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Delhi's Air Pollution - A Failure of Governance

Research · March 2019

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11172.94083

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DELHI’S AIR POLLUTION
A FAILURE OF GOVERNANCE

Teslin Maria Augustine

Matriculation Number: 45120

*This policy paper was written for the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, Universität Erfurt for the Public Governance,
Institutions and Economic Development course
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary........................................................................................................... 2
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 2
Background ....................................................................................................................... 3
Literature Review & Methodology ...................................................................................... 4
Multiplicity of Regulatory Bodies ........................................................................................ 4
Political Blame Game ........................................................................................................ 6
Way Forward ..................................................................................................................... 8
Policy Recommendations .................................................................................................. 9
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 10
Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 11

Page 1 of 13
 Executive Summary

Delhi has turned into a ‘gas chamber’ despite regulations and regulators that are in place to prevent
and combat the city’s air pollution. This paper analyses how the multiplicity of regulators and partisan
politics have contributed to a failure of governance in Delhi and has resulted in the current situation. It
argues that the way forward for Delhi is to take incremental measures with smaller and more
manageable networks that are under the administrative control of the Delhi government. This paper
also argues that it is time to reconsider India’s overall approach of using command-and-control
measures to manage environmental pollution and experiment with market-based instruments.

Introduction

Over the last decade India’s capital city Delhi has gained notoriety for having one of the worst
quality of air in the world. Delhi was ranked as the most polluted megacity by the World Health
Organization in a report released in May, 2018 (“Delhi Remains Most Polluted”, 2018). Another
study by the Lancet Planetary Health which was published in 2018 found that of all the Indian
cities, Delhi had the highest annual population-weighted particulate matter levels in 2017
(Balakrishnan et al. 2018). There are other studies that rank Delhi as one of the most polluted
cities in the world1 and the fact that the city’s air pollution is an urgent and imminent public
policy problem is widely agreed upon (“Health Emergency Declared”, 2017; “Delhi, Blanketed”,
2017).

What is interesting about Delhi is that it has turned into a ‘gas chamber’, a term used by Delhi’s
Chief Minister to describe the state (“Delhi, Blanketed”, 2017), despite regulations that have
been put in place to manage the pollution. Moreover, Delhi, which is home to foreign diplomatic
missions and is the seat of the Indian central government, is one of the wealthiest states in
India and has the second highest per capita income in the country (“Why Delhi’s Air”, 2018).
Therefore it is even more puzzling that the state’s air quality has deteriorated to such an extent.

Accordingly, the policy question that this paper seeks to answer is – why despite several
regulations in place to combat air pollution and the existence of several regulatory bodies to

1Another relevant report on Delhi’s air quality - IQ Air-Air Visual (2018), 2018 World Air Quality Report,
Retrieved March 08, 2019 from https://www.airvisual.com/world-most-polluted-cities/world-air-quality-
report-2018-en.pdf

Page 2 of 13
implement those regulations, air pollution has continued to increase at an alarming rate in
Delhi?

Background

The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (hereinafter “Air Act”) was the first
legislation put in place by the central government with the sole purpose of preventing,
controlling and abating air pollution (Bhave & Kulkarni, 2015). The Air Act established central
and state-level pollution control boards2 which were tasked with planning and executing a
nation-wide program for combating air pollution (Air Act, 1981)

In 1986, the federal Environment (Protection) Act (hereinafter “Environment Act”) came into
force. The Environment Act is a comprehensive law which addresses all aspects of the
environment including air, water and land. Broadly speaking, it gives central government the
power to create an authority for environmental protection and co-ordinate the activities of the
various regulatory agencies under the existing laws. It also gives central government
overarching powers to penalize those who endanger the environment (Environment Act,
1986). Under the Environment Act, and specifically to protect and improve the quality of Delhi’s
environment, the Central Government constituted the Environment Pollution (Prevention and
Control) Authority (EPCA) in 1998. The EPCA has been operational for the last two decades
with the dedicated objective of “protecting and improving the quality of the environment and
preventing and controlling environmental pollution” in Delhi (Order S.O. 93(E), 1998).
However, despite that, all available data shows that there has been a massive decline in
Delhi’s environment in terms of air quality (Dutta, 2018).

