TOLINERO, RENATO JR. F.

AUGUST 26, 2020

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

1. KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., Petitioners,

vs.

MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007

Facts:

Respondent filed case no. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages with the RTC of Lipa upon
being employed with Nippon and informed that his service shall be only until the expiration of the
Independent contractor agreement (ICA). Petitioner contending that ICA had been perfected in Japan
and executed between Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
following the principle of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari
still within the reglementary period, and a second Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 already stating
therein the material dates and attaching thereto the verification and certification.

Ruling:

The Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly filed a Rule 65 petition to question the trial court's
denial of their motion to dismiss. It is a well-established rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory, and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus. The
appropriate recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in the
motion, to proceed to trial, and, in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in
due course.44 While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, petitioners' case does not fall among
them. In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial court is not
properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, Civil Case No. 00-
0264 for specific performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly
cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter
jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the most
significant relationship rule." The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
 2. CHESTER DE JOYA vs. JUDGE PLACIDO MARQUEZ

G.R. No. 162416, JANUARY 31, 2006

Facts

In order to seek annulment and to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Marquez, Petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. The latter asserts that the Judge erred in finding the
existence of probable cause.

Ruling

Probable cause where facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested without resorting to
the calibrations of technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Instead, the court relies on
the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance which is less stringent
than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. The trial court Judge has sufficient ground to
issue a warrant of arrest as long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the
accused. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold
him for trial.

3. BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013

Facts:

A complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo was filed by the petitioner. After Lolita filed her answer with the
allegation that her husband already died, the petitioner then moved for substitution against the heirs of
Toledo to be party-defendant in the case which was then granted by the court. Thereafter, the
respondent moved for dismissal of the case on the grounds that RTC has no jurisdiction over the person
of Manuel who already died when the complaint was filed and erred in granting the motion for
substitution. On appeal, petitioner alleged that motion to dismiss filed by respondent must be denied on
the basis of estoppel by laches.

Ruling:

The court rendered a decision that the complaint against Manuel shall be dismiss as the court does not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Manuel because he already died by the time the complaint was
filed. Further, the court held that the petitioner is wrong in its contention that the respondent’s motion
to dismiss questioning the court’s jurisdiction is already barred by estoppel due to laches, though a party
can raise the issue on jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter even first time on appeal, the
same cannot be impugned where the parties has already voluntarily submitted their cause in the said
court of jurisdiction

4. MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
ROBERT H. CULLEN, Respondent.

G.R. No. 181416               November 11, 2013

Facts:

A condominium unit in Medica Plaza Makati was purchase by the respondent. Later, petitioner
demanded payment for alleged unpaid association dues and assessment amounting P145,567.42. he
was prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted during the election of petitioner Board of
Directors. Respondent demanded from petitioner for an explanation why he is considered a delinquent
payer despite the fulfillment of the obligation. Respondent filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioner after the latter failed to serve an explanation. Petitioner filed Motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. The motion was granted by RTC. It was appealed to CA and reverse the decision of
RTC.

Ruling:

The court uses two tests in determining whether a dispute constitute an intra-corporate controversy
these are the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test. It was held that the case involves
intra-corporate controversy by applying the two tests. It obviously arose from the intra-corporate
relations between the parties, and the questions involved pertain to their rights and obligations under
the Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of the corporation. These issues are clearly
corporate and the demand for damages is just incidental. Being corporate in nature the issues should be
first lodge before the RTC as a special commercial court. In the same court the issues concerning the
damages may still be resolved.

5. PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER BUNCAN, Petitioner,

vs.

STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA GICALE, Respondents.

G.R. No. 140746 March 16, 2005

Facts:

Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his mother. While driving the said vehicle, a
passenger bus driven by one Alexander Buncan was trailing behind. Standard Insurance Company paid
only P8000.00, and the balance of P13,415.00 was shouldered by the mother. The insurance Company
Gicale and the latter demanded reimbursement from the petitioner Pantranco and its driver but they
refused. Now the respondent filed complaint for a sum of money before the RTC. The court rendered
decision in favor with the respondent. It was appealed before the CA and affirmed the decision of the
lower court. Petitioner filed MR butwas denied by the CA.

