INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF BUCHAREST

MODEL UNITED NATIONS

(ISBMUN)
4-7 FEBRUARY 2011

SECURITY COUNCIL

TOPIC AREA B: THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

I. SHORT HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

From the 7th to the 10th century, Arab and Persian trading posts were established along the coast of
present-day Somalia. Nomadic tribes occupied the interior, occasionally pushing into Ethiopian
territory. In the 16th century, Turkish rule extended to the northern coast, and the sultans of Zanzibar
gained control in the south.
After British occupation of Aden in 1839, the Somali coast became its source of food. The French
established a coal-mining station in 1862 at the site of Djibouti, and the Italians planted a settlement in
Eritrea. Egypt, which for a time claimed Turkish rights in the area, was succeeded by Britain. By 1920,
a British and an Italian protectorate occupied what is now Somalia. The British ruled the entire area
after 1941, with Italy returning in 1950 to serve as United Nations trustee for its former territory.
By 1960, Britain and Italy granted independence to their respective sectors, enabling the two to join as
the Republic of Somalia on July 1, 1960. Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Britain in 1963 when
the British granted the Somali-populated Northern Frontier District of Kenya to the Republic of Kenya.
On Oct. 15, 1969, President Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated and the army seized power.
Maj. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre, as president of a renamed Somali Democratic Republic, leaned
heavily toward the USSR. In 1977, Somalia openly backed rebels in the easternmost area of Ethiopia,
the Ogaden Desert, which had been seized by Ethiopia at the turn of the century. Somalia
acknowledged defeat in an eight-month war against the Ethiopians that year, having lost much of its
32,000-man army and most of its tanks and planes. President Siad Barre fled the country in late Jan.
1991. His departure left Somalia in the hands of a number of clan-based guerrilla groups, none of
which trusted each other.
Africa's worst drought of the century occurred in 1992, and, coupled with the devastation of civil war,
Somalia was plunged into a severe famine that killed 300,000. U.S. troops were sent in to protect the
delivery of food in Dec. 1992, and in May 1993 the UN took control of the relief efforts from the U.S.
The warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid ambushed UN troops and dragged American bodies through the
streets, causing an about-face in U.S. willingness to involve itself in the fate of this lawless country.
The last of the U.S. troops departed in late March, leaving 19,000 UN troops behind.

Since 1991 Somalia has been engulfed in anarchy. Years of peace negotiations between the various
factions were fruitless, and warlords and militias ruled over individual swaths of land. In 1991, a
breakaway nation, the Somaliland Republic, proclaimed its independence. Since then several warlords
have set up their own mini-states. Although internationally unrecognized, these states have been
peaceful and stable. Leaders in the northeast proclaimed the formation of Puntland in 1998. Puntland's
leader, Abdullahi Yusuf, publicly announced that he did not plan to break away from the remainder of
the country. In 2001, traditional elders elected Jama Ali Jama as the Puntland President. Yusuf refused
to accept the elders' decision. Both Yusuf and Jama continued to claim the presidency, and there were
continued efforts to resolve the conflict at year's end. In addition to Yusuf's and Jama's competing
claims on the presidency, General Adde Musse in April attempted to seize Puntland with Somaliland
support. After intensive mediation efforts by traditional elders, Musse reconciled with Yusuf. A ban on
political parties in Puntland remained in place.

In the northwest, the Republic of Somaliland continued to proclaim its independence within the borders
of former British Somaliland but did not have international recognition. Somaliland's Government
included a parliament, a functioning civil court system, executive departments organized as ministries,
six regional governors, and municipal authorities in major towns. Presidential elections were held on
April 15 and the ruling United People's Democratic Party (UDUB) won a very close victory in
elections determined to be credible and significantly transparent.

