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao," petitioner having been "recognized and
acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime." 3

The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:

Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten
(10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William
Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived
together in the company of Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:

Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in Quezon City and
Manila. This was with the knowledge of William Liyao’s legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and
Christina were both employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William
were then vice president and president, respectively.

Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the signature of her
husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature
and, had never been in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William
Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the
name of Far East Realty Investment, Inc.

On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital.
During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new
born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid
under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia
Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billy’s birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank
account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be
4 

deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son
5 

and had their pictures taken together. 6

During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among others, William
Liyao and Corazon together with Billy’s godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyao’s legal staff and
their wives while on vacation in Baguio. Corazon also presented pictures in court to prove that that
7 
she usually accompanied William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other
important meetings. During the occasion of William Liyao’s last birthday on November 22, 1975 held
8 

at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence
of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, "Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a
good looking son." Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status
9 

of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt acts.
William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. However, after
William Liyao’s death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition
fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old
newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his last moments
with Corazon.

Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G. Garcia and
William Liyao who were godparents to her children. She used to visit Corazon and William Liyao
from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette
and Enrique (Ike), together with some housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one
family. On some occasions like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the
couple’s residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would usually see William
Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her child
Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills and later on in White
Plains where she would often see William Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon, she was at the
Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them at White
Plains and knew that William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of
grocery supplies, money for household expenses and matriculation fees for the two (2) older
children, Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyao’s birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the
Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his two (2)
daughters from his legal marriage, "Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy." He then talked
10 

about his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to make it "engrande" and
"make the bells of San Sebastian Church ring." Unfortunately, this did not happen since William
11 

Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyao’s funeral and helped Corazon
pack his clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and gray which Mr. Liyao wore
12 

in a photograph as well as another shirt of lime green as belonging to the deceased. A note was
13  14 

also presented with the following inscriptions: "To Cora, Love From William." Maurita remembered
15 

having invited the couple during her mother’s birthday where the couple had their pictures taken
while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still married to
Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her
said husband. However, during the entire cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita
had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house when she usually visited Corazon.

Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew that Billy is the
son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her customers.
Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazon’s house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965.
Gloria had numerous occasions to see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the
couple transferred to White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was
conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage so he insisted that
she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play
mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes’ wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions among
themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of the
maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is
married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo
with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.

Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time that
the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was about six (6) years old when
William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the latter’s death on December 2, 1975. Mr.
Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enrique’s half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures
showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enrique’s testimony was
corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures showing Mr. Liyao
carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that the negatives were in the possession of
her mother, Corazon Garcia.

Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.

Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were
legally married. Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro
16 

Manila until she got married; that her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that there was
no reason why any of her parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father
lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of town
business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father would change his clothes
at home because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly had trouble sleeping in
other people’s homes. Linda described him as very conservative and a strict disciplinarian. He
believed that no amount of success would compensate for failure of a home. As a businessman, he
was very tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered two
strokes before the fatal attack which led to his death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at
the office sometime in April-May 1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in the
house for two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture treatment. He could not talk,
move, walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran
the office. She handled the collection of rents while her sister referred legal matters to their lawyers.
William Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed. He was not active in business and had
dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke during the latter part of September to
October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3) days and went back to work. He felt
depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did not put in long hours in the office unlike before
and tried to spend more time with his family.

Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally
separated from her husband and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the
couple obtained any annulment of their marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo
17 

picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage. Immediately after the death of Linda’s father,
Corazon went to Linda’s office for the return of the former’s alleged investments with the Far East
Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda added that
Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company, was able to take out documents, clothes and
several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. There was one instance when she was
told by the guards, "Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out things again." Linda then instructed the
18 

guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon
Garcia go. Linda did not recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having
been shown three (3) large suit cases full of men’s clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and
pajamas.

Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never been separated.
They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of her father’s
death on December 2, 1975. Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to
19 

his death. During the first heart attack sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and hands
were affected and he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under strict medication,
taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood
pressure and cholesterol level control. Tita Rose testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon
20 

Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) representing her
investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never
received any formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of
her father, William Liyao. After assuming the position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not
come across any check signed by her late father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the
house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the laminated photographs presented by
Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were displayed at the latter’s
office.

The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of
William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village,
Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 o’clock in the morning. At past 7:00 o’clock in the evening, either
Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime between April and
May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was able to report to the office.
Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in September 1974, Mr.
Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr.
Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him
like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of Mr.
Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyao’s breast and
decided later to carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao
and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the Republic
Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would
sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if
to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself as
car dealer.

Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon. He freely
relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic Supermarket once in 1973
and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to the latter’s law office. Being the driver of Mr.
Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao,
Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with
the lawyers’ wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving for
Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like shopping.

On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as
follows:

(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad litem of the minor
William Liyao, Jr.;

(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased
William Liyao;

(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan
and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr. as a
compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao, entitled to all succesional rights as such; and

(d) Costs of suit. 21

In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of evidence that
the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when
Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner had
been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and
overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his confidential
secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son;
providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the
legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and "the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only
on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between husband and wife was physically
impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code." The appellate
court gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and
Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and have not secured legal separation, were seen in each
other’s company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased William Liyao.
The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of William
Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish proof of paternity in the
absence of any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said
certificates and considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated
that neither do family pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With regard to the passbook
which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court observed that there was nothing
in it to prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia
since William Liyao’s signature and name do not appear thereon.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition.

It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of issues
which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of
filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the real
crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of
his supposed father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be
legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration
22 

contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy.23

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:
24 

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses
shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility
of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was
not possible;

3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from
her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was
physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was
conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner presented a document entitled, "Contract of
Separation," executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims
25 

on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future. 26

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time
petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child,
it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255
of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the
conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a
27 

strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he
is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces
and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral
and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest
28 

such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount o an insult to his memory. 29

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the
then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as
the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a
valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his
30 

present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional
circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting
marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the
father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter
cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the
presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who
successfully defeated the presumption. 31

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon
Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are
allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon
Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation
of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother,
Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the
child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and
within the period limited by law.
1âwphi1

Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented by
both parties on the petitioner’s claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event,
there is no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father
had admitted or recognized his paternity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

2. De Jesus vs Estate of Dizon, GR#142877, 10/2/2001

G.R. No. 142877           October 2, 2001

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors, represented by their

mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON,
FELIFE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA
CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY
CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The petitioner involves the case of the illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful
wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their
respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules of succession.

Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born,
the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.

In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie

de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died
intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in
various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and
Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including
the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing
that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for
altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased
Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and subsequent
motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994.
Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals.

On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to
be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting
assertions should be threshed out at the trial considering that the birth certificates presented by
respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted petitioners' allegation of illegitimacy. 1âwphi1.nêt

On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions,
respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the
illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior
relief once petitioners would have been able the establish their status as such heirs. It was
contended, in fine that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the
question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or
proceeding.

Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint
of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper.1 It decreed that the declaration of
heirship could only be made in a special proceeding in asmuch as petitioners were seeking the
establishment of a status or right.

Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Basically, petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent,
embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not
require a separate action for judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs.
Bellosillo.2

In the comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is
inapplicable to the case because there has been no attempt to impugn legitimate filiation
in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal of the complaint, respondents count on the
case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,3 which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be
questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but must be seasonably brought up in direct
action frontally addressing the issue.

The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is time that this
matter draws to a close.

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuos possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.4 The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no
further court action is required.5 In fact, any writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval.6 Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicted on other evidence merely
tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
or record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statue of limitations is
essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgement.7

A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents.
The certificates of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate.8 this presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in such a way
that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely
prevents sexual intercourse.9 Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article
170,10 and in proper cases Article 171,11 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988),
the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable,12

Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners,
in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of
children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,13 or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully
impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia. In said case,
the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the action for partition filed by
an illegitimate child who had claimed to be an acknowledgement spurious child by virtue of a private
document. Signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of
legitimate children asserting to be somebody else's illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored
the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to declare that they
could not have been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth
certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.

The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes
petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any
relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate
offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted
to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus
born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy
by law cannot be attacked collaterally,15 one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose.16 Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as having been an adulteress.17

WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.

3. Concepcion vs CA, GR No. 123450, 31 Aug 2005

G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and
care, including appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth. In case of assault on
1 

his rights by those who take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in
his defense with the single-minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.

This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte,
and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29,
1989. After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresa’s parents in Fairview, Quezon City. Almost a
2  3 

year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. 4

Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19,
1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of
bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had
5 

married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario
6 

was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City. 7

Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred
that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all. 8

The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she
married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose
Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa
while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.9
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him
responsible for the ‘bastardization’ of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the above
decision "INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the … decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-
called ‘visitation rights’… between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday." She 10 

argued that there was nothing in the law granting "visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an
illegitimate child." She further maintained that Jose Gerardo’s surname should be changed from
11 

Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the
mother’s surname.

Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of ‘Concepcion’ as
Jose Gerardo’s surname.

Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresa’s motion and
made the following observations:

It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the other, something
they should never do if they want to assure the normal development and well-being of the boy.

The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a father, especially as
he is a boy, who must have a father figure to recognize – something that the mother alone cannot
give. Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and psychological well-being of the boy would
be better served if he were allowed to maintain relationships with his father.

There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this matter, the Court
invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, to wit:

"In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be
the paramount consideration."

WHEREFORE, the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby DENIED. 12

Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the trial court
granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardo’s surname
(Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been declared illegitimate and should
therefore use her surname (Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. 13

On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a putative father
visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the "best interest of the child"
policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that "[a]t bottom, it (was) the child’s welfare and not the
convenience of the parents which (was) the primary consideration in granting visitation rights a few
hours once a week." 14

The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mother’s surname motu
proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a separate proceeding for a change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the correction in the civil registry. 15

Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the appellate
court. She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate the
issues involved in the controversy.

After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the appellate court
resolved the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was
not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage:

It is, therefore, undeniable – established by the evidence in this case – that the appellant [Ma.
Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with
the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called "marriage" with the latter was void ab initio. It was
[Gerardo] himself who had established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately
married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore,
the child Jose Gerardo – under the law – is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage
between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the
void and non-existent ‘marriage’ between [Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be
the child of the legitimate and existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164,
Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody
nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the
child. Not only is it without legal basis (even supposing the child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146,
The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and
Gopiao, would prevent any possible rapproachment between the married couple, and would mean a
judicial seal upon an illegitimate relationship. 16

The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose
Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate showing that he was
born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married:

We are not unaware of the movant’s argument that various evidence exist that appellee and the
appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein, We
cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:

"The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress." (underscoring ours)

Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her
legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed father.
In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for
one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of
the minor can change his status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the
mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it
is. (Emphasis supplied)
17 

Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was
denied. Hence, this appeal.
18 

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A
19 

child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. 20

As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
21 

Code provides:

Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained 22 

the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals :23 

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on
the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the
policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to
24 

dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband Mario or, in a proper case, his 25 

heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the
26 

legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his
heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never
27 

became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family
28 

Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled
the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not
29 

disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. 30

The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical
impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child. 31
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital
intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or
32 

provinces and they were never together during the period of conception. Or, the husband was in
33 

prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the
violation of prison regulations.
34

Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City,
Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are
only a scant four kilometers apart.

Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was
presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the
separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make
it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.

Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be
presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption
of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario,
stands.

Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa’s statement in her answer to the petition for annulment of
35 

marriage that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never any
36 

sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her.

Gerardo’s argument is without merit.

First, the import of Ma. Theresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario
but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is
illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.

The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her
child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.

Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an
instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely
no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed
that nothing ever happened between them.

Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose
Gerardo’s conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity
to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was
never established beyond reasonable doubt.

Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right
exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. A mother has no right to disavow a
37 

child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question
38 

Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.

Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no
intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in consonance
39 

with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean
toward the legitimacy of children. 40

Gerardo’s insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and
in the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and
agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that
the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to
allowing the mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the
denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the very acts from which
the law seeks to shield the child.

Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise,
41 

the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value
in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court
shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered. 42

Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. Although a
43 

record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child, as the
44 

status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the
legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following
the termination of marriage is sought to be established. 45

Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be
contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs.
Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.

In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. As prima
46 

facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant
evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made
therein by the interested parties. Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of
47 

Jose Gerardo’s illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof
beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more
weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the
purpose of the law.

It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose Gerardo’s
illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the child’s interests at heart. The law, reason and
common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law,
the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of
both his father and mother, full support and full inheritance. On the other hand, an illegitimate child
48 

is bound to use the surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim
support only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate
counterpart. Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the eyes
49 

of society, a ‘bastard’ is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state,
the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.

It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble between the very
persons who were passionately declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that he was made
to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness should end.

This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an innocent
child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these proceedings began. He is now
almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now comes to
his aid to write finis to the controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.

Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.

As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and
mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A person’s
50 

surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to
child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law,
51 

not related to him in any way.

The matter of changing Jose Gerardo’s name and effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil
register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.

In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights
flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each other’s company. There being no such
parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose
Gerardo.

Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Child’s Welfare Paramount. – In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.

Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a
signatory is similarly emphatic:

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration.

The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the
52 

end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be
impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this
case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

4. Angeles vs Maglaya, GR No. 153798, 2Sep 2005

G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, Petitioners,

vs.
ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Belen Sagad
Angeles seeks to set aside the Decision dated May 29, 20021 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 66037, reversing an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court at Caloocan City which dismissed
the petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles, thereat commenced by
the herein respondent Aleli "Corazon" Angeles-Maglaya.

The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March 25, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) at Caloocan City, respondent filed a petition2 for letters of administration and her appointment
as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco, hereinafter). In the
petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. C-2140 and raffled to Branch 120 of the court,
respondent alleged, among other things, the following:

1. That Francisco, a resident of 71 B. Serrano St., Grace Park, Caloocan, died intestate on January
21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building, among other
valuable properties;

2. That there is a need to appoint an administrator of Francisco’s estate;

3. That she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and,
together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedent’s wife by his second marriage, are the surviving
heirs of the decedent; and

4. That she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an administrator.
Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the
administratrix of Francisco’s estate.3 In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having
married Francisco on August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal,
a union which was ratified two (2) months later in religious rites at the Our Lady of Grace Parish in
Caloocan City, and that Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that
time. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although
she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not
signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the
legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract
between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. And
evidently to debunk respondent’s claim of being the only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise
averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al.
Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of
the superior right to the administration of his estate.

In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate
offices, the January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor,
Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. In the
same reply, respondent dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her
having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the
RTC at Caloocan.4

Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as petitioner a quo, commenced the
presentation of her evidence by taking the witness stand. She testified having been born on
November 20, 1939 as the legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, who
died in January 1988.5 She also testified having been in open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child. Four (4) other witnesses testified on her behalf, namely: Tomas
Angeles,6 Francisco Yaya,7 Jose O. Carreon8 and Paulita Angeles de la Cruz.9 Respondent also
offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the
Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon
the handwritten word "Yes" appears on the space below the question "Legitimate? (Legitimo?)";
pictures taken during respondent’s wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of
her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service records.

After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner filed a "Motion to
Dismiss" under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the
petition for letters of administration on the ground that the petition failed "to state or prove a cause of
action", it being her stated position that "[P]etitioner [Corzaon], by her evidence, failed to establish
her filiation vis-à-vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M.
Angeles."10

To the motion to dismiss, respondent interposed an opposition, followed by petitioner’s reply, to

which respondent countered with a rejoinder.

Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999,11 the trial court, on its finding that respondent failed to
prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure of the [respondent] to

state a cause of action in accordance with Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil of
Procedure. (Word in bracket added]

Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the trial court in its Order
of December 17, 1999.12 Therefrom, respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals where her
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66037.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated May 29,
2002,13 reversed and set aside the trial court’s order of dismissal and directed it to appoint
respondent as administratrix of the estate of Francisco, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is REVERSED. The Trial Court is hereby ordered to
appoint petitioner-appellant Aleli "Corazon" Angeles as administratrix of the intestate estate of
Francisco Angeles.
SO ORDERED.

The appellate court predicated its ruling on the interplay of the following main premises:

1. Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, albeit premised on the alleged failure of the
underlying petition for letter of administration to state or prove a cause of action, actually partakes of
a demurrer to evidence under Section 1 of Rule 33;14

2. Petitioner’s motion being a demurer, it follows that she thereby waived her right to present
opposing evidence to rebut respondent’s testimonial and documentary evidence; and

3. Respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with the deceased Francisco.

Hence, petitioner’s instant petition for review on certiorari, on the submission that the Court of
Appeals erred: (1) in reversing the trial court’s order of dismissal;15 (2) in treating her motion to
dismiss as a demurrer to evidence; (3) in holding that respondent is a legitimate daughter of
Francisco; and (4) in decreeing respondent’s appointment as administratrix of Francisco’s intestate
estate.

We resolve to grant the petition.

The principal issue tendered in this case boils down to the question of whether or not respondent is
the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. The Court of
Appeals resolved the issue in the affirmative and, on the basis of such determination, ordered the
trial court to appoint respondent as administratrix of Francisco’s estate.

We are unable to lend concurrence to the appellate court’s conclusion on the legitimate status of
respondent, or, to be precise, on her legitimate filiation to the decedent. A legitimate child is a
product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union
and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code
cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate."

In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and extensibly quoting from Tison vs. Court of
Appeals,16 stated that since petitioner "opted not to present any contrary evidence", the presumption
on respondent’s legitimacy stands "unrebutted."17

Following is an excerpt from Tison:

It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the
universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing than
the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well-settled is the rule that the
issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

The rationale for this rule has been explained in this wise:

‘The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . .

actually fixes a status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

‘Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170 [of the Family Code], the action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child can no longer be bought. The status conferred by the presumption,
therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to
prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty. It also aims to
force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child so that the evidence material to
the matter . . . may still be easily available.’

xxxxxxxxx
‘Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife . . . .’(Words in bracket
added; Emphasis ours)

Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a
child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy
of such child cannot be attacked collaterally.

A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption
to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact.18 For, a presumption
is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact
thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved,19 the
presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code20 may be availed only upon
convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and
that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the
presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise.

In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under review, did not categorically state
from what facts established during the trial was the presumption of respondent’s supposed
legitimacy arose. But even if perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For, save for
respondent’s gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof
of the decedent’s marriage to respondent’s mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage
certificate or marriage contract – doubtless the best evidence of Francisco’s and Genoveva’s
marriage, if one had been solemnized21 – was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other
solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage
between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let
alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent was
Francisco’s daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita Angeles de la Cruz testified that
they know respondent to be their cousin because his (Tomas’) father and her (Paulita’s) mother, who
are both Francisco’s siblings, told them so.22 And one Jose Carreon would testify seeing respondent
in 1948 in Francisco’s house in Caloocan, the same Francisco who used to court Genoveva before
the war.23 In all, no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-
Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity
of the solemnizing officer; the persons present, and like significant details.

While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage between Francisco and
Genoveva, we can even go to the extent of saying that respondent has not even presented a
witness to testify that her putative parents really held themselves out to the public as man-and-wife.
Clearly, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of
legitimacy which, as above explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and
Genevova. To reiterate, absent such a marriage, as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy and,
therefore, there was really nothing for petitioner to rebut.

Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and Francisco Angeles were married in
1938, respondent never, thru the years, even question what would necessarily be a bigamous
Francisco-Belen Sagad marriage. Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very
own case. As it were, she made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion – as well as
the appellate court’s conclusion - that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. As may be
recalled, respondent had declared that her mother Genoveva died in 1988, implying, quite clearly,
that when Francisco contracted marriage with petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and
Francisco were already "spouses". Now, then, if, as respondent maintained despite utter lack of
evidence, that Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it follows that the marriage
of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to Genoveva’s death, would necessarily
have to be bigamous, hence void,24 in which case petitioner could not be, as respondent alleged in
her petition for letters of administration, a "surviving spouse" of the decedent. We quote the pertinent
allegation:

4. The surviving heirs of decedent are the petitioner [Corazon] herself who is 58 years old, and
BELEN S. Angeles, the surviving spouse of deceased Francisco M. Angeles by his second
marriage, who is about 77 years old . . . .YEARS OLD . . . " (Emphasis and word in bracket added)

We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code appears to say so, that the legitimate
filiation of a child can be established by any of the modes therein defined even without direct
evidence of the marriage of his/her supposed parents. Said article 172 reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or

2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and

signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Here, respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate
dated November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila (Exh. "E"). In it, her birth
was recorded as the legitimate child of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. And the word
"married" is written in the certificate to indicate the union of Francisco and Genoveva.

Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that "[I]t was error for the Court of Appeals to
have ruled . . . that [respondent’s] Birth Certificate indubitably establishes that she is the legitimate
daughter of Francisco and Genoveva who are legally married".

The contention commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as simple as it is elementary: the
Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted.
Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who
certified to having attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a
private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact
which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a child.25 Jurisprudence teaches that a birth
certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must
be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.26 Dr. Arturo
Tolentino, commenting on the probative value of the entries in a certificate of birth, wrote:

xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the birth certificate, the putting of his name
by the mother or doctor or registrar is void; the signature of the alleged father is necessary.27

The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the Birth Certificate of respondent, unsigned as
it were by Francisco and Genoveva, establishes – and "indubitably" at that - not only respondent’s
filiation to Francisco but even her being a legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva, taxes
credulity to the limit. In a very real sense, the appellate court regarded such certificate as defining
proof of filiation, and not just filiation but of legitimate filiation, by inferring from it that Francisco and
Genoveva are legally married. In the apt words of petitioner, the appellate court, out of a Birth
Certificate signed by a physician who merely certified having attended "the birth of a child who was
born alive at 3:50 P.M. ", created " a marriage that of ‘ Francisco and Genoveva’, and filiation (that
said child) is the daughter of ‘Francisco’"’28

It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself.29 It
cannot, as the decision under review seems to suggest, be made dependent on the declaration of
the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed
mother, with or without the participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest legitimate
status to her offspring through the simple expedient of writing the putative father’s name in the
appropriate space in the birth certificate. A long time past, this Court cautioned against according a
similar unsigned birth certificate prima facie evidentiary value of filiation:

Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the way for any scheming unmarried
mother to extort money for her child (and herself) from any eligible bachelor or affluent pater
familias. How? She simply causes the midwife to state in the birth certificate that the newborn babe
is her legitimate offspring with that individual and the certificate will be accepted for registration . . . .
And any lawyer with sufficient imagination will realize the exciting possibilities from such mischief of
such prima facie evidence – when and if the "father" dies in ignorance of the fraudulent design xxx30

Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive comfort from her marriage contract to
Atty. Maglaya and from her student and government records which indicated or purported to show
that Francisco Angeles is her father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed
Francisco giving respondent’s hands in marriage. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are
by Francisco or the execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or
recognition.31 And needless to stress, they cannot support a finding of the legitimate union of
Francisco and Genoveva.

The argument may be advanced that the aforesaid wedding pictures, the school and service records
and the testimony of respondent’s witnesses lend support to her claim of enjoying open and
continuous possession of the status of a child of Francisco. The Court can even concede that
respondent may have been the natural child of Francisco with Genoveva. Unfortunately, however,
that angle is not an, or at issue in the case before us. For, respondent peremptorily predicated her
petition for letters of administration on her being a legitimate child of Francisco who was legally
married to her mother, Genoveva, propositions which we have earlier refuted herein.

If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could very well end this disposition were it not for another
compelling consideration which petitioner has raised and which we presently take judicially notice of.

As may be recalled, respondent, during the pendency of the proceedings at the trial court, filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the decision of the RTC Caloocan granting the
petition of spouses Francisco Angeles and petitioner Belen S. Angeles for the adoption of Concesa
A. Yamat and two others. In that petition, docketed with the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No.
47832 and captioned "Aleli ‘Corazon’ Angeles Maglaya vs. Hon Jaime T. Hamoy, Consesa A.
Yamat, Teodora A. Santos, Franco Angeles and Belen S. Angeles", respondent alleged that as
legitimate daughter of Francisco, she should have been notified of the adoption proceedings.

