To 2012 and Beyond: International assistance to police and security sector

development in Timor-Leste
Bu Wilson

In Timor-Leste in 2006 a serious security and governance crisis looked set to undo
all of the small country’s post-independence achievements.1 The crisis involved
fighting between and within the uniformed security forces, the almost complete
cessation of government functionality, the resignation of multiple government
ministers, widespread violence, the displacement of approximately 150,000 people,
extensive destruction of housing stock and the deaths of at least thirty-eight people.
The government of Timor-Leste sought international police and military assistance,
and subsequently requested a new UN mission. The UNMIT mission was
established by Security Council Resolution 1704 on 25 August 2006. UNMIT was
mandated to restore and maintain public security, provide assistance to further
develop Timor-Leste’s police (Policía Nacional Timor-Leste or PNTL), and support
carrying out a security sector review.2

The UNMIT mandate is due to expire on 26 February 2011, although it is

widely expected that the mission will be extended until at least 2012. Discussions
still need to occur on what funding mechanisms will be used to facilitate this
extension. Timor-Leste is now considerably calmer than in 2006 although significant
social and economic challenges remain. However, as in 2006, one of the greatest
threats to enduring security is the Timorese security forces themselves.

The focus of this paper is international assistance to policing and security

sector development in Timor-Leste, although there is also much work to be done by
the sovereign government of Timor-Leste.3 I contend it is timely to analyze the
particular conundrum faced by the UN in Timor-Leste when deciding to scale back

1 The proximate cause of the crisis was the sacking of 591 members (or approximately one

third) of Timor-Leste’s military (the FALINTIL-Forças Defesa de Timor-Leste or F-FDTL) in

March 2006, a group that came to be known as ‘the petitioners’. The petitioners were almost
exclusively from western districts, and they alleged discrimination towards members of F-
FDTL from the west of the country by members from the east. The majority of higher
ranking F-FDTL members are drawn from the east of the country. The ‘crisis’ of April and
May 2006 continues to influence and inform political developments in Timor-Leste.
2 The F-FDTL, on the other hand, barely features in the UNMIT mandate. It quickly became

clear that no screening of the F-FDTL would be entertained by Timor-Leste’s authorities,

despite knowledge of the significant role F-FDTL played in the 2006 violence.
3 Of immediate importance is the need for the government to finalize the cases of those PNTL

who are not yet certified. It was anticipated in the Supplementary Agreement that, through
a process of evaluation, unsuitable police officers would face disciplinary action or be
dismissed. However, the government evaluation panel has not met for a long time and the
government has, in the main, not been keen to take action against offending officers.
their activities. More senior personnel within the UN recognize that the PNTL has
essentially not been reconstructed since the 2006 crisis and that the security sector
reform agenda has not meaningfully progressed. They also recognize that police
development and security sector reform have not been the strong suit of the UNMIT
mission. Additionally, the government of Timor-Leste rarely values and often
derides UNMIT input on these matters. There is a reasonable likelihood that the
security forces will unravel again. Thus the central dilemma is that while the
security sector needs reform, the UN has not succeeded in effecting such reform, and
the Government of Timor-Leste neither welcomes international reform efforts nor is
it capable of achieving reform on its own. This dilemma has been exacerbated by an
unrealistic appraisal of developments that are overly optimistic. This in turn has
clouded decision-making and complicated efforts to maximize the potential for the
UN to have a positive impact in the time that remains under the current mandate.

This paper suggests four essential prerequisites for the UN and the broader
donor community to enable a more effective and accountable security sector to
develop in Timor-Leste in the lead up to 2012. This will require an honest
assessment of the state of Timor-Leste’s security sector, as well as an unflinching
evaluation of the UN and other donor’s comparative strengths and weaknesses in
Timor-Leste. It will also require bilateral donors to insist on a place at the table in
planning for a transition post-UNMIT. The paper suggests some specific, but not
exhaustive, activities that deserve support up to, and after, 2012.

