Angola

Ingo Winkelmann

Content type: Encyclopedia entries

Product: Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law
[MPIL]
Module: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law [MPEPIL]
Article last updated: May 2019

Subject(s):
National liberation movements — Secession — De facto regime — NGOs (Non-Governmental
Organizations) — Responsibility of non-state actors — Recognition of states — States, independence
Published under the auspices of the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law
under the direction of Rüdiger Wolfrum.

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Peace Palace Library; date: 21 February 2020
 A.  General
1  Angola is a relatively sparsely populated country in south-western Africa. With an area of
approximately 1.25 million km2, it is estimated to be home to almost 30 million inhabitants.
It borders the two Congos (to the north and north-east), Zambia (to the east), and
→ Namibia (to the south) and is divided into 18 provinces.

2  One of the most important dates in Angola’s history was 11 November 1975. On this
date, the country achieved independence after more than four centuries as part of the
Portuguese colonial empire (see also → Decolonization: Portuguese Territories). The years
immediately before independence and most of the years thereafter were marred by armed
conflict. From 1961 to 1975 the Angolans fought to end Portugal’s colonial hegemony. The
country then slid into a bloody civil war which, with the involvement of various external
parties, lasted from 1975 to 2002. The conflict was fanned by the ideological east-west
confrontation that existed well into the 1980s, and soon developed into a proxy war par
excellence. From the outset, numerous peace initiatives were pursued by the → United
Nations (UN), but these had only limited success.

3  Since 2002, Angola has experienced its first sustained period of peace. The situation is
becoming more stable all the time. The effects of the war are still visible: there is
widespread poverty, damaged infrastructure, and certain areas are infested with → land
mines. Living conditions have not yet tangibly improved for the people, especially in the
countryside. Angola is using its oil and diamond resources to finance its reconstruction. It
possesses 0.75% of the world’s oil reserves. The income from oil accounts for 80% of
Angola’s budget revenue, while diamond production accounts for some 10%. In 2005, oil to
the value of US$22 billion was exported and in the period up to and including 2009, Angola
earned about US$172 billion in oil revenues.

B.  The Colonial Period

1.  1575–1951
4  The exploration of the territory that is now Angola began when the Portuguese navigator
Diogo Cão landed at the mouth of the → Congo River in 1482. The modern nation’s capital,
Luanda, was founded in 1575. The name Angola is derived from the word ‘Ngola’, the title
of the rulers of the former Kingdom of Ndongo, which, beside the Kingdom of Kongo in the
north, was one of two Bantu kingdoms, and which encompassed more than a dozen, mainly
Bantu-speaking, ethnic groups who lived in Angola in the early days of colonization. The
main ethnic groups were then and still are the Ovimbundu (in the modern provinces of
Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huila, Kwanza-Sul), the Mbundu (Malanje, Kwanza-Norte, Bengo,
Luanda, Kwanza-Sul), and the Bakongo (Uíge, Zaire, Cabinda, Bengo). A fourth group, the
Lunda-Tchokwe, lived in the north-eastern provinces of Moxico and Cuando-Cubango.
Angola remained a Portuguese colony until the 20th century, with the exception of one short
period under Dutch rule (1641–48). Until the early 19th century, Angola was one of the
major centres of the slave trade during the → slavery period. The borders of Angola were
finally determined at the → Berlin West Africa Conference (1884–85) and were thereafter
enforced on the ground by Portugal’s military.

2.  1951–75
5  In 1951, ties were tightened between Angola and the motherland Portugal under the
estado novo (new State) of the Salazar regime. Like Guinea, Cape Verde, Mozambique, São
Tomé and Principe, and Timor, Angola ceased to be a colony, and became an ‘overseas
province’, part of the Portuguese nação pluricontinental (pluricontinental nation).
Significant Portuguese investment in the 1950s led to talk of an Angolan economic miracle.
However, as decolonization took hold across Africa, Angola too experienced a number of

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Peace Palace Library; date: 21 February 2020
 uprisings. The first was in January 1961, when cotton pickers in the northern province of
Malanje rebelled. This uprising was brutally put down. One month later, violence broke out
in the capital. These two events marked the start of the Angolan war of independence.