Recognizing the high level of air pollution in Delhi, the federal Ministry of Environment, in 2017,
notified the Graded Response Action Plan (GRAP) meant specifically to address Delhi’s
pollution problem. GRAP lays down measures that must be taken based on the capital city’s
air quality. Measures under GRAP include restricting entry of certain kinds of vehicles into
Delhi, stopping construction activities, intensifying public transport services, increasing
frequency of mechanized cleaning of roads, sprinkling water on roads and shutting down
power plants. The primary implementing and co-ordinating agency for GRAP is the EPCA.
(Graded Response Action Plan for Delhi & NCR, 2017). However, despite these measures,
Delhi’s air quality has worsened.

It is pertinent here to touch upon the very recent National Clean Air Programme (NCAP)
unveiled by the central government in January, 2019. Analysis of NCAP’s implementation lies

2The Central Pollution Control Board or the CPCB and in Delhi’s case the Delhi Pollution Control
Committee or DPCC.

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outside the scope of this paper as not enough time has passed since its passage to evaluate
its effectiveness and also because NCAP is a ‘soft law’ and is neither enforceable nor legally
binding. Arguably, the NCAP is more a wish-list of the government and simply shows the
direction in which the government wants to take the nation with respect to air pollution.
Moreover, regulations (and regulatory bodies) specifically meant to control industrial pollution
and pollution from mines also fall outside the scope of this paper.

Literature Review & Methodology

This paper focuses on two specific issues that have contributed to the governance and
implementation failure of air pollution regulations in Delhi, namely, the multiplicity of regulatory
bodies and the tendency of politicians to engage in blame games. Taking the example of
GRAP which is meant specifically for the Delhi region, the author first maps all the bodies
involved in its implementation and also analyses where the administrative control of each of
these bodies lies. In order to analyse the complex network of actors involved theories on
network management have been employed (McGuire, 2010; Klijn et al., 2010). Klijn’s research
on types of strategies that matter most for positive outcomes (Klijn et al., 2010) helped
understand the failure of the EPCA to effectively implement GRAP. In order to gauge EPCA’s
performance, the author relied on media articles and a report published by an environmental
watchdog (Dutta, 2018).

Robinson’s text (2007) on the political factors that contribute to successful reform outcomes
has been used to analyse the political commitment of Delhi politicians to implement existing
air pollution laws as well as politicians’ tendency to avoid reforms in the face of powerful
organized groups. Media reports provided the factual basis for understanding the blame game
politicians engage in as well as for understanding the different lobbies at play.

Greenstone et al.’s (2017) empirical study on India’s air pollution has been relied upon in
analysing the way forward and in suggesting policy recommendations. Specific case studies
on use of market-based instruments to manage environmental pollution in other countries was
also looked into (Coria & Sterner, 2008; Ridder, 2016).

Multiplicity of Regulatory Bodies

McGuire (2010) defines ‘network’ as a structure “involving multiple nodes – agencies and
organizations – with multiple linkages, ordinarily working on cross-boundary collaborative
activities”. One of the main reasons for the poor implementation of existing air pollution
regulations in Delhi is the complex ‘network’ of regulatory bodies. This is especially true of

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GRAP, which requires at least 15 different implementation agencies. The agencies within the
dotted lines in Figure 1 below are all involved in the implementation of GRAP.

Scholarly literature has established a strong relationship between network management and
the ability to achieve successful outcomes in governance networks (Klijn et al., 2010).
Scholars have also argued that management is crucial in networks because of its influence
on organizational performance in terms of governance outcomes (O’Toole & Meier, 1999).
Moreover, it does make a difference which network management strategies are employed in
enabling interactions in the governance network (Klijn et al., 2010). Klijn et al. (2010) in their
study on environmental projects concluded that ‘connecting’ - whereby network managers
identify actors required for an initiative and activate situations in which these actors become
interested in investing their resources - is the most promising management strategy in realising
outcomes. According to McGuire (2010), adopting a set of rules, providing coordinative tools
and operating within a defined governance structure can increase the likelihood of success.
Clearly, therefore, there are some strategies that network managers can adopt in order to
affect desired outcomes.