It is anticipated that a new UN political mission—along the lines of

UNOTIL—will be mandated to follow on from UNMIT.4 Some observers have
suggested that UNMIT will be extended until 2014 with the hope of improving
currently poor justice and security sector outcomes. In the first model, longer term
development programs will continue to be carried out by members of the UN
Country Team. It is hoped that the work currently performed by UNMIT’s Human
Rights Unit will continue as an Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) under an arrangement between OHCHR and the
government of Timor-Leste. This would allow OHCHR to continue to exercise its
mandate to independently monitor and report on the human rights situation in
Timor-Leste. Although a role for the UN Peace Building Commission (PBC) has been
discussed for Timor-Leste it is doubtful whether the PBC is in a position to
contribute usefully at this time. Initial expectations of the PBC were considerable
but it is hampered by its ‘head office focus’, inadequate post-conflict and country
specific experience, an absence of funds for peacebuilding and lack of control or
influence over other UN agencies. More importantly senior Timorese officials have
expressed opposition to PBC involvement in Timor-Leste. The Timor-Leste

4 UNOTIL (United Nations Office in Timor-Leste) was established by Security Council

Resolution 1599 authorizing peacebuilding activities. It commenced on 20 May 2005 and was
mandated for one year until 19 May 2006 and extended for one month after that due to the
2006 crisis. UNOTIL followed on from the larger and more comprehensive UNMISET
(United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor) mission.

2
government is already engaged with a plethora of conflict resolution initiatives and
in these circumstances the PBC would constitute an additional burden.

On 13 October 2010 the UN Security Council received a report from the

Secretary-General covering the period from 21 January to 20 September 2010
(S/2010/522), and this was debated on 19 October. The report highlighted that,
although considerable progress had been made in developing the security sector,
gains were fragile and further strengthening of the sector would be required.
Particular problems highlighted included the continuing need to delineate the
respective roles of the police and military, as well as the need to institutionalize
effective disciplinary mechanisms, command and control structures, weapons
control, planning and logistics. In the October Security Council debate, member-
states continued to express concern about the excessive use of force and lack of
accountability in the PNTL, and reemphasized the continued failure to differentiate
between the roles of the police and the military.

The UN now has some experience in handing over a variety of governance

functions, including the provision of security, at the conclusion of a peace mission. It
is widely held that a precipitous handover to national authorities could result in a
return to conflict. Determining when the appropriate time has been reached is never
a straightforward matter but ideally would take place when a pre-determined series
of context-specific benchmarks has been reached. Indeed former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan emphasized that there should be “no exit without strategy”
(S/2001/394). The UNMISET mandate contained such an inbuilt exit strategy
although initial withdrawal plans were revised in response to security threats and
the inadequate and inappropriate response of the Timorese national security forces
to those threats. Similarly the UNMIT Medium-Term Strategy provides a series of
benchmarks which are defined as “targets that, when met as a group, can
reasonably be expected to provide the foundations for a stable and sustained
democratic state in Timor-Leste.” Unfortunately this strategy now appears to
receive little attention.

The conundrum
There are some particular issues with determining the timetable for the transition of
the UNMIT mission to a smaller political mission, the drawdown of United Nations
Police (UNPOL), and the handover of full executive policing power to the PNTL.5 In
many ways, the UNMIT mission was an opportunity for the UN to rectify the
mistakes and shortcomings of earlier missions, to salvage their reputation as police-
builders, and to address the particular problems within and between the two
security organizations (the PNTL and the F-FDTL) and their respective civilian

5 PNTL are currently undergoing a district-by-district and unit-by-unit resumption of

everyday policing responsibility. Overall executive policing will be returned from UNPOL to
PNTL at a yet to be determined time.

3
oversight mechanisms.6 The UN was and continues to be mindful of the widespread
criticism that they previously withdrew from Timor-Leste too soon and that the UN
intervention did not sufficiently leave behind a stable government and reconciled
population. There is understandable apprehension about being seen to repeat those
mistakes. It is for this reason that some observers believe that there will be
attempts to extend the current mission until 2014.