6  In the Congolese city of Léopoldville, exiled members of the north Angolan Bakongo
people established the União das Popolaçôes do Norte de Angola (Union of the Peoples of
the North of Angola) in 1957, which became the União dos Povos de Angola (Union of
Angola’s Peoples; ‘UPA’) in 1958. The leading figure of this US-backed movement, from
which the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of
Angola; ‘FNLA’) emerged in 1962, was Holden Roberto. In 1966, the União Nacional para a
Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola;
‘UNITA’) broke away from the FNLA under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi and formed
regional strongholds in the north-east, east, and south of the country (see para. 7 below).
The Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola; ‘MPLA’) was established between 1956 and 1960. From 1962 on, Agostinho Neto
presided over the MPLA, which merged with the Communist Party of Angola, co-founded by
white Angolans in 1955. In the course of the 1960s, the MPLA attained the levels of popular
support already enjoyed by the UPA/FNLA. The FNLA’s Governo Revolucionário de Angola
no Exílio (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile) was officially recognized by the
Organization of African Unity in 1963, but this had no lasting impact, since → recognition
was withdrawn in 1971. The MPLA grew even stronger and declared itself to be a → de
facto regime, whilst dealing with considerable in-fighting within its own ranks.

7  Of the three main parties, the MPLA and UNITA were the two that best retained their
influence beyond 1975. UNITA defined itself as an anti-Marxist, pro-western movement with
regional roots in Ovimbundu areas. The MPLA, a Marxist movement from at least 1977
onwards, drew most of its support from the white, Mestizo and Umbundu population in the
capital Luanda, as well as from the so-called ‘asimilados’ (assimilated) in general. The
conflict between the two movements was not only exacerbated by figures such as UNITA
leader Jonas Savimbi, but was also complicated by the → Cold War (1947–91) and resulting
interference by international players such as → Cuba, the Soviet Union, South Africa, and
the United States of America (‘US’), as well as by the → national liberation movements in
neighbouring States such as Namibia (South West Africa People’s Organization),
Mozambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique), and → Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe
African National Union—Patriotic Front).

8  From their inception, the FNLA, UNITA, and the MPLA met with fierce resistance from
the Portuguese colonial rulers. The Salazar regime not only considered its actions in Angola
as a fight against Russian expansionism, but also believed that ‘old Europe’ had to assert
itself against the two superpowers, thereby preserving a ‘Portuguese world’. Portugal held
its ground in Angola with the help of the regular army (Forças Armadas de Portugal; Armed
Forces of Portugal) and the secret police (Policía Internacional e Defesa do Estado—
Segurança Colonial; International and State Defence Police—Colonial Security). Cautious
moves towards liberalization taken in the meantime did not, however, come to fruition. In
1971, progressive autonomy was enshrined in the constitution, followed in 1972 by a new
organic law for Angola, which provided for an Angolan government, parliament, and courts.
Nothing came of this, however. Following the Portuguese Carnation Revolution of April
1974, the way was paved for negotiations on independence. In January 1975 Portugal, as
peace broker, negotiated the Acordo entre o Estado Português e a Frente Nacional de
Libertação de Angola (FNLA), o Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) e a
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) (‘Alvor Agreement’) on the
formation of a transitional government by the rival independence movements FNLA, MPLA,
and UNITA, which were recognized as legitimate representatives of the Angolan people. A
joint army was envisaged, as was the drafting of a constitution and an electoral law, in

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Peace Palace Library; date: 21 February 2020
 preparation for the elections in October 1975. None of these steps was completed. Angola
nevertheless became independent in November 1975.

C.  Independent Angola

9  The history of the new State was marked by violence even before it had been founded. A
bitter power struggle erupted in the months leading up to the date set for independence.
FNLA troops marched in from the north, with the backing of Zaire (→ Congo, Democratic
Republic of the), → China, the US, and Romania. With America’s blessing, pro-UNITA South
African troops took control of large areas of southern Angola. The MPLA held Luanda and a
number of provincial capitals with the assistance of Soviet and Cuban forces. It was not
until the very last minute that a massive Cuban force succeeded in repulsing the poorly
trained FNLA/UNITA troops, enabling the MPLA to seize power and proclaim the new State
on 11 November 1975. The subsequent exodus of most of the remaining Portuguese did
nothing to stabilize the new government under Agostinho Neto (and after 1979 under
Eduardo dos Santos). Three civil wars were waged in the years following 1975, and these
were interrupted but briefly by various third-party peace initiatives, none of which lasted
long.