In August 2000, a parliament convened in nearby Djibouti and elected Somalia's first government in
nearly a decade. The Transitional National Assembly elected Abdiqassim Salad Hassan as Transitional
President. After its first year in office, the government still controlled only 10% of the country. In
August 2003, its mandate expired, but, despite the expiry of the term, both institutions continued to
function at year's end. Since October 2002, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD)
sponsored a reconciliation conference led by Kenya, in association with Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and
Uganda. All major political and military leaders attended as well as elders, religious leaders, and
members of civil society. There was no national judicial system.
In August 2004 a 275-member transitional parliament was inaugurated for a five-year term. Parliament
selected a national president in September, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the president of the breakaway
region of Puntland. The new government, however, spent its first year operating out of Kenya -
Somalia remained too violent and unstable to enter - eventually settling in the provincial town of
Baidoa.
In May 2006, the country's worst outbreak of violence in 10 years began, with Islamist militias, called
the Somali Islamic Courts Council (SICC), battling rival warlords. On June 6, the Islamist militia
seized control of the capital, Mogadishu, and established control in much of the south. Somalia's
transitional government, led by President Abdullahi Yusuf and situated in Baidoa, spent months
engaged in unsuccessful peace negotiations with the Islamic Courts Council. In the meantime,
neighboring Ethiopia, which has clashed in the past with Somalia's Islamists and considers them a
threat to regional security, began amassing troops on the border. In mid-December, Ethiopia launched
air strikes against the Islamists, and in a matter of days Ethiopian ground troops and Somali soldiers
loyal to the transitional government regained control of Mogadishu. A week later most of the Islamists
had been forced to flee the country. Ethiopia announced that its troops would remain in the country
until stability was assured and a functional central government had been established, ending Somalia's
15 years of anarchy.
In January 2007, the U.S. Launched airs trikes on the retreating Islamists, who they believed included
three members of al-Qaeda suspected of involvement in the 1998 bombings of the American embassies
in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The air strikes were strongly criticized in a number of Muslim countries,
which accused the Americans of killing Somali civilians. Battles between the insurgents and Somali
and Ethiopian troops intensified in March, leaving 300 civilians dead in what has been called the worst
fighting in 15 years. The fighting created a humanitarian crisis, with more than 320,000 Somalis fleeing
the fighting in Mogadishu in just two months. In July, a national reconciliation conference opened in
Mogadishu but was quickly postponed when leading opposition figures failed to appear. The fighting
intensified once again in October. The Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia, a coalition of moderate
Islamist leaders, and the transitional government agreed to a cease-fire in June 2008 that called on
Ethiopian troops that were propping up the fragile government to be replaced by UN troops. The future
of the deal was tenuous from the start and was greeted by much skepticism indeed, it was unclear if the
UN could assemble a force willing to be deployed in the troubled region, and several powerful Islamist
groups did not participate in the negotiations.
Al-Shabab, the militant wing of SICC, began gaining strength in 2007. It allied itself with al-Qaeda and
won the support of many local warlords, primarily in the south. The group has raised alarms in the U.S.
that its brand of militant Islam would spread throughout eastern Africa and beyond. The group seeks to
return Somalia to an Islamist state and has intimidated civilians with stonings, by chopping off hands,
and by banning many forms of technology, while continuing to wage war against the transitional
government. Al-Shabab has taken advantage of the power vacuum and weak transitional government.
By February 2009, the group controlled almost all of southern Somalia.
Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Ghedi resigned in October 2007 after a protracted feud with President
Yusuf. He was succeeded by Nur Hassan Hussein.
President Yusuf dismissed Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein in Dec. 2008, saying Hussein had
"failed to accomplish his duties." It was not clear, however, if Yusuf had the authority to make such a
move. The following day, Parliament passed, 143-20, a confidence vote in the government of Hussein.
Despite the vote, President Yusuf appointed Muhammad Mahmud Guled Gamadhere as prime minister.
Guled, resigned, however, saying he did not want to be "seen as a stumbling block to the peace process
which is going well now." President Yusuf also resigned in the power struggle.
On January 31, 2009, Parliament elected Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a moderate Islamist cleric, as
president. Many Somalis greeted the election of Ahmed as an opportunity to move toward peace and
end the brutal 18-year war. In February, President Ahmed named Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as
prime minister. Parliament approved the appointment. Observers greeted the appointment with
optimism, saying Sharmarke, a former diplomat and the son of Somalia's second civilian president,
could help generate support both at home and abroad for the Islamist government.
Amid a growing threat from militant Islamists, Ethiopia began withdrawing troops from Somalia in
January 2009.
Al-Shabab formally declared allegiance to al-Qaeda in February 2010, sparking further concern that the
group posed a global threat. It claimed responsibility for the July bombing at a restaurant in Kampala,
Uganda, that killed about 75 people who were watching the final game of the World Cup. The bombing
was intended to send a message to countries that have sent troops to support Somalia's transitional
government.

Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke, who has been criticized for failing to defeat the Shabab and who has
been at odds with President Ahmed, resigned in September 2010.