As far as Delhi’s GRAP is concerned, EPCA has been tasked with the overall co-ordination
and is the network manager responsible for effecting interactions within the network3.
However, the EPCA has failed to function as an effective network manager and has failed to
prevent and control air pollution in Delhi. A performance review conducted by the
environmental watchdog, Legal Initiative for Forests and Environment, observes that the
EPCA has not only failed to perform the basic role of a co-ordinator, but in the two decades
since it was set up, it has not initiated a single punitive or judicial action against violators nor
against any of the implementing agencies for failing to follows its directives (Dutta, 2018).
Though the law has empowered it as an ‘Authority’, EPCA has essentially relegated itself to
an advisory body to Government (Dutta, 2018). The EPCA chief has said that lack of human
resources is the reason why the EPCA has chosen not to pursue judicial action against
offenders (“No Cases, Only Advisories”, 2018). Arguably, EPCA’s ‘connecting’ and ‘co-
ordinating’ role has been limited to only issuing letters to the various implementation agencies
‘requesting’ action.

3 McGuire defines a network manager as the “person or persons who assume a network-level
perspective, act strategically to effect interactions within the network, and undertake tasks and
behaviors designed to achieve network-level goals, be they process or outcome-oriented goals” (2010).

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 Figure 1: Regulatory Bodies Involved in the Implementation of GRAP

List of agencies sourced from Graded Response Action Plan for Delhi & NCR, 2017
(Created by author based on information collected from various government websites)

This attitude of shying from exercising power is not limited to just the EPCA and is evident
with the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) as well as the Delhi Pollution Control
Committee (DPCC) which have been tasked with implementing the Air Act. The CPCB is
routinely in the habit of issuing ‘warnings’ to a violator to cease the polluting activity. However,
refusal to follow the directive does not usually result in judicial action (“Do you Pollute the
Air?”, 2018). This is further evident with the DPCC, which despite rising pollution levels, had
not filed a single case against polluting industries in Delhi between 2014 and 2016 (“Choking
Delhi”, 2017). Manpower challenge is a common feature of state pollution control committees
including Delhi. Bhushan et al. (2009) found how the number of approved employees at the
SPCBs has decreased over time, although the number of industries they regulate has
increased by two or three-fold.

Political Blame Game

Robinson (2007) in his study on the political and institutional factors that contribute to
successful reform outcomes found that political commitment at the highest level of government
is an essential factor for reform. Such political commitment is missing from Delhi’s politicians

Page 6 of 13
because failure to properly implement the existing air pollution laws gives political parties the
mileage to make each other look bad. As seen in Figure 1 above, administratively, the
implementing agencies responsible for combating Delhi’s air pollution fall within the control of
either the central government, the Delhi state government or are independently managed by
private bodies or groups of individuals. Interestingly, most agencies responsible for managing
Delhi’s pollution fall within the administrative control of the central government and not the
state government. Moreover, two organisations the Delhi Municipal Corporation and the Delhi
Metro Rail Corporation fall under the control of both the central and state governments. Not
being centrally administered is problematic in Delhi’s scenario because of the fierce rivalry
between the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) led state government and the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) led central government. The BJP led central government is headquartered in New Delhi
and has the powers to tackle Delhi’s pollution crisis (“Centre has the Powers, 2017), yet the
air quality troubles of Delhi seem to be the political headache exclusively for the Delhi
government. The BJP probably hopes that this issue may turn into an Achilles heel for the
AAP in the next state elections (Soreide, 2017). Thus in Delhi, political competition acts as
an incentive for implementing bodies to underperform on their duties so that publicly blame
can be attributed to competing agencies controlled by the rival political party (“AAP, BJP
Governments Indulge in Blame Game”, 2018; “Delhi’s Politicians”, 2015).