1.  1975–94: First and Second Civil Wars

10  The phases of civil war in Angola until 1994 can be divided up into a first and a second
civil war. The first war, called guerra da mata (bush war), raged from 1975 to 1991. In that
period, UNITA’s influence spread over large areas of the country. After the US Congress
repealed the ban on military assistance to the Angolan factions in July 1985, UNITA grew
even stronger. 1987 saw embittered battles between UNITA/South African troops and
government/MPLA forces, particularly for the south-eastern town of Cuito Carnavale. The
toll was heavy, both in terms of lives lost and in terms of material. On 22 December 1988,
the Agreement among the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the
Republic of South Africa (‘New York Accords’) on the independence of Namibia was signed.
This was linked to a bilateral Cuban-Angolan agreement for a withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban
troops from Angola (Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the
Government of the People’s Republic of Angola for the Conclusions of the Internationalist
Mission of the Cuban Military Contingent) and led to the first UN peacekeeping mission to
Angola (UNSC Res 626 [1988] ‘Angola’ [20 December 1988] SCOR 43rd Year 19, see para.
17 below) (→ Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement; → Peacekeeping Forces). By then,
between 100,000 and 350,000 people had died. After a meeting of UNITA leader Savimbi
and (MPLA) President Dos Santos in 1989 in Zaire, peace negotiations began in Portugal.

11  The negotiations and the end of the Cold War paved the way for the Peace Accords for
Angola (‘Bicesse Accords’) between the MPLA government and UNITA, which were signed
in May 1991 at Estoril, near Lisbon. The parties agreed to a → ceasefire, → demilitarization,
demobilization, a single army, a ban on arms purchases and the preparation of elections by
the MPLA, which was then in government. Portugal, Russia, and the US acted as
guarantors. The ‘fundamental principles for the establishment of peace’ set out in the
Attachment II Bicesse Accords included recognition of the President and the government by
UNITA, as well as UNITA’s right to stand as a political party. Notwithstanding a lack of
demobilization and the failure to establish joint army structures, elections were held in
September 1992—the first free elections in the country’s history. The MPLA emerged the
victors, with 53% of the vote for the party and 49.5% for its leader, Dos Santos. UNITA won
only 34% of votes cast, and its leader Savimbi 40.7%. Turnout was high at 91%. The UN,

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Peace Palace Library; date: 21 February 2020
 which had 400 electoral observers in the country (see also → Election Monitoring,
International), described the elections as generally free and fair.

12  The refusal of Jonas Savimbi (UNITA) to recognize the election results led to the second
civil war, also dubbed the guerra das cidades (war of the cities), which raged from October
1992 to November 1994. In Luanda, the two factions fought in the streets, and numerous
UNITA politicians were murdered. The MPLA held most of the provincial capitals, but these
were besieged by UNITA, which at times controlled 70% of the country. Many towns were
almost completely destroyed, the best known examples being Kuito and Huambo. It is
estimated that another 300,000 Angolans died during that period. In the summer months of
1993 alone, 1,000 people are said to have died every day. In 1994, the MPLA began to fight
back successfully, and UNITA found itself forced to enter into a new round of negotiations,
which led in October 1994 to the conclusion of the Lusaka Protocol.

2.  1994: The Lusaka Protocol

13  The Lusaka Protocol of October 1994 between the government and UNITA provided for
a cease-fire, the integration of UNITA into the official → armed forces, the demobilization of
soldiers, the completion of the electoral process, and national reconciliation. It was also
signed by Portugal, the Russian Federation, and the US as observer States, and by the UN
as mediator. The Lusaka Protocol stated that Jonas Savimbi should have a special status,
thereby trying to meet long-standing demands from Savimbi that the question of his role be
placed at the top of the agenda, but it did not lay down the form that this special status
should take.

14  The Joint Commission for the Implementation of the Lusaka Protocols (‘Joint
Commission’) was created to monitor the implementation of these provisions and to
determine any violation of them. UNITA’s participation in the government was one of the
steps agreed upon to bring about national reconciliation. It was to be given four ministerial
posts, seven vice-ministerships, and three governorships, as well as various vice-
governorships and mayorships. The UN, which was granted a new mandate for a peace
mission (see paras 19 and 20 below) was given important monitoring and supervision tasks.