Following a legal skirmish, the Court of Appeals referred the aforementioned annulment case to
RTC, Caloocan for reception of evidence. Eventually, in a Decision32 dated December 17, 2003, the
Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 on the ground, inter alia, that herein respondent
is not, contrary to her claim, a "legitimate daughter" of Francisco, nor "a child of a lawful wedlock
between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado". Wrote the appellate court in that case:

Petitioner [Aleli "Corazon Maglaya] belabors with repetitious persistence the argument that she is a
legitimate child or the only daughter of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado . . . .

In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner, there is nothing in the
record to support petitioner’s claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the late Francisco M.
Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. xxx In other words, Francisco M. Angeles was never married
before or at anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the claim of petitioner that
Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado were married in 1938

While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of marriages during
the war years . . . were totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was presented by petitioner to
prove the existence of the marriage between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado, even
as no witness was presented to confirm the celebration of such marriage . . . .

Petitioner presented pictures. x x x However, it is already settled law that photographs are not
sufficient evidence of filiation or acknowledgment.

To be sure, very little comfort is provided by petitioner’s birth certificate and even her marriage
contract.. . . Reason: These documents were not signed by Francisco . . . . Equally inconsequential
are petitioner’s school records . . . . all these lacked the signatures of both Francisco and
Genoveva . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or acknowledged natural child of the late
Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner cannot be a real party in interest in the adoption proceedings, as
her consent thereto is not essential or required. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added)

Significantly, the aforesaid December 17, 2003 Decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP
No.47832 was effectively affirmed by this Court via its Resolution dated August 9, 2004 in G.R. No.
163124, denying Aleli "Corazon" Maglaya’s petition for Review on Certiorari,33 and Resolution dated
October 20, 2004,34 denying with "FINALITY" her motion for reconsideration. Another Resolution
dated January 24, 2005 resolved to "NOTE WITHOUT ACTION" Maglaya’s second motion for
reconsideration.

In the light of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as affirmed with finality by
this Court in G.R. No. 163124, there can be no serious objection to applying in this case the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment,35 one of two (2) concepts embraced in the res judicata principle.
Following the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that
she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein
respondent’s legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been
judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res
judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or
their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter.36

Lest it be overlooked, the same ruling of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as sustained
by this Court in G.R. No. 163124, virtually confirms the ratio of the trial court’s order of dismissal in
Special Proceedings (SP) No. C-2140, i.e, that respondent failed to establish that she is in fact a
legitimate child of Francisco. Accordingly, the question of whether or not the Motion to
Dismiss37 interposed by herein petitioner, as respondent in SP No. C-2140, is in the nature of a
demurer to evidence has become moot and academic. It need not detain us any minute further.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent.38 When the law
speaks of "next of kin", the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to
the decedent’s property;39 one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as
distributed,40 or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters
of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to
determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of
suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon
the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.

WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET

ASIDE, and the order of the trial court dismissing Special Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED.

No costs. SO ORDERED.

5. Babiera vs Catotal, GR No. 138493, 15 June 2000

G.R. No. 138493               June 15, 2000

TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner,
vs.
PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus,
void is a certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time
of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed
mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such
mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.

Statement of the Case

Submitted for this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1 

Rules of Court, seeking reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
2  3 

GR CV No. 56031. Affirming the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No.
3046, the CA ruled as follows:

IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant
appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA
BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista Guinto. 4

The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:

 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and pronouncements of the Court, judgment
is hereby rendered, to wit[:]

1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as null and void
"ab initio";

2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry
of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035;

Furnish copies of this-decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the City Prosecutor,
counsel for private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel for petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

The Facts

The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:

Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional

Trial Court of Lanao del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of the
entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter referred to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of
Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3046.

From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted "that she is the only surviving child of the
late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and
July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by "hilot" in
the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said
spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by
simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena,
then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her
signature . . .; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally
witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by "hilot"; that
the birth certificate . . . of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth,
signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is made to
appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariñosa, when she is not; b) The signature of Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is
falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and
unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real
mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child; The natural father, the
carpenter, did not sign it; that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab
initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible for
the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera, was
already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner
was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of
Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate of
cancelled and declared void and theretofore she prays that after publication, notice and
hearing, judgment [be] render[ed] declaring . . . the certificate of birth of respondent Teofista
Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective and ordering the respondent local civil
registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE
recorded as Registry No. 16035.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order
directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in a newspaper, the
Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and
TEOFISTA.

TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that "the petition states no cause of
action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file
the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant
petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code." The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss.
 Subsequently, "Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an answer/opposition
in behalf of private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was later on substituted by Atty. Cabili
as counsel for private respondent."

In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred "that she was always known as Teofista Babiera and
not Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the matter [is that] plantiff Presentacion
B. V. Catotal and [defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her Certificate of
Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, . . . Certificate of Baptism, . . . Student's
Report Card . . . all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent testimonies of her filiation. By
way of special and affirmative defenses, defendant/respondent contended that the petition
states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child
of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñoza Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal
capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that
the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family
Code. 5

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner was not the
biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was presented to show that
Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was already 54 years old at the
time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed
birth took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant
medical complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil
registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to be that of Hermogena, was different
from her other signatures.

The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which stated that only
the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral
attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a situation wherein the husband or his heirs
asserted that the child of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of the
child's Birth Certificate for being void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the
father or the mother.

Hence, this appeal. 6

Issues

Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:

1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal capacity to file the
special proceeding of appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 subject matter of this review
on certiorari;

2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 is improper and is barred
by [the] statute of limitation (prescription); [and]

3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to hold, that the
ancient public record of petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving oral testimony of
respondent. 7

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

First Issue: Subject of

the Present Action

Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 of the Family Code
8 

states that the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances, his
heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The
9 

interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the
latter filed against the former.  The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her
10 

parents.

Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of
this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his
wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the
mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other
words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to
establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn
petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation
to impugn in the first place.

In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,  the Court ruled thus:

11 

Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family
Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:

x x x           x x x          x x x

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like
in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of
a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs)
denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can
impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to
have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons,
the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived insemination,
the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they
speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the
action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err
when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one
where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel.
Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not horn to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling
in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned
decision is apropos, viz:

"Petitioners" recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the
Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn
legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is
not the decedent's child at all. Being neither [a] legally adopted child, nor an
acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat,
Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.  (Emphasis supplied.)
12 

Second Issue: Prescription

Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late Hermogena
Babiera has already prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the Family Code which provides the
prescriptive period for such action:

Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year
from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a
proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took
place or was recorded.
 If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined
in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should
reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been
concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted
from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said
birth, whichever is earlier.

This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner's Birth
Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of
the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe,
because it was allegedly void ab initio. 1

Third Issue:

Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate

Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena's testimony that
petitioner was not her real child, cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of
the Birth Certificate.

While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption
of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence
presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were already irregularities
regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar.  More important, the
14 

Court of Appeals observed that the mother's signature therein was different from her signatures in
other documents presented during the trial.

Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the
former's real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as medical
records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was
presented to attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time.  Moreover, at the time of her
1awphil

supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given
birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her
advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.

The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which
states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband
Eugenio's. The deposition reads in part:

q Who are your children?

a Presentation and Florentino Babiera.

q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate child with your husband
Eugenio Babiera, what can you say about that?

a She is not our child.

x x x           x x x          x x x

q Do you recall where she was born?

a In our house because her mother was our house helper.

q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera lived with you in your residence?

a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to time.

q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her as your daughter with your
husband?

a No, sir. 
15
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has presented no
other evidence other than the said document to show that she is really Hermogena's child; Neither
has she provided any reason why her supposed mother would make a deposition stating that the
former was not the latter's child at all.

All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and the appellate
courts that petitioner was not the child of respondent's parents.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.

6. Lee vs CA, GR No. 118387, 11 Oct 2001

G.R. No. 118387            October 11, 2001

MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO
K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in
their capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Manila and Branch
130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK
SHENG in their personal capacities and ROSA K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN,
LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K.
LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K.
LEE, respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated October 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP NO. 317862 . The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
upheld the Orders issued by respondents Judges Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion3 and Hon. Jaime T.
Hamoy4 taking cognizance of two (2) separate petitions filed by private respondents before their
respective salas for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2)
different mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and
his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee
Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.

Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek
Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel
and Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions
for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-
Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee
(hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against all petitioners, with
the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and docketed
as SP. PROC. NO. 92-636925 and later assigned to Branch 47 presided over by respondent Judge
Lorenzo B. Veneracion. On February 3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before
the RTC of Kalookan and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-16746 and assigned to the sala of
respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.

Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records
of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their
mother, and by substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the petitioners'
true birth mother.

The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the legitimate
children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China
sometime in 1931. Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private respondents
herein were all born and raised in the Philippines.
Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a
young girl named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new
housemaid but far from becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek
Sheng's mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.

Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of
the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of
petitioners by making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.

Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the
petitioners. They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were
residing in. All was well, therefore, before private respondents' discovery of the dishonesty and fraud
perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.

The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the
names of all his children, including those of petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh
Shiok Cheng's death that was to be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act
that piqued private respondents' curiosity, if not suspicion.7

Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to conduct an investigation into the matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent
records, the NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of
birth of petitioners, specifically the following.

1. As per Birth Certificate MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1), their father, LEE TEK SHENG made
it appear that he is the 12th child of Mrs. KEH SHIOK CHENG, but upon investigation, it was
found out that her Hospital Records, the mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE had given
birth for the 1st time, as per diagnosis of the attending physician, Dr. R. LIM, it was
"GRAVIDA I, PARA I" which means "first pregnancy, first live birth delivery" (refer to:
MASTER PATIENT'S RECORDS SUMMARY — Annex I). Also, the age of the mother when
she gave birth to MARCELO LEE as per record was only 17 years old, when in fact and in
truth, KEH SHIOK CHENG's age was then already 38 years old. The address used by their
father in the Master Patient record was also the same as the Birth Certificate of MARCELO
LEE (2425 Rizal Avenue, Manila). The name of MARCELO LEE was recorded under
Hospital No. 221768, page 73.

2. As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it was made to appear that ALBINA
LEE was the third child which is without any rationality, because the 3rd child of KEH SHIOK
CHENG is MELODY LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-2). Note also, that the age of the mother as
per Hospital Records jump (sic) from 17 to 22 years old, but the only age gap of MARCELO
LEE and ALBINA LEE is only 2 years.

3. As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3), it was made to appear that
MARIANO LEE was the 5th child, but the truth is, KEH SHIOK CHENG's 5th child is LUCIA
LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-4). As per Hospital Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was
only 23 years old, while the actual age of KEH SHIOK CHENG, was then already 40 years
old.

4. As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it was made to appear that PABLO
LEE was the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG which is impossible to be true, considering
the fact that KEH SHIOK CHENG have stopped conceiving after her 11th child. Also as per
Hospital Record, the age of the mother was omitted in the records. If PABLO LEE is the 16th
child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, it would only mean that she have (sic) given birth to her first
born child at the age of 8 to 9 years, which is impossible to be true.

Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the recorded age of KEH SHIOK
CHENG was 23 years old. Two years after PABLO LEE was born in 1955, the difference is
only 2 years, so it is impossible for PABLO LEE to be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG,
as it will only mean that she have (sic) given birth at that impossible age.

5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it was made to appear that she is the
6th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, but as per Birth Certificate of JULIAN LEE (Annex E-5), he
 is the true 6th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG. Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is
only 28 years old, while KEH SHIOK CHENG'S true age at that time was 45 years old.

6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per complainant's allegation, she
was born at their house, and was later admitted at Chinese General Hospital.

7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it was made to appear that he is
the 14th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG a.k.a. Mrs.
LEE TEK SHENG, jumped from 28 years old at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957
to 38 years old at the birth of CATALINO LEE on 22 April 1959.