Moreover, Robinson (2007) observed that politicians “tended to avoid difficult reforms where
they anticipated the interests of powerful groups would be adversely affected”. As per the
author’s analysis, organized advocacy groups for air pollution in Delhi can broadly be divided
into two broad categories. On the one hand are the environmental groups such as Greenpeace
India and the Centre for Science and Environment as well as the tourism and outdoor
recreation industry that want to see improvement in the air quality (“Other Indian Cities Join
Delhi”, 2016), and on the other hand are the powerful lobbies that want to maintain status quo.
These include the farmer lobby (crop burning is a major source of Delhi’s air pollution) which
constitutes a large vote bank particularly in North India (“North India Stares”, 2018), the
automobile and transport lobby which has a history of resisting lowering in emission limits
(“Who Changed Delhi’s Air”, 2005; “Society of Indian Automobiles”, 2018), factory owners’
lobby and the real estate lobby that doesn’t want further check on industrial emissions and
construction dust respectively (“India’s Air Pollution Plan”, 2018). Arguably, there are powerful
lobbies at play here that want to maintain status quo.

Page 7 of 13
Way Forward

It is pertinent to note that Delhi’s air pollution is a highly complex problem and this paper
focuses only on two key implementation-related challenges. Keeping these limitations in mind,
the author argues that clean air for Delhi is more likely to be achieved through an incremental
approach to policy making instead of drastic and sweeping policy reforms like the GRAP.
Incremental approaches typically work well when there is potential opposition to reform and
pacts need to be negotiated to ensure successful implementation (Robinson, 2007). Given the
political rivalry between the central and the Delhi state government as well as the powerful
lobbies at play, a successful policy outcome is most likely if the government introduces reforms
in a gradual manner thus allowing it to limit damaging reactions and also garner support for its
initiatives (Robinson, 2007).

According to a recent survey, 71% of Delhi’s residents are not satisfied with the quality of air
and as much as 58% believe that air pollution negatively impacts them (URJA & ARK
Foundation, 2019). Since Delhi residents constitute the state government’s entire vote bank,
arguably the government of Delhi is more vested and concerned with the city’s pollution than
the central government. Therefore, the author contends that the Delhi state government is the
appropriate venue for initiating the incremental reform discussed above. Moreover, sources of
air pollution in Delhi are varied (Sharma & Onkar, 2016) and the intricate federal nature of the
Indian democracy means that the Delhi state government has the ability to regulate only some
of these sources of pollution4. Pollution generated from transport fall within the direct preview
of the state government, as do activities of the Delhi Pollution Control Committee5, which has
overarching powers to regulate industrial emissions, construction-related pollution etc. under
the Air Act. Hence the author argues that DPCC and transport emissions should be the site of
reform initiation for the Delhi state government.

Finally and perhaps more critically, the failure of GRAP leads the author to question the very
effectiveness of ‘command-and-control’ regulations to deal with air pollution in Delhi. A basic
requirement for command-and-control regulation to work is a well-informed regulator and the
willingness and ability to systematically enforce fair penalties in cases of non-compliance
(Greenstone et al., 2017). As observed in the analysis above the EPCA, CPCB and DPCC all
lack the willingness and the ability to enforce penalties. Other than manpower shortage,
Greenstone et al. (2017) find that central and state expenditures on environmental governance

4 Figure 1 above gives a snapshot of the issues/agencies under the direct control of the Delhi state
government.
5 While ultimately controlled by the federal Environment Ministry, day-to-day operations, appointments

of key personnel etc. fall within the ambit of the state government.

Page 8 of 13
in India are extraordinarily low and argue that India spends too little money on monitoring and
penalizing sources of pollution. This compromises both the ability and the access to
information the regulators have. It also makes a strong case for considering market-based
instruments (MBIs) since MBIs can minimize costs associated with reaching a specified level
of pollution abatement in India (Greenstone et al., 2017). Moreover, an incremental, Delhi
state government controlled, MBI-based policy reform will also reduce the complexity of the
network of actors required to implement the same and therefore is more likely to be successful.

The argument is not that MBIs will not have challenges of their own, but simply that given
Delhi’s specific scenario, MBIs will be less problematic than traditional command-and-control
regulations which have clearly been ineffective in Delhi. As Jenkins & Lamech (1992)
observed, MBIs could face potential resistance from within the environmental bureaucracy
itself as bureaucrats might perceive that their work routines, organisational power or even
existence may be threatened. Moreover, there might be resistance from the firms themselves
as they might fear, perhaps justifiably in Delhi’s case, unfair and poor administration of MBIs
(Jenkins & Lamech, 1992).