Ruling:

Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of court provides: A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:x x x

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. Thus, the Totality Rule. According to the Supreme Court,
this rule was exemplified by Sec. 33 (1) of BP 129: “where there are several claims or causes of action
between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions.” Hence, the total amount of 21,415.00, at that time, is
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC of Manila.
 6. AGG Trucking and/or Alex Ang Gaeid, Petitioners,

vs.

MELANIO B. YUAG, Respondent.

G.R. No. 195033 October 12, 2011

Facts:

A complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming for separation pay and 13 th month pay was filed by the
respondent. Respondent alleged that he was whimsically dismissed because he had not been able to
answer the employer’s call during the delivery due to his phone’s battery pack was broken down. His
employer shouted at him and told him “pahuway naka”. He asked for clarification, petitioner allegedly
told him “wala nay dagahan istorya, pahulay na”. He then realized that he was being dismissed.

Ruling:

The Court upheld that a writ for certiorari is sought to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgement. “An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of
was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment,
correctible by an appeal if the aggrieved party raised factual and legal issues; or a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if only questions of law are involved”. Hence, the Court found
nothing in the decision of the NLRC that would be considered as whimsical and capricious tantamount to
grave abuse of discretion that would warrant the issuance of the writ.

7. REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner

vs.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Respondent

G.R. No. 237428 June 19, 2018

Facts:

Chief Justice Sereno was charged with impeachment alleging that it failed to disclosed the truthful
declaration of her SALN’s. A certain Atty. Mallari requested the Office of the Solicitor General to
represent the Republic to initiate a quo warranto proceeding against the respondent. The respondent
argues that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the case and qou warranto is not the proper
remedy due to the fact that as to her, an impeachable officer may only be removed through
impeachment in the senate committee as an impeachment court.
Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that “Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the
Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. Further, Section 7, Rule
66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto, when commenced by the
Solicitor General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the
Supreme Court.” Furthermore, the court upheld that invocation of jurisdiction of Supreme Court directly
may be had when the case is of transcendental importance since the subject person is no other than the
highest member of the Court- the Chief Justice.

8. G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262               November 27, 2013

THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, Petitioner,

vs.
JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondent.

Facts:

Jody King Construction and Development Corp entered into a contract with The province of Aklan where
the former is task to design and construct the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal in Malay, Aklan
amounting P38,900,000. Further petitioner entered into contract with the respondent for the
construction of a Passenger Terminal Building in the same place. Respondent now demand for the total
amount of money. Respondent now sued petitioner in RTC Marikina City to collect the aforesaid
amounts. Petitioner denied any unpaid balance and interest, it asserted that the sums claimed by
respondent was not indicated in the change order no 3 as approved by the governor. Petitioner filed MR
but denied because it was filed on day after the finality of the decision. Petitioner then filed petition for
certiorari before the CA with application of TRO and PI assailing the writ of execution.

Ruling:

Under Commonwealth Act no. 327 as amended by Section 26 of PD no. 1445, It is the COA which has
primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities. In this case,
it is the COA and not the RTC which has original jurisdiction over money claim against government
agencies and subdivisions. The CA, in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, simply stated that
the issue had become moot by respondent's filing of the proper petition with the COA. However,
respondent's belated compliance with the formal requirements of presenting its money claim before the
COA did not cure the serious errors committed by the RTC in implementing its void decision. The RTC's
orders implementing its judgment rendered without jurisdiction must be set aside because a void
judgment can never be validly executed.

9. LUCIA BARRAMEDA VDA. BALLESTEROS vs. RURAL BANK OF CANAMAN, INC.

G.R. No. 176260 November 24, 2010

Facts

Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Mortgage and damges with
Preliminary injunction against her children and the respondent. The children allotted parcel of lands in
favor of Ballesteros without the consent of Lucia. Ballesteros now mortgaged the property to RCBI.
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage and damaged before the RTC-Iraga but
subsequently respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that RTC-Makati has the jurisdiction
over the case for being the liquidation court. While the case is still pending, RCBI was placed under
receivership of the PDIC. The CA ordered the consolidation of the action of Lucia and the liquidation of
RCBI before the RTC-Makati.