However, the mission has struggled to fulfill its mandate for a range of
structural reasons that are not new for the UN. Recruitment of sufficient UN police
of adequate caliber and with relevant skills in a timely manner continued to prove
challenging. Although following the Technical Assessment Mission in 2006 former
UNAMET Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Ian Martin had
recommended the inclusion of civilian policing advisors, this had been rejected in
designing UNMIT’s mandate. Martin recognized that building a public service
institution such as the PNTL, like any other public service institution, requires
functioning human resources, planning, budgeting, procurement, logistics,
communications, administrative and asset management systems. This had been a
significant oversight during UNTAET’s tenure. These tasks cannot be performed by
‘cops on the beat’, or even by police alone, and led to a recommendation that civilian
advisers with expertise in these essential organizational sectors be appointed.
Instead the UN persisted with an inoperable model of recruiting inappropriately
skilled police.

Similarly the newly formed Security Sector Support Unit (SSSU) was slow to
recruit appropriately skilled staff able to build rapport with their Timorese
counterparts in furtherance of a review of the security sector. Unfortunately, these
two processes which should have been integrally linked –reforming, restructuring
and rebuilding the police, carried out by UNPOL, and a security sector review,
carried out by the SSSU –became separated early on. Consequently, each program
progressed slowly and without integration. Over time it became clear that the
Timorese Government had lost interest in police reform according to the UN’s
unclear formula and probably never had any interest in a review of the security
sector. Because of sustained pressure from the government to hand over primary
policing responsibility to the PNTL, the most volatile districts remain outstanding.
Furthermore, these districts have a concentration of uncertified officers, as
problematic officers from the "cleared for handover" districts have been
systematically moved to other areas to facilitate the process.. 7 A realistic

6 UNTAET’s initial development of the PNTL between 2000 and 2002 was hailed as a

success; supported by considerable media coverage of newly-minted, well-uniformed, East

Timorese police undergoing rituals of comfort such as training, and parade. This provided
considerable legitimacy to the international effort. These illusions were shattered by the
events of 2006.
7 Greater detail of how the public security and reform, restructuring and rebuilding tasks

were to be carried out is contained in a Supplemental Arrangement (SA) between UNMIT

and the Timor-Leste government which was signed on 1 December 2006 (UNMIT and

4
understanding of progress in the PNTL’s development is clouded by the
government’s lip service to various positive initiatives such as the new promotions
regime for the PNTL. The Government then proceeds to disregard these policies
after a certain time, and continues to appoint uncertified officers to ranks they have
not rightly attained.

Despite many critical reports about the progress of police and security sector
reform in Timor-Leste—both external and internal to the UN—a positive but
somewhat disingenuous story about development in these areas was promoted by
both the UN and the government. Although the agendas of the government and the
UN in championing such a positive story were different, even opposing, they acted in
a mutually reinforcing manner. These stories about measurable and inexorable
progress serve to confuse assessments of the current capacity of the security sector
and stymie the attendant planning required by donors and the government of Timor-
Leste to determine useful future international programming.

Misleading progress reports include repeatedly noting that crime has not
increased in districts where the PNTL has assumed primary responsibility. The
reason for this is simple: nothing of substance has changed following the handover.
The PNTL previously carried out primary policing responsibilities and continue to
do so. Similarly, much emphasis has been placed on the promulgation of the package
of national security laws. The UN and the government promote these as delineating
responsibilities between police and military. However, these do no such thing, are
poorly drafted, refer to outdated governance structures and are, in all likelihood,
unconstitutional.

With the arrival of Ameerah Haq as the SRSG in Timor-Leste, there was a
sense of renewed optimism among policy makers and some senior mission staff that
the former tendency to ‘spin’ the successes of police and security sector reform would
be addressed. The SRSG focused on many of the technical yet crucial issues that
bedevil UNPOL deployments worldwide, including the need for longer rotations of
UNPOL and the need to identify police with specific capacity-building expertise. She

Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2006). The SA outlines the phased approach to the
conduct and eventual handover of executive policing from UNPOL to PNTL and outlines the
co-operative arrangements of UNMIT and the Timorese government in relation to the
rebuilding of PNTL. The SA provides for executive policing to be carried out by UNPOL until
such time as the PNTL are reconstituted through a process of screening, mentoring and
certification. The SA also gives the UNPOL Police Commissioner, in consultation with the
SRSG and in close collaboration with the Timor-Leste government, the power to decide when
the phased handover of Units and Districts from UNPOL to PNTL can occur, when the
PNTL attains benchmarks that would make such a handover possible. In reality it has not
been possible to follow the SA in any great detail because a number of early pre-conditions
have never been met.