8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last son of KEH SHIOK CHENG, the
age of the mother is 48 years old. However, as per Hospital Record, the age of Mrs. LEE
TEK SHENG, then was only 39 years old. Considering the fact, that at the time of
MARCELO's birth on 11 May 1950. KEH SHIOK CHENG's age is 38 years old and at the
time of EUSEBIO's birth, she is already 48 years old, it is already impossible that she could
have given birth to 8 children in a span of only 10 years at her age. As per diagnosis, the
alleged mother registered on EUSEBIO's birth indicate that she had undergone CEASARIAN
SECTION, which Dr. RITA K. LEE said is not true.

In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:

10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients Records, it is very

obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but
a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and
analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in fixing the age of
KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8
children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his 2nd
family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not
have been necessary had not the father and his 2nd family kept on insisting that the
8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.8

It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in petitioners' records of birth with the lower courts.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions — SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC.
NO. C-1674 — on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is
to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to
impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.9

On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss SP. PROC. NO.
92-63692 for failure of the herein petitioners (defendants in the lower court) to appear at the hearing
of the said motion.10 Then on February 17, 1993, Judge Veneracion issued an Order, the pertinent
portion of which, reads as follows:

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby given due
course. Let this petition be set for hearing on March 29, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning before
this Court located at the 5th Floor of the City Hall of Manila.

Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any objection to the petition should file on or
before the date of hearing his opposition thereto with a statement of the grounds therefor.

Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of the petitioners, once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and of this Order be served upon the
Office of the Solicitor General, and the respondents, and be posted on the Bulletin Board of
this Court, also at the expense of the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.11

On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated April 15, 1993 taking
cognizance of SP. PROC. No. C-1674, to wit:
 It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by the petitioners that
the Order of the Court setting the case for hearing was published in "Media Update" once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks, that is on February 20, 27, and March 6, 1993 as
evidenced by the Affidavit of Publication and the clippings attached to the affidavit, and by
the copies of the "Media Update" published on the aforementioned dates; further, copy of the
order setting the case for hearing together with copy of the petition had been served upon
the Solicitor General, City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, Civil Registrar of Kalookan City and
the private respondents, the Court holds that the petitioners have complied with the
jurisdictional requirements for the Court to take cognizance of this case.

xxx           xxx           xxx

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioners' attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders of Judge

Veneracion and Judge Hamoy failed, hence their recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners averred that respondents judges had acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders allowing
the petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners' records of birth to prosper
in the lower courts.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the following arguments: (1) Rule
108 is inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation of children; (2) Respondents judges
are sanctioning a collateral attack against the filiation and legitimacy of children; (3) Respondents
judges are allowing private respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their siblings despite
the fact that their undisputed common father is still alive; (4) Respondents judges are entertaining
petitions which are already time-barred; and (5) The petitions below are part of a forum-shopping
spree.13

Finding no merit in petitioners' arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition in a Decision
dated October 28, 1994.14 Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision was also
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December 19, 1994.15

Hence, this petition.

1. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is improper since private
respondents seek to have the entry for the name of petitioners' mother changed from "Keh Shiok
Cheng" to "Tiu Chuan" who is a completely different person. What private respondents therefore
seek is not merely a correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek
Sheng's legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a "bastardization
of petitioners."16 Petitioners thus label private respondents' suits before the lower courts as a
collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.

Debunking petitioners' above contention, the Court of Appeals observed:

xxx           xxx           xxx

As correctly pointed out by the private respondents in their comment . . . , the proceedings
are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right. Stated differently, the
thrust of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of
certain events which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived
said persons of rights.17

xxx           xxx           xxx

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.18 The petitions
filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were
intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok
Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary
to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn
legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok
Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as
there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.19

Further sanctioning private respondents' resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals adverted to our
ruling in the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia20 where we affirmed the decision of Branch XI of
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality and civil
status of petitioner's minor children as stated in their records of birth from "Chinese" to "Filipino", and
"legitimate" to "illegitimate", respectively. Although recognizing that the changes or corrections
sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, this Court,
sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected and the
true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.21 In the said case, we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction
and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature
and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 are complied with. Thus we held:

"Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish
the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered, the suit or proceeding is 'appropriate.'

The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:

'SECTION 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.'

'SECTION 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.'

'SECTION 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto.'

"Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are — (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it
becomes the duty of the court to — (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the
hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The
following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: — (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any
person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought.

"If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt
that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person
having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the
opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary
proceedings."22 (Emphasis supplied.)

To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both petitions for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate
adversary proceedings.

We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

 In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth was filed by
private respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993,
a copy of the order setting the case for hearing was ordered published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the RTC-
Kalookan, there was an actual publication of the order setting the case for hearing in "Media
Update" once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In both cases notices of the orders
were ordered served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and Kalookan
and upon the petitioners herein. Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil
Registrars and the other respondents in the case below to file their oppositions to the said
petitions. A motion to dismiss was consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano,
Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-
Manila, and an opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private respondents in the
courts below by way of a special proceeding cancellation and/or correction of entries in the
civil registers with the requisite parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded
as that proper suit or appropriate action.23 (Emphasis supplied.)

The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts
the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated by
Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature.24 The
petitioners point to the case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,25 which is of a later date than Republic
vs. Valencia,26 where this Court reverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier cases,27 starting with Ty
Kong Tin vs. Republic,28 prohibiting the extension of the application of Rule 108 beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil
Registrar,29 allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule unconstitutional
as the same would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,30 the
reason we declared null and void the portion of the lower court's order directing the change of
Labayo-Rowe's civil status and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in the latter's record
of birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to effect such changes, but because Labayo-
Rowe's petition before the lower court failed to implead all indispensable parties to the case.

We explained in this wise:

"x x x An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable parties should be
made parties to the case as required under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

"In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only
respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what is required
in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor
General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include
not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal
grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other
persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented x x x.

xxx           xxx           xxx

"The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if
her status would be changed from 'legitimate' to 'illegitimate'. Moreover, she would be
exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate
filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was
published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the
State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other
provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-
making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that
such rules 'shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be
extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible
to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said
 rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or
modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil
Code."31 (italics supplied).

Far from petitioners' theory, this Court's ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic32 does not exclude
recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in
entries of the civil register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be
an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding. Thus:

"If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register]
is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction
of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations
which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the
nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party
are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon
the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by
the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of
the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x x."33 (Emphasis supplied.)

It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy granted upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the
statute expressly provides.34 Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to
take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a
summary proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec.4). The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all
persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3).
The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec.
5). Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after
hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).

Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia,35 that Rule 108, when all
the procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.

It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs. Valencia36 there continues to be a

seesawing of opinion on the issue of whether or not substantial corrections in entries of the civil
register may be effected by means of Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The
more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of Appeals37 and Republic vs. Labrador38 do seem to signal a
reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the scope of application of Article 412 to clerical
or typographical errors in entries of the civil register.

In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase
substantive rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:

"This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of Appeals. In that case, Respondent
Mauricio Leonor filed a petition before the trial court seeking the cancellation of the
registration of his marriage to Petitioner Virginia Leonor. He alleged, among others, the
nullity of their legal vows arising from the "non-observance of the legal requirements for a
valid marriage." In debunking the trial court's ruling granting such petition, the Court held as
follows:

'On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry
regarding "marriages" in the civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a
verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally,
the only errors that can be canceled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or
clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage.
A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding;
error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs.
Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous change such
as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).'
 'Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of
petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted
except only in an adversarial x x x .'

'Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that
matter under Article 412 of the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his
and Virginia's civil status from married to single and of their three children from
legitimate to illegitimate x x x '

"Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a
person from "legitimate to "illegitimate," as in Sarah Zita's case, the same cannot be granted
in summary proceedings."39

It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in
conflict with each other, and perhaps, in the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising the
same substantial issue.

The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is
unconstitutional is embodied in the early case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic40 that first delineated the
extent or scope of the matters that may be changed or corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New
Civil Code. The Supreme Court ruled in this case that:

"x x x After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated
therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not those that may
affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of
the petition is merely a clerical error then the court may issue an order in order that the error
or mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial change, which affects the status or
citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon
the nature of the issue involved. Such action can be found at random in our substantive and
remedial laws the implementation of which will naturally depend upon the factors and
circumstances that might arise affecting the interested parties. This opinion is predicated
upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in nature which
cannot cover cases involving controversial issues."41

This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republic42 where the Court
said that:

"From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of
the Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court
prescribing the procedure to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous
rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should be
limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of
correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of
Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under
Section 13 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which directs that such rules of court 'shall not
diminish or increase or modify substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or
obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule
108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying
substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil
Code."43 (Italics supplied).

We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the
interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature,
effectively excluding from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule, substantial changes
that may affect nationality, status, filiation and the like. Why the limited scope of Article 412?
Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except to opine that the
procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover cases
involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine
without, however, shedding light on the matter.

The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:

"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order."

It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or
changes must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the
procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.

Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms "corrected" and "changed". In its
ordinary sense, to correct means to make or set right"; "to remove the faults or errors from"44 while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute".45 The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or
corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have.
Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under
Article 412. What are the entries in the civil register? We need not go further than Articles 407 and
408 of the same title to find the answer.

"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register."

"Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name."

It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only
status but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not
contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous. This
interpretation has the effect of isolating Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of
the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction that a statute must
always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be attached to any word or
phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject treated.46

Thirdly, Republic Act No. 904847 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially
amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name
or Nickname. — No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations."

The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now
to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction
or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of
operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. This is
precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said, perhaps another
indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.

It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress' response to the confusion wrought
by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or
corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary
proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have
constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just
what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while Rule
108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided
on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application. Hence, the necessity for
the preceding treatise.
II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the cases
below as Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn
the legitimacy of his children only after his death.48

Article 171 provides:

"The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in
the preceding article only in the following cases:

"(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;

"(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or

"(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband."

Petitioner's contention is without merit.

In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal,49 we upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that
affirmed the judgment of the RTC of Lanao del Norte declaring the birth certificate of one Teofista
Guinto as null and void ab initio, and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City to cancel the
same from the Registry of Live Births. We ruled therein that private respondent Presentacion
Catotal, child of spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, had the requisite standing to
initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera, another alleged child of the same
spouses because she is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.50

We likewise held therein that:

"x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of
the provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of
his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed
offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give
birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioner is an
illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all x
x x. ''51

Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals52 that:

"Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family
Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. x x x.

xxx           xxx           xxx

"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation,
like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child
of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs)
denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can
impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to
have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons,
the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this
reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs
should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate
court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at
bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his
child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457
cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:

'Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family
Code] is not well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy.
 It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of
a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal
heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the
decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged
natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal
heir of the deceased. "'53

III. Petitioners claim that private respondents' cause of action had already prescribed as more than
five (5) years had lapsed between the registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960
and the filing of the actions in December of 1992 and February of 1993.54

We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule
specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to
Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New Civil Code that applies:

"Art. 1149. other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be
brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues."

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements,
namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission
on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element
occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.55

It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of their cause of
action, that is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners' birth records, occurred
more than thirty (30) years ago. Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private
respondents' right of action or right to sue accrued. However, we must take into account the fact that
it was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents discovered that they in fact had a cause of
action against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth records.

Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to
establish the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners' true mother, and their real status, simply
because they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a
much later date. This is especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their father's
legitimate children, did not have any reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against
them and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mother's (Keh Shiok Cheng's) estate. It
was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents' suspicions were aroused and confirmed. From
that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.

Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the registration of
the last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private respondents had
discovered the false entries in petitioners' birth records in 1989. Petitioners base their position on the
fact that birth records are public documents, hence, the period of prescription for the right of action
available to the private respondents started to run from the time of the registration of their birth
certificates in the Civil Registry.

We cannot agree with petitioners' thinking on that point.

It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.56 Petitioners liken their
birth records to land titles, public documents that serve as notice to the whole world. Unfortunately
for the petitioners, this analogy does not hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person's
parentage cannot be acquired by prescription. One is either born of a particular mother or not. It is
that simple.