II. CURRENT SITUATION

Since Ethiopian armed forces entered Mogadishu in December 2006, Somalia has suffered an
increasingly brutal conflict that has devastated the country and laid waste to its capital. Lawlessness
and violence have plagued Somalia since the collapse of its last central government in 1991. But the
magnitude of the crisis facing the country today dwarfs everything else Somalis have endured
throughout the last 10 years.
Ethiopia and Somalia have a long history of bitter conflict and in 1977 the two countries fought a full-
scale war when Somalia attempted to annex what is now Ethiopia’s eastern Somali region. Ethiopia has
legitimate security interests in Somalia. But for many Somalis, the presence of ENDF forces in
Mogadishu was an intolerable development, and tensions built rapidly among the local population.

In 2008 the human rights and humanitarian situation in Somalia deteriorated into unmitigated
catastrophe. Several thousand civilians have been killed in fighting. More than one million Somalis are
now displaced from their homes and thousands flee across the country’s borders every month.
Mogadishu, a bustling city of 1.2 million people in 2006, has seen more than 870,000 of its residents
displaced by the armed conflict. All sides have used indiscriminate force as a matter of routine, and in
2008 violence has taken on a new dimension with the targeted murders of aid workers and civil society
activists.

1. The issue of human rights

Amnesty International expressed its concern at the widespread violations of international humanitarian
law and human rights law, including war crimes, and the dire humanitarian situation that civilians face
in southern and central Somalia. Civilians are at high risk of being killed and injured in indiscriminate
attacks by all parties to the internal armed conflict, and as a result of a situation of generalized violence
and collapse of the rule of law. In addition, certain categories of persons also face targeted attacks,
including unlawful killings, torture and other-ill treatment, abductions, death threats and harassment. In
areas where there is currently no fighting, civilians bear the brunt of arbitrary and repressive rules,
violating their human rights, enforced by armed Islamist groups.
Conflict and associated human rights abuses continue to cause massive displacement in Somalia.
According to UNHCR, over 200,000 civilians were estimated to have fled their homes in Somalia
between January and early September 2010, some 1.4 million are currently displaced within the
country and 68,000 have been registered as newly arrived refugees in neighbouring countries in 2010.

Given the difficulties of access to southern and central Somalia by independent observers, Amnesty
International relies on information provided by local sources to document the situation, as well as
accounts from Somali refugees who flee Somalia. Amnesty International interviewed hundreds of
Somali refugees who had recently fled their country in March and June 2010 in Kenya.

a) The situation in Mogadishu

Somalia’s capital Mogadishu has since 2007 been the epicentre of armed conflict between the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and its allies, and the armed Islamist groups al-
Shabab and Hizbul Islam. Since 2008, al-Shabab has extended its control to most of the territory in
south and central Somalia, including major towns, but heavy fighting and attacks continue in
Mogadishu.

Civilians bear the brunt of the fighting. No party to the conflict appears to take the necessary
precautions to avoid loss of civilian life and injury, despite their obligations to do so under international
humanitarian law. Civilians are often caught up in shelling and cross-fire by all parties to the conflict,
resulting in death and injury to thousands. The fighting provokes massive displacement within and
outside Mogadishu and disrupts access to humanitarian aid, which is already curtailed by insecurity and
the targeting of aid workers.
Medical records of the Daynile hospital on the outskirts of Mogadishu for the first seven months of the
year 2010 showed that 48 percent of its patients were suffering war-related injuries and that 38 percent
of patients with war-related injuries were women and children under 14. Between June and July 2010,
hundreds of civilians were killed and injured in Mogadishu in clashes between armed Islamist groups
and the TFG and AMISOM. Some field reports claimed as many as 50 deaths in one day. The Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated that between the last week of August and
the first week of September 2010, 230 civilians were killed and 400 injured by fighting.

The African Union recently announced that the number of AMISOM troops will increase to 8,000, and
hopes that AMISOM can be reinforced further in the next few months. This is likely to result in more
attacks against the force by armed Islamist groups, and more retaliatory shelling by AMISOM in the
capital.

b) The level of violence in South and Central Somalia

Al-Shabab has been seizing cities and territory in southern and central Somalia since 2008 and now
controls most of it. However the region has experienced sporadic fighting in the past year and a
resurgence in the fighting in areas other than in Mogadishu remains likely.