15  Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was, however, slow. It was not until April 1997
that the Governo da Unidade e Reconciliação Nacional (Government of National Unity and
Reconciliation) was formed with the participation of UNITA, which as a result had 70
members of parliament. In the same month, the National Assembly conferred upon Jonas
Savimbi the special status of president of the largest opposition party, a status that was
abrogated in 1999. Ultimately, however, neither side had sufficient interest in making the
Lusaka Protocol a real success. Violations of the ceasefire and arms purchases occurred
from the outset, reaching a peak in 1997. Attempts by the UN to mediate in order to end
the cat and mouse game being played by the parties, failed.

3.  1998–2002: Third Civil War and End of the Conflict

16  At the end of 1998, war broke out once again and this third civil war did not end until
2002. An emergency government was established in January 1999. UNITA, now
internationally ostracized and subject to UN → sanctions, withdrew to the interior of the
country, mainly to the south-western provinces of Moxico and Cuando-Cubango. Even
though all the major Angolan cities were now in the hands of the MPLA, and UNITA had lost
its headquarters in Andulo and Bailundo, Angola was not yet at peace, and large parts of
the mine-infested country remained unsafe. The death of UNITA leader Savimbi in February
2002 cleared the way for an immediate cease-fire. The cease-fire agreement was followed in
April by the Luena Memorandum of Understanding: Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for
the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues under the

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Peace Palace Library; date: 21 February 2020
 Lusaka Protocol. This led to the demilitarization of some 105,000 UNITA soldiers, and
ushered in Angola’s first sustained period of peace.

D.  Angola and the United Nations

17  Throughout the conflict, especially after the end of the Cold War, the UN endeavoured
to bring the strife in Angola to an end. In the 1960s and 1970s, the UN General Assembly
passed numerous resolutions concerning the independence of Angola. UNSC Resolution
387 (1976) ‘Angola-South Africa’ ([31 March 1976] SCOR 31st Year 10) was the first of more
than a dozen resolutions condemning, in particular, South Africa’s military intervention in
Angola as → aggression, which were passed before the first UN peace mission was
established in 1988. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (→ United Nations, Secretary-
General) repeatedly played a personal role in the peace efforts. On the whole, however, the
UN’s endeavours had only limited success. This damaged the UN’s reputation in Angola and
led to a lack of trust in the UN’s conflict-resolution capabilities, with the result that the UN
is held in low esteem there even today.

1.  The United Nations Peace Missions

18  The deployment of the first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (‘UNAVEM I’;
1989–91) in 1989 resulted from a diplomatic process which initiated both the
implementation of UNSC Resolution 435 (1978) ‘Namibia’ ([29 September 1978] SCOR 33rd
Year 13), leading to the independence of Namibia, and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from
Angola. UNAVEM I, consisting of a number of unarmed military observers, monitored the
withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. Once the withdrawal was complete it was seen as
a step towards ending the long-standing conflict between the Angolan government and
UNITA.

19  The second UN Angola Verification Mission (‘UNAVEM II’; 1991–95) was launched in
1991. UNAVEM II had far more complex responsibilities. The main tasks were monitoring
the implementation of the Bicesse Accords, including the observation and verification of the
first elections, together with efforts aimed at demobilizing troops and forming a joint armed
force. The signing of the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 was followed by a ceasefire and a gradual
improvement in the overall conditions. As a result, in February 1995, the UN Secretary-
General made a recommendation to the United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’; → United
Nations, Security Council) that a new UN Angola Verification Mission (‘UNAVEM III’)
should immediately take over from UNAVEM II.

20  Among the main features of UNAVEM III (1995–97) were: to provide → good offices and
→ mediation to the Angolan parties; to monitor and verify the extension of State
administration and the process of national reconciliation; to supervise, control and verify
the disengagement of forces, and to monitor the cease-fire. In contrast to the previous
missions, UNAVEM III also comprised military personnel.

21  The UN Observer Mission in Angola (‘MONUA’) took over from UNAVEM III and was
established by UNSC Resolution 1118 (1997) ([30 June 1997] SCOR 52nd Year 48). In
setting up MONUA, the UNSC called upon the government of Angola and, in particular,
UNITA to co-operate fully with MONUA (at para. 8) and strongly urged the government and
UNITA to complete the remaining political and military aspects of the peace process (at
para. 9). It was hoped and planned that the UN military personnel would be gradually
withdrawn as State administration was extended throughout the country. It was also hoped
that MONUA’s civilian police component, alongside its military personnel, would continue to
verify the neutrality of the Angolan National Police and the incorporation of UNITA
personnel into the national police. The initial mandate of MONUA was due to expire on 31
October 1997. As the peace process proceeded more slowly than expected, the mandate

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Peace Palace Library; date: 21 February 2020
 was first extended until 31 January 1998 (UNSC Res 1135 [1997] [29 October 1997] SCOR
52nd Year 52) and later, for a second time, until 30 April 1998 (UNSC Res 1149 [1998] [27
January 1998] SCOR 53rd Year 36).

