Blas Regnault / March 2018

The Crisis of the Bolivarian Democracy in Venezuela: a

necessary revision
By Blas Regnault regnault@iss.nl 1
09 March 2018

The Venezuelan Democracy is experiencing a complex crisis, in which the legitimacy of the
political system and the economic model are at a cliff’s edge, creating a situation with few
solutions in sight. This two-dimensional crisis has consequences on multiples levels for
political representation, participation of social movements, the exercise of the right of equality
before the law and people’s access to food and medicines. Consider the historical and political
dimensions of the crisis.
1. Unachieved Participatory Democracy (1999-2013) and the
Authoritarian Twist (2013-2018)
Participatory Democracy and its challenges. In 1999 Venezuela inaugurated a new
Democratic Constitution, perhaps one of the most inspiring political models of the last 50 years
in Latin America: Participatory Democracy. Previously, popular participation had been
marginalized in the 1961 Democratic-Liberal Constitution. Once Chavez won the Presidential
elections in 1998 and proposed the Constituent Assembly to “re-establish” Venezuelan
democracy, his popularity was guaranteed.
It is important to note that the 1999 Constitution and its Participatory Democracy model never
privileged “real socialism” as an economic and political model. However, the operationalization
of Participatory Democracy never actually took place. At the end of 2012, few laws2 had been
passed to give substance to this democratic model.
From “Participatory Model” to “Twenty First Century ‘Real’ Socialism”. In 2007, after
two unsuccessful coup attempts (2002 and 2003), two presidential election wins (2000 and
2006) and a defeated recall referendum (2004), Chávez proposed a constitutional reform
process. The aim was to promulgate the socialist character of the Constitution. This
referendum was the only electoral process that Chávez lost. The attempt to establish a
Communal Socialist State was frustrated by the outcome of this popular election. Despite
Chavez’ struggles to lead the model towards a more conventional socialist system, the
Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela remained formally untouchable. From
2007 until the announcement of his illness in June 2011, Chávez attempted try to “keep the
peace in the party”, consolidating even more the centralized style of leadership. As a leader,
he left two uncompleted tasks: the institutionalization of Participatory Democracy model of
1999, and deconstruction of the Liberal State founded in 1961. These two unfinished tasks
created a political and institutional limbo that paved the way for the authoritarian twist that took
place after 2013.
The Authoritarian Twist. With the death of Chávez (5 March 2013), and the rise of Nicolás
Maduro to the Presidency, political forces (into and out of Chavismo) reconfigured themselves,
with the military taking an increasingly prominent role. The ruling party founded by Chavez

1
Blas Regnault is a Venezuelan Sociologist, devoted to the study of global oil price cycles and its impact on the
sustainable development in oil exporting economies.
2
The Organic Law for Potable Water and Waste Service is one of the law. However most of the set up policies
were Presidential decrees, or voluntary wishes expressed by Chavez during his allocutions in “Aló Presidente”
(García Guadilla, María PIlar, 2018).

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 Blas Regnault / March 2018

(Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela –PSUV)3 weakens. This undermines the chances of
generating consensus for an economic policy strategy to cope with falling oil rents since June
2014, and falling oil production since 2015.
In December 2015, the opposition won two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly,
radically changing the configuration of political parties within the institution. The elected
National Assembly would elect the National Electoral Council (CNE), the General Attorney of
the Republic (FGR) and the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ). However, to forestall this, the
outgoing members of the government, in a fast track mode, elected a new Justice of the
Supreme Court (TSJ) just before the new National Assembly was installed. Thus, the TSJ
remains in the hands of central government, and the party, and has systematically overturned
the policies of the new National Assembly.
State of Exception and Economic Emergency. In February 2016, the TSJ authorized the
President to move forward and open up the oil sector to international investment. TSJ also
empowered him to declare a State of Exception and Economic Emergency, violating the
constitutional framework. In March 2017, the TSJ declared that the National Assembly was in
contempt, despite having been elected by the population in 2015, and transferred the National
Assembly’s its powers to central government (Rulings 155 and 156 of the Constitutional
Chamber of the TSJ). In this way, the Supreme Court becomes the supreme national body,
lending a "legal" gloss to the authoritarian actions of central government.
Protests 2017. In April 2017 a new wave of protests began, which ended in July with young
protesters either dead or in prison.
New Constitution? The government of Maduro called for elections on 31st of July 2017, to
set up a new National Constituent Assembly, parallel to the National Assembly elected in
2015. This National Constituent Assembly was to draft a new Constitution. Unlike what
happened in 1999, little is known about this new national political contract. The Constituent
Assembly has served to ratify the power of a new General Attorney of the Republic (FGR) and
the National Electoral Council (CNE).
The Dialogue in the Dominican Republic: towards a Transition? From October 2016 to
February 2018 several meetings have been held in the Dominican Republic between the
visible opposition (mainly established in the Constituted National Assembly) and the
Government. The aim of these talks was to re-establish political consensus and end the
political violence. Some international mediators have participated in these discussions.
Unfortunately, these negotiations had no positive results, and constitutional order is not yet
re-established. On the contrary, it seems these dialogues contribute even more to delegitimize
the political forces in power around Maduro. At the time of the writing in early March 2018,
presidential elections are planned for 20 May 2018. The visible opposition has decided to call
for a boycott of these presidential elections, since there is no confidence in transparent and
fair electoral processes.
2. The present state of Democracy in Venezuela
Basic rights: Venezuela is falling behind. Access to basic goods is no longer guaranteed
for most Venezuelans. There is an increase of dependency on direct subsidies through the
so-called CLAP, a box with food provided by the central government. This is only for those
registered for a consumption card called the “Carnet de la Patria”. Other social consequence