Al-Shabab has severely restricted humanitarian access in most of southern and central Somalia, putting
civilians at risk. Restrictions have included the banning of UN and international agencies working in
areas under al-Shaba’s control, and the arbitrary closure of national organisations, which the group
sometimes accuses of “spying” for the international community. One high-profile ban was that of the
World Food Programme in early 2010. According to OCHA, humanitarian access in southern Somalia
is at its lowest since the end of 2006. In August 2010, al-Shabab banned three humanitarian
organisations from areas under its control, claiming that they were spreading Christianity; in September
2010, three more aid organisations were banned after al-Shabab accused them of having links with the
USA.

OCHA reports that on 23 August 2010, al-Shabab instructed aid agencies operating in Beletweyne to
pay 10,000 USD within 15 days, in order to work for the next six months, after which agencies should
pay an additional 6,000 USD for another six-month work permit, and transmitted similar instructions to
all aid agencies operating in Middle and Lower Shabelle, Bay, Bakool, Middle and Lower Juba regions.
Restrictions on the movement of humanitarian supplies are also imposed. For instance, MSF reported
in October 2010 that a truck containing medical supplies was stopped and that flights carrying medical
supplies have been banned from landing in southern Somalia.

c) Targeted human rights abuses

In addition to indiscriminate attacks and the situation of generalized violence which put the lives of
civilians at risk, certain categories of people are at risk of being targeted for killings, torture,
harassment and forced recruitment. In 2009 and 2010, armed Islamist groups have reportedly been
responsible for the majority of such targeted attacks.

Persons linked with the TFG are at high risk of being killed, abducted, tortured and otherwise
threatened by armed Islamist groups; they include members of the government, parliamentarians,
judges, district officers or former officials. But the perception of being linked or sympathizing with the
TFG, is sometimes considered enough reason to be targeted: women selling tea to TFG soldiers have
been flogged or otherwise punished by al-Shabab members , and persons coming from TFG areas in
Mogadishu are sometimes suspected by the armed groups of being spies.

Civil society activists, including human rights activists, aid workers and journalists are at risk of being
targeted for killing, abduction and torture, because they are suspected of sharing information on the
conflict with outside observers, or because they have expressed opinions about the human rights
situation in Somalia.

Throughout 2009 and 2010, reports of incidents of torture and unlawful killings carried out by armed
opposition groups have increased. There has been a worrying trend of individuals stoned to death,
publicly shot dead, amputated and flogged on the orders of quasi-judicial bodies operated by local
leaders linked to armed groups. There is little information about the way the “courts” of armed
opposition groups operate, but individuals “tried” under these bodies do not appear to benefit from any
due process guarantees, including legal representation or possibility of appeal. These acts violate
international humanitarian law, which armed opposition groups are obliged to respect. Declarations
attributed to al-Shabab local leaders ostensibly claim that such acts are carried out to impose
conformity with their interpretation of Islamic law. However, several testimonies gathered by Amnesty
International show that many such abuses target persons suspected of opposing al-Shabab or who
refuse to comply with an al-Shabab order. Many of these acts are carried out in public. Amnesty
International believes that armed groups aim, under the pretext of maintaining law and order, at
intimidating and instilling fear in the civilian population, through public displays of cruelty and
violence, in order to assert their control over territory.

According to the UN, from April to early July 2010, there were reports of nine executions by firing
squad or stoning in areas controlled by al-Shabab, on accusations of spying, adultery or murder; five
cases of amputation; some 28 individuals flogged; and seven cases of beheading, including of five
workers allegedly involved in reconstruction work at the Parliament in Mogadishu. Amnesty
International believes that the number of such abuses remains under-reported because of the secrecy
within which al-Shabab leaders operate and the dangers associated with circulating information about
the group’s actions.