5
also supported Ian Martin’s 2006 proposal for the appointment of civilian police
advisers. She sensibly looked to facilitating longer-term relationships with police-
providing nations in the region. A greater openness regarding mission shortcomings
was in evidence.

Understandably, senior managers in the mission supported these attempts.

However a convergence of perverse incentives –principally related to the legacy of
the UN’s work in Timor-Leste, but also with an eye to future relevance and
employment opportunities –has led to a continuing overly-positive rewriting of the
UN’s achievements in Timor-Leste. Other senior managers, together with Haq, saw
the opportunity for the reputation of the UNMIT mission to be salvaged. Attempts to
improve the poor relationship between UNMIT and the government resulted in an
increase in encouraging ‘positive speak’ about government initiatives, extending to
lauding unworkable government programs. Around the same time, senior managers
and long term observers noted that the even-worse record on security sector and
police reform in other UN missions, coupled with relative calm in Dili, have led to
talk once again of Timor-Leste being the (comparative) poster child of the UN. A
number of member countries in the Security Council repeated the good news story
that the Mission is about to become a success story.8

Other incentives in promoting positive news stories have less to do with

legacy and more to do with a search for continued relevance and employment.
Although planning for a follow-on mission is still nascent, agencies such as UNDP
are starting to look at future opportunities. In this instance this requires the
disaster of the work of the Security Sector Support Unit to be cast in a positive light.
There is a further reason that the UN continues to promote Timor’s security sector
reform process. The idea that if security sector reform cannot be achieved in Timor-
Leste then it can probably not be achieved anywhere else is often repeated, both by
UN officials and engaged observers. Arguably an admission of failure in the case of
Timor-Leste would cast doubt on the whole engagement of the UN in the business of
SSR.

Despite some positive developments in the PNTL and the FDTL, the
institutions remain weak, prone to the use of excessive force, their respective roles
ill-defined, and their accountability and oversight (civilian or otherwise) remains
seriously underdeveloped. Significant reform will need to be undertaken by the
government with assistance from bilateral donors. Over many years, and despite the
input of several million dollars, the SSSU has been unable to engage the
Government of Timor-Leste to enable the production of a review of the security
sector. As a box-ticking exercise, a review has recently been produced by the SSSU

8 By way of example, the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN, Ambassador Viotti,

stated that she “believes that the political and socio-economic progress made by the Timorese
and the smooth resumption of policing responsibilities by the PNTL so far show that we are
getting closer to turning UNMIT into a full success story. We must now stay the course, with
prudence and determination.”

6
with factual assistance and corrections from other parts of the mission, but no input
from Timor-Leste’s authorities. The draft review, produced only in English, has been
passed from hand to hand through the Office of the Secretary of State for Security
and now languishes in the President’s office.

The way forward

There are still ways that the UN in Timor-Leste can support lasting improvements
to the security sector. There are four critical steps that need to happen in order for
international actors to be in a position to assist future development of the Timorese
security sector.

The first of these is that UNPOL need to be drawn down much quicker.9
Although Timor-Leste has experienced improved security and the PNTL has
resumed primary policing responsibilities in ten of thirteen districts, the number of
UNPOL in Timor-Leste has not been significantly reduced.10 The plan outlined in
the most recent Report of the Secretary-General envisages 800 of the current 1,023
UNPOL remaining until 30 June 2011 subject to an assessment conducted in late
2010 or early 2011. The current attempt to hold on to as many UNPOL as possible
as long as possible is premised on the legitimate fear that the Timorese police are
essentially unreformed and that long-standing divisions within the police will re-
surface with potentially destabilizing consequences once the PNTL resume executive
policing. If UNPOL staying longer would improve the prospect for long-term security
or police reform then it would be a good idea. However, there are a number of
reasons this will not happen.