Policy Recommendations

Using the analysis in the above sections as the point of departure, this section now tries to
identity specific steps that can be taken to reform Delhi’s air quality.

• The author’s analysis suggests that incremental MBI-based reforms such as congestion
pricing for vehicles should be introduced. Congestion pricing involves charging drivers a
fee to drive in congested areas and using the revenue generated to fund clean-air friendly
transportation improvements such as better transit service and pedestrian projects.
Globally, congestion-pricing has proven to be successful in abating air pollution in cities
like Singapore, London, Milan, Stockholm, and has forced motorists to internalize the full
cost of their decision to drive (Ridder, 2016). The Transport Department which falls
completely under the control of the Delhi government can oversee and enforce this reform
completely without needing to rely on a complex network of actors.
• Another incremental reform which can be piloted by DPCC is the introduction of cap-and-
trade instruments for industries. Through this, industries can be granted permits to pollute
up to a certain limit and may be allowed to trade these permits among themselves. Coria
and Sterner (2008) argue that even in a middle-income country a cap-and-trade program
can be successful in reducing air pollution. They evaluated Santiago’s experience with a
trading scheme and concluded that developing countries can benefit from the additional

Page 9 of 13
 flexibility that tradable permits confer over more inflexible regulations (Coria & Sterner,
2008).
• Irrespective of whether a command-and-control regime is continued or a shift to MBIs is
made, the Delhi state government needs to increase its budgetary allocation to DPCC and
the transport department6 to enable better monitoring and reliable data collection through
the use of improved technology and monitoring equipment. Greenstone et al. (2017) argue
that effective policy depends very heavily on the information regulators possess on the
cumulative outcome of all emissions sources and this is currently lacking in Delhi.
Moreover, the staff crunch at implementation bodies also needs to be addressed on an
urgent basis through increased budgetary allocation.
• Lastly, while designing these MBIs, the Delhi government needs to consider how to
adequately penalise violators. Under the current regulatory regime, penalties are restricted
to criminal penalties and plant closures. An industrial unit that exceeds a norm by 15%
percent can be subjected to the same penalties as one that exceeds norms by 100%. Such
inflexibility results in regulatory inaction as regulators are hesitant to impose harsh
penalties on all violators (Greenstone et al., 2017). The lack of flexibility in penalties thus
significantly reduces the effectiveness of regulation as well as the regulators.

Conclusion

The committee appointed by the Central Government to review the country’s environment
regulations famously said about them that “the legislations are weak, monitoring is weaker,
and enforcement is weakest” (Report of the High Level Committee on Forest and Environment
Related Laws, 2014). This rings especially true for Delhi where good intentions and an
abundance of regulations and regulators have had almost no impact on the city’s worsening
air. Every reform initiative of the government has been bigger and more ambitious than the
previous mean, meant more to grab media attention than anything else. For example, NCAP
– the latest reform to be announced – aims to reduce particulate matter concentration by 20-
30% by 2024 (National Clean Air Programme, 2019). This inclination towards grand and highly
ambitious plans is perhaps at least partly attributable to the increasing public pressure on the
government to mitigate the crisis. Irrespective, such grand reform plans have created
increasingly complex governance network structures that are not equipped with the right
network management tools, or even incentives due to political rivalries within the network, to

6 Exact figures of current allocation is not available in the public domain. However there is consensus
that the current allocation is not sufficient.

Page 10 of 13
manage these networks. This has resulted in the complete failure of air pollution governance
in Delhi.

This way forward for Delhi is to take incremental measures with smaller and more manageable
networks that are under the administrative control of the Delhi government. Success of initial
reforms piloted by the state will later on increase public and political pressure on the central
government to take a more proactive role. Moreover it is time to reconsider India’s overall
approach of using command-and-control measures to manage air pollution and experiment
with MBIs. Integration of of economic and environmental decision-making will induce the
private sector to reduce their pollution emission levels. The challenge of course lies in
designing an administratively and politically acceptable MBI.

******

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