22  Later in 1998, the Secretary-General reported to the UNSC that no progress had been
achieved in the implementation of one of the last major pending tasks under the Lusaka
Protocol, namely, the normalization of State administration throughout the country. The
reporting period was also marked by a dangerous deterioration of the security situation in
various parts of the country, including armed attacks by UNITA forces against villages and
local government authorities as well as UN and other international personnel. Acts of
banditry, new mine-laying activities and troop movements also increased. The incidents
resulted in the loss of many lives and in the destruction of property, as well as the
displacement of thousands of civilians (Report of the Secretary-General on MONUA of 23
November 1998). These developments seriously undermined the progress achieved in the
peace process. By adopting UNSC Resolution 1213 (1998) ([3 December 1998] SCOR 53rd
Year 46) the UNSC extended the MONUA mandate for the last time until 26 February 1999.
Observing that the peace process in Angola had collapsed and the country found itself in a
state of war, the Secretary-General stated, in his Report on MONUA of 17 January 1999,
that the observer mission had no other option but to continue to reduce its presence and
proceed with the orderly repatriation of UN personnel and property. On 27 January 1999,
the Angolan government informed the UN that a continued presence of the UN in Angola
was not necessary, but that it should continue its activities through the specialized agencies
under the co-ordination of the → United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

23  MONUA’s mandate ended on 26 February 1999. Through UNSC Resolution 1268 (1999)
([15 October 1999] SCOR 54th Year 22), the UNSC authorized the establishment of the UN
Office in Angola (‘UNOA’) to liaise with the political, military, police, and other civilian
authorities in that country. The tasks of the UNOA were to explore effective measures for
restoring peace, assist the Angolan people in the areas of capacity building, humanitarian
assistance, promotion of → human rights and the co-ordination of other activities. Given the
1.25 million km2 of varied and difficult terrain in Angola and the difficult progression from a
former Portuguese colony to a war-torn independent State, the UN tried to do its utmost to
assist Angola’s transition to independence and stability. The UN was not, however,
successful in its efforts and was forced to leave the country in chaos, without peace having
been achieved.

2.  United Nations Sanctions

24  The role of oil and diamonds in the Angolan civil war can scarcely be emphasized
enough. Without the revenue from the sales of these natural resources, neither of the
parties to the conflict could have fought so hard for so long. Between 1996 and 1999, the
MPLA bankrolled an annual military budget of US$1.2 billion. It received the bulk of the oil
revenue from the wells in the enclave of Cabinda (see paras 27 and 28 below), which had
formerly generated more than 60% of Angola’s oil income. Ironically, the oil there—initially
under the protection of Cuban soldiers—was extracted by American companies whose
government had, until 1993, funded the opposing side (UNITA). In 1993, daily oil
production—which was barely affected by the war—equalled 504,000 barrels, and was
extracted with the assistance of western companies. From 1995 to 1997, the annual
revenue from Angolan diamonds equalled approximately US$1 billion, of which US$600
million was earned in areas controlled by UNITA. Before 1995, UNITA controlled roughly

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Peace Palace Library; date: 21 February 2020
 90% of the diamond mining areas. It is estimated that UNITA obtained some US$3.7 billion
from diamond sales in the years from 1992 to 1998.