Although the executive policing mandate of UNPOL is repeated in many of

the documents pertaining to the handover, this has neither a practical or legal basis.
In reality UNPOL do not have command and control of PNTL who operate, albeit
erratically, within their own command structures. In addition, the 2008 Court of
Appeal decision regarding Neto made it clear that the Supplementary Agreement
does not have the force of law. More importantly, UNPOL do not have the skill sets
or language abilities to contribute to police reform in Timor-Leste, and remain
challenged by monitoring in the same way they were challenged by mentoring.
Given that the role of UNPOL is more form than substance there is no need to delay
their drawdown or departure.

The belated and lumbering recruitment of nineteen civilian policing advisors

is just too late. Although Ian Martin’s proposal for the inclusion of civilian policing
advisors in 2006 had significant merit, provided that appropriately skilled people
could have been identified, the moment has passed. In addition, without a clear

9 This has also been argued by Britain’s UN Deputy Ambassador Parham in the Security

Council Debate of 19 October.

10 Between January and September 2010 UNPOL numbers were only reduced from 1,045 to

1,023.

7
assessment of what the outstanding police development needs are in Timor-Leste it
is unclear exactly what advisers would be advising upon. This problem has already
occurred with the placement of unwanted SSSU advisers into Ministry positions and
it is important not to repeat the mistake. At this point it needs to be recognized that
the principal international inputs to security sector development in the future will
be on a bilateral basis. The UN has a role to play in facilitating and coordinating
planning for these inputs but not in their operationalization.

There are four distinct advantages to an earlier drawdown. First, it would be

a reminder to the government that they will need to plan and budget for a time
when UNPOL resources are withdrawn, something that to date they have been
reluctant to address. Second, what amounts to a rather sudden withdrawal of
UNPOL in the final stages of UNMIT might produce public alarm. Early planning
for a gradual withdrawal is key as is a public information campaign alerting the
citizens to the transition. The concern that security will unravel once UNPOL
become less visible can be addressed by the maintenance of Formed Police Units
(FPU), under UN mission control. If maintaining FPU’s post-UNMIT, on a bilateral
basis, is of benefit in guaranteeing security, this can be discussed by the government
and donors, with a possible facilitating role for UNMIT. Third, a drawdown would be
a more responsible use of UN resources saving time, money and personnel while
allowing for a more efficient and effective deployment of limited UN capacities.
Finally, and most importantly, a tacit acknowledgement that UNPOL have produced
as much change as they are going to would provide UNMIT with both arms-length
objectivity and the increased moral authority it needs to speak more freely about
actual shortcomings in the accountability of the Timorese security forces.

As long as the pretence that UNPOL is in charge is maintained, it is difficult

for UNMIT to speak out when PNTL or F-FDTL misbehaves. The Good Offices of the
SRSG could thus continue without the uncomfortable schizophrenia engendered by
needing to excuse UNPOL. By creating a greater distance between UNPOL and
PNTL a more objective and accurate appraisal of the latter’s strengths and
weaknesses would be possible. This distance could also address the developing
tendency, discussed above, of the UN to exaggerate progress and overlook flaws in
the PNTL. Many donors support an early drawdown of UNPOL and are mystified by
the large numbers of UNPOL being maintained.

As part of promoting a straight-talking approach, it is critical that the

mission and the UN more broadly distance itself from the inaccurate accounts of
progress such as those contained in the report of the UNDP-DPKO Joint Mission on
Rule of Law, Justice and Security conducted from 16-24 August 2010. Any number
of UN and external assessments have noted the poor progress made by the
UNDP/UNMIT Security Sector Support Unit in contributing to security sector
reform and their failure to engage the government on these important issues. The
UN Office of Internal Oversight Services’ (OIOS) Internal Audit Division conducted
an audit of the management of the Security Sector Support Programme in December

8
2009 and concluded that “UNMIT’s support to Security Sector Review in Timor-
Leste has not been fully effective, noting an absence of “consolidated and clear
methodology and plan of action, an inappropriate staffing profile, poor co-ordination
of activities between UNMIT and UNDP, excessive delays in implementing projects
and the disinterest of the government of Timor-Leste in the reform, restructuring
and rebuilding plan for the PNTL devised by UNMIT (once again only in English)
without Timorese input. Significant problems with advisers were noted, including
the failure of an adviser to follow UN staff rules. The UNMIT-appointed advisers did
not share their draft laws on national security and national defense with UNMIT,
instead signing a secrecy agreement with the Government.