IV. Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of forum shopping. They enumerate the other
actions filed by private respondents against them prior to the filing of their Rule 108 petitions in the
lower courts, as follows:

(1) A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in the birth certificates filed against their
father as principal and against defendants as alleged accessories;
 (2) A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate of their father, Lee Tek
Sheng; and

(3) A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate.57

According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions above-mentioned, as well as the Rule 108
petitions, subject of the case before us, raise the common issue of whether petitioners are the
natural children of Keh Shiok Cheng or Tiu Chuan. They contend that in all these cases, the judge or
hearing officer would have to resolve this issue in order to determine whether or not to grant the
relief prayed for.58

Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights
or causes of action and reliefs sought.59 Even a cursory examination of the pleadings filed by private
respondents in their various cases against petitioners would reveal that at the very least there is no
identity of rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for. The present case has its roots in two (2)
petitions filed under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to correct and/or cancel certain entries in
petitioners' birth records. Suffice it to state, the cause of action in these Rule 108 petitions and the
relief sought therefrom are very different from those in the criminal complaint against petitioners and
their father which has for its cause of action, the commission of a crime as defined and penalized
under the Revised Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the accused; or the action for
the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng naturalization certificate which has for its cause of action the
commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral act, and his ultimate deportation for its object; or for
that matter, the action for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate which has for its cause of action the
private respondents' right under the New Civil Code to inherit from their mother's estate.

We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum shopping to speak
of in the concept that this is described and contemplated in Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court.
HCISED

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 28, 1994 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

7. Estate of Ong vs Diaz, GR No. 171713, 17 Dec 2007

G.R. No. 171713             December 17, 2007

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner,

vs.
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C.
Diaz, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing (1) the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2) the
Resolution2 of the same court dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in
CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.

A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor
Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky),
against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her
Complaint, Jinky prayed that judgment be rendered:

(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.

(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00 pendente lite and
thereafter to fix monthly support.

(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees in the sum of P100,000.00.
 (d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe just and equitable in the
premises.4

As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got
acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was
already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19
February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.5

From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at Fairlane
Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.

From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998
was born at the Central Luzon Doctors’ Hospital, Tarlac City.

Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio
paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joanne’s needs –
recognizing the child as his.

In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor
Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.

Rogelio, despite Jinky’s remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give
support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the
heretofore adverted complaint.

After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any responsive pleading
despite repeated motions for extension, prompting the trial court to declare him in default in its Order
dated 7 April 1999. Rogelio’s Answer with Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative Defenses was
received by the trial court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence ex
parte on the basis of which the trial court on 23 April 1999 rendered a decision granting the reliefs
prayed for in the complaint.

In its Decision6 dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child;

2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly support of P10,000.00 and further

3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and the
cost of the suit.

On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for reconsideration
seeking the court’s understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to find a solution to a
very difficult problem of his life.7

On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the decision of the trial court
dated 23 April 1999 be vacated and the case be considered for trial de novo pursuant to the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.8

On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelio’s Motion for New Trial:

WHEREFORE, finding defendant’s motion for new trial to be impressed with merit, the same
is hereby granted.

The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the decision is this court dated
April 23, 1999 are hereby set aside but the evidence adduced shall remain in record, subject
to cross-examination by defendant at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.
 In the meantime defendant’s answer is hereby admitted, subject to the right of plaintiff to file
a reply and/or answer to defendant’s counterclaim within the period fixed by the Rules of
Court.

Acting on plaintiff’s application for support pendente lite which this court finds to be
warranted, defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum of P2,000.00
a month from January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support pendente lite in arrears and the
amount of P4,000.00 every month thereafter as regular support pendente lite during the
pendency of this case.9

The RTC finally held:

The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant is the father of the plaintiff
Joanne Rodjin Diaz.

Since it was duly established that plaintiff’s mother Jinky Diaz was married at the time of the
birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the
spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child is still
presumed legitimate even if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy (Article
167, Ibid).

The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds provided for in
Article 166 of the same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there must be
physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days following the birth of the child because of –

a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;

b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was
not possible;

c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.

It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national and that he was
living outside of the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home only once a
year. Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was outside the country and no
evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth
of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.

While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship with another man before
she met the defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations with other
men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see
Exh. "A"), so her first child, a certain Nicole (according to defendant) must have a different
father or may be the son of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.

The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered the hospital bills representing
the expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of admission that he is
the real father of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that even when he stopped going out with
Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels even after 1996. Defendant also admitted that on
some instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was
even the one who fetched Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne.

On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and
defendant Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the latter should support plaintiff.10

On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the

illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this Court
awarding support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed and that the support
should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority age.11
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in an Order of the trial
court dated 19 January 2001.12 From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio appealed
to the Court of Appeals. After all the responsive pleadings had been filed, the case was submitted for
decision and ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study and report as early as 12 July 2002.13

During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelio’s counsel filed a manifestation
informing the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed
by said counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong,14 which
motion was accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.15

In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The

appealed Decision dated December 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac,
Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to
the court a quo for the issuance of an order directing the parties to make arrangements for
DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin
Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of DNA
analysis.

No pronouncement as to costs.16

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 1 March 2006.

In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as follows:

In this case, records showed that the late defendant-appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early
stage of the proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and plaintiff’s mother submit
themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the issue of paternity, as a sign of good faith.
However, the trial court did not consider resorting to this modern scientific procedure
notwithstanding the repeated denials of defendant that he is the biological father of the
plaintiff even as he admitted having actual sexual relations with plaintiff’s mother. We believe
that DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and
effective method of settling the present paternity dispute. Considering, however, the untimely
demise of defendant-appellant during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court, in
consultation with out laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis, can possibly avail
of such procedure with whatever remaining DNA samples from the deceased defendant
alleged to be the putative father of plaintiff minor whose illegitimate filiations is the subject of
this action for support.17

Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS
RESPONDENT’S COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION DESPITE ITS
FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT ROGELIO G.
ONG WAS HER FATHER.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE
RESPONDENT AS THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER JAPANESE
HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE
PRESUMPTION OF HER LEGITIMACY.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED THE

CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO
LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.18
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be modified, by setting aside the judgment remanding the case
to the trial court for DNA testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for
compulsory recognition, and by declaring the minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa
Katsuo.19

From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds it prudent to concentrate its
attention on the third one, the propriety of the appellate court’s decision remanding the case to the
trial court for the conduct of DNA testing. Considering that a definitive result of the DNA testing will
decisively lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to resolve the first
two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be rendered moot by the result of the DNA testing.

As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes
of support in favor of the said minor.

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The
burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological
father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and child.20

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.21 As a guaranty in
favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:

Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained
the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals22:

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code23 provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was
not possible;

3) By the serious illness of the husband.24

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
 (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.

There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties
to the present petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological
father of the minor, through DNA testing.

DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all
human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a
person’s DNA profile can determine his identity.25

DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an
individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the
individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for
identical twins.

Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is
exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single,
fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every cell in
the human body, the DNA of an individual’s blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells,
hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.

The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (Adenine), G (guanine),
C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an individual’s
DNA determines his or her physical make up. And since DNA is a double stranded molecule,
it is composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called
"genes."

Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular

sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework,
nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as "polymorphic loci," which are the
areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing
simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."

How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular
biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct
DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot
blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by
37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; DNA process; VNTR (variable number tandem
repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction)
based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most
forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an
evidence sample a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-
called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13
separate places and can match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less
than one (1) in a trillion.

Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate, when
DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence
collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known" print. If a substantial amount of
the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But
then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have
come from the suspect.
 As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of
these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called "allele," one inherited from each
parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions
in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and
child, it is possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother.
The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s
profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which
match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types do not match that of the child,
the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the
father.26

In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:

SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be defined
as follows:

xxxx

(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic
information directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples;

(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample
obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating from that
person;

(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction
of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the
information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of
determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more
distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or if the
biological samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis); and

(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of
a putative parent compared with the probability of a random match of two unrelated
individuals in a given population.

Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution thereof may provide the
definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne. Our articulation in Agustin v.
Court of Appeals27 is particularly relevant, thus:

Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe
Lim v. Court of Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in 1997, we cautioned
against the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been
accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such
conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts,verbal and written, by the putative
father."

In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as

enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 17]:

x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of
the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has
two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts
should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said results is to deny progress.
 The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine
jurisprudence came in 2002 with out en banc decision in People v. Vallejo [G.R. No. 144656,
9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and murder victim’s DNA samples from the
bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the
purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their profile.

A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 584], we
acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed) in
our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been
perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific
evidence to still our doubts."

In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March
2004, 424 SCRA 277], where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then
presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or

would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained
from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity.
In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA
testing...

Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May

2004, 428 SCRA 504], we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with
homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. x x x.

Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the
appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for
DNA testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the
RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged
impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible
than real. Petitioner’s argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA
Evidence28 allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:

SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the
parties upon a showing of the following:

(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;

(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and

(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.

From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.

As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a
person’s body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes
blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.29
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of
obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.

And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v.
Umanito,30 citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections,31 this Court held:

The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424
SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our jurisdiction in this wise:
"[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to."

It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of AAA’s
child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and correct
adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized,
after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while this Court
retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter
in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the course of daily
routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate that the case be remanded
to the RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties.
(Emphasis supplied.)

As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals32:

x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to
deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a
much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed
in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case
comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and
authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully
reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.

8. Cabatania vs CA, GR No. 124814, 21 Oct 2004

G.R. No. 124814             October 21, 2004

CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
March 15, 1996 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which
compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as his
illegitimate son and to give support to the latter in the amount of ₱ 500 per month.

This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in
behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her
husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work
and was eventually hired as petitioner’s household help. It was while working there as a maid that,
on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan
Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.

Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after their sexual
encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on
suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner’s wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought
her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by
a hilot in her aunt’s house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent
Camelo Regodos.

Petitioner Camelo Cabatania’s version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter and a
businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the
course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to
work the following morning. This displeased petitioner’s wife, hence she was told to look for another
job.

In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Year’s Eve
in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited her to
dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her
save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While doing
it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the
child of her husband. They went home the following day.

In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioner’s house
hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioner’s wife was in need of one, she was re-
hired. However petitioner’s wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about the father
of the unborn child. She told petitioner’s wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of her
condition, she was again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore.

Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencia’s counsel. She
was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the
alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to
Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with
her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City.

After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its
discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive.
Deciding in favor of private respondent, the trial court declared:

The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on
the personal appearance of the child then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor
is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minor’s mother, Florencia Regodos.

xxx     xxx     xxx

In view of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the Court finds the evidence of the plaintiff
in support of the claim to "be meritorious; defendant admitted having a sexual intercourse
with the plaintiff’s mother, Florencia Regodos, but denied paternity to the child. The child was
presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the personal
appearance of the child, then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child
of the defendant with plaintiff-minor’s mother, Florencia Regodos."2

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC:

The misrepresentation made by Florencia in the petition that she was a widow should not
prejudice the right of petitioner-appellee. As held by the Supreme Court, even where a
witness has been found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not
required that the whole of her testimony be rejected (People vs. Bohol, 170 SCRA 585). It is
perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and
disbelieve it with respect to other facts (People vs. Delas, 199 SCRA 574, 575). There is
therefore no reason to disbelieve Florencia that her first intercourse with appellant occurred
on January 2, 1982 and nine (9) months later or on September 9, 1982, she gave birth to
appellee (TSN, Hearing of June 10, 1991 and Exhibit "A").
 In the absence of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the evidence adduced before the trial
court and there being no evidence that the latter had overlooked or misappreciated, we find
no cogent reason to disturb the trial court’s findings.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.3

Hence this petition which assigns the following errors:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF THE

CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS;

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION BASED ON THE EVIDENCE

ADDUCED BY RESPONDENT CAMELO REGODOS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.4

Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two lower courts. As a general
rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court. Factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, become final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal except (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooks
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, justifies a
different conclusion, and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. The Court is convinced that
this case falls within one of the exceptions.5

The trial court’s finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was
based on the testimony of the child’s mother and "the personal appearance of the child."