25  When UNITA refused to recognize the 1992 election results, if not even before then, the
members of the UNSC realized that UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi bore the main
responsibility for the continuing civil war in Angola. Starting with UNSC Resolution 864
(1993) ([15 September 1993] SCOR 48th Year 59), a sanctions committee was established
and sanctions were imposed on UNITA and then progressively tightened. The first set of
sanctions consisted of an arms and oil embargo. In 1996, trade sanctions were added
(UNSC Res 1075 [1996] [11 October 1996] SCOR 51st Year 20). In 1997, a second set of
sanctions was adopted that restricted the mobility and political activities of UNITA officials
(UNSC Res 1127 [1997] [28 August 1997] SCOR 52nd Year 50). A third set of sanctions,
imposed on UNITA in 1998, included a prohibition on the sale or supply of mining
equipment, a ban on diamond imports and the freezing of bank accounts (UNSC Res 1173
[1998] [12 June 1998] SCOR 53rd Year 40; see also → Kimberley Process). The sanctions
imposed on UNITA in 1993 were the first ever sanctions imposed on → non-State actors in
the history of the UN. They were carefully and intelligently designed (‘smart sanctions’).
However, with the exception of the travel restrictions, the sanctions had no effect for
several years because the UNSC failed to establish any monitoring or verification
mechanisms. It was therefore easy to flout the sanctions. The UNSC’s sanctions committee
established in 1993 did little to change the situation.

3.  The Fowler Report

26  It was not until Canada assumed the chairmanship of the sanctions committee in 1999
that it managed to give the sanctions more bite. By dint of extensive shuttle diplomacy
between numerous capitals in Africa and Europe, it proved possible to bring on board
Angola’s neighbouring States, → non-governmental organizations, private enterprises in the
west, and individual leaders and to involve them more closely in the sanctions process. In
addition, the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against
UNITA submitted its report in March 2000. This so-called ‘Fowler Report’—named after
Robert Fowler, the Canadian Ambassador to the UN—was the first document to name
sanction-busting States and/or government members and agencies (Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, Togo, Ukraine, Zaire), as well as other individuals and groups
such as South African arms dealers and Belgian diamond agencies (Hoge Raad voor
Diamant, Antwerp) who ignored the sanctions. This ‘naming and shaming’ was instrumental
in severely reducing UNITA’s diamond sales. UNITA was thereby deprived of the funds it
sorely needed to continue the war. On 4 December 2002, the chairman of the Monitoring
Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA, Ambassador Larrain (Chile), presented the final
report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA (Letter Dated 4 December
2002) in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1439 (2002) ([18 October 2002] SCOR [1
August 2002–31 July 2003] 4), concluding that sanctions should be lifted in accordance with
the new reality in Angola. On 9 December 2002, the UNSC decided to dissolve the sanctions
committee and to lift the sanctions imposed on UNITA (UNSC Res 1448 [2002] [9 December
2002] SCOR [1 August 2002–31 July 2003] 6).

E.  Peace in Angola

1.  Cabinda
27  While the situation in the country at large has become much calmer following the end
of the war in 2002, some tensions remain in the province of Cabinda. The majority of the
population of this north Angolan enclave (→ Enclaves), sandwiched between the two
Congos, have long called for → secession from Angola or for far-reaching → autonomy. They
base these claims on agreements reached with Portugal in pre-colonial days and in the run-

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Peace Palace Library; date: 21 February 2020
 up to the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1885. The independence movements also call for
a greater share of the oil revenues, a large percentage of which are still generated in
Cabinda.

28  The independence movement’s roots lie in the Frente de Libertação da Enclave de
Cabinda (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda; ‘FLEC’), established in 1963.
This organization used to enjoy the support of Kinshasa and has, over the years, split into
various groups. The FLEC is one of several groups involved in the Forum Cabindés para o
Dialogo (Cabindan Forum for Dialogue), formed in 2003. In the town of Namibe in August
2006, the then President of this forum concluded a Memorandum of Understanding for
Peace and Reconciliation in the Province of Cabinda with the central government. The
appendices of this memorandum of understanding provide for a special status for Cabinda,
but this has met with little enthusiasm from the Cabindan population. FLEC supporters
attacked the Togo national football team in 2010, killing three people. The Angolan security
forces subsequently reacted harshly against members of the FLEC and assassinated their
chief of staff, among other FLEC leaders. There have been no further attacks. An end to the
conflict is thus not in sight although it does not look as if the conflict will spill over into
other regions. The question of Cabinda was excluded from both the Alvor Agreement of
1975 (see para. 8 above) and the Lusaka Protocol of 1994 because at the time they were
concluded all signatories were united in their rejection of the separatist movements in
Cabinda. In its final report of 2002, the Joint Commission (see para. 14 above) identified ‘a
need for the government to address … finding a political resolution to the question of
Cabinda’.