The Joint Mission’s report suggests they will now “take SSR to the next level.”
When so little has been achieved, this conclusion seems highly unlikely, given the
high probability that previous approaches will be repeated with similar results. It is
hoped that donors will not contribute further funding to the “SSR second-phase
project on civilian oversight/democratic governance” or the “joint UNDP/DPKO
Policing Project”. Further work on civilian oversight and democratic governance is
imperative but it should be carried out by those with appropriate technical and
management skills and the capacity and interest to engage the government.
Unfortunately, these capacities have been absent in SSSU efforts thus far and there
is little evidence that these flaws have been rectified. There is currently considerable
anger in Timor-Leste towards the Security Sector Support Unit for its failure to
deliver anything tangible and incredulity that a second project is being
contemplated. In an interview the Director of Fundasaun Mahein11, Nelson Belo,
stated that

Since the establishment of the Security Sector Support Unit, and the
project within the UNDP, from FM's observation their activities have
mainly involved paying foreigners large amounts of money to come to
Timor and talk about the security sector. We have yet to see any concrete
evidence of a successful Security Sector Review, or any effective
implementation of activities on the ground. Timor-Leste is not a pet-
project for people to learn about post-conflict societies and security sector
development. One can acknowledge that similar "project" attitudes were
used when creating PNTL. Timor is our home, and we are the ones who
face the consequences if our security sector is not developed in a way that
benefits the Timorese. When things get bad, the UN always leaves to take
their people to safety, while the indigenes stay put. We don't care for those
UN staff who only see Timor as a stepping stone to further their UN

11 Fundasaun Mahein is a well respected local NGO that monitors the development of the

security sector in Timor-Leste.

9
 careers by putting on their resume they worked in a post-conflict nation.
Where is the Security Sector Review?12

Continued support for this project will serve to undermine the good work and
reputation that UNMIT has earned for its more positive achievements.

Another step towards sustainable SSR reform is to ensure that the current
nascent UNMIT planning for a transition involves not only the government but also
donors.13 Although a joint planning mechanism between UNMIT and the
government of Timor-Leste for the transition was announced by both the SRSG and
the Permanent Representative of Timor-Leste to the UN, Sofia Borges, during the
19 October Security Council debate, the details of how this mechanism will work
have still not been agreed upon.14 However, to date, discussions regarding the
transition have tended to be carried out on a fragmented bilateral basis and there is
no indication that the UN or the government envisages a planning process with all
relevant stakeholders. Some donors have noted that they are keen to “manage
expectations” that they will be able to fulfill a major security maintenance or
development role post-UNMIT. Australia has already reduced its contribution to the
Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP) and New Zealand has reduced
its contribution to UNPOL. In the 19 October debate in the Security Council,
Japan’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Tsuneo Nishida, argued that it is not
too early to discuss the question of who would provide the services now provided by
UNMIT after its scheduled withdrawal. Japan is to be commended for its intention
to take up the issue of the logistics, management and gaps in UNMIT’s activities in
its role as Chair of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping.

It would be reasonable for the Security Council to request an integrated exit

strategy from UNMIT based on planning that involves future stakeholders, which
should include Timor-Leste’s principal bilateral donors. The government of Timor-
Leste has already indicated a preference for individual bilateral inputs aimed at
developing the security sector. Bilateral donors, in turn, need to advocate for their

12 More recently it was widely reported in the Timorese press that on 18 October 2010 SSSU
member Andre Thorsen had advocated the arming of private security guards. While
UNMIT’s claims that Thorsen was misquoted and argued the exact opposite position have
some merit, the ensuing condemnation of Thorsen by the Timor-Leste National Parliament
and the vociferous attacks against him in the media are indicative of the already poor esteem
in which the SSSU is held in Timor-Leste.
13 This was also argued by New Zealand’s Permanent Representative, Jim McLay, to the UN

in the Security Council Debate of 19 October.