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity
and filiation.6 An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be
an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation
is established by clear and convincing evidence.7

The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation
of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there
 is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The
local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the
information of a third person.8

In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified
but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity.9 Thus, certificates issued by
the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.10

Aside from Florencia’s self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in Singcang,
Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.

We now proceed to the credibility of Florencia’s testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate
court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a
widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony. We
disagree. The fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between
them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.11 The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but
is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.12

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective
test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity
and filiation before the courts of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. 36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City,
Branch 60, in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C is reversed and set aside. Private respondent’s petition for
recognition and support is dismissed. SO ORDERED.

b) Impugning legitimate filiation

9. Andal vs Macaraig, GR No. 2474, 30 May 1951

G.R. No. L-2474             May 30, 1951

MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and MARIA
DUEÑAS, plaintiffs,
vs.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.

Reyes and Dy-Liaco for appellants.

Tible, Tena and Borja for appellees.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad litem, brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur.

The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas;
that Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of
land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter
nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former; that Emiliano Andal had been in possession of
the land from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal situation
then prevailing, entered the land in question.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano Andal the
legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in question; (b) declaring
Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant
took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved.
It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to her son Emiliano
Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias she has executed in his favor on the occasion of his
marriage to Maria Dueñas. If the son born to the couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to
inherit the land in question. If otherwise, then the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as
the next of kin entitled to succeed him under the law. The main issue, therefore, to be determined
hinges on the legitimacy of Mariano Andal in so far as his relation to Emiliano Andal is concerned.
The determination of this issue much depends upon the relationship that had existed between
Emiliano Andal and his wife during the period of conception of the child up to the date of his birth in
connection with the death of the alleged father Emiliano Andal.

The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in
January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his
house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942,
he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942,
Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until
the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other
as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did
not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the
name of Mariano Andal. Under these facts, can the child be considered as the legitimate son of
Emiliano?

Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:

Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of
marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of
the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for the
husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of the
three hundred next preceding the birth of the child.

Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is
presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three
hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted
by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the
first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove that it
was physically impossible for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that Emiliano was sick of
tuberculosis and was so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed sufficient to
overcome this presumption?

Manresa on this point says:

Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during the initial period
of conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable, and (3)
imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation
of prison regulations. Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his book
"Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p.90)."

There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period of
conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10,
1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano
Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano
Andal and his wife were still living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the
same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not
preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. We admit that Emiliano was already suffering
from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from
bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does not prevent
carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act
even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. As an author
has said, "the reputation of the tuberculosis towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably
dependent more upon confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease." (An Integrated
Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202). There is neither evidence to show that Emiliano
was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence that he was
imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of the child has not,
therefore, been overcome.

We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par. (c) of Rule 123, of the Rules
of Court, which is practically based upon the same rai'son d'etre underlying the Civil Code. Said
section provides:

The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is indisputably
presumed to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred eighty days immediately
succeeding the marriage, or after the expiration of three hundred days following its
dissolution.

We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to
the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within three (300) days following
the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than that the
issue is legitimate. We have also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that
it was physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is
no such proof. The fact that Maria Dueñas has committed adultery can not also overcome this
presumption (Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 92).

In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower court did not err in declaring
Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

c) Proving legitimate filiation

10. Gono-Javier vs CA, GR No. 111994, 29 Dec 1994

G.R. No. 111994 December 29, 1994

SOTENIA GONO-JAVIER, TEBURCIO GONO, ANUNCIACION G. JAVIER, GERMANA G.

GULAY, LUCIO GONO, RAMON GONO, ALFREDO GONO and MANUEL GONO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESTITUTA CASOCOT, FERMIN CASOCOT, ALICIA
YONSON, ADRIANO CASOCOT, CARLOS MONTE DE RAMOS, REGINA DUGLAS and NONITO
MARAVE, respondents.

Estanislao G. Ebarle , Jr for petitioners.

Roberto T. Tejano for private respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Juan Casocot, the alleged natural grandfather of petitioners, was said to have owned during his
lifetime five (5) parcels of land in Nasipit, Agusan, covered by Tax Declaration ("T.D.") No. 2667,
3227, 1209, 738 and 2666.

On 13 February 1978, petitioners filed a case with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Butuan City
for the recovery of ownership and possession of the above five (5) parcels which they claimed were
merely held in trust for them by private respondents. Petitioners averred that they were the children
of deceased Catalino Gono, an acknowledged natural child of Juan Casocot, who, by intestate
succession, should thus be held to be the owners of the property. Additionally, they asserted that
petitioner Anunciacion Gono-Javier purchased the parcels of land on 20 June 1956 from the
Provincial Government of Agusan following the levy thereof (on 28 May 1956) for tax delinquency.

In their answer, private respondents, all nephews and nieces of Juan Casocot except for Carlos
Monte de Ramos, a grandnephew, and Nonito Marave, a stranger, to whom a portion of one of the
parcels of land had been sold, contended that since the complaint had failed to state that Catalino
Gono had been recognized by Juan Casocot either in a record of birth or in a will, an independent
action for voluntary recognition should have first been instituted to permit any intestate successional
right to legally pass to petitioners. Also alleged in the answer was that, with the exception of the
parcel covered by T.D. No. 738, the questioned property had been sold by Juan Casocot to private
respondents Restituta and Fermin Casocot on 19 April 1960 and a portion to private respondent
Marave. Private respondents belied the claim that petitioner Gono-Javier purchased the property
from the Provincial Government of Agusan. Finally, the defense of prescription was raised on the
ground that private respondents had been in possession of the disputed property in good faith and
for value for more than 17 years before petitioners' action was instituted.

After trial, the Butuan RTC rendered judgment for petitioners declaring them to be the lawful owners
of the property. The court, in rejecting the claim of ownership made by private respondents, opined
that the deed of sale executed by Juan Casocot on 19 April 1960, when he was already 80 years
old, in favor of respondents Restituta and Fermin Casocot was absolutely simulated and void. It
ruled that petitioners' father, Catalino Gono, had been duly recognized by Juan Casocot since 1954
to be his natural child that thereby entitled petitioners to inherit the parcels of land in question. The
trial court likewise held that the property had been sold to petitioner Anunciacion Gono-Javier on 05
and 20 June 1956 after it had been levied by the Provincial Government for
non-payment of taxes.

The trial court thus nullified Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. RT-349, issued in the names of
Restituta and Fermin Casocot, with respect to the parcel of land covered by T.D. No. 1209, and all
certificates of title issued in the names of transferees, Felipe Yonson, Alicia Yonson, Adriano
Casocot, Carlos Monte de Ramos, Regina Duglas, Restituta, Fermin Casocot and Nonito Marave.

On appeal by private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, and
ordered the dismissal of the complaint by petitioners for the recovery of title and possession of the
disputed parcels. The appellate court ratiocinated and concluded:

First. The trial court declared Catalino Gono to be the acknowledged natural child of
Juan Casocot on the basis of a statement in a deed of donation which he made in
favor of Eugenia Gonzales, widow of Catalino Gono, to the effect that among the
reasons for making the donation was the fact that the donee "is the surviving spouse
of my son had with my common law wife." (Exh. G).

The deed of donation conveyed to Eugenia Gonzales the parcel of land covered by
TD 738 (Exh. E). It was made on March 29, 1954, about 11 years after the death of
Catalino Gono in 1942 or 1943. In the first place, the statement therein describing
Eugenia Gonzales "the surviving spouse of my son had with my common law wife" is
only, if at all, an indirect acknowledgement of Catalino Gono as the son of Juan
Casocot. This falls short of the requirement that the voluntary recognition of a natural
child must be expressly made either in the record of birth, or in a will, or in a
statement before the court of record or in any authentic writing. (Civil Code, Art. 278).

In the second place, according to the testimony of plaintiff-appellee Sotenia Gono

herself, Catalino Gono died in 1942 or 1943. (TSN, p. 24, Dec. 10, 1980). On the
other hand, his supposed acknowledgment was made only in 1954. Now, Art. 281
requires that if the child is of age, his recognition must be with his consent.
Obviously, therefore, it was not possible for Catalino Gono to have given his consent,
even if the indirect reference to him in the deed of donation as the son of Juan
Casocot were considered a sufficient acknowledgment.

For these reasons, it was error for the trial court to declare the plaintiff-appellees, the
children of Catalino Gono, to be the owners of the four parcels of land covered by TD
No. 2667 (Exh. B), TD No. 3227 (Exh. C), TD No. 1209 (Exh. D), and TD No. 2666
(Exh. F) by right of inheritance.

Second. Nor may the plaintiff-appellees base their claim of ownership on the fact that
one of them (Anunciacion Gono-Javier) allegedly repurchased the lands in question
after they had been forfeited to the Province of Agusan for nonpayment of taxes. The
records show that while it is true that Anunciacion Gono-Javier was issued a
certificate of Repurchase of Real Property after Sale (Exh. N) on June 20, 1956, it is
equally true that on February 3, 1959, she was refunded the amount she had paid.
This is evidenced by a municipal voucher issued on February 3, 1959 (Exh. P) by
which she acknowledged receipt of P850.00 from Eduardo V. Amber, Treasurer of
Nasipit, Agusan, from the partial payment previously made by Juan Casocot for
 taxes covering the period May 29, 1956 to February 2, 1959. Indeed, the Final Bill of
Sale (Exh. M) to her, dated February 3, 1959, which had been prepared, was never
executed as the Provincial Treasurer of Agusan never signed it, apparently because
the day (February 2, 1959), Juan Casocot had repurchased the properties. That is
the reason why on February 3, 1959 a municipal voucher (Exh. P) for the payment of
P850.00 to Anunciacion G. Javier was made and Anunciacion G. Javier was actually
refunded what she had paid. The trial court, therefore, erred in holding that, in the
alternative, plaintiff-appellees are owners of the lands in question by virtue of a right
of repurchase from the Provincial Government of Agusan.

Third. The four parcels of land covered by TD No. 2667 (Exh. B), TD No. 3227 (Exh.
C), TD No. 1209 (Exh. D), and TD No. 2666 (Exh. F) were sold to Restituta and
Fermin Casocot by virtue of a deed of sale made by Juan Casocot on April 19, 1960.
However, the trial court declared the sale to be simulated and therefore void based
on its finding that Juan Casocot was already in his 80's when he signed the contract
in 1960. There is, however, no proof that he did not know the contents of the
documents or that he did not intend the deed of sale at all. The trial court
unwarrantedly theorized that because the properties were valuable properties, Juan
Casocot could not have intended to sell them.

Indeed, the fact is that the deed of sale was duly notarized and the notary public,
Atty. Noli G. Cortel, testified that from his observation, there was nothing either in the
mental or physical condition of Juan Casocot to indicate that he was not in the full
possession of his mental faculties when he executed the deed of sale in favor of
Restituta and Fermin Casocot. Moreover, Atty. Cortel testified that he interpreted the
contents of the document in the Visayan dialect to Juan Casocot and that afterward
Juan Casocot voluntarily affixed his signature to the document. (TSN, pp. 9,
11-12, Sept. 6, 1991). Needless to say, a public document, which is executed with all
the solemnities of the law, should not be set aside on such slender grounds as those
cited by the trial court.

Fourth. The trial court also erred in not ruling that the present action is barred by the
order of Court of First Instance of Agusan in Civil Case No. 896 (Juan Casocot v.
Restituta Casocot and Fermin Casocot), dismissing a complaint for the nullification of
the deed of sale. (Exh. U) That order, issued on August 10, 1965, became final and it
constitutes res judicata in this case, as no appeal appears to have been taken from
it. The trial court found the dismissal erroneous allegedly because Juan Casocot had
not been notified of the hearing on July 24, 1965 in Civil Case No. 896. But the trial
court did not have the power to reopen that case. It was improper for it to do so,
since the order of dismissal was final.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the complaint in this
case is DISMISSED in so far as it seeks the recovery of the title and possession of
four parcels of land covered by TD No. 2667 (Exh. B), TD No. 3227 (Exh. C), TD No.
1209 (Exh. D), TD No. 2666 (Exh. F). In other respects, the decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED. 1

In this petition for review, petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:

1. The appellate court gravely erred in reversing the trial court's decision holding that
Catalino Gono was the acknowledged natural child of Juan Casocot by his common
law wife, and that the deceased Juan Casocot's declaration in his deed of donation
to Eugenia Gonzales, wife of Catalino Gono, that the deceased was giving the land
in donation to the surviving wife of my son is sufficient recognition.