Male children, including sometimes as young as nine years old, and young men are at a high risk of
being forcibly recruited to fight for the armed Islamist groups. During its last visit to Kenya, Amnesty
International collected information about a widespread pattern of such forced recruitment, particularly
by al-Shabab, in the areas under its control, including in al-Shabab controlled districts of Mogadishu.
Amnesty International has also received reports of girls being forced to marry al-Shabab members, or
to cook and clean for al-Shabab forces. Amnesty International has also received testimonies indicating
that al-Shabab has targeted minority group members for recruitment into their forces.

d) Humanitarian situation in IDP camps and refugee camps in neighbouring countries

According to humanitarian organizations, the situation of the displaced in camps throughout southern
and central Somalia is critical. The UN Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of
internally displaced persons (IDP) reported in January 2010:
“During flight and in settlements, the internally displaced remain exposed to grave human rights
abuses, in particular rape and domestic violence. Many of their rights and needs, including shelter,
food, water, health care and education, remain unaddressed. The severe situation of malnourishment, in
particular of children, in camps for internally displaced persons is of deep concern. Protracted
displacement situations in all parts of Somalia are exacerbated by the influx of new arrivals. Existing
humanitarian assistance is insufficient, because of a lack of humanitarian access as well as a lack of
funds. At the same time, recovery and development efforts are needed to strengthen the resilience of the
displaced and the absorption capacities of host communities and to find durable solutions for the
displaced where this is possible”.

The Afgoye corridor, a stretch of land north-west of Mogadishu, hosts hundreds of thousands of
displaced persons from Mogadishu, with minimal or no access to humanitarian aid. The Afgoye
corridor is currently under the control of Hizbul Islam and al-Shabab. Satellite imagery released by
UNHCR shows that some 410,000 persons currently reside in Afgoye.

2. Piracy
The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was established on January 14, 2009
pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851. Its purpose is to facilitate discussion and
coordination of actions among states and organizations working on suppressing piracy off the coastline
of Somalia.

In a statement released in 2009, the Contact noted that piracy grew significantly over the previous year
and that it can be expected to increase unless enhanced international efforts are taking place.

The pirates have been demanding million-dollar ransoms for release of the hostages, ships and cargoes.
Piracy disrupts critical humanitarian aid deliveries to Somalia, increases shipping insurance premiums
along one of the world’s most traveled routes to near-prohibitive levels, damages littoral economies by
forcing the diversion of vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, and raises the prospect of an
environmental disaster as ships fall prey to hostile intent. Piracy is a symptom of a wider lack of
security and rule of law in Somalia and continues to constitute a threat to regional stability. As
important, piracy is symptomatic of the overall situation in Somalia including the prevalence of illegal
fishing and toxic waste dumping off the coast of Somalia, which adversely affects the Somali economy
and marine environment.
The CGPCS emphasized the primary role of Somalia itself in rooting out piracy and armed robbery at
sea and the importance of assisting Somalia in strengthening its own operational capacity to fight
piracy and bring to justice those involved in piracy.
The Contact Group recognized the importance of apprehending and prosecuting suspected pirates. It
called on state parties to implement their obligations under relevant treaties and applicable international
law, including in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea with respect to suppressing
piracy, establishing jurisdiction, and accepting delivery of suspected pirates, and to discuss, as
appropriate, the applicability of other international instruments including the 1988 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ("SUA Convention"), and the
UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The CGPCS identified six related focus areas:
• improving operational and information support to counter-piracy operations,
• establishing a counter-piracy coordination mechanism,
• strengthening judicial frameworks for arrest, prosecution and detention of pirates,
• strengthening commercial shipping self-awareness and other capabilities,
• pursuing improved diplomatic and public information efforts, and
• tracking financial flows related to piracy.
Additionally, participating states affirmed the importance of attention to financial flows to pirates and
their activities; international bodies that track illicit financial flows were called upon to examine the
question of such flows to pirates and their operations and to report as appropriate to the CGPCS and
other groups concerned with the issue.
During the another meeting of the Group, it was decided to consider creating a center in the region to
coordinate information relevant to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia (the
Counter-Piracy Coordination Center) as soon as possible in 2009.

3. The refugees in the region

Kenya’s violations of the human rights of Somali refugees and asylum-seekers are putting thousands of
lives at risk, Amnesty International said in a report released recently.

From life without peace to peace without life describes how thousands fleeing violence in Somalia are
unable to find refuge, protection and lasting solutions in Kenya, due to the closure of the border
between the two countries almost four years ago amid security concerns.

“Continued fighting and horrendous abuses in Somalia pose a very real threat to the lives of tens of
thousands of children, women and men. No Somali should be forcibly returned to southern and central
Somalia,” said Michelle Kagari, Africa Programme Deputy Director at Amnesty International.

“Many Somalis have no option but to cross into Kenya. Kenya’s closure of the screening centre near
the border however means no Somali is registered immediately and that nobody is screened. Inevitably,
this does nothing to address Kenya’s national security concerns” said Michelle Kagari.