2.  Outlook
29  The challenge faced by Angola in the first two decades of the 21st century will be to
keep the peace, foster reconstruction and reconciliation and alleviate poverty. The
tremendous natural resources at the country’s disposal mean that Angola is, even today, a
regional player of some importance, not least in the eyes of countries such as China and the
US, both of which import Angolan oil. The UN no longer has any peace mission in the
country. UN bodies in Angola such as UNDP, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
(→ Human Rights, United Nations High Commissioner for [UNHCHR]), the → United
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the → United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the
→ World Food Programme (WFP) and the → World Health Organization (WHO) are co-
ordinated through the UN Resident Representative and UNDP country co-ordinator. Key
areas of activity are poverty reduction, democratic governance, energy and the
environment, crisis prevention and recovery, as well as the combating of HIV/AIDS. The role
of UN bodies is often limited (see para. 17 above) but even so, they contribute to the
stabilization of Angola and to → peacebuilding within the country. Angola is a member of the
→ African Union (AU) as well as two African regional organizations, the → Southern African
Development Community (SADC) and the → Economic Community of Central African States
(‘ECCAS’). While Angola joined the SADC for economic reasons, its membership of ECCAS
is mainly to protect its security interests. Angola is also a member of the Conference of the
Great Lakes Region (→ Great Lakes Region, Africa). Angola is endeavouring to pursue a
foreign policy that will buttress its regional position. To this end, it established the
Association of African Diamond Producing Countries and brought the headquarters of the
Gulf of Guinea Commission to Luanda in 2006. In 2007, Angola joined the → Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Ultimately, the realization of Angola’s ambitious
objectives will depend to a great extent on the responsible use of the country’s resources
and consolidation of the peace and democratization process across the country. The
parliamentary elections in September 2008 resulted in a blunt victory for the MPLA (81.6%)
while the second largest party, UNITA, captured only 10.3%. UNITA also lost all of its three
governorships (see para. 14 above). The turnout for these first free elections in the history

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Peace Palace Library; date: 21 February 2020
 of post-war Angola was high: 87.3%. The new absolute parliamentary majority for the MPLA
helped with drafting a new constitution, which came into force in February 2010. The new
constitution marks the beginning of the so-called third Angolan Republic. The first elections
under the new constitution took place in 2012. President Eduardo Dos Santos was re-
elected in accordance with the new provisions, as the top candidate of the party which won
the most votes in the parliamentary elections.

30  After 38 years as head of government, Dos Santos did not stand as top candidate for the
MPLA in the elections in 2017. The MPLA once again won a two-thirds majority, although
the party lost more than 10 percent at the polls compared with 2012 (61.08%). João
Lourenço became the new President of Angola. In September 2018 he also succeeded Dos
Santos as MPLA party president. The new Angolan government faces the challenge of
having to consolidate the economy, which was battered by the collapse of oil prices in 2014.
In December 2018, the IMF made available a US$3.7 billion loan over three years to help
Angola refinance its debts and undertake structural economic reforms. The government has
also made tackling the widespread corruption in the country a priority. Investigations have
been initiated against numerous senior figures, including some close to former President
Dos Santos. The progress made by the government on consolidating the economy, sharing
Angola’s wealth more fairly among the population, and combating corruption will determine
whether the MPLA is able to retain its dominant position in Angola’s political system. The
first test will be the municipal elections due to be held for the first time ever in 2020
following the government’s decision to introduce local self-administration.

Select Bibliography
D Birmingham The Portuguese Conquest of Angola (OUP London 1965).

RH Chilcote Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa (Hoover Institution on War,

Revolution and Peace Press Stanford 1969).

JA Marcum The Angolan Revolution vols 1–2 (MIT Press Cambridge 1969–78).

R Pelissier and DL Wheeler Angola (Praeger New York 1971).

F-W Heimer ‘Les dilemmes de la décolonisation en Angola’ (1976) 8 Revue

Internationale des Sciences du Développement 3–42.

E de Sousa Ferreira O colonialismo português em Africa: O fim de uma era (Sá da

Costa Lisboa 1977).

R Kapuściński Another Day of Life (WR Brand and K Mroczkowska-Brand (trs),

Picador London 1987).

WM James III A Political History of the Civil War in Angola 1974–1990 (Transaction
Publishers New Brunswick 1992).

M Kuder and WJG Möhlig (eds) Angola: Naturraum, Wirtschaft, Bevölkerung, Kultur,
Zeitgeschichte und Entwicklungsperspektiven (Weltforum Verlag München 1994).