Ruling

RTC Makati has jurisdiction over all claims, including that of Lucia, against the insolvent bank for such
court is considered as the liquidation court. Such consolidation is proper because that liquidation court
has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s action. Unless there is a clear showing that the action taken by BSP,
through the Monetary Board, in the closure of financial institutions was in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, regular courts do not have jurisdiction over the actions filed against the
insolvent bank. To allow Lucia’s case to proceed independently of the liquidation case, a possibility of
favorable judgment and execution thereof against the assets of RBCI would not only prejudice the other
creditors and depositors but would defeat the very purpose for which a liquidation court was
constituted as well.

10. LILIA ADA vs. FLORANTE BAYLON

G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012

Facts

The spouses Florentino and Maximina Baylon were survived by their heirs Rita, Victoria, Dolores, Panfila,
Ramon, and Lilia. One of the heirs Victoria died and was survived by her daughter Luz. Also Ramon was
survived by respondent Florante Baylon when he died in 1989. Petitioner alleged that the spouses
Florantino and Maximina Baylon acquired 43 parcels of land in their lifetime and that Rita tool possessin
of the said parcels of land, appropriating for herself the income thereof. They further allege that Rita
used the income to buy a 2 parcels of land in the partition by filing a civil action. While the case is still
pending, Rita executed a Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997, in favor to her nephew Florante Baylon.
The petitioners now seek the rescission of the Deed of Donation.

Ruling
The RTC involves two separate, distinct and independent actions from the complaint filed by the
petitioners, these are partition and rescission. The action for partition filed by the petitioners could not
be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of the nephew
Florante. An action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while
an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. The
variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action of
rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid
confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the
determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action.

11. FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and EUTIQUIO DICO, JR., petitioners,

vs.

PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, for himself and Attorney-in-Fact of his daughter DEBORAH ANN C. ENRIQUEZ, and
SPS. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ and CATALINA FERNANDEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 162956 April 10, 2008

Facts:

The petitioners are the lawful heirs of the subject land in this case. They then executed a deed of
Extrajudicial settlement with sale of the estate of dionisia upon the death of their decedent. The
petitioners and the known heirs of Cabrera further executed a Segregation of real estate and
confirmation of sale over the subject property which resulted to a division for their corresponding
shares. Later, Enriquez and Debbirah who is the spouse and minor daughter of Etta the sole heir of
Cabrera succeeded the land owned by Cabrera. Enriquez then sold to spouses Fernandez a portion of
the land they inherited. Fernandez then found out that the subject land they bought was already has
extrajudicial settlement with sale of Dionisia and segregation of real estate and confirmation of sale
fraudulently executed. This prompted the the respondents to file a complaint for annulment of the said
documents and for damages. The petitioners then alleged that respondents must have to institute a
special proceeding to determine their status as legal heirs before they can file an ordinary civil action to
nullify the documents.

Ruling:

The claim of the petitioners is meritorious. As defined by law, “an ordinary civil action is one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right
or a particular fact.” Further, it was held that before they can file ordinary civil action it is necessary for
them to institute first an action in special proceeding for the determination of their rights as legal heirs
of the decedent. Thus, declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action because such is
within the ambit of the court in special proceeding.

12. ARTURO SARTE FLORES, Petitioner,

vs.

SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C. LINDO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 183984 April 13, 2011

Facts:

Secured by a real estate mortgage, Edna loan from Flores the amount of P400,000. The checks which
Edna issued to Flores was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Now, the petitioner filed a complaint
with the RTC Manila for Foreclosure of Mortgage with damages against respondents. The RTC rendered
decision in favor with Edna because the execution of such mortgage is without the consent of her
husband and therefore void. This prompted flores to file complaint for collection of sum of money with
damages against the respondent. Respondent, in her answer, prayed for the dismissal of the case on the
grounds that res judicata and for lack of cause of action.