2. The appellate court gravely erred in reversing the trial court's decision holding that
when the land in question was sold at public auction or failure to pay taxes the same
was brought by Anunciacion
Gono-Javier who is one of the petitioners' herein, hence the questioned land belongs
to the petitioners.

3. The appellate court gravely erred in reversing the trial court's decision holding that
the alleged sale between the late Juan Casocot and the private respondents herein
were simulated hence null and void.
 4. The appellate court gravely erred in ruling that the action for recovery of
possession and ownership filed by the herein petitioners with the trial court is barred
by the dismissal of the complaint for nullification of the Deed of Sale filed by the
deceased Juan Casocot himself during his lifetime, which was dismissed, for his
failure to attend the hearing wherein he was not notified. 2

Petitioners' first assignment of error would have been impressed with merit had the acknowledgment
in the deed of donation in 1954 been extended to Catalino prior to his death sometime in 1942 or
1943. Juan Casocot himself died in 1964. Article 278 of the New Civil Code, the law applicable in
1954,  provided:
3

Art. 278. Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing. (Emphasis ours.)

The statement made in the deed of donation, a public document, executed by Juan Casocot in favor
of Eugenia Gonzales, widow of Catalino, i.e., that among the reasons for the donation was that the
donee was "the surviving spouse of my son had with my common law wife," would have well been
explicit enough or, at the very least, sufficient to make it fall within the purview of the doctrine of
incidental recognition. Unfortunately for petitioners, however, the recognition came too late. The
donation, whereon the questioned statement appeared, was made on 29 March 1954, or about 11
years after the death of Catalino in 1942 or 1943.

The provisions of the Civil Code  on acknowledgment would readily indicate that voluntary
4

acknowledgment can legally be effected only during the lifetime of both the acknowledging parent
and the acknowledged illegitimate child. When that voluntary recognition is so timely made, as
above, an action for its judicial declaration can survive the death of either or both parties (see
Gaspay, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102372, 15 November 1994). The reason for this latter
rule is that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing (Art. 278, Civil Code) is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required (see Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo,
143 SCRA 356), albeit not prohibited, to yet have it declared as such. When a party is so minded as
to still bring an action on the basis of such voluntary acknowledgment, no time frame for initiating it
would obviously be a constraint.

Parenthetically, where, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to
prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicate statute of limitations  is essential in order to
5

establish the child's acknowledgment. Thus, the mere possession of status of a child, contrary to the
assertion in passing of petitioners, does not itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground
for the child to compel, by judicial action, recognition by his assumed parent. 6

Petitioners, in their second and third assignment of errors, would want us to reverse the Court of
Appeals in finding: (a) that while petitioner Anunciacion Gono-Javier was issued a Certificate of
Repurchase (Exh. "N") on 20 June 1956, she was, however, fully refunded for the price paid and
actual redemption was, in truth, made by Juan Casocot and (b) that the deed of sale executed by
Juan Casocot, duly notarized, was validly executed. These factual findings by the appellate court,
having been amply explained and substantiated by it, should not further be disturbed.

Petitioners take issue, finally, with the Court of Appeals in holding that petitioners' action to nullify the
deed of sale to private respondents is, in any event, barred by the order of dismissal thereof by the
then Court of First Instance of Agusan in Civil Case No. 896, entitled "Juan Casocot vs. Restituta
Casocot and Fermin Casocot." Suffice it to say that an unconditional dismissal of an action for failure
to prosecute under Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court is with prejudice and has the effect of
an adjudication on the merits (Guanzon vs. Mapa, 7 SCRA 457; Insular Veneer, Inc. vs. Plan, 73
SCRA 1).

All told, we find no valid justification for sustaining the petition.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

11. Herrera v Alba, GR No. 148220, 15 Jun 2005

G.R. No. 148220               June 15, 2005

ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA
CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 to set aside the Decision2 dated 29 November 2000 of the Court of
Appeals ("appellate court") in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. The appellate court affirmed two
Orders3 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("trial court") in SP No. 98-88759.
The Order dated 3 February 2000 directed Rosendo Herrera ("petitioner") to submit to
deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") paternity testing, while the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by his mother
Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages
against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied
that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with
respondent’s mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos,
Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she
taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences
Research Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular Biology
Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA
paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing
paternity.4

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to conduct DNA
paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Thus:

In view of the foregoing, the motion of the petitioner is GRANTED and the relevant individuals,
namely: the petitioner, the minor child, and respondent are directed to undergo DNA paternity
testing in a laboratory of their common choice within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the
Order, and to submit the results thereof within a period of ninety (90) days from completion. The
parties are further reminded of the hearing set on 24 February 2000 for the reception of other
evidence in support of the petition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that "under
the present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant
and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen…, unconstitutional."

In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.6

On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He asserted that the trial court rendered the Orders dated 3
February 2000 and 8 June 2000 "in excess of, or without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Petitioner further contended that there is "no
appeal nor any [other] plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law." Petitioner
maintained his previous objections to the taking of DNA paternity testing. He submitted the following
grounds to support his objection:

1. Public respondent misread and misapplied the ruling in Lim vs. Court of Appeals (270
SCRA 2).

2. Public respondent ruled to accept DNA test without considering the limitations on, and
conditions precedent for the admissibility of DNA testing and ignoring the serious constraints
affecting the reliability of the test as admitted by private respondent’s "expert" witness.

3. Subject Orders lack legal and factual support, with public respondent relying on scientific
findings and conclusions unfit for judicial notice and unsupported by experts in the field and
scientific treatises.

4. Under the present circumstances the DNA testing petitioner [is] compelled to take will be
inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen from the
petitioner, unconstitutional.7

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the
questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to
correct the trial court’s evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated
that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination because
the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner
can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA paternity testing. The dispositive portion of the
appellate court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and

ordered dismissed, and the challenged orders of the Trial Court AFFIRMED, with costs to Petitioner.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its Resolution dated 23
May 2001.9

Issues

Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to
determine filiation. Petitioner asks for the conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated
into our judicial system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity
suit.10

Petitioner further submits that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it authorized the
trial court "to embark in [sic] a new procedure xxx to determine filiation despite the absence of
legislation to ensure its reliability and integrity, want of official recognition as made clear in Lim vs.
Court of Appeals and the presence of technical and legal constraints in respect of [sic] its
implementation."11 Petitioner maintains that the proposed DNA paternity testing violates his right
against self-incrimination.12

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to give an overview of
a paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the requirements of the
Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and filiation.

An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship,13 support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The
burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological
father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and child.14

A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative father.
In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the
putative father.15

There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative father may show
incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either physical absence or
impotency.16 The putative father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other men
at the time of conception.

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.17 The child’s
legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.18

Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part of
evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However,
although likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how
much a child must or must not look like his biological father.19 This kind of evidence appeals to the
emotions of the trier of fact.

In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba, respondent’s
mother, put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondent’s biological
father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered corroborative
proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Alba’s assertion.
He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent is Armi Alba’s
child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioner’s denial by submitting pictures of respondent
and petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble each other.

Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now look to the law, rules,
and governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of incriminating acts on paternity
and filiation are allowed in this jurisdiction.

Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing Filiation

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.

xxx

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.—The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage,
may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between
the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where
these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.—The reputation or tradition existing in a

family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

This Court’s rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish
filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA,20 a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has
to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts
by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent
shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the
writing must be the writing of the putative father.21 A notarial agreement to support a child whose
filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence.22 Letters to the
mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child
on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation.23 However, a student
permanent record, a written consent to a father’s operation, or a marriage contract where the
putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing.24 Standing alone, neither a
certificate of baptism25 nor family pictures26 are sufficient to establish filiation.

So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity and filiation to
incriminating acts alone. However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of paternity
and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost universal scientific
agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on
paternity.27

In Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,28 the result of the blood grouping test showed that the putative
father was a "possible father" of the child. Paternity was imputed to the putative father after the
possibility of paternity was proven on presentation during trial of facts and circumstances other than
the results of the blood grouping test.

In Jao v. Court of Appeals,29 the child, the mother, and the putative father agreed to submit
themselves to a blood grouping test. The National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") conducted the
test, which indicated that the child could not have been the possible offspring of the mother and the
putative father. We held that the result of the blood grouping test was conclusive on the non-
paternity of the putative father.

The present case asks us to go one step further. We are now asked whether DNA analysis may be
admitted as evidence to prove paternity.

DNA Analysis as Evidence

DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all
human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a
person’s DNA profile can determine his identity.30

DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an
individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the
individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for
identical twins.31 We quote relevant portions of the trial court’s 3 February 2000 Order with approval:

Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is

exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single,
fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every cell in the human
body, the DNA of an individual’s blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles,
semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.

The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known
as A (adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases
appear in an individual’s DNA determines his or her physical makeup. And since DNA is a double-
stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These
are called "genes."

Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular sequence. This
gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are
sections that differ. They are known as "polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA
typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In
other words, DNA typing simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."

How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist
may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing.
They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm
loci which was used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of
November 1994; mtDNA process; VNTR (variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent
which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats)
method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the
process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample a million times through repeated
cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes
measurements in 13 separate places and can match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical
error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.

Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or
fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the
crime scene is compared with the "known" print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features
are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of
the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.

As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of these
regions, a person possesses two genetic types called "allele", one inherited from each parent. In [a]
paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to
produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have
been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain
whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s
DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types
match, then he is not excluded as the father.32 (Emphasis in the original)

Although the term "DNA testing" was mentioned in the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee, Jr.,33 it
was only in the 2001 case of Tijing v. Court of Appeals34 that more than a passing mention was
given to DNA analysis. In Tijing, we issued a writ of habeas corpus against respondent who
abducted petitioners’ youngest son. Testimonial and documentary evidence and physical
resemblance were used to establish parentage. However, we observed that:

Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using
short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. xxx For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would be
useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence

The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo35 discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be considered
a 180 degree turn from the Court’s wary attitude towards DNA testing in the
1997 Pe Lim case,36 where we stated that "DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet
been accorded official recognition by our courts." In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs
taken from the rape victim matched the accused’s DNA profile. We affirmed the accused’s conviction
of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. We declared:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.37

Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there was no
longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from
the issue of according "official recognition" to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance
of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.

In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on jurisprudence on DNA
testing: People v. Yatar38 and In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa.39 In Yatar,
a match existed between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the DNA profile of the
blood sample given by appellant in open court. The Court, following Vallejo’s footsteps, affirmed the
conviction of appellant because the physical evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence,
showed appellant guilty of rape with homicide. In De Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test
results to prove that he is not the father of the child conceived at the time of commission of the rape.
The Court ruled that a difference between the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA
profile of the victim’s child does not preclude the convict-petitioner’s commission of rape.

In the present case, the various pleadings filed by petitioner and respondent refer to two United
States cases to support their respective positions on the admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence: Frye v. U.S.40 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.41 In Frye v. U.S., the trial
court convicted Frye of murder. Frye appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia. During trial, Frye’s counsel offered an expert witness to testify on the result of a systolic
blood pressure deception test42 made on defendant. The state Supreme Court affirmed Frye’s
conviction and ruled that "the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify
the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments
thus far made." The Frye standard of general acceptance states as follows:

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.