J Mattoso (ed) História de Portugal vol 7 O Estado Novo (1926–74) (Editorial Estampa
Lisboa 1994).

AH de Oliveira Marques Breve história de Portugal (Editorial Presença Lisboa 1995).

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Peace Palace Library; date: 21 February 2020
 MJ Anstee Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan
Peace Process, 1992–93 (Macmillan Basingstoke 1996).

A Vines ‘Angola and UNAVEM III’ (1997) 107 Brassey’s Defence Yearbook 257–70.

P Hare Angola’s Last Best Chance for Peace: An Insider’s Account of the Peace
Process (United States Institute of Peace Press Washington 1998).

C Messiant ‘Angola: The Challenge of Statehood’ in D Birmingham and PM Martin

(eds) History of Central Africa: The Contemporary Years Since 1960 (Longman New
York 1998) 131–65.

Human Rights Watch and A Vines Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka
Peace Process (Human Rights Watch New York 1999).

J Cilliers and others (eds) Angola’s War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds
(Institute for Security Studies Pretoria 2000).

JP Cunha da Silva As resolucões das Nacões Unidas sobre Angola (Nzila Luanda
2002).

ME Ferreira ‘Angola, à procura do seu passo: apresentação’ (2002) 25 Política

internacional 5–7.

J Götz Ethnische Grenzen und Frontlinien in Angola (Köppe Köln 2002).

T Debiel UN-Friedensoperationen in Afrika—Weltinnenpolitik und die Realität von

Bürgerkriegen (Dietz Bonn 2003).

DJR Angell ‘The Angola Sanctions Committee’ in DM Malone (ed) The UN Security
Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Rienner Boulder 2004) 195–204.

WW Schneidman Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal’s Colonial

Empire (University Press of America Dallas 2004).

MG Comerford The Peaceful Face of Angola: Biography of a Peace Process (1991–

2002) (self-published Luanda 2005).

S Fandrych ‘From Liberation Struggle to Proxy War, and From Warlordism to a

Victor’s Peace: The Role of Resources in Angolan Policies’ in M Basedau and A Mehler
(eds) Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa (Institut für Afrika-Kunde Hamburg
2005) 73–105.

D Birmingham A Short History of Modern Angola (Hurst & Company London 2015).

T Burgis The Looting Machine: Warlords, Tycoons, Smugglers, and the Systematic
Theft of Africa’s Wealth (William Collins London 2015).

R Soares de Oliveira Magnificent and Beggar Land: Angola since the Civil War (Hurst
London 2015).

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Peace Palace Library; date: 21 February 2020
 Select Documents
Acordo entre o Estado Português e a Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola
(FNLA), o Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) e a União Nacional
para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) (signed 15 January 1975) in Academia
Internacional da Cultura Portuguesa (ed), Nova colecção de tratados, convenções e
outros actos públicos internacionais relativos a Portugal vol II (Silvas Lisboa 1993) 70.

Agreement among the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the
Republic of South Africa (22 December 1988) UN Doc S/20346 Annex.

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of
the People’s Republic of Angola for the Conclusions of the Internationalist Mission of
the Cuban Military Contingent (22 December 1988) UN Doc S/20345 Annex.

Lusaka Protocol (15 November 1994) in UNSC ‘Letter Dated 9 December 1994 from
the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations Addressed to the
President of the Security Council’ UN Doc S/1994/1441 Annex.

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Angola and UNITA on

the Peace Process: Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities
and the Implementation of the Outstanding Military Issues under the Lusaka Protocol
(4 April 2002) UN Doc S/2002/483 Annex.

Peace Accords for Angola (Government of Angola-UNITA) (31 May 1991) <http://
www.c-r.org/> (16 October 2019).

UNSC ‘Letter Dated 4 December 2002 from the Chairman of the Monitoring
Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA Addressed to the Chairman of the Security
Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) concerning the
Situation in Angola’ (10 December 2002) UN Doc S/2002/1339.

UNSC ‘Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions

against UNITA’ (10 March 2000) UN Doc S/2000/203 Enclosure.

UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in

Angola (MONUA)’ (23 November 1998) UN Doc S/1998/1110.

UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in

Angola (MONUA)’ (17 January 1999) UN Doc S/1999/49.

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Peace Palace Library; date: 21 February 2020