Following a surge in violence in December 2006, Kenya closed its 682 kilometre border with Somalia,
maintaining that fighters with alleged links to al-Qa'ida might otherwise enter Kenya and endanger
national security. However, because of the border’s porousness, Somalis have continued to flee and
seek refuge in Kenya. The Kenyan authorities have turned a blind eye to the continuous flow of Somali
asylum-seekers across the border, calling into question what impact, if any, the closure has had on the
security situation.

Since the border was closed, Kenyan security forces have forcibly returned asylum-seekers and
refugees to Somalia; demanded bribes and arbitrarily arrested and detained them. Somalis are regularly
harassed by Kenyan police at the border areas, in the Dadaab refugee camps in north-eastern Kenya
and in urban areas, including Nairobi.

About half of all Somalis fleeing to Kenya register in the world’s largest refugee settlement, made up of
three overcrowded refugee camps near the town of Dadaab in north-east Kenya, now hosting almost
300,000 people. The other half make their way to Nairobi, Kenya’s capital, where very few are able to
register as refugees due to the limited capacity of the government and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In the camps, police responsible for protecting refugees
sometimes detain, assault, and extort money from them. Police have also failed to investigate cases of
sexual violence between refugees, leading to a climate of impunity for those responsible.

The three Daadab camps are themselves grossly overcrowded. Originally built to accommodate 90,000
refugees, they now house more than 280,000. This has put enormous pressure on refugees’ access to
shelter, water, sanitation, health and education. The Kenyan government has been slow in allocating
more land to host the growing refugee population.

Refugees in the Daadab camps told Amnesty International that the camps themselves were increasingly
insecure and that members and sympathisers of al-Shabab, an armed Islamist group in Somalia, were
present in the camps or travelled through them and at times recruited refugees to fight in Somalia. The
Kenyan security forces are also reported to have been involved in recruiting Somali refugees for
military training in late 2009.

Kenya’s reputation for hospitality towards Somali refugees is turning sour. Two decades after they first
started to flee the brutal conflict in their country, Kenya provides asylum to 325,000 registered Somali
refugees – and probably an equal number who have not registered. But the authorities’ increasing
demonization of these refugees - 80 percent of whom are women and children - as a national security
threat has made them among the most vulnerable victims of Kenya’s notoriously corrupt and abusive
police force.
Police arresting newly arrived Somali asylum seekers incorrectly tell them they are unlawfully in
Kenya and charge them with offenses under Kenya’s Immigration Act which prohibits entry into Kenya
without documents and a visa. But the Act does not apply to asylum seekers who, under Kenya’s
Refugee Act, have 30 days from the moment they enter the country to register as refugees with the
authorities at the nearest office of the Kenyan Refugee Commissioner.
International refugee and human rights law prohibit refoulement, the forcible return of refugees to
persecution, of anyone to torture and, in Africa, of civilians to situations of generalized violence. Kenya
has every right to regulate the presence of non-nationals on its territory and may therefore normally
prevent certain people from entering or remaining in Kenya – including those viewed as a threat to its
national security such as members of the Somali Islamist group al-Shabaab. But Kenya may not close
its borders to asylum seekers and may not deport them, or registered refugees, back to Somalia.
UNHCR (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) has failed to put in place an effective
monitoring system to collect information on the types of abuses documented in this report. The UN
refugee agency says that a number of factors have affected its ability to carry out its protection
mandate: security concerns that restrict its work in the camps, a lack of human resources and financial
capacity, and the absorption of its time and resources in addressing the myriad needs relating to the
humanitarian situation in the chronically overcrowded and underfunded camps.
To help put an immediate end to the widespread abuses described in this report, the Kenyan authorities,
UNHCR, and donor countries should take a number of urgent steps.
1. The Kenyan authorities should immediately instruct the police to end their systematic
interception, detention, abuse, deportation, and extortion of asylum seekers crossing the border
from Somalia and instruct them to allow asylum seekers to safely travel to the Dadaab refugee
camps.
2. The authorities should expedite their plans to open a new refugee screening center in Liboi to
ensure the orderly registration of all newly arrived asylum seekers and allow all registered
refugees in the camps to freely move throughout Kenya.
3. The authorities should also introduce rigorous monitoring and supervision of police handling of
sexual and gender-based violence in the camps by creating a national police task force on sexual
violence against refugees in coordination with the National Commission on Gender and
Development.
4. The police should ensure sufficient police capacity including through the stationing of female
police officers to effectively prevent and respond to sexual violence.

III. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

The situation in Somalia was first addressed by the Security Council in 1992 in resolution 733 (1992),
upon request from the Somali government. The Security Council issued a series of resolutions between
1009 and 1993 addressing the situation in Somalia, which was labeled as representing a threat to peace
and security. After that, a long period of silence followed. The Council tackled the issue again in 2001
(Resolution 1356(2001)).

Of all the resolutions that were adopted on the situation in Somalia, one of great importance is
Resolution 733(1992) which establishes a “general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons
and military equipment”. Several control and experience-sharing mechanisms have been established in
the following years.

Another resolution of great importance is Resolution 751(1992) which establishes the United Nations
Operation in Somalia(UNOSOM). The same resolution also established a Security Council Committee
on Somalia. As outlined in the resolution, its purpose was to:
− “seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective
implementation” of the arms embargo,
− “consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the
embargo” and
− “recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo”.

Moreover, in 2007 (Resolution 1744), the Security Council approved the establishment of an African
Union mission for an initial period of 6 months. The duration of the mission was extended through
subsequent resolutions. The latest resolution that referred to the matter extended the mandate until 31
September 2011.
In Resolution 1816(2008) appears the first reference to the phenomenon of piracy, which is strongly
condemned. A series of resolutions dealing with the same issue followed.

In Resolution 1863(2009) the Council expressed its intent to establish a peacekeeping operation in
Somalia. The intention was reiterated in other resolutions that followed, but it has not been put into
action until present date.

Also, please bare in mind the activity of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea (http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/).

IV. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ISBMUN 2011

The Security Council must first make an assessment of the current situation in Somalia.

The measures proposed by the Council must address the main issues outlined in the previous chapters:
the situation of human rights, the problem of refugees in the region, piracy, but delegates may also
bring into discussion other matters of relevance to the topic.

At the same time, delegates must bare in mind the most important principle of international law → state
sovereignty. All measures undertaken by the United Nations in general and by the Security Council in
particular need to offer sufficient guarantees that the sovereignty of the state in question shall be
respected. However, like any other general principle, it is left to the interpretation of parties involved to
determine which actions are infringements of sovereignty and which are not.

The United Nations Charter refers to several means by which the Security Council may taker action.
1. (art 33) The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties involved in a
dispute which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, to settle
their disputes by peaceful means (negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements and other peaceful means of
their choice).
2. (art 34) The Security Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to
international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of
the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
3. (art 36) The Council may make recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment of
a peaceful nature at any stage of a dispute.
Note: However, legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred to the International Court of
Justice. The security Council is one of the entities that may refer issues to the ICJ.
4. (art 39) The Security Council is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and
security. For this purpose, it is entitled to determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression; moreover, it may make recommendations in order to
restore international peace and security.
5. (art 41) The Security Council shall take measures not involving the use of armed force in order
to give effect to its measures. These are the so-called sanctions that the SC may impose and
they have natures (general economic sanctions, trade embargoes, freezing of assets, travel bans
on individuals etc). It also may call upon member states to apply these measures. These
measures recommended by the SC are mandatory to member states. All the other UN bodies
may only adopt measures that are left at the discretion of countries, they may not impose
mandatory measures or establish sanctions directly for the countries that do not implement
 them. Also, the previous types of intervention of the SC (recommendations for the parties to a
dispute – art 36) also has a optional character for the parties involved.
However, the intervention under art 41 is mandatory for all member countries of the UN. A state that
does not enforce these measures or acts against them may be the subject of sanctions (adopted also by
the Security Council).
6. The Council may also also take actions by air, sea or land forces: demonstrations, blockades and
other operations. All member states of the United Nations have to make available to the SC, on
its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements armed forces, assistance and
facilities. Therefore, these measures are also mandatory to the states.

It is important to understand that there are certain rules governing the actions of the SC. When first
facing an international issue, the Council must first make recommendations to the party/parties
involved. Only if these recommendations repetitively fail in solving the situation it may move to
mandatory measures. Out of these measures, priority must be given to those of a peaceful nature (art
41). Military actions are the last solution the Council may resort to, if all the other peaceful means of
addressing the issue have failed.