Ruling:

The court rendered favorable decision in favor with the petitioner. The complaints filed by the petitioner
cannot be construed to constitute multiplicity of suits as the lower court did not afford him the
opportunity to avail of either remedied. Id the mortgagee filled a real action of foreclosure against the
real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the debt which is personal action.

13. Heirs of Simon vs. Chan

G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011

Facts:

An information charging the late Eduardo Simon with a violation of BP 22 was filed by the prosecutor of
Manila before the MeTC. Three years later, Respondent Elvin Chan commenced the MeTC in Pasay City a
civil action for the collection of principal amounting of P336,000 with an application for writ of
preliminary attachment. The court dismissed the case on the grounds of litis pendentia which was
affirmed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and ordered the continuance of the civil
case.
Ruling:

“There is no independent civil action to recover, the civil liability arising from the issuance of an
unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22”. When a criminal action has
been instituted the civil action for the recovery of civil liabilities arising from the offense charged shall
deemed instituted except the aggrieved party waives the civil action to reserve it separately prior to
criminal action. Thus the rules specifically provide that the criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall
deemed to include the corresponding civil action.

14. DULAY VS. CA

G.R. NO. 108017 APRIL 3, 1995

Facts:

Dulay was shot by a security guard of SAFEGUARD. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss for the
complaint does not a state a valid cause of action. the latter claimed that the security guard acts of
shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was
committed with intent, the civil liability governed by Art. 100 of the RPC.

Ruling:

The shooting occurred while the security guard is on duty and that SAFEGUARD is the employer of the
former therefore, the latter is responsible for his acts. “The liability of the employer under Article 2180
is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the insolvency of such employee under.” Art. 2180 provides that the obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.

15. MULTI-REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.

CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, Respondent.

G.R. No. 146726 June 16, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner is real estate developer and constructed the Makati Tucany Condominium. Respondent is a
corporation established to manage the condominium units. The Master Deed and Declaration of
Restrictions did not reflect or specify the ownership of 98 parking slots. Nevertheless, petitioner sold 26
of them to unit buyers without the objection of the Respondent despite the issuance of Certificate of
Title. Henry Sy who was a member of the board of directors of such corporation requested that two
Multi-Realty executives be allowed to park their cars in two of Makati Tuscanys remaining 72
unallocated parking slots. MATUSCO denied the request, asserting, for the first time, that the remaining
unallocated parking slots were common areas owned by it. Multi-Realty filed a complaint against
MATUSCO for Damages and Reformation of Instrument with prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. Petitioner alleged they had retained ownership of the 98 parking lots, however
was not specified in Sec 7 (d). Trial Court dismissed, on the ground that petitioner failed to prove any
ground for the reformation of its agreement with respondent relative to the ownership of the common
areas. There is no evidence on record to prove that the respondent had acted fraudulently. CA dismissed
on the ground of prescription.

Ruling:

Since the petitioner had already breached the deed, it is inappropriate to declare and decide the action
for reformation of the lease contract. It is concluded that the prescriptive period of 10 years, as provided
for in Article 1144 of the Civil Code, applies by operation of law and not by the will of the parties, and
that, therefore, the right of action for reformation accrues from the date of the execution of the
contract of lease in 1968. When there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, the time for
prescription of all actions shall be counted from the day they may be brought.

16. UNIMASTER CONGLOMERATION, INC. vs. CA and KUBOTA

G.R. No. 119657 February 7, 1997

Facts

A dealership agreement for sale and services was entered by Kubota and Unimasters whereby a contract
contained a stipulation that all suits arising out of such shall be filed within the proper Courts of QC.
Later on, Unimasters filed an action before the RTC of Tacloban City against Kubota. Kubota now filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the action filed in RTC of Tacloban has no jurisdiction.

Ruling
The Rules provide that, the venue of any personal action between them is "where the defendant or any
of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff. Kubota's theory that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Unimasters’ action considering that venue was improperly laid is incorrect. However, if
the objection to venue is waived by the failure to set it up in a motion to dismiss, the RTC would proceed
in perfectly regular fashion if it then tried and decided the action.