14 Email correspondence with Administrative Assistant to the Special Representative

of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste, Michiko Ikarashi, 22 October 2010 and Special
Assistant to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste, Takakazu
Ito, 23 November 2010

10
place in a more integrated planning process. The challenge for donors is devising
mechanisms for a unified effort on integrating accountability measures into their
programming while implementing coordinated and coherent policies and programs.
These discussions need to include planning for the eventuality of police
investigations being taken away from the PNTL and assigned to a specialized armed
criminal investigations police unit within the Ministry of Justice as currently
mooted by the government. Creating a further security force raises additional and
significant security concerns about rivalries between those forces which would not be
unprecedented in recent Timorese history.

Lastly, the requirement for planning for future security sector development
as discussed above would be greatly facilitated by a comprehensive independent
assessment of the PNTL as proposed by the Secretary of State for Security,
Francisco Guterres, in 2008. This proposal found no favor with UNMIT in the past.
However a truly independent assessment would enable the government and current
and future donors to gauge the administrative, institutional and operational
readiness of the PNTL, and highlight any shortcomings while enabling planning for
future coordinated inputs. The Secretary of State’s proposal for an independent
commission was predicated on an acknowledgement that “the United Nations and
Timorese authorities have both been deeply involved in the reform process, which
means that neither enjoys the necessary remove to look at the readiness of the
PNTL in a dispassionate manner”. UNMIT’s support for such an independent
assessment now would be crucial to helping achieve durable improvements in
policing in Timor-Leste.

2012 and Beyond

A number of specific, though not exhaustive, initiatives to improve accountability
and oversight in Timor-Leste’s Security Sector could usefully commence in the near
term with donor support:

• Donors and their attendant program implementers need to ensure they

are well acquainted with existing mechanisms for state accountability in
order to emphasize and integrate these measures in all programming
inputs. Production of a handbook of state accountability mechanisms,
ideally with easy to follow flow-charts and theoretical examples, would
form a useful reference for government, UN, donors and civil society
institutions alike.
• Committee B of the Parliament, responsible for foreign affairs, defense
and national security issues, requires further training in security sector
reform and accountability issues as well as advice on how to monitor,
intervene, and follow up on issues relevant to their mandate. The
committee, together with other parliamentary committees, would also be
greatly assisted by establishing a research division within the parliament.

11
• The good work of the Office of the Provedor requires an increase in
technical support and financial assistance if it is to further develop its
role.
• Donors currently engaged with PNTL development could assist with
advocating for, and assisting with, strengthening the district level
Department of Justice (within the PNTL) disciplinary mechanisms which
are currently hampered by the appointment of junior level officers with
ostensible responsibility for discipline, who are in reality beholden to the
District Commander. These bodies thus lack independence and are failing
in their key oversight role.
• Donors currently engaged with F-FDTL could advocate for, and assist
with, developing guidelines for better access for the Provedor and for the
PNTL to F-FDTL personnel for the conduct of investigations involving F-
FDTL members.
• Donors currently engaged with training the military police of the F-FDTL
could assist in advocating for and ensuring that the military police are
better aware that their mandate is limited to policing the military, rather
than extending to general policing duties.
• Donors currently engaged with judicial and police development could
assist with better investigation and evidence collection skills on the part
of PNTL; this would lead to better prosecution outcomes. In the event that
investigations are taken over by criminal investigation police these
personnel will also require training and effective oversight.
• Research into how investigation and prosecution of cases involving the
police and army are conducted could assist with the drawing up of
guidelines outlining processes to be followed and differentiating
responsibilities between institutions and actors. This would helpfully
form the basis for joint training across institutions.
• Researching the potential undesirable consequences of a sudden
drawdown of the large number of private security personnel at the
conclusion of UNMIT could assist in planning for alternative employment
opportunities for the newly unemployed security guards.
• At some point Timor-Leste will need to entertain the possibility of
establishing a Law Reform Commission. Initiating a discussion now
between donors and the government would be timely.
• All donors have a role to play in the development of a more legitimate
justice sector by advocating for an end to the indiscriminate use of
pardons. Assistance could be provided in determining guidelines for
pardons.
Canberra/New York, December 2010

12