Please mind Chapter III of this study guide that deals with the measures the Security Council has
already undertaken in the case of Somalia. Delegates must analyze them and determine those that
proved effective and those that were not effective. Delegates must understand the reasons why the latter
category proved inefficient and avoid them in the future resolution or find means to correct them.
Moreover, delegates are highly encouraged to come up with their own creative measures to tackle the
situation in Somalia.

FURTHER RESEARCH

− reports of the HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH:

− http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/12/08/so-much-fear-0
− http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/06/17/welcome-kenya-0
− http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/03/29/horror-hopelessness
− http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/07/13/hostages-peace-0
− http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/04/13/harsh-war-harsh-peace
− United Nations Security Council Resolutions
733 (1992): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/010/92/IMG/NR001092.pdf?OpenElement
746 (1992): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/011/05/IMG/NR001105.pdf?OpenElement
751 (1992): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/011/10/IMG/NR001110.pdf?OpenElement
755 (1992): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/410/10/IMG/N9241010.pdf?OpenElement
767 (1992): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/342/21/IMG/N9234221.pdf?OpenElement
794 (1992): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/772/11/PDF/N9277211.pdf?OpenElement
814 (1993): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/226/18/IMG/N9322618.pdf?OpenElement
837 (1993): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/332/32/IMG/N9333232.pdf?OpenElement
865 (1993): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/513/77/PDF/N9351377.pdf?OpenElement
878 (1993): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/591/87/PDF/N9359187.pdf?OpenElement
885 (1993): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/639/14/PDF/N9363914.pdf?OpenElement
886 (1993): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/646/08/PDF/N9364608.pdf?OpenElement
1356 (2001): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/417/27/PDF/N0141727.pdf?OpenElement
1407 (2002): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/366/07/PDF/N0236607.pdf?OpenElement
1425 (2002): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/488/79/PDF/N0248879.pdf?OpenElement
1519 (2003): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/658/82/PDF/N0365882.pdf?OpenElement
1474 (2003): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/314/33/PDF/N0331433.pdf?OpenElement
1558 (2004): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/461/98/PDF/N0446198.pdf?OpenElement
1587 (2005): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/271/33/PDF/N0527133.pdf?OpenElement
1630 (2005): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/554/12/PDF/N0555412.pdf?OpenElement
1676 (2006): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/343/85/PDF/N0634385.pdf?OpenElement
1724 (2006): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/633/52/PDF/N0663352.pdf?OpenElement
1725 (2006): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/646/11/PDF/N0664611.pdf?OpenElement
1744 (2007): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/245/31/PDF/N0724531.pdf?OpenElement
1766 (2007): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/434/17/PDF/N0743417.pdf?OpenElement
1772 (2007): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/485/62/PDF/N0748562.pdf?OpenElement
1801 (2008): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/246/98/PDF/N0824698.pdf?OpenElement
1811 (2008): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/322/41/PDF/N0832241.pdf?OpenElement
1814 (2008): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/343/79/PDF/N0834379.pdf?OpenElement
1816 (2008): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/361/77/PDF/N0836177.pdf?OpenElement
1831 (2008): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/465/82/PDF/N0846582.pdf?OpenElement
1838 (2008): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/538/84/PDF/N0853884.pdf?OpenElement
1844 (2008): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/611/31/PDF/N0861131.pdf?OpenElement
1846 (2008): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/630/29/PDF/N0863029.pdf?OpenElement
1851 (2008): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/655/01/PDF/N0865501.pdf?OpenElement
1853 (2008): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/663/27/PDF/N0866327.pdf?OpenElement
1863 (2009): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/211/65/PDF/N0921165.pdf?OpenElement
1872 (2009): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/349/46/PDF/N0934946.pdf?OpenElement
1897 (2009): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/624/65/PDF/N0962465.pdf?OpenElement
1910 (2010): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/222/59/PDF/N1022259.pdf?OpenElement
1916 (2010): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/281/93/PDF/N1028193.pdf?OpenElement
1918 (2010): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/331/39/PDF/N1033139.pdf?OpenElement
1950 (2010): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/649/02/PDF/N1064902.pdf?OpenElement
1964 (2010): http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/706/02/PDF/N1070602.pdf?OpenElement
− Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning
Somalia and Eritrea: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/
− for up-to-date news on the Situation in Somalia, please visit:
− www.cnn.com
− www.bbc.co.uk
− www.reuters.com
− http://www.un.org/News/
or other similar websites