3
On 5 February 2018, Nicolás Maduro registered a new political party with the National Electoral Council
(CNE). This new party is called “Vamos Venezuela”, and is set up as if it were separate from the PSUV.

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 Blas Regnault / March 2018

of the food crisis are cases of malnutrition which are even preventing children from attending
school (UNICEF, 2018)4.
Inefficiency in public management, unsustainable exchange rates. Misguided economic
policies create profound distortions throughout the whole economy.5 Exchange rate parity
means drastic reductions in foreign currency and a deterioration of the productive sectors, with
damaging effects on the ability to import, and crises in production and distribution of medicines
and food. In the case of medicines, the population is having enormous difficulties in
treatment of chronic diseases such as high blood pressure, cancer, diabetes and renal
dialysis.
Hyperinflation. In 2017, non-official figures indicate that inflation was near 2,616 per cent!
For instance, by February 2018, a person that earned the basic minimum wage (basic salary
plus food allowance) had the capacity to buy around 10 per cent of the food basket required
and 8 per cent of a basic family food basket. A public sector graduate could acquire just 19
per cent of the food basket and 13 per cent of the basic family basket, with their average
salary.
Forced migration. The number of people leaving the country is growing. The main reasons
for migration are the low wages relative to living costs, and the general critical situation of
shortages. Unofficial figures estimate that up to 4.5 million people have emigrated in the last
5 years6. People have started to move to neighbouring countries such as Colombia and Brazil.
Other important contingents of people are migrating to other Latin American countries,
including Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Panama and Costa Rica, as well as to
European countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal. Many migrants to Europe are
descendants of refugees who arrived in Venezuela after the Spanish Civil War and The
Second World War.
In conclusion, this crisis of democracy in Venezuela is fundamentally due to two historically
unsolved puzzles. On the one hand, a frustrated “Participatory Democracy” has been pending
since 1999. On the other hand, misunderstandings of the oil economy, and its consequent
mismanagement, has resulted in the squandering of oil rents. To solve these puzzles,
politicians and social scientists should pay much more attention to the social and economic
history of such this diverse and specific country, Venezuela.
References and Sources
- García Guadilla, María PIlar (2018). Exclusionary Inclusion: Post-Neoliberal Incorporation of Popular
Sectors and Social Movements in New Left 21st Century Socialism: the experience of Venezuela.
https://www.academia.edu/23713466/Exclusionary_Inclusion_Post-
Neoliberal_Incorporation_of_Popular_Sectors_and_Social_Movements_in_New_Left_21st_Century_So
cialism_the_experience_of_Venezuela

- UNICEF (26th January 2018) https://www.unicef.org/media/media_102501.html

4
Statement published the 26 of January 2018 in New York https://www.unicef.org/media/media_102501.html
5
Since February 2018, the official exchange rate changed from 10.00 to 30,000.00 bolivars per dollar, while
the parallel dollar parity, which has a significant impact on the pricing, was 230,000.00 bolivars per dollar on
23 February 23, 2017.
6
According to the last Census, in 2018 Venezuela reach 32 Million of people.