In 1989, State v. Schwartz43 modified the Frye standard. Schwartz was charged with stabbing and

murder. Bloodstained articles and blood samples of the accused and the victim were submitted for
DNA testing to a government facility and a private facility. The prosecution introduced the private
testing facility’s results over Schwartz’s objection. One of the issues brought before the state
Supreme Court included the admissibility of DNA test results in a criminal proceeding. The state
Supreme Court concluded that:

While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has gained general acceptance in the
scientific community, we hold that admissibility of specific test results in a particular case hinges on
the laboratory’s compliance with appropriate standards and controls, and the availability of their
testing data and results.44

In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.45 further modified the Frye-

Schwartz standard. Daubert was a product liability case where both the trial and appellate courts
denied the admissibility of an expert’s testimony because it failed to meet the Frye standard of
"general acceptance." The United States Supreme Court ruled that in federal trials, the Federal
Rules of Evidence have superseded the Frye standard. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence, while
Rule 402 provides the foundation for admissibility of evidence. Thus:

Rule 401. "Relevant evidence" is defined as that which has any "tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Daubert cautions that departure from the Frye standard of general acceptance does not mean that
the Federal Rules do not place limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence. Rather, the judge
must ensure that the testimony’s reasoning or method is scientifically valid and is relevant to the
issue. Admissibility would depend on factors such as (1) whether the theory or technique can be or
has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique’s operation; and (5) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted
in the scientific community.

Another product liability case, Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael,46 further modified

the Daubert standard. This led to the amendment of Rule 702 in 2000 and which now reads as
follows:

If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.

We now determine the applicability in this jurisdiction of these American cases. Obviously, neither
the Frye-Schwartz standard nor the Daubert-Kumho standard is controlling in the Philippines.47 At
best, American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our decisions. Here, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the
Rules of Court.48 Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence.49 Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of
expert testimony, provides as follows:

The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which
he is shown to possess may be received in evidence.

This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed,
even evidence on collateral matters is allowed "when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish
the probability or improbability of the fact in issue."50

Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions in Tijing,
Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as evidence. In our jurisdiction, the
restrictive tests for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into the
weight of the evidence.

Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence

Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving credence
to DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.51]

We also repeat the trial court’s explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity cases:
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual
to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have
been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain
whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s
DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types
match, then he is not excluded as the father.52

It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A complete
match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not
necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard adopted in an
American jurisdiction,53 trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the
Probability of Paternity ("W") prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the
likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference population database, such as the Philippine
population database, is required to compute for W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity
inclusions, W will never equal to 100%. However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the
putative father, mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted
between the putative father and child alone.54

DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-
paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered
as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption
of paternity.55 This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.

Right Against Self-Incrimination

Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself." Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates
his right against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is
applicable only to testimonial evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial court’s 3
February 2000 Order with approval:

Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity
case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-
incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under
duress (People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against
self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his
body when it may be material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract
virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis, Supra); the substance emitting from the body of the
accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145);
morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an
order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed (People vs. Otadora,
86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test
(Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on "testimonial
compulsion."56

The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to
claim his or her own defenses.57 Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through
the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the
limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the Orders dated 3 February 2000 and
8 June 2000 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. SP-98-
88759. SO ORDERED.

12. Lucas vs Lucas, GR No. 190710, 6 Jun 2011

G.R. No. 190710               June 6, 2011

JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner,
vs.
JESUS S. LUCAS, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order? In this
petition for review on certiorari, we address this question to guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing
with a relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009.

The antecedents of the case are, as follows:

On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with
Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)2 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie),
migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a
prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one occasion,
Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen’s workplace, and an intimate
relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she
gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner’s father was not stated in petitioner’s
certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent. On August
1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent
allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When the
relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondent’s offer of support
and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several
attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.

Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s
baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis
University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the
same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music;
and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.

Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the
petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and
obtained a copy of the petition.

Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September
3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued the
Order3 setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his
opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and that the Solicitor General be
furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear and represent the
State in the case.

On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a
Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the
summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was
required, he was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice by
publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of the subject
matter.4

On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation and Comment on Petitioner’s Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Respondent reiterated that the petition for recognition is
adversarial in nature; hence, he should be served with summons.

After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration.5 Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because
petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that
DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioner’s
father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.

On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondent’s motion for reconsideration, issued an
Order6 dismissing the case. The court remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v. Alba,7 there
are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have to face:
a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child. The court opined that petitioner must first establish these
four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include
incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results. The court
observed that the petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present. Petitioner failed
to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she
had sexual relations with respondent, and petitioner’s statement as to what his mother told him
about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent;
and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he was
treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court opined that, having failed to
establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any affirmative defenses. The
dispositive portion of the said Order therefore reads:

WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects
of a traditional paternity action in his petition, his motion for the submission of parties to DNA testing
to establish paternity and filiation is hereby denied. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July 30, 2008, which the
RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on October 20, 2008, it issued the Order9 setting aside the court’s
previous order, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30, 2008 is hereby reconsidered and
set aside.

Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) be set for hearing
on January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.10

This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for filing the petition
is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court stressed that the
petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it included a certification against forum
shopping, and it contained a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which
petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The
court remarked that the allegation that the statements in the petition were not of petitioner’s personal
knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also dismissed respondent’s arguments that there is
no basis for the taking of DNA test, and that jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of
DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule on DNA Evidence11 allows the conduct of DNA testing,
whether at the court’s instance or upon application of any person who has legal interest in the matter
in litigation.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of
Petition,12 reiterating that (a) the petition was not in due form and substance as no defendant was
named in the title, and all the basic allegations were hearsay; and (b) there was no prima facie case,
which made the petition susceptible to dismissal.

The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009, and rescheduled the hearing.13

Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the Orders dated
October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009.

On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. The
assailed Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 both issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 is DISMISSED.14

The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no
summons had been served on him. Respondent’s special appearance could not be considered as
voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the
court over respondent. Although respondent likewise questioned the court’s jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person.

The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking
a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show that the four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met. The CA further held that
a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case,
thus:

While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to be absolute, the rule could not
really have been intended to trample on the substantive rights of the parties. It could have not meant
to be an instrument to promote disorder, harassment, or extortion. It could have not been intended to
legalize unwarranted expedition to fish for evidence. Such will be the situation in this particular case
if a court may at any time order the taking of a DNA test. If the DNA test in compulsory recognition
cases is immediately available to the petitioner/complainant without requiring first the presentation of
corroborative proof, then a dire and absurd rule would result. Such will encourage and promote
harassment and extortion.

xxxx

At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that it sees the danger of allowing an
absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed to establish
prima facie proof. x x x If at anytime, motu proprio and without pre-conditions, the court can indeed
order the taking of DNA test in compulsory recognition cases, then the prominent and well-to-do
members of our society will be easy prey for opportunists and extortionists. For no cause at all, or
even for [sic] casual sexual indiscretions in their younger years could be used as a means to harass
them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of their children may just be taking the chances-
just in case-by pointing to a sexual partner in a long past one-time encounter. Indeed an absolute
and unconditional taking of DNA test for compulsory recognition case opens wide the opportunities
for extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for scandal.15

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA denied the motion for lack of
merit.16

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED THE

ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF HEREIN RESPONDENT
ALBEIT THE SAME WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

I.A

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT

JURISDICTION WAS NOT ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON OF THE
RESPONDENT.

I.B

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO

REALIZE THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED VOLUNTARILY
TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO.
 I.C

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY

RULED THAT THE TITLE OF A PLEADING, RATHER THAN ITS BODY, IS
CONTROLLING.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE

DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE MOTION (FILED BY THE
PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT A QUO) FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA TESTING.

II.A

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED

THAT DNA TESTING CAN ONLY BE ORDERED AFTER THE PETITIONER ESTABLISHES
PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF FILIATION.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED

RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF HERRERA VS. ALBA,

ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE ‘FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A

TRADITIONAL PATERNITY ACTION.’17

Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his petition for certiorari the court’s lack
of jurisdiction over his person. Hence, the CA had no legal basis to discuss the same, because
issues not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate, respondent had already voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of several motions asking for affirmative
relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 3, 2007; (b) Ex
Parte Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 6, 2007; and (c)
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition.
Petitioner points out that respondent even expressly admitted that he has waived his right to
summons in his Manifestation and Comment on Petitioner’s Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the
Case. Hence, the issue is already moot and academic.

Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the caption of the petition does
not state respondent’s name, the body of the petition clearly indicates his name and his known
address. He maintains that the body of the petition is controlling and not the caption.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason for the dismissal of
the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA entertained any doubt
as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply denied the motion.18 Petitioner points out
that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require that there must be a prior proof of
filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that the CA erroneously relied on the four
significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as enunciated in Herrera v. Alba.19 Petitioner avers
that these procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of the proceedings because they are
matters of evidence that should be taken up during the trial.20

In his Comment, respondent supports the CA’s ruling on most issues raised in the petition for
certiorari and merely reiterates his previous arguments. However, on the issue of lack of jurisdiction,
respondent counters that, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, he raised the issue before the CA in
relation to his claim that the petition was not in due form and substance. Respondent denies that he
waived his right to the service of summons. He insists that the alleged waiver and voluntary
appearance was conditional upon a finding by the court that summons is indeed required. He avers
that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person.

The petition is meritorious.

Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying respondent’s
motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to
be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that
the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is
a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of
a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is
rendered. In a number of cases, the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the
denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.21 In the present case, we discern no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.

The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a) the court’s lack of jurisdiction over his
person due to the absence of summons, and (b) defect in the form and substance of the petition to
establish illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state a cause of action.

We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised before the CA, whether
the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent, or whether respondent waived his right
to the service of summons. We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was
necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the case. In other words, was the service of summons jurisdictional? The answer to this
question depends on the nature of petitioner’s action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in
rem, or quasi in rem.

An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is
directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person
as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or
obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a
person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth
certificate, is an action in rem.22

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. 23

The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the
petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world
that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection
of any sort to the right sought to be established.24 Through publication, all interested parties are
deemed notified of the petition.

If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting
the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.25 This is but proper
in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.26 Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that
the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the
due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has
participated in the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the
petition to establish filiation.

To address respondent’s contention that the petition should have been adversarial in form, we
further hold that the herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed
adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to implead
respondent as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is
adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the
latter an opportunity to contest it.27 In this petition—classified as an action in rem—the notice
requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication of the petition
and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the trial court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the
ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out
without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.28 A complaint states a cause of
action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right.29

The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to
respondent. Respondent, however, contends that the allegations in the petition were hearsay as
they were not of petitioner’s personal knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that
cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his evidence.

In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the
court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a
cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.30

The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.31 The test of the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.32

If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and
correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and require
the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the
parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.33

The statement in Herrera v. Alba34 that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this
case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have
presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this
initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s
observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case—the first procedural aspect in a
paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by
mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the
motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More
essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is
warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has
just set the said case for hearing.

At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative
proof is well taken and deserves the Court’s attention. In light of this observation, we find that there
is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA
testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of
whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.

The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and
use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed parameters on the requisite
elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory
reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test
results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure that the
evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and]
shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA
analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public."35

Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are
aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:

SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of
the following:

(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;

(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and

(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.

This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any
party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.

This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during
the hearing, the said conditions are established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or
a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In these states, a
court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in ours),
must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a
prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding
of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained —

Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory
blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be
made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory
blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing.37
1avvphi1

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from
mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute
necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity
and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA
testing.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
 B. Illegitimate Children;
13. Uyguangco vs CA, GR No. 76873, 26 Oct 1989
14. Bernabe vs Alejo, GR No. 140500, 21 Jan 2002
15. Dela Cruz vs Gracia, GR No. 177728, 31 Jul 2009
16. Mendoza vs CA, GR No. 86302, 24 Sep 1991
17. Manuel v Ferrer, GR No. 117246, 21 Aug 1995
18. Dolina vs Vallecera, GR No. 182367, Dec 15, 2010
19. Salas vs Matusalem, GR No. 180284, 11Sept 2013
20. Grande v Antonio, GR No. 206248, 18 Feb 2014

C. Legitimated Children;
21. De Santos vs Angeles, GR No. 105619, 10 